Mobilization as a Theory of Victory

Deploying all elements of national defense

Vignette
 On 1 August 2027—the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army—the Chinese Communist Party launches a preplanned invasion of Taiwan. The operation begins with covert special forces infiltrating Taipei, paralyzing communications, and severing Taiwan’s offshore internet cables. Simultaneously, the United States suffers from coordinated cyberattacks on its power grids, financial networks, and transportation systems, resulting in widespread disruptions. As Chinese stealth bombers and nuclear submarines posture for escalation, the United States mobilizes its Pacific forces. However, the United States struggles to project sufficient combat power across the 12,000-kilometer (7,456-mile) expanse of the Pacific amid domestic chaos. The crisis deepens as North Korea joins the fray, launching tactical nuclear strikes that incapacitate U.S.-South Korea command centers, raising the specter of a broader nuclear confrontation. Despite escalating threats, allied coordination falters and diplomatic avenues close under Chinese and Russian vetoes at the UN Security Council.

Facing strategic paralysis, the U.S. president issues involuntary mobilization orders under Title 10, but years of neglect toward large-scale mobilization planning quickly manifest. The U.S. military, particularly the Marine Corps Reserve, finds itself unable to respond with the necessary speed or cohesion in a contested homeland. Communication lines collapse, Reserve service members remain unreachable, and infrastructure buckles under pressure. Mobilization plans, long outdated and designed for permissive environments, falter as civilian contractors and logistical nodes are overwhelmed by chaos. Amid the turmoil, reserve units struggle to assemble beyond the company level or move toward embarkation points, hindered by fragmented staffs and command structures. The lack of deliberate, large-scale rehearsals leaves the force staggered at the outset—dangerously unprepared to project and sustain operations deep into the first island chain.

Purpose
The critical-case scenario reveals that large-scale mobilization is fundamentally an active component (AC) problem requiring a total force solution that integrates the reserve component (RC), contracted support (CS), and host-nation support. Without a practiced, coordinated mobilization framework, the United States risks being unable to project and sustain combat power in contested theaters. The objective of this article is threefold: first, to clarify key terms to establish a shared vocabulary; second, to highlight historical fallacies, such as the overreliance on peacetime structures or exquisite technologies at the expense of preparedness for mobilization; and third, to recommend conceptual frameworks and analytic approaches that help identify and close capability gaps in the Services’ current force generation models. 

Marine Corps Today
The Marine Corps lacks doctrine, organizational structure, education and training frameworks, policy guidance, and funding to build the depth required for an organized, timely, large-scale mobilization. The present-day AC alone cannot meet the force demands of a sustained conflict against any single peer adversary without immediate augmentation from the Ready Reserve. This is exacerbated by outdated policy and infrastructure that do not allow for the rapid expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.1 Should a conflict become protracted, the Services lack a formal plan or policy to generate combat-ready forces from inductees processed through the Selective Service System. Within the Marine Corps, no unified command or logistical support structure currently exists to oversee the mobilization of reserve forces, Selective Service inductees, and CS. If left unaddressed, delays will likely occur in generating combat-capable, follow-on forces at scale. These gaps will severely jeopardize the tempo, momentum, and initiative required to sustain overseas campaigns and maintain the operational advantage in a conflict with a peer adversary. 

Baseline Concepts
Mobilization is a broad, total force effort encompassing far more than the activation of RC personnel.2 It involves assembling, organizing, and deploying all elements of the DOD—active and reserve forces, retirees, civilians, contractors, and host-nation support—to respond to national emergencies or contingencies.3 Activation, by contrast, is a legal and administrative subset of mobilization that places RC members on active duty under specific authorities.4 While activation is necessary, it is insufficient; mobilization integrates logistics, infrastructure, and command and control to generate and sustain combat power.5 Effective mobilization requires deliberate, synchronized employment of the entire total force following Total Force Optimization principles.6 

The Past Is Not a Prologue for the Future
World War II: 8 December 1941–2 September 1945
During World War II, the United States mobilized over sixteen million service members, an unparalleled effort in scale. The attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized bipartisan support and unified public opinion, enabling President Franklin D. Roosevelt to rapidly exercise sweeping war powers.7 The United States leveraged alliances and global outrage against Axis aggression to rally the Allied powers.8 Wartime propaganda and censorship preserved morale while the War Production Board repurposed America’s vast industrial base to produce war materiel at a record pace.9 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 established preemptive conscription, laying the groundwork for rapid manpower expansion.10 Strong institutional frameworks, a vast logistics network, including the Merchant Marine and national rail system, and an arsenal of democracy preserved national morale and cohesion.11 

Today, the conditions that enabled the mobilization for World War II have largely eroded. Diplomatically, the cohesion once found among Allied powers has given way to fragmented global alliances and a decline in trust in multilateral institutions. In the information domain, centralized control and narrative discipline have been replaced by media fragmentation and disinformation, making maintaining national morale and cohesion challenging. Economically, the U.S. industrial base no longer possesses the surge capacity of the 1940s. Infrastructure critical to mobilization, such as rail and sealift, has degraded. Militarily, the existing sustainment infrastructure is not optimized for large-scale, rapid deployment. As a result, the foundational elements that once enabled the United States to mobilize at scale are now fractured, posing significant challenges to replicating that success in a modern conflict.12 

Korean War: 27 June 1950–27 July 1953
The Korean War era presented a unique confluence of political, diplomatic, military, and economic conditions that no longer exist today. These conditions enabled swift legislative action to authorize reserve mobilization and extend enlistments.13 Diplomatically, the United Nations (UN) provided legitimacy, allowing the United States to quickly galvanize a coalition—an opportunity shaped by the Soviet Union’s absence from early Security Council votes.14 Today, the fractured state of great-power relations and eroded multilateral trust make such diplomatic cohesion far less plausible. Additionally, the Cold War’s clear ideological framework enabled a decisive narrative for U.S. intervention, whereas modern conflicts suffer from ambiguity.15 

Militarily and economically, the United States retained the industrial strength and manpower depth to remobilize quickly, even after significant post-World War II drawdowns. A large pool of World War II veterans, maintained stockpiles of supplies and equipment, and robust strategic sealift and airlift capacities supported rapid force generation.16 Reserve integration and political willingness to spend “large sums of money” further sustained mobilization despite doctrinal friction and inter-Service rivalry.17

The conditions that enabled rapid mobilization during the Korean War have deteriorated. Diplomatically, deepening great-power competition and weakened trust make coalition-building far less feasible.18 Strategically, the ideological clarity of the Cold War has given way to fragmented narratives, complicating public and international support for intervention.19 Militarily, reduced force structure, lack of practiced large-scale mobilization, and fragile defense supply chains hinder rapid force generation.20 Economically, minimal prepositioned stores, an efficiency-focused industrial base, and supply chain vulnerabilities undermine the Nation’s ability to sustain operations.21 The synergies that enabled successful mobilization in 1950—political unity, narrative clarity, and industrial depth—can no longer be assumed.

The Gulf War: 7 August 1990–28 February 1991
The Gulf War showcased the rapid assembly of nearly a million U.S. and Coalition forces following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but its success rested on conditions no longer prevalent. Diplomatically, the United States secured a UN mandate, rallied a 35-nation coalition, and received logistical and financial backing from Saudi Arabia, Japan, and others.22 The conflict was presented through a unified media as a just and necessary war, reinforcing public support.23 Economically, the Cold War-era defense structure and coalition burden-sharing offset much of the operation’s cost.24 These advantages—powerful diplomatic legitimacy, unified media narratives, and partner-nation financing—are less accessible in today’s increasingly fragmented global environment. Militarily, the Gulf War benefited from prepositioned stocks, robust host-nation support, and uncontested access to ports and airfields—none guaranteed to be secure during conflict with a peer adversary. Since then, much of the surge capacity, particularly in sealift, airlift, and industrial readiness, has atrophied.25 

Global War on Terror: 11 September 2001–30 August 2021
Mobilizations for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) were extensive but fundamentally different from those of past great-power wars. Politically, the 9/11 attacks briefly unified bipartisan support, which fractured as the wars dragged on and strategic aims became unclear.26 Diplomatically, the Afghanistan coalition unraveled during the Iraq invasion as key allies publicly opposed U.S. actions.27 In the information domain, prolonged conflict and media fragmentation eroded U.S. narrative control.28 Economically, the wars relied on deficit spending and outsourced logistics rather than large-scale industrial mobilization.29 

The OIF and OEF operations used the Global Force Management (GFM) model. This tiered readiness approach accepted non-mission capable units in the sourcing pool if they could meet operational timelines.30 After the height of OEF in 2011, the Marine Corps disestablished the Marine Corps Mobilization Command (MOBCOM), as part of a force structure realignment following heavy Ready Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve activations under various Title 10 authorities. While adequate for counterinsurgency and stability operations, the current GFM model, lacking a unified mobilization command, will most likely be paralyzed by the speed and scale required for a protracted, large-scale peer conflict, especially in a contested homeland environment. 

The erosion of bipartisan unity after 9/11 created an unstable policy environment that weakened institutional support for national mobilization. Diplomatic fractures isolated the United States, leaving it to shoulder logistics and sustainment largely alone. Militarily, modular rotations and contractor-heavy sustainment models emerged, unsuitable for protracted, high-intensity war. The GFM model, sufficient for counterinsurgency, is dangerously misaligned to the demands of peer conflict, yet persists as a critical strategic fallacy.31 The GWOT featured heavy reliance on the RC and CS, with contractors sometimes outnumbering U.S. troops, rather than rapid, force generation.32 Economically, deficit-financed wars left the defense industrial base untested for surge capacity.33 

Post-9/11 wars have featured smaller peak troop deployments sustained over far more extended periods than earlier conflicts like Vietnam, as shown in Figure 1.34 Unlike Vietnam’s mass-conscription model, which peaked at ~537,000 U.S. troops in 1968, OIF/OEF relied on a lean, all-volunteer force with repeated deployments, heavily supplemented by the RC and contractors (at a near 1:1 ratio, compared to 1:8 in Vietnam).35 These campaigns also saw a decline in Allied participation. The 2003 Iraq invasion was led primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom, unlike the 16 U.N. sending states in Korea or the 32-nation Gulf War coalition.36 Meanwhile, the United States maintained a constant overseas presence with tens of thousands stationed in Germany, South Korea, and Japan.37 

So what? The past is not a prologue. The shift from mass mobilization to prolonged, modular deployments has stressed the force differently. A future peer conflict will likely require rapid expansion of troop strength and industrial capacity exceeding today’s sustained deployment model, and demands renewed focus on preparedness, large-scale force generation, and industrial mobilization for a protracted, high-intensity conflict from a contested homeland.

Impact of Force Modernization on Mobilization Capacity
Since 2019, DOD investments have overwhelmingly favored advanced sensor-to-shooter technologies and high-end combat capabilities designed for a limited-duration, high-intensity fight. While these systems offer an advantage in early engagements, they are insufficient in number, and the Defense Industrial Base cannot sustain long-term campaigns. The winner of the first fight may be the loser as they expend too many resources and will not be able to reconstitute in time to be ready for a counterpunch.38 Marine Corps modernization efforts have emphasized long-range precision fires, small-unit lethality, reconnaissance-strike networks, and expeditionary advanced basing operations. However, these initiatives lack corresponding investments in mobilization infrastructure, large-scale mobilization training exercises, and force generation pipelines. The Marine Corps’ readiness for the opening salvo has improved, but its ability to absorb attrition, scale operations, and transition to strategic depth remains dangerously underdeveloped.

The absence of a deliberate strategy to sufficiently balance modernization with mobilization preparedness has created critical vulnerabilities. The Marine Corps must account for risk in forgoing investments in mobilization planning, deployment infrastructure, and the human capital needed to convert surge capacity into actual combat power. Without such scrutiny, technological overmatch becomes brittle when confronted by an adversary willing and able to contest in time and space over the long term.

Conceptual Framework
A coherent conceptual framework must encompass five mutually reinforcing lines of effort to address the Marine Corps’ current mobilization deficiencies. These lines of effort are derived from existing policy gaps, organizational shortcomings, and the imperative to adapt force development for sustained competition and conflict. Collectively, they form the basis of a deliberate Capability-Based Assessment methodology and serve as a foundation for institutionalizing strategic mobilization as a core competency.

First, the Marine Corps must pursue comprehensive policy reform and synchronization. Reform begins with establishing a robust, Service-level, large-scale mobilization policy that reflects contemporary realities and aligns with ongoing doctrinal reforms. Critical to this effort is revising and integrating MCO 3061.1, Total Force Mobilization Deployment Plan, and MCO 1235.1A, Administration and Management of the Individual Ready Reserve to define clear authorities, roles, and responsibilities across Headquarters Marine Corps, the operating forces, and the supporting establishment. All commands must also identify and train to Mobilization Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to standardize and operationalize planning. For example, Schools of Infantry East and West should be assigned METs, such as be prepared to conduct combat refresher training for additional trainees throughout the conflict and be prepared to augment staff with additional instructors and contracted support to sustain increased student throughput. This will result in a coherent family of mobilization plans nested within the DOD and interagency structures.

Second, a modernized command-and-control architecture is essential for generating unity of effort and streamlining wartime force generation. This command should oversee the activation and integration of RC forces, Individual Ready Reserves, inductees, CS, and critical infrastructure. It would unify key mobilization nodes—such as deployment processing centers, regional support programs, and select inspector-instructor sites—under a framework optimized for scale and responsiveness. A general officer with delegated authority from the Commandant should lead this command to coordinate directly with the Joint Staff, Service component commanders, and supporting establishment leadership.

Third, a dedicated officer and enlisted talent structure is required to institutionalize total force integration. This entails creating a new military occupational specialty, the Total Force Integrator (TFI), within the 05XX MAGTF occupational field. The TFI would consolidate mobilization planners responsible for integrating the RC into the AC at all echelons. Officers and senior enlisted with RC experience are ideal candidates, particularly active-reserve officers (all of which hold a Title 10 mandate to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the RC).39 Selection should mirror the foreign area officer experience track board to ensure only high-performing candidates with the requisite attributes are selected. A formal education pipeline, such as at the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, would provide doctrinal expertise and joint operational fluency.40 Unlike MOBCOM’s past centralization, TFIs should be organized into cells under the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, led by an active reserve O-6 at a Mobilization Plans Branch, with integration into each MEF and MARFOR G-5 Plans section under AR-led TFI cells.41 

Fourth, the Marine Corps must integrate mobilization readiness into its training, education, and wargaming systems. Large-scale mobilization scenarios must be incorporated into Command and Staff College curricula, the Marine Corps War College, and other professional military education venues to build shared understanding across the Total Force. Mobilization METs must also be an inspectable item, reportable to the Commandant at a venue such as the Quarterly Readiness Board. The Marine Corps should conduct regular, large-scale mobilization exercises to validate force generation plans under contested conditions. Supported by a campaign of learning, these efforts will drive informed investment in mobilization requirements and foster a culture fluent in transitioning from crisis response to major combat operations.

Finally, force development and capability investment must be recalibrated to achieve a sustainable balance between initial lethality and strategic depth. While advancing critical high-end capabilities, the Marine Corps’ modernization must be paired with talent management, surge logistics, force generation, and sustainment investments. Iterative Capability-Based Assessment is necessary to identify and prioritize these gaps, aligning operations, activities, and investments across the Future Years Defense Program. Only through this dual-track approach—modernization paired with mobilization preparedness—can the Marine Corps build the resilient, scalable force needed to win a protracted conflict against a peer adversary.

The conceptual framework, Figure 2 (on the following page), is not intended as a prescriptive end-state or a comprehensive operational approach but as a reference model to guide the Marine Corps’ strategic transformation. By adopting these lines of effort in an integrated, sustained manner, the Service can recover its ability to generate and sustain combat power at scale, reinforcing its role as an effective contributor to the Joint Force in high-end conflict.

Conclusion
The United States Marine Corps stands at a strategic inflection point. The 2027 Taiwan Strait scenario underscores a fundamental vulnerability: the potential inability to execute an organized, large-scale, contested mobilization on pace with a peer competitor. Historical advantages in diplomatic consensus, industrial capacity, and military readiness no longer exist at reliable levels. Force modernization efforts have improved tactical lethality but at the expense of strategic depth.

To remain a credible contributor to Joint Force operations in great-power competition, the Marine Corps must reframe mobilization not as an afterthought but as a theory of victory if deterrence fails. The proposed framework provides a path to institutionalizing mobilization as a core competency of the Service. If implemented with urgency and sustained investment, the Marine Corps will regain its ability to scale, surge, sustain, and prevail in high-intensity, protracted conflict.

>Col Murata is an Active Reserve Infantry Officer currently assigned as the Director of the Office of Marine Corps Reserve within Headquarters Marine Corps. 

>>Maj Ryu is an Active Reserve Logistics Officer currently assigned as a Plans Assessment Officer, focused on the Korea Plans Set, within the War Plans Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, Policies, Plans, and Operations. 

Notes

1. Title 10, U.S. Code §8063(c).

2. Title 10, U.S. Code §129a, General Policy for Total Force Management. Total Force is the organization, unit, and individual that comprises the DOD resources for implementing the National Security Strategy. It includes DOD active and reserve component military personnel, military retired members, DOD civilian personnel (including foreign national direct-, indirect-hire, and non-appropriated fund employees), contractors, and host-nation support personnel. Total Force recognizes that no single component can generate or sustain combat power alone in protracted, high-end conflict.

3. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Total Force Optimization for Strategic Competition, Memorandum, (Washington, DC: October 2024). Total Force Optimization is the deliberate, synchronized use of all elements of the total force—AC, RC, contracted support, and host-nation support—to ensure maximum effectiveness, readiness, and resilience. This includes aligning human capital, capabilities, and resources to mission requirements over time, while preserving strategic depth and surge capacity.

4. Department of Defense, DOD Instruction 1235.12, (Washington, DC: 2017). Activation is the legal and administrative process by which members of the reserve component are ordered to active duty. Activation authorities encompass voluntary and involuntary mechanisms under various statutes (e.g., Title 10 §§ 12301, 12302, 12304, 12305) and necessitate coordination across multiple levels of command.

5. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, (Washington, DC: 2018). Mobilization is the process of assembling, organizing, and deploying personnel, units, and material in response to a national emergency or contingency. Mobilization includes the activation of reserve forces, the coordination of logistics, infrastructure, and command-and-control elements, and may extend to the broader industrial base and national resources. 

6. Total Force Optimization for Strategic Competition.

7. David. M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

8. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

9. Ralph E. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1964). 

10. Kent R. Greenfield, Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987).

11. Why the Allies Won; and The Army and Economic Mobilization.

12. Freedom from Fear: The Army and Economic Mobilization; and Command Decisions.

13. Headquarters Marine Corps, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 1967). 

14. Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010).

15. Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 

16. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951; and The Army and Economic Mobilization.

17. Command Decisions.

18. The War for Korea, 1950–1951.

19. Victory at High Tide.

20. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951.

21. The Army and Economic Mobilization.

22. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

23. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf War: Strategy, Air Power, and the Challenge of War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

24. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993).

25. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; and The Gulf War.

26. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 

27. Kate Phillip, Shane Lauth, and Erin Schenck, U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation (Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2006).

28. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Penguin Random House, 2013).

29. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: High-Level DoD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces (Washington, DC: 2006). 

30. Department of Defense, CJCSM, 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance (Washington, DC: 2019). 

31. Ibid.

32. T. Christian Miller, “Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq,” L.A. Times, July 4, 2007, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jul-04-na-private4-story.html; and David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008). 

33. Kristen Bialik, “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades,” Pew Research Center, August 22, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades.

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid.; and Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq (Washington, DC: CBO, August 2008).

36. Ivo H. Daalder, “The Coalition That Isn’t,” Brookings, March 24, 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-coalition-that-isnt.

37. “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades.”

38. Col Kevin H. Hutchison, interview by authors, April 2, 2025.

39. Title 10, U.S. Code §12310 titled “Reserves: Duty with Organization of the Ready Reserve” authorizes members of the reserve components, including the Marine Corps Reserve, to be ordered to active duty to perform duties that contribute to the readiness of their reserve component. Subsection (a) provides that a reservist is activated under this authority to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the reserve component. Subsection (b) provides that reservists activated under this authority are considered to be serving on active duty for all intents and purposes, and their duty may be performed full-time. MCO 1001.52K Management of the Active Reserve Program states that AR Marines are primarily assigned to inspector-instructor staffs, training commands, recruiting support, and mobilization planning billets (italics added).

40. The Eisenhower School, “Mission: Forging a New Generation of Strategic Leaders,” The Eisenhower School, n.d. https://es.ndu.edu/About/Mission. 

41. The Marine Forces Reserve Mobilization Command of the past was tasked to: (1) manage the Individual Ready Reserve accountability and readiness; (2) execute mobilization processing for involuntary and voluntary activations; (3) standardize mobilization procedures under Title 10 authorities; (4) develop and maintain mobilization plans and procedures in coordination with Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Corps Forces Reserve; (5) provide infrastructure and administrative oversight for mobilization processing centers. Mobilization Command centralized but professionalized mobilization efforts that had previously been handled in a more fragmented or ad hoc manner, streamlining readiness verification and improving the responsiveness of reserve force generation. The key distinguishing feature of the proposed framework is decentralizing mobilization planning from the Service. Ideally, the selected AR total force integrators disperse throughout Marine Corps Forces and the FMF, which are at the forefront of contingency planning in support of combatant commanders, to provide dedicated total force integration subject-matter expertise. 

>The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the authors and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Headquarters Marine Corps or the Service. 

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