Modernization and force structure efforts for the Army resulted in plans by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to make cuts that would account for the entire size of the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) if applied by the Marine Corps.1 The Marine Corps, however, has made significant transformational efforts elsewhere with Force Design 2030, and the value of MARSOC has continued to provide a significant benefit to both the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the FMF. Marine Special Operations Command is highlighted as a key capability of the Stand-In Forces (SIF) concept in the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), “The unique capabilities contained within the MAGTF paired with the special operations capabilities of our Raiders forms a modernized warfighting capability with the agility and lethality capable of gaining and maintaining advantage from inside the [weapons engagement zone (WEZ)].”2
Marine special operations companies (MSOC) like Marine littoral regiments (MLR) provide value at the Service level through their ability to sense, make sense, and communicate with the Joint Force. Marine Special Operations Command units offer theater special operations commands a unit of action for employment toward strategic, operational, and campaign objectives. Marine Special Operations Command additionally produces specialized human capital for the Marine Corps outside of Special Operations Officers, MOS 0370, and Critical Skills Operators , 0372, by training, manning, and equipping USSOCOM unique Special Operations Capability Specialists (SOCS), 8071, that subsequently integrate back to FMF formations. Furthermore, MARSOC leverages special operations-peculiar funding from USSCOM through Major Forces Program 11 to rapidly acquire unique capabilities to support real-world operations and preserve the force. By sustaining the integration of joint kill webs between MSOCs and the other joint SIF units, prioritizing manning through Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and driving modernization, the Marine Corps will continue to use MARSOC as a worthwhile investment as outlined by the 39th Commandant to fight and win today and set conditions to win in the future.
The problem of mature kill webs and a combined Joint all-domian command and control is not new to the Joint Forces’ efforts of modernization or USSOCOM. It is an effort where MARSOC plays a critical role, as highlighted by the 39th CPG, “Marines in the Stand-in Force, critically bolstered by our MARSOC Raiders, are the tip of the spear of the entire Joint and Combined Force.”3 Marine Special Operations Command and FMF units routinely participate in various operations, activities, and investments (OAI) in the first-island chain and throughout the globe to train against Joint Force objectives. Operations, activities, and investments like Exercise Balikatan—an annual exercise between the Philippines and the U.S. military designed to strengthen bilateral interoperability, capabilities, trust, and cooperation—demonstrate combined joint kill webs that culminate in real-world sink exercises at key maritime terrain in the first-island chain.4 The OAI further provides MARSOC units at the MSOC level to train and integrate adjacent to emerging transformational units of the Joint Force like 3d MLR, the U.S. Army 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, and Joint certified headquarters from the Marine Corps such as I MEF and 3d MarDiv, III MEF, FMF Pacific, as well as Joint headquarters from I Corps and 25th Infantry Division. Moreover, it can be stated that the problem of combined Joint all-domian command and control and kill webs, easily traced to the history of USSOCOM during Operation EAGLE CLAW, will continue to require investment and integration across the Joint Force to succeed and win during great-power competition.5
The 39th CPG states, “Ironclad discipline is the currency of our Corps. Ruthless adherence to standards is what makes us special as a Service.” This discipline and affinity toward ruthless adherence to standards and mission accomplishment are why Marines subsequently make another choice to start a journey toward a career or tour at MARSOC. Unlike the deployable units of Navy Special Warfare, Navy Special Warfare Task Groups, the MSOCs of MARSOC are enabled by a detachment of SOCS, who are special operations qualified by the Marine Raider Training Center or Marine Raider Support Group.6 The SOCS MOS has its unique pipeline based on its specialization of logistics, intelligence, communications, or fires. These Marines serve anywhere from three to five years at MARSOC before returning to the FMF. The value of a tour at MARSOC provides these SOCS unique, but operationally relevant experience that seamlessly translates to assignments at III MEF or other SIF units. A SOCS trained for intelligence gains all the skills necessary to sense and make sense for an MLR headquarters or MEU. A SOCS trained for communications can seamlessly bolt onto a task unit from a MEF Information Group or provide communication to contested logistics for a littoral logistics battalion. Manpower and Reserve Affairs must continue to assign a prioritized staffing goal at MARSOC units while incentivizing tours for Marines and those SOCS post-MARSOC to spread the knowledge and experience across the FMF. The tours at MARSOC must elevate to the equivalent of FMF by precept for career officers and Subsequent-Term-Alignment-Plan Marines to ensure talent does not transition from the Service or create an unnecessary demand for curtailed tours from a SIF unit as outlined by the Commandant to remain competitive for advancement and promotion.
A final unique characteristic of MARSOC as a part of the SIF is the ability to tap into special operations-peculiar funding for operational and training modernization, experimentation in command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, and Preservation of the Force and Family programs. The unique funding and access to USSOCOM continue to enable greater modernization for training and operational effects with FMF and other Joint SIF units as seen during the Service-Level Training Exercise and at forward-deployed locations. The command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting advancements and experimentation continue to align with FMF advances whether the touchpoints and engagements are through wargaming or implementation of assets in support of live, virtual, or constructive training at a newly established Special Operations Training, Exercise, and Simulation Center at Stone Bay, Camp Lejeune, NC, that shares similar capability to sites hosted by Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group or Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group. Furthermore, the expansion of Preservation of the Force and Family resources have served as a model to carry over to FMF units to maintain and sustain career-long readiness. The 39th CPG states, “No single issue is more existential for our Corps than recruiting and retaining high-quality Marines.”7 Marine Special Operations Command sustains this critical effort while efficiently employing SOF-peculiar resources to accomplish the assigned USSOCOM missions as well as providing benefits to the Service.
Manpower and funding will remain a constant for all the military services like the unchanging nature of war. For the Marine Corps, it must remain a priority to man, train, and equip MARSOC units like MLRs as both serve as the critical stand-in forces for competition and conflict. For the SOCS and those that are assigned to MARSOC, Manpower and Reserve Affairs must ensure stable and continuing careers like those in the FMF. The value of MARSOC remains that they are Marines first, and special operations are what they do. Like all SOF units, the resourcing of MARSOC by the Marine Corps will allow them to fight and win both now and in the future while upholding the Special Operations Forces Truth that Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.8
>Maj Fultz is an Infantry Officer serving as the Battalion Executive Officer for the 1st Marine Raider Support Battalion. He has served in all three divisions with a most recent tour with the Stand-In Force at III MEF Command Element and 4th Mar.
Notes
1. Cole Livieratos, “Cutting Army Special Operations Will Erode the Military’s Ability to Influence the Modern Battlefield,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/cutting-army-special-operations-will-erode-the-militarys-ability-to-influence-the-modern-battlefield.
2. Gen Eric Smith, 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: September 2024).
3. Ibid.
4. Embassy Manila, “Philippine, U.S. Troops to Kick Off Exercise Balikatan 2024,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, April 17, 2024, https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-kick-off-exercise-balikatan-2024.
5. Special Operations Warrior Foundation, “Operation Eagle Claw,” Special Operations Warrior Foundation, September 2024, https://specialops.org/operation-eagle-claw.
6. Joint Special Operations University Center for Engagement and Research, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 5th Edition (MacDill Air Force Base: November 23).
7. 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance.
8. Joint Special Operations University Center for Engagement and Research, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 5th Edition (MacDill Air Force Base: November 2023).
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, July 1960. Extracted from Chapter Four of The Compact History of the U. S. Marine Corps, by LtCol P.N. Pierce and the late LtCol F.O. Hough. Copyrighted by Hawthorne Books, May 1960. $4.95
ON OCTOBER 17, 1820, MAJOR ARCHIBALD HENDERSON was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and became the fifth Commandant of the Marine Corps at the age of 37.
Under the blunt, outspoken Henderson the Marine Corps underwent some profound changes. The long span of years of his command were eventful ones, and through a series of dramatic events which commanded wide attention, the Corps established a high reputation with the people of the nation. The man who was to become known as “the grand old man of the Marine Corps” was largely responsible.
Morale was low in the Armed Forces of the 1820s. As usual after each war, the military had been shunted aside. The War of 1812 was rapidly passing into the limbo of forgotten things. It had been an unpopular war to begin with, as far as Americans were concerned. The war-torn era of Napoleon had ended at Waterloo, and the great powers of Russia, England, Austria and Prussia had combined in the Quadruple Alliance to “preserve the tranquillity of Europe” against a revival of revolution. The danger of being drawn into a European war appeared very remote. The Congress of the United States was much too occupied with internal expansion to pay attention to the relatively few people it hired for the defense of the nation. The strength of the Marine Corps stood at 49 officers and 865 enlisted men.
Immediately upon assuming command, Henderson, who had evidently given the matter considerable thought, set about improving the morale and efficiency of his Corps. He began by personally inspecting every shore station which included Marines and many of the ship’s detachments. He was a stickler for detail, and continually gave evidence of knowing thoroughly the job of everyone of his Marines. He insisted on the strictest economy in the expenditure of funds, and personally handled the majority of the Corp’s legal affairs. Although he had the reputation of being a martinet, he went to great lengths to insure that his officers and men were properly accorded their every right.
In the matter of training he was almost a fanatic. He had long realized that the key to the efficiency of any fighting organization lay in two inseparable and basic fundamentals—training and spirit. He ordered all the newly commissioned officers to duty at Marine Corps Headquarters, in order to personally supervise their indoctrination and training. During most of his tour of duty, the Army was unable to absorb all of the graduates of West Point. Henderson obtained as many of these officers as possible for the Marine Corps. To assist in the training of the new officers, and to act as a nucleus for a landing force, he kept a skeletonized battalion at Headquarters. This battalion was thoroughly trained in the latest developments of military weapons and tactics.
Archibald Henderson.
Henderson demanded, and received, the strict subordination of all his officers. He took no nonsense from anyone, including his superiors in the U.S. Navy. On one occasion, when the Navy Department countermanded his orders to a Marine Captain to go to sea, Henderson went directly to the President. He respectfully, and probably vigorously, explained that it was imperative that his orders be carried out in order to vindicate his position and authority. Four days later the captain in question reported for sea duty, and the Secretary of the Navy reported to the President for what might have been described as a unilateral conversation.
The agencies for maintaining law and order in the United States during the first half of the Nineteenth Century were few and far between. Those which did exist were poorly organized, and even more poorly trained. During this era the Marines were often called upon to lend a hand in local disturbances.
In the great Boston fire of 1824 they performed both rescue work and police functions in helping to stamp out the wave of pilfering and looting which followed the holocaust.
A short time later, Maj Robert D. Wainwright earned prominent mention in the classic school books of the era, McGuffey’s Readers. And, for the next 75 years, the nation’s school children received a lesson dealing with the heroic conduct of Marines.
The scene of the action was the Massachusetts State Prison at Boston. Having become thoroughly dissatisfied with their lot in life, some 283 prisoners staged a riot which rapidly got beyond control of the prison authorities. With the situation out of hand, the warden sent a frantic call for help to the Boston Marine Barracks.
Maj Wainwright, with a detachment of 30 Marines, soon arrived at the prison area. Making a hasty estimate of what was apparently a bad situation, Wainwright came up with a simple solution. Hastily forming a single rank facing the prisoners, he ordered his Marines to fire a warning volley into the air. The shots had the desired effect and the clamor subsided. As his Marines reloaded their muskets, the major addressed the rebellious prisoners, “These men are United States Marines,” he said. “They follow my orders to the letter.”
Turning to the Marines, Wainwright consulted his watch, and then issued his orders in a loud, parade ground voice, “Exactly three minutes from now I shall raise my hand over my head,” he bellowed. “When I drop my hand you will commence firing. You will continue to fire until you have killed every prisoner who has not returned to his cell.”
For three long minutes not a word was spoken. The only sound was the shuffle of the inmates’ feet as they dejectedly returned to their cells.
With the advent of the 1830s the traditional isolationist policy of America underwent an abrupt change. It had become apparent to the United States that many areas of commercial advantage lay beyond its own boundaries. This change in policy had a pronounced effect on the functions performed by Marines. As a result of it, the Marines, under the energetic leadership of their fifth Commandant, ranged far and wide to protect the interests of their country.
United States Marines of General Henderson’s era.
Late in 1831 the natives of Sumatra seized and robbed an American merchantman in the harbor of Quallah Battoo. This act of piracy resulted in the murder of several members of the crew. In retaliation the United States sent the frigate Potomac, especially outfitted for the job, on a punitive expedition against the Sumatran pirates. Arriving in February 1832, the Potomac put a landing force of over 250 Marines and sailors ashore. In two days of bloody warfare, the force captured four pirate forts and reduced the town of Quallah Battoo to a heap of smouldering ruins.
At the same time, on the other side of the Southern Hemisphere, Marines were having some difficulties in South America. Argentina was attempting to establish claim over the Falkland Islands. In pursuit of this claim, that country looked with extreme disfavor on American vessels conducting trade with the Islands. In an effort to discourage this practice, the Argentinians proceeded to impound three American schooners and jail their crews. Marines from the sloop Lexington waded ashore and through dint of considerable small arms fire, succeeded in impressing the Argentine officials that the United States did not look kindly upon such treatment of its ships and citizens.
But, as far as the Marine Corps was concerned, the most far-reaching effect of the new anti-isolation policy of the United States was reflected in the Act of 1834. Passed by Congress on June 30, the legislation authorized a substantial increase in the strength of the Marine Corps. It also settled the question of its control, by placing it in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. In addition, it authorized the President to order the Marines into whatever action his judgment dictated, including duty with the Army. Within the year the President was to make good use of his newly granted powers.
In the Everglades of Florida a bad situation of long standing was rapidly coming to a head.
Over a period of many years runaway Negro slaves had found refuge with the Seminole Indians and many slaves and members of the tribe had intermarried. The southern planters, aware of this refuge for their escaped slaves, had made repeated petitions to the Crown of Spain, without avail. Unhappy with the refusal of Charles IV to take the necessary steps to return their slaves, the southern land owners began to petition their own government for the annexation of Florida. In 1819 a portion of Florida was purchased from Spain for $5,000,000. Immediately the slave owners renewed their demands to the government that their slaves be returned. Inasmuch as some 75 years had passed since their ancestors had taken refuge in Florida, it was a little difficult for the Seminoles to understand the claims of the planters. As a result, such demands met with a particularly unenthusiastic response by the Seminoles.
Under the political pressure eventually brought to bear by the slave owners, the Administration completed a treaty with the Indians, under which the government would take the tribe under its protection and assign the Indians to reservations. Perhaps things might have worked out if certain enterprising souls hadn’t become aware of the lucrative possibilities in the profession of slave catching. The “slave hunters,” in direct violation of the terms of the treaty, entered Florida in organized bands to catch runaway slaves who brought high prices on the slave markets. There is no evidence to indicate that the government made any attempts to stop this practice, although the Indians continually demanded redress.
In 1828 the proposal was made to the Seminoles to move to a reservation in the area now occupied by the state of Arkansas. Tribal chiefs made a reconnaissance of the area and returned with the report that “snow covers the ground, and frosts chill the bodies of men.” Their objections notwithstanding, the Seminoles were ordered to emigrate West. At which point, things got rapidly out of hand.
Determined to force the emigration, the government sent troops into Florida. Just as determined to remain where they were, the Seminoles made preparations for war. In December 1835 the hostilities began in earnest, and in a short time the horrors of the Seminole War were being chronicled throughout the land.
BGen D.L. Clinch, who was commanding the US troops in Florida, was charged with the responsibility of the removal of the Indians. The end of the year found the well-armed Indians, under the leadership of a colorful half-breed named Osceola, assembled in the almost inaccessible swamps of the Withlacoochee River.
Clinch, whose immediate problem was to protect the white settlers, decided to attack the Indians. Since his own force, which occupied Fort King near the present town of Ocala, was too small for the job, he sent to Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay for reinforcements.
The reinforcements, numbering 110 and under the command of a Maj Dade, answered the call of Gen Clinch with colors flying and bugles blaring across the swamps. With the possible exception of Custer’s debacle at Big Horn, the fate of this force is without parallel in the history of Indian warfare.
Shortly after Dade’s force crossed the Withlacoochee, they were met with an ambush so effective that only two survivors remained to crawl through the wire grass to safety. One was Pvt Clark of the 2d Artillery who, although badly wounded, is reputed to have crawled to Fort Brooke, a distance of 60 miles. The other was Louis Pacheo, a Negro slave who acted as guide for the force. There is reason to suspect that the escape of Pacheo from the ambush was something more than blind luck. Be that as it may the only man to survive without a scratch lived to the venerable old age of 95 without being taken to task for his treachery, if such it was.
On the same day as the Dade Massacre, Osceola and a small band invaded a dinner party given by Gen Wiley Thompson, who had been sent from Washington to oversee removal of the Indians, and murdered the General and his five guests. If there had been any doubts about the earnestness of the war in Florida, the Dade Massacre and the murder of Gen Thompson provided the clinching argument.
By the spring of 1836 the Army in central Florida found themselves in difficulty. Some 1,000 soldiers were trying to round up and deport over 3,000 Indians. The State militias, which had originally augmented the Army of the South, soon had their stomachs full of poor food, swamp fever and general discomfort. And, with the coming of spring, they left Florida for healthier climes.
To add to the general misery, the Creek Indians of southern Alabama and Georgia decided to go on the warpath. The results of this uprising were severe enough to cause the Army to shift its main effort from the Seminole country to the area occupied by the Creeks.
At this juncture Archibald Henderson volunteered the services of a regiment of Marines for duty with the Army. The offer was promptly accepted. On May 23, 1836, President Jackson, under the recently enacted law, ordered all available Marines to report to the Army. Henderson, never one to sit on the sidelines, insisted on leading the regiment personally. By taking practically all officers, reducing shore detachments to sergeant’s guard, and leaving behind only those who were unfit for duty in the field, Henderson was able to mobilize more than half the total strength of the Corps.
There is a tale, often related by Marines, that Col Henderson closed Marine Corps Headquarters during this period. It is said that he locked the door to his office, placed the key under a mat, and tacked a neatly lettered sign to the door which read:
Have gone to Florida to fight Indians. Will be back when the war is over.
A. HENDERSON Col. Commandant More reliable accounts indicate that the Commandant left the Headquarters in charge of LtCol Wainwright, with the Band to provide the guard. Among those deemed unfit for duty in the field was one Sgt Triguet, whom Henderson commended to Wainwright in a letter of instruction which began: “Sergeant Triguet is left to assist in attending to the duties at Headquarters. He is a respectable old man, and has no other failing than that which but too often attends an old soldier….”
Henderson, with a force of 38 officers and 424 enlisted men, reported to Gen Winfield Scott at Columbus, Georgia. Since the Commandant was under direct orders of the Secretary of War, he technically became an Army officer and was placed in command of a brigade composed of Marines, Army Infantry and Artillery, and friendly Creeks.
Presaging the modern Marine battle garb of dungarees, the troops wore white fatigues, rather than the green and white uniforms of the period. Armed mostly with muskets, they also carried some of the new-fangled Colt rifles which had a disconcerting tendency to explode spontaneously when carried loaded for any length of time in the hot sun.
Both the Marine commander and Gen Scott took an optimistic view of the final outcome of the campaign. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Henderson wrote: “It is now expected that the Campaign will be closed in the course of ten days or two weeks….” On the same day Gen Scott went on record to the effect, “war against the hostile Creeks is supposed to be virtually over.” One may well speculate as to the thoughts of Gen Scott a month later when he was recalled to Washington for an investigation of his conduct of the war against the Creeks and Seminoles. After a long, drawn-out investigation, Scott was exonerated and restored to his command.
The end of summer brought with it the termination of the Creek Campaign. The Creeks were removed to a reservation in what is now the state of Oklahoma, and the Army of the South again turned its attention to the problem of the Seminoles in Florida.
On June 24 a battalion of Marines under LtCol W.H. Freeman reached Milledgeville, Georgia, and moved on into Florida. In October Freeman’s battallion was consolidated with the one Henderson had been leading into a six-company regiment and moved to Apalachicola, to garrison Fort Brooke. The Marines were augmented by a regiment of Creek Indians, some 750 strong, who had been mustered and were paid as militia. The regiment was officered mainly by Marines, and wore white turbans to distinguish them from the enemy during battle. The Seminoles were rather unhappy about being pursued by their blood relatives, and showed their dislike by scalping all Creeks who fell into their hands.
On November 21 the Creeks, under the command of 1stLt Andrew H. Ross, fought an advance guard action at Wahoo Swamp. From Wahoo a four-pronged advance, two columns of Army troops and two of Marines, pushed the Seminoles back to the Hatchee-Lustee River. Six days later the main body of Indians was located in the area of the Great Cypress Swamp, and was promptly attacked. The attackers managed to capture the horses of the enemy and 25 prisoners, most of whom were women and children. The braves slipped back into the swamp. Henderson left a detachment to guard the prisoners and horses, while the regiment pressed on after the warriors who had taken up positions on the opposite bank of the Hatchee-Lustee. The troops extended along the river bank and took up a cross fire, in an effort to dislodge the enemy. As soon as the Indians’ fire slackened, the troops crossed the river by swimming and by means of logs. According to Henderson’s report, “… we pursued the enemy as rapidly as the deep swamp and their mode of warfare permitted.”
Osceola, Chief of Seminoles.
The chase continued until nightfall when Henderson was forced to withdraw his troops from the dense undergrowth. The result of the day’s operations was the capture of the Indian women and children, already mentioned, 23 Negroes, a few horses and some clothes and blankets. The battle report states that one Indian and two Negroes were seen dead by the troops.
As a result of his routing of the Indian forces Henderson was brevetted a brigadier general and several Marines were promoted for “gallantry.” Four days later, Abraham, a Seminole Chief, appeared at Henderson’s camp under a flag of truce. This marked the beginning of several days of negotiations between Maj Gen T.H. Jesup, to whom Gen Scott had relinquished command upon being recalled to Washington, and the Indian leaders at Fort Dade. These meetings finally resulted in an agreement by the chiefs to assemble their people for transportation to their new reservation. The peace treaty was formally signed on March 6. Jesup, believing the war to be over, began to discharge his volunteers.
On May 22, 1837, Henderson received orders to proceed to Washington. Taking with him all Marines except two companies, which totalled 189 officers and men, Henderson left Florida the next day.
On the night of June 2, Micanopy, grand chief of the Seminoles, and several of his lesser chiefs who had encamped with their followers near Tampa Bay, the port of embarkation, were abducted and taken to the interior. The next day a report was received from the troops south of Hillsboro that the Seminoles encamped in that vicinity had disappeared. These two incidents were the signal of the renewal of hostilities. Gen Jesup reported, “This campaign, so far as relates to the Indian emigration, has entirely failed,” and requested to be “immediately relieved from the
command of the Army.” The Seminole War was far from over.
For the next five years Archibald Henderson vainly tried to get the remaining Marines recalled from Florida. His appeals were met with refusal by the Secretary of War, who felt that the need for Marines in Florida was more pressing than the need for their return.
Jesup was finally relieved and realized what had been his burning desire since the beginning of the campaign—to join his family and spend the rest of his life on his farm. He was replaced by Col Zachary Taylor, who was soon promoted to the rank of brigadier general.
The campaign wore on and the possibility of success appeared more remote with each passing day. Osceola, who had been arrested while conferring with Gen Jesup, died in prison at Fort Moultrie in October 1837. The next year some 4,000 Seminoles made the move to Oklahoma, though many of them slipped away from the New Orleans concentration camps and returned to the Everglades.
The two remaining companies of Marines put in four more years of duty along the coast and around the keys of Florida with the Mosquito Fleet. From June 1838 to the summer of 1842, this array of half a dozen small vessels, two barges and 140 canoes was manned by 68 officers and 600 men. The Marines of the fleet numbered about 130, and for the first two years of operation were commanded by 1stLt George H. Terrett who, seven years later, was to lead the way into Mexico City.
The object of the Mosquito Fleet was twofold, to intercept communications between the Indians and small boats operating off the Florida coast, and to conduct amphibious sorties into the interior of the Everglades. The fleet operated successfully throughout the remainder of the campaign, and the Indians came to have great respect for the “sailor boats” as they called them.
In the summer of 1842 the Seminole War gradually waned, without formal cessation of hostilities and with neither side clearly victorious. The Marines returned north in July, well pleased to be relieved of what had been six long years of extremely dreary duty. In the final accounting, 61 Marines had given their lives in the Seminole Campaign. Over half of them had died from disease, and one unfortunate soul had departed the scene, dispatched by a friendly musket ball—“discharged by accident.” In analyzing the success of the campaign, one need only reflect upon the fact that the Seminoles still occupy the Everglades of Florida.
The arrest of Osceola, who later died in prison.
With the Seminole War a matter for the record books, Henderson again turned his attention to strengthening and developing the Corps. His efforts were aimed at keeping the Marines in a state of readiness for any emergency, domestic or foreign. The remainder of his career was distinguished by such important events as the Mexican War and Perry’s Expedition to Japan. Under his direction Marines virtually covered the globe. To protect Americans and their commerce with China, they stormed the forts of Canton during the great Taiping Rebellion. In the South Seas they splashed ashore to bring the rampaging Fiji Islanders to heel. In the jungles of Central America they made their first contact with the Republic of Nicaragua, which was to see the repeated return of Marines over the next three-quarters of a century. Along the Gold Coast of Africa the slave traders, on more than one occasion, felt the bite of a Marine’s bayonet.
For the 50 years he wore the uniform of a Marine, Archibald Henderson preached the gospel of strong leadership and constant readiness. At 74, he dramatically demonstrated that advanced age was no deterrent to practicing what he preached.
The issues of the elections of 1857 were particularly bitter ones. In an effort to control the election in Washington, the “Know Nothing” Party imported a gang of hired thugs, known as the “Plug Uglies,” from Baltimore. The gang commenced activities by physically threatening the voters, and finally put a complete halt to the elections by taking possession of the polling places throughout the city. Civil authorities, unable to cope with the situation, appealed to the President who ordered two companies of Marines from the Marine Barracks to restore order to the city.
General Henderson facing up to the “Plug Uglies.”
The Marines met the “Plug Uglies” on Pennsylvania Avenue, in the vicinity of City Hall. The rioting thugs, who were armed with every conceivable weapon, dragged up a brass cannon, aimed it at the Marine formation and demanded that they return to their barracks. Capt Tyler, commanding the Marines, ordered a detachment forward to capture the cannon. At that moment, Gen Henderson, who had been mingling with the mob and was dressed in civilian clothing, walked calmly up to the muzzle of the cannon and forced the weapon around. Henderson addressed the “Plug Uglies,” warning them of the seriousness of their acts and telling them that the Marines would fire if it became necessary. In the hectic few minutes that followed, a number of rioters who fortunately were very bad marksmen, fired their pistols at Henderson. A platoon of Marines charged in to protect the Commandant and capture the cannon. One of the rioters, at point blank range, aimed his pistol at Henderson’s head. A Marine knocked the pistol to the ground with a butt stroke of his musket. The General promptly grabbed the culprit by the collar and the seat of his pants and marched him off to jail. With the riot getting out of control, the Marines opened fire. The rioters, suddenly convinced that the Marines meant business, beat a hasty retreat and order was restored to the city.
On January 6, 1859, the “grand old man of the Marine Corps,” who had served as Commandant under 11 Presidents, died in office at the age of 76. The impact of his strong personality and zealous devotion to duty remains to this day, indelibly engraved on the Corps to which he devoted over 50 years of his life.
The era of Archibald Henderson had encompassed two wars worthy of examination from the standpoint of the nation’s history. One, which had been purely internal, was the protracted campaign against the Creek and Seminole Indians. The other, which took place on foreign soil, provided the Marines with the first line to their hymn, and the nation with something it had long wanted—a western boundary that bordered the blue Pacific.
2024 marks the 30th anniversary of the Intelligence Plan of 1994. The purpose of the plan, approved by Commandant (CMC) Mundy in 1994, was not just to address the intelligence deficiencies that became apparent in Operation DESERT STORM (1991) but to professionalize the intelligence occupational field by structuring its manning and training the way other occupational fields were structured. This short article will focus on three areas: plan development, plan implementation, and the performance of intelligence in OIF/OEF.
For roughly the first 200 years of the Marine Corps, the role of intelligence was analogous to that of a volunteer fire department. Whenever a war or serious conflict arose, G-2/S-2 sections were manned by non-intelligence officers and enlisted personnel to augment the meagerly manned and poorly trained intelligence ranks. For the first 200 years, it worked well in the sense that we never lost a war.
It was not until advanced technical intelligence systems for collection, imagery, targeting, and analysis were developed that the volunteer fire department approach to intelligence was no longer viable. The first wake-up call came from BGen P.K. Van Riper in his June ’91 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “Observations during Operation Desert Storm.” He said, “The weakest area I observed was tactical intelligence; many of the problems are endemic and stem from the way we select, train, and educate our intelligence personnel.” He suggested changing the way we select and train our intelligence personnel.
He also said, “Now is the time to reconsider whether we want to continue acquiring the majority of our intelligence officers through lateral moves.” This comment referenced the Marine Corps’ decision in 1978 to open the intelligence field to regular officers—not just limited duty officers. While this created an opportunity for regular officers to enter the intelligence field, the sourcing was based entirely on lateral moves. There was no dedicated sourcing of intelligence officers directly from The Basic School and, therefore, no manpower pyramid to sustain career progression in the occupational field.
In the spring of 1992, the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence became aware of deficiencies in Marine Corps intelligence and started sending questions for the record to Headquarters Marine Corps regarding its intelligence capabilities, or absence of capabilities. Ultimately, the Senate directed the Marine Corps to develop a five-year plan to correct the intelligence deficiencies that were identified during Operation DESERT STORM. MajGen Jenkins, Director of Intelligence (DIRINT) at the time, established a Program Objective Memorandum Working Group to develop a response to the Senate. Maj Dan Dietz, who was directed to write the response to the Senate based on the working group’s effort, admitted that the final report to the Senate “absolutely wasn’t a polished, staffed document, but provided a framework.” CMC Mundy approved the report in the spring of 1993.
When MajGen Van Riper became DIRINT in early 1993, one of his first initiatives was to establish the Intelligence Structure Support Group (ISSG) that would include senior officers from the FMF, Manpower, Training and Education, Systems Command, and the Doctrine Division to provide the rigorous analysis of the issues that the official response sent to the Senate did not include. He assigned Col Larry Burgess, a regular intelligence officer, as the lead for the ISSG which took place in August 1993. The findings of the ISSG were then turned over to the Resources Division of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence headed by Col Jim Clark (an infantry officer) and staffed with a talented group of intelligence officers including LtCol Gerry Hughes, LtCol Herb Strauss, Maj Buck Buikema, and Capt Rick Natale.
Working closely and continuously with Manpower and Training and Education over the next year (1993–94), Resource Division developed a comprehensive plan to address the deficiencies and establish a professional occupational field. They were aided greatly by the publication of the Restricted Officer Manpower Study/Act that significantly changed the warrant officer and limited-duty officer program for the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps intelligence community. It provided the Resources Division the ability to convert the limited-duty officer structure to an unrestricted officer structure and the ability to finally establish direct accessions from The Basic School to develop the essential intelligence officer manpower Christmas tree to sustain the intel occupational field.
Other important elements of the plan included the establishment of four intelligence battalions (one for each MEF and one for the reserves), an additional radio battalion (at the time only two existed), and consolidated training for basic intel officers and enlisted at the Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Center in Dam Neck, VA. It also established separate MOS designations at The Basic School for ground, air, and counter-intelligence/human intelligence officers. Once these officers achieved the rank of Captain, they would return to the Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence
Center for the Marine Intelligence Officers Course where they would be designated as MAGTF intelligence officers (0202).
The Intel Plan of 1994 was approved by CMC Krulak—thus ending the development stage of the Intel Plan and beginning the challenging implementation phase.
The implementation phase of the Intel Plan of 1994 lasted 14 years. It was a challenging and arduous task requiring close and continuous attention to the core elements of the plan in the face of numerous challenges on several fronts. To put it in combat terms, it was a battle of inches, not yards. Responsibility for implementing the Intel Plan fell to the Assistant DIRINT, Michael Decker, and the Intel Occ Field Sponsor staff. Number one on the priority list was to recruit, train, and field the 600 new enlisted Marines and 90 officers (sourced from The Basic School) every year until the four intelligence battalions and one signals intelligence (Radio) battalion were fully sourced, trained, and fielded. This involved working closely with Recruiting Command, Training and Education Division at Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the officer and enlisted assignments branches within Manpower, and required major adjustments to enlisted recruiting and staffing goal models and training input plans.
Initially, there was overall acceptance of the Intel Plan and little bureaucratic resistance. In the late 1990s, this began to change. It was a relatively peaceful time in the world and the operational imperative for a robust intelligence presence was no longer as pronounced as it was immediately after Operation DESERT STORM. The Intelligence Department had to overcome the institutional requirement in two CMC-directed Force Study Review Groups (1997 and 1999) to cut a table of organization and to find compensatory reductions in the structure to be added. The Intel Plan called for additional structure with no compensatory structure (other than 117 reserve officers that were converted to unrestricted officers by the Restricted Officer Manpower Study/Act directive) to offer up. It was an uphill battle. The CMC’s Force Structure Review Group of 1997 recommended a Marine Corps-wide, salami-sliced approach to downsizing irrespective of the fact the Intel Plan called for an increase.The Marine Corps Support Battalion was a target for reduction. Fortunately, several Marine generals who had commanded MEUs or had been in joint billets knew what the NSA did for the MAGTFs. Unlike command post exercises where the opposition force was a notional (Country ORANGE) threat, MEUs deployed against real-world threats. These commanders relied heavily on the embedded robust intel package that accompanied them to help define these threats. When the Force Study Review Group recommendations were presented at the General Officer Symposium, one MarFor CG with prior MEU command experience stood up in the face of the crowd in opposition to a cut to the Marine Corps Support Battalion and CMC took it off the list. It was a minor but important step in protecting further cuts to intelligence. The 1999 Force Study Review Group focused not only on cuts but also on capability gaps. Intel was still a large capability gap and once again survived any cuts despite opposition from many competing occupational fields.
The second priority in the Intel Plan implementation effort was to establish a paper trail documenting each step along the way. Much like mountain climbers drive pinions in rock to cement their slow advance up the mountain, the Intel Department created, received CMC approval for, and published ALMARS, MC Bulletins, table of organization cover letters, and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP 2, Intelligence) to officially document their progress. Anyone who has been involved in creating and getting CMC approval for this kind of documentation would appreciate the tedious work this requires.
The third priority was to remove the Marine Corps from under the yoke of the Office of Naval Intelligence which controlled funding from the General Defense Intelligence Program (run by the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]). The Navy determined how much funding the Marine Corps got (primarily for civilian hires). Up until this time, DIA recognized only the Army, Air Force, and Navy as recipients of General Defense Intelligence Program funding. The Intel Department was successful in getting the DIA to recognize the Marine Corps as a Service intelligence organization, separate from the Navy. This was a major victory that allowed the Marine Corps (with General Defense Intelligence Program funding) to increase its civilian intelligence workforce without requiring the Navy’s permission or to require offsets in the Marine Corps structure. The primary beneficiary of this was the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) which grew from 20 civilians in 1994 to 187 in 2009.
The importance of this became evident in the work-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CENTCOM used an Army-generated trafficability and hydrologic study of the routes the 1st MarDiv could use in their advance to Baghdad. Much of the territory on either side of the MSRs between Basra and Baghdad had been declared “not available for tracked vehicles or heavy trucks.” The CG of 1st MarDiv tasked MCIA with an updated trafficability study. The MCIA, with help from the National Ground Intelligence Agency, developed a study that refuted CENTCOM’s study and 1st MarDiv was able to significantly alter their plans, freeing them from sticking solely to the MSR and advancing more quickly and safely toward Baghdad.
Finally, the Nail in the Coffin
Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM delivered the operational imperative for a professional, robust intelligence presence. In 2005, CMC held an Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM after-action review. The general officer support from ground and aviation combat commanders was overwhelmingly supportive of Marine Corps intelligence. This support put the Intel Plan of 1994 over the goal line. The institutional resistance to Marine Corps intelligence faded away and cleared the way to fulfill the remaining elements of the plan by 2008.
The real heroes of this arduous fourteen-year effort were not just Deputy DIRINT Michael Decker and his talented OccFld Sponsor staff but the combat commanders of OEF/OIF who were freed from command post exercises with notional Country ORANGE threats came to embrace the role and importance of intelligence.
Since 2000, eight intel colonels have been promoted to brigadier general and then to major general. Four advanced to lieutenant general (one as Director of DIA, one as J-2 JCS, one as CG Artificial Intelligence Command, and the fourth as Deputy Commandant C4I). Where do we go from here?
Except for the MC DIRINT billet, and most recently the Deputy Commandant C4I billet, all the other billets occupied by Marine Corps intel generals have been in the joint arena. In the early stages of the Intel Plan development, (then) MajGen P.K. Van Riper said, “Intel and Ops are like the 2 sides of the same coin and shouldn’t be separated.” Intel cells are now a permanent fixture in current ops, future ops, and targeting. The two are now inseparable. The green door syndrome became a thing of the past. The intelligence officers’ knowledge of the concept of operations should qualify them for more MAGTF operational billets. Unfortunately, the intel moniker remains an impediment to being assigned to these billets. The general officer assignments branch needs to get beyond the thought that intel generals can only fill intel billets. Between 1995 and 1997, command of the 3rd Force Service Support Group was given to an aviator and a public affairs general. When the need arises, intel generals are equally qualified. Given the close relationship between ops and intel, the Deputy MEF CG is one billet that should be at the top of the list, and there are others as well.
There is a saying that it takes a generation for a major organizational restructuring to become fully accepted. I argue now, in the fourth decade of the Intel Plan, that has happened. Without Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, I am not sure it would have turned out the same way. There is now a valuable capability and opportunity for the Marine Corps not to be overlooked and needs to be recognized.
I salute those individuals and working groups that contributed to the success of the Intel Plan of 1994 and to the combat commanders of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM who provided the credibility that cemented the operational psyche of the entire Marine Corps. Well done!
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, February 2016.
Editor’s Note: The authors biography is available in the original edition.
Lieutenant O’Bannon and Marines advancing toward Tripoli. (Image from Merrill L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD: 2001), 30–31.)
Preface On 7 April 1805, William Eaton, one midshipman, and eight United States Marines under the command of Presley O’Bannon stood at the Egyptian frontier and looked up toward the hills that would take them into hostile territory.1 Accompanying them was a collection of several hundred mercenaries and followers of the exiled ruler of the Barbary State of Tripoli, Hamet Qaramanli. Having crossed 280 miles of desert, the war party still had to advance 180 miles into Tripoli to capture the port city of Derne, the capital of Cyrenaica. In the weeks that followed, Eaton would succeed beyond expectations, earning his place in history. While much has been written about the Barbary Wars—including the Derne victory—discussions on the social dynamics at work in Tripoli largely have been missing. Yet those dynamics, which may be described as “cultural intelligence,” played an important role.2 Failing to understand that is to fail to fully understand the war itself. This article is an attempt to introduce that history as an argument for a greater focus on cultural intelligence in military planning.
“A Country Not Your Own”3 For four years, the United States waged desultory naval combat with Tripoli after its leader, Bey Yusef Qaramanli, declared war on 14 May 1801. The conflict stemmed from a refusal to offer tribute, a dubious scheme where America paid not to have their ships robbed or seized by the Bey’s pirates. In June 1803, a frustrated President Thomas Jefferson authorized a land attack and appointed Eaton, an experienced North African diplomat, as commander (Naval Agent for the Barbary Regencies). As Washington never contemplated sending an army abroad and the few Marines proved inadequate, the need for local forces became critical and the ability to rally fighters to oppose his brother Yusef made Hamet indispensible. Under Eaton, Hamet’s “army” would conduct the first land campaign led by the young United States on a foreign shore.4
On 27 April 1805, some 400 soldiers under Eaton assaulted Derne, defended by twice their number. A charge by a handful proved decisive: the Marines and midshipmen, a company of 26 Greek mercenaries and 24 artillerymen. The fight was a short, if bloody, affair; Eaton suffered a shattered wrist from a musket ball, and two Marines died with another wounded while Hamet emerged unscathed during the subsequent capture of the Governor’s palace. Within three hours, Derne fell and the Stars and Stripes waved for the first time over a distant battlefield. Why was a mixed and meager force under American generalship able to defeat a superior force located deep within their homeland?5 The courage of Eaton and his men won out, but a number of social factors worked to their advantage. Tripoli was riddled with social fissures stemming from the nature of the Barbary States and the local political situation in Tripoli.
In 1805, Ottoman Barbary consisted of the provinces (eyalats) of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Barbary came from the Arab barbar (Berber), describing North Africa’s inhabitants. The term became misleading after the 11th century as the Arabian Banu Hilal tribes migrated across North Africa, halting only at Morocco’s border. Over the course of their migration, they swept away much of the Berber farming population, something that had two lasting effects. The Arabs and the Berbers formed a mixed race and two societies were created, one sedentary, clustered around the remaining coastal cities and farmlands and the other consisting of semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes. This also divided economic life between inland pastoralism with the caravan trade and littoral agriculture linked to sea commerce. The society fractured further with the rise of the Barbary States in the 1500s.6
Around 1505, Hayreddin Barbarossa moved his pirate fleet from the Aegean to Algeria and began raiding European shipping. In the process, he made a great fortune and his forces grew in strength. Simultaneously, the Spanish Reconquista spread into the Maghreb. In 1517, Barbarossa traded submission to Ottoman authority for military aid and Sultan Selim I obliged by sending forces while elevating Barbarossa to beylerbey. In 1551, the Ottomans recaptured Tripoli from the Maltese Knights of Saint John and the Spanish were driven from Tunis in 1574.7
With the crisis averted, the Porte dismissed the beylerbey and divided its holdings into the three eyalats, each ruled by a commander (bey) appointed by the Sultan and, if successful, promoted to pasha. Together with the bey and a Turkish administrative staff, Janissaries were dispatched along with a naval contingent. The three capital ports were turned into fortified bases. Ideally, the eyalats should have been divided into sanjaks (districts headed by sanjak-beys) to solidify control, but Ottoman rule was too tenuous to expand inland. This created additional societal strains as the Turks, Janissaries, and sailors disturbed the status quo. The Ottoman legal tradition also created friction; it followed the Hanafi Sharia while most peoples of the Maghreb adhered to the more conservative Maliki school. Acknowledging the limits of its authority, the Porte never forced the Hanafi system on the local population, but the result heightened the barrier between the governed and those that governed.8
The Janissaries—lifelong soldiers—were also a breed apart. Most had been taken as boys as a “blood tax” on Christians dwelling in Ottoman Europe. Moved to Anatolia, they were reared as soldiers and volunteered or coerced to convert to Islam. Despite these hardships, Janissaries were well paid, held a respected position in society, and were free to elect their own leaders, the deys. Finally, sailors, the most alien and profitable contingent, were able seamen recruited from anywhere and, if not Muslim, became converts. Motivated by the promise of privateering spoils, they were singularly mercenary and of limited loyalty but brought much needed cash to the States. Pirate rule soon reigned.9
The Ottoman conquest ended in the imposition of an alien government that never fully integrated with the people. Tripoli suffered most from these internal disconnects. Because of geography, it had only two enclaves able to support agriculture: the plateau south of the port of Tripoli and the ancient Pentapolis in Cyrenaica with Derne on the eastern extreme. The Bedouin tribes were economically self-sufficient and dominated the rest of the country, allowing them to stand apart from the Bey. This made rule tenuous in the best of times and the war with America did not come during the best of times.10
Tripoli was ostensibly part of the Ottoman Empire, but the power yielded was far from that of the 16th century. When Tripoli was recaptured, the Sublime Porte installed Aga Murad as bey and as an indication of the importance of Tripoli as a naval base, named Admiral (Reis) Turgut the second bey in 1553. For the next half century, Tripoli was ruled directly by the Porte. In 1609, the local Janissaries selected Suleiman Safar as dey who overthrew Bey Ahmad Pasha, and the Porte subsequently acceded to the elected deys as rulers. In late 1709, Bey Halil Pasha died without a successor and over the next two years, Tripoli witnessed five different self-professed governors attempting to take and keep power.11
During this crisis, the Janissaries chose as dey the capable sipahi (cavalry) leader Ahmed Qaramanli. Qaramanli was not a pure-blooded Janissary but a khouloughli (children of soldiers), the descendants of earlier Janissaries who had married into the local elite in Tripoli. In July 1711, Ahmed seized control and the Sublime Porte recognized him as bey and awarded him the rank of pasha. Although he continued to refer to himself as Dey, Ahmed ended the dey elections and the Qaramanli became hereditary leaders. The Qaramanli were able to expand their control into the Fezzan to the south and Cyrenaica to the east. A succession of Qaramanlis ruled effectively for most of the 18th century until the physical decline of the long serving Ali Pasha in the 1790s set in motion an internecine power struggle. The troubles began when Ali designated his eldest son, Hassan, as his successor in 1790.12
In August, Yusef, the youngest son, lured Hassan into the Bey’s harem under the ruse of reconciling their differences. The harem was a refuge whose protections exceeded that of a mosque. Once there, Hassan disarmed as required and greeted his mother. A hiding Yusef then cut him down. Hassan was able to recover his saber and slightly wound Yusef before dying. This murderous outrage threw the country’s leadership into turmoil. Bey Ali refused to recognize Yusef as regent and a civil war erupted with Yusef besieging Ali in the Tripoli fortress during the spring and summer of 1793.13
In early July, Ali died after naming Hamet, the middle son, as bey. Amidst this chaos, the Turks acted. On 29 July 1793, an Ottoman fleet under Ali Benghul arrived in the harbor. He declared himself ruler and both Hamet and Yusef fled to Tunis. Benghul’s rule ended in failure when the brothers, with the assistance of the Dey of Tunis, regained power in 1795. Yusef then pushed aside Hamet, sending him to Derne as Governor of Cyrenaica—an internal exile. Yusef also took Hamet’s family hostage. In fear for his life, Hamet fled first to Tunis and then to Egypt. Yusef sat uneasily on the throne, knowing that the Porte and his brother awaited an opportunity to overthrow him. Those were not his only problems.14
Tripoli was the poorest of the Barbary States and the government’s survival had become dependent on extortion, namely the tribute and wartime privateering policy. Even Yusef acknowledged that reality, stating in 1797 that his aim was to declare war on one nation as soon as he made peace with another. Internal conflicts made matters all the worse. When Americans had paid tribute to avoid trouble, the Barbary silver piaster was interchangeable with the U.S. dollar, except in the case of Tripoli. Yusef had so badly bankrupted Tripoli’s finances that its piaster had been reduced to a small copper coin. By the outbreak of war, one U.S. dollar was trading for 800 Tripolitanian piasters.15
In this environment, the American blockade worked exceptionally well as it affected little outside the Port of Tripoli. There was no hardship in the agricultural regions, a reality equally true for the pastoral tribes and their caravan trade. For the United States, the war became a conflict limited to Yusef and his followers, and the blockade cost Yusef his primary source of income, forcing him to raise taxes, an act that alienated the population under his control. As if the economic and political difficulties were not enough, Yusef could not count on his military for much help as the situation within the ranks of Janissaries and amongst the ships’ crews was nothing short of dire.16
Lt Presley O’Bannon. (Photo credit: Naval History and Heritage Command.)
Tripoli was a feeble military power in the early 1800s. When Yusef declared war on the United States, his navy had seven ocean-going corsairs: 2 frigates, one of 32 and one of 28 guns, plus 5 barks or sloops of 10–18 guns each. The only bright spot was the fleet commander, Admiral Murad, a competent commander who sailed on the seized American vessel Betsy. This compared with 13 corsairs held by Tunis and 18 by Algiers. By the time of the Eaton Expedition, Murad’s diminished fleet was trapped in port and the U.S. Navy’s Mediterranean Squadron under Commodore Samuel Barron containing 6 frigates (220 guns total), 2 brigantines (16 guns each), 3 schooners (12 guns each), and the 10-gun sloop Hornet, sailed offshore.17
The exact size of Tripoli’s Janissary-khouloughli corps during the war is not known. Given its poorness and the fact that Tunis had an army of 6,800 badly trained and equipped soldiers, Tripoli may have been able to field half that force. Further, because Yusef had alienated himself from the Porte, he could not count on Turkish reinforcements. This limited his ability to defend the country from a land attack. By the spring of 1805, excluding fortress cannoneers, the port of Tripoli garrison was approximately 900 sipahi Janissaries with another 90 each at Misurata and Benghazi. Derne had an estimated 800 defenders, both Janissary and untrained local Arab levees.18
Derne was an enclave on a coastal plain and passage into town followed the Roman road that was used by Hadj pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca, providing a source of income and information. The Mediterranean coast ran before Derne roughly from east to west with a sloping point jutting slightly into the sea to the northwest and the sheltered port just to the east. To either side of the open shore that abutted the Derne plain, the beaches were shallow and pinned between sea and rocky cliffs. Rising hills surrounded the plain, starting approximately one and a half miles inland from the coast. In the 1800s, the wadi system that had formed the plain consisted of a seasonally dry riverbed that passed Derne to the southeast and emptied into the port along with the main wadi that passed west of town en route to the sea. It contained an aqueduct system that provided water to Derne and the surrounding fields. By 1805, Derne was known as a fertile region, rich in fruits and grains as well as wax, honey, and butter.19
The population was approximately 7,000 people and represented the social upheavals of the Mediterranean world. Originally a 7th century B.C. Greek settlement, it fared well during Roman times, becoming a bishopric by the 5th century. Following the 7th century Arab conquest, Derne fell into decline and its people were swept up in the Banu Hilal migration during the 11th century. Refugees from Moorish Spain, the moriscos, resettled the abandoned city in the 15th century. As sedentary settlers, communal ties, not Bedouin bloodlines, formed the basis of morisco society. Communities were tied to the farmland, the town, and as it grew, by its quarters that formed de facto sub-tribes. The Bedouins regarded the inhabitants of Derne as outsiders, a people without a tribe, well into the 20th century.20
The Bedouin tribal leaders were more opportunists than adherents of the Qaramanli regime. Their focus was on herding and trading with Derne and the caravans that operated far from the court intrigues in the Port of Tripoli. They acknowledged the Dey’s authority but were disinterested in politics so long as it did not interfere in their livelihoods. The relationship between the town’s community and the Bedouins was one of uneasy tension. This made Derne’s population dependent on the protection of the Dey, to feel the hand of his rule or misrule, and by 1805, their loyalties were divided between the competing Qaramanli heirs.21
In Egypt, Eaton formed an “army” after the Ottoman Viceroy provided a letter of amnesty on 17 December 1804. The letter granted permission for Hamet and Eaton to pass the Turkish garrison without interference during what was in essence an invasion of Tripoli. This was a blow to Yusef who had sent an envoy to the Viceroy with the aim of keeping Hamet in Egypt. The envoy returned to Tripoli and upon hearing of Hamet’s plan, Yusef ordered the dispatch of a Derne relief column, a decision that stretched his army to its limit, leaving only 600 sapahis at the port fortress. The column was augmented by Bedouin horsemen and untrained soldiers from tribes of questionable loyalty and, as Derne was on the pilgrimage route to Mecca, Yusef could not keep the movement secret.22
In February 1805, several hundred Hamet loyalists assembled in the Egyptian desert nearly 300 miles from the frontier. To transport the necessary supplies and weapons, Eaton was forced to hire some 200 camels with drivers from a venal and troublesome Bedouin sheik named Tayyb, who would bring several dozen armed horsemen for protection. This allowed the expedition to travel relatively unmolested and trade with the local tribes for food from the time it departed on 6 March until the 21 April Battle of Derne. The American victory had an immediate and profound impact on the course of the war.23
Yusef immediately sued for peace. The demand for tribute and a $200,000 ransom proposed ironically on 21 April was withdrawn for a new one with three conditions: first, a $60,000 payment; second, the ending of aid to Hamet; and third, the evacuation of Derne. Tribute would end and Yusef also agreed to the release of Hamet’s family upon the return of Derne, but there was a secret provision that allowed him to keep Hamet’s family hostage for four years even if Hamet quit Derne. The American negotiator, Tobias Lear, agreed and the treaty was signed on 4 June and the secret provision, the day following. The war was over.24
The expedition was a marked military success. While achieved by the heroics of those who fought there, it was made possible by Tripoli’s social fissures. Culturally, the bifurcation of the society in the 11th century created the caravan system and made the expedition logistically viable, and the Turkish insertion of foreign coastal colonies deepened fault lines and formed a Bedouin society that would indifferently accept outsiders like Hamet and Eaton. Militarily, Tripoli’s poorness and the limits of the Janissary-khouloughli system put Yusef at a disadvantage. Divided loyalties at Derne also meant that Eaton would be sufficiently strong in relative terms. Victory was not certain but not by the risky undertaking indicated by Eaton’s small numbers. Politically, had Yusef not risen bloodily to power or had Hamet not escaped, the entire enterprise would not have been possible. Yusef’s illegitimate rule in the eyes of the Porte also helped, as demonstrated by the lack of aid for Yusef coupled with the Viceroy’s support of Hamet.25
By themselves, none of these factors ensured success, but together they leveled the battlefield. It was equally true that, had any factorial combination been different, victory at Derne may have proven impossible. The point for military planners is that cultural intelligence or regional knowledge and experience can prove invaluable, and formally integrating cultural intelligence into the planning process can make a difference between success and failure.
Notes
1. The Ottoman’s named provinces for their capital, to avoid confusion; this article uses “Tripoli” to denote the Barbary State of Tripoli. The capital will be referred to as the Port of Tripoli.
2. The author first heard the term “cultural intelligence” in 1993 during a lecture by Gen Anthony Zinni on his experiences during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
3. William S. Shaw, The Life of the Late General Eaton (Brookfield, MA: E. Merriam, 1813), 315.
4. Shaw, Eaton, 256; United States Department of the Navy, Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers: Naval Operations including Diplomatic Background, 1785–1807, 450.
5. Shaw, Eaton, 306, 338–340. The ships were the brigantine Argus, schooner Nautilus, and sloop Hornet. Derne was the name used at the time of the battle. Other versions include Darnis (the name given by its Greek founders) and Darnah. Today’s name, Derna, dates from the Roman Era. Its name in Arabic is virtually identical: Dernah.
6. Ramzi Rouighi, “The Berbers of the Arabs,” Studia Islamica, new series, 1, (2011): 81; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 103–104.
7. Hourani, 215. Beylerbey means “commander of commanders.”
8. Hourani, 228; Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, “An Agenda for Research in History: The History of Libya between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, No. 3 (August 1983), 306–307. “Pasha,” pronounced “bashaw” in North Africa, came from the Persian “padishah” roughly meaning “master king.” Within the Sublime Porte, it was a rank superior to Bey, but in the Barbary States, the local title of Dey or Bey was often retained.
9. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 45–46. The Turks referred to the “blood tax” process as devserme or collection.
10. Chai-lin Pan, “The Population of Libya,” Population Studies 3, no. 1 (June 1949), 101; K.S. McLachlan, “Tripoli and Tripolitania: Conflicts and Cohesion during the Period of the Barbary Corsairs (1551–1850),” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 3, no. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978), 287.
11. Navy, Documents, Volume 1, 207; see World Statesmen-Libya at http://www.worldstatesmen.org (accessed 29 January 2012).
12. Helen Chapin Metz, editor, Libya: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987), See “Karamanlis,” paragraph 1. Available at http://countrystudies.us/Libya (accessed 15 January 2012). Ahmed Qaramanli was of Albanian descent.
13. Shaw, Eaton, 339; Richard Tully, A Narrative of a Ten Year Residence in Tripoli in Africa (London: Henry Colburn, 1817), 231–233, passim, 329. Accessed at http://books.google.com, 1 February 2012.
14. Tully, 336–337; Chapin, Libya, see “Karamanlis,” paragraph 2; Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 110–111.
17. Navy, Documents, Volume 1, 300, 315, 368; Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805 (New York: Princeton University Press, 1945), 89; Joshua E. London, Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation, (Hoboken: Wiley, 2005), 191. Murad, a convert to Islam, had been born as Peter Lisle in Scotland. The USS Enterprise took the 14-gun corsair Tripoli out of action on 1 August 1801.
18. Shaw, Eaton, 98, 330, 335–336, 348. Misurata is also known as Misrata or Misratah. The composition of the Derne forces was not cited. To crush a similar rebellion by his son in 1817, Yusef deployed fewer than 500 Janissaries (See Della Cella’s Narrative, 8).
19. Hourani, 480–481; Shaw, Eaton, 306; Paola Della Cella, Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontiers of Egypt in 1817, translated by Anthony Aufrere (London: John & Arthur Arch, 1822), 176, available at http://books.google.com (accessed 28 January 2012); John W. Norie, New Piloting Directions for the Mediterranean Sea (London: J. W. Norie, 1831), 338. Accessed at http://books.google.com/books (accessed 23 January 2012).
20. Della Cella, 177; R.G. Goodchild, “Mapping Roman Libya,” The Geographical Journal,Volume 118, No. 2 (June 1952), 143, 150; Hourani, 106; Vladimir Peniakoff, Popski’s Private Army: A Legendary Commander’s True Story of World War II Commando Combat (New York: Bantam Books, 1950), 106.
21. McLachlan, 292; Shaw, Eaton, 337, 348, 358.
22. Shaw, Eaton, 283, 293; Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror, 1801–1805 (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 267; Shaw, Eaton, 306, 348, 358.
23. Shaw, Eaton, 311, 316–317, 326–327, 336; Navy, Documents, Volume 5; for examples of difficulties associated with Tayyb, see 405, 456, and 470–472.
24. Navy, Documents, Volume 6, 1, 81–82. The ransom was for the safe return of the crew of the USS Philadelphia that had been taken prisoner after the ship ran afoul of a reef off the port of Tripoli on 31 October 1803.
The publication of Talent Management 2030 in November of 2021 was a watershed moment in the Marine Corps’ transition from Industrial Era human capital management to 21st-century talent management. While over the last three years there have been significant efforts at the headquarters level to realize these initiatives, there have only been a handful of tangible results for Marines. The development efforts toward creating a talent marketplace are one such result. These efforts include the award of contracts to prototype two industry-leading marketplace solutions in addition to the release of an internally developed marketplace called the Talent Management Engagement Platform (TMEP). The TMEP has already been released to approximately 30,000 enlisted Marines and officers and is in use for the fiscal year 2025 assignment season.
The TMEP will enable the Marine Corps to reimagine and enhance career management by increasing the transparency of the assignments process, improving the education of the individual Marine on career options and progression, and enhancing agency throughout the assignments process.
What Is TMEP and How Is It a Marketplace? A talent marketplace is a platform that enables job seekers to match their skillsets and interests with available job opportunities. Many marketplaces have familiar names, like LinkedIn or Zip Recruiter, which use advanced algorithms to match prospective employees with organizations that can reach out to begin negotiations. Harvard Business Review describes internal marketplaces like TMEP as having two forms.1 The first allows employees to search through job listings while managers search through candidate profiles and when interests align the process moves forward. In the second version, the platform automates the matching process, providing a curated list of recommended matches to the employees and managers. The TMEP is being designed to leverage the best of both internal marketplace types.
The current deployment of TMEP is like the first version of the internal marketplace. Marines can search through available billets to find opportunities that match their interests and desires. Simultaneously, monitors can review the Marines available for assignment and find options that align with their preferences. As the system matures and collects enough data, TMEP will implement machine learning techniques to include functionality more like the second version of the internal marketplace. Here the platform will use available data to align Marines’ skills, education, experience, and necessary career growth with the Marine Corps’ warfighting needs. Regardless of version, TMEP is being developed to support a modern internal talent marketplace rooted in three core principles: education, transparency, and agency.2
The level of transparency provided by TMEP is unprecedented in the assignments process. Education and transparency often go together since education is nearly impossible without transparency of information. Before TMEP, Marines only had persistent access to their personal service record information, which includes their past assignments, but they lacked access to current and future assignment availability. The TMEP addresses this by providing Marines the ability to access a live update of the same assignment availability as the monitors. This level of transparency allows Marines to tailor their preferences based on current availability. The freedom to change their preference outside of the annual mover’s survey also allows Marines to adapt their career plan as their life circumstances change. The TMEP also increases transparency by providing an asynchronous and persistent communication platform for Marines and their monitors providing continuity even as monitors rotate out of the billet.
In the current assignment process, a typical Marine has very little agency. They may complete a short survey and have a quick conversation with their monitor, but that is the extent of their input during the assignment process. Increasing the available information creates an opportunity for Marines to educate themselves and have more agency in their career progression.
The TMEP is a significant step in the right direction to increase transparency and agency in the assignments process and further educate Marines on available career opportunities. While TMEP creates the opportunity for Marines to be more involved in the assignments process, it does not change the priority to meet the needs of the Marine Corps.
What We See Today Although most readers had not seen TMEP before the summer of 2024 when access was expanded to 12,000 enlisted Marines and 16,000 officers, the Marine Corps has been working on this effort for nearly two years. In that time Manpower and Reserve Affairs has conducted industry research, created an actionable vision, gathered user inputs, and began building that vision to meet those user requirements. This methodology, called user-centered design, is arguably one of the greatest changes and most impactful actions the Marine Corps has taken when it comes to IT modernization. The TMEP is being designed by and for the user: the Marines and their monitors. The version available today via Marine Online represents the most basic functionality and will serve as the foundation for future iterations still being shaped through Marines’ feedback and ideas.
Today, Marines can log onto TMEP and access the same service data that the monitors use to make assignment decisions. Officers can view their projected move date as well as when they can expect to be on a promotion board and in what zone. All Marines can see a consolidated graphic that captures key information for making career decisions including the ability to see how factors like age, time in service, rank, and children’s school grade levels line up over time to facilitate informed career planning (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Career path display. (Figure provided by author.)
Instead of being limited to an annual conversation with their monitor, Marines can send direct messages that are archived within the platform. The TMEP also provides Marines the capability to search through available assignments to make a more informed decision on assignment preferences. Marines can see the same availabilities that their monitor sees, including billet descriptions the commands can edit for their specific unit. Registering assignment preferences and communications with a monitor is now consolidated in the same platform monitors use to conduct assignments. This means no more jumping between systems reducing the potential to lose communications.
What We’ll See Tomorrow What we see today in TMEP is just the most basic functionality. What TMEP will look like in the future is up to the users of the platform. The TMEP leverages a user-centered design methodology, allowing Marines to inform the requirements and prioritization of future features. Users have already provided some great ideas that have resulted in functionality resident in the platform today.
In addition to improving user experience through feedback, the platform must incorporate talent-based criteria and decision tools. If we are to truly move to a talent-based marketplace, the next step for TMEP must be to identify required skills and talents by billet and register and validate the talent and skills of our Marines. One of the key ingredients in any talent marketplace is the mapping of skills to jobs and people, also known as a skills ontology. Without this mapping, matching Marines to billets will continue to rely on rank and MOS as the primary selection criteria. Mapping skills also clear the way for TMEP to start leveraging machine learning to automate and optimize the assignment process.
In this instance, the intent of machine learning goes far beyond simple optimization. As the platform learns the various career paths Marines can take, the system will generate dynamic career path options and recommendations Marines can use as a roadmap to reach their career goals. Machine learning would be used to generate a draft list matching Marines to future vacancies optimized based on preferences, priority, and relevant skills. Machine learning will offer Marines a much clearer picture of their choices and how those choices impact their career progression and support monitors in meeting the needs of the Marine Corps.
Summary Three years after the publication of Talent Management 2030, the marketplace effort is moving at full speed with two contracts and TMEP competing for the future of the Marine Corps’ talent management solution. Assignment processes are being evaluated for business improvement opportunities and the transition to a modern talent management system has begun. This move is long overdue but in no way an indictment of the old systems or the professionals who made it work for so long through sheer will and dedication. In a short time, TMEP made great strides to consolidate information, streamline workflows, and improve the efficiency of the overall assignments process with every additional feature added the Marine Corps’ talent marketplace brings the Commandant’s vision in Talent Management 2030 closer to reality.
>LtCol Peterson is currently serving as the Manpower and Reserve Affairs MITSM Portfolio Manager and Modernization Officer in the Manpower Information Systems Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
>>Capt Figlioli is currently serving as the Talent Management Engagement Platform Product Owner and Project Officer in the Manpower Information Systems Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
Notes
1. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington DC: 2021).
2. Bo Cowgill et al., “How to Design an Internal Talent Marketplace,” Harvard Business Review, May–June 2023, https://hbr.org/2023/05/how-to-design-an-internal-talent-marketplace.
2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: Second Place
A satire of and recommendation for the Marine Corps Fitness Report
“A collection of talented individuals without personal discipline will ultimately and inevitably fail. Character triumphs over talent.” 1
—James Kerr, Legacy
“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.” 2
—Sir William F. Butler
Part 1: The Problem, in Satire There is a pyramid of Eagle, Globe, and Anchor logos that comprise the Comparative Assessment Chart in Section K of the Marine Corps fitness report. The image is colloquially referred to as “the Christmas tree” for the diagram’s resemblance to the traditional holiday pine. In this portion of the report, a higher-ranking officer, who may not know the Marine very well, will compare the Marine’s value against that of other Marines who the higher-ranking officer also may not know very well.
At the bottom of the chart is a single logo, mimicking the stump of the tree, where the Corps’ invalids are lumped under the solitary, shameful tag of Unsatisfactory. Those who happen to blunder and slip through the cracks of bare proficiency to rank so lowly against their peers should be separated by a bold double black line to annotate inadequacy and disgrace.
Above the doomed are the Qualified, who represent the lowest trim of branches that merit holding ornaments. They are the foundational layer of bottom-third talent upon whom those of higher standing rely to buffer against shame. To be qualified is to be relegated to an inference of sub-standard functioning that, while technically satisfactory, must be categorically subjugated and cataloged as a group that has failed. They only did what they were told to do.
Then, atop the regular folk but just below la crème, sit the masses of the Many Highly Qualified Professionals Who Form the Majority of this Grade. It is quite the epithet, especially considering the phrase portends where most Marines shall be assessed. They have done much more than is to be expected and should think highly of their accomplishments. However, that they have done more that what is expected of Marines. They will find a modicum of success within the organization.
Next, one finds the proverbial pick of the litter, also known as One of the Few Exceptionally Qualified Marines. These must be the men and women who are charged with keeping bright the shining light atop the Corps’ hill because, without their influence, how will those wide-eyed followers beneath them know the morally right from the objectively wrong? When young boys and girls say out loud to their friends at recess that they want to grow up to be a Marine, this is what they intend.
Still, there is a rank above these do-no-wrongers. At the top of the Christmas tree is another single Eagle, Globe, and Anchor logo. This one is labeled: The Eminently Qualified Marine. It is commonly understood that no Marine truly ranks in this category. It exists to humble us and to let us know that only because the very best of our ancestors were so exceedingly proficient at winning wars was this classification even created.
However, this is not the system that describes human interaction. The pursuit of principled achievement cannot be summed through an exaggerated appellation that has no real definable metric. Who has not woken up on days and felt barely Qualified? Yet, there is no box to tick for One of the Many Who Succeeds in the Daily Conquering of an Inner Demon. Nor is there a category for Unassuming, Yet Expertly Competent. Who is not eminently qualified, sometimes, though having made unsatisfactory errors in judgment and execution, on occasion?
Nonetheless, the slow, steep climb out of despair starts with one trudging step in darkness. Arguably, this is the hardest step. Marines might better be judged by how far and determined their trek than if they were able to plant a flag on the summit of eminence. The latter is an evaluation of talent; the former is an assessment of character.
As leaders commonly convey, Marines are promoted on future potential rather than past performance. Yet, the current version of the Marine Corps fitness report does little to characterize the potential of individuals. In fact, its sole function is to quantify past performance. The report and its accompanying master brief sheet codify every blemish, categorize every remark, and collate every meritorious phrase, reducing the sum of evaluations into a single comparative number known as a relative value. These values form the proverbial hourglass figure (or lack thereof): the graphical depiction of a career’s worth of reports.
The obvious discrepancy when attempting to shape-ify performance over the length of a career is the lack of nuance regarding the individual. Fitness reports capture performance for instance, and master brief sheets average those instances across a decade or more. Neither provides an evaluation of potential, which, at least colloquially, is the fundamental attribute for promotion (and by implication, denotes character). To avoid propagating the Peter Principle, where Marines rise to their level of incompetence, we must select for potential, within which is an assessment of character, and prepare prospective promotables for future successes.3
Figure 1. Comparative assessment chart. (Source: Commandant of the Marine Corps, NAVMC 10835, USMC Fitness Report, [Washington, DC: n.d.].)Figure 2. The proverbial hourglass. (Source: created by author.)
Part 2: Selecting for Potential (and by Implication, Character) The first part of this recommendation, and an easy proposal to make, is an update to the evaluation form. The problem, however, is defining potential. Then, once defined, quantifying it for comparative review. For the former issue, Harvard Business Review identified three general markers of high potential: ability, social skills, and drive.4
At its core, the current fitness report is an appraisal of ability. Essentially, the report is a drawn-out work sample test, where Marines are evaluated based on observations of the tasks that make up their job. That this evaluation is divided into five sections and fourteen sub-sections simply demonstrates the extent to which the individual’s ability (in his current position) is scrutinized. However, when evaluating a candidate for a higher, more complicated position, the capacity to learn “where the single best predictor is […] cognitive ability”5 supersedes the propensity to perform. In this sense, a premium should be placed on education, the ability to acquire new skills quickly, and flexibility in new roles or when making mistakes. Still, beyond a measure of raw cognitive ability, promotion to each successive rank or position requires examination of intangible items related to intelligence. As an example, promotion to a rank of organizational influence or selection for leadership positions should include an assessment for creativity and a knack for systems thinking.6 These advancements should also involve a sense of vision and imagination, items not usually captured in a standard annual report. Moreover, if the Corps is serious about promoting smart Marines, then the organization should test for aptitude as a required element of promotion, command, or school selection. Evaluation of ability, as it relates to potential, requires a rigorous assessment of intelligence.
Social skills are the core elements of emotional intelligence, another item not explicitly measured when concerning retention, promotion, and selection for advanced programs or leadership opportunities. The core competencies of emotional intelligence, depicted with their relationships in Figure 3, are self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management. The primary attribute, self-awareness, describes the ability to understand your own strengths and weaknesses and recognize how they impact the team’s performance.7 Related, and perhaps the one item mentioned within the current Marine Corps fitness report, addressed as effectiveness under stress, is self-management. Beyond basic recognition, self-management refers to the ability to manage emotions, especially under stressful conditions. Social awareness closely relates to empathy and can best be described as knowing how to read a room. Lastly, relationship management “refers to your ability to influence, coach, and mentor others, and resolve conflict effectively.”8 The evaluation of these social skills, progressing generally in order of merit as they are listed above, is necessary to qualify emotional intelligence, an important factor in determining potential and assessing character.
An individual’s drive, best expressed in the current fitness report as initiative, is probably the most measurable and the most easily shaped by the environment. To the latter point, and in the parlance of the expectancy-value theory, drive is “motivated by a combination of people’s expectations for success and subjective task value in particular domains.”9 To this end, a Marine’s drive partially belongs to the individual yet is also indicative of a leader’s ability to create expectations of success and valency of the tasks to lead to it.
Figure 3. Four core competencies of emotional intelligence. (Source: Lauren Landry, “Emotional Intelligence in Leadership: Why It’s Important,” Business Insights Blog, April 3, 2019, https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/emotional-intelligence-in-leadership.)
Part 3: Evaluating through Education If cognitive ability is the single best predictor for higher-level success within the organization, then a Service-level investment in an individual’s intellect is the best groundwork for collectively preparing cohorts of Marines for selection and promotion. Furthermore, the results of that educational assessment (e.g., class ranking) should inform competitiveness for future opportunities. Within the officer corps, career-level, intermediate-level, and top-level schools require professional military education (PME) for promotion to the respective ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. Whether accomplished through resident PME (an allegedly selective process for attendance) or through non-resident education, and irrespective of the Marine’s relative success at the school, accomplishing PME is briefed at non-statutory boards as either complete or incomplete.
While the Marine Corps PME system excels in providing a baseline education to the masses, at least for the officer ranks, it lacks a tool for educational assessment that could advise promotion and selection panels on the potential of a Marine for advancement or command. If resident PME is truly selective, then attending an in-person school program is the first aimpoint for an individual’s efforts to increase his or her value to the organization. It then follows that Marines are incentivized to perform well if they understand that the educational assessment affects career potential.
Beyond baseline educational schools, such as Expeditionary Warfighting School for captains or Command and Staff College for majors, specialty schools aligned to billet or general job descriptions are few and far between. If an infantry captain attends the Army’s Maneuver Captain Career Course (MCCC), then he is well-prepared to be an infantry company commander. Conversely, if the same captain attends Expeditionary Warfighting School, he or she is well prepared to be a staff officer in a MEU. Why is a curriculum like MCCC not mandated for the preparation of incoming company commanders? Why does the student’s evaluation from a school like MCCC not influence whether he or she should be a company commander? These schools, and many like them, become proverbial checks in boxes without any measurable bearing on a Marine’s career.
Figure 4. The new fitness report. (Source: Created by author.)
Part 4: A Recommendation Character and intelligence ebb and flow over the course of a career, ideally upward, yet the fitness report and the master brief sheet do little to distinguish progress. Evaluations must be adjusted to provide the best picture of the current Marine’s value. Only the last five observed reports should be included in the master brief sheet.
If a fitness report is a tool used to screen promotion and selection opportunities, then its sections must evaluate potential. These sections should include ability (identified as talent and intelligence), social skills (identified as self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management), and initiative (i.e., drive).
If cognitive ability is the single best predictor for higher-level success, then resident education should be valued higher than non-resident, and the individual’s evaluation at a PME school should affect master brief sheet percentages. Additionally, skill-enhancing schools should become a requirement for advancement within military occupation specialty fields.
Figure 4 is imperfect and requires a process for normalization within a reporting senior’s profile. Additionally, it does not address the reviewing officer’s markings—but it does provide a better framework for how those markings should be applied. In any case, the current Marine Corps fitness report format is multiple decades old; it is time to accept a challenge to improve.
“The challenge is to always improve, to always get better, even when you are the best. Especially when you are the best.” 10
—James Kerr, Legacy
>Maj Halpern is an Infantry Officer whose previous experience includes deployments with the 22d MEU, FAST Deployment Programs, and SPMAGTF–Crisis Response Africa. Additionally, he spent two years working within the Australian Defence Force as part of the Marine Corps Personnel Exchange Program–Australia. Following, he served as the Assistant Operations Officer for 7th Mar. He is currently the Future Operations Officer for 4th Mar.
Notes
1. James Kerr, Legacy: What the All Blacks Can Teach Us About the Business of Life (London: Little, Brown Book Group Limited, 2013).
2. Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (London & New York: Macmillan & Co, 1893). Charles George Gordon served in the British Army from 1852–1885, retiring as a major general. He served in the Crimean War, the Second Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Mahdist War.
3. “Peter Principle is prevalent in situations where people downplay the aptitude for management when making promotion decisions in organizations. In most cases, promotion decisions are made largely dependent on current performance. Therefore, those who excel in their current roles are promoted to managers despite not having the necessary management skills.” Human Capital Hub, “Peter Principle: What You Need to Know,” Human Capital Hub, May 29, 2023, https://www.thehumancapitalhub.com/articles/peter-principle-what-you-need-to-know.
4. Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Seymour Adler, and Robert B. Kaiser, “What Science Says about Identifying High-Potential Employees,” Harvard Business Review, October 3, 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/10/what-science-says-about-identifying-high-potential-employees.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Lauren Landry, “Emotional Intelligence in Leadership: Why It’s Important,” Business Insights Blog, April 3, 2019, https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/emotional-intelligence-in-leadership.
8. Ibid.
9. Robert V. Kail and Campbell Leaper, “Chapter 9-More Similarities than Differences in Contemporary Theories of Social Development: A plea for theory bridging,” in Advances in Child Development and Behavior 40 (Burlington: Elsevier Science, 2011).
10. James Kerr, Legacy: What the All Blacks Can Teach Us About the Business of Life (London: Little, Brown Book Group Limited, 2013).
I hate Sun Tzu. There, I said it. Go on, make your judgments, roll your eyes, and think: Here we go, this is the same guy who dismissed Plato in Philosophy 101 just to be a shocking contrarian. That is, admittedly, a perfectly reasonable reaction—but let me add some context now that I have your attention.
The Art of War does not offer bad advice, quite the opposite. It has had a profound effect on the 20th century through men like Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap; that is unquestioned. The Art of War is the definitive work on war in some parts of the world—but not here. The problem with Sun Tzu is two-fold. First, the influence of Sun Tzu is wildly overemphasized in Western military education since The Art of War is a relatively recent addition to the Western strategic canon. Second, his Confucian philosophy is antithetical to the philosophies that shaped the American way of war. Ultimately, Sun Tzu is an outsider whose work has limited applicability to the Marine Corps.
What value does Sun Zi add to the study of the Western way of war? (Photo provided by author.)
New Kid on the Block Sun Tzu is typically covered first when studying the theory of war. This makes sense, as he is chronologically the earliest great theorist. Yet, when the historicity is considered, Sun Tzu is a relatively recent addition. French Jesuits brought the first translations of The Art of War to Europe in the late 18th century, but when The Art of War entered into the Western zeitgeist is up for debate. Just because translations were available did not mean they were utilized. B.H. Liddell-Hart, whose indirect approach bears some similarities to The Art of War, was already working on his ideas when he was introduced to Sun Tzu in 1927.1 It was Marine Gen Samuel B. Griffith’s translation and commentary alongside Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare in 1963 that finally brought the text to wider attention in the West. Griffith even observes in his translation’s appendix that, despite European theorists having access to the text, they either had little knowledge or regard for it.2 Sun Tzu did not even make the cut for the definitive Makers of Modern Strategy, first released in 1986, though he did make the cut in the 2023 edition.3
Mediocre translations were certainly a factor in the relative sluggishness of Sun Tzu’s acceptance in Europe; however, likely the most significant factor was the lack of foundational texts whose understanding was a requisite for comprehension. Even today, much of the nuance of The Art of War is lost on Westerners who are not familiar with Confucian philosophy and Chinese history.
Most Westerners are not familiar with their own foundational texts, much less the Chinese ones. However, this was not always the case. For centuries, education in Europe was based on the medieval model’s trivium and quadrivium—collectively referred to as the liberal arts.4 This model drew heavily from the Greco-Roman texts that formalized education and served as a means of leveling the upper class.5 Classical works were pervasive in the development of modern military theory, practitioner Wellington and theorist Clausewitz would have equally dreaded the sentence: Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.6
Intellectually, the Greco-Roman and Medieval worlds were far more influential than Sun Tzu could ever hope to be. The overwhelming majority of theorists and practitioners who shaped our world had no idea who Sun Tzu was. If studying the evolution of Western strategic theory as it developed chronologically, Sun Tzu appears very late—certainly after Clausewitz and Jomini. The ancient classics with their medieval linkages are so vast that scholars frequently forget they are standing on them.
Why Sun Tzu Does Not Belong The Art of War was a subversive text at the time of its collection. War in ancient China had become increasingly theatrical with battles serving as opportunities for the nobility to display their manliness. Sun Tzu brought pragmatism to war in China. That is precisely the problem, Sun Tzu is the ultimate pragmatist; winning without fighting is a pragmatic goal, not a moral ideal. Restraint and magnanimity in victory are only necessary when the benefits outweigh the cost. People are disposable if it means winning; he lets others do the fighting and suffering provided it leads to victory. Everything is available to Sun Tzu—how you win is of no importance so long as you do. Mao and Giap won their wars in no small part because they were willing to inflict truly staggering degrees of suffering not just on their soldiers but on their own people; safe in the knowledge, it was for their own good. Effectively employing The Art of War requires the kind of hubris that Icarus would briefly appreciate.
This is where Sun Tzu fails to meaningfully contribute to the American way of war or Marine Corps warfighting. His commonsense advice is just that—common. Sun Tzu is certainly not unique, Homer compares conflict to flowing water as well.7 Readers can already learn the value of deception from wily Odysseus, sound campaign preparations from Julius Caesar, and strategic foolishness from Thucydides. Sun Tzu just reads better on a PowerPoint.
What is distinct to Sun Tzu is his cynical philosophical underpinnings that are best suited to equally cynical autocrats seeking to create a world more advantageous for themselves. The difference becomes more apparent when it is compared directly to the Western intellectual tradition that would create the concepts of chivalry and just war. The Art of War stresses the importance of the general as the “bulwark of the state” and “arbiter of fate” which has been an antithetical concept in American history since George Washington.8
Like Liddle-Harts’s indirect approach, Sun Tzu requires a healthy degree of sophistry to intellectually sustain. If you properly observe the techniques, then success is all but guaranteed; failure is the result of not following the proscribed techniques. By this logic, one could argue that Alexander applied the indirect approach when he slashed open the Gordian knot. Just consider the translation convention of terms like Moral Law and virtue, Sun Tzu and Thomas Aquinas are talking about very different things.9 Where Sun Tzu advocates morally relative pragmatism, Thomas Aquinas acknowledges moral paradox. War can be both awful and just. Violent men are expected to control themselves with courtly manners. This is not hypocrisy but the inability to live up to transcendent ideals, much like Clausewitz’s acknowledgment that theoretical total war is impossible. This is why Europe has King Arthur and China has Confucius.
Know Your Self, Know Your Adversary Science is the handmaiden of philosophy. Therefore, cynical pragmatic philosophy will produce cynical pragmatic means of making war. Sun Tzu would be baffled by Western readers’ negative perception of the Melian Dialogue as an increasingly imperious Athens threatens the small neutral island of Melos into submission; obviously, the weak endure what they must, that is the entire point of being strong! For the most hardened student of realpolitik, it is hard to make a case that Americans are particularly talented at the strategy advocated by Sun Tzu. It has been attempted but rarely with lasting success and never with moral justification. When Americans are at peace, Sun Tzu has minimal applicability to U.S. foreign policy because pragmatism does not win friends.
Two states that actively espouse Sun Tzu will never truly be at peace. Sun Tzu emphasizes attacking an opponent’s strategy. In peacetime, this means undermining the enemy society since the best way to win without fighting is to endlessly prepare for war while undermining your adversary. A state that ascribes to this sort of mentality can have a public policy of no preemptive strikes yet still launch a surprise attack in the name of defense.
Sun Tzu emphasizes a mental model of war versus a physical one; this becomes truly terrifying when it hybridizes with postmodern materialistic philosophy. The pursuit of gaining and maintaining political power becomes its principal goal and is endlessly pursued. Sun Tzu is far more applicable to the challenges of international order, unsurprisingly, the People’s Republic of China. China has recognized that attacking an opponent’s strategy means corrupting their society, which they do through disinformation campaigns on social media, complicity in illicit synthetic opioid exports, and eroding trust in global institutions, such as the World Health Organization. A state that emphasizes undermining its perceived adversary’s societal fabric through deception will have to pay a moral cost as words will cease to mean things and trust corrodes.
What Should the Marine Corps Do About It? Thucydides should be acknowledged as the intellectual godfather of the Marine Corps; the History of the Peloponnesian War puts tragic the human cost of war on full display. When war is perceived as easy and convenient, reality quickly dispels this notion at a terrible cost. Society breaks down when pragmatism is ahead of ideals. The fact humans are unable to achieve permanent peace does not make the ideal less worthwhile. Wars should be fought with the intent to create a better state of peace, wars of pragmatism rarely accomplish this. Thucydides paints an imperfect world that is worth living and fighting for, the world of Sun Tzu knows no leisure.
Sun Tzu should be studied and comprehended in the same way that Mao’s Little Red Book should be kept handy. No reasonable person could argue about Mao’s effectiveness as a leader; he achieved his political objectives and was one of the most consequential leaders of the 20th century. Yet, this came at the cost of ruthless purges, grinding campaigns, and mass starvation but on a scale that most Americans can barely comprehend. The current generation of the Chinese Communist Party helming China are the heirs of that tradition. Whether they appreciate it or not, Americans are crusaders. Brilliant crusaders. Whether crushing insurrections to end slavery or ending the terror of an authoritarian dictator; when Americans go to war with ideals and strategic alignment—they get the job done regardless of the cost and blood.
Sun Tzu is commonly referenced because it is easily referenced, pithy quotes that apply to everything. The Western classical tradition is more difficult to digest but offers a much richer understanding of humans in conflict. Thucydides is a grind, both textually and spiritually, and it should be—comprehending war should not be easy or convenient. The works of Homer and Thucydides are ostensibly sad, life is hard, and war is tragic but that is only because deep down they understand that it should not have to be this way. Understanding the rage of Achilles, the despair of Odysseus, or the whole tragedy of the Peloponnesian War offers a far more realistic view of humanity in conflict because of its longing for a better world that is denied to them. They can only see the silhouettes that are created by a luminous perfect form. They are focused on the light; Sun Tzu is focused on the shadows.
Sun Tzu’s current place in the Western strategic canon is poetic, his introduction is far more recent, yet he is the most recognizable and more often quoted. The West Point Civil War generals fought because of Jomini, the Prussian generals fought because of Clausewitz, and both of whom are footnotes when compared to the influence of Thucydides. Sun Tzu has truly won without fighting.
>Maj Stephens is the Course Chief for the Logistics Intelligence Planners Course at the Marine Corps Operational Logistics Group in Twentynine Palms, CA.
Notes
1. Sun Tzu, Art of War, translated by Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
2. Ibid.
3. Gordon Gecko cites the text in 1987’s Wall Street if that is any indication of public awareness.
4. For a concise description of the medieval liberal arts, see the Dorthy L. Sayers essay “The Lost Tools of Learning.”
5. Thomas Ricks, First Principles (New York: Harper, 2020).
6. “All of Gaul is divided into three parts,” The (in)famous opening line of Julius Caesar’s campaign in Gaul.
7. Homer, The Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).
2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: First Place
Eleven challenges to Talent Management 2030
As stated in Talent Management 2030 (TM2030), “Our modern operational concepts and organizations cannot reach their full warfighting potential without a talent management system that recruits, develops, and retains the right Marines.”1 While this statement is extremely valid, there is one significant problem with this sentence, and furthermore, one significant problem with TM2030—specifically the word talent. Simply put, the Marine Corps does not need talent.
Talent Management 2030’s mandate is to “achieve a full transition from the current manpower system to a talent management system no later than 2025.”2 However, there are challenges that need to be addressed immediately to facilitate this intent to the fullest—increasing our combat lethality, operational effectiveness, and survivability to win our Nation’s battles. Therefore, this article poses eleven challenges to TM2030 and describes how the Marine Corps does not need talent. The ultimate thesis is that we do not need a talent management system but a Marine management system.
Challenge 1: Talent is Overvalued In his book,Talent is Overrated, Geoff Colvin defines talent as: “A natural ability to do something better than most people can do it.”3 This is similar to how TM2030 defines talent (i.e., “an individual’s innate potential to do something well.)”4 Regarding talent being overvalued, throughout the book, Colvin’s research showcases that we exceedingly credit innate gifts (i.e., talents) to top performance. The reality is that top performance comes from extreme purposeful effort (i.e., deliberate practice).5 Colvin describes how we overinflate talent with musicians, intelligence, and individuals such as Tiger Woods and Mozart.6 In fact, Colvin’s book demonstrates that top-performing musicians practiced 800 percent more than lower-performing musicians and that both Tiger Woods and Mozart’s fathers started their training while they were infants and toddlers. Therefore, they could hardly be described as child prodigies.7
As seen in Case Study 1, Johnny Manziel shows that talent will only get a person so far in one’s career. Colvin credits high consistent performance with deliberate practice, not talent.8 “Deliberate practice is also not what most of us do when we think we’re practicing … Deliberate practice is hard. It hurts. But it works. More of it equals better performance. Tons of it equals great performance.”9 Deliberate practice can be summarized as practice that is purposefully designed to elicit performance by pushing a person just beyond their current limits, with high quality, frequent and recurrent repetitions, with immediate feedback, and is mentally taxing.
“… but of course we can take any credit for our talents, it is how we use them that counts.”
—A Wrinkle in Time
Case Study 1: Talent is overinflated—Johny Manziel. (Study provided by author.)
Challenge 2: Experience is Overinflated When you read Malcolm Gladwell’s book, Outliers: The Story of Success, the reader will clearly see that talent, experience, or rank did not enable the outliers (top performers) to achieve greatness, rather it was the opportunity combined with hard, diligent work.10 Mike Eruzione, captain of the 1980 U.S. Miracle hockey team, credits two fortunate chances (i.e., opportunities) in his life that provided him the opportunity to score the winning goal on 22 February 1980 against the Soviets; however, it was Eruzione’s blue-collar work ethic that allowed him to exploit those chances.11 Regarding experience being overrated, as stated by Colvin, “extensive research in a wide range of fields shows that many people not only fail to become outstandingly good at what they do, no matter how many years they spend doing it, they frequently don’t even get any better than they were when they started.”12
Furthermore, Colvin states: “More experienced doctors reliably score lower on tests of medical knowledge than do less experienced doctors; general physicians also become less skilled over time at diagnosing heart sounds and X-rays. Auditors become less skilled at certain types of evaluations.”13 The way we should view experience is as whether or not one’s experience is that of a low performer, average performer, or a high performer. For too many in our Corps, our experience is that of being average; yet, we overinflate having experience of being average to that of credibility.
Let us never confuse a driven, hardworking, and problem-solving individual who possesses little experience to be less than an individual with more experience of being average. What we should acknowledge and reward is not experience but rather learning, innovation, effort, and the ability to fail and grow. Of note, “sub-elite skaters spent lots of time working on the jumps they could already do, while skaters at the highest levels spent more time on the jumps they couldn’t do.”14
Challenge 3: Rank is Overrated As stated in TM2030, “We should have an open door for exceptionally talented Americans who wish to join the Marine Corps, allowing them to laterally enter at a rank appropriate to their education, experience, and ability.”15 However, anyone who has been in the Marine Corps long enough knows that rank is overrated. We have all seen the lance corporal who outperforms the sergeant; the sergeant who outperforms the gunnery sergeant; or the captain who outperforms the major. Similar to talent and experience, rank is overrated.
As stated by Evans Carlson when he was the 2d Marine Raider Battalion commanding officer in World War II, “Are you willing to starve and suffer and go without food and sleep? I promise you nothing but hardships and anger. When we go into battle, we ask no mercy, we give none.” We should ask a similar question for those qualified (not talented) individuals we are trying to recruit into our Corps, specifically are you willing to start at the bottom, earn the title U.S. Marine, give up the comforts of your life that you are accustomed to, so that you may serve alongside the finest men and women of the United States?
Gen Krulak stated on 6 May 1946 to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in his infamous bended knee speech:
Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past, but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go.16
Then we must ask our Marine leaders of 2024, why do we have a bent knee to civilians with credentials we value? Figure 1 is a simple flow chart that displays if we as Marines should accept a 35-year-old with PhD in Cyber Security with ten years of cyber experience to try out for our Corps and earn the title of Marine. It has been stated that humility needs to be incorporated into our Marine culture, and if a civilian is not willing to humble himself, start at the bottom, and earn our title, then we do not need that individual.17 Of note, in the book Good to Great, Collins notes that “ten of eleven good-to-great CEOs came from inside the company, whereas the comparison companies tried outside CEOs six times more often.”18
Figure 1. Flow chart for a civilian’s potential rapid promotion into the Marine Corps. (Figure provided by author.)
Challenge 4: We Already Recruit a Different Person As stated in TM230, “the core objectives of all modern personnel management systems are to recruit individuals with the right talents, match those talents to organizational needs, and incentivize the most talented and highly performing individuals to remain with the organization.”19 However, as emphasized, talent is overvalued. Furthermore, are we certain that TM2030 is truly appreciating what we should be recruiting? Case Study 2 showcases what happens when you recruit for the wrong variables, such as perceived talents.
Our history, culture, character, and standards should draw the correct Americans toward us. Coach John Wooden coached the University of California Los Angeles for 29 years, where he won 10 national championships, had 4 perfect seasons, and 88 consecutive victories. Over Wooden’s 29 years as a coach, he only visited 10–12 players at their home but only after the athlete initiated first contact. Coach Wooden’s philosophy was that if these high-performing athletes did not want to play for the University of California Los Angeles, then perhaps they should play somewhere else.20
As stated by Coach Wooden:
I always felt that my nonrecruiting policy for players was the right thing to do—a productive part of the screening process. Before I talked to an individual about joining us, I first wanted to see evidence of his desire to be a part of the Bruins. The last thing you want is people in your organization who had to be talked into being there, who needed convincing that your team was worthy of them … Recruiting should be a two-way street.21
Furthermore, as stated by Dave Nassef, “I used to be in the Marines, and the Marines get a lot of credit for building people’s values. But that is not the way it really works. The Marine Corps recruits people who share the corps values, then provides them with training required to accomplish the organizations mission.”22
While we need to improve our recruiting process, we need to recognize we are already recruiting a different American. What we do with that American, from their initial training until they get out of our Marine Corps, rests on our shoulders as leaders and commanders. Specifically, we must truly sustain the transformation; make our Marines more lethal, resilient, and proficient; and retain the right Marines. Lastly, our legacy and current culture should continue to drive the right (not talented) civilians to want to earn the title of Marine.
Challenge 5: Entry Training Needs to be a Selection Process We do need to improve our recruiting process. However, we must also increase the standard of our entry-level schools (basic training [BT] and Officer Candidate Course [OCC]). As stated in TM2030, “approximately 20% of those recruited do not complete their first enlistment, a strong indicator that the service can do better to screen potential recruits.”23 While TM2030 states that we need to recruit to a higher standard, TM2030 completely negates the fact that the twenty percent who do not complete their first enlistment earned the title Marine. We failed our ancestors by allowing such a high number of individuals with the inability to serve four years in our Corps to earn the title of Marine.
Civilians wanting to earn the title of Marine are already volunteering to serve their country in the hardest Service. We should not forget this; we are already recruiting a different person. However, we need to take the earning of the title to a higher standard. We should treat BT and OCC the same way Marine Corps Special Operations Command treats assessment and selection. Specifically, BT and OCC should be a selection process. Based on the data, at least twenty percent of those who start BT should not earn the title of Marine.
Challenge 6: Talent Management Neglects Leadership As stated in TM 2030, “A Marine turns their talents into strengths, aptitudes, and skills through dedicated study, repetition, and hard work—a process accelerated by their curiosity, passion, and interests, and desire for excellence.”24 This is similar to the sentiment in Training and Education 2030 that states, “ultimately, every Marine is responsible for their own learning.”25 However, it has been posed that while each Marine is responsible for their own learning, “We as leaders in the Marine Corps must recognize it is imperative to educate our Marines by providing the optimal resources and direction.”26
In a similar vein, while it is the Marine’s job to turn their talents into strengths, it is also a mandate of Marine leaders to get the most out of their Marines, to include improvements in their strengths and weaknesses, in their interests and non-interests. Leadership has been defined as, “The ability to inspire and influence those around you to perform at a higher level and become better versions of themselves.”27 A leader’s job is to push Marines. Grow them, push them outside their comfort zone, build interests, develop passion, create opportunities, make innovation occur, give feedback, create optimal experiences, and develop specific, detailed, and progressive training. The moment the Marine Corps ceases to make leaders, our Nation should divest of her. Therefore, we must make leadership a part TM2030.
Case Study 2: What happens when we do not understand the traits of performance—Billy Beane. (Study provided by author.)
Challenge 7: Leaders and Commanders Cannot Retain the Right Marines A significant reason we have issues retaining the right (not talented) Marines in our formation is the direct leadership and command experienced by our young Marines during their short tenure in our Corps. Simply put, the Marine Corps did not lie to us—all one has to do is to look at our recruiting posters which typically either display a Marine in their dress blues or a Marine suffering in training. The Marine Corps promises civilians the ability to earn the title Marine (i.e., dress blues) as well as tough and miserable times via realistic training, physical conditioning, deployments, etc.
However, the Marine Corps also promises competent, moral, ethical, and beyond-reproach leaders. When we fail to deliver strong, competent, and confident leaders who possess humility, we lose the trust, passion, and motivation of our Marines we fail to sustain the transformation and retain the right (not talented) Marines.
Challenge 8: Our Culture (Not Talent) is What Makes Us the Marine Corps As stated in TM2030, “Marines make the Marine Corps. We have never defined ourselves by our equipment, organization constructs, or operational concepts.”28 Furthermore, as stated by Gen Berger, “Our historical and legislatively mandated role as the Nation’s force-in-readiness remains a central requirement in the design of our future force. The most important element of this requirement is the individual Marine.”29
The title of Marine should not be synonymous with talent. If Marines are to be synonymous with talent, then we should divest of BT, the Crucible, OCC, basic officer course, etc. Marines should be synonymous with riflemen, learners, leaders, problem solvers, resilient, passionate, dedicated, winners, driven, disciplined, professionals, accountable, and reliable—not talented. Case Study 3 displays that purposeful effort can achieve greatness while lacking the talents needed.
In the book TheCulture Code, Daniel Coyle states, “Our instincts have led us to focus on the wrong details. We focus on what we can see—individual skills. But individual skills are not what matters. What matters is the interaction.”30As stated, the “Marine Corps culture is what makes us who we are. Our warfighting culture is what made us successful in battles past, and our culture will either enable or hinder our future battles. Remember, our culture is our DNA, and while we cannot see it, we see its manifestation, which for the Marines, is on the battlefield.”31
Case Study 3: Purposeful and collective effort can achieve greatness—1980 United States Miracle Hockey Team. (Study provided by author.)
Challenge 9: Mandate a Culture of Pursuing Performance Talent Management 2030 states, “Once an individual earns the title ‘Marine,’ they have made the grade. There are no additional obstacles or barriers to entry—‘Once a Marine, always a Marine,’” and that we must encourage a culture of inclusion.32 TM2030 additionally directs our leaders to “focus on building inclusive teams … based on performance.”33 There are two issues with this: the passivity of the word encourage, and the passivity and acceptance of simply earning the title of Marine is enough.
Regarding culture, I have argued “that the single greatest contributor to a high-performing unit is the unit’s culture.”34 Furthermore, we as leaders “must define, emphasize, measure, acknowledge, and correct the culture we pursue.”35 However, leaders and commanders, who are the owners of the unit’s culture, should not encourage (passive) our culture, we should mandate (active) the culture we pursue.”36 We should have a culture of “hostility towards mediocrity.”37
Second, we as Marines should be proud of the title Marine, but we should not be content with just the title. Our mothers can be proud that we once earned the title Marine; however, we must earn that title every day while in uniform. Having graduated from BT or OCC is not enough. Far too many Marines in our Corps peak at earning the title Marine, evident by the twenty percent unable to complete four years of service.38 While hazing, tribalism, and/or a culture of less than for being new to the Marine Corps is not warranted nor is it productive, there should be daily challenges and mini-goals. However, these daily challenges and mini-goals are completed by each Marine in the unit every day. These can be physical or cognitive events done individually or collectively. However, each Marine regardless of rank, billet, years of service, or MOS should earn the title every day. Being a Marine should be a holistic, deliberate lifestyle. Case Study 4 shows that even talent must pursue greatness.
Challenge 10: Define Performance Talent Management 2030 discusses performance, but we as an organization have failed to define what performance means for early 21st-century warfighting performance (CWP). The more clearly defined a trait is, the more easily we can measure it. The better we can measure it, the more easily we can acknowledge success and correct setbacks. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 describes the constants of war via Chapter 1, The Nature of War.39 The changing character of the modern-day battlefield can be seen in the rise of private military contractors, the execution and planning of war by non-humans (i.e., drones and artificial intelligence), the saturation and proliferation of information and disinformation, additive manufacturing, and the accelerating pace of change.40
Without clearly defining early 21st-CWP, we will have: an unnecessary variance in preparation for war, a greater inherent risk of creating myopic definitions which leads to suboptimal performance, and increased risk by misclassifying performance, leading to incorrect emphases. Thus, we must adequately define early 21st-CWP. The author states that early 21st-CWP is the transient and relative capacity to impose our will during times of cooperation, competition, crisis, and conflict; the transient and relative capacity to efficiently and effectively achieve mission success criteria on the three levels of war; relative to the enemy, environment, and political situation, and a pursuit, where we never fully culminate. This definition of early 21st-CWP applies from the individual to the platoon to the Joint Force.
Challenge 11: Talent Management is the Incorrect Sentiment While TM2030 has numerous valid points, the Marine Corps does not need talent. Those who do possess talents (i.e., innate abilities) can often achieve quick success in learning new skills. However, when these talented individuals do not combine their gifts with practice, passion, or by challenging themselves, they will be surpassed by those who are less talented but are driven. For our newest Marines to join our ranks, current performance does not directly reflect future performance.
For example, a talented infantryman who recently graduated from Infantry Training Battalion may be more physically fit, have greater cognition, and display what we might perceive as being a leader, compared to a peer lacking in those domains due to their talents. However, if this Marine does not have the drive to be a better infantryman, Marine, or leader, and if a less-talented Marine were to consistently and deliberately practice his deficiencies, then over time, the less-talented Marine would become the better infantryman. In the book, The Sports Gene, Epstein states that regarding becoming a high performer, the 10,000-hour rule is what the average person takes to become an expert with intentional and designed practice.41 However, David Epstein states that due to people’s innate abilities (talents), it should really be called the 10,000 ± 5,000 hours because some can become experts in 5,000 hours, whereas others will take 15,000 hours to become experts. Thus, a talented, low-driven Marine may never make the 5,000 hours needed to become an expert, but the less talented, high-driven Marine may very well accumulate 15,000 hours. A talented Marine with low drive will be the first to fall asleep on watch, the last to volunteer for extra duties, and will not embody esprit de corps. Therefore, we can see that talented Marines are not innately preferable to hard-working, driven Marines.
Furthermore, talented individuals can be less resilient to failures and setbacks. In her book Mindset, Dr. Dweck’s research shows that individuals who are praised for their talents can develop fixed mindsets.42 While those with fixed mindsets can be highly successful, they are ultimately less resilient than those with growth mindsets. Figure 2 summarizes the research by Dr. Dweck regarding those with fixed mindsets to those with a growth mindset.43
Therefore, talent management is not the right sentiment; rather, it is Marine management. While there would be significant overlap to the principles laid out in TM2030, Marine management recognizes that we should not emphasize innate gifts, but whether or not the Marine is making improvements in their MOS and billet and is living by the ethos we pursue. As stated by Coach Herb Brooks, coach of the 1980 U.S. Miracle hockey team, “Gentlemen, you don’t have enough talent to win on talent alone.”44
Figure 2. Fixed versus growth mindsets. (Figure provided by author.)Case Study 4: Talent still has to pursue greatness—2008 United States Redeem Team. (Study provided by author.)
Conclusion While there are eleven challenges to TM2030, there are many facets I fully agree with, such as: “Marines are individuals, not inventory,” “Talents can be identified and evaluated,” and “Data drives decision-making.”45 Furthermore, transforming our recruitment system as identified in TM2030 is vital moving forward as well as increasing opportunities for Marines while in uniform.46
As stated in TM2030, “It begins and ends with preparedness for combat. Our ability to fight and win on future battlefields demands a personnel system that can recruit, develop, and retain a corps of Marines that is more intelligent, physically fit, cognitively mature, and experienced.”47 Were the Marines at Belleau Wood, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir able to impose their will on our enemies because of their talent (i.e., innate ability), or were our forefathers able to impose their will because they were Marines, forged in training, developed by small-unit leaders, led by morally-competent commanders, fighting for a purpose higher than themselves? We do not need talent.
>Maj Carter, before becoming a Special Operations Officer, was an Infantry Officer, serving as a Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer, and Company Commander, with deployment experience as both. Before commissioning in the Marine Corps, he was a strength and conditioning coach, a researcher in sports science, and a graduate teaching assistant. He is still currently active in the strength and conditioning community with his research centric to holistic training approaches for human performance.
Notes
1. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021).
2. Ibid.
3. Geoff Colvin, Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else (New York: Portfolio/ Penguin, 2018).
4. Talent Management2030.
5. Talent is Overrated.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (New York: Back Bay Books, 2008).
11. Mike Eruzione with Neal E. Boudette, The Making of a Miracle: The Untold Story of the Captain of the 1980 Gold Medal-Winning U.S. Olympic Hockey Team (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2020).
12. Talent is Overrated.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Talent Management 2030.
16. Alexander A. Vandegrift, “Bended Knee Speech,” Marine Corps University, March 30, 2024, https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Frequently-Requested-Topics/Historical-Documents-Orders-and-Speeches/Bended-Knee-Speech.
17. Jeremy Carter, “A Critical and Devastating Gap in our Leadership Traits, Principles, Evaluations, Ethos, and Culture: The Problem with Solutions,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, No. 7 (2024).
18. Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Don’t (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001).
19. Talent Management 2030.
20. John Wooden and Steven Jamison, Wooden on Leadership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
21. Ibid.
22. Good to Great.
23. Talent Management 2030.
24. Ibid.
25. Gen David H. Berger, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2023).
26. Jeremy Carter, “Strategic Competition and Stand-in Forces: A Novel View for Tactical Units,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, No. 8 (2024).
27. Jeremy Carter and Thomas Ochoa, “The Relationship Between Enlisted and Officers- Part 1: The T-Shape Philosophy,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7 (2023).
28. Talent Management 2030.
29. Ibid.
30. Daniel Coyle, The Culture Code: The Secrets of Highly Successful Groups (New York: Bantam Books, 2018).
31. Jeremy Carter, “Achieving the Culture We Pursue: The DEMAC Approach,” Marine Corps Gazette (Submitted).
32. Talent Management 2030.
33. Ibid.
34. “Achieving the Culture We Pursue.”
35. “A Critical and Devastating Gap in our Leadership Traits, Principles, Evaluations, Ethos, and Culture.”
36. “Achieving the Culture We Pursue.”
37. Ibid.
38. Talent Management 2030.
39. Douglas W. Hubbard, How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of “Intangibles” in Business, 3d edition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014);“Achieving the Culture We Pursue;” and Headquarters Marine Corps: MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).
40. Jeremy Carter, “United States Marine Corps Commandos: Enabling Joint Forcible Entry,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7. (2023).
41. David Epstein, The Sports Gene: Inside the Science of Extraordinary Athletic Performance (New York: Penguin Random House LLC, 2014).
42. Carol S. Dweck, Mindset: The New Psychology of Success- How We Can Learn to Fulfill Our Potential (New York: Ballantine Books, 2016).
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, September 1921.
Great deeds were done by the American Marines in the World War, and of these every school child knows. Only the historian and the antiquarian know of the part played by the Continental Marines in the Revolution, yet in that desperate struggle in which our forefathers won freedom and the right to exist as a nation, the Marines of that day acted a role fully as important and spectacular as that of the immortal Fourth Brigade in the war with Germany, covering their Corps with undying honor in battles more fruitful in their effect on our history than Belleau Wood and more smashing and decisive in results than the Meuse-Argonne.
Few Americans, aside from avowed historians and other searchers of Colonial and Continental documents, know that there were American Marines with Washington at the Battle ofTrenton, yet recent investigation of the records of that period disclose that fully a quarter of the entire strength of the heroic band of patriots with whom the First Commander-in-Chief crossed the Delaware on Christmas Eve, 1776,and smote the Hessians in the midst of their revels was made up of Soldiers of the Sea. The archives also show that on that occasion as well as at the equally decisive Battle of Princeton, the Marines conducted themselves in a manner worthy of the high traditions of their Corps and won the warmest praise from Washington himself by their valor, steadiness, discipline and efficiency.
On the roster of officers who led the Marines under Washington are names borne by families distinguished in Colonial annals and woven throughout the history of the United States. Some of these continued in the service of the Corps and won added glory on later occasions. Others transferred to different branches of Washington’s forces in need of their services, particularly to the artillery of the Army, where their experience with heavy cannon on shipboard rendered them particularly useful. Others made the supreme sacrifice in the cause of their country on the fields of Trenton and Princeton and were buried on the ground that their blood had hallowed.
In dealing with the Battles of the Revolution, writers of popular histories of the United States have paid little attention to the identity of corps or divisions of troops of the regular branches of the service. When the militia of the colonies appeared upon the field, their presence has been noted by writers of their respective states but with the regulars of Washington’s forces, little attempt has been made to preserve a record as to the troops which took part in the various battles and skirmishes, except as to the names of general officers and commanders of groups, with the result that the specific achievements of the Marines and of the regiments and other organizations of the Revolutionary Army have been to a great degree lost.
Recent search of the records reveals that of Washington’s force of about twenty-four hundred men with whom he crossed the Delaware on that momentous Christmas Eve, 1776, more than six hundred were Marines. These were made up of the “Famous Battalion” of Major Samuel Nicholas, the Marine Guards of the Andrea Doria, Hancock, Montgomery, and other vessels. Coming as they did, as a fresh, well-fed, well-equipped, well-trained reenforcement to Washington’s worn-out veterans, exhausted by the constant forced marches and desperate rear-guard actions of their retreat across the Jerseys, they may well have been the factor, which supplied the fresh strength and aggressive force, which made possible the decisive strategic successes of Trenton and Princeton.
With the coming of December, 1776, the position of Washington’s Army was indeed a precarious one, and the cause of the newly born United States trembled in the balance. Worsted in the battles of Long Island and forced to cross the Hudson to New Jersey, Washington was obliged to look on helplessly while the City of New York was occupied by a British Army and Fort Washington and Fort Lee captured. While this was going on a detachment of the main British force overran the surrounding territory, driving awedge between New England and the more southern colonies, cutting vital avenues of communication.
Furiously pursued by an overwhelming force across the Jerseys, Washington reached the Delaware near Trenton, and rapidly assembled a fleet of boats and barges while the Continental Navy and Pennsylvania State Navy combed the banks of the river fifty miles above and below Trenton, sweeping up everything that would float. On December 8th, Washington’s Army completed the passage of the river, taking the most serviceable of the boats with it and destroying those not needed for its own transportation. So effective had been the work of the naval detachments, that when the British reached the river a few days later, not a boat was to be found, and Lord Howe and his commanders quickly decided that it would be impossible to cross until the river should freeze.Accordingly detachments of the British Army occupied Trenton while other details spread up and down the eastern bank of the Delaware pillaging and burning the homes of those colonists loyal to the new government and occupying towns and strongpositions.
Meanwhile consternation struck into the hearts of the leaders of the Revolution, and itseemed that nothing could save the Americans from complete subjugation.Disheartened by the defeats of their Army and the rapid advances of the British forces, the Continental Congress adjourned from Philadelphia to Baltimore, and adopted a resolution arming Washington with absolute dictatorial powers for a period of six months.
All the able-bodied citizens of Philadelphia were enrolled in the Militia, and the Council of Safety of Pennsylvania organized a Home Guard of all such persons who were not fit to march with the Militia. On December 12,1776, bounties were offered to all Volunteers enlisting“who shall join General Washington” for six weeks’ service, “at this inclement season, to assist in defending their country, threatened with instant invasion.”
From New England to Virginia, disheartenment reigned and the affairs of the Thirteen States seemed without hope or promise of success. Among the British, confidence was supremely evident, and Lord Howe and his generals openly boasted that with the coming of colder weather they would cross the frozen Delaware without opposition and occupy Philadelphia, the capital city of the new nation, without striking a blow.
Under these discouraging conditions Washington rallied his shattered Army with desperate energy, sending a call to Philadelphia for all available reenforcements to join him in the most urgent haste. His appeal was immediately answered by the dispatch of approximately 1,500 men, nearly half of whom were Marines. These were made up of a battalion numbering about three hundred Marines under command of Major Samuel Nicholas, which had been raised and drilled in Philadelphia to furnish Marine Guards for a number of frigates being built for the Continental Navy.Added to this were other Marine detachments, hastily withdrawn from naval vessels in Philadelphia and operating on the Delaware River, bringing the total up to approximately six hundred Marines.
On account of the pride which Philadelphia, even at that early date, took in its connections with the Marine Corps, these Marines were well-equipped with clothing, arms and ammunition. Practically all of their officers had seen active service against the British on board the vessels of theContinental Navy and for several months they had been occupied in daily drill and frequent skirmishes with small British detachments. As a consequence they had reached an extremely high state of training and discipline and from the numerous successes which had attended their operations, their confidence and morale were excellent.
In addition to the Marines the forces sent to Washington from Philadelphia consisted of several hundred troops of that State, including the famous Philadelphia City Troops and detachments of Bluejackets, used to firing guns under command of Captain Thomas Read of the Navy. The arrival of these reenforcements greatly encouraged Washington and served to raise the morale of his small Army to a great degree. Seeing the scattered and overconfident state of the British forces opposing him, the American Commander-in-Chief resolved to profit by these conditions and strike a blow at the earliest possible moment. He selected the city of Trenton, at that time occupied by a body of about 1,200 Hessian mercenaries in the British service under the command of a German, Colonel Rahl, as the point at which his first stroke should be directed. Knowing that it was the custom of these troops to celebrate Christmas with feasting and unrestrained drunkenness, Washington selected Christmas Eve as the night for the blow. On the evening of December 24th, he gathered together a force of about 2,400men with which he crossed the Delaware in open boats through drifting ice, landing at about three o’clock in the morning, several miles above Trenton.
He had originally planned to attack that city in the dark before daybreak Christmas morning, but owing to the difficulties in crossing it was found that he would be unable to reach the city until after daylight. Undaunted, however, he determined to persevere in his attempt, trusting to the overconfidence of the British and the demoralization of the Hessians following their Christmas feast, to make good his surprise. In this hope he was not disappointed. Although the American columns did not reach their positions for the attack until eight o’clock the surprise was complete. Not a shot was fired until the attack was well underway, and the American troops were in the heart of the city almost before the astonished Hessians were aware of their proximity. The success of the attack was assured before a blow was struck. Scarcely any casualties were sustained by the patriots while of the Hessians, Colonel Rahl and about a hundred of his men were killed and the rest surrendered. More than a thousand prisoners were taken by Washington, who retreated with them at once again to the west bank of the Delaware.
Encouraged by his success at Trenton, Washington determined upon a further stroke. Crossing the Delaware again on December 30th, here occupied Trenton as a feint. General Cornwallis, who commanded a large British force occupying the town of Princeton, at once responded by marching towards Trenton to give battle. After a skirmish at Assanpink Creek, on January 2, 1777, Washington retreated to the eastward, drawing the British force after him.
Nightfall found him hemmed in by Cornwallis, with the British Army in front and rough country with practically no roads or trails, in his rear. Full of confidence the British commander made his camp, believing that at last he had caught the elusive Colonial chief, and that with the dawn of day, he would be able to scatter or crush his patriot force. Washington had other ideas, however. When night had fallen he gathered his forces, leaving guards to keep his camp-fires burning through the night, and set out to force his way through the rough country to his rear, around to the Princeton road.
Accustomed to travel, through wild and unbroken country, the Colonials effected this manoeuvre without loss of time or attracting attention, and at daybreak on the following morning when Cornwallis was preparing to advance against their empty camp, Washington’s advance guard appeared on the outskirts of Princeton, more than ten miles distant. Here they found three British regiments, constituting the rear-guard of their army.
Completely surprised, these were beaten in battle in the early morning and retreated with a loss of more than 400 men, leaving quantities of military stores in the hands of the victors. The loss of the American force was extremely small, and after destroying the stores which fell into their hands, Washington continued the march with his Army, and before the British main body around his vacant camp at Assanpink could pursue, he had broken entirely through the British cordon and taken up a strong position at Morristown. Here he was joined by other units of the scattered American forces, and soon found himself at the head of a force sufficiently numerous to give battle to the British on equal terms.
The effect of the news of the successes of Trenton and Princeton on the cause of the Colonies was magical. Congress returned at once from Baltimore to Philadelphia and public rejoicing reigned from New England to Savannah. Through their defeat of the Red-Coats in superior numbers at Princeton the Continentals lost all their awe of the British regulars as fighting men and even the prestige of the dreaded Hessians was shaken. Patriots everywhere renewed their hopes and redoubled their activities, and everywhere militia companies were recruited with new zeal and sent off to join Washington’s forces in northern Jersey.
The British were correspondingly discouraged and dispirited. From overrunning southern Jersey and confidently preparing to march on Philadelphia, they were gradually driven back and forced to abandon town after town and concentrate on New Brunswick, where they were constantly harassed and hemmed in until it became a question as to whether they would be able to effect their retreat to the protection of the guns of their fleet at New York without further severe reverses and great loss.
Of the part played by the Marines in these decisive battles of the Revolution, much evidence is scattered through the Continental records, and through the historical archives ofPennsylvania and New Jersey.
Even before the retreat of Washington across New Jersey, the Marines commenced to wage a campaign in connection with the Navy on the Delaware which ended in the complete destruction of British influence in the Delaware valley. It was this campaign which rendered that river an impassible barrier to the British forces, and a safe defense behind which Washington was able to retire to rally his army.
The campaign on the Delaware began in the summer of 1776 following the return of Esek Hopkin’s Continental Fleet from its exploit in the Bahamas, where it captured New Providence, together with the British Governor and much military stores. Several vessels of the Continental Navy and the State Navy of Pennsylvania, based on Philadelphia, turned their attention to the work of weeding out, by means of naval expeditions, the British garrisons and groups of armed Tories along the shores of the river, and in parts of New Jersey which could be reached from that waterway and its branches.
Vessels which are named in the Continental records as sending their Marines ashore to take part in these actions are the Montgomery,Flagship of the Pennsylvania State Navy, the Virginia, Hancock and the AndreaDoria,of the Continental Navy, and it is very probable that several others participated from time to time.
In addition to the above named, the following vessels carried Marine Guards: Congress, Franklin, Effingham, Dickinson, Chatham, Burke, Camden,BullDog,Experimentand Convention.
A careful count from the muster rolls of the vessels of the Pennsylvania State Navy at this time shows that there were 529Marines serving on board them. In addition Captain Thomas Forest, in command of 31 Marines, was serving with the Arnold Battery. Captain William Brown commanded the 64 Marines, and his Junior Officer, First Lieutenant James Morrison, on board the Montgomery.
The intimate relations between the Pennsylvania State Marines and the Continental Marines is shown by the fact that during this period two Marines of the Effingham were turned over to Captain Robert Mullan since that Continental Marine Officer claimed to have first enlisted them. In the course of the campaign, which was conducted for the control of the Delaware River, these Marines played a vital part.
By means of their ships’ boats, and galleys specially constructed for river warfare, they were able to commandthe river completely and drive the disloyal forces far inland, burning small forts and capturing garrisons and sweeping up all boats and means ofwater transportationthatmightbeusedagainstthe States.
One of the notable exploits by the Marines during this campaign was the landing at Burlington on December 12, 1776, from the galleys of the Continental Fleet, where they threatened to burn houses in which it was supposed Hessians were concealed. Similar landings were made at other places with similar success, and forces of Marines in boats were constantly at work sweeping the creeks and estuaries between Philadelphia and the rapids above Trenton, keeping detachments of the British forces on the move, and breaking up bands of Tories and pro-British colonists.
When the news came of Washington’s defeat on Long Island and his forced retreat across the Jerseys came, the activities of the Marines was redoubled, as it seemed self-evident that it was his intention to retreat beyond the Delaware and make a stand, using that river as a barrier between himself and the British Army. As a result, when Washington reached the Delaware an ample number of boats and barges were at hand for the transportation of his Army, and so complete had been the work of the Marines and the Navy on the river, that his scouts reported that for fifty miles above Trenton and as far below, not a boat remained in disloyal hands.
Commissioning documents. (Photo: Marine Corps History Division.)
Andrew Porter 1743–1812. (Photo from wikipedia. com.)
The value of this work to Washington’s harrassed army it is not possible to overestimate. Reaching the Delaware in hot pursuit, the victorious British were compelled to come to an abrupt halt. Not a boat could be found for their transportation across the river, and Lord Howe was faced with the alternative of building a bridge, or of waiting for the freezing of the river, either alternative necessitating a delay of weeks or months, affording Washington a vital interval for reorganizing his forces and allowing them to recuperate and repair their shakened morale.
In addition to the British lack of boats, the American Navy held command of the Delaware, rendering operations by the British near the banks of that stream hazardous in the extreme.American Marines still operated in New Jersey in connection with the vessels of the Navy, attacking small parties of the British, cutting off stragglers and dispersing bands of Tories, retiring to the ships when menaced by overwhelming numbers.In these, constant success seems to have attended the Marines, and these unvaried successes relatively unimportant though they were, proved a great factor in raising the morale and inspiring Washington’s main army.
It was in this period, between the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, that an exploit was planned with characteristic dash, which promised to rival the most daring feats of the war. Hearing that Elisha Laurence, Sheriff of Monmouth, New Jersey, who had been appointed Lieutenant Colonel by the British, was raising a force of Tories at Monmouth Court House and had imprisoned twenty Americans for refusing to bear arms under the Royal Standard, Major Nicholas of the Marines requested permission of General Cadwalader “of going after Laurence’s Party.” The incident was of such importance that on December31, 1776, General Cadwalader wrote to General Washington, asking authority to permit Major Nicholas to start out on his expedition, but the skirmish at Assanpink Creek and the Battle of Princeton intervened to prevent its accomplishment.
On account of their daring and success it was accordingly natural that when Washington appealed for all possible troops prior to his decisive strokes at Trenton and Princeton, the Marines who had proved that they could fight so well ashore should be sent. Asa nucleus of these reenforcing Marines, the powerful new Marine battalion recently formed in Philadelphia was selected.
Commissioning documents. (Photo: Marine Corps History Division.)
Major Samuel Nicholas commanded this battalion with Captain Isaac Craig as his adjutant. The first company was commanded by Captain Andrew Porter, the second by Captain Robert Mullan, and the third by Captain Robert Deane. Since Captain Craig had taken the Marine Guard of the Andrea Doria ashore, and also acted as Adjutant of Major Nicholas’ Battalion, it would appear that his Marines were also attached directly to this battalion.
A payroll of Captain Mullan’s company, serving in the battalion of Major Nicholas, signed by Major Nicholas and Lieutenant Montgomery, shows that First Lieutenant David Love, Second Lieutenant HughMontgomery, four Sergeants, four Corporals, one drummer, one fifer, and seventy-three other Marines, composed this company. This and other rolls appear in a book containing also minutes of a Masonic Lodge which met at the Tun Tavern on Water Street, Philadelphia, beginning with the year 1749. Robert Mullan, it seems, was a member of the Lodge, proprietor of the tavern and Captain of the Company of Marines, the rolls of which are written in the book. The book was found at “Mill Bank,” formerly the residence of Nathan Sellers, in Upper Darby, near Philadelphia, and now the property of his grandson, Coleman Sellers.
In addition to Major Nicholas’ Battalion many of the Marine Guards which had participated so successfully in the river campaign were assembled and sent as a part of the reenforcement. It is a matter of known record that the Marine Guards from the Flagship Montgomery, the Hancock, and the Continental warships Virginiaand Andrea Doria, were sent, and since there were over five hundred Marines serving on board other naval vessels in the river, it is reasonable to conclude that a considerable number of them also participated in these battles.
There is no doubt but that the arrival of this veteran contingent, well-equipped and with the confidence arising from victories over the British, was a vital element in supplying the stamina and spirit necessary for the achievement of the victories of Trenton and Princeton.
In the Battle of Trenton there were very few casualties on the side of the Americans, and so far as is known, none of these were Marines.In the succeeding frays of Assanpink and Princeton, however, the Marines were not so fortunate.
After the Battles of Trenton and Princeton the Marines accompanied Washington to his winter quarters at Morristown, where, during the reorganization of the Army, a number of them were assigned to the artillery. Major Nicholas’ Battalion served as infantry up to February 1777, and later as artillery. Some acted as convoys for prisoners taken at Trenton and Princeton. For instance, a list dated February 27,1777, shows that Captain Robert Mullan escorted twenty-five British prisoners of war to Philadelphia. The remainder returned to their ships on the Delaware or to their stations in Philadelphia, and resumed their duties in connection with the Navy.
* Much of the material included in this article was published in the magazine of the Daughters of the American Revolution, and is reprinted here by the courtesy of that magazine and its editor, Miss Natalie S. Lincoln.
The Marines’ first amphibious assault on New Providence
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, November 2019. Editor’s Note: The authors biography is available in the original edition.
Within his logbook, Lt James Josiah wrote, “At 2 P.M. Cast off from ye Warf In Company with ye Commodore Ship Alfred, Columbus & Cabot, Light airs from ye Westward & much Ice in ye River.”1 The date was 4 January 1776. The wharf that Lt Josiah was writing about is located outside of Philadelphia, and he was on board the Continental Navy ship Andrew Doria. As Josiah looked over the rails of the Andrew Doria, he saw the newly formed Continental Marines board his ship and the surrounding Continental Navy vessels. Led by Capt Samuel Nicholas, over 200 Marines loaded aboard the ships. The Continental Marines were not even three months old, but they were embarking on what would be their first amphibious assault in a long and illustrious future that lay ahead.
At this time of the year, the water was frigid and many parts were frozen. This made movement difficult, delaying their departure date by a few days. Eight ships were in the fleet. The Alfred was the largest with multiple cannons. She had 20 nine-pounders and 10 six-pounders. On her bow, she had an elaborate figurehead of a man in armor drawing his sword as if riding into battle.2 Most of the ships were top of the line, newly built by the Continental Navy. They were commanded by Commodore Esek Hopkins, who made his flagship the Alfred. The other ships in the fleet were the Columbus, Cabot, AndrewDoria, Wasp, Hornet, Fly, and the Providence.3 Once on board, the Marines did not know where they were going or what their mission would be. This was all to be briefed on the way down to their target.
Commodore Hopkins was the only person who knew the destination and targets before he passed on the information to Capt Nicholas. Hopkins was ordered by the Naval Committee to sail down to Virginia. If he chose not to do so, the Naval Committee and the Continental Congress surely thought Hopkins would sail to Georgia or South Carolina as the possibility of a large campaign in the South was becoming more real. However, Hopkins had a better idea. He was going to sail to the Caribbean islands of the Bahamas. This proved to be a wise decision because the British had just sent two frigates and two sloops-of-war to Virginia, and Hopkins’ fleet could very well have been destroyed. The same may have occured in Georgia and the Carolinas as the British built up their military mass there for a southern campaign.4 The British Sailors hinted to their superiors the idea of an American attack in the Bahamas, but when Hopkins’ fleet eventually sailed, the British believed his destination to be New York City or Boston. In picking the Bahamas, Hopkins understood what others did not: the logistical needs of the army as well as the importance of surprise and strategy.
Before the war, many American Sailors had traveled throughout the Caribbean for trading purposes when they were loyal to the British Crown. The Americans were familiar with the waters and knew the islands and their inhabitants quite well. In fact, the islanders cared for the Americans more than the British because they benefited more from their relationship; however, they generally cared for whichever deal benefited them the most.5
Map of the island. (Image from NASA.)
The logistics of the Continental Army were poor. There was a serious lack of heavy artillery and black powder. Over the years, the British had established forts in the Bahamian capital city of Nassau. These forts consisted of cannon and huge armories full of gunpowder. The British assigned a company of the 14th Regiment of Foot to protect these supplies and weapons. However, the Americans found that this company of the 14th Regiment of Foot had been called to Boston to reinforce the British garrisons there. Additionally, the British sloop HMSSavage only visited the harbor occasionally.6 While Hopkins’ orders were to sail down to Virginia as reinforcements, his decision to attack the Bahamas was not totally against the Continental Congress’ will. On 29 November 1775, just nineteen days after the creation of the Marine Corps, the Continental Congress realized the Bahamas provided mass stores of gun powder and cannon, so they issued a resolution:
Information being given to Congress that there is a large quantity of powder in the Island of Providence, Ordered that the foregoing Committee take Measures for securing & bring[ing] away the said powder.7
Hopkins saw the opportunity for glory and was not going to let it slip away.
The fleet finally set sail in February after being stuck for six weeks behind the thick ice of the Delaware Bay.8 While they waited in the ice, more reports came to Hopkins about how desperate GEN George Washington was for gun powder. Hopkins wanted to take action. Nicholas was in command of over 200 Marines with his two main lieutenants: Matthew Parke and John Fitzpatrick.9 As the fleet left the Delaware Bay, the Marines still believed they were heading to Virginia or further south. What the Marines did not know what Hopkins’ orders were after dealing with Virginia. His orders ended with the phrase, “You are then to follow such course as your best judgment shall suggest to you as most useful to the American cause.”10
As Hopkins sailed into the Atlantic, the risk grew. This was the first fleet that the Continental Navy had put together, and its destruction would surely devastate the morale and future of the Continental Navy. The men were poorly trained for maritime warfare as they had only been merchants and knew only the basics of sailing and little of fighting on the open ocean. The threat of a growing number of British warships in the area loomed. The British had already deployed a 28-gun frigate, the HMSLiverpool, and there was a good chance it could cross paths with the American fleet.11
From the beginning, luck was not on the side of the Americans. Disease found its way onboard most of the ships. Smallpox was a huge concern; on 18 February 1776, it became a reality when the Alfred had to bury a man at sea who had succumbed to the disease. The next day, the Columbus did the same. Fear of the disease spreading grew among the men, lowering morale.12 In the days following the deaths of the two Sailors, storms appeared and the winds grew heavy. The fleet had lost visual contact of the Hornet and the Fly. In reality, the two ships had collided with each other; the Hornet was forced to return to port, the closest being Charleston, SC, to make repairs. However, the Fly made repairs and rendezvoused with the fleet on 1 March in the Caribbean.13 Two more weeks went by and nothing horrendous happened; the Sailors’ morale was lifting, and they were only about one day of sailing from their anchor point. Then tragedy struck again. On 1 March, the Columbus buried another sailor who died from smallpox. Hopkins reported in his logbook that four of his ships were infected with the disease.14
Later that same day, the fleet was sailing down the coast and spotted two sloops from New Providence belonging to the British Navy. The flagship quickly caught up to them and seized them as the first prizes of the Continental Navy.15 Later that afternoon, the fleet anchored on the southwest side of Grand Abaco in twelve fathoms of water.16
The assault on New Providence had two objective points: Fort Nassau and Fort Montagu. Both had guns and powder the Marines could take back to the colonies for use in Washington’s army only. Over the past few months, the British had moved some of the guns and troops from the fort to help reinforce Boston, but there were still enough guns and powder to make the mission a successful one. Fort Nassau was built in 1697 and overlooked the western entrance to the harbor. It was a fort of superior technology and heavy firepower. The fort was armed with cannon, including twelve-pounders, eighteen-pounders, eight-inch bronze mortars, five and one-half inch howitzers, and bronze Coehorn mortars. However, at the time of the attack, the fort was falling apart. The local loyalist militia thought the British infantry would kill themselves by simply firing the guns because of how old the guns were and because the walls were probably not sturdy enough to withstand artillery fire.
Fort Montagu was a different story. It was built between 1741 and 1742 and was located approximately one mile east of Fort Nassau. It was more simplistic than Fort Nassau, but larger, and it guarded the vulnerable rear entrance to Fort Nassau. Fort Montagu, at the time of the attack, maintained a strong defense, including eighteen-pounders, twelve-pounders, nine pounders, and six pounders. It also contained a large powder magazine, barracks, and a guardroom. Fort Montagu was not falling apart like Fort Nassau, but it did have one major flaw: its simple square shape made it extremely vulnerable to any type of assault.17
The assault was scheduled for 2 March. Hopkins knew the forts could be easily taken because the British failed to leave enough infantry to defend them, and the local loyalist militia was unprepared. The plan was to take the two sloops that had been captured the day before and hide the Marines below deck. The ships were known to the locals, so the Americans believed they could come into port, unload the Marines, and take their objectives. Once the sloops entered the sight of Fort Nassau, however, the plan fell apart. There were warning shots fired, and it was clear that the British knew the sloops had been captured and were not friendly. Hopkins’ fleet and the two sloops fled, hoping to attack the next day.18 That night, Hopkins called for a council of war to figure out the next move. He wanted to go to the western side of the island to have the Marines attack the town from the rear; however, there was no road for a march and no water deep enough to make anchor. Despite these issues, a decision was finally made.
As the American fleet sailed over the horizon and into the view of the British in the early morning of 3 March, the alarm guns were sounded and troops were called to arms. The British governor, Montfort Browne, decided it was necessary to defend the powder and put Fort Nassau’s commander, Maj Robert Sterling, in charge.19 The Marines made an amphibious landing at a point called “The Creek,” which was located a mile and a half south of Fort Montagu. This was the first amphibious assault in the history of the Marine Corps.
Fort Montagu today. Fort Nassau no longer stands. (Photo from http://www.thebahamasweekly.com.)
Over 200 Marines and 50 Sailors took the beach with the Wasp and Providence in support;20 they landed near a group of free slaves, and the Marines encountered no resistance. Capt Nicholas made a report in his journal about the first amphibious landing:
The inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance, and supposed us to be Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing.21
The Marines under Nicholas formed into two columns and marched toward Fort Montagu. Despite being under cannon fire from 110 local militia under the command of Browne, not a single American casualty was taken. Browne then took his militia to Fort Nassau, and the Marines easily captured Fort Montagu. The militia tried to “spike” its artillery but failed to do so properly.22 Nicholas and his Marines were tired. Nicholas later wrote,
I thought it necessary to stay all night, and refresh my men, who were fatigued, being on board the small vessels, not having a convenience to either sleep or cook in.23
Hopkins knew he could now take Fort Nassau, but to help save American lives and show the courtesy of eighteenth century warfare, he sent a message to the British:
If I am not Opposed in putting my design in Execution the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe, Neither shall they be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no Resistance.24
Browne understood this and knew he could not defend the city or the harbor from the outnumbering American force. Knowing the Americans wanted the powder he did what he knew best. The powder was the single most important item Browne possessed; thus, he loaded it all onto the HMS St. Johns. In total, there were over 100 barrels of powder, and Browne sent them to the British-occupied town of St. Augustine, FL. This was Hopkins’ major fault of the operation that later found him in trouble with the Naval Committee and in the likings of Congress. He failed to use the other ships of his fleet to block the few lanes out of the harbor. The powder escaped under the cover of darkness aboard the HMSSt. Johns and made it to its destination safely.25
The following day, Nicholas was met with an invitation from Browne to take the city and Fort Nassau if he liked. Nicholas wrote in his journal,
On our march I met an express from the Governor … The messenger then told me I might march into the town, and if I thought proper, into the fort, without interruption.26
Not a single shot was fired, and the Marines took the city and the fort. Browne was arrested in chains and taken aboard the Alfred.
The raid was a huge success. The Americans did manage to capture some barrels of powder. The fleet then spent two weeks loading all of its captured prizes onto its ships. The prizes consisted of a city, two forts, 88 guns, and over 16,500 shells of shot.27 On the Andrew Doria alone, 38,240 pounds of round shot were loaded into her storage areas. Hopkins had to hire a private sloop to carry some of the prizes back with him because there was not enough room on his own ships.28 However, sickness was still killing some of the men, and many took desertion on the island to get away from it.29 The fleet finally set sail on 16 March back toward Rhode Island, and along the way it captured four prize ships. The Marines performed these captures with outstanding musket fire. They finally returned on 8 April with seven dead and four wounded from the trip back. One of the dead included Lt Fitzpatrick, one of Nicholas’ personal friends.30
The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].)Upon return, individuals were both praised and reprimanded. Capt Nicholas was promoted to major for his brave actions. Hopkins’ repution was tarnished for disobeying orders and attacking the Bahamas despite documentation stating he could. He was also reprimanded for failing to secure the lanes of escape from the harbor and allowing the most important asset, the powder, to escape.31
It was the first of many overseas attacks by the United States. It is astonishing that even though most of the Sailors and Marines were untrained, they performed as if they had been doing it for years. The seized cannon greatly helped the artillery-starved Continental Army.
The raid at Providence did have one major impact that was more important than guns or powder. The British were now forever paranoid. They knew they had been vulnerable where they least expected it, and now they had to concentrate more naval powers in other areas that held guns and powder. It also hurt the British because the guns and shot seized in the raid would be used against the British five years later at Fort Griswold and other battles.32 Over the years, the Marines and the United States took what they learned on the Raid of Nassau and transformed it into an art form.
Notes
1. Charles Smith, Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution 1775–1783, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1975).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Staff, “The New Providence Expedition,” American War at Sea, (Online: April 2012), available at http://www.awiatsea.com.
5. John McCusker, Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London, UK: Routledge, 1997).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Marines in the Revolution.
9. Ibid.
10. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.
11. Marines in the Revolution.
12. “The New Providence Expedition.”
13. Marines in the Revolution.
14. “The New Providence Expedition.”
15. Ibid.
16. Marines in the Revolution.
17. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.
18. “The New Providence Expedition.”
19. Ibid.
20. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. United States Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps University, (Online), available at https://www.usmcu.edu.
28. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.
29. “The New Providence Expedition.”
30. Marine Corps University.
31. Ibid.
32. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the stand-in force
To implement the concepts supporting Force Design 2030 (FD2030), the Marine Corps must revise what it considers its key units of action while studying the emerging characteristics of modern warfare. Traditionally, the Marine Corps focuses on the infantry battalion and flying squadron as units of action for all basic measurements of capability and readiness. Those capabilities, however, do not provide what the Stand-In Forces (SIF) and Reconnaissance Counter-Reconnaissance (RXR) concepts need—especially during competition. They may in fact distract from the principal object of operations. Instead, in competition, infantry battalions and flying squadrons are enablers for the key capabilities of SIF and RXR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection resulting in targeting. The purpose-built SIF force performs operational-level ISR on behalf of the maritime and Joint Force: “Stand-in forces’ enduring function is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition continuum. Stand-in forces do this by gaining and maintaining contact (establishing target custody and identifying the potential adversary’s sensors) below the threshold of violence.”1 The units of action for that type of activity are the platforms and teams in the Marine Corps that perform intelligence and reconnaissance collection and the cells, teams, and units that perform intelligence analysis and support to targeting. Before the Corps can close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, if that ever becomes necessary, it must locate that enemy.
The heart of the SIF and RXR concepts is ISR collection and analytical support for targeting. The Marine Corps fields such elements today in the MEFs. The MEFs have light infantry reconnaissance teams, maritime sensor elements, counterintelligence-human intelligence detachments, signals intelligence/electronic warfare teams, meteorological and oceanographic detachments, and increasingly cyber mission elements and space capabilities. Furthermore, the FMFs have the analytical specialties to support fusion and targeting as well as the transport and encryption of sensitive compartmented information and are performing these missions. Fixed-wing and unmanned squadrons can also perform ISR under the reconnaissance mission of Marine Aviation, just as light armored reconnaissance and engineers can, but most other squadrons and battalions are enablers to these functions, and none of them have the core mission essential task to execute ISR or intelligence on behalf of the fleet or Joint Force. They could provide the transport, security, or simply the cover story for ISR units of action.
The Marine Corps, however, does not customarily assign ISR as a main effort, much less employ dedicated intelligence assets in support of anything other than the local commander. ISR does not appear as part of the core mission essential task list (METL) for the MEU; for example, it only appears as “Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations” on the METL for the CE.2 Despite what the concepts say about providing eyes and ears for the fleet and the Joint Force, there are no tasks requiring a commander, especially a MAGTF commander, to do that. For a SIF performing RXR, however, those dedicated intelligence and reconnaissance assets might be both the main effort and the only employable force.
The FD2030 original concept evokes a force “optimized for naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces, purpose-built to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of the fleets.”3 This suggests that this force will perform, above all else, maritime domain awareness (MDA) by sensing and making sense of their immediate environs. For the stand-up of the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) in Japan, the Commandant assured Congress that “this unit will possess advanced ISR capabilities as well as long-range precision fires capabilities, improving both maritime domain awareness and our ability to deter potential adversaries.”4 In competition and crisis short of shooting conflict, that description means a force with a particularly acute ability to sense and make sense: an exceptionally strong ISR force that can do all the necessary work to constantly and consistently hold potential targets at risk. Under maritime strategic doctrine, there is a direct correlation between this kind of targeting and intelligence. The principal challenge for the maritime reconnaissance force “relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is obvious that for this kind of operation, the most precise intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence, the most difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy’s fleet from day to day.”5
Whether employed as part of a larger formation, as in the proposed MLR in Japan, or as independent assets, the Marine Corps needs to perfect its concepts against the characteristics of the real world to see whether it can bring the capability sets together to accomplish them. For the larger formations, the Service follows a logical progression beginning with the 3rd MLR in Hawaii, inside the confines of the United States, and then proceeding to the 12th MLR in the first island chain and weapons engagement zone (WEZ) for the pacing threat envisioned—the People’s Republic of China.6 If the 12th MLR does indeed possess “advanced ISR capabilities,” it will be able to execute real-world ISR in competition and practice exercise targeting cycles in its zone of crisis action. For ISR and intelligence support to targeting, the task of perfecting against live opponents is easier than for any other participants in the targeting cycle because the possible adversarial target sets are abundant, and real-world and realtime missions can be executed short of conflict.
Stationing in the main competition space will develop familiarity with the problem set, but it is a conflict that provides the best driver of innovation, even conflict elsewhere. “A military force wins by seeing how general principles apply to a specific situation and being creative with combat solutions.”7 ISR, while sometimes provocative, could be employed on behalf of allies, partners, or the Joint Force without engaging the rest of the force in crisis or contingency. The fusion and analysis of the intelligence collected could produce both innovation and action. “There has been no dearth of reporting on the changing character of war and the potential for disruption by new technology to alter the landscape of conflict.”8
The pacing threat also surveys current conflicts to evolve its planning to match probable warfare trends. Before the Russians began their current campaign in the Ukraine, for example, it was clear that “Chinese strategists face an economic security problem in the Malacca Dilemma, describing the threat of a naval blockade of vital Chinese sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.”9 China—however confrontational it has been in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea, demonstrating tactics and procedures—is not currently at war. Another peer adversary, Russia has begun to explore new operating concepts in realtime conflict in a resource-constrained environment in the Ukraine and Black Sea. Because the war in Ukraine involves a peer competitor—Russia—that conflict would appear to provide an ideal case to inform FD2030. While it is possible that a robust classified effort is occurring, there is little public evidence that the Marine Corps is doing much more than accepting public lessons learned from Ukraine.
With increasing multi-domain drone implications, Ukraine provides a hotbed of military innovation.10 “As drones started to be used extensively, new operational concepts started to evolve, radically transforming armed conflict. This is especially visible in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where drone usage dominates most of the highlights of the conflict.”11 Ukraine is also exercising littoral sea operations in the Black Sea, with particular success in the first few weeks of 2024 using surface drones against warships.12 Over that few weeks, a landing ship, a missile-armed patrol vessel, and a corvette were sunk by a special operations unit according to Ukraine as well as several Russian patrol craft.13 In 2022, Ukraine sank the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, using Neptune anti-ship missiles. Public reporting indicates that without a single warship of its own, Ukraine has sunk nearly a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.14 It is notable that the announcements of successful targeting have come first, and sometimes exclusively, from “Ukrainian Intelligence.”15 How this has happened, and how the targets were located and analyzed, ought to be of paramount importance to Marines, especially how the Ukrainians developed the maritime awareness through ISR to execute the actions.
There is an opportunity to support Ukraine alongside NATO allies in Europe. With another force doing the fighting, ISR from a distance and observation of procedures is still possible and best performed from a position of direct support. Ukraine also possesses a Marine Corps, organized into brigades, trained for the most part by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway.16 While it is not clear that Ukrainian Marines participated at all in recent Black Sea littoral-control operations, these forces in size and formation more closely resemble the Marine Corps than the commando forces that have volunteered to train them. If Ukrainian Marines participated in Black Sea maritime operations, however, the Marine Corps has not been training them at scale through its typical units of action and so has minimal relation to the results.
The other possibility, then, for learning from the conflict would be through participating in Black Sea MDA by employing ISR and intelligence analytical units of action. There is no public evidence of such activity by Marines. Although two-thirds of the FMF is devoted to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the lack of attention to a peer-competitor conflict exhibiting the characteristics of contemporary littoral warfare seems particularly striking: “In times of war, front-line practitioners are agents of innovation and change if only through necessity. Because there is no way to fully anticipate what a dynamic and evolving adversary will do in a conflict, the fog of war requires adaptation.”17 Marine force concepts appear to ignore this aspect of contemporary conflict, instead developing the force focused exclusively on a perception of a pacing threat not currently at war.
Three current Marine Corps trends converge to generate this inattention to current crises. First, the pressure of transformational innovation that FD2030 created, especially in terms of those within the Service who stand to gain or lose, required a particularly singular rationale: that the most dangerous potential adversary translated into the requirement. Divestments in any organization result in difficult decisions, so the Corps turned to its pacing threat to justify them. Cuts, the Commandant explained, are “sizing the force for what you need, what you think you’ll be asked to do in the future.”18 The tension created by divestment resulted in a singular focus for justifications, even as the force struggled to balance its SIF identity with its accustomed crisis response identity. Something had to support the case for predictive change. The singularity of focus resulted in resource decisions that have had consequences on the global availability of Marine forces, impacting the balance of force innovation and crisis response capability. Forces involved in innovation have not been available for crises elsewhere because the SIF is meant to be a standing capability forward deployed. Likewise, surging capacity in elements of non-core units of action like ISR, targeting fusion, and intelligence analysis for a crisis elsewhere has been out of the question.
The second issue is the stress assumed by the force when setting aside units for experimentation, continuing to maintain existing global force management requirements, the deliberate reduction of the force, and the retention problems that followed. This kind of stress leads to readiness issues when a reduced number of units attempt to respond to the same or a growing number of requirements. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, analytical, and targeting support Marines tend to be high-demand, low-density assets, meaning the stress to the force overall is particularly acute among these specialties. As a result, units at all echelons, but especially the MEFs in this case, seek to husband their resources to preserve readiness by avoiding non-core mission requirements. Even if the MAGTF had a METL that included performing ISR on behalf of the fleet and Joint Force (which it does not), conflicts that do not directly involve the United States or its Marines are not core requirements, however interesting the lessons from them may be. So, the MEFs avoid smaller requests, like intelligence collectors or intelligence targeting cells to support Ukraine, that seem reasonable at first but rapidly deplete high-demand, low-density specialties in the formation.
The third issue and the key to this discussion relates directly to the example of force stress mentioned earlier: correctly identifying modern units of action, especially concerning the SIF and RXR concepts. Marine Corps thinking might occasionally extend to artillery or logistics units but never to intelligence as a unit of action. It does not think of the types of intelligence and reconnaissance collection teams who perform the key sensing tasks of the SIF and RXR as anything more than adjuncts to a local commander. The Service thinks even less of analytical and targeting teams, the groups that make sense for the SIF in RXR, as usable units of action. For this reason, the Service resists requests for support involving collections or analysis alone, viewing them exclusively as enablers for the traditional pacing units whose focus is the local commander. Other Services, however, have begun to recognize an ability to apply portions of a unit against specified problem sets outlined in requests for support. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has organized echelon III and IV headquarters intelligence sections into usable Analytical Support Elements. The Analytical Support Elements of a unit can be applied to a problem set with which the remainder of the unit is not otherwise involved. Furthermore, the Army and Air Force are organized into global ISR enterprises, respectively in INSCOM and the 16th Air Force, able to both support Service units and source support globally. No such entity exists in the Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps, then, has not manned, trained, or equipped itself to provide an ability to sense and make sense of producing MDA. The Marine Corps instead has deemphasized and subordinated its intelligence apparatus into a new information warfighting function that it has yet to fully define.19 To create new information specialties including cyber Marines, all of whom require clearances akin to intelligence specialties, the Service took the easy path of converting the intelligence structure. The Marine Corps leads no national or military intelligence programs on behalf of the DOD and so receives orders of magnitude less intelligence budgeted funds than all other Services except the Coast Guard. Fielded Marine intelligence formations fall under the MEF Information Groups with unclear lines of authority between the staff intelligence and fielded intelligence capabilities, still less between the DOD agency functional managers (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, etc) and the units. Having purchased the MQ9a Reaper Group 5 unmanned aerial system, explicitly an ISR platform as previously employed by the Air Force and U.S. Central Command, Marine public statements emphasize instead its use for command and control: “the service also plans to have a capability on their Reapers which transforms the UAVs into relay nodes for forces to communicate and receive information.”20 It is possible that this is why the Service did not buy the increased payload capability of the MQ-9b, which could have carried more intelligence collection. Only the Marine Corps has no independent director of intelligence, having combined the duties into the Deputy Commandant for Information. Even the United States Coast Guard has an Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (CG-2).21 Since the Marine Corps is the only Service that does not promote colonels into Joint O7 positions, that means that no further intelligence officers are likely to form any part of leadership for the Service in the future, clearly demonstrating Service priorities.
The question, then, is why any warfighting combatant command would choose a Service without emphasis on intelligence to fulfill an intelligence requirement in the WEZ in the first island chain? The SIF and RXR role and mission, akin to a kind of joint tactical air controller for the fleet and Joint Force, only provides value with an organic ability to sense, make sense, and fuse and correlate data into intelligence. If the SIF merely provides command and control for sensors and fires that are not organic to it, then there is no point in placing it at risk in the WEZ. For the analogy, the only reason for a joint tactical air controller is to provide positive confirmation by direct observation. Consequently, the ISR sensing and intelligence sense-making capabilities of the SIF are critical to its potential and deterrence value. As a result, a combatant command would likely choose a Service with an emphasis on intelligence. Why would the combatant command not pick the Army, for example, whose INSCOM and multi-domain task forces practically guarantee a measure of MDA coupled with a deep ability to support fires? The Army has been conducting demonstrations of maritime fires since 2018: “The 17th Field Artillery Brigade, alongside the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, conducted its first live-fire exercise here, July 12, during the biennial Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, exercise. The Naval Strike Missile was the first to launch as a land-based asset.”22 Likewise, the Defense Policy Review Initiative caps Marine forces and reinvests them away from the first island chain (“More than half of the billions of dollars of contracting for the construction of facilities to accommodate the relocation of U.S. Marine units to Guam from Japan has been awarded”),23 the Air Force is moving fifth-generation aircraft to Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa, which could serve as the eyes and ears as well as the fires for the fleet and Joint Force.24
The Marine Corps requires a clarifying review to connect its operating concepts based on current events to its force capabilities. The current conflict, like that in the Ukraine, is the closest thing that military studies have to a proving ground. It is intelligence that analyzes the multi-domain operating environments in which the Service seeks to assert itself to generate the assessment that supports adapting to pertinent conditions for imminent conflict. The units of action for intelligence are the forward-deployed collectors and advanced analytical and fusion units that make meaning from the mass of data. Collectors can indeed be any Marine unit given for its main effort and standing tasks intelligence collection operations. Providing for that mission and the fusion and analysis that supports it within formations like infantry battalions only makes those battalions more formidable, especially in competition where an adversary must suspect any Marine element of providing “the eyes and ears for the Joint Force”25 at scale. While information, as a warfighting function, produces only an anomalous interplay of contradictory messages that may or may not bear on actual facts on the ground, intelligence has for its primary purpose establishing the actual facts on the ground and obscuring them from the adversary. Unlike mere information, intelligence derives meaning from raw data and information to create actionable insights in support of the commander’s decision making.26 Furthermore, intelligence is supported by a multi-agency, cross-government community, budgetary and procurements processes, and standing authorities and legal basis. The capabilities that the Marine Corps needs to emphasize above all else to achieve the vision set forth for a SIF conducting RXR are ISR and intelligence capabilities: these are the key units of action.
The Corps, however, has spent several years de-emphasizing and drawing resources from precisely these communities. As a result, the Service at the moment possesses insufficient ISR and intelligence resources and does not consider those that it has produced to be units of action to implement its own concepts. Force Design coupled with stresses to the force has set in motion a cycle of processes that myopically focus on a version of the pacing threat provided by someone else without sufficient contemporary references to be relevant. There are several current examples of SIF performing RXR in the littorals of the world. One of them is a partner nation force at war with a peer competitor in Ukraine, but Marines are barely participating in support of that force, unlike the Army who will learn the lessons there along with the British, Dutch, and Norwegian Marines training the Ukrainian Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps has made it abundantly clear that it prefers only to close with and destroy the enemy, not to locate the adversary in competition. If that is the case, then Marines cannot be the SIF in the WEZ performing RXR. If the Service seeks to alter course to achieve its SIF and RXR vision, then it will have to find a way to make culture-adjusting investments in ISR and intelligence immediately. Marines would need a Service-wide intelligence structure, strategy, and architecture among many other major changes. A good starting point in such a change, however, would be for the Service to recognize its basic ISR and intelligence units of action and to give its major formations the core task of performing operational ISR and intelligence on behalf of the fleet and Joint Force.
>Col David is the Deputy Director for Intelligence Division under the Deputy Commandant for Information/Director of Intelligence.
Notes
1. Gen David Berger, A Concept for Stand-In Forces, (Washington, DC: 2021).
3. Gen David Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019).
4. Gen David Berger, “Statement of General David H. Berger Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps Before the Senate Appropriations Committee,” Marines.mil, March 28, 2023, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3360019/statement-of-general-david-h-berger-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-postu.
5. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1991).
6. Jim Garamone, “Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence,” DOD News, June 2, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2641068/official-talks-dod-policy-role-in-chinese-pacing-threat-integrated-deterrence.
7. Brian A. Hester, Dennis Doyle & Ronan A. Sefton, “Techcraft on Display in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, May 16, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/techcraft-on-display-in-ukraine.
8. Susan F. Bryant and Andrew Harrison, “Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the U.S. Armed Forces,” Strategic Perspectives 31, (2019).
9. Lucas Myers, “China’s Economic Security Challenge: Difficulties Overcoming the Malacca Dilemma,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 22, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/03/22/chinas-economic-security-challenge-difficulties-overcoming-the-malacca-dilemma.
10. Kristen D. Thompson, “How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict.
11. Gloria Shkurti Özdemir and Rıfat Öncel, “The War in Ukraine Has Revolutionized Drone Warfare,” The National Interest, January 11, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-ukraine-has-revolutionized-drone-warfare-206095.
12. Svitlana Vlasova and Brad Lendon, “Ukraine’s Drones Sink another Russian Warship, Kyiv Says,” CNN World Europe, March 6, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
13. Associated Press, “Ukraine Claims It Has Sunk Another Russian Warship in the Black Sea Using High-Tech Sea Drones,” Politico, March 5, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/05/ukraine-warship-russia-black-sea-00145037; and Newsweek, “Video Shows Moment Russian Black Sea Ships Destroyed in Naval Drone Attack,” Newsweek, May 30, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-fleet-magura-v5-naval-drones-crimea-1906280.
14. Lauren Frias, “Ukraine Wiped Out Nearly a Third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet without Even Having a Real Navy, These Are the Warships Russia Lost,” Business Insider, February 7, 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/warships-in-russia-black-sea-fleet-that-ukraine-wiped-out-2024-2.
15. “The War in Ukraine Has Revolutionized Drone Warfare.”
16. The Ministry of Defense, “British Commandos Train Hundreds of Ukrainian Marines in UK Programme,” Gov.UK, August 21, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-commandos-train-hundreds-of-ukrainian-marines-in-uk-programme.
17. Nina Kolars, “Genious and Mastery in Military Innovation,” Modern War Institute, April 3, 2017, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/genius-mastery-military-innovation.
18. Meredith Roaten, “Marine Corps Commandant Defends Equipment Divestment, End Strength Cuts,” National Defense, September 1, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/9/1/marine-corps-commandant-defends-force-size-divestment.
19. There is no definition of “Information” as a warfighting function given in MCDP 8, Information—only characteristics are described. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 8, Information, (Washington, DC: 2022).
20. Aaron Matthew Lariosa, “First Marine Corps MQ-9A Reaper Squadron Now Operational,” USNI News, August 8, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/08/08/first-marine-corps-mq-9a-reaper-squadron-now-operational.
21. United States Coast Guard, “Assistant Commandant for Intelligence,” United States Coast Guard, n.d., https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Intelligence-CG-2.
22. Capt Rachel Jeffcoat, “Army Conducts 1st RIMPAC Joint Live-fire Sinking Exercise as Multi-Domain Task Force,” U.S. PACOM JTF Micronesia, July 25, 2018, https://www.pacom.mil/JTF-Micronesia/Article/1584462/army-conducts-1st-rimpac-joint-live-fire-sinking-exercise-as-multi-domain-task/#:~:text=The%2017th%20Field%20Artillery%20Brigade,as%20a%20land%2Dbased%20asset.
23. Frank Whitman, “Boudra: ‘We Have to Respond from Within the Theater of Operations’,” Pacific Island Times, November 16, 2022, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/boudra-we-have-to-respond-from-within-the-theater-of-operations.
24. Unshin Lee Harpley, “Kadena Adds More Stealth Fights Amid ‘Increasingly Challenging Strategic Environment’,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, May 1, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/kadena-more-stealth-fighters-strategic-environment.
25. Eric Smith, “Statement of General Eric M. Smith Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps Before The Senate Appropriations Committee,” Marines.mil, April 16, 2024, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3759255/statement-of-general-eric-m-smith-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-posture.
26. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” Congressional Research Service, May 9, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10574.
![The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].)](https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/WaterhouseFirstRecruits.png)
![The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].)](https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/WaterhouseFirstRecruits-1030x668.png)
