Road to 250: Cultural Intelligence

To the Shores of Tripoli: a Case Study
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, February 2016.
Editor’s Note: The authors biography is available in the original edition.
Lieutenant O’Bannon and Marines advancing toward Tripoli. (Image from Merrill L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD: 2001), 30–31.)
Lieutenant O’Bannon and Marines advancing toward Tripoli. (Image from Merrill L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD: 2001), 30–31.)

Preface
On 7 April 1805, William Eaton, one midshipman, and eight United States Marines under the command of Presley O’Bannon stood at the Egyptian frontier and looked up toward the hills that would take them into hostile territory.1 Accompanying them was a collection of several hundred mercenaries and followers of the exiled ruler of the Barbary State of Tripoli, Hamet Qaramanli. Having crossed 280 miles of desert, the war party still had to advance 180 miles into Tripoli to capture the port city of Derne, the capital of Cyrenaica. In the weeks that followed, Eaton would succeed beyond expectations, earning his place in history. While much has been written about the Barbary Wars—including the Derne victory—discussions on the social dynamics at work in Tripoli largely have been missing. Yet those dynamics, which may be described as “cultural intelligence,” played an important role.2 Failing to understand that is to fail to fully understand the war itself. This article is an attempt to introduce that history as an argument for a greater focus on cultural intelligence in military planning.

“A Country Not Your Own”3
For four years, the United States waged desultory naval combat with Tripoli after its leader, Bey Yusef Qaramanli, declared war on 14 May 1801. The conflict stemmed from a refusal to offer tribute, a dubious scheme where America paid not to have their ships robbed or seized by the Bey’s pirates. In June 1803, a frustrated President Thomas Jefferson authorized a land attack and appointed Eaton, an experienced North African diplomat, as commander (Naval Agent for the Barbary Regencies). As Washington never contemplated sending an army abroad and the few Marines proved inadequate, the need for local forces became critical and the ability to rally fighters to oppose his brother Yusef made Hamet indispensible. Under Eaton, Hamet’s “army” would conduct the first land campaign led by the young United States on a foreign shore.4 

On 27 April 1805, some 400 soldiers under Eaton assaulted Derne, defended by twice their number. A charge by a handful proved decisive: the Marines and midshipmen, a company of 26 Greek mercenaries and 24 artillerymen. The fight was a short, if bloody, affair; Eaton suffered a shattered wrist from a musket ball, and two Marines died with another wounded while Hamet emerged unscathed during the subsequent capture of the Governor’s palace. Within three hours, Derne fell and the Stars and Stripes waved for the first time over a distant battlefield. Why was a mixed and meager force under American generalship able to defeat a superior force located deep within their homeland?5 The courage of Eaton and his men won out, but a number of social factors worked to their advantage. Tripoli was riddled with social fissures stemming from the nature of the Barbary States and the local political situation in Tripoli.

In 1805, Ottoman Barbary consisted of the provinces (eyalats) of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Barbary came from the Arab barbar (Berber), describing North Africa’s inhabitants. The term became misleading after the 11th century as the Arabian Banu Hilal tribes migrated across North Africa, halting only at Morocco’s border. Over the course of their migration, they swept away much of the Berber farming population, something that had two lasting effects. The Arabs and the Berbers formed a mixed race and two societies were created, one sedentary, clustered around the remaining coastal cities and farmlands and the other consisting of semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes. This also divided economic life between inland pastoralism with the caravan trade and littoral agriculture linked to sea commerce. The society fractured further with the rise of the Barbary States in the 1500s.6 

Around 1505, Hayreddin Barbarossa moved his pirate fleet from the Aegean to Algeria and began raiding European shipping. In the process, he made a great fortune and his forces grew in strength. Simultaneously, the Spanish Reconquista spread into the Maghreb. In 1517, Barbarossa traded submission to Ottoman authority for military aid and Sultan Selim I obliged by sending forces while elevating Barbarossa to beylerbey. In 1551, the Ottomans recaptured Tripoli from the Maltese Knights of Saint John and the Spanish were driven from Tunis in 1574.7 

With the crisis averted, the Porte dismissed the beylerbey and divided its holdings into the three eyalats, each ruled by a commander (bey) appointed by the Sultan and, if successful, promoted to pasha. Together with the bey and a Turkish administrative staff, Janissaries were dispatched along with a naval contingent. The three capital ports were turned into fortified bases. Ideally, the eyalats should have been divided into sanjaks (districts headed by sanjak-beys) to solidify control, but Ottoman rule was too tenuous to expand inland. This created additional societal strains as the Turks, Janissaries, and sailors disturbed the status quo. The Ottoman legal tradition also created friction; it followed the Hanafi Sharia while most peoples of the Maghreb adhered to the more conservative Maliki school. Acknowledging the limits of its authority, the Porte never forced the Hanafi system on the local population, but the result heightened the barrier between the governed and those that governed.8 

The Janissaries—lifelong soldiers—were also a breed apart. Most had been taken as boys as a “blood tax” on Christians dwelling in Ottoman Europe. Moved to Anatolia, they were reared as soldiers and volunteered or coerced to convert to Islam. Despite these hardships, Janissaries were well paid, held a respected position in society, and were free to elect their own leaders, the deys. Finally, sailors, the most alien and profitable contingent, were able seamen recruited from anywhere and, if not Muslim, became converts. Motivated by the promise of privateering spoils, they were singularly mercenary and of limited loyalty but brought much needed cash to the States. Pirate rule soon reigned.9 

The Ottoman conquest ended in the imposition of an alien government that never fully integrated with the people. Tripoli suffered most from these internal disconnects. Because of geography, it had only two enclaves able to support agriculture: the plateau south of the port of Tripoli and the ancient Pentapolis in Cyrenaica with Derne on the eastern extreme. The Bedouin tribes were economically self-sufficient and dominated the rest of the country, allowing them to stand apart from the Bey. This made rule tenuous in the best of times and the war with America did not come during the best of times.10 

Tripoli was ostensibly part of the Ottoman Empire, but the power yielded was far from that of the 16th century. When Tripoli was recaptured, the Sublime Porte installed Aga Murad as bey and as an indication of the importance of Tripoli as a naval base, named Admiral (Reis) Turgut the second bey in 1553. For the next half century, Tripoli was ruled directly by the Porte. In 1609, the local Janissaries selected Suleiman Safar as dey who overthrew Bey Ahmad Pasha, and the Porte subsequently acceded to the elected deys as rulers. In late 1709, Bey Halil Pasha died without a successor and over the next two years, Tripoli witnessed five different self-professed governors attempting to take and keep power.11 

During this crisis, the Janissaries chose as dey the capable sipahi (cavalry) leader Ahmed Qaramanli. Qaramanli was not a pure-blooded Janissary but a khouloughli (children of soldiers), the descendants of earlier Janissaries who had married into the local elite in Tripoli. In July 1711, Ahmed seized control and the Sublime Porte recognized him as bey and awarded him the rank of pasha. Although he continued to refer to himself as Dey, Ahmed ended the dey elections and the Qaramanli became hereditary leaders. The Qaramanli were able to expand their control into the Fezzan to the south and Cyrenaica to the east. A succession of Qaramanlis ruled effectively for most of the 18th century until the physical decline of the long serving Ali Pasha in the 1790s set in motion an internecine power struggle. The troubles began when Ali designated his eldest son, Hassan, as his successor in 1790.12 

In August, Yusef, the youngest son, lured Hassan into the Bey’s harem under the ruse of reconciling their differences. The harem was a refuge whose protections exceeded that of a mosque. Once there, Hassan disarmed as required and greeted his mother. A hiding Yusef then cut him down. Hassan was able to recover his saber and slightly wound Yusef before dying. This murderous outrage threw the country’s leadership into turmoil. Bey Ali refused to recognize Yusef as regent and a civil war erupted with Yusef besieging Ali in the Tripoli fortress during the spring and summer of 1793.13 

In early July, Ali died after naming Hamet, the middle son, as bey. Amidst this chaos, the Turks acted. On 29 July 1793, an Ottoman fleet under Ali Benghul arrived in the harbor. He declared himself ruler and both Hamet and Yusef fled to Tunis. Benghul’s rule ended in failure when the brothers, with the assistance of the Dey of Tunis, regained power in 1795. Yusef then pushed aside Hamet, sending him to Derne as Governor of Cyrenaica—an internal exile. Yusef also took Hamet’s family hostage. In fear for his life, Hamet fled first to Tunis and then to Egypt. Yusef sat uneasily on the throne, knowing that the Porte and his brother awaited an opportunity to overthrow him. Those were not his only problems.14 

Tripoli was the poorest of the Barbary States and the government’s survival had become dependent on extortion, namely the tribute and wartime privateering policy. Even Yusef acknowledged that reality, stating in 1797 that his aim was to declare war on one nation as soon as he made peace with another. Internal conflicts made matters all the worse. When Americans had paid tribute to avoid trouble, the Barbary silver piaster was interchangeable with the U.S. dollar, except in the case of Tripoli. Yusef had so badly bankrupted Tripoli’s finances that its piaster had been reduced to a small copper coin. By the outbreak of war, one U.S. dollar was trading for 800 Tripolitanian piasters.15 

In this environment, the American blockade worked exceptionally well as it affected little outside the Port of Tripoli. There was no hardship in the agricultural regions, a reality equally true for the pastoral tribes and their caravan trade. For the United States, the war became a conflict limited to Yusef and his followers, and the blockade cost Yusef his primary source of income, forcing him to raise taxes, an act that alienated the population under his control. As if the economic and political difficulties were not enough, Yusef could not count on his military for much help as the situation within the ranks of Janissaries and amongst the ships’ crews was nothing short of dire.16 

Lt Presley O’Bannon. (Photo credit: Naval History and Heritage Command.)
Lt Presley O’Bannon. (Photo credit: Naval History and Heritage Command.)

Tripoli was a feeble military power in the early 1800s. When Yusef declared war on the United States, his navy had seven ocean-going corsairs: 2 frigates, one of 32 and one of 28 guns, plus 5 barks or sloops of 10–18 guns each. The only bright spot was the fleet commander, Admiral Murad, a competent commander who sailed on the seized American vessel Betsy. This compared with 13 corsairs held by Tunis and 18 by Algiers. By the time of the Eaton Expedition, Murad’s diminished fleet was trapped in port and the U.S. Navy’s Mediterranean Squadron under Commodore Samuel Barron containing 6 frigates (220 guns total), 2 brigantines (16 guns each), 3 schooners (12 guns each), and the 10-gun sloop Hornet, sailed offshore.17 

The exact size of Tripoli’s Janissary-khouloughli corps during the war is not known. Given its poorness and the fact that Tunis had an army of 6,800 badly trained and equipped soldiers, Tripoli may have been able to field half that force. Further, because Yusef had alienated himself from the Porte, he could not count on Turkish reinforcements. This limited his ability to defend the country from a land attack. By the spring of 1805, excluding fortress cannoneers, the port of Tripoli garrison was approximately 900 sipahi Janissaries with another 90 each at Misurata and Benghazi. Derne had an estimated 800 defenders, both Janissary and untrained local Arab levees.18 

Derne was an enclave on a coastal plain and passage into town followed the Roman road that was used by Hadj pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca, providing a source of income and information. The Mediterranean coast ran before Derne roughly from east to west with a sloping point jutting slightly into the sea to the northwest and the sheltered port just to the east. To either side of the open shore that abutted the Derne plain, the beaches were shallow and pinned between sea and rocky cliffs. Rising hills surrounded the plain, starting approximately one and a half miles inland from the coast. In the 1800s, the wadi system that had formed the plain consisted of a seasonally dry riverbed that passed Derne to the southeast and emptied into the port along with the main wadi that passed west of town en route to the sea. It contained an aqueduct system that provided water to Derne and the surrounding fields. By 1805, Derne was known as a fertile region, rich in fruits and grains as well as wax, honey, and butter.19 

The population was approximately 7,000 people and represented the social upheavals of the Mediterranean world. Originally a 7th century B.C. Greek settlement, it fared well during Roman times, becoming a bishopric by the 5th century. Following the 7th century Arab conquest, Derne fell into decline and its people were swept up in the Banu Hilal migration during the 11th century. Refugees from Moorish Spain, the moriscos, resettled the abandoned city in the 15th century. As sedentary settlers, communal ties, not Bedouin bloodlines, formed the basis of morisco society. Communities were tied to the farmland, the town, and as it grew, by its quarters that formed de facto sub-tribes. The Bedouins regarded the inhabitants of Derne as outsiders, a people without a tribe, well into the 20th century.20 

The Bedouin tribal leaders were more opportunists than adherents of the Qaramanli regime. Their focus was on herding and trading with Derne and the caravans that operated far from the court intrigues in the Port of Tripoli. They acknowledged the Dey’s authority but were disinterested in politics so long as it did not interfere in their livelihoods. The relationship between the town’s community and the Bedouins was one of uneasy tension. This made Derne’s population dependent on the protection of the Dey, to feel the hand of his rule or misrule, and by 1805, their loyalties were divided between the competing Qaramanli heirs.21 

In Egypt, Eaton formed an “army” after the Ottoman Viceroy provided a letter of amnesty on 17 December 1804. The letter granted permission for Hamet and Eaton to pass the Turkish garrison without interference during what was in essence an invasion of Tripoli. This was a blow to Yusef who had sent an envoy to the Viceroy with the aim of keeping Hamet in Egypt. The envoy returned to Tripoli and upon hearing of Hamet’s plan, Yusef ordered the dispatch of a Derne relief column, a decision that stretched his army to its limit, leaving only 600 sapahis at the port fortress. The column was augmented by Bedouin horsemen and untrained soldiers from tribes of questionable loyalty and, as Derne was on the pilgrimage route to Mecca, Yusef could not keep the movement secret.22 

In February 1805, several hundred Hamet loyalists assembled in the Egyptian desert nearly 300 miles from the frontier. To transport the necessary supplies and weapons, Eaton was forced to hire some 200 camels with drivers from a venal and troublesome Bedouin sheik named Tayyb, who would bring several dozen armed horsemen for protection. This allowed the expedition to travel relatively unmolested and trade with the local tribes for food from the time it departed on 6 March until the 21 April Battle of Derne. The American victory had an immediate and profound impact on the course of the war.23 

Yusef immediately sued for peace. The demand for tribute and a $200,000 ransom proposed ironically on 21 April was withdrawn for a new one with three conditions: first, a $60,000 payment; second, the ending of aid to Hamet; and third, the evacuation of Derne. Tribute would end and Yusef also agreed to the release of Hamet’s family upon the return of Derne, but there was a secret provision that allowed him to keep Hamet’s family hostage for four years even if Hamet quit Derne. The American negotiator, Tobias Lear, agreed and the treaty was signed on 4 June and the secret provision, the day following. The war was over.24 

The expedition was a marked military success. While achieved by the heroics of those who fought there, it was made possible by Tripoli’s social fissures. Culturally, the bifurcation of the society in the 11th century created the caravan system and made the expedition logistically viable, and the Turkish insertion of foreign coastal colonies deepened fault lines and formed a Bedouin society that would indifferently accept outsiders like Hamet and Eaton. Militarily, Tripoli’s poorness and the limits of the Janissary-khouloughli system put Yusef at a disadvantage. Divided loyalties at Derne also meant that Eaton would be sufficiently strong in relative terms. Victory was not certain but not by the risky undertaking indicated by Eaton’s small numbers. Politically, had Yusef not risen bloodily to power or had Hamet not escaped, the entire enterprise would not have been possible. Yusef’s illegitimate rule in the eyes of the Porte also helped, as demonstrated by the lack of aid for Yusef coupled with the Viceroy’s support of Hamet.25 

By themselves, none of these factors ensured success, but together they leveled the battlefield. It was equally true that, had any factorial combination been different, victory at Derne may have proven impossible. The point for military planners is that cultural intelligence or regional knowledge and experience can prove invaluable, and formally integrating cultural intelligence into the planning process can make a difference between success and failure.

Notes

1. The Ottoman’s named provinces for their capital, to avoid confusion; this article uses “Tripoli” to denote the Barbary State of Tripoli. The capital will be referred to as the Port of Tripoli.

2. The author first heard the term “cultural intelligence” in 1993 during a lecture by Gen Anthony Zinni on his experiences during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

3. William S. Shaw, The Life of the Late General Eaton (Brookfield, MA: E. Merriam, 1813), 315.

4. Shaw, Eaton, 256; United States Department of the Navy, Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers: Naval Operations including Diplomatic Background, 1785–1807, 450.

5. Shaw, Eaton, 306, 338–340. The ships were the brigantine Argus, schooner Nautilus, and sloop Hornet. Derne was the name used at the time of the battle. Other versions include Darnis (the name given by its Greek founders) and Darnah. Today’s name, Derna, dates from the Roman Era. Its name in Arabic is virtually identical: Dernah.

6. Ramzi Rouighi, “The Berbers of the Arabs,” Studia Islamica, new series, 1, (2011): 81; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 103–104.

7. Hourani, 215. Beylerbey means “commander of commanders.”

8. Hourani, 228; Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, “An Agenda for Research in History: The History of Libya between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5, No. 3 (August 1983), 306–307. “Pasha,” pronounced “bashaw” in North Africa, came from the Persian “padishah” roughly meaning “master king.” Within the Sublime Porte, it was a rank superior to Bey, but in the Barbary States, the local title of Dey or Bey was often retained.

9. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 45–46. The Turks referred to the “blood tax” process as devserme or collection.

10. Chai-lin Pan, “The Population of Libya,” Population Studies 3, no. 1 (June 1949), 101; K.S. McLachlan, “Tripoli and Tripolitania: Conflicts and Cohesion during the Period of the Barbary Corsairs (1551–1850),” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 3, no. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978), 287.

11. Navy, Documents, Volume 1, 207; see World Statesmen-Libya at http://www.worldstatesmen.org (accessed 29 January 2012).

12. Helen Chapin Metz, editor, Libya: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987), See “Karamanlis,” paragraph 1. Available at http://countrystudies.us/Libya (accessed 15 January 2012). Ahmed Qaramanli was of Albanian descent.

13. Shaw, Eaton, 339; Richard Tully, A Narrative of a Ten Year Residence in Tripoli in Africa (London: Henry Colburn, 1817), 231–233, passim, 329. Accessed at http://books.google.com, 1 February 2012.

14. Tully, 336–337; Chapin, Libya, see “Karamanlis,” paragraph 2; Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 110–111.

15. Navy, Documents, Volume 1, 217, 333; McLachlan, “Tripoli and Tripolitania,” 290.

16. Shaw, Eaton, 342–343.

17. Navy, Documents, Volume 1, 300, 315, 368; Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805 (New York: Princeton University Press, 1945), 89; Joshua E. London, Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation, (Hoboken: Wiley, 2005), 191. Murad, a convert to Islam, had been born as Peter Lisle in Scotland. The USS Enterprise took the 14-gun corsair Tripoli out of action on 1 August 1801.

18. Shaw, Eaton, 98, 330, 335–336, 348. Misurata is also known as Misrata or Misratah. The composition of the Derne forces was not cited. To crush a similar rebellion by his son in 1817, Yusef deployed fewer than 500 Janissaries (See Della Cella’s Narrative, 8).

19. Hourani, 480–481; Shaw, Eaton, 306; Paola Della Cella, Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontiers of Egypt in 1817, translated by Anthony Aufrere (London: John & Arthur Arch, 1822), 176, available at http://books.google.com (accessed 28 January 2012); John W. Norie, New Piloting Directions for the Mediterranean Sea (London: J. W. Norie, 1831), 338. Accessed at http://books.google.com/books (accessed 23 January 2012).

20. Della Cella, 177; R.G. Goodchild, “Mapping Roman Libya,” The Geographical Journal,  Volume 118, No. 2 (June 1952), 143, 150; Hourani, 106; Vladimir Peniakoff, Popski’s Private Army: A Legendary Commander’s True Story of World War II Commando Combat (New York: Bantam Books, 1950), 106.

21. McLachlan, 292; Shaw, Eaton, 337, 348, 358.

22. Shaw, Eaton, 283, 293; Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror, 1801–1805 (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 267; Shaw, Eaton, 306, 348, 358.

23. Shaw, Eaton, 311, 316–317, 326–327, 336; Navy, Documents, Volume 5; for examples of difficulties associated with Tayyb, see 405, 456, and 470–472.

24. Navy, Documents, Volume 6, 1, 81–82. The ransom was for the safe return of the crew of the USS Philadelphia that had been taken prisoner after the ship ran afoul of a reef off the port of Tripoli on 31 October 1803.

25. Shaw, Eaton, 315, 337.

Talent Management Engagement Platform

Our first step toward a modern talent marketplace

The publication of Talent Management 2030 in November of 2021 was a watershed moment in the Marine Corps’ transition from Industrial Era human capital management to 21st-century talent management. While over the last three years there have been significant efforts at the headquarters level to realize these initiatives, there have only been a handful of tangible results for Marines. The development efforts toward creating a talent marketplace are one such result. These efforts include the award of contracts to prototype two industry-leading marketplace solutions in addition to the release of an internally developed marketplace called the Talent Management Engagement Platform (TMEP). The TMEP has already been released to approximately 30,000 enlisted Marines and officers and is in use for the fiscal year 2025 assignment season.

The TMEP will enable the Marine Corps to reimagine and enhance career management by increasing the transparency of the assignments process, improving the education of the individual Marine on career options and progression, and enhancing agency throughout the assignments process.   

What Is TMEP and How Is It a Marketplace?
A talent marketplace is a platform that enables job seekers to match their skillsets and interests with available job opportunities. Many marketplaces have familiar names, like LinkedIn or Zip Recruiter, which use advanced algorithms to match prospective employees with organizations that can reach out to begin negotiations. Harvard Business Review describes internal marketplaces like TMEP as having two forms.1 The first allows employees to search through job listings while managers search through candidate profiles and when interests align the process moves forward. In the second version, the platform automates the matching process, providing a curated list of recommended matches to the employees and managers. The TMEP is being designed to leverage the best of both internal marketplace types.

The current deployment of TMEP is like the first version of the internal marketplace. Marines can search through available billets to find opportunities that match their interests and desires. Simultaneously, monitors can review the Marines available for assignment and find options that align with their preferences. As the system matures and collects enough data, TMEP will implement machine learning techniques to include functionality more like the second version of the internal marketplace. Here the platform will use available data to align Marines’ skills, education, experience, and necessary career growth with the Marine Corps’ warfighting needs. Regardless of version, TMEP is being developed to support a modern internal talent marketplace rooted in three core principles: education, transparency, and agency.2  

The level of transparency provided by TMEP is unprecedented in the assignments process. Education and transparency often go together since education is nearly impossible without transparency of information. Before TMEP, Marines only had persistent access to their personal service record information, which includes their past assignments, but they lacked access to current and future assignment availability. The TMEP addresses this by providing Marines the ability to access a live update of the same assignment availability as the monitors. This level of transparency allows Marines to tailor their preferences based on current availability. The freedom to change their preference outside of the annual mover’s survey also allows Marines to adapt their career plan as their life circumstances change. The TMEP also increases transparency by providing an asynchronous and persistent communication platform for Marines and their monitors providing continuity even as monitors rotate out of the billet.  

In the current assignment process, a typical Marine has very little agency. They may complete a short survey and have a quick conversation with their monitor, but that is the extent of their input during the assignment process. Increasing the available information creates an opportunity for Marines to educate themselves and have more agency in their career progression.  

The TMEP is a significant step in the right direction to increase transparency and agency in the assignments process and further educate Marines on available career opportunities. While TMEP creates the opportunity for Marines to be more involved in the assignments process, it does not change the priority to meet the needs of the Marine Corps. 

What We See Today
Although most readers had not seen TMEP before the summer of 2024 when access was expanded to 12,000 enlisted Marines and 16,000 officers, the Marine Corps has been working on this effort for nearly two years. In that time Manpower and Reserve Affairs has conducted industry research, created an actionable vision, gathered user inputs, and began building that vision to meet those user requirements. This methodology, called user-centered design, is arguably one of the greatest changes and most impactful actions the Marine Corps has taken when it comes to IT modernization. The TMEP is being designed by and for the user: the Marines and their monitors. The version available today via Marine Online represents the most basic functionality and will serve as the foundation for future iterations still being shaped through Marines’ feedback and ideas.

Today, Marines can log onto TMEP and access the same service data that the monitors use to make assignment decisions. Officers can view their projected move date as well as when they can expect to be on a promotion board and in what zone. All Marines can see a consolidated graphic that captures key information for making career decisions including the ability to see how factors like age, time in service, rank, and children’s school grade levels line up over time to facilitate informed career planning (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Career path display. (Figure provided by author.)
Figure 1. Career path display. (Figure provided by author.)

Instead of being limited to an annual conversation with their monitor, Marines can send direct messages that are archived within the platform. The TMEP also provides Marines the capability to search through available assignments to make a more informed decision on assignment preferences. Marines can see the same availabilities that their monitor sees, including billet descriptions the commands can edit for their specific unit. Registering assignment preferences and communications with a monitor is now consolidated in the same platform monitors use to conduct assignments. This means no more jumping between systems reducing the potential to lose communications.  

What We’ll See Tomorrow
What we see today in TMEP is just the most basic functionality. What TMEP will look like in the future is up to the users of the platform. The TMEP leverages a user-centered design methodology, allowing Marines to inform the requirements and prioritization of future features. Users have already provided some great ideas that have resulted in functionality resident in the platform today.

In addition to improving user experience through feedback, the platform must incorporate talent-based criteria and decision tools. If we are to truly move to a talent-based marketplace, the next step for TMEP must be to identify required skills and talents by billet and register and validate the talent and skills of our Marines. One of the key ingredients in any talent marketplace is the mapping of skills to jobs and people, also known as a skills ontology. Without this mapping, matching Marines to billets will continue to rely on rank and MOS as the primary selection criteria. Mapping skills also clear the way for TMEP to start leveraging machine learning to automate and optimize the assignment process.  

In this instance, the intent of machine learning goes far beyond simple optimization. As the platform learns the various career paths Marines can take, the system will generate dynamic career path options and recommendations Marines can use as a roadmap to reach their career goals. Machine learning would be used to generate a draft list matching Marines to future vacancies optimized based on preferences, priority, and relevant skills. Machine learning will offer Marines a much clearer picture of their choices and how those choices impact their career progression and support monitors in meeting the needs of the Marine Corps.

Summary
Three years after the publication of Talent Management 2030, the marketplace effort is moving at full speed with two contracts and TMEP competing for the future of the Marine Corps’ talent management solution. Assignment processes are being evaluated for business improvement opportunities and the transition to a modern talent management system has begun. This move is long overdue but in no way an indictment of the old systems or the professionals who made it work for so long through sheer will and dedication. In a short time, TMEP made great strides to consolidate information, streamline workflows, and improve the efficiency of the overall assignments process with every additional feature added the Marine Corps’ talent marketplace brings the Commandant’s vision in Talent Management 2030 closer to reality.

>LtCol Peterson is currently serving as the Manpower and Reserve Affairs MITSM Portfolio Manager and Modernization Officer in the Manpower Information Systems Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
>>Capt Figlioli is currently serving as the Talent Management Engagement Platform Product Owner and Project Officer in the Manpower Information Systems Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington DC: 2021).

2. Bo Cowgill et al., “How to Design an Internal Talent Marketplace,” Harvard Business Review, May–June 2023, https://hbr.org/2023/05/how-to-design-an-internal-talent-marketplace.

The Eminently Qualified Marine

2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: Second Place
A satire of and recommendation for the Marine Corps Fitness Report

“A collection of talented individuals without personal discipline will ultimately and inevitably fail. Character triumphs over talent.” 1

—James Kerr, Legacy

“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.” 2

—Sir William F. Butler

Part 1: The Problem, in Satire
There is a pyramid of Eagle, Globe, and Anchor logos that comprise the Comparative Assessment Chart in Section K of the Marine Corps fitness report. The image is colloquially referred to as “the Christmas tree” for the diagram’s resemblance to the traditional holiday pine. In this portion of the report, a higher-ranking officer, who may not know the Marine very well, will compare the Marine’s value against that of other Marines who the higher-ranking officer also may not know very well. 

At the bottom of the chart is a single logo, mimicking the stump of the tree, where the Corps’ invalids are lumped under the solitary, shameful tag of Unsatisfactory. Those who happen to blunder and slip through the cracks of bare proficiency to rank so lowly against their peers should be separated by a bold double black line to annotate inadequacy and disgrace. 

Above the doomed are the Qualified, who represent the lowest trim of branches that merit holding ornaments. They are the foundational layer of bottom-third talent upon whom those of higher standing rely to buffer against shame. To be qualified is to be relegated to an inference of sub-standard functioning that, while technically satisfactory, must be categorically subjugated and cataloged as a group that has failed. They only did what they were told to do. 

Then, atop the regular folk but just below la crème, sit the masses of the Many Highly Qualified Professionals Who Form the Majority of this Grade. It is quite the epithet, especially considering the phrase portends where most Marines shall be assessed. They have done much more than is to be expected and should think highly of their accomplishments. However, that they have done more that what is expected of Marines. They will find a modicum of success within the organization. 

Next, one finds the proverbial pick of the litter, also known as One of the Few Exceptionally Qualified Marines. These must be the men and women who are charged with keeping bright the shining light atop the Corps’ hill because, without their influence, how will those wide-eyed followers beneath them know the morally right from the objectively wrong? When young boys and girls say out loud to their friends at recess that they want to grow up to be a Marine, this is what they intend.

Still, there is a rank above these do-no-wrongers. At the top of the Christmas tree is another single Eagle, Globe, and Anchor logo. This one is labeled: The Eminently Qualified Marine. It is commonly understood that no Marine truly ranks in this category. It exists to humble us and to let us know that only because the very best of our ancestors were so exceedingly proficient at winning wars was this classification even created.

However, this is not the system that describes human interaction. The pursuit of principled achievement cannot be summed through an exaggerated appellation that has no real definable metric. Who has not woken up on days and felt barely Qualified? Yet, there is no box to tick for One of the Many Who Succeeds in the Daily Conquering of an Inner Demon. Nor is there a category for Unassuming, Yet Expertly Competent. Who is not eminently qualified, sometimes, though having made unsatisfactory errors in judgment and execution, on occasion? 

Nonetheless, the slow, steep climb out of despair starts with one trudging step in darkness. Arguably, this is the hardest step. Marines might better be judged by how far and determined their trek than if they were able to plant a flag on the summit of eminence. The latter is an evaluation of talent; the former is an assessment of character.

As leaders commonly convey, Marines are promoted on future potential rather than past performance. Yet, the current version of the Marine Corps fitness report does little to characterize the potential of individuals. In fact, its sole function is to quantify past performance. The report and its accompanying master brief sheet codify every blemish, categorize every remark, and collate every meritorious phrase, reducing the sum of evaluations into a single comparative number known as a relative value. These values form the proverbial hourglass figure (or lack thereof): the graphical depiction of a career’s worth of reports.

The obvious discrepancy when attempting to shape-ify performance over the length of a career is the lack of nuance regarding the individual. Fitness reports capture performance for instance, and master brief sheets average those instances across a decade or more. Neither provides an evaluation of potential, which, at least colloquially, is the fundamental attribute for promotion (and by implication, denotes character). To avoid propagating the Peter Principle, where Marines rise to their level of incompetence, we must select for potential, within which is an assessment of character, and prepare prospective promotables for future successes.3

Figure 1. Comparative assessment chart. (Source: Commandant of the Marine Corps, NAVMC 10835, USMC Fitness Report, [Washington, DC: n.d.].)
Figure 2. The proverbial hourglass. (Source: created by author.)

Part 2: Selecting for Potential (and by Implication, Character)
The first part of this recommendation, and an easy proposal to make, is an update to the evaluation form. The problem, however, is defining potential. Then, once defined, quantifying it for comparative review. For the former issue, Harvard Business Review identified three general markers of high potential: ability, social skills, and drive.4

At its core, the current fitness report is an appraisal of ability. Essentially, the report is a drawn-out work sample test, where Marines are evaluated based on observations of the tasks that make up their job. That this evaluation is divided into five sections and fourteen sub-sections simply demonstrates the extent to which the individual’s ability (in his current position) is scrutinized. However, when evaluating a candidate for a higher, more complicated position, the capacity to learn “where the single best predictor is […] cognitive ability”5 supersedes the propensity to perform. In this sense, a premium should be placed on education, the ability to acquire new skills quickly, and flexibility in new roles or when making mistakes. Still, beyond a measure of raw cognitive ability, promotion to each successive rank or position requires examination of intangible items related to intelligence. As an example, promotion to a rank of organizational influence or selection for leadership positions should include an assessment for creativity and a knack for systems thinking.6 These advancements should also involve a sense of vision and imagination, items not usually captured in a standard annual report. Moreover, if the Corps is serious about promoting smart Marines, then the organization should test for aptitude as a required element of promotion, command, or school selection. Evaluation of ability, as it relates to potential, requires a rigorous assessment of intelligence. 

Social skills are the core elements of emotional intelligence, another item not explicitly measured when concerning retention, promotion, and selection for advanced programs or leadership opportunities. The core competencies of emotional intelligence, depicted with their relationships in Figure 3, are self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management. The primary attribute, self-awareness, describes the ability to understand your own strengths and weaknesses and recognize how they impact the team’s performance.7 Related, and perhaps the one item mentioned within the current Marine Corps fitness report, addressed as effectiveness under stress, is self-management. Beyond basic recognition, self-management refers to the ability to manage emotions, especially under stressful conditions. Social awareness closely relates to empathy and can best be described as knowing how to read a room. Lastly, relationship management “refers to your ability to influence, coach, and mentor others, and resolve conflict effectively.”8 The evaluation of these social skills, progressing generally in order of merit as they are listed above, is necessary to qualify emotional intelligence, an important factor in determining potential and assessing character.

An individual’s drive, best expressed in the current fitness report as initiative, is probably the most measurable and the most easily shaped by the environment. To the latter point, and in the parlance of the expectancy-value theory, drive is “motivated by a combination of people’s expectations for success and subjective task value in particular domains.”9 To this end, a Marine’s drive partially belongs to the individual yet is also indicative of a leader’s ability to create expectations of success and valency of the tasks to lead to it. 

Figure 3. Four core competencies of emotional intelligence. (Source: Lauren Landry, “Emotional Intelligence in Leadership: Why It’s Important,” Business Insights Blog, April 3, 2019, https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/emotional-intelligence-in-leadership.)

Part 3: Evaluating through Education
If cognitive ability is the single best predictor for higher-level success within the organization, then a Service-level investment in an individual’s intellect is the best groundwork for collectively preparing cohorts of Marines for selection and promotion. Furthermore, the results of that educational assessment (e.g., class ranking) should inform competitiveness for future opportunities. Within the officer corps, career-level, intermediate-level, and top-level schools require professional military education (PME) for promotion to the respective ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. Whether accomplished through resident PME (an allegedly selective process for attendance) or through non-resident education, and irrespective of the Marine’s relative success at the school, accomplishing PME is briefed at non-statutory boards as either complete or incomplete.

While the Marine Corps PME system excels in providing a baseline education to the masses, at least for the officer ranks, it lacks a tool for educational assessment that could advise promotion and selection panels on the potential of a Marine for advancement or command. If resident PME is truly selective, then attending an in-person school program is the first aimpoint for an individual’s efforts to increase his or her value to the organization. It then follows that Marines are incentivized to perform well if they understand that the educational assessment affects career potential.

Beyond baseline educational schools, such as Expeditionary Warfighting School for captains or Command and Staff College for majors, specialty schools aligned to billet or general job descriptions are few and far between. If an infantry captain attends the Army’s Maneuver Captain Career Course (MCCC), then he is well-prepared to be an infantry company commander. Conversely, if the same captain attends Expeditionary Warfighting School, he or she is well prepared to be a staff officer in a MEU. Why is a curriculum like MCCC not mandated for the preparation of incoming company commanders? Why does the student’s evaluation from a school like MCCC not influence whether he or she should be a company commander? These schools, and many like them, become proverbial checks in boxes without any measurable bearing on a Marine’s career.

Figure 4. The new fitness report. (Source: Created by author.)

Part 4: A Recommendation
Character and intelligence ebb and flow over the course of a career, ideally upward, yet the fitness report and the master brief sheet do little to distinguish progress. Evaluations must be adjusted to provide the best picture of the current Marine’s value. Only the last five observed reports should be included in the master brief sheet.

If a fitness report is a tool used to screen promotion and selection opportunities, then its sections must evaluate potential. These sections should include ability (identified as talent and intelligence), social skills (identified as self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management), and initiative (i.e., drive).

If cognitive ability is the single best predictor for higher-level success, then resident education should be valued higher than non-resident, and the individual’s evaluation at a PME school should affect master brief sheet percentages. Additionally, skill-enhancing schools should become a requirement for advancement within military occupation specialty fields.

Figure 4 is imperfect and requires a process for normalization within a reporting senior’s profile. Additionally, it does not address the reviewing officer’s markings—but it does provide a better framework for how those markings should be applied. In any case, the current Marine Corps fitness report format is multiple decades old; it is time to accept a challenge to improve.

“The challenge is to always improve, to always get better, even when you are the best. Especially when you are the best.” 10

—James Kerr, Legacy

>Maj Halpern is an Infantry Officer whose previous experience includes deployments with the 22d MEU, FAST Deployment Programs, and SPMAGTF–Crisis Response Africa. Additionally, he spent two years working within the Australian Defence Force as part of the Marine Corps Personnel Exchange Program–Australia. Following, he served as the Assistant Operations Officer for 7th Mar. He is currently the Future Operations Officer for 4th Mar.

Notes

1. James Kerr, Legacy: What the All Blacks Can Teach Us About the Business of Life (London: Little, Brown Book Group Limited, 2013).

2. Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (London & New York: Macmillan & Co, 1893). Charles George Gordon served in the British Army from 1852–1885, retiring as a major general. He served in the Crimean War, the Second Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Mahdist War.

3. “Peter Principle is prevalent in situations where people downplay the aptitude for management when making promotion decisions in organizations. In most cases, promotion decisions are made largely dependent on current performance. Therefore, those who excel in their current roles are promoted to managers despite not having the necessary management skills.” Human Capital Hub, “Peter Principle: What You Need to Know,” Human Capital Hub, May 29, 2023, https://www.thehumancapitalhub.com/articles/peter-principle-what-you-need-to-know.

4. Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Seymour Adler, and Robert B. Kaiser, “What Science Says about Identifying High-Potential Employees,” Harvard Business Review, October 3, 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/10/what-science-says-about-identifying-high-potential-employees.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Lauren Landry, “Emotional Intelligence in Leadership: Why It’s Important,” Business Insights Blog, April 3, 2019, https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/emotional-intelligence-in-leadership.

8. Ibid.

9. Robert V. Kail and Campbell Leaper, “Chapter 9-More Similarities than Differences in Contemporary Theories of Social Development: A plea for theory bridging,” in Advances in Child Development and Behavior 40 (Burlington: Elsevier Science, 2011).

10. James Kerr, Legacy: What the All Blacks Can Teach Us About the Business of Life (London: Little, Brown Book Group Limited, 2013).

Why I Hate Sun Tzu

2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: Honorable Mention
Reevaluating a supposedly foundational text

I hate Sun Tzu. There, I said it. Go on, make your judgments, roll your eyes, and think: Here we go, this is the same guy who dismissed Plato in Philosophy 101 just to be a shocking contrarian. That is, admittedly, a perfectly reasonable reaction—but let me add some context now that I have your attention.

The Art of War does not offer bad advice, quite the opposite. It has had a profound effect on the 20th century through men like Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap; that is unquestioned. The Art of War is the definitive work on war in some parts of the world—but not here. The problem with Sun Tzu is two-fold. First, the influence of Sun Tzu is wildly overemphasized in Western military education since The Art of War is a relatively recent addition to the Western strategic canon. Second, his Confucian philosophy is antithetical to the philosophies that shaped the American way of war. Ultimately, Sun Tzu is an outsider whose work has limited applicability to the Marine Corps.

What value does Sun Zi add to the study of the Western way of war? (Photo provided by author.)

New Kid on the Block
Sun Tzu is typically covered first when studying the theory of war. This makes sense, as he is chronologically the earliest great theorist. Yet, when the historicity is considered, Sun Tzu is a relatively recent addition. French Jesuits brought the first translations of The Art of War to Europe in the late 18th century, but when The Art of War entered into the Western zeitgeist is up for debate. Just because translations were available did not mean they were utilized. B.H. Liddell-Hart, whose indirect approach bears some similarities to The Art of War, was already working on his ideas when he was introduced to Sun Tzu in 1927.1 It was Marine Gen Samuel B. Griffith’s translation and commentary alongside Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare in 1963 that finally brought the text to wider attention in the West. Griffith even observes in his translation’s appendix that, despite European theorists having access to the text, they either had little knowledge or regard for it.2 Sun Tzu did not even make the cut for the definitive Makers of Modern Strategy, first released in 1986, though he did make the cut in the 2023 edition.3

Mediocre translations were certainly a factor in the relative sluggishness of Sun Tzu’s acceptance in Europe; however, likely the most significant factor was the lack of foundational texts whose understanding was a requisite for comprehension. Even today, much of the nuance of The Art of War is lost on Westerners who are not familiar with Confucian philosophy and Chinese history.

Most Westerners are not familiar with their own foundational texts, much less the Chinese ones. However, this was not always the case. For centuries, education in Europe was based on the medieval model’s trivium and quadrivium—collectively referred to as the liberal arts.4 This model drew heavily from the Greco-Roman texts that formalized education and served as a means of leveling the upper class.5 Classical works were pervasive in the development of modern military theory, practitioner Wellington and theorist Clausewitz would have equally dreaded the sentence: Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.6

Intellectually, the Greco-Roman and Medieval worlds were far more influential than Sun Tzu could ever hope to be. The overwhelming majority of theorists and practitioners who shaped our world had no idea who Sun Tzu was. If studying the evolution of Western strategic theory as it developed chronologically, Sun Tzu appears very late—certainly after Clausewitz and Jomini. The ancient classics with their medieval linkages are so vast that scholars frequently forget they are standing on them.

Why Sun Tzu Does Not Belong
The Art of War was a subversive text at the time of its collection. War in ancient China had become increasingly theatrical with battles serving as opportunities for the nobility to display their manliness. Sun Tzu brought pragmatism to war in China. That is precisely the problem, Sun Tzu is the ultimate pragmatist; winning without fighting is a pragmatic goal, not a moral ideal. Restraint and magnanimity in victory are only necessary when the benefits outweigh the cost. People are disposable if it means winning; he lets others do the fighting and suffering provided it leads to victory. Everything is available to Sun Tzu—how you win is of no importance so long as you do. Mao and Giap won their wars in no small part because they were willing to inflict truly staggering degrees of suffering not just on their soldiers but on their own people; safe in the knowledge, it was for their own good. Effectively employing The Art of War requires the kind of hubris that Icarus would briefly appreciate.

This is where Sun Tzu fails to meaningfully contribute to the American way of war or Marine Corps warfighting. His commonsense advice is just that—common. Sun Tzu is certainly not unique, Homer compares conflict to flowing water as well.7 Readers can already learn the value of deception from wily Odysseus, sound campaign preparations from Julius Caesar, and strategic foolishness from Thucydides. Sun Tzu just reads better on a PowerPoint.

What is distinct to Sun Tzu is his cynical philosophical underpinnings that are best suited to equally cynical autocrats seeking to create a world more advantageous for themselves. The difference becomes more apparent when it is compared directly to the Western intellectual tradition that would create the concepts of chivalry and just war. The Art of War stresses the importance of the general as the “bulwark of the state” and “arbiter of fate” which has been an antithetical concept in American history since George Washington.8

Like Liddle-Harts’s indirect approach, Sun Tzu requires a healthy degree of sophistry to intellectually sustain. If you properly observe the techniques, then success is all but guaranteed; failure is the result of not following the proscribed techniques. By this logic, one could argue that Alexander applied the indirect approach when he slashed open the Gordian knot. Just consider the translation convention of terms like Moral Law and virtue, Sun Tzu and Thomas Aquinas are talking about very different things.9 Where Sun Tzu advocates morally relative pragmatism, Thomas Aquinas acknowledges moral paradox. War can be both awful and just. Violent men are expected to control themselves with courtly manners. This is not hypocrisy but the inability to live up to transcendent ideals, much like Clausewitz’s acknowledgment that theoretical total war is impossible. This is why Europe has King Arthur and China has Confucius.

Know Your Self, Know Your Adversary
Science is the handmaiden of philosophy. Therefore, cynical pragmatic philosophy will produce cynical pragmatic means of making war. Sun Tzu would be baffled by Western readers’ negative perception of the Melian Dialogue as an increasingly imperious Athens threatens the small neutral island of Melos into submission; obviously, the weak endure what they must, that is the entire point of being strong! For the most hardened student of realpolitik, it is hard to make a case that Americans are particularly talented at the strategy advocated by Sun Tzu. It has been attempted but rarely with lasting success and never with moral justification. When Americans are at peace, Sun Tzu has minimal applicability to U.S. foreign policy because pragmatism does not win friends.

Two states that actively espouse Sun Tzu will never truly be at peace. Sun Tzu emphasizes attacking an opponent’s strategy. In peacetime, this means undermining the enemy society since the best way to win without fighting is to endlessly prepare for war while undermining your adversary. A state that ascribes to this sort of mentality can have a public policy of no preemptive strikes yet still launch a surprise attack in the name of defense.

Sun Tzu emphasizes a mental model of war versus a physical one; this becomes truly terrifying when it hybridizes with postmodern materialistic philosophy. The pursuit of gaining and maintaining political power becomes its principal goal and is endlessly pursued. Sun Tzu is far more applicable to the challenges of international order, unsurprisingly, the People’s Republic of China. China has recognized that attacking an opponent’s strategy means corrupting their society, which they do through disinformation campaigns on social media, complicity in illicit synthetic opioid exports, and eroding trust in global institutions, such as the World Health Organization. A state that emphasizes undermining its perceived adversary’s societal fabric through deception will have to pay a moral cost as words will cease to mean things and trust corrodes.

What Should the Marine Corps Do About It?
Thucydides should be acknowledged as the intellectual godfather of the Marine Corps; the History of the Peloponnesian War puts tragic the human cost of war on full display. When war is perceived as easy and convenient, reality quickly dispels this notion at a terrible cost. Society breaks down when pragmatism is ahead of ideals. The fact humans are unable to achieve permanent peace does not make the ideal less worthwhile. Wars should be fought with the intent to create a better state of peace, wars of pragmatism rarely accomplish this. Thucydides paints an imperfect world that is worth living and fighting for, the world of Sun Tzu knows no leisure.

Sun Tzu should be studied and comprehended in the same way that Mao’s Little Red Book should be kept handy. No reasonable person could argue about Mao’s effectiveness as a leader; he achieved his political objectives and was one of the most consequential leaders of the 20th century. Yet, this came at the cost of ruthless purges, grinding campaigns, and mass starvation but on a scale that most Americans can barely comprehend. The current generation of the Chinese Communist Party helming China are the heirs of that tradition. Whether they appreciate it or not, Americans are crusaders. Brilliant crusaders. Whether crushing insurrections to end slavery or ending the terror of an authoritarian dictator; when Americans go to war with ideals and strategic alignment—they get the job done regardless of the cost and blood.

Sun Tzu is commonly referenced because it is easily referenced, pithy quotes that apply to everything. The Western classical tradition is more difficult to digest but offers a much richer understanding of humans in conflict. Thucydides is a grind, both textually and spiritually, and it should be—comprehending war should not be easy or convenient. The works of Homer and Thucydides are ostensibly sad, life is hard, and war is tragic but that is only because deep down they understand that it should not have to be this way. Understanding the rage of Achilles, the despair of Odysseus, or the whole tragedy of the Peloponnesian War offers a far more realistic view of humanity in conflict because of its longing for a better world that is denied to them. They can only see the silhouettes that are created by a luminous perfect form. They are focused on the light; Sun Tzu is focused on the shadows.

Sun Tzu’s current place in the Western strategic canon is poetic, his introduction is far more recent, yet he is the most recognizable and more often quoted. The West Point Civil War generals fought because of Jomini, the Prussian generals fought because of Clausewitz, and both of whom are footnotes when compared to the influence of Thucydides. Sun Tzu has truly won without fighting.

>Maj Stephens is the Course Chief for the Logistics Intelligence Planners Course at the Marine Corps Operational Logistics Group in Twentynine Palms, CA.

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, Art of War, translated by Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

2. Ibid.

3. Gordon Gecko cites the text in 1987’s Wall Street if that is any indication of public awareness.

4. For a concise description of the medieval liberal arts, see the Dorthy L. Sayers essay “The Lost Tools of Learning.”

5. Thomas Ricks, First Principles (New York: Harper, 2020). 

6. “All of Gaul is divided into three parts,” The (in)famous opening line of Julius Caesar’s campaign in Gaul.

7. Homer, The Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Talent: We Do Not Need It

2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: First Place
Eleven challenges to Talent Management 2030

As stated in Talent Management 2030 (TM2030), “Our modern operational concepts and organizations cannot reach their full warfighting potential without a talent management system that recruits, develops, and retains the right Marines.”1 While this statement is extremely valid, there is one significant problem with this sentence, and furthermore, one significant problem with TM2030—specifically the word talent. Simply put, the Marine Corps does not need talent. 

Talent Management 2030’s mandate is to “achieve a full transition from the current manpower system to a talent management system no later than 2025.”2 However, there are challenges that need to be addressed immediately to facilitate this intent to the fullest—increasing our combat lethality, operational effectiveness, and survivability to win our Nation’s battles. Therefore, this article poses eleven challenges to TM2030 and describes how the Marine Corps does not need talent. The ultimate thesis is that we do not need a talent management system but a Marine management system. 

Challenge 1: Talent is Overvalued
In his book, Talent is Overrated, Geoff Colvin defines talent as: “A natural ability to do something better than most people can do it.”3 This is similar to how TM2030 defines talent (i.e., “an individual’s innate potential to do something well.)”4 Regarding talent being overvalued, throughout the book, Colvin’s research showcases that we exceedingly credit innate gifts (i.e., talents) to top performance. The reality is that top performance comes from extreme purposeful effort (i.e., deliberate practice).5 Colvin describes how we overinflate talent with musicians, intelligence, and individuals such as Tiger Woods and Mozart.6 In fact, Colvin’s book demonstrates that top-performing musicians practiced 800 percent more than lower-performing musicians and that both Tiger Woods and Mozart’s fathers started their training while they were infants and toddlers. Therefore, they could hardly be described as child prodigies.7

As seen in Case Study 1, Johnny Manziel shows that talent will only get a person so far in one’s career. Colvin credits high consistent performance with deliberate practice, not talent.8 “Deliberate practice is also not what most of us do when we think we’re practicing … Deliberate practice is hard. It hurts. But it works. More of it equals better performance. Tons of it equals great performance.”9 Deliberate practice can be summarized as practice that is purposefully designed to elicit performance by pushing a person just beyond their current limits, with high quality, frequent and recurrent repetitions, with immediate feedback, and is mentally taxing. 

“… but of course we can take any credit for our talents, it is how we use them that counts.”

A Wrinkle in Time

Case Study 1: Talent is overinflated—Johny Manziel. (Study provided by author.)

Challenge 2: Experience is Overinflated
When you read Malcolm Gladwell’s book, Outliers: The Story of Success, the reader will clearly see that talent, experience, or rank did not enable the outliers (top performers) to achieve greatness, rather it was the opportunity combined with hard, diligent work.10 Mike Eruzione, captain of the 1980 U.S. Miracle hockey team, credits two fortunate chances (i.e., opportunities) in his life that provided him the opportunity to score the winning goal on 22 February 1980 against the Soviets; however, it was Eruzione’s blue-collar work ethic that allowed him to exploit those chances.11 Regarding experience being overrated, as stated by Colvin, “extensive research in a wide range of fields shows that many people not only fail to become outstandingly good at what they do, no matter how many years they spend doing it, they frequently don’t even get any better than they were when they started.”12

Furthermore, Colvin states: “More experienced doctors reliably score lower on tests of medical knowledge than do less experienced doctors; general physicians also become less skilled over time at diagnosing heart sounds and X-rays. Auditors become less skilled at certain types of evaluations.”13 The way we should view experience is as whether or not one’s experience is that of a low performer, average performer, or a high performer. For too many in our Corps, our experience is that of being average; yet, we overinflate having experience of being average to that of credibility. 

Let us never confuse a driven, hardworking, and problem-solving individual who possesses little experience to be less than an individual with more experience of being average. What we should acknowledge and reward is not experience but rather learning, innovation, effort, and the ability to fail and grow. Of note, “sub-elite skaters spent lots of time working on the jumps they could already do, while skaters at the highest levels spent more time on the jumps they couldn’t do.”14

Challenge 3: Rank is Overrated
As stated in TM2030, “We should have an open door for exceptionally talented Americans who wish to join the Marine Corps, allowing them to laterally enter at a rank appropriate to their education, experience, and ability.”15 However, anyone who has been in the Marine Corps long enough knows that rank is overrated. We have all seen the lance corporal who outperforms the sergeant; the sergeant who outperforms the gunnery sergeant; or the captain who outperforms the major. Similar to talent and experience, rank is overrated. 

As stated by Evans Carlson when he was the 2d Marine Raider Battalion commanding officer in World War II, “Are you willing to starve and suffer and go without food and sleep? I promise you nothing but hardships and anger. When we go into battle, we ask no mercy, we give none.” We should ask a similar question for those qualified (not talented) individuals we are trying to recruit into our Corps, specifically are you willing to start at the bottom, earn the title U.S. Marine, give up the comforts of your life that you are accustomed to, so that you may serve alongside the finest men and women of the United States? 

Gen Krulak stated on 6 May 1946 to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in his infamous bended knee speech:

Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past, but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go.16

Then we must ask our Marine leaders of 2024, why do we have a bent knee to civilians with credentials we value? Figure 1 is a simple flow chart that displays if we as Marines should accept a 35-year-old with PhD in Cyber Security with ten years of cyber experience to try out for our Corps and earn the title of Marine. It has been stated that humility needs to be incorporated into our Marine culture, and if a civilian is not willing to humble himself, start at the bottom, and earn our title, then we do not need that individual.17 Of note, in the book Good to Great, Collins notes that “ten of eleven good-to-great CEOs came from inside the company, whereas the comparison companies tried outside CEOs six times more often.”18

Figure 1. Flow chart for a civilian’s potential rapid promotion into the Marine Corps. (Figure provided by author.)

Challenge 4: We Already Recruit a Different Person
As stated in TM230, “the core objectives of all modern personnel management systems are to recruit individuals with the right talents, match those talents to organizational needs, and incentivize the most talented and highly performing individuals to remain with the organization.”19 However, as emphasized, talent is overvalued. Furthermore, are we certain that TM2030 is truly appreciating what we should be recruiting? Case Study 2 showcases what happens when you recruit for the wrong variables, such as perceived talents. 

Our history, culture, character, and standards should draw the correct Americans toward us. Coach John Wooden coached the University of California Los Angeles for 29 years, where he won 10 national championships, had 4 perfect seasons, and 88 consecutive victories. Over Wooden’s 29 years as a coach, he only visited 10–12 players at their home but only after the athlete initiated first contact. Coach Wooden’s philosophy was that if these high-performing athletes did not want to play for the University of California Los Angeles, then perhaps they should play somewhere else.20

As stated by Coach Wooden:

I always felt that my nonrecruiting policy for players was the right thing to do—a productive part of the screening process. Before I talked to an individual about joining us, I first wanted to see evidence of his desire to be a part of the Bruins. The last thing you want is people in your organization who had to be talked into being there, who needed convincing that your team was worthy of them … Recruiting should be a two-way street.21

Furthermore, as stated by Dave Nassef, “I used to be in the Marines, and the Marines get a lot of credit for building people’s values. But that is not the way it really works. The Marine Corps recruits people who share the corps values, then provides them with training required to accomplish the organizations mission.22

While we need to improve our recruiting process, we need to recognize we are already recruiting a different American. What we do with that American, from their initial training until they get out of our Marine Corps, rests on our shoulders as leaders and commanders. Specifically, we must truly sustain the transformation; make our Marines more lethal, resilient, and proficient; and retain the right Marines. Lastly, our legacy and current culture should continue to drive the right (not talented) civilians to want to earn the title of Marine. 

Challenge 5: Entry Training Needs to be a Selection Process
We do need to improve our recruiting process. However, we must also increase the standard of our entry-level schools (basic training [BT] and Officer Candidate Course [OCC]). As stated in TM2030, “approximately 20% of those recruited do not complete their first enlistment, a strong indicator that the service can do better to screen potential recruits.”23 While TM2030 states that we need to recruit to a higher standard, TM2030 completely negates the fact that the twenty percent who do not complete their first enlistment earned the title Marine. We failed our ancestors by allowing such a high number of individuals with the inability to serve four years in our Corps to earn the title of Marine.  

Civilians wanting to earn the title of Marine are already volunteering to serve their country in the hardest Service. We should not forget this; we are already recruiting a different person. However, we need to take the earning of the title to a higher standard. We should treat BT and OCC the same way Marine Corps Special Operations Command treats assessment and selection. Specifically, BT and OCC should be a selection process. Based on the data, at least twenty percent of those who start BT should not earn the title of Marine. 

Challenge 6: Talent Management Neglects Leadership
As stated in TM 2030, “A Marine turns their talents into strengths, aptitudes, and skills through dedicated study, repetition, and hard work—a process accelerated by their curiosity, passion, and interests, and desire for excellence.”24 This is similar to the sentiment in Training and Education 2030 that states, “ultimately, every Marine is responsible for their own learning.”25 However, it has been posed that while each Marine is responsible for their own learning, “We as leaders in the Marine Corps must recognize it is imperative to educate our Marines by providing the optimal resources and direction.”26 

In a similar vein, while it is the Marine’s job to turn their talents into strengths, it is also a mandate of Marine leaders to get the most out of their Marines, to include improvements in their strengths and weaknesses, in their interests and non-interests. Leadership has been defined as, “The ability to inspire and influence those around you to perform at a higher level and become better versions of themselves.27 A leader’s job is to push Marines. Grow them, push them outside their comfort zone, build interests, develop passion, create opportunities, make innovation occur, give feedback, create optimal experiences, and develop specific, detailed, and progressive training. The moment the Marine Corps ceases to make leaders, our Nation should divest of her. Therefore, we must make leadership a part TM2030. 

Case Study 2: What happens when we do not understand the traits of performance—Billy Beane. (Study provided by author.)

Challenge 7: Leaders and Commanders Cannot Retain the Right Marines
A significant reason we have issues retaining the right (not talented) Marines in our formation is the direct leadership and command experienced by our young Marines during their short tenure in our Corps. Simply put, the Marine Corps did not lie to us—all one has to do is to look at our recruiting posters which typically either display a Marine in their dress blues or a Marine suffering in training. The Marine Corps promises civilians the ability to earn the title Marine (i.e., dress blues) as well as tough and miserable times via realistic training, physical conditioning, deployments, etc. 

However, the Marine Corps also promises competent, moral, ethical, and beyond-reproach leaders. When we fail to deliver strong, competent, and confident leaders who possess humility, we lose the trust, passion, and motivation of our Marines we fail to sustain the transformation and retain the right (not talented) Marines. 

Challenge 8: Our Culture (Not Talent) is What Makes Us the Marine Corps
As stated in TM2030, “Marines make the Marine Corps. We have never defined ourselves by our equipment, organization constructs, or operational concepts.”28 Furthermore, as stated by Gen Berger, “Our historical and legislatively mandated role as the Nation’s force-in-readiness remains a central requirement in the design of our future force. The most important element of this requirement is the individual Marine.”29

The title of Marine should not be synonymous with talent. If Marines are to be synonymous with talent, then we should divest of BT, the Crucible, OCC, basic officer course, etc. Marines should be synonymous with riflemen, learners, leaders, problem solvers, resilient, passionate, dedicated, winners, driven, disciplined, professionals, accountable, and reliable—not talented. Case Study 3 displays that purposeful effort can achieve greatness while lacking the talents needed. 

In the book The Culture Code, Daniel Coyle states, “Our instincts have led us to focus on the wrong details. We focus on what we can see—individual skills. But individual skills are not what matters. What matters is the interaction.”30 As stated, the “Marine Corps culture is what makes us who we are. Our warfighting culture is what made us successful in battles past, and our culture will either enable or hinder our future battles. Remember, our culture is our DNA, and while we cannot see it, we see its manifestation, which for the Marines, is on the battlefield.31

Case Study 3: Purposeful and collective effort can achieve greatness—1980 United States Miracle Hockey Team. (Study provided by author.)

Challenge 9: Mandate a Culture of Pursuing Performance
Talent Management 2030 states, “Once an individual earns the title ‘Marine,’ they have made the grade. There are no additional obstacles or barriers to entry—‘Once a Marine, always a Marine,’” and that we must encourage a culture of inclusion.32 TM2030 additionally directs our leaders to “focus on building inclusive teams … based on performance.”33 There are two issues with this: the passivity of the word encourage, and the passivity and acceptance of simply earning the title of Marine is enough. 

Regarding culture, I have argued “that the single greatest contributor to a high-performing unit is the unit’s culture.”34 Furthermore, we as leaders “must define, emphasize, measure, acknowledge, and correct the culture we pursue.35 However, leaders and commanders, who are the owners of the unit’s culture, should not encourage (passive) our culture, we should mandate (active) the culture we pursue.”36 We should have a culture of “hostility towards mediocrity.”37 

Second, we as Marines should be proud of the title Marine, but we should not be content with just the title. Our mothers can be proud that we once earned the title Marine; however, we must earn that title every day while in uniform. Having graduated from BT or OCC is not enough. Far too many Marines in our Corps peak at earning the title Marine, evident by the twenty percent unable to complete four years of service.38 While hazing, tribalism, and/or a culture of less than for being new to the Marine Corps is not warranted nor is it productive, there should be daily challenges and mini-goals. However, these daily challenges and mini-goals are completed by each Marine in the unit every day. These can be physical or cognitive events done individually or collectively. However, each Marine regardless of rank, billet, years of service, or MOS should earn the title every day. Being a Marine should be a holistic, deliberate lifestyle. Case Study 4 shows that even talent must pursue greatness. 

Challenge 10: Define Performance
Talent Management 2030 discusses performance, but we as an organization have failed to define what performance means for early 21st-century warfighting performance (CWP). The more clearly defined a trait is, the more easily we can measure it. The better we can measure it, the more easily we can acknowledge success and correct setbacks. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 describes the constants of war via Chapter 1, The Nature of War.39 The changing character of the modern-day battlefield can be seen in the rise of private military contractors, the execution and planning of war by non-humans (i.e., drones and artificial intelligence), the saturation and proliferation of information and disinformation, additive manufacturing, and the accelerating pace of change.40

Without clearly defining early 21st-CWP, we will have: an unnecessary variance in preparation for war, a greater inherent risk of creating myopic definitions which leads to suboptimal performance, and increased risk by misclassifying performance, leading to incorrect emphases. Thus, we must adequately define early 21st-CWP. The author states that early 21st-CWP is the transient and relative capacity to impose our will during times of cooperation, competition, crisis, and conflict; the transient and relative capacity to efficiently and effectively achieve mission success criteria on the three levels of war; relative to the enemy, environment, and political situation, and a pursuit, where we never fully culminate. This definition of early 21st-CWP applies from the individual to the platoon to the Joint Force.  

Challenge 11: Talent Management is the Incorrect Sentiment
While TM2030 has numerous valid points, the Marine Corps does not need talent. Those who do possess talents (i.e., innate abilities) can often achieve quick success in learning new skills. However, when these talented individuals do not combine their gifts with practice, passion, or by challenging themselves, they will be surpassed by those who are less talented but are driven. For our newest Marines to join our ranks, current performance does not directly reflect future performance. 

For example, a talented infantryman who recently graduated from Infantry Training Battalion may be more physically fit, have greater cognition, and display what we might perceive as being a leader, compared to a peer lacking in those domains due to their talents. However, if this Marine does not have the drive to be a better infantryman, Marine, or leader, and if a less-talented Marine were to consistently and deliberately practice his deficiencies, then over time, the less-talented Marine would become the better infantryman. In the book, The Sports Gene, Epstein states that regarding becoming a high performer, the 10,000-hour rule is what the average person takes to become an expert with intentional and designed practice.41 However, David Epstein states that due to people’s innate abilities (talents), it should really be called the 10,000 ± 5,000 hours because some can become experts in 5,000 hours, whereas others will take 15,000 hours to become experts. Thus, a talented, low-driven Marine may never make the 5,000 hours needed to become an expert, but the less talented, high-driven Marine may very well accumulate 15,000 hours. A talented Marine with low drive will be the first to fall asleep on watch, the last to volunteer for extra duties, and will not embody esprit de corps. Therefore, we can see that talented Marines are not innately preferable to hard-working, driven Marines.

Furthermore, talented individuals can be less resilient to failures and setbacks. In her book Mindset, Dr. Dweck’s research shows that individuals who are praised for their talents can develop fixed mindsets.42 While those with fixed mindsets can be highly successful, they are ultimately less resilient than those with growth mindsets. Figure 2 summarizes the research by Dr. Dweck regarding those with fixed mindsets to those with a growth mindset.43

Therefore, talent management is not the right sentiment; rather, it is Marine management. While there would be significant overlap to the principles laid out in TM2030, Marine management recognizes that we should not emphasize innate gifts, but whether or not the Marine is making improvements in their MOS and billet and is living by the ethos we pursue. As stated by Coach Herb Brooks, coach of the 1980 U.S. Miracle hockey team, “Gentlemen, you don’t have enough talent to win on talent alone.”44

Figure 2. Fixed versus growth mindsets. (Figure provided by author.)
Case Study 4: Talent still has to pursue greatness—2008 United States Redeem Team. (Study provided by author.)

Conclusion
While there are eleven challenges to TM2030, there are many facets I fully agree with, such as: “Marines are individuals, not inventory,” “Talents can be identified and evaluated,” and “Data drives decision-making.”45 Furthermore, transforming our recruitment system as identified in TM2030 is vital moving forward as well as increasing opportunities for Marines while in uniform.46

As stated in TM2030, “It begins and ends with preparedness for combat. Our ability to fight and win on future battlefields demands a personnel system that can recruit, develop, and retain a corps of Marines that is more intelligent, physically fit, cognitively mature, and experienced.47 Were the Marines at Belleau Wood, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir able to impose their will on our enemies because of their talent (i.e., innate ability), or were our forefathers able to impose their will because they were Marines, forged in training, developed by small-unit leaders, led by morally-competent commanders, fighting for a purpose higher than themselves? We do not need talent.

>Maj Carter, before becoming a Special Operations Officer, was an Infantry Officer, serving as a Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer, and Company Commander, with deployment experience as both. Before commissioning in the Marine Corps, he was a strength and conditioning coach, a researcher in sports science, and a graduate teaching assistant. He is still currently active in the strength and conditioning community with his research centric to holistic training approaches for human performance. 

Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021).  

2. Ibid. 

3. Geoff Colvin, Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else (New York: Portfolio/ Penguin, 2018).

4. Talent Management 2030.

5. Talent is Overrated. 

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (New York: Back Bay Books, 2008). 

11. Mike Eruzione with Neal E. Boudette, The Making of a Miracle: The Untold Story of the Captain of the 1980 Gold Medal-Winning U.S. Olympic Hockey Team (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2020). 

12. Talent is Overrated.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Talent Management 2030. 

16. Alexander A. Vandegrift, “Bended Knee Speech,” Marine Corps University, March 30, 2024, https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Frequently-Requested-Topics/Historical-Documents-Orders-and-Speeches/Bended-Knee-Speech. 

17. Jeremy Carter, “A Critical and Devastating Gap in our Leadership Traits, Principles, Evaluations, Ethos, and Culture: The Problem with Solutions,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, No. 7 (2024). 

18. Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Don’t (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001).

19. Talent Management 2030. 

20. John Wooden and Steven Jamison, Wooden on Leadership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005). 

21. Ibid.

22. Good to Great.

23. Talent Management 2030. 

24. Ibid.

25. Gen David H. Berger, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2023). 

26. Jeremy Carter, “Strategic Competition and Stand-in Forces: A Novel View for Tactical Units,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, No. 8 (2024). 

27. Jeremy Carter and Thomas Ochoa, “The Relationship Between Enlisted and Officers- Part 1: The T-Shape Philosophy,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7 (2023). 

28. Talent Management 2030.

29. Ibid.

30. Daniel Coyle, The Culture Code: The Secrets of Highly Successful Groups (New York: Bantam Books, 2018).

31. Jeremy Carter, “Achieving the Culture We Pursue: The DEMAC Approach,” Marine Corps Gazette (Submitted).

32. Talent Management 2030.

33. Ibid. 

34. “Achieving the Culture We Pursue.”

35. “A Critical and Devastating Gap in our Leadership Traits, Principles, Evaluations, Ethos, and Culture.” 

36. “Achieving the Culture We Pursue.”  

37. Ibid.  

38. Talent Management 2030.

39. Douglas W. Hubbard, How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of “Intangibles” in Business, 3d edition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014);  “Achieving the Culture We Pursue;” and Headquarters Marine Corps: MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

40. Jeremy Carter, “United States Marine Corps Commandos: Enabling Joint Forcible Entry,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7. (2023). 

41. David Epstein, The Sports Gene: Inside the Science of Extraordinary Athletic Performance (New York: Penguin Random House LLC, 2014).

42. Carol S. Dweck, Mindset: The New Psychology of Success- How We Can Learn to Fulfill Our Potential (New York: Ballantine Books, 2016). 

43. Mindset.

44. The Making of a Miracle.

45. Talent Management 2030.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

American Marines in the Battles of Trenton and Princeton

The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].)
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, September 1921.

Great deeds were done by the American Marines in the World War, and of these every school child knows. Only the historian and the antiquarian know of the part played by the Continental Marines in the Revolution, yet in that desperate struggle in which our forefathers won freedom and the right to exist as a nation, the Marines of that day acted a role fully as important and spectacular as that of the immortal Fourth Brigade in the war with Germany, covering their Corps with undying honor in battles more fruitful in their effect on our history than Belleau Wood and more smashing and decisive in results than the Meuse-­Argonne.

Few Americans, aside from avowed historians and other searchers of Colonial and Continental documents, know that there were American Marines with Washington at the Battle ofTrenton, yet recent investigation of the records of that period disclose that fully a quarter of the entire strength of the heroic band of patriots with whom the First Commander-in-Chief crossed the Delaware on Christmas Eve, 1776, and smote the Hessians in the midst of their revels was made up of Soldiers of the Sea. The archives also show that on that occasion as well as at the equally decisive Battle of Princeton, the Marines conducted themselves in a manner worthy of the high traditions of their Corps and won the warmest praise from Washington himself by their valor, steadiness, discipline and efficiency.

On the roster of officers who led the Marines under Washington are names borne by families distinguished in Colonial annals and woven throughout the history of the United States. Some of these continued in the service of the Corps and won added glory on later occasions. Others transferred to different branches of Washington’s forces in need of their services, particularly to the artillery of the Army, where their experience with heavy cannon on shipboard rendered them particularly useful. Others made the supreme sacrifice in the cause of their country on the fields of Trenton and Princeton and were buried on the ground that their blood had hallowed.

In dealing with the Battles of the Revolution, writers of popular histories of the United States have paid little attention to the identity of corps or divisions of troops of the regular branches of the service. When the militia of the colonies appeared upon the field, their presence has been noted by writers of their respective states but with the regulars of Washington’s forces, little attempt has been made to preserve a record as to the troops which took part in the various battles and skirmishes, except as to the names of general officers and commanders of groups, with the result that the specific achievements of the Marines and of the regiments and other organizations of the Revolutionary Army have been to a great degree lost.

Recent search of the records reveals that of Washington’s force of about twenty-four hundred men with whom he crossed the Delaware on that momentous Christmas Eve, 1776, more than six hundred were Marines. These were made up of the “Famous Battalion” of Major Samuel Nicholas, the Marine Guards of the Andrea Doria, Hancock, Montgomery, and other vessels. Coming as they did, as a fresh, well-fed, well-equipped, well-trained reenforcement to Washington’s worn-out veterans, exhausted by the constant forced marches and desperate rear-guard actions of their retreat across the Jerseys, they may well have been the factor, which supplied the fresh strength and aggressive force, which made possible the decisive strategic successes of Trenton and Princeton.

With the coming of December, 1776, the position of Washington’s Army was indeed a precarious one, and the cause of the newly born United States trembled in the balance. Worsted in the battles of Long Island and forced to cross the Hudson to New Jersey, Washington was obliged to look on helplessly while the City of New York was occupied by a British Army and Fort Washington and Fort Lee captured. While this was going on a detachment of the main British force overran the surrounding territory, driving a wedge between New England and the more southern colonies, cutting vital avenues of communication.

Furiously pursued by an overwhelming force across the Jerseys, Washington reached the Delaware near Trenton, and rapidly assembled a fleet of boats and barges while the Continental Navy and Pennsylvania State Navy combed the banks of the river fifty miles above and below Trenton, sweeping up everything that would float. On December 8th, Washington’s Army completed the passage of the river, taking the most serviceable of the boats with it and destroying those not needed for its own transportation. So effective had been the work of the naval detachments, that when the British reached the river a few days later, not a boat was to be found, and Lord Howe and his commanders quickly decided that it would be impossible to cross until the river should freeze.Accordingly detachments of the British Army occupied Trenton while other details spread up and down the eastern bank of the Delaware pillaging and burning the homes of those colonists loyal to the new government and occupying towns and strongpositions.

Meanwhile consternation struck into the hearts of the leaders of the Revolution, and itseemed that nothing could save the Americans from complete subjugation.Disheartened by the defeats of their Army and the rapid advances of the British forces, the Continental Congress adjourned from Philadelphia to Baltimore, and adopted a resolution arming Washington with absolute dictatorial powers for a period of six months.

All the able-bodied citizens of Philadelphia were enrolled in the Militia, and the Council of Safety of Pennsylvania organized a Home Guard of all such persons who were not fit to march with the Militia. On December 12,1776, bounties were offered to all Volunteers enlisting  “who shall join General Washington” for six weeks’ service, “at this inclement season, to assist in defending their country, threatened with instant invasion.”

From New England to Virginia, disheartenment reigned and the affairs of the Thirteen States seemed without hope or promise of success. Among the British, confidence was supremely evident, and Lord Howe and his generals openly boasted that with the coming of colder weather they would cross the frozen Delaware without opposition and occupy Philadelphia, the capital city of the new nation, without striking a blow.

Under these discouraging conditions Washington rallied his shattered Army with desperate energy, sending a call to Philadelphia for all available reenforcements to join him in the most urgent haste. His appeal was immediately answered by the dispatch of approximately 1,500 men, nearly half of whom were Marines. These were made up of a battalion numbering about three hundred Marines under command of Major Samuel Nicholas, which had been raised and drilled in Philadelphia to furnish Marine Guards for a number of frigates being built for the Continental Navy.Added to this were other Marine detachments, hastily withdrawn from naval vessels in Philadelphia and operating on the Delaware River, bringing the total up to approximately six hundred Marines.

On account of the pride which Philadelphia, even at that early date, took in its connections with the Marine Corps, these Marines were well-equipped with clothing, arms and ammunition. Practically all of their officers had seen active service against the British on board the vessels of theContinental Navy and for several months they had been occupied in daily drill and frequent skirmishes with small British detachments. As a consequence they had reached an extremely high state of training and discipline and from the numerous successes which had attended their operations, their confidence and morale were excellent.

In addition to the Marines the forces sent to Washington from Philadelphia consisted of several hundred troops of that State, including the famous Philadelphia City Troops and detachments of Bluejackets, used to firing guns under command of Captain Thomas Read of the Navy. The arrival of these reenforcements greatly encouraged Washington and served to raise the morale of his small Army to a great degree. Seeing the scattered and overconfident state of the British forces opposing him, the American Commander-in-Chief resolved to profit by these conditions and strike a blow at the earliest possible moment. He selected the city of Trenton, at that time occupied by a body of about 1,200 Hessian mercenaries in the British service under the command of a German, Colonel Rahl, as the point at which his first stroke should be directed. Knowing that it was the custom of these troops to celebrate Christmas with feasting and unrestrained drunkenness, Washington selected Christmas Eve as the night for the blow. On the evening of December 24th, he gathered together a force of about 2,400 men with which he crossed the Delaware in open boats through drifting ice, landing at about three o’clock in the morning, several miles above Trenton.

He had originally planned to attack that city in the dark before daybreak Christmas morning, but owing to the difficulties in crossing it was found that he would be unable to reach the city until after daylight. Undaunted, however, he determined to persevere in his attempt, trusting to the overconfidence of the British and the demoralization of the Hessians following their Christmas feast, to make good his surprise. In this hope he was not disappointed. Although the American columns did not reach their positions for the attack until eight o’clock the surprise was complete. Not a shot was fired until the attack was well underway, and the American troops were in the heart of the city almost before the astonished Hessians were aware of their proximity. The success of the attack was assured before a blow was struck. Scarcely any casualties were sustained by the patriots while of the Hessians, Colonel Rahl and about a hundred of his men were killed and the rest surrendered. More than a thousand prisoners were taken by Washington, who retreated with them at once again to the west bank of the Delaware.

Encouraged by his success at Trenton, Washington determined upon a further stroke. Crossing the Delaware again on December 30th, here occupied Trenton as a feint. General Cornwallis, who commanded a large British force occupying the town of Princeton, at once responded by marching towards Trenton to give battle. After a skirmish at Assanpink Creek, on January 2, 1777, Washington retreated to the eastward, drawing the British force after him.

Nightfall found him hemmed in by Cornwallis, with the British Army in front and rough country with practically no roads or trails, in his rear. Full of confidence the British commander made his camp, believing that at last he had caught the elusive Colonial chief, and that with the dawn of day, he would be able to scatter or crush his patriot force. Washington had other ideas, however. When night had fallen he gathered his forces, leaving guards to keep his camp-fires burning through the night, and set out to force his way through the rough country to his rear, around to the Princeton road.

Accustomed to travel, through wild and unbroken country, the Colonials effected this manoeuvre without loss of time or attracting attention, and at daybreak on the following morning when Cornwallis was preparing to advance against their empty camp, Washington’s advance guard appeared on the outskirts of Princeton, more than ten miles distant. Here they found three British regiments, constituting the rear-guard of their army.

Completely surprised, these were beaten in battle in the early morning and retreated with a loss of more than 400 men, leaving quantities of military stores in the hands of the victors. The loss of the American force was extremely small, and after destroying the stores which fell into their hands, Washington continued the march with his Army, and before the British main body around his vacant camp at Assanpink could pursue, he had broken entirely through the British cordon and taken up a strong position at Morristown. Here he was joined by other units of the scattered American forces, and soon found himself at the head of a force sufficiently numerous to give battle to the British on equal terms.

The effect of the news of the successes of Trenton and Princeton on the cause of the Colonies was magical. Congress returned at once from Baltimore to Philadelphia and public rejoicing reigned from New England to Savannah. Through their defeat of the Red-Coats in superior numbers at Princeton the Continentals lost all their awe of the British regulars as fighting men and even the prestige of the dreaded Hessians was shaken. Patriots everywhere renewed their hopes and redoubled their activities, and everywhere militia companies were recruited with new zeal and sent off to join Washington’s forces in northern Jersey.

The British were correspondingly discouraged and dispirited. From overrunning southern Jersey and confidently preparing to march on Philadelphia, they were gradually driven back and forced to abandon town after town and concentrate on New Brunswick, where they were constantly harassed and hemmed in until it became a question as to whether they would be able to effect their retreat to the protection of the guns of their fleet at New York without further severe reverses and great loss.

Of the part played by the Marines in these decisive battles of the Revolution, much evidence is scattered through the Continental records, and through the historical archives ofPennsylvania and New Jersey.

Even before the retreat of Washington across New Jersey, the Marines commenced to wage a campaign in connection with the Navy on the Delaware which ended in the complete destruction of British influence in the Delaware valley. It was this campaign which rendered that river an impassible barrier to the British forces, and a safe defense behind which Washington was able to retire to rally his army.

The campaign on the Delaware began in the summer of 1776 following the return of Esek Hopkin’s Continental Fleet from its exploit in the Bahamas, where it captured New Providence, together with the British Governor and much military stores. Several vessels of the Continental Navy and the State Navy of Pennsylvania, based on Philadelphia, turned their attention to the work of weeding out, by means of naval expeditions, the British garrisons and groups of armed Tories along the shores of the river, and in parts of New Jersey which could be reached from that waterway and its branches.

Vessels which are named in the Continental records as sending their Marines ashore to take part in these actions are the Montgomery, Flagship of the Pennsylvania State Navy, the Virginia, Hancock and the Andrea Doria, of the Continental Navy, and it is very probable that several others participated from time to time.

In addition to the above named, the following vessels carried Marine Guards: Congress, Franklin, Effingham, Dickinson, Chatham, Burke, Camden, Bull Dog, Experiment and Convention.

A careful count from the muster rolls of the vessels of the Pennsylvania State Navy at this time shows that there were 529 Marines serving on board them. In addition Captain Thomas Forest, in command of 31 Marines, was serving with the Arnold Battery. Captain William Brown commanded the 64 Marines, and his Junior Officer, First Lieutenant James Morrison, on board the Montgomery.

The intimate relations between the Pennsylvania State Marines and the Continental Marines is shown by the fact that during this period two Marines of the Effingham were turned over to Captain Robert Mullan since that Continental Marine Officer claimed to have first enlisted them. In the course of the campaign, which was conducted for the control of the Delaware River, these Marines played a vital part.

By means of their ships’ boats, and galleys specially constructed for river warfare, they were able to commandthe river completely and drive the disloyal forces far inland, burning small forts and capturing garrisons and sweeping up all boats and means ofwater transportationthatmightbeusedagainstthe States.

One of the notable exploits by the Marines during this campaign was the landing at Burlington on December 12, 1776, from the galleys of the Continental Fleet, where they threatened to burn houses in which it was supposed Hessians were concealed. Similar landings were made at other places with similar success, and forces of Marines in boats were constantly at work sweeping the creeks and estuaries between Philadelphia and the rapids above Trenton, keeping detachments of the British forces on the move, and breaking up bands of Tories and pro-British colonists.

When the news came of  Washington’s defeat on Long Island and his forced retreat across the Jerseys came, the activities of the Marines was redoubled, as it seemed self-evident that it was his intention  to retreat beyond the Delaware and make a stand, using that river as a barrier between himself and the British Army. As a result, when Washington reached the Delaware an ample number of boats and barges were at hand for the transportation of  his Army, and so complete had been the work of the Marines and the Navy on the river, that his scouts reported that for fifty miles above Trenton and as far below, not a boat remained in disloyal hands.

Commissioning documents. (Photo: Marine Corps History Division.)
Commissioning documents. (Photo: Marine Corps History Division.)

Andrew Porter 1743–1812. (Photo from wikipedia. com.)
Andrew Porter 1743–1812. (Photo from wikipedia. com.)

The value of this work to Washington’s harrassed army it is not possible  to overestimate.  Reaching the Delaware in hot pursuit, the victorious British were compelled to come to an abrupt halt. Not a boat could be found for their transportation across the river, and Lord Howe was faced with the alternative of  building a bridge, or of waiting for the freezing of the river, either alternative necessitating a delay of weeks or months, affording Washington a vital interval for reorganizing his forces and allowing them to recuperate and repair their shakened morale.

In addition to the British lack of boats, the American Navy held command of the Delaware, rendering operations by the British near the banks of that stream hazardous in the extreme.American Marines still operated in New Jersey in connection with the vessels of the Navy, attacking small parties of the British, cutting off stragglers and dispersing bands of Tories, retiring to the ships when menaced by overwhelming numbers.In these, constant success seems to have attended the Marines, and these unvaried successes relatively unimportant though they were, proved a great factor in raising the morale and inspiring Washington’s main army.

It was in this period, between the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, that an exploit was planned with characteristic dash, which promised to rival the most daring feats of the war. Hearing that Elisha Laurence, Sheriff of Monmouth, New Jersey, who had been appointed Lieutenant Colonel by the British, was raising a force of Tories at Monmouth Court House and had imprisoned twenty Americans for refusing to bear arms under the Royal Standard, Major Nicholas of the Marines requested permission of General Cadwalader “of going after Laurence’s Party.” The incident was of such importance that on December31, 1776, General Cadwalader wrote to General Washington, asking authority to permit Major Nicholas to start out on his expedition, but the skirmish at Assanpink Creek and the Battle of Princeton intervened to prevent its accomplishment.

On account of their daring and success it was accordingly natural that when Washington appealed for all possible troops prior to his decisive strokes at Trenton and Princeton, the Marines who had proved that they could fight so well ashore should be sent. As a nucleus of these reenforcing Marines, the powerful new Marine battalion recently formed in Philadelphia was selected.

Commissioning documents. (Photo: Marine Corps History Division.)
Commissioning documents. (Photo: Marine Corps History Division.)

Major Samuel Nicholas commanded this battalion with Captain Isaac Craig as his adjutant. The first company was commanded by Captain Andrew Porter, the second by Captain Robert Mullan, and the third by Captain Robert Deane. Since Captain Craig had taken the Marine Guard of the Andrea Doria ashore, and also acted as Adjutant of Major Nicholas’ Battalion, it would appear that his Marines were also attached directly to this battalion.

A payroll of Captain Mullan’s company, serving in the battalion of Major Nicholas, signed by Major Nicholas and Lieutenant Montgomery, shows that First Lieutenant David Love, Second Lieutenant Hugh Montgomery, four Sergeants, four Corporals, one drummer, one fifer, and seventy-three other Marines, composed this company. This and other rolls appear in a book containing also minutes of a Masonic Lodge which met at the Tun Tavern on Water Street, Philadelphia, beginning with the year 1749. Robert Mullan, it seems, was a member of the Lodge, proprietor of the tavern and Captain of the Company of Marines, the rolls of which are written in the book. The book was found at “Mill Bank,” formerly the residence of Nathan Sellers, in Upper Darby, near Philadelphia, and now the property of his grandson, Coleman Sellers.

In addition to Major Nicholas’ Battalion many of the Marine Guards which had participated so successfully in the river campaign were assembled and sent as a part of the reenforcement. It is a matter of known record that the Marine Guards from the Flagship Montgomery, the Hancock, and the Continental warships Virginia and Andrea Doria, were sent, and since there were over five hundred Marines serving on board other naval vessels in the river, it is reasonable to conclude that a considerable number of them also participated in these battles.

There is no doubt but that the arrival of this veteran contingent, well-equipped and with the confidence arising from victories over the British, was a vital element in supplying the stamina and spirit necessary for the achievement of the victories of Trenton and Princeton.

In the Battle of Trenton there were very few casualties on the side of the Americans, and so far as is known, none of these were Marines.In the succeeding frays of Assanpink and Princeton, however, the Marines were not so fortunate.

After the Battles of Trenton and Princeton the Marines accompanied Washington to his winter quarters at Morristown, where, during the reorganization of the Army, a number of them were assigned to the artillery. Major Nicholas’ Battalion served as infantry up to February 1777, and later as artillery. Some acted as convoys for prisoners taken at Trenton and Princeton. For instance, a list dated February 27, 1777, shows that Captain Robert Mullan escorted twenty-five British prisoners of war to Philadelphia. The remainder returned to their ships on the Delaware or to their stations in Philadelphia, and resumed their duties in connection with the Navy.

* Much of the material included in this article was published in the magazine of the Daughters of the American Revolution, and is reprinted here by the courtesy of that magazine and its editor, Miss Natalie S. Lincoln.

The First of Many

The Marines’ first amphibious assault on New Providence
>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, November 2019. Editor’s Note: The authors biography is available in the original edition.

Within his logbook, Lt James Josiah wrote, “At 2 P.M. Cast off from ye Warf In Company with ye Commodore Ship Alfred, Columbus & Cabot, Light airs from ye Westward & much Ice in ye River.”1 The date was 4 January 1776. The wharf that Lt Josiah was writing about is located outside of Philadelphia, and he was on board the Continental Navy ship Andrew Doria. As Josiah looked over the rails of the Andrew Doria, he saw the newly formed Continental Marines board his ship and the surrounding Continental Navy vessels. Led by Capt Samuel Nicholas, over 200 Marines loaded aboard the ships. The Continental Marines were not even three months old, but they were embarking on what would be their first amphibious assault in a long and illustrious future that lay ahead.

At this time of the year, the water was frigid and many parts were frozen. This made movement difficult, delaying their departure date by a few days. Eight ships were in the fleet. The Alfred was the largest with multiple cannons. She had 20 nine-pounders and 10 six-pounders. On her bow, she had an elaborate figurehead of a man in armor drawing his sword as if riding into battle.2 Most of the ships were top of the line, newly built by the Continental Navy. They were commanded by Commodore Esek Hopkins, who made his flagship the Alfred. The other ships in the fleet were the Columbus, Cabot, Andrew Doria, Wasp, Hornet, Fly, and the Providence.3 Once on board, the Marines did not know where they were going or what their mission would be. This was all to be briefed on the way down to their target.

Commodore Hopkins was the only person who knew the destination and targets before he passed on the information to Capt Nicholas. Hopkins was ordered by the Naval Committee to sail down to Virginia. If he chose not to do so, the Naval Committee and the Continental Congress surely thought Hopkins would sail to Georgia or South Carolina as the possibility of a large campaign in the South was becoming more real. However, Hopkins had a better idea. He was going to sail to the Caribbean islands of the Bahamas. This proved to be a wise decision because the British had just sent two frigates and two sloops-of-war to Virginia, and Hopkins’ fleet could very well have been destroyed. The same may have occured in Georgia and the Carolinas as the British built up their military mass there for a southern campaign.4 The British Sailors hinted to their superiors the idea of an American attack in the Bahamas, but when Hopkins’ fleet eventually sailed, the British believed his destination to be New York City or Boston. In picking the Bahamas, Hopkins understood what others did not: the logistical needs of the army as well as the importance of surprise and strategy. 

Before the war, many American Sailors had traveled throughout the Caribbean for trading purposes when they were loyal to the British Crown. The Americans were familiar with the waters and knew the islands and their inhabitants quite well. In fact, the islanders cared for the Americans more than the British because they benefited more from their relationship; however, they generally cared for whichever deal benefited them the most.5 

Map of the New Providence Island, as seen from satellite images. (Image from NASA.)
Map of the island. (Image from NASA.)

The logistics of the Continental Army were poor. There was a serious lack of heavy artillery and black powder. Over the years, the British had established forts in the Bahamian capital city of Nassau. These forts consisted of cannon and huge armories full of gunpowder. The British assigned a company of the 14th Regiment of Foot to protect these supplies and weapons. However, the Americans found that this company of the 14th Regiment of Foot had been called to Boston to reinforce the British garrisons there. Additionally, the British sloop HMS Savage only visited the harbor occasionally.6 While Hopkins’ orders were to sail down to Virginia as reinforcements, his decision to attack the Bahamas was not totally against the Continental Congress’ will. On 29 November 1775, just nineteen days after the creation of the Marine Corps, the Continental Congress realized the Bahamas provided mass stores of gun powder and cannon, so they issued a resolution:

Information being given to Congress that there is a large quantity of powder in the Island of Providence, Ordered that the foregoing Committee take Measures for securing & bring[ing] away the said powder.7

Hopkins saw the opportunity for glory and was not going to let it slip away. 

The fleet finally set sail in February after being stuck for six weeks behind the thick ice of the Delaware Bay.8 While they waited in the ice, more reports came to Hopkins about how desperate GEN George Washington was for gun powder. Hopkins wanted to take action. Nicholas was in command of over 200 Marines with his two main lieutenants: Matthew Parke and John Fitzpatrick.9 As the fleet left the Delaware Bay, the Marines still believed they were heading to Virginia or further south. What the Marines did not know what Hopkins’ orders were after dealing with Virginia. His orders ended with the phrase, “You are then to follow such course as your best judgment shall suggest to you as most useful to the American cause.”10 

As Hopkins sailed into the Atlantic, the risk grew. This was the first fleet that the Continental Navy had put together, and its destruction would surely devastate the morale and future of the Continental Navy. The men were poorly trained for maritime warfare as they had only been merchants and knew only the basics of sailing and little of fighting on the open ocean. The threat of a growing number of British warships in the area loomed. The British had already deployed a 28-gun frigate, the HMS Liverpool, and there was a good chance it could cross paths with the American fleet.11

From the beginning, luck was not on the side of the Americans. Disease found its way onboard most of the ships. Smallpox was a huge concern; on 18 February 1776, it became a reality when the Alfred had to bury a man at sea who had succumbed to the disease. The next day, the Columbus did the same. Fear of the disease spreading grew among the men, lowering morale.12 In the days following the deaths of the two Sailors, storms appeared and the winds grew heavy. The fleet had lost visual contact of the Hornet and the Fly. In reality, the two ships had collided with each other; the Hornet was forced to return to port, the closest being Charleston, SC, to make repairs. However, the Fly made repairs and rendezvoused with the fleet on 1 March in the Caribbean.13 Two more weeks went by and nothing horrendous happened; the Sailors’ morale was lifting, and they were only about one day of sailing from their anchor point. Then tragedy struck again. On 1 March, the Columbus buried another sailor who died from smallpox. Hopkins reported in his logbook that four of his ships were infected with the disease.14

Later that same day, the fleet was sailing down the coast and spotted two sloops from New Providence belonging to the British Navy. The flagship quickly caught up to them and seized them as the first prizes of the Continental Navy.15 Later that afternoon, the fleet anchored on the southwest side of Grand Abaco in twelve fathoms of water.16

The assault on New Providence had two objective points: Fort Nassau and Fort Montagu. Both had guns and powder the Marines could take back to the colonies for use in Washington’s army only. Over the past few months, the British had moved some of the guns and troops from the fort to help reinforce Boston, but there were still enough guns and powder to make the mission a successful one. Fort Nassau was built in 1697 and overlooked the western entrance to the harbor. It was a fort of superior technology and heavy firepower. The fort was armed with cannon, including twelve-pounders, eighteen-pounders, eight-inch bronze mortars, five and one-half inch howitzers, and bronze Coehorn mortars. However, at the time of the attack, the fort was falling apart. The local loyalist militia thought the British infantry would kill themselves by simply firing the guns because of how old the guns were and because the walls were probably not sturdy enough to withstand artillery fire.

Fort Montagu was a different story. It was built between 1741 and 1742 and was located approximately one mile east of Fort Nassau. It was more simplistic than Fort Nassau, but larger, and it guarded the vulnerable rear entrance to Fort Nassau. Fort Montagu, at the time of the attack, maintained a strong defense, including eighteen-pounders, twelve-pounders, nine pounders, and six pounders. It also contained a large powder magazine, barracks, and a guardroom. Fort Montagu was not falling apart like Fort Nassau, but it did have one major flaw: its simple square shape made it extremely vulnerable to any type of assault.17

The assault was scheduled for 2 March. Hopkins knew the forts could be easily taken because the British failed to leave enough infantry to defend them, and the local loyalist militia was unprepared. The plan was to take the two sloops that had been captured the day before and hide the Marines below deck. The ships were known to the locals, so the Americans believed they could come into port, unload the Marines, and take their objectives. Once the sloops entered the sight of Fort Nassau, however, the plan fell apart. There were warning shots fired, and it was clear that the British knew the sloops had been captured and were not friendly. Hopkins’ fleet and the two sloops fled, hoping to attack the next day.18 That night, Hopkins called for a council of war to figure out the next move. He wanted to go to the western side of the island to have the Marines attack the town from the rear; however, there was no road for a march and no water deep enough to make anchor. Despite these issues, a decision was finally made.

As the American fleet sailed over the horizon and into the view of the British in the early morning of 3 March, the alarm guns were sounded and troops were called to arms. The British governor, Montfort Browne, decided it was necessary to defend the powder and put Fort Nassau’s commander, Maj Robert Sterling, in charge.19 The Marines made an amphibious landing at a point called “The Creek,” which was located a mile and a half south of Fort Montagu. This was the first amphibious assault in the history of the Marine Corps.

Fort Montagu today. Fort Nassau no longer stands. (Photo from http://www.thebahamasweekly.com.)
Fort Montagu today. Fort Nassau no longer stands. (Photo from http://www.thebahamasweekly.com.)

Over 200 Marines and 50 Sailors took the beach with the Wasp and Providence in support;20 they landed near a group of free slaves, and the Marines encountered no resistance. Capt Nicholas made a report in his journal about the first amphibious landing:

The inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance, and supposed us to be Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing.21

The Marines under Nicholas formed into two columns and marched toward Fort Montagu. Despite being under cannon fire from 110 local militia under the command of Browne, not a single American casualty was taken. Browne then took his militia to Fort Nassau, and the Marines easily captured Fort Montagu. The militia tried to “spike” its artillery but failed to do so properly.22 Nicholas and his Marines were tired. Nicholas later wrote,

I thought it necessary to stay all night, and refresh my men, who were fatigued, being on board the small vessels, not having a convenience to either sleep or cook in.23

Hopkins knew he could now take Fort Nassau, but to help save American lives and show the courtesy of eighteenth century warfare, he sent a message to the British:

If I am not Opposed in putting my design in Execution the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe, Neither shall they be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no Resistance.24

Browne understood this and knew he could not defend the city or the harbor from the outnumbering American force. Knowing the Americans wanted the powder he did what he knew best. The powder was the single most important item Browne possessed; thus, he loaded it all onto the HMS St. Johns. In total, there were over 100 barrels of powder, and Browne sent them to the British-occupied town of St. Augustine, FL. This was Hopkins’ major fault of the operation that later found him in trouble with the Naval Committee and in the likings of Congress. He failed to use the other ships of his fleet to block the few lanes out of the harbor. The powder escaped under the cover of darkness aboard the HMS St. Johns and made it to its destination safely.25

The following day, Nicholas was met with an invitation from Browne to take the city and Fort Nassau if he liked. Nicholas wrote in his journal,

On our march I met an express from the Governor … The messenger then told me I might march into the town, and if I thought proper, into the fort, without interruption.26

Not a single shot was fired, and the Marines took the city and the fort. Browne was arrested in chains and taken aboard the Alfred. 

The raid was a huge success. The Americans did manage to capture some barrels of powder. The fleet then spent two weeks loading all of its captured prizes onto its ships. The prizes consisted of a city, two forts, 88 guns, and over 16,500 shells of shot.27 On the Andrew Doria alone, 38,240 pounds of round shot were loaded into her storage areas. Hopkins had to hire a private sloop to carry some of the prizes back with him because there was not enough room on his own ships.28 However, sickness was still killing some of the men, and many took desertion on the island to get away from it.29 The fleet finally set sail on 16 March back toward Rhode Island, and along the way it captured four prize ships. The Marines performed these captures with outstanding musket fire. They finally returned on 8 April with seven dead and four wounded from the trip back. One of the dead included Lt Fitzpatrick, one of Nicholas’ personal friends.30 

The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].)
The First Recruits, December 1775. (Painting by Col Charles Waterhouse, USMCR, from The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History, by Merrell L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001].)
Upon return, individuals were both praised and reprimanded. Capt Nicholas was promoted to major for his brave actions. Hopkins’ repution was tarnished for disobeying orders and attacking the Bahamas despite documentation stating he could. He was also reprimanded for failing to secure the lanes of escape from the harbor and allowing the most important asset, the powder, to escape.31

It was the first of many overseas attacks by the United States. It is astonishing that even though most of the Sailors and Marines were untrained, they performed as if they had been doing it for years. The seized cannon greatly helped the artillery-starved Continental Army. 

The raid at Providence did have one major impact that was more important than guns or powder. The British were now forever paranoid. They knew they had been vulnerable where they least expected it, and now they had to concentrate more naval powers in other areas that held guns and powder. It also hurt the British because the guns and shot seized in the raid would be used against the British five years later at Fort Griswold and other battles.32 Over the years, the Marines and the United States took what they learned on the Raid of Nassau and transformed it into an art form. 

Notes

1. Charles Smith, Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution 1775–1783, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1975).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Staff, “The New Providence Expedition,” American War at Sea, (Online: April 2012), available at http://www.awiatsea.com.

5. John McCusker, Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London, UK: Routledge, 1997). 

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Marines in the Revolution.

9. Ibid.

10. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

11. Marines in the Revolution.

12. “The New Providence Expedition.”

13. Marines in the Revolution.

14. “The New Providence Expedition.”

15. Ibid.

16. Marines in the Revolution.

17. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

18. “The New Providence Expedition.”

19. Ibid.

20. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. 

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. United States Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps University, (Online), available at https://www.usmcu.edu. 

28. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

29. “The New Providence Expedition.”

30. Marine Corps University.

31. Ibid.

32. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

Units of Action

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the stand-in force

To implement the concepts supporting Force Design 2030 (FD2030), the Marine Corps must revise what it considers its key units of action while studying the emerging characteristics of modern warfare. Traditionally, the Marine Corps focuses on the infantry battalion and flying squadron as units of action for all basic measurements of capability and readiness. Those capabilities, however, do not provide what the Stand-In Forces (SIF) and Reconnaissance Counter-Reconnaissance (RXR) concepts need—especially during competition. They may in fact distract from the principal object of operations. Instead, in competition, infantry battalions and flying squadrons are enablers for the key capabilities of SIF and RXR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection resulting in targeting. The purpose-built SIF force performs operational-level ISR on behalf of the maritime and Joint Force: “Stand-in forces’ enduring function is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition continuum. Stand-in forces do this by gaining and maintaining contact (establishing target custody and identifying the potential adversary’s sensors) below the threshold of violence.”1 The units of action for that type of activity are the platforms and teams in the Marine Corps that perform intelligence and reconnaissance collection and the cells, teams, and units that perform intelligence analysis and support to targeting. Before the Corps can close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, if that ever becomes necessary, it must locate that enemy. 

The heart of the SIF and RXR concepts is ISR collection and analytical support for targeting. The Marine Corps fields such elements today in the MEFs. The MEFs have light infantry reconnaissance teams, maritime sensor elements, counterintelligence-human intelligence detachments, signals intelligence/electronic warfare teams, meteorological and oceanographic detachments, and increasingly cyber mission elements and space capabilities. Furthermore, the FMFs have the analytical specialties to support fusion and targeting as well as the transport and encryption of sensitive compartmented information and are performing these missions. Fixed-wing and unmanned squadrons can also perform ISR under the reconnaissance mission of Marine Aviation, just as light armored reconnaissance and engineers can, but most other squadrons and battalions are enablers to these functions, and none of them have the core mission essential task to execute ISR or intelligence on behalf of the fleet or Joint Force. They could provide the transport, security, or simply the cover story for ISR units of action. 

The Marine Corps, however, does not customarily assign ISR as a main effort, much less employ dedicated intelligence assets in support of anything other than the local commander. ISR does not appear as part of the core mission essential task list (METL) for the MEU; for example, it only appears as “Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations” on the METL for the CE.2 Despite what the concepts say about providing eyes and ears for the fleet and the Joint Force, there are no tasks requiring a commander, especially a MAGTF commander, to do that. For a SIF performing RXR, however, those dedicated intelligence and reconnaissance assets might be both the main effort and the only employable force.

The FD2030 original concept evokes a force “optimized for naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces, purpose-built to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of the fleets.”3 This suggests that this force will perform, above all else, maritime domain awareness (MDA) by sensing and making sense of their immediate environs. For the stand-up of the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) in Japan, the Commandant assured Congress that “this unit will possess advanced ISR capabilities as well as long-range precision fires capabilities, improving both maritime domain awareness and our ability to deter potential adversaries.”4 In competition and crisis short of shooting conflict, that description means a force with a particularly acute ability to sense and make sense: an exceptionally strong ISR force that can do all the necessary work to constantly and consistently hold potential targets at risk. Under maritime strategic doctrine, there is a direct correlation between this kind of targeting and intelligence. The principal challenge for the maritime reconnaissance force “relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is obvious that for this kind of operation, the most precise intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence, the most difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy’s fleet from day to day.”5 

Whether employed as part of a larger formation, as in the proposed MLR in Japan, or as independent assets, the Marine Corps needs to perfect its concepts against the characteristics of the real world to see whether it can bring the capability sets together to accomplish them. For the larger formations, the Service follows a logical progression beginning with the 3rd MLR in Hawaii, inside the confines of the United States, and then proceeding to the 12th MLR in the first island chain and weapons engagement zone (WEZ) for the pacing threat envisioned—the People’s Republic of China.6 If the 12th MLR does indeed possess “advanced ISR capabilities,” it will be able to execute real-world ISR in competition and practice exercise targeting cycles in its zone of crisis action. For ISR and intelligence support to targeting, the task of perfecting against live opponents is easier than for any other participants in the targeting cycle because the possible adversarial target sets are abundant, and real-world and realtime missions can be executed short of conflict. 

Stationing in the main competition space will develop familiarity with the problem set, but it is a conflict that provides the best driver of innovation, even conflict elsewhere. “A military force wins by seeing how general principles apply to a specific situation and being creative with combat solutions.”7 ISR, while sometimes provocative, could be employed on behalf of allies, partners, or the Joint Force without engaging the rest of the force in crisis or contingency. The fusion and analysis of the intelligence collected could produce both innovation and action. “There has been no dearth of reporting on the changing character of war and the potential for disruption by new technology to alter the landscape of conflict.”8

The pacing threat also surveys current conflicts to evolve its planning to match probable warfare trends. Before the Russians began their current campaign in the Ukraine, for example, it was clear that “Chinese strategists face an economic security problem in the Malacca Dilemma, describing the threat of a naval blockade of vital Chinese sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.”9 China—however confrontational it has been in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea, demonstrating tactics and procedures—is not currently at war. Another peer adversary, Russia has begun to explore new operating concepts in realtime conflict in a resource-constrained environment in the Ukraine and Black Sea. Because the war in Ukraine involves a peer competitor—Russia—that conflict would appear to provide an ideal case to inform FD2030. While it is possible that a robust classified effort is occurring, there is little public evidence that the Marine Corps is doing much more than accepting public lessons learned from Ukraine. 

With increasing multi-domain drone implications, Ukraine provides a hotbed of military innovation.10 “As drones started to be used extensively, new operational concepts started to evolve, radically transforming armed conflict. This is especially visible in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where drone usage dominates most of the highlights of the conflict.”11 Ukraine is also exercising littoral sea operations in the Black Sea, with particular success in the first few weeks of 2024 using surface drones against warships.12 Over that few weeks, a landing ship, a missile-armed patrol vessel, and a corvette were sunk by a special operations unit according to Ukraine as well as several Russian patrol craft.13 In 2022, Ukraine sank the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, using Neptune anti-ship missiles. Public reporting indicates that without a single warship of its own, Ukraine has sunk nearly a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.14 It is notable that the announcements of successful targeting have come first, and sometimes exclusively, from “Ukrainian Intelligence.”15 How this has happened, and how the targets were located and analyzed, ought to be of paramount importance to Marines, especially how the Ukrainians developed the maritime awareness through ISR to execute the actions.

There is an opportunity to support Ukraine alongside NATO allies in Europe. With another force doing the fighting, ISR from a distance and observation of procedures is still possible and best performed from a position of direct support. Ukraine also possesses a Marine Corps, organized into brigades, trained for the most part by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway.16 While it is not clear that Ukrainian Marines participated at all in recent Black Sea littoral-control operations, these forces in size and formation more closely resemble the Marine Corps than the commando forces that have volunteered to train them. If Ukrainian Marines participated in Black Sea maritime operations, however, the Marine Corps has not been training them at scale through its typical units of action and so has minimal relation to the results. 

The other possibility, then, for learning from the conflict would be through participating in Black Sea MDA by employing ISR and intelligence analytical units of action. There is no public evidence of such activity by Marines. Although two-thirds of the FMF is devoted to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the lack of attention to a peer-competitor conflict exhibiting the characteristics of contemporary littoral warfare seems particularly striking: “In times of war, front-line practitioners are agents of innovation and change if only through necessity. Because there is no way to fully anticipate what a dynamic and evolving adversary will do in a conflict, the fog of war requires adaptation.”17 Marine force concepts appear to ignore this aspect of contemporary conflict, instead developing the force focused exclusively on a perception of a pacing threat not currently at war. 

Three current Marine Corps trends converge to generate this inattention to current crises. First, the pressure of transformational innovation that FD2030 created, especially in terms of those within the Service who stand to gain or lose, required a particularly singular rationale: that the most dangerous potential adversary translated into the requirement. Divestments in any organization result in difficult decisions, so the Corps turned to its pacing threat to justify them. Cuts, the Commandant explained, are “sizing the force for what you need, what you think you’ll be asked to do in the future.”18 The tension created by divestment resulted in a singular focus for justifications, even as the force struggled to balance its SIF identity with its accustomed crisis response identity. Something had to support the case for predictive change. The singularity of focus resulted in resource decisions that have had consequences on the global availability of Marine forces, impacting the balance of force innovation and crisis response capability. Forces involved in innovation have not been available for crises elsewhere because the SIF is meant to be a standing capability forward deployed. Likewise, surging capacity in elements of non-core units of action like ISR, targeting fusion, and intelligence analysis for a crisis elsewhere has been out of the question. 

The second issue is the stress assumed by the force when setting aside units for experimentation, continuing to maintain existing global force management requirements, the deliberate reduction of the force, and the retention problems that followed. This kind of stress leads to readiness issues when a reduced number of units attempt to respond to the same or a growing number of requirements. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, analytical, and targeting support Marines tend to be high-demand, low-density assets, meaning the stress to the force overall is particularly acute among these specialties. As a result, units at all echelons, but especially the MEFs in this case, seek to husband their resources to preserve readiness by avoiding non-core mission requirements. Even if the MAGTF had a METL that included performing ISR on behalf of the fleet and Joint Force (which it does not), conflicts that do not directly involve the United States or its Marines are not core requirements, however interesting the lessons from them may be. So, the MEFs avoid smaller requests, like intelligence collectors or intelligence targeting cells to support Ukraine, that seem reasonable at first but rapidly deplete high-demand, low-density specialties in the formation. 

The third issue and the key to this discussion relates directly to the example of force stress mentioned earlier: correctly identifying modern units of action, especially concerning the SIF and RXR concepts. Marine Corps thinking might occasionally extend to artillery or logistics units but never to intelligence as a unit of action. It does not think of the types of intelligence and reconnaissance collection teams who perform the key sensing tasks of the SIF and RXR as anything more than adjuncts to a local commander. The Service thinks even less of analytical and targeting teams, the groups that make sense for the SIF in RXR, as usable units of action. For this reason, the Service resists requests for support involving collections or analysis alone, viewing them exclusively as enablers for the traditional pacing units whose focus is the local commander. Other Services, however, have begun to recognize an ability to apply portions of a unit against specified problem sets outlined in requests for support. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has organized echelon III and IV headquarters intelligence sections into usable Analytical Support Elements. The Analytical Support Elements of a unit can be applied to a problem set with which the remainder of the unit is not otherwise involved. Furthermore, the Army and Air Force are organized into global ISR enterprises, respectively in INSCOM and the 16th Air Force, able to both support Service units and source support globally. No such entity exists in the Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps, then, has not manned, trained, or equipped itself to provide an ability to sense and make sense of producing MDA. The Marine Corps instead has deemphasized and subordinated its intelligence apparatus into a new information warfighting function that it has yet to fully define.19 To create new information specialties including cyber Marines, all of whom require clearances akin to intelligence specialties, the Service took the easy path of converting the intelligence structure. The Marine Corps leads no national or military intelligence programs on behalf of the DOD and so receives orders of magnitude less intelligence budgeted funds than all other Services except the Coast Guard. Fielded Marine intelligence formations fall under the MEF Information Groups with unclear lines of authority between the staff intelligence and fielded intelligence capabilities, still less between the DOD agency functional managers (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, etc) and the units. Having purchased the MQ9a Reaper Group 5 unmanned aerial system, explicitly an ISR platform as previously employed by the Air Force and U.S. Central Command, Marine public statements emphasize instead its use for command and control: “the service also plans to have a capability on their Reapers which transforms the UAVs into relay nodes for forces to communicate and receive information.”20 It is possible that this is why the Service did not buy the increased payload capability of the MQ-9b, which could have carried more intelligence collection. Only the Marine Corps has no independent director of intelligence, having combined the duties into the Deputy Commandant for Information. Even the United States Coast Guard has an Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (CG-2).21 Since the Marine Corps is the only Service that does not promote colonels into Joint O7 positions, that means that no further intelligence officers are likely to form any part of leadership for the Service in the future, clearly demonstrating Service priorities. 

The question, then, is why any warfighting combatant command would choose a Service without emphasis on intelligence to fulfill an intelligence requirement in the WEZ in the first island chain? The SIF and RXR role and mission, akin to a kind of joint tactical air controller for the fleet and Joint Force, only provides value with an organic ability to sense, make sense, and fuse and correlate data into intelligence. If the SIF merely provides command and control for sensors and fires that are not organic to it, then there is no point in placing it at risk in the WEZ. For the analogy, the only reason for a joint tactical air controller is to provide positive confirmation by direct observation. Consequently, the ISR sensing and intelligence sense-making capabilities of the SIF are critical to its potential and deterrence value. As a result, a combatant command would likely choose a Service with an emphasis on intelligence. Why would the combatant command not pick the Army, for example, whose INSCOM and multi-domain task forces practically guarantee a measure of MDA coupled with a deep ability to support fires? The Army has been conducting demonstrations of maritime fires since 2018: “The 17th Field Artillery Brigade, alongside the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, conducted its first live-fire exercise here, July 12, during the biennial Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, exercise. The Naval Strike Missile was the first to launch as a land-based asset.”22 Likewise, the Defense Policy Review Initiative caps Marine forces and reinvests them away from the first island chain (“More than half of the billions of dollars of contracting for the construction of facilities to accommodate the relocation of U.S. Marine units to Guam from Japan has been awarded”),23 the Air Force is moving fifth-generation aircraft to Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa, which could serve as the eyes and ears as well as the fires for the fleet and Joint Force.24 

The Marine Corps requires a clarifying review to connect its operating concepts based on current events to its force capabilities. The current conflict, like that in the Ukraine, is the closest thing that military studies have to a proving ground. It is intelligence that analyzes the multi-domain operating environments in which the Service seeks to assert itself to generate the assessment that supports adapting to pertinent conditions for imminent conflict. The units of action for intelligence are the forward-deployed collectors and advanced analytical and fusion units that make meaning from the mass of data. Collectors can indeed be any Marine unit given for its main effort and standing tasks intelligence collection operations. Providing for that mission and the fusion and analysis that supports it within formations like infantry battalions only makes those battalions more formidable, especially in competition where an adversary must suspect any Marine element of providing “the eyes and ears for the Joint Force”25 at scale. While information, as a warfighting function, produces only an anomalous interplay of contradictory messages that may or may not bear on actual facts on the ground, intelligence has for its primary purpose establishing the actual facts on the ground and obscuring them from the adversary. Unlike mere information, intelligence derives meaning from raw data and information to create actionable insights in support of the commander’s decision making.26 Furthermore, intelligence is supported by a multi-agency, cross-government community, budgetary and procurements processes, and standing authorities and legal basis. The capabilities that the Marine Corps needs to emphasize above all else to achieve the vision set forth for a SIF conducting RXR are ISR and intelligence capabilities: these are the key units of action.  

The Corps, however, has spent several years de-emphasizing and drawing resources from precisely these communities. As a result, the Service at the moment possesses insufficient ISR and intelligence resources and does not consider those that it has produced to be units of action to implement its own concepts. Force Design coupled with stresses to the force has set in motion a cycle of processes that myopically focus on a version of the pacing threat provided by someone else without sufficient contemporary references to be relevant. There are several current examples of SIF performing RXR in the littorals of the world. One of them is a partner nation force at war with a peer competitor in Ukraine, but Marines are barely participating in support of that force, unlike the Army who will learn the lessons there along with the British, Dutch, and Norwegian Marines training the Ukrainian Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps has made it abundantly clear that it prefers only to close with and destroy the enemy, not to locate the adversary in competition. If that is the case, then Marines cannot be the SIF in the WEZ performing RXR. If the Service seeks to alter course to achieve its SIF and RXR vision, then it will have to find a way to make culture-adjusting investments in ISR and intelligence immediately. Marines would need a Service-wide intelligence structure, strategy, and architecture among many other major changes. A good starting point in such a change, however, would be for the Service to recognize its basic ISR and intelligence units of action and to give its major formations the core task of performing operational ISR and intelligence on behalf of the fleet and Joint Force. 

>Col David is the Deputy Director for Intelligence Division under the Deputy Commandant for Information/Director of Intelligence.

Notes

1. Gen David Berger, A Concept for Stand-In Forces, (Washington, DC: 2021). 

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, NAVMC 3500.99, (Washington, DC: 2012).

3. Gen David Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019). 

4. Gen David Berger, “Statement of General David H. Berger Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps Before the Senate Appropriations Committee,” Marines.mil, March 28, 2023, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3360019/statement-of-general-david-h-berger-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-postu.

5. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1991).

6. Jim Garamone, “Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence,” DOD News, June 2, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2641068/official-talks-dod-policy-role-in-chinese-pacing-threat-integrated-deterrence. 

7. Brian A. Hester, Dennis Doyle & Ronan A. Sefton, “Techcraft on Display in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, May 16, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/techcraft-on-display-in-ukraine.

8. Susan F. Bryant and Andrew Harrison, “Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the U.S. Armed Forces,” Strategic Perspectives 31, (2019). 

9. Lucas Myers, “China’s Economic Security Challenge: Difficulties Overcoming the Malacca Dilemma,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 22, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/03/22/chinas-economic-security-challenge-difficulties-overcoming-the-malacca-dilemma. 

10. Kristen D. Thompson, “How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict. 

11. Gloria Shkurti Özdemir and Rıfat Öncel, “The War in Ukraine Has Revolutionized Drone Warfare,” The National Interest, January 11, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-ukraine-has-revolutionized-drone-warfare-206095. 

12. Svitlana Vlasova and Brad Lendon, “Ukraine’s Drones Sink another Russian Warship, Kyiv Says,” CNN World Europe, March 6, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. 

13. Associated Press, “Ukraine Claims It Has Sunk Another Russian Warship in the Black Sea Using High-Tech Sea Drones,” Politico, March 5, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/05/ukraine-warship-russia-black-sea-00145037; and Newsweek, “Video Shows Moment Russian Black Sea Ships Destroyed in Naval Drone Attack,” Newsweek, May 30, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-fleet-magura-v5-naval-drones-crimea-1906280. 

14. Lauren Frias, “Ukraine Wiped Out Nearly a Third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet without Even Having a Real Navy, These Are the Warships Russia Lost,” Business Insider, February 7, 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/warships-in-russia-black-sea-fleet-that-ukraine-wiped-out-2024-2. 

15. “The War in Ukraine Has Revolutionized Drone Warfare.”

16. The Ministry of Defense, “British Commandos Train Hundreds of Ukrainian Marines in UK Programme,” Gov.UK, August 21, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-commandos-train-hundreds-of-ukrainian-marines-in-uk-programme.

17. Nina Kolars, “Genious and Mastery in Military Innovation,” Modern War Institute, April 3, 2017, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/genius-mastery-military-innovation. 

18. Meredith Roaten, “Marine Corps Commandant Defends Equipment Divestment, End Strength Cuts,” National Defense, September 1, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/9/1/marine-corps-commandant-defends-force-size-divestment.

19. There is no definition of “Information” as a warfighting function given in MCDP 8, Information—only characteristics are described. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 8, Information, (Washington, DC: 2022).  

20. Aaron Matthew Lariosa, “First Marine Corps MQ-9A Reaper Squadron Now Operational,” USNI News, August 8, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/08/08/first-marine-corps-mq-9a-reaper-squadron-now-operational. 

21. United States Coast Guard, “Assistant Commandant for Intelligence,” United States Coast Guard, n.d., https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Intelligence-CG-2.

22. Capt Rachel Jeffcoat, “Army Conducts 1st RIMPAC Joint Live-fire Sinking Exercise as Multi-Domain Task Force,” U.S. PACOM JTF Micronesia, July 25, 2018, https://www.pacom.mil/JTF-Micronesia/Article/1584462/army-conducts-1st-rimpac-joint-live-fire-sinking-exercise-as-multi-domain-task/#:~:text=The%2017th%20Field%20Artillery%20Brigade,as%20a%20land%2Dbased%20asset.

23. Frank Whitman, “Boudra: ‘We Have to Respond from Within the Theater of Operations’,” Pacific Island Times, November 16, 2022, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/boudra-we-have-to-respond-from-within-the-theater-of-operations. 

24. Unshin Lee Harpley, “Kadena Adds More Stealth Fights Amid ‘Increasingly Challenging Strategic Environment’,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, May 1, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/kadena-more-stealth-fighters-strategic-environment. 

25. Eric Smith, “Statement of General Eric M. Smith Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps Before The Senate Appropriations Committee,” Marines.mil, April 16, 2024, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3759255/statement-of-general-eric-m-smith-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-posture.

26. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” Congressional Research Service, May 9, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10574. 

A New Kind of Intelligence Analyst

Meeting the demands of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

Marine Intelligence professionals have always struggled to stay up-to-date with current developments and maintain relevancy. There is a consistent risk to the intel field of relying too much on grassroots efforts and personal talent to carry intelligence forward into tomorrow while doctrine and training focus on yesteryear’s war. Tactical intelligence traditionally focuses on establishing baselines and using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to detect anomalies, engage targets, and confirm or deny adversary courses of action in the battlespace. This approach is sufficient for low-intensity conflict in permissible environments, and for the past 25 years, the United States has optimized its processes through various supporting agencies. However, this has also meant military intelligence, at the tactical echelon, has not had to seriously consider the national-strategic mission their unit may be a part of and how military intelligence supports it or operates without the current level of support they are accustomed to.

With the introduction of Force Design and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), Marines down to the local commander level will be expected to support wider, protracted campaigns, in austere or possibly hostile areas, and across a spectrum inclusive of competition but at the other extreme involving outright conflict. Currently, Marine intelligence is not equipped or optimized to support the Naval Service as envisioned and will require these Marines at the lowest echelons to think more strategically and critically with fewer resources in their analysis to ensure that commanders and Marines can operate in these environments. Before identifying what intelligence Marines need, it is important to discuss what EABO is on paper and what EABO is de facto asking Marines to think and do. 

Expeditionary advanced base operations, as defined in the latest tentative manual, is a naval concept designed to improve maneuver, exploit control over key maritime terrain, and integrate the FMF with Navy capabilities.1 The spirit of EABO can be derived from the original EABO Handbook, which described it as an adversary-specific, cost-effective, advantage-focused concept of operations that could mitigate the risk from long-range precision fires while maintaining resilient forward forces—and thus move the Marine Corps away from relying on traditional, easily-targeted bases.2 However, another interpretation is that EABO is the enabler for larger campaigns. Supporting this approach is the nested concept of Stand-in Forces (SIF), which are forward deployed among allied and partner forces across the competition continuum. The SIF supports multi-domain awareness, information operations, and security cooperation efforts aiming to bolster partner-nation confidence and set conditions for advantage in conflict. 

Expeditionary advanced base operations are framed as an operational-level adaptation to China’s specific military threat. However, it encompasses a new approach to thinking about the crucial aspects of terrain, diplomatic, information, and even economic domains—marking the idea as more of a first step toward a geo-strategy, rather than just an operational concept. Geo-strategy has many schools of thought, but all rest on the idea that geographical factors inform and shape military planning.3 As a result, EABO requires a nuanced understanding of the key maritime and littoral areas. Expeditionary advanced base operations takes this approach in two ways: First, it is explicitly designed to maximize the use of chokepoints and the littorals, making its planning assumptions dependent on the terrain, its physical characteristics, and regional significance. For example, EABO provides a frame to understand where SIF could best operate and maximize the effect of their contribution to campaign operations across the competition continuum. Second, it assumes a certain level of austerity in its operating areas and proposes several methods in the planning process to overcome this issue. Marines may be operating in materially bereft areas devoid of much infrastructure but still must complete complex tasks as part of the overall naval commander’s campaign. 

What EABO requires of Marines, then, is ambitious. Task groups will be part of a larger interservice and multi-domain campaign, protracted and complex in its efforts to counter an adversary’s military strength or perform a variety of tasks in a minimally permissive environment—colloquially thought of as grey-zone activity. Although this campaign can be decisive, it will require interservice planning and execution at a level far more advanced than the Joint Force’s recent practical experience. Expeditionary advanced basing operations are also meant to be complemented by distributed maritime operations, a core Navy operating concept that explores dispersed, lower-signature methods of sustaining the SIF and other forces performing EABO. The littoral operations area envisioned by EABO also notes the multitude of avenues logistics may have to take to sustain units in expeditionary locations across key coastal points.4 The local commander presiding over the littoral operations area will likely find themselves in a difficult information environment. In that scenario, the commander will need to lean on military intelligence professionals. 

The requirements for intelligence support for EABO demand long-term, strategic thinking, and analysis to assist commanders in setting conditions for success across all domains of national power to enable their mission.5 Marine intelligence with SIF in these areas would need to know not only the local environment and its human terrain but how that human terrain interacts with regional, provincial, and national-level political entities, and how the implications of such actions further or hinder national strategy. This awareness is necessary to maintain access, collect relevant intelligence, and inform the wider defense and intelligence apparatus assessing the macropolitical picture. Explicitly or not, the SIF and their intel components are going to be de facto envoys of the United States. This dilemma may not appear to be an intelligence professional’s concern, but the role of intelligence in a task-organized group performing in this environment is much more complex and the Marine Corps intelligence enterprise may not be set up to easily support this. The current structure of Marine intelligence is sufficient for tactical decision making at the squad-leader level but does not provide room for serious consideration of the joint military or national-strategic mission a unit may be a part of and how their military intelligence supports it. Intel Marines may not be trained to the standard EABO tentatively asks of them and therefore cannot credibly inform the joint commander’s decision-making cycle. 

The future operating environment presents new and unique challenges to Marines. Partnering with a host nation for EABO may provide logistical advantages in remote or impermissible environments, but they are also susceptible to adversary actions beyond military means. The information environment, for example, can be exploited by an adversary to denigrate a SIF’s host nation and convince them to reduce the SIF presence, eliminate it, or redirect it away from the geo-strategic, crucial areas it was designed to operate in, effectively removing the SIF ability to serve as a deterrent. Marines on the ground may be quickly outmaneuvered by adversaries if intelligence and commanders do not understand the follow-on effects of their own actions, necessitating skills at lower echelons to hasten decision making.6 The intelligence professional supporting a SIF must understand the political risk of operating in a partner-nation territory, what the limits are on SIF operations in its borders, and how to maintain a favorable information environment. Some of these issues are further expanded on in the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance concept updated for Force Design.7 

At its core, Force Design, to be effective, will need the military intelligence professional to move  beyond the wars of the past two decades. With the growing role and presence of information and grey-zone warfare, the future operating environment requires intelligence Marines to add the role of geo-strategist to their portfolio. This will ultimately empower them to inform, adapt, and execute ambitious concepts—taking a more active role in intelligence preparation of the environment, rather than a passive one. The military intelligence professional in the field, supporting EABO, will more than likely be a non-commissioned officer (NCO) or staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO); therefore, these Marines must be trained, equipped, and enabled to think strategically, incorporating analytic techniques, knowledge, and expertise previously not currently associated with their grade. By better training and educating intelligence NCOs, SNCOs, and commanders, Marines at these levels can operate more autonomously in austere environments to support the wider campaign and national interests in a crisis. 

The Marine Corps could leverage the professional military education institutions at its disposal to better integrate Marines with the intelligence and policy world preemptively, and build up a deep bench of regional subject-matter expertise and technical proficiency for the future fight. For building the Indo-Pacific geostrategic expert, the Marine Corps could work with professional military education-associated research centers like the China Maritime Studies Institute or the China Aerospace Studies Institute; alternately, it could develop its own research center and mechanisms for convening outside experts. Working with academia to further intelligence training would allow the Marine Corps to better support building a deeper bench of competent and capable intelligence NCOs and SNCOs. This would be the initial step in integrating them with the fleet and intelligence community—and having them ready and equipped for tomorrow. 

>SSgt Campbell enlisted in the Marine Corps in March of 2017 from Charleston, SC. Currently stationed in the National Capital Region, he studies Strategic and Organizational Communication. 

>>Mr. Long is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Brute Krulak Center on Innovation and Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. 

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd Edition, (Washington, DC: 2023). 

2. Art Corbett, “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook, Version 1.1,” Marine Corps Association, June 1, 2018, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-EABO-handbook-1.1.pdf. 

3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs 76, No. 5 (1997).

4. Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

5. Ibid; and Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 6, Command and Control, (Washington, DC: 1996). 

6. MCDP 6. 

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030–Annual Update, (Washington, DC: 2023). 

>Authors’ Note: Their views are their own and do not reflect the opinions of the Marine Corps or the DOD. 

We Are Currently in the Most Dangerous Period of Force Design 2030

Balancing readiness and modernization

Divisions between the Marine Corps and Navy, divestments for Force Design 2030, and a rapidly rising China have created a situation that threatens the ability of the Marine Corps to be able to complete its mission. While Force Design 2030 is still in the transition phase, the Marine Corps needs to find a way in the here and now to be able to respond to a diverse array of potential threats, vastly increase its cooperation with the Navy, and be able to meet the needs of the country as its premier force in readiness. 

At the start of the Ukrainian-Russian war in 2022, European Command asked for a Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) to deploy to Europe to be a deterrence to the aggression that was rapidly unfolding. However, the Marine Corps was unable to fulfill that request. The ARG—comprised of USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), USS Arlington (LPD-24), and USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44)—were unable to be deployed until a month after they were asked to, with the latter ship still arriving later than the first two due to maintenance issues.1

Even more recently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps testified that the Marines were unable to send a crisis response force to Turkey after the disastrous earthquake because we did not have the ships, saying, “We didn’t have a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a MEU, nearby that could respond … I owe the Secretary of Defense, the President—we Joint Chiefs owe them options … all the time. Here, I felt like the best option, we couldn’t offer them because we have the Marines and the equipment and they’re trained, we didn’t have the ships.”2 Here, the Commandant is explicitly admitting that the Marine Corps has fallen short of the Nation’s expectations of them.

These two cases are concerning symptoms of a larger problem at bay in the Marine Corps and the Navy—and they hold clues about the readiness of our Service to counter the rising threats in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. Without a doubt, the MEU and the ARG are the core of the Marine Corps’s capability. These allow the Marine Corps to be the President’s crisis response force, a capability none of the other conventional Services have. A great example of everything offered by the MEU is in 1983 when a MEU headed to Beirut diverted halfway through its journey and conducted an invasion of Grenada to help save American students. Immediately after, they proceeded directly to Lebanon, where they assisted in humanitarian operations.3

The flexibility and versatility offered by the MEU, to rapidly transition from one mission to the next seamlessly, is the great strength of the Corps. But the Marine Corps can be the Nation’s crisis response force for one reason: American sea power. Marines embark on Navy amphibious assault ships, land on beaches using Navy LCUs and LCACs, and conduct flight operations off Navy flight decks using Navy landing officers. Thus, American sea power and the ability of the Marines to project power requires having the requisite number of ships. Without them, Force Design 2030 simply cannot take shape.

The threats facing this country are modern and rapidly evolving. President Xi has instructed his country’s armed forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, with some reports indicating that they could invade as early as 2024.4 Yet, the equipment the Marine Corps needs to counter a potential conflict is not operationally ready, and the Navy and Marine Corps are at an impasse as to who should provide it for them. The end product of Force Design 2030 creates a lighter, more mobile, faster responding Marine Corps capable of operating as a stand-in force inside the enemy’s weapon engagement zone.5

However, Force Design 2030 only works if they have the ships to do so. Divesting our tanks and reorganizing our artillery, aviation, and infantry to meet the needs of the coming threats are correct. However, this requires the Navy to have ships that are both practical and survivable in a contested area to bring Marines to the fight. For the last twenty years, the Marine Corps has been in sustained land combat, operating well away from the littoral zone in two landlocked countries. Those who criticize Force Design 2030 fail to see that the last twenty years of sustained land conflict have driven this divide between the Marine Corps and the Navy, and now we see the result of that. As such, the partnership with the Navy has been eroded and summarily forgotten in many regards.

There is now a divide between what the Marine Corps needs and the priorities of the Navy. This is illustrated in the fact that the number one item on the fiscal year 2023 budget request of the Marine Corps is amphibious warships, yet amphibious landing ships are being retired faster than they can be procured. Landing Dock Ships (LSDs) are on track to be entirely out of service by 2027. Additionally, the Navy has stated that the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock-32 (LPD-32) would be the last LPD produced and they would be ending that line of ship, a line which was initially expected to go until LPD-42.6 The former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Berger, stated that the requirements of the Marine Corps is 31 amphibious assault ships, whereas this current plan to end the line of LPDs and LSDs would bring that number down to 25 in the coming years, leaving the Marine Corps at least 6 ships short of being mission capable.7 Obviously, the Navy must make budget choices, and rightly so. The nuclear navy, including our submarines and carriers, rightly takes many resources and financing to acquire and maintain. However, the Navy should also understand that their relationship with the Marine Corps is symbiotic; it is not a zero-sum game.

Money invested in the Marine Corps is not necessarily money lost for the Navy. The Navy is not simply driving the Marines across the ocean and dropping them off on an island to conduct independent running operations. The actions the Marine Corps will be taking will help to protect naval shipping, including providing bases on which to refuel, and provide a defense in depth that will serve to protect our biggest naval assets like our carrier fleet. From the expeditionary advanced base operations handbook itself,

In order to enhance the speed of deployment and minimize infrastructure and logistical support requirements, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) will exploit passive defenses to the degree prudent and practical. Dispersion, decoys, cover, camouflage, and concealment will all be maximized to preclude effective enemy targeting of EAB-hosted assets.8

We see incredibly similar messaging that mirrors this within the Marine Corps’ own warfighting doctrine, MCDP 1, where it says, “We avoid enemy strength and focus our efforts against enemy weakness with the object of penetrating the enemy system since pitting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results.”9

This is exactly what EABO is intended to do. The nature of warfare has changed. With the onset of 21st-century weapons such as hypersonic (carrier killer) missiles, an aircraft carrier anywhere within that weapons’ engagement zone presents an inviting target. Operating inside that weapons engagement zone, we seek to disrupt the enemy’s system and out cycle the enemy—with the goal of avoiding taking casualties ourselves and inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy. China itself has even taken notice of this, admitting that the EABO concept will create, “a dense, multi-directional intersecting kill zone over large areas west of the island chain.”10 This EABO concept will help to navigate and hopefully avoid a potential war of attrition in the South China Sea where instead of trading an aircraft carrier for an aircraft carrier, our naval forces can cycle at a higher tempo and outmaneuver the adversary before becoming targets themselves. 

This begs the question, how can the Navy and Marine Corps team better cooperate to achieve mission readiness while meeting both the needs of the Marine Corps as well as all the other needs of the Navy? Eastern Europe is already at war, and as such, the timeline to become mission-ready is rapidly dwindling. Training in the Navy and Marine Corps must change to reflect the cohesion necessary in the coming fight. Expeditionary advanced base operations create a web of information, which is shared continuously between Marines, ships, satellites, aircraft, and commanders to better shape the battle space. However, this requires new tactics, techniques, and procedures, which means the Navy needs to understand Marine Corps capabilities and the Marine Corps needs to understand Naval capabilities, specifically, ship-related capabilities. The Navy cannot support the Marine Corps if they misunderstand our capabilities, and likewise, the Marine Corps cannot provide the Navy with the intelligence and data that they will need if we do not understand the operational requirements—in other words: the how we fit into the bigger picture. Currently, at The Basic School, hands-on training with the Navy is limited to an amphibious exercise, which is one day in Norfolk, VA. However, the interaction is limited to LCACs, LCUs, and LSDs. If we are expected to be integrating extensively with the Navy, however, it would be beneficial for young Marine officers to also be exposed to and learn the capabilities of Naval warships, such as cruisers and destroyers, as well all types of other amphibious assault ships.

In short, we need to know what the Navy needs to complete its mission. They should also have a deeper depth understanding of how those forces are employed, and how they work to support amphibious operations. This would allow young officers to get a better understanding of what the future battlespace may look like. Additionally, a majority of our guest speakers have all been Marine Corps generals and officers. If we are a naval force in readiness, then more Navy officers need to be included in these discussions so we can ask questions, and therefore better learn from them, and they learn from us. Joint interactions allow us to better understand each other capabilities and missions, which help to drive cooperation.

Lastly, The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations should be required for reading and discussion at The Basic School and concepts from that should influence the curriculum at MOS schools, especially the schools that are highly impacted by this, such as logistics, artillery, infantry, intelligence, and air defense. The bridge between the Navy and Marine Corps needs to be seamless for Force Design 2030 to work as intended, and as officers at The Basic School, at the very least we can do our part to make sure that happens.  

This transition zone is both an exciting and a dangerous time for the Navy and Marine Corps. The less time spent in this area of transition, the better. Just like in the transition from the offense to the defense, we are at our most vulnerable if we spend too long in this phase. If China closes its shipping lanes tomorrow, if Russia starts to drop bombs on Poland, or if Iran decides to flex its nuclear muscle, does the United States have the ability to respond? These questions must be answered, and if necessary, a hard look in the mirror must be taken. This response will require intestinal fortitude in the highest level of leadership. It will require admitting in front of Congress, the Nation, and most importantly, our fellow Marines that our force is not yet ready. The reputation of the Marine Corps was not given to us just by being Marines. It has been earned over many generations, and any time that we do not live up to that reputation we disrespect those who came before us and gave the highest devotion to duty. From the lowest level to the highest, there must be a sense of urgency in fixing these current issues of our operational shipping capability, and our lack of Navy/Marine Corps team mentality so that we give our Marines and our sailors the best to survive and win on the 21st-century battlefield. If we do not, the next force design’s lessons will only be written in blood by the failures of this one.

>1stLt Smith is a Student Naval Aviator currently assigned to Training Squadron 2 (VT-2) Doerbirds at NAS Whiting Field. He graduated from the University of Arizona in 2021 and graduated from The Basic School in May 2023.

Notes

1. Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet,” USNI News, April 26, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/04/26/marines-couldnt-meet-request-to-surge-to-europe-due-to-strain-on-amphibious-fleet.

2. Conor M. Kennedy and Scott E Stephan, “The PLA Is Contemplating the Meaning of Force Design,” Proceedings 149, No. 4 (2023).

3. Gary Wilson, William A. Woods, and Michael D. Wyly, “Send in the Marines? Reconsider Force Design 2030 Beforehand,” Defense News, Defense News, August 22, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/04/send-in-the-marines-reconsider-force-design-2030-beforehand.

4. John Culver, “How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan,” Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace, October 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/03/how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053.

5. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020). 

6. “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet.”

7. Ibid. 

8. Art Corbett, “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook Version 1.1,” Marine Corps Association, June 1, 2018, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-EABO-handbook-1.1.pdf.

9. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

10. “The PLA Is Contemplating the Meaning of Force Design.”

Positional Warfare

Prospects for Ukraine in 2024–2027

The Road to Here
Three years into the Ukraine War, it is worth recalling the breathless American and European estimates of Ukrainian collapse, including from then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley and President Joseph Biden.1 Germany and France reacted with a combination of disbelief and wish-casting. Germany wholly discounted the prospects of an invasion.2 This explains the volte-face that characterised Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech on 27 February, when per American estimates, Russian troops should have been in Kyiv.3 A serious French intelligence failure did occur, but France clearly viewed Russian aggression as a political opportunity, hence Emmanuel Macron’s high-speed dashes to Moscow.4  It is a testament to Macron’s political instincts that Macron ultimately transformed France’s strategic position, making it a crucial rhetorical supporter of Kyiv’s independence and European alignment.5 American intelligence failure was more explicable in one respect: the Russian campaign plan did very nearly succeed.6 Russia’s multi-axis assault, intelligence preparation, and country-wide air campaign were designed to overwhelm Ukrainian decision making, allowing Russian paratroopers to hold Hostomel Airport and Russian armored forces to enter Kyiv by 25 February. The Ukrainian military would dissolve into disconnected units that could be encircled and mopped up over the coming weeks, while the Russian Special Services would begin population control measures to occupy the country. Russia’s failure stemmed partly from planning complexity, much like Graf Schlieffen’s planned single-wing envelopment of French forces. Graf Moltke did weaken the right wing of the envelopment, but his moves never actually decreased German combat power on the right.7 But despite its theoretical merits, the Germans ultimately failed because of a number of friction points, primarily the need to neutralize Liege in 48 hours, conduct a high-speed advance through France on foot, and maintain momentum despite encountering battles. In the event, the third factor spoiled the operational plan. Much like Valery Zaluzhny and Oleksandyr Syrskyi assembled a defense of Kyiv after the shock of war dissipated, Joffre’s decision to drive forward and disrupt the German advance broke the battlefield theory of victory.8

Western planners should have understood the dangers of an overwrought, hyper-intellectualized view of battlefield maneuver.9 Even though Russian forces had pushed over the Irpin River, the capital remained in a defensible position, particularly since the Desna River narrowed Russian options in the east and the Dnipro prevented direct assault from the north. Moreover, absent the intelligence penetration that enabled Russia’s southern advances, there was little chance of Russian forces rapidly capturing urban areas. Hence Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv all resisted despite Russian encirclement, pressuring Russian supply lines running and forcing Russia to choose between an assault on the capital or methodical high-casualty urban combat elsewhere.10

Unsurprisingly, 2022 was a year of operational movement. Most wars begin with a movement phase. Even the World War, a partial exception, proves the rule: the Phoney War from September 1939 to May 1940 was a strategic interlude, finally broken with a rapid maneuver campaign.11 Indeed, the Wehrmacht’s Fall Gelb is also illustrative in the Ukraine case.12  Ukraine and Russia have fought since 2014 over the Donbas, generating well-constructed, multi-layered fortifications along the line of contact.13 Assaulting these locations is difficult and costly, as Russia’s combat record demonstrates: it took Russia three months to capture Severodonetsk, six months to take Bakhmut, and six months of concerted combat after a decade of war to take Avdiivka. Much like the Wehrmacht’s General Staff in 1940, the Russian General Staff generated an aggressive operational plan that bypassed positional defenses. Yet, even the World War, a supposed maneuver war, had static stretches, including German and British minefield breaching operations, Soviet-German see-saw engagements around Moscow, brutal frontal assaults against trenches in Italy, and the costly U.S.-UK punch through the Siegfried Line.14

The Ukraine War’s positional-movement dynamics are similar. Ukraine staged three counteroffensives in 2022: a limited operation in Kharkiv that broke Russia’s siege, a broader Kharkiv operation that liberated 12,000 square kilometers of territory, and a more methodical operation in Kherson that threw Russian forces back over the Dnipro. Yet, since that point, there has been little to no movement, and not for lack of trying. Russia has executed two major offensives, a winter-spring 2022–2023 offensive that sought to capture Vuhledar and Bakhmut, and the winter 2023–2024 offensive against Avdiivka and Kupyansk. Neither has resulted in a major operational change, and both have imposed enormous losses on Russian forces. Ukraine, meanwhile, launched a major offensive June–September 2023, which failed to deliver operationally significant gains at obvious cost.

Western military and security officials repeatedly anonymously criticized Ukrainian strategic and operational decision making during the 2023 offensive.15 Ukraine, of course, largely disengaged with Western advice after the opening phase of its offensive, rapidly judging after the failure of its first breakthrough attempt against Robotyne that Western advice was irrelevant considering combat conditions.16 For example, the West has never fought a war under mutual air denial, limited but prised long-range strike capacity, and the acceleration and fusion of reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fires complexes, all with a mass-mobilization army. Indeed, no Western country has executed a combined-arms breakthrough operation of the type Ukraine attempted since the World War or defended against one since the Vietnam War.

What, then, are the conditions that Ukraine faces? How can the advice and support effort be better calibrated to assist Ukrainian strategic planning and operational work? What might this tell us as a diagnostic for the battlefield and European policy over the next three years?

Positional Warfare
American advice and support missions have largely failed since Vietnam and notably failed in Iraq and Afghanistan.17 In the latter two cases, the United States refused to create a military organization that actually matched tactical and strategic requirements. The United States excels at Special Operations Forces (SOF) support. In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S.-trained SOF were, and in the latter case remain, the backbone of state combat capacity.18 Ruthlessly deployed as assault infantry with extensive U.S. enabling capabilities behind them, local SOF tactically outfought any adversary. But the issue was strategic. Absent an American-sustained support network around them, Iraqi and Afghan SOFs lose combat effectiveness. In the Afghan case, this led to the regime’s collapse: absent air support, the Afghan National Army SOF were overwhelmed once the United States ended its sustainment mission.19

We arguably see a similar pattern in Ukraine. The closest contact between the U.S. military and the Ukrainian military prior to February 2022 came in SOF training missions.20 U.S. operators have spoken since 2022 of their lack of surprise at Ukrainian success—their view of the Ukrainian military, for bureaucratic reasons, was never transmitted to higher command or to net assessment and combat forecasting teams.21

Yet, bureaucracy alone does not explain the shortcomings of American and allied perceptions of the Ukrainian-Russian military balance, or difficulties in the advice and support mission. Bureaucratic inertia matters: Western-trained Ukrainian soldiers did receive high-quality combat medical instruction, but their trainers, never having fought on a UAS-saturated battlefield, did not provide coherent tactical and operational guidance that applied to the Ukrainian battlefield.22

Understanding the gap between the American advice and support mission and the realities of the battlefield requires a return to military theory. Specifically, we need to understand the character of positional war, to which the Ukrainian battlefield has evolved, and from there, build out a series of analytical inferences and programmatic recommendations.

The recently relieved Valery Zaluzhny’s Economist piece last November offers a useful but incomplete starting point, particularly since he patterned his essay off Soviet military-theoretical models.23  His analysis centered upon the interlocking character of UAS, air defense, mines, electronic warfare, and counter-battery fire. When combined, they create a nasty problem for the attacker—dense minefields slow the attacker, persistent UAS surveillance identify attacking units rapidly while effective electronic disruption, counter-battery fire, and air defenses limit the offensive battlespace isolation. A breakthrough is possible with sufficient mass, but training and equipping that mass is difficult. Moreover, the combat power benefits of mass decline on the Ukrainian battlefield when massed forces are discovered and thereby attacked and destroyed, a reality Ukraine has amply demonstrated through its use of precision-guided munitions.

Zaluzhny’s piece is a relevant starting point because it identifies the fundamental positional logic of the Ukraine War. But Zaluzhny, to his detriment, never explicitly defines a positional war. This generates a significant difficulty since the term itself is not thoroughly defined elsewhere.

Anglo-American military thought often conflates position with attrition.  Attrition, in turn, is charged with significant negative implications. A war of attrition is often contrasted with a war of maneuver. The former is an unsophisticated slugfest akin to that of the Great War’s Western Front, in which materiel production and political resilience outweigh factors of military command.24 The latter is a model of military art, akin to Napoleon’s campaigns, in which tactical skill and aggression combine to create real examples of strategic and operational leadership.

The American bias toward maneuver over attrition is odd considering American military history. The greatest U.S. supreme commanders of the 18th and 19th centuries, George Washington and Ulysses Grant, were both masterful attritional fighters. Washington’s genius was in the retreat. While better-trained and equipped British forces won major engagements, Washington executed multiple successful retreats that preserved the bulk of Colonial forces. This was undoubtedly an attritional approach: by wearing the enemy down, Washington created the conditions for a more equitable strategic balance. Grant, meanwhile, embraced the logic of attrition. His Overland Campaign involved constant pressure on Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, compelling it to give battle multiple times in just a few weeks, ultimately locking the Confederate forces into a brutal static war they could not win. William T. Sherman, the third great general of the American tradition, fought an equally attritional war in the Confederacy’s heartland, slicing it in half and destroying its war-making capacity through his March to the Sea and subsequent Carolinas Campaign.

Moreover, the American military tradition lacks, in several fundamental respects, the concept of strategy given the United States’ commanding economic capacity. With the partial exception of the War of 1812, the United States has never engaged in a conflict from a position of structural weakness. The Confederacy did take with it well-trained officers and U.S. cotton production, but the Union’s industrial-mercantile northeast gave it a dominant advantage. Imperial Spain in 1898 was decaying. In 1917 and 1941, the United States did face significant adversaries, but America held advantages in population, industrial production, and resource wealth. Hence Franklin Roosevelt’s fundamental supposition, prior to December 1941, that ultimately American policy was simply to engage in the fight given its natural advantages.

The American strategy is, therefore, logistics, the skill of translating industrial capacity and population into combat power, and subsequently sustaining forces during engagements. This is an all-to-often neglected aspect of military science. However, it does not provide the American military practitioner with great fodder for theoretical inquiry.

The American tradition largely reaches to its German counterpart for examples of tactical military excellence. This began immediately after the World War, with the U.S. Army’s rational insistence upon debriefing German armored officers. Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State solidified the trend. It takes the Prussian-German General Staff as its modern civil-military model, viewing the military officer as a professional dedicated to the rational political control of violence.25

Tactically and operationally, American military art emphasizes initiative, aggression, and the application of superior firepower and simultaneity between armor, artillery, and airpower, today coupled with cyberspace operations to collapse enemy cohesion and win a rapid, decisive victory akin to DESERT STORM or IRAQI FREEDOM. The Marine Corps equally embraced maneuver warfare and arguably drove beyond the Army’s obsession with it by the 1990s.26

This view self-evidently embraces maneuver warfare for partly self-serving reasons. Maneuver engagements are expressions of true military skill, embodied by Patton, Guderian, or Rommel—but they also keep wars short, crucial for U.S. democracy. Moreover, U.S. political authorities, per Huntington’s model, provide general objectives, while the military identifies the most rational combat solution to the problem presented. The military commander becomes capable of challenging the political leader on ostensibly objective military grounds, thereby abdicating responsibility to understand the totality of the combat environment in a manner Clausewitz would find inexplicable.

Yet, the dichotomy between attrition and maneuver, while common in American and Western military thought, is unhelpful intellectually. For one, attrition is the basic state of conflict, both from combat realities and due to Clausewitz’s friction.27 For another, the maneuver paradigm has prevented American strategists from coherently linking ends and means. By overwhelmingly emphasizing American combat methods, U.S. maneuver warfare departs from the contextual factors, political and military, that actually color combat.

The Soviet tradition conceived of maneuver and attrition rather differently. Most valuable is the work of AA Svechin, the first—and arguably the most intellectually coherent—of Soviet theorists.28 His text Strategy counterposes not attrition and maneuver, but attrition and destruction, the latter being a form of war in which the object is the destruction of the enemy’s combat capacity in direct engagements, the former being any other way of prosecuting an armed conflict. Svechin’s point is to demonstrate the limited context under which a war of destruction may be waged.

Historical comparison in military arts is difficult, hence Clausewitz’s demand that analogy should be sought from cases near in time.29 War is a political phenomenon, hence its nature is by necessity fixed, as is the nature of politics. But the character of politics, namely the organization of the political unit and the sorts of political and economic technologies employed, change over time, as does the character of warfare. The period of late 18th and early 19th century warfare thus marked the high point of the destruction approach, exemplified by Napoleon. Army size greatly expanded by the late 18th century due to changes in political technology and sustainment, but communications and transportation limits meant that tactical engagements could retain a direct link to strategy. Moreover, the 18th and early 19th-century state was personalized and post-feudal, not bureaucratic. Napoleon could win transformational victories because his enemies, as sovereigns or near-sovereigns, commanded their forces in combat, creating a direct link between the tactical and the political. This explains Napoleon’s success at Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstadt, and Wagram: in each engagement, he defeated an enemy sovereign and was, therefore, able to impose a peace. By contrast, Napoleon’s ultimate defeats from 1812 to 1815 stemmed from his inability to generate political effects from tactical victory. Borodino lacked it, while even Napoleon’s victories during the German Campaign were never overwhelming enough to achieve political reverberations. Subsequent examples of tactical engagements with direct political effect do exist, namely the Prussian victory at Koniggratz and the German victory at Sedan. But there are obvious differences between these victories and that of Austerlitz and Wagram. For in neither case did defeat lead to immediate enemy capitulation. After Koniggratz, it took Bismarck’s restraint to end the war on favorable terms. The French fought on for a year after Sedan, despite Napoleon III’s abdication.

Svechin grasped that the Great War’s brutality was a result of this loss of the tactical-political link that dominated the age of linear tactics.30 The battlespace had expanded in width and depth, through a combination of societal mobilization, advances in communications, and the advent of indirect fire artillery to necessitate an organizing principle for combat well beyond that of individual engagements. The Prussian General Staff model did provide some help, particularly with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau’s political emphasis—an approach Prussian military genius Graf Moltke the Elder missed. However, the Prussian model did not successfully provide a logic for large-scale modern combat. Svechin’s objective was to demonstrate that, rather than emphasizing a decisive point and harmonizing all efforts toward that goal, modern war would typically be a societal contest of attrition in which victory would go to the side capable of winning the final engagement, not the first one.31

Svechin’s understanding of positional warfare is couched within these terms.32 All wars have either offensive or defensive aims, which often change through a conflict, as tactical actions have strategic reverberations that compel a shift in political goals. A positional war occurs when at least one side adopts, even if temporarily, defensive objectives and digs in, creating Western Front-style layered fortification systems. Although offensives remain possible, a well-constructed defense requires excellent planning to conduct a breakthrough and exploitation operation at a high cost to the attacker. We can see this logic in action during the Soviet offensives from 1943 to 1945, when the Soviets were able to maintain the operational momentum from Kursk to Berlin through the careful management of reserves and staging of attacks, thereby preventing the Wehrmacht from reconstituting a stable defensive line.

Svechin distinguishes between two types of positional offensives, those that are conducted still under positional conditions and those that break a positional war and return it to conditions of manoeuvre. His examples for the former include some of the highest-cost battles in human history, namely Verdun and the Somme.

Transforming a positional battlefield into a manoeuvre one therefore requires immense effort and careful planning. Svechin’s analysis is instructive on the conditions necessary to prepare a positional offensive. There are two fundamental mistakes a commander can make in a positional war. First, a positional commander can reduce strategic and operational questions to those of logistics, viewing the positional fight as a contest with a static adversary that hinges upon production. Positional combat does demand a materiel focus. Yet, war is a non-linear and human phenomenon, requiring focus on far more than just materiel factors.

Second, and more dangerously, a positional commander can retain an unwarranted commitment to the offensive. Under maneuver conditions, commanders often decline the offensive, falling back to positions in the hope of making an enemy fight on unfavorable ground. This impulse, in Svechin’s view, is often taken to the extreme, although there is some good sense in it: had Lee followed it during the Gettysburg Campaign, the Army of Northern Virginia might well have retreated with its forces intact and compelled the Army of the Potomac to follow. However, under positional conditions, the scale of planning, coordination, and sequencing necessary for a breakthrough demands preparation beyond a single engagement or scrap of ground. But positional commanders rapidly become wedded to the ground upon which they fight, creating a dynamic where each side leans on the other.33

Commanders maintain positions on unfavorable ground to use them for a future offensive, even if eminently defensible territory exists just a few hundred meters behind the current front line. Limited positional offensives can succeed with proper patience and planning to unpick an enemy defensive system. But positional conditions demand the careful accumulation of resources for an ultimate offensive, with force preservation and the limitation of adversary attrition being the tactical priority.

Attrition and Decision
The Ukraine War is locked in a positional phase, with fortifications dominating the battlefield. The question, however, is whether Ukraine or Russia has any prospect of breaking the war’s positional character or whether or not the contest will continue in this manner until external political factors compel one or both parties to change their strategic calculus and accept a settlement.

Russia and Ukraine face distinct geographic problems. Viewed purely economically, and bracketing diplomatic issues and political pressure, Ukraine could accept a peace that ceded most occupied territory to Russia. Prior to 2022, Ukraine had already moved much of its industrial production away from the Donbas. Russian gains do jeopardize both Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, but Ukraine can shift production elsewhere. Moreover, Ukraine has successfully reopened the Odesa port and expanded its rail links to Romania, reducing its reliance upon Kherson and the Azov Sea ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

Russia, however, cannot conclude a peace in this fashion. It lacks a wide enough land corridor between the Donbas and Crimea to maintain coherent logistics under Ukrainian pressure, as the war has demonstrated in ample fashion. In the east, it lacks an anchor for defensive lines by virtue of geographic chance, as well as sufficient strategic depth. Ideally, the Oskil and Siverskyi Donbets would anchor the line in the north, while at minimum Slovyansk and Kramatorsk would anchor the line in the center.34 Ideally, Russia would push to the Dnipro, bisecting the country and establishing that as a long-term defensive shield from Ukrainian strikes in depth. Russia requires greater territorial gains to stabilize its strategic position, or it risks—much like from 2014 to 2022—facing an insoluble strategic problem that its regime seeks to solve through conquest.

Russia has clung to the tactical offensive with the exception of Sergei Surovikin’s command during late 2022 and the summer 2023 defense in the south. Russia’s offensive results have been remarkably poor—the Russian military has lost north of 300,000 men killed and wounded, has burned through nearly all of its high-end armored vehicle stocks, and has turned to North Korea and Iran to provide it with ammunition. The difficulty is that absent a long refit period, better command-and-control structures, and improved planning, Russia will struggle to conduct and exploit a major breakthrough despite its materiel superiority.

Svechin provides two points of additional reference for commanders in a positional, attritional war. This war is undoubtedly one of attrition for Ukraine, if not for Russia, since Ukraine is incapable, for political and strategic reasons, of conducting a destruction campaign.

First, in a war of attrition, the decisive point in a post-Clausewitzean sense does not exist.  Svechin does not mean that Clausewitz’s center of gravity is irrelevant—as authentically understood, Clausewitz’s center of gravity is not a physical piece of ground, but the nexus between moral cohesion, political objectives, economic capacity, and military power.35 In an attrition campaign, it is exceptionally difficult to identify a specific decisive point, because the objective is the overthrow of the enemy’s system. Hence per Svechin, the conditions for a decisive point must be created over time.

Second, in a positional war, the most crucial element of planning and operational art is the ability to manipulate enemy reserves. Positional defenses are extraordinarily difficult to break. If they are to be broken, the enemy must be corroded over time, with his forces divided, placed off balance, and attrited cumulatively to enable a final, decisive breakthrough that transforms the character of the war into one of destruction, rather than attrition.

Prospects
2024 will be a year of defensive planning, fortifying, and attrition. Russian resources are finite, and more specifically, broader economic constraints will begin to impinge upon Russian planning. Hence a successful strategy from Ukraine and the West must use this year to build combat capacity in anticipation of actions in the future.

Russia’s strategy is to buy time and keep up pressure in anticipation of a Western unraveling. Yet, it seems increasingly unlikely that this will occur. Aid is stalled in the U.S. Congress due to a combination of politicking and moral absurdity, for which blame is unevenly but collectively distributed between the Biden administration, House Republicans, and Congressional Democrats. However, the European powers look to have finally woken up. Ukraine has secured defense pacts with the UK, France, and Germany, while Central and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia are aggressively expanding defense production. Even if the United States abandons Ukraine, expanding European support and declining American leverage make this unlikely to end the war.

Russia, however, has a ceasefire as its objective for obvious reasons. The Russian labor market is already extraordinarily tight and tightening daily with more losses in Ukraine and subsequent conscription for the war effort. Military product quality has dropped as a result. Moreover, much of Russian production is instead refurbishment from Soviet stockpiles. This is enough to keep Russia in the fight, to be sure, and an old tank or artillery piece is just as deadly if employed en masse. Yet, attrition is cumulative—additional stresses on the system will unravel it.

General mobilization in Russia would place the Kremlin in an increasingly insoluble bind, particularly in light of solidifying European support for Ukraine. Russia is unlikely to win the ground war absent a period of reorganization, planning, and stabilization. But accepting this would require reducing front-line pressure, all as Ukraine executes public drone attacks embarrassing to Putin. Hence the pressure must be maintained.  However, this will demand greater mobilization—soon, given the sheer number of casualties Russia has taken. A mobilization will lead to another round of human and capital flight, squeezing an already tight labor market, and triggering another round of inflationary pressure.36 As the rouble depreciates, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to purchase foreign supplies, military and otherwise. This raises the odds of a domestic that Russia has continuously sought to prevent since February 2022. This crisis will destroy the state if left to fester long enough, demanding that Russia either win the war, a proposition beyond its capacity or pause the war, a move within its power if the Europeans do fragment.

Ukraine, meanwhile, must execute a well-organized active defense that inflicts severe casualties on Russia, forces it into a mobilization cycle, and maintains the pressure during that cycle to expand societal stress. Avdiivka is an example of this. Ukraine inflicted severe attrition upon Russian forces during the six-month engagement, committing several brigades, including 47 and 110 Mechanised Brigades, elements of 10 Mountain Assault Brigade, and other smaller units to the city’s defense, against a dozen Russian line brigades and regiments, likely a half-dozen territorial brigades, and a variety of Storm-Z units. The extraction from Avdiivka, conducted by the 3 Assault Brigade, came at a cost, including 200 stranded Ukrainian soldiers, while the 110 Mechanised Brigade in particular took a beating. But in return, Ukraine inflicted north of 30,000 casualties on the Russians, in exchange for around 6,000 Ukrainian dead and wounded—a rate of two Ukrainian brigades to around ten Russian brigades depending upon precise combat strength and combat medicine.

A slow, methodical defense during which Ukraine cedes ground in a careful, painstaking manner is the best way to inflict this degree of trauma upon the Russian military. Yet, the issue is a political one. Ukraine will lose more ground this year, as Russia hopes to press Ukraine back to Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and then take it, and drive Ukraine back over the Oskil in Kharkiv Oblast. Russia will trumpet every victory, especially in the lead-up to the November 2024 U.S. elections. It is up to Ukraine and its partners, in Washington and Europe, to cultivate the political will to recognize the reality of the battlefield.

Ukraine can win a positional war—if it fights smart.

>Mr. Halem is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Fellow at Yorktown Institute, Senior Fellow in Defence and the London-based Policy Exchange, and Title VIII State Department Black Sea Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He holds an Master of Arts (Hons) in International Relations and Philosophy from the University of St  Andrews, and an Master of Science in Political Theory from the London School of Economics.

Notes

1. Jacqui Heinrich and Adam Sabes, “Gen Milley Says Kyiv Could Fall Within 72 hours if Russia Decides to Invade Ukraine: Sources,” Fox News, February 5, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/us/gen-milley-says-kyiv-could-fall-within-72-hours-if-russia-decides-to-invade-ukraine-sources; and John Bowden, “Biden Warned Ukraine’s President Kyiv Could Be ‘Sacked’ By Imminent Russian Invasion,” The Independent, January 28, 2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/biden-ukraine-kyiv-invasion-russian-troops-b2002442.html.

2. Michel Duclos, “War in Ukraine–France Needs to Reassess its Foreign Policy Options,” Institute Montaigne, June 8, 2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/war-ukraine-france-needs-reassess-its-foreign-policy-options; Bernhard Blumenau, “How Russia’s Invasion Changed German Foreign Policy,” Chatham House, November 18, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/how-russias-invasion-changed-german-foreign-policy; Justin Huggler, “Embarrassment as Head of German Intelligence Trapped in Ukraine after Failing to Foresee Invasion,” Telegraph, February 26, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/26/embarrassment-head-german-intelligence-trapped-ukraine-failing; and Laura Pitel, “Robert Habeck Adds to Criticism of German Intelligence Blunders,” Financial Times, August 24, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/cc0b1300-89fc-4df8-863b-f691e0aac758.

3. Bastian Gigerich and Ben Schreer, “Zeitenwende One Year On,” IISS, February 27, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/sv/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/02/zeitenwende-one-year-on.

4. Maia de la Baume, “France Spooked By Intelligence Failures,” Politico, April 6, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-military-intelligence-failure-russia-invasion-ukraine; and Luke Harding, et al., “Macron Claims Putin Gave Him Personal Assurances on Ukraine,” The Guardian, February 8, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/08/macron-zelenskiy-ukraine-talks-moscow-denies-deal-to-de-escalate.

5. Office of the President of Ukraine, “Agreement on security cooperation between Ukraine and France,” Office of the President of Ukraine, February 16, 2024, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ugoda-pro-spivrobitnictvo-u-sferi-bezpeki-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-89005.

6. See Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Unconventional Operations During the Russo-Ukrainian War, February 2022–February 2023 (RUSI: 2023).

7. Terence Zuber, “The Schieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6, No. 3 (1999).

8. Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, “The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv,” War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv.

9. Napoleon’s campaigns provide ample evidence of this reality, particularly his victory at Austerlitz. See Frederick W. Kagan, The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801–1805 (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2007).

10. See ISW’s tactical updates, 3 March 2022–30 March 2022, for a fuller analysis of the predicament facing Russian forces in northern Ukraine.

11. Winson Churchill, The Second World War, Volume 1: The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1949).

12. Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (London: MacMillan, 2001).

13. The only English-language assessment of the Donbas War from a military viewpoint is the Ukrainian National Defence University’s assessment.  See Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in the East of Ukraine, 2014–2016 (Kyiv: 2016).

14. See William Schneck, Breaching the Devil’s Garden: The 6th New Zealand Brigade in Operation Lightfoot, the Second Battle of El Alamein (DTIC, 2005), accessed via: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA447540. Unfortunately, the only version of this study is the linked one, which has a number of formatting errors, rather than a full-text PDF. The 300-page appendix is accessible as a PDF, but the original study is not. David Glantz and Mary Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Ernest F. Fisher Jr., Cassino to the Alps (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993); and Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993).

15. Washington Post, “Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning by U.S., Ukraine,” Washington Post, December 4, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war.

16. For another example of snide criticism, see John Hudson and Alex Horton, “U.S. Intelligence Says Ukraine Will Fail to Meet Offensive’s Key Goal,” Washington Post, August 17, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/08/17/ukraine-counteroffensive-melitopol.

17. Rachel Tecott Metz, “Why Security Assistance Often Fails,” Lawfare, April 23, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/why-security-assistance-often-fails.

18. Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel 14, No. 1 (2021); and David Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,” Brookings, June 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iraqi-counter-terrorism-service.

19. SIGAR, Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed (SIGAR, 2023).

20. Adrian Bonenberger, “Ukraine’s Military Pulled Itself Out of the Ruins of 2014,” Foreign Policy, May 9, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/09/ukraine-military-2014-russia-us-training.

21. See from the early war, Michael Lee, “The U.S. Army’s Green Berets Quietly Helped Tilt the Battlefield a Little Bit More Toward Ukraine,” Fox News, March 24, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-armys-green-berets-have-lasting-impact-on-fight-in-ukraine.

22. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,” RUSI, September 4, 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/stormbreak-fighting-through-russian-defences-ukraines-2023-offensive.

23. Valery Zaluzhny, “Modern Positional War and How to Win It,” The Economist, November 1, 2023.

24. Pat Garrett and Frank Hoffman, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” USNI Proceedings 149, No. 11 (2023).

25. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957).

26. Antulio J. Echevarria II, War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

27. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

28. The edition of Svechin referenced is Alexander A. Svechin, Strategy, Kent D. Lee (editor) (East View Information Service, 1992). This edition is accessible as a PDF, but unfortunately it lacks page numbers. Section titles and subtitles are cited where appropriate to provide the reader with an idea of a specific quotation, although the interested reader will need to access the text independently to find the precise passage referenced.

29. On War.

30. Strategy.

31. Ibid. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Ibid.

34. As of this writing, Russia is engaged in an offensive to throw Ukrainian forces back over the Oskil. See Riley Bailey and Fredrick W. Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward, “The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis,” Institute for the Study of War, February 21, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis.

35. On War.

36. Anastasia Stognei and Polina Ivanova, “Russia’s War Economy Leaves Businesses Starved of Labour,” Financial Times, November 9, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/dc76f0bb-cae2-4a3a-b704-903d2fc59a96.