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Recently the Corps published Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence. MCDP 2 provides all Marines with a conceptual framework for the understanding and practice of effective intelligence. In doing so, it provides a framework for the planning and execution of intelligence operations in peace, in crisis, or in war.

MCDP 2‘s view of intelligence is based upon a common understanding of the nature of war and the Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy. MCDP 2 builds upon this doctrinal foundation by describing the relationship of intelligence within the context of other warfighting activities. In particular, MCDP 2 emphasizes that:

Intelligence is a fundamental component of command and control that is inseparable from operations.

Intelligence provides not just information but knowledge of the enemy and the environment that is used to support decisionmaking.

Effective intelligence shapes operations by uncovering enemy vulnerabilities that may be exploited to provide a decisive advantage. Intelligence also aids in protecting friendly forces against the effects of enemy actions by identifying the enemy’s capabilities and potential courses of action.

Given the inherent uncertainty of war and the fact that intelligence deals directly with the hostile, independent will of the enemy, intelligence provides estimates and probabilities, not certainty.

The commander’s direct involvement is necessary to provide effective conduct of intelligence operations. MCDP 2 points out that intelligence is every Marine’s responsibility. All Marines must see themselves as collectors, protectors, disseminators, and users of intelligence.

MCDP 2 is the third in a series of nine higher order doctrinal publications presently under development; the series is on schedule to be completed by the end of this summer. MCDP 2 does not supersede any current doctrinal publications, however, it does provide the authoritative basis for the subsequent development of intelligence doctrine, education, training, equipment, procedures, and organization.

Marine units will soon receive sufficient copies of MCDP 2 via the Marine Corps Publications Distribution System for all officers, SNCOs, and unit libraries. In addition, the publication is available now for immediate electronic distribution from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Doctrine Division Internet Homepage at http//ismo-www1.mqg.usmc.mil/docdiv or http//138.156.107.3/docdiv/.

On 20 June 1997 the Commandant signed Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. MCDP 1 replaces FMFM 1, Warfighting, as the Marine Corps’ capstone doctrinal publication. It provides the authoritative basis for how Marines fight and prepare to fight, and defines a way of thinking that guides our approach to duty.

Since FMFM 1 was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. In effect it has changed the way Marines think about warfare. However, doctrine is not stagnateit evolves based on new operational experiences, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.

MCDP 1, with a foreword by Gen XM. Gray-the architect of FMFM I-retains the spirit, style, and essential message of the 1989 document. The majority of the text has been carried forward from the original Warfighting with only minor revisions. The new publication contains three major enhancements:

First, the description of the nature of war has been expanded both to emphasize war’s complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for the expanding forms of conflict in the modern world.

Second, the descriptions of the styles of warfare have been clarified.

Third, important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander’s intent, main effort, and centers of gravity/critical vulnerabilities have been refined.

Marine units will soon receive their initial allocation of MCDP 1 via the Marine Corps Publications Distribution System (MCPDS). Additional copies may then be ordered from MCPDS or via the Doctrine Division internet homepage at http://ismowww1.mqg.usmc.mil/docdiv or http://138.156.107.3/docdiv.

by LtGen Paul K. Van Riper

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me begin by expressing my appreciation for having this opportunity to speak to you today. This may be my final visit to Capitol Hill to testify on future warfare requirements, since I plan to retire from the Marine Corps this summer after more than 40 years of Active and Reserve service. During these years, I have had many opportunities to consider the fundamental aspects of war. Some of this time I spent reflecting on warfare in the quiet solitude of a library. At other times, the sounds of the battlefield punctuated my “study” time. From these experiences, I have drawn a number of observations and conclusions that I want to leave with you. I realize that, given the distinguished Representatives present today, I do not have a monopoly on combat experience, but because I believe strongly that we are at a significant juncture in history, I welcome the chance to offer my comments for the record.

I would like to begin by providing my perspective on the so called Revolution in Military Affairs-or RMA-and then transition to an outline of the Marine Corps view on the nature of war. I will then discuss the Marine Corps’ basic philosophy for command and control, which provides an overarching approach to the use of information systems and the technologies needed to win battles. Finally, I will finish with a brief description of the programs the Corps is pursuing, within a joint context, for future applications. With an appreciation for how the Corps looks at war today, you will be able to better understand how Marines intend to march ahead into the next century.

The Nature of Revolutions in Military Affairs

Our success in the Gulf War in 1991 and the explosive growth of information technologies over the past decade have resulted in a number of extraordinary claims about the future of war. Some of these claims have gone so far as to argue that technology will allow us to see and understand everything in the battlespaces of the future-even to eliminate the “fog” and “friction” of war. There are indeed great changes that are occurring with civilian and military technologies. But our view in the Marine Corps is that these changes will only allow us to improve our capabilities, they will not alter the fundamental nature of war. This is the argument that we insist should be central to any effort to provide effective military capabilities for the defense of our national interests.

I believe the current period is analogous to the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. That was an era where threats were uncertain, where technological advances occurred steadily, and where defense resources were limited. In that interregnum, military organizations matched a number of innovative operational concepts with new doctrines and emerging technologies. These efforts resulted in the development of carrier aviation, armored blitzkrieg, amphibious doctrine, air defense, and strategic bombing. What occurred was the culmination of a number of RMAs. They occurred simultaneously during a period very similar to our current situation. Today as then, we do not know whom we will fight, where we will fight, and how we will fight. To decide now that we know and understand the coming revolution (or revolutions) in military affairs will more than likely close down a number of potentially significant options.

There are important lessons to be gained from the interwar period that are relevant to thinking about RMAs. First, success in developing advantageous capabilities does not always go to those with the most sophisticated technology. History suggests that technology has played only a relatively small part in past RMAs. Success appears to be the result of the combination of different organizational structures and innovative operational concepts to solve specific problems. Second, success is the result of serious intellectual effort that focused, not on near-term, but long-term advantage. Finally, success follows those who have anchored their combat development on a solid and honest historical analysis and on realistic experimentation. Those who ignored history got lost. Those who followed narrow paths, espoused dogmas, or placed undue faith in ungrounded assumptionsthose who failed to use a painstaking process of experimentation-paid a harsh penalty in the early days of World War II. To protect U.S. national security interests in the 21st century, we should heed these lessons and plan accordingly.

During the interwar era the Marines saw opportunity in amphibious operations, where others, because of the disaster at Gallipoli, saw only failure and limitations. The Marines anticipated the upcoming changes in the strategic environment and envisioned a need to seize and defend advanced naval bases in the Pacific. They translated this vision into concepts that prepared the Corps for amphibious assaults to support the emerging Pacific strategy. Despite a lack of resources, the Marines worked through the problem. With serious study of history, they developed a number of innovative concepts and technical applications. These were eventually tested and refined in experiments with the Navy near the island of Culebra.

Getting the most out of revolutions in military affairs requires an approach perhaps best characterized by comparison with a set of automobile headlights. What the American military needs as it travels towards the next millennium is to use a set of high beams with halogen bulbs. Our Nation needs to extend its vision and peer far down the road into the future by asking the right questions. Driving too fast with only the limited illumination of parking lights is simply unsafe. Using too narrow a beam or insufficient visionary illumination will only limit how fast and how far we can travel. Above all, the military must conduct its preliminary moves in light of a study of history. The microchip has not made Thucydides, Clausewitz, or Mahan irrelevant. In fact, all the trends in modern science, evolutionary biology, nonlinear mathematics, and quantum physics underline that Clausewitz’s fundamental belief that we do not live in a predictable universe was right on target.

The Nature of War in the 21st Century In addition to understanding the historical parameters of revolutions and military innovation, the American military must address the changing character of war. Unfortunately, the RMA debate has distracted some experts from an open-eyed assessment of the character of future conflict. Our national security cannot be preserved solely by being able to destroy targets from a great distance. Simply put, the destruction of greater quantities of things more efficiently will not help the United States accomplish its political objectives in the next millennium. Its Armed Forces must prepare for the complex, dynamic, and asymmetric threats of “the day after tomorrow,” not simply create and field forces that can fight DESERT STORM more efficiently. In the next century, we will confront thinking and adaptive opponents who have studied our systems and configured their tactics to defeat ours. To address lethal and flexible adversaries, the American military must radically reduce its current vulnerabilities, those key nodes that make easy targets for an enemy possessing only limited technical capabilities. The United States has the time today to take advantage of the current “strategic pause” to explore and experiment, before rushing towards substantive investments.

Much of the RMA debate over the past few years has centered on investing in a set of platforms or in acquiring more information systems. There are valid modernization requirements among all the Services, but that should not be the focus today. Ultimately, national security is not about platforms, software, or hardware, but about the capabilities the United States needs in an uncertain world. A narrowly defined threat will result in an equally narrow set of defense capabilities. The real issue is far broader and more complex than measuring and quantifying our ability to strike a specific threat from great distances. The United States will confront a great number of threats from the high end of the spectrum to the low; consequently, it must prepare its forces to adapt against a wide variety of challenges. The forces designed this year for the day after tomorrow must be capable in a range of operating environments, from deserts to foliage, to densely populated urban centers with embedded antagonists. Not all of these environments are conducive to “information dominance.”

Preparing to Fight in the 21st Century The Marine Corps efforts to prepare for the 21st century rest on a solid appreciation of the fundamental nature of war. This understanding has shaped our central philosophy about warfighting and is the basis for a cohesive doctrine that shapes all our combat development efforts. FMFM 1, Warfighting, our capstone doctrinal publication, sets out our basic understanding of war.

War possesses elements that are both timeless and ever changing. We view the basic nature of war as immutable. It is a violent clash between opposing wills to seek to impose their own will on the other. This interaction occurs cyclically in a series of actions and counteractions between two independent and irreconcilable forces. Our view of the nature of war captures a number of factors including friction, chance, and disorder. Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central to our views about conflict. Fusing war with intangible factors beyond calculation, prediction, or rational analysis is an absolute necessity, for war is shaped by human nature, the complexities of human behavior, and the limitations of human mental and physical capabilities. These human and moral factors shape our understanding and preparation for combat. Any view of war that fails to consider fear, danger, and exhaustion is extremely suspect, if not irrelevant. Any doctrine or theory that neglects the human element neglects the central dimension of warfare.

Yet for all of its immutable nature, the means and methods used in war vary continuously. Changes in the way wars are fought can occur in an evolutionary manner or in rapid flashes. Technological advances can be a major catalyst of change. The employment of the stirrup, the longbow, the rifled musket, and the railroad had a measurable impact on warfare and induced changes in both organizational and operational terms. As the physical hardware of war improved through new developments, so did the tactical, operational, and strategic use of those means adapt to new capabilities offered by technological change.

War in the future will be characterized, as always, by friction and uncertainty and the ensuing chaos. Where, why, and how we fight will undoubtedly change. The epicenter of instability will be in the world’s littorals where 70 percent of the world’s population now lives. By 2010, that percentage will have increased. Unfortunately, this environment will negate much of our technological edge.

The conflicts of the future are not likely to have much in common. In all respectsgoals, organizations, armaments, and tactics-conflict in the coming decades will be distinguished by its great variety. For that reason, it is imperative that the United States resist the temptation to prepare for only one type of conflict. To focus on one threat increases the danger that the American military will be surprised, and perhaps defeated, by another. The chaos of the future requires that the Nation maintain the capability to project power ashore for a variety of potential tasks, ranging from disaster relief to countering armed threats in high-intensity urban combat. In the future, such threats will not array themselves neatly on a chessboard or subject themselves to attrition from afar. Any examination of the revolution in military affairs must consider a wide array of threats and threat environments.

But we also have to be realistic about the nature of warfare and the limits of technology. I have in my military career commanded a platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, and a division; and some of those commands were on the terrifying and frictionfilled battlefield. I have also been the assistant chief of staff for the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence Department for the Marine Corps. Consequently, I have a combat commander’s perspective on the issue of communications, information, and intelligence; but I also understand the technical side of the equation. Without a doubt information is important, but all the information in the world is useless unless it contributes to effective decisionmaking in battle. The U.S. military possesses a plethora of systems today to gather, store, and retrieve information. It has numerous programs in place to improve its capacity to manipulate and handle pixels and imagery. Yet information is not knowledge. Our command and control needs to focus, above all else, on providing the combat commander with understanding in a form that allows professional judgment and experience to be rapidly applied.

Given the pervasive nature of uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction on the battlefield, it is natural that the U.S. military focuses on command and control and information superiority. At the same time, however, we should temper our enthusiastic rush to embrace the Information Age. As Mahan once observed, “It will be better to offer certain considerations for reflection, rather than make sweeping dogmatic assertions.” However, much of what one hears today is sweeping assertions and dogmatic platitudes. For example, a cursory review of recent comments in defense publications provides these examples:

* “If you see the battlefield, you win the war.”

* “If we had today’s sensors, we would have won in Vietnam.”

* “In the near future, we will be able to find, fix, track, and target-in realtime-anything of consequence that moves or is located on the face of the earth.”

* “Technology now provides the ability to identify virtually everything of military significance, in realtime, in any kind of weather, at any time.”

These assertions do not square with the Marine understanding of the nature of warfare or my personal experience. In fact, they represent a considerable ignorance of war and a certain arrogance. Vietnam represents a failure of flawed strategy and operational concepts that no amount of sensor data could solve. “Seeing” things and designating targets is not the same as wisdom. Warfare is more than systems; it is fundamentally and ineluctably an interactive contest of human wills. Information superiority, as an enabling element in a command and control system that includes the appropriate doctrine and professional education, is vital. But information superiority in and of itself will not win any wars.

I think that a useful way to visualize this point is to look at a glass of water. You and I would both agree that this glass is half full. The difference between winning and losing battles is not in the half that is full, but in being able to deal with the half that is empty. There will always be uncertainty and ambiguity on the battlefield. We may be able to visualize 80 percent of the battlespace, and we might even believe that we can target everything that we think is militarily important. But the battle will be lost or won in the portion of the glass that is empty due to enemy deception or the limits of our own technology. Trying to fill the glass with more technology, more systems, and greater investment will not eliminate the existence of uncertainty or friction. Our approach to command and control addresses this critical factor and defines how we hope to function effectively despite the confusion, uncertainty, and ambiguity of war.

Command and Control

The Marine Corps published its fundamental command and control doctrine last year in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control (MCDP 6). It provides the authoritative basis for subsequent development of command and control technologies, procedures, organizations, facilities, training, and professional military education. The doctrine is descriptive rather than prescriptive; that is, it provides guidance in the form of principles and concepts rather than specific instructions. It requires broad judgment in application.

The Command and Control Environment

The two fundamental factors that drive the Marine Corps’ approach to command and control are uncertainty and time. Of these, uncertainty is dominant. In the words of Clausewitz:

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.

Simply put, uncertainty represents what we do not know or understand about a given situation. From a practical point of view, we can think of uncertainty as doubt which threatens to block action. It is not simply the result of gaps in information. It is a fundamental and inevitable attribute of war, and no amount of information technology, no matter how powerful, will eliminate it or even reduce it to the point that it becomes a materially easier problem.

Uncertainty is not merely an initial environmental condition resulting from a lack of data solved by gathering and processing more information. It is a natural and inevitable product of the dynamics of war. Any action in war-friendly, enemy, or neutral-necessarily generates uncertainty. Because there will always be a significant amount of uncertainty we cannot eliminate, the ultimate requirement is to operate effectively in spite of uncertainty.

The second factor that drives command and control is time. War is a tempo-based, interactive phenomenon. Theoretically, we can always reduce uncertainty by gaining better knowledge of the situation. However, to gain better knowledge takes time. We reduce uncertainty at the expense of time and so risk surrendering the initiative to the enemy. It is axiomatic that effective command must strive to generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy. This dual desire to operate effectively despite widespread uncertainty and to generate a higher operating tempo than the enemy is the fundamental conceptual basis for all aspects of Marine Corps command and control.

We view war as a highly complex interactive system characterized by friction, unpredictability, disorder, and fluidity. It is not a mechanistic system amenable to precise, positive control mechanisms or synchronized, centralized schemes. War has more in common with biological and ecological systems than with closed, mechanical systems. It is an open system interacting with its external environment (which includes the enemy) and characterized by complex feedback loops and nonlinear dynamics.

As a result, one cannot control a complex system like war. We should not think of command and control as a coercive form of mechanistic control-the way an operator operates a machine. The object of mechanistic command and control is for the top of the organization to be “in control” of the bottom, and for the bottom to be “under* the control of the top. The worst thing that can happen is for a commander to “lose” control of the situation. But given the reality of war, it is a delusion to believe that a commander can really control the enemy or the situation with certitude or precision.

The prevailing metaphor for military command and control is a chess player moving chess pieces. We are all familiar with the rules for moving chess pieces across the board. In fact it is a poor analogy for describing the potential range of options for military operations. The turbulence of modern war suggests a need for a looser form of influence, one that provides the necessary parameters for control in an uncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without sacrificing flexibility or stifling the initiative of subordinates.

Command and control should not impose precise domination over details because the details are inherently uncontrollable. Rather, it should aim to provide a broad, meaningful structure to the roiling chaos and complexity of the battlefield. War defies microscopic command and control and instead requires macroscopic command and control which “controls” the system by influencing the system parameters and boundary conditions. “Command” and “control” are not coercive measures imposed on the bottom of the organization by the top. Instead, “command and control” is a process of reciprocal influence-give and take-in which all parts of the organization contribute action and feedback.

The Purpose of Command and Control

Popular literature today is replete with talk about “dominance”: command and control dominance, information dominance, dominant battlespace awareness, dominant battlefield knowledge, dominant maneuver, dominant fires, etc. Command and control is not fundamentally about dominance; information is not a medium anyone or any organization can dominate the way the air or sea can theoretically be dominated. Instead, in the Marine Corps’ view, the fundamental purpose of command and control is, first, to recognize what needs to be done in a situation and, second, to see to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control is thus essentially about effective decisionmaking and effective execution. The sole measure of effectiveness of any command and control component-technology, organization, procedure, whatever-is whether it facilitates timely decisionmaking and execution. Stripped to its essentials, this is what command and control is all about.

The Command and Control Process: The Observation to Action Loop

We use a simple model to explain the Marine Corps view of the command and control process. Developed by the late Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), it is known as the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop. The OODA loop essentially describes command and control as a continuous, cyclical process of adaptation to a changing situation. It applies to any conflict, whether the antagonists are individuals in hand-to-hand combat or large military formations.

Engaged in any conflict, we first observe the situation-take in information. Having observed the situation, we next orient to it-make certain assessments, estimates, and judgments about the situation and the possibilities. Based on our orientation, we decide what to do. Then we put the decision into action. Having acted we have changed the situation, and so the cycle begins again.

Importantly, the OODA loop reflects the significance of generating tempo. In any conflict, the antagonist who can cycle through the loop faster-who can maintain a higher operating tempo-gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle. The slower antagonist falls farther behind with each cycle and is increasingly unable to cope with the deteriorating situation. In short, speed is an essential element of effective command and control.

The Information Hierarchy.

One way or another, command and control is about information: getting it, judging its value, processing it into useful form, sharing it with others, acting upon it. We view information not as a medium to be dominated but as a control parameter. It allows us to provide structure to our actions. But to be useful, information must be converted into knowledge, into an understanding of what the massive amounts of bits and bytes really mean.

MCDP 6 defines uncertainty as a function of the lack of knowledge or understanding rather than of data. The distinction is important because not all information is the same; there are different classes. The lowest class of information is data. Data are the most quantifiable and tangible class of information. They are the easiest to gain. However, they are the least useful as the basis for effective decisionmaking. Data must be turned into knowledge through the process of cognition, by which humans add meaning and value through analysis, evaluation, integration. Technology may assist, but cognition remains primarily a process of human intellect. The highest class of information is understanding-knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness that allows us to make projections about the future. True situational awareness, what Napoleon would call coup d’oeil, is a function of understanding.

We should not confuse having masses of data with understanding what it represents or what to do with it. By nature, data are significantly easier to generate, identify, quantify, reproduce, and transmit than are knowledge and understanding. But commanders need knowledge and understanding to make effective decisions. Likewise, subordinates need not merely data, but knowledge and understanding of the commander’s concept and intent. The goal in command and control should not be collecting, processing, and communicating vast amounts of data-and increasing the danger of information overload in the process-but approaching understanding as closely as possible. However, we cannot simply provide the commanders with readymade wisdom and understanding. They will have to make the final judgments themselves. Unfortunately, the “information revolution” is primarily a “data revolution.” The Marine Corps believes that this emphasis on data is misplaced and that there is no substitute for the judgment and intuition of experienced and properly educated commanders.

Mission Command and Control

Marine Corps doctrine calls for mission command and control-a relative term which describes a loose, decentralized form of command and control based on deciding and acting out of an understanding of the requirements of overall mission rather than out of compliance with detailed, coercive direction from above. Every situation is different and some require greater control than others, but MCDP 6 calls for mission command and control to the extent that each situation permits. Mission command and control is preferable because through decentralization it:

* Provides greater flexibility for adapting rapidly to changing battlefield situations-to deal with unforeseen problems and exploit fleeting opportunities.

* Generates a higher operating tempo. Subordinates do not have to pass reports up the chain and wait for instructions to be passed down; they act on their own initiative.

* Deals better with the friction, uncertainty, and disorder that are pervasive in war.

In mission command and control, commanders assign missions and explain their underlying intent, but leave subordinates as free as possible to choose the manner of accomplishment. Commanders frame guidance in such a way as to provide subordinates sufficient understanding to act in consonance with their desires, while not restricting freedom of action. They reserve the use of close personal supervision for exceptional cases. And they use restrictive control measures and prescribe the manner of execution only to the degree required to provide coordination they cannot achieve by any other method.

Mission command and control relies on initiative from subordinates who must act on their own authority without waiting for instructions. Mission command and control requires a knowledge of the commander’s intent so that when the situation changes subordinates can exercise initiative in consonance with the commander’s desires. This intent is an essential device for providing harmony of effort in a decentralized and adaptive system. Finally, mission command and control rests on mutual trust throughout the organization, as well as a sense of implicit understanding and communication. This latter requirement describes the ability of people familiar with each other to understand one another and communicate with minimal information having to be expressed explicitly. It is essential in a decentralized system. Command and control based upon implicit understanding and communication is less vulnerable to disruption and attack than command and control relying on explicit communication.

Our philosophy provides a command and control doctrine that accepts war for what it is: an uncertain, tempo-driven, disorderly, and complex phenomenon. It seeks to provide a philosophy of command and control that will allow commanders to make and implement effective military decisions faster than the enemy in any type of conflict, in any setting, on any scale. It relies on mission command and control to provide the flexibility and responsiveness to deal with uncertainty and generate the tempo that is a key to success in war. It seeks to provide a workable balance among people, procedures, and technology, but recognizes that ultimately there is no substitute for human judgment and understanding.

Realizing Command and Control The preceding sections have described our vision of the future, our philosophy of maneuver warfare, and the profound impact that both have had on the Marine Corps doctrine of command and control. This final section will describe the intent, if not the methodology, behind our approaches to realize the elements of the command and control system. In doing so, many terms familiar to our warfighting concepts-balance, innovation, and jointness-have analogous representatives in the effort to transition command and control from concept to a reality.

Underpinning our approach is a single belief. It is the central thread which weaves throughout our efforts. Ultimately people, not machines, define success in war. Accordingly, we will equip our Marines, not man our equipment.

Balance

“Equipping Marines” is the fulcrum for a balanced approach to realizing effective command and control. By focusing in this way we establish the right mix of people, the doctrine, and technical systems. This balance ensures that the human dimension complements the technical element of information systems. Using this approach, our definition of a robust command and control system does not simply refer to spare equipment and alternate circuit paths, but also includes those training and education programs oriented toward enhancing rapid decisionmaking skills at all levels of command.

The Marine Corps uses this balanced approach in meeting command and control deficiencies identified through its Concept Based Requirements System. The process is not predisposed toward equipment solutions for command and control deficiencies. Rather it produces solutions involving new training procedures or updates to doctrinal publications as readily as it does acquiring new radios. With this approach, the Marine Corps pursues a balance of educational and equipment solutions for successful command and control.

Our command and control training and educational pursuits reflect the depth of commitment which the Corps makes towards its most valuable resource, the Marine. Our goal is to equip every Marine with the thinking ability to win on the battlefields of the 21st century, where the junior enlisted Marine may well need and use more information than a battalion commander does today. The changes are Corps-wide, from the transformation of recruit training to the many steps taken to improve the Corps’ entire Professional Military Education Program. The entire Marine Corps University serves not only to educate Marines but also to interact with our operating forces and the Warfighting Lab so that real thinking and innovation take place. Some of this is accomplished by exposing our Marines to classic military theorists such as Clausewitz, as well as the unique writings of historians such as John Gaddis, Alan Beyerchen, and Williamson Murray. Other of our initiatives are literally on the “edge of chaos,” involving the emerging nonlinear sciences such as chaos and complexity. These “new sciences” are the object of research at Quantico and are also being introduced into the curriculums of our schools.

Innovation

The ability to generate and harness innovation is too important to be left to chance. We believe that innovation is best achieved through experimentation. This is particularly significant during a time when the United States-without a peer competitor-can effect a “strategic pause.” The Marine Corps believes experimenting with command and control will support the innovation and agility necessary to recognize, respond, and adapt to fleeting opportunities. The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory is our most visible indication of this approach.

Just as the Corps used its schools at Quantico and the fleet exercises to redefine the science and art of amphibious operations during the 1930s, so the Warfighting Laboratory now helps us chart our future course. At the forefront of this effort is the “Sea Dragon” process of experimentation, which reflects our commitment to innovation. It is a model for future thinking and exploring, where ideas are born, evaluated, bear fruit, or die.

While the Laboratory is our engine of change, we expect innovative ideas and approaches will come from many sources; from Marines throughout the Corps, from combat developers and defense academics, as well as industry. The seeds of innovation have been planted in our logistics community, our training and education establishment, in our personnel management programs, and in the operating forces. Many ideas are being brought forth to be evaluated by the Warfighting Laboratory. Some will be of immediate benefit to the Fleet Marine Force. Others will be tossed aside or taken back to the drawing board. Results from our most promising experiments will be fed into the Marine Corps Combat Development System at Quantico.

The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory’s recently completed Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) HUNTER WARRIOR exemplifies Marine Corps command and control experimentation. The operational concept required the linking of individuals, teams, and information technology assets together in new organizational structures far different than the classic Napoleonic model. The objective for the command and control concept was to create an information management system that supported a reduction in decision process times from hours to minutes and a reduction in deliberate planning times from days to hours.

To support the operational concept, the experiment’s command and control system supported parallel decisionmaking, rather than time-consuming and inflexible sequential decisionmaking. A new network with “expert agents” was employed for HUNTER WARRIOR to represent knowledge within the system as facts and relationships of these facts, thus providing a structure for organizing and accessing this knowledge. Communications was based on Internet technology, to support the new information flows and decision processes. Cellular communications extended the network from the Enhanced Combat Operations Center to dispersed Marine forces across the noncontiguous, extended battlefield.

The results of the AWE execution phase were exciting. While detailed analysis of the results will take time, the feedback from participants and observers thus far has supported continued commitment to command and control experimentation for the Marine Corps. Just after his visit to the HUNTER WARRIOR AWE, Dr. Marvin Langston, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Space Programs, commented:

I visited the Marine Corps/Navy HUNTER WARRIOR demonstration/experiment this Saturday and found myself completely overwhelmed by the significance of what was quietly taking place. This exercise (small dispersed force supported by remote fires opposing large force) says much about the extent to which we are actively searching for profound new ways to sustain our mission. I am not saying that this set of systems operated seamlessly or even close to flawlessly, but I am saying that by this one exercise we have proven that warfare can change dramatically.

This quote captures my own feelings about HUNTER WARRIOR and my enthusiasm for the work in which our young Marine and Navy warfighters are engaged. They are throwing the full weight of their creativity into this effort.

Joint Solutions

Critical to our approach to realizing command and control is to seek and support joint solutions for command and control. We recognize the Marine Corps will not retain its warfighting edge by simple product improvements of today’s technology and thinking. Our commitment is to get the most out of equipment and at the same time integrate technology properly with related Marine Corps and joint systems. We are fully committed to a joint solution and the Chairman’s vision, C41 for the Warrior. We will achieve it through implementation of the joint standards and common operating environments of the Defense Information Infrastructure.

We have mirrored our joint approach after the tenants outlined in the Defense Information Infrastructure Master Plan. From the perspective of command and control, we do not view ourselves as mere users of an external Defense Information Infrastructure. We consider the Marine Corps’ command and control infrastructure, whether in garrison or deployed, as the Marine Corps segment of the infrastructure. While the benefits of jointness are most often described in terms of interoperability and integration, the Marine Corps views jointness as a means to leverage our limited resources. Each dollar we spend on joint command and control solutions opens up greater potential. Dollars spent otherwise run the risk of ending up in stovepipe systems.

One of our most significant efforts to date under this joint approach has involved the migration of legacy command and control systems to the Global Command and Control System’s common operating environment. Ultimately, all our automated systems will transition or be developed to use the core services of the Global Command and Control System. This will provide commanders and their staffs the capability to send, receive, process, filter, and display data to aid their decisionmaking. With the first 15 of our legacy systems to migrate, we will reduce the associated code from 4.4 million source lines to an estimated 1.5 million lines.

Conclusions

The foregoing has provided a macro perspective of how the Marine Corps views revolutions in military affairs, the immutable and fundamental nature of war, and how the American military should approach the current age of uncertain threats and rapid technological change. Technology permeates every aspect of war, but the science of war cannot account for the dynamic interaction of the physical and moral elements that come into play, by design or by chance, in combat. War will remain predominantly an art, infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.

Technology will undoubtedly assist the commander faced with a massive variety of data in an environment of ambiguity. But to focus solely on the technological side of information superiority would be a major mistake. Effective command and control, as the Marines understand it, relies just as much on a shared understanding of the commander’s intent, doctrine, teamwork and mutual trust, and extensive investment in professional military education. The use of mission command and control seeks to give subordinates sufficient understanding of the situation and the commander’s intent before the battle, while encouraging initiative and creativity once the fight is joined.

The Marine Corps sees great opportunities and great challenges in the coming decades. We are working energetically in many places to address these challenges. The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory is just one example of the Corps’ interest in melding innovative concepts with appropriate technical capabilities. The Commandant has planted the seeds of innovation and encouraged fresh thinking throughout the Corps, and I can assure you that our speed of innovation will remain high. But experimentation and evidentiary-based processes should be preferred over unfounded assertions. We have the time today to explore across a broad range of solutions to tomorrow’s problems.

I would like to leave you with a quote from a wonderful classicist on how the early Greeks thought about preparing for the future:

The early Greek imagination envisaged the past and the present as in front of us-we can see them. The future, invisible, is behind us . . . paradoxical though it may sound to the modern ear. This image of our journey through time may be truer to reality than the medieval and modern feeling that we face the future as we make our way forward into it.

As we in the American military make our way into the 21st century, we need to keep a solid anchor in the past to understand what is possible and what is not. One path leads from analysis and experimentation toward knowledge of the real world, the other toward ignorance and thus peril.

by Maj John M. Jansen

Since the end of DESERT STORM, there has been an intense, if not confused, discussion over the current condition and future direction of close air support (CAS). The discussion has been fueled by uncertainties created by changing roles and functions, and by a heightened competition for diminishing assets among and within the Services. Concurrently, as the Marine Corps has been seeking new operational effectiveness by merging new technologies with concepts of maneuver warfare, questions have arisen regarding the role and validity of Marine and Navy tactical aviation (TacAir) on future battlefields. This rather loosely knit discourse has taken place in an environment where change is considered good. This dialectic has produced many recommendations for changes in doctrine, tactics, and even force structure, as well as a few recommendations that no change is required at all.

This debate over the future of CAS is actually a debate over future roles and functions within the larger context of offensive air support (OAS). Many of the recommendations made in this regard unknowingly impact our ability to engage in the operational art of combined arms warfare, which is an enduring concept, critical to the Corps’ future warfighting strategy. This concept is characterized by the calculated orchestration of firepower and maneuver elements that produces a ferocious synergy on the battlefield. The retention of the combined arms warfare capability is the litmus test that must be used when considering any proposed changes to doctrine and/ or force structure.

Combined Arms and Maneuver Warfare

Is the concept of combined arms relevant within the construct of maneuver warfare? It is not only relevant, it is critical. To give up on combined arms within the framework of maneuver warfare merely trades in one brand of three-dimensional warfare for another, rather than going for a brand of operations that is truly four dimensional. Conventional combined arms tactics are three dimensional in that weapons are brought to bear from a three-dimensional battlespace. The fourth dimension-timeis a critical element of maneuver warfare. Ideally, it is brought into play by rapid movement on the battlefield to engagement points of our choosing, while creating shock and confusion within the enemy. Many of the proposed changes to our doctrine and force structure appear to be offered for the sole purpose of gaining the element of time/rapid movement on the battlefield. The advocates of these “advancements” recommend the use of various weapons systems as independent maneuver elements to capitalize on their respective characteristics of speed, firepower, or observation. The advertised benefits are the expansion of the battlefield and confusion within the ranks of the enemy brought on by multiaxis attacks. What is gained in the dimension of time/rapid movement, however, may be sacrificed in the area of density. We risk the loss of the synchronized employment of complementary weapons systems and, at the same time, provide the enemy with better predictability as to what he needs to defend against, depending on the position and ranging of our various maneuver elements. These proposals risk losing the capability to produce the kind of shock and confusion that the synchronicity of combined arms warfare brings to the equation. As we examine some of the schools of thought we will see a common tendency to simply trade one dimension for another.

Schools of Thought

Four groups have emerged out of this free flowing debate, each with its own view of the future. These groups include the Airpower Strategists, the Evolutionaries, the Traditionalists, and the Revolutionaries.

The Airpower Strategist asks: “Is not the concept of combined arms and the resultant need for Servicespecific air arms antiquated, given a national strategy of executing a sustained air campaign prior to the introduction of ground forces? Based on our success in DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, can’t we rely largely on a ground-based air force for the execution of the air campaign, with minor mopping up operations to follow on?”

The downfall of this strategy is that it hinges on having an opponent willing to provide the time required to execute a sustained air campaign. Given a scenario of a rolling invasion, sustained in its own right, into a sovereign state by a committed aggressor, we will not have the time needed to execute a pure, ground-based air campaign. Absent this ability, ground forces will have to engage concurrently with air forces to counter the sustained enemy thrust. At that point you will want a force that is capable of sustaining itself, a combat-ready force trained in the principles and tactics of combined arms.

The Evolutionary asks: “Quantum leaps in laser-guided missile technology, as well as the newly acquired ability to self-laser designate, have turned the attack helicopter into a formidable offensive weapons platform. Given their performance in Southwest Asia, should we not evolve into an all-helicopter attack force? Are they not perfectly suited to maneuver warfare with their ability to easily liaise with the ground combat element and the ability to act as independent maneuver elements?”

Like the Airpower Strategist, the Evolutionary relies almost solely on experiences in DESERT STORM to make his case. An all-helicopter attack force assumes a clear air, foliage-free environment where the primary target is armored vehicles, and there is a relatively defined forward line of troops. Given an environment of heavy foliage or triplecanopy,jungle or where the threat is massed infantry, the case for an allhelicopter attack force is more difficult to make. (The Pacific Rim and North Korea come to mind as locations/scenarios where the benefits of laser-guided weapons will not be as profound as in a desert environment and where the survivability of helicopters will be more difficult to guarantee.) It is hard to tell whether this offering has greater implications for force structure or doctrine. However, it is clear that you cannot make a case for added synergy by removing the benefits of fixed-wing platforms from the equation.

The Traditionalist asks: “Do we not now have the right mix of doctrine and tactics suitable for the future? We teach a doctrine born of many years of development in combat and training, and we see no reason for fundamental change. Also, while we realize that our command and control system is cumbersome and restrictive, it is a necessary evil that prevents friendly fire incidents from occurring in the heat of battle. Much of what is offered in the way of change arises only from the need to create or protect a rice bowl, for which we have no time. We have training to accomplish.”

This position is obviously short sighted. While it is the one school of thought that is solidly grounded in current doctrine, it fails to acknowledge a great many dynamics that simply cannot be ignored. Even though this position is doctrine-centered, it may ultimately lead to changes in force structure as those who espouse this point of view will become irrelevant and fade away.

The Revolutionary asks: “Is not our current system of employing fixed-wing aerial fire support outmoded? Aren’t we sacrificing capability by restricting naval TacAir with our cumbersome command and control system, as well as by current close control tactics of CAS? Could we not gain capability on the modern battlefield by scrapping the only system entirely and creating a new breed of aviator, one trained to hunt and kill on his own volition? It is time for a change and we offer something completely different.”

There is nothing wrong with those sentiments. Our command and control system is too cumbersome and our repetitious training in close control CAS does raise questions about underutilized capability. So this school of thought holds some promise. We will see that while the problems that the Revolutionaries identify are right on target, the direction of their conclusion is off course. Yet, by bringing this issue to the fore, the Revolutionaries find their greatest utility. We are provided the impetus to examine our current doctrine within the context of maneuver warfare, which is exactly the direction that we want to head.

Each of these groups is making its own recommendations, based on its own set of assumptions. Ironically, the different assumptions used to proffer vastly divergent concepts of warfighting all tend to find their birth in recent experiences in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and even Somalia. Generally given, the assumptions are that our experience in DESERT STORM is readily transferable to potential conflicts in other regions of the world, and that events such as Bosnia and Somalia are the defining models of future conflicts. These assumptions are shaky pillars on which to build a warfighting model for the future.

You Say You Want a Revolution?

What are the different methods that we can use to analyze a “revolutionary” idea? One is simply to judge it on its own merits, acknowledging the potential benefits and exposing potential problems. Another way is to judge this new idea relative to the reality that it seeks to replace. However, it is important to determine if the reality that this new idea seeks to replace has been misrepresented, and if the direction in which this new idea seeks to take us is as revolutionary as claimed. For starters, the synergistic potential of tactical aviation has been simplified, trivialized, and marginalized by conducting the discussion under the headings of CAS and, to a lesser extent, battlefield interdiction (BI). Col Michael Wyly, USMC(Ret), and Cdr Daniel E. Moore, USN, do a fine job of painting a picture of the problem in their article published in the December 1995, Proceedings. In this article, they produce a “Theory for warfare in the littorals,” built around a “new” brand of air support that they call Jaeger Aviation. In their attempt to provide us with insight, however, they use the stereotypical, narrow definition of CAS to deride its usefulness as they seek to create a new flavor of aerial firepower. An examination of their concept reveals the dangers we submit ourselves to when we are not fluent in current doctrine and why it is critical that we use current doctrine to establish a common language as a frame of reference.

The common denominator with which we must become familiar is FMFM 5-40, Offensive Air Support (OAS). It can only be through discussion of the limitations and functional benefits of OAS in its entirety that we can productively debate the support that fixed-wing tactical aviation will provide to our future endeavors. Our doctrine not only accounts for the concept of Jaeger Aviation in the form of guidance on deep air support (DAS), but also increases five-fold the possible uses of CAS in the form of offensive employment of CAS. Yes that’s right, there is an offensive side to CAS that engages the enemy based on commander’s intent. Fires before the preparation, fires in preparation of the attack, fires in support of the attack, fires in support of exploitation and pursuit, and fires in support of consolidation and reorganization are all subtasks of CAS that are underutilized in current fleet training as well as in the current debate.

The article by Col Wyly and Cdr Moore is a good example of the dangers we can subject ourselves to when we don’t understand our own doctrine. They make a case for their revolutionary brand of warfighting that supposedly “will bring an entirely new dimension to warfare:”

Understanding the force’s intent and the friendly scheme of maneuver on the surface and familiar with the enemy’s predisposition, hunter aviation separates friend from foe and attacks on its own initiative. It probes and ranges outward ahead of the force and to its flanks, seeking to destroy or pin down the enemy before he can slow us down.

Compare their thesis with selected definitions from the FMFM 5-40 and it becomes clear that this “new dimension” of warfare is provided for under the two missions of DAS known as armed reconnaissance (AR) and air interdiction (AI):

Deep Air Support requires a complete understanding of the MAGTF Commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. Air Interdiction and Armed Reconnaissance are DAS tasks . . . (A)rmed reconnaissance missions can be used as a covering force. These aircraft will patrol open, extended flanks of the main axis of movement not covered by scout or reconnaissance forces. Air Interdiction can neutralize, destroy, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it is brought to bear against friendly forces.

The Jaeger Group’s definition of hunter aviation almost perfectly mirrors the concepts of DAS, AI, and AR.

Can’t We All Just Get Along?

Is this a simple matter of talking about the same concepts using different terminology? No. At the very least, the danger of such an argument becomes manifest in the degree to which it consumes valuable resources creating a system that, while new, is qualitatively no better than the system or culture that it replaces. In the worst case, the danger lies in the degree to which the new doctrine provides us with a net decrease in capability or a doctrinal mindset that does not match the tactics that it is supposed to spawn. For instance, when we examine the specific examples given by the Jaeger Group to flesh out its proposed general philosophy, we are confronted with serious logical inconsistencies that stand a good chance of producing negative unwanted consequences on the battlefield. While we have seen that the general construct of hunter aviation is provided for by our current understanding of DAS, the two examples used by Wyly and Moore to demonstrate this “new” capability actually sound like offensive CAS missions.

Enemy forces retreating in disarray is the first scenario used to flesh out their concept. Such a situation will require close and/or deep support missions based on the degree to which the enemy forces have managed to disengage and, more importantly, the degree to which friendly ground maneuver elements have decided to pursue. If the bad guys have disengaged from ground-based direct fire weapons but are still being ranged by indirect fires, this would be a CAS mission defined by current doctrine as fires in support of exploitation and pursuit. Even if the enemy forces have retracted out of range of all groundbased fires but the ground maneuver elements are on the move in pursuit, this would still be a CAS mission as a high degree of coordination will be required to ensure containment and efficient destruction of enemy forces as well as deconfliction to inhibit friendly fire catastrophes. This does not necessarily mean that TacAir would be controlled by a FAC or an airborne FAC (FAC(A)). It does mean however, that a coordinated game plan should be constructed to define the roles and assign areas of responsibility. For example, will the mission and priority of fires for the aviators be to limit the advance of the retreating forces? to allow the advance but canalize enemy forces? or to simply engage targets of opportunity?

The second example given by our Jaegers is definitely a CAS mission even though a single aircraft may never be brought to bear under the close control of a FAC or FAC(A). Their illustration offers the potential of airborne weapons platforms as a maneuver element in a “one-two punch” where the “two” is armor and mobile infantry. This is certainly a viable tactic that leans toward the decentralized nature of maneuver warfare and is a departure from our peacetime training that generally puts all of our firepower assets in the same target area. I submit, however, that there is a level of integrated planning and detailed coordination required that goes beyond the concept of having aviators roaming the flanks, armed with nothing more than years of experience and commander’s intent. Absent this close coordination, we should expect a less than synergistic effect on enemy forces and a higher rate of “blue-on-blue” opportunities.

The Jaeger initiative asks all of the right questions: What limitations are inherent in past and present practices vis-a-vis the employment of naval TacAir in OAS? How best to tailor future organizational tactics and training to maximize the lethality and flexibility that aerial trigger pullers bring to future battlefields? How do we mate that flexibility and lethality with emerging concepts ot maneuver warfare in the littorals-for example-infestation tactics? How do we take advantage of emerging technologies such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the forward observer/FAC, or FO/FAC? (For more on FO/FAC, see articles appearing in MCG, Apr, Jul, & Oct96, and on pp. 47-53 of this issue.) While their questions are right on target, their “theory of warfare” misses the mark. Their general concept of freeing the attack birds from a perceived paradigm of close control by the ground combat element has brought them to a place that strongly resembles the detached, disassociated employment of fixed-wing assets practiced by the U.S. Air Force. It tends also to lean in the direction of those who believe that future battlefields will consist almost solely of remote and/or airborne weapons platforms to the exclusion of ground combat elements. A movement in this direction is not in the best interest of our warfighting capability. Because it ultimately seeks total pilot autonomy in the cockpit, it is not supportive of what continues to be a highly lethal and valid concept of combined arms warfare. However much these pilots are supposed to be air-to-mud, maneuver warfare ninjas, the disassociated nature of the aviation combat element in their paradigm renders it just one more three-dimensional proposal.

Summary

If the Revolutionaries have asked so many good questions, but come up short on good answers, what are the fill-ins? I believe that a truly fourdimensional battlefield must be the goal. If the goal of maneuver warfare is to cause the collapse of the enemy by inflicting violent, measured blows to critical nodes within his system (rather than causing defeat by utter obliteration through force-on-force engagements), then the role of aviation is to be part of a firepower “package” that is delivered at a time and place of our choosing to one of the bad guy’s critical nodes. At times, that package will consist, exclusively, of aviation assets. At other times, the targets will be engaged by a coordinated attack from an air/ground team. The method of engagement will be determined by the nature of the target and by the desired results. And the degree to which coordination is required between air and ground elements will determine whether or not the mission is a combined arms attack or simply simultaneous attacks, mutually supporting by presence, that supports the overall intent of the commander.

Communications will be the key to success on the four-dimensional battlefield. In order to engage in those communications, we must speak the same language. If we want to speak the same language, we must read the same book and, for now, that book is titled Offensive Air Support. This doctrine may change a little or a lot. The degree to which it changes will depend upon such things as the level of incorporation of new tactics, like infestation, as well as modifications based on evolutionary operations in the joint environment. It will also change by the degree in which concepts of CAS and DAS are developed to optimize their impact on a fast-paced, coordinated, four-dimensional battlefield. Communications will be characterized by a much higher degree of premission planning and coordination between the ground element and aviation commanders. As a result, the operation order for a combined arms attack will look much more like a present day, premission brief for a deep air strike with coordinated times on targets, suppression plans, electronic warfare plans, etc., as opposed to the current method of simply fighting the air war off of an air tasking order. And communications technologies using datalink, satellite communications, and Global Prepositioning Systems will be used for command and control rather than routing elements through various agencies.

The days of training to defensive CAS-nine lines, terminal control, and “cleared hot,” over and over again-must come to an end. Aviators train to it because we think that is what the grunts want. The grunts ask for it because they are not sure what else to do with the assets. There is so much more out there. The clues (not the answers) lie in our current doctrine. We must capitalize on the beneficial concepts of maneuver warfare as well as on the benefits of emerging technologies without losing our ability to provide the Nation with a skilled airground team capable of meting out destruction using a combination of maneuver warfare and advanced principles of combined arms. We must actively define our own futureor someone else is going to come along and define it for us.

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

There are two basic, rather compelling reasons why most Marines believe synchronization is not a valid approach for implementing maneuver warfare. First, synchronization is thoroughly systematic, linear, and quantifiable in its approach. These conditions make it incompatible with Marines’ view of the frictional, chaotic, and fluid battlefield. Second, the Soviet experience has shown that synchronization simply does not work well in practice.

So where does this leave us? We have reaffirmed the importance of coordination, cooperation, preparation, and planning to successful operations, but not to the extreme and inhibitive degree advocated by the synchronization enthusiasts-war simply does not work that way. Marines at all levels, however, continue to grapple with how to implement maneuver warfare theory. Just how do we put these concepts into practice? We are learning that this is something apparently more easily said than done. What practical form should maneuver warfare operations take? The purpose of this article is to pose an initial, partial answer to those questions.

Asynchronous Operations

In general, not only do we not want to move toward synchronized operations, we actually want to move in the opposite direction. We want to move toward asynchronous operations. Let me make it perfectly clear that I do not propose a new buzzphrase, “asynchronous operations,” to replace the old buzzword “synchronization.” The last thing we need to do is to make “asynchronous operations” an official term. I simply use the adjective “asynchronous” to describe one aspect of the operations we should conduct in order to implement maneuver warfare concepts:

Maneuver warfare operations are generally asynchronous. What does this mean? The American Heritage Dictionary states that to “synchronize” means “to cause to occur at the same time . . . to operate in unison . . to cause to agree exactly in time or rate.” An asynchronous operation, then, is an operation in which the different tasks that make up the operation do not need to occur at the same time, the various units do not need to operate in unison, and the various components of the operation to not need to agree in time or rate. Notice that I have described the operations as asynchronous rather than antisynchronous. Antisynchronous (if there were such a word) would mean that the operations are intentionally discoordinated or out of phase, whereas asynchronous means that the operations do not require synchronization to work. In an asynchronous operation, the timing of one unit’s actions does not depend on the timing of another’s. One unit’s accomplishment of its mission does not depend on another unit accomplishing its mission first. In short, an operation is asynchronous when each component of the operation-each “moving part,” each subordinate unit pursuing its assigned mission-can act independently, operating without constraint imposed by the requirement for close coordination with other components.

Asynchronicity Emergent

Actually, rather than say we want to move away from synchronized operations, it might be more accurate to say that we want to move past synchronized operations to asynchronous operations. As a concept, synchronization is already passe. Experts and researchers in a growing variety of fields-from computer programming to electrical engineering to genetics to economics-are recognizing the significant advantages of asynchronicity. Computer scientist David Gelernter, for example, talks of “asynchronous ensembles” as complex computer programs consisting of multiple, simpler programs that actually run independently of one another, yet in cooperation. Likewise, the telephone answering machine and E-mail have facilitated asynchronous communications: The receiving parties do not actually have to be present to receive your message and can respond (or ignore you) at their own convenience.

Or consider an example from everyday life. The inherent advantages of asynchronicity explain the boom in the video rental business and the corresponding decline of the television movie. With a video you do not have to make it a point to be sitting in front of the television precisely at the scheduled time for 2 uninterrupted hours (along with everybody else in America who is going to watch the movie). With a video you do not have to synchronize your trips to the refrigerator to correspond with the commercial breaks in the broadcast. A video gives you complete asynchronous freedom and convenience. You watch the video exactly when you want. You pause it when you want. You replay the good parts. The videotape is asynchronous; the broadcast is synchronous.

The basic appeal of synchronization is the unity of effort that it is designed to create. But we are beginning to learn that we can achieve effective unity with asynchronous systems, and we can do so without the loss of flexibility that synchronization invariably involves. Synchronization is based on the underlying assumption that the various moving parts of a system are “dumb”-meaning that they lack the internal intelligence necessary to allow them to act independently or in cooperation with one another. Synchronization assumes that each moving part will move only as the result of a force acting on it from the outside. In such a system, synchronization is in fact necessary to achieve coordinated action. The “logic” of the system must be imparted from the outside. However, a military operation, or a military unit, is hardly a dumb system. Rather, it has innate intelligence built into each moving part that is composed of numerous humans. The “logic” of the system builds up from the bottom.

Military units and military operations exhibit the characteristics of what scientists have come to call self-organizing, adaptive systems. The world around us is filled with self-organizing, adaptive systems (also known as complex systems). Examples include economies, many computer programs, ecologies, families, evolution, food chains, all living things (plant or animal), stock markets, the Internet, jazz bands, soccer teams. Consider the soccer team-Il players, each with assigned responsibilities but acting independently in relation to the situation on the field as it pertains to him. There is a team captain, but he rarely tries to move the other players around during the course of the game. The team plays according to certain offensive and defensive strategies, but rarely uses set plays. Yes, the team uses set plays off a penalty kick or corner kick-these equate to what we would call “deliberate” operations. But most of soccer and most of war (unlike American gridiron football) consists of what we would call “hasty” operations. The players react individually to the ball, and yet somehow the result is that they manage to work together as a team. The logic of the team’s play is innate in each player and not imparted by a coach maneuvering players from the sideline. Individual players may cooperate closely-as in demonstrating pinpoint passing and timing while mounting an attack against the enemy’s goal. But it is important to recognize that the cooperation is improvised and “local.” It occurs spontaneously between the individual players involved and is not the result of instructions from the captain or coach. A key feature of any self-organizing, adaptive system is that it is asynchronous; the moving parts do not act according to the instructions of some central “synchronizer,” but each acts independently, according to its own local situation. And yet, the parts somehow work together as a cohesive system.

The Critical Consideration: Harmony

The critical issue with regard to asynchronous operations is how to create focus of effort or cohesion if all the moving parts act independently. We know that synchronization seeks to achieve cohesion through close, coordinated control-that is, regulation-of each component in the execution of the operation. But with asynchronous operations, focus takes a different form. Focus is not imparted on the system from the outside. As with the soccer team, the logic (or “intent”) of the whole system is programmed into each part of the system so that the parts will cooperate spontaneously. Harmony is thus perhaps a better word than focus. The parts will operate in harmony, and the ultimate result will be what FMFM 1, Warfighting, calls “harmonious initiative.”

It is all well and good to talk about harmonious initiative, but what does this mean in practical terms? It means that units cooperate indirectly rather than directly, implicitly rather than explicitly, by the effects they achieve rather than by the way they operate in relation to one another. For example, Alfa Company supports the main effort, while Bravo Company keeps the enemy occupied north of the river however it can rather than by launching a supporting attack against a specified objective, at a specified time, after a scheduled preparation fire. In other words, the parts of the operation fit together, but “loosely” rather than “tightly.” (More about this later.)

The Advantages of Asynchronous Operations

Now, in reality we know that truly asynchronous operations are no more possible to conduct than are truly synchronized ones. It is important to recognize that we are talking about matters of degree. No commander can operate with complete autonomy, without the need for any coordination whatsoever with others. But we can say that a given operation is more asynchronous than synchronous, or vice versa. As a general principle, we want to conduct operations that tend to be more asynchronous than synchronous. Why?

First, asynchronous operations facilitate tempo. The synchronizationists argue that synchronization does not mean timetables and a lock-step mentality. But in practical reality we know better. Let us say that three companies are going to participate in a synchronized attack in which their actions are closely coordinated. In order to do this, each must arrive at the designated place at the prescribed time, ready to execute its assigned task. We know what will happen: One of the companies will arrive first at its designated place and will be waiting on the others. To avoid this problem higher headquarters may try to closely regulate the progress of each company to ensure that all three arrive at their designated places at the same time. Or else, as often happens, higher headquarters will establish a time of attack which is sufficiently delayed to ensure that all three companies have more than enough time to get into position-and all three end up waiting. In any case, we surrender tempo. No matter how we look at it, in practice synchronization involves waiting around to get all the assets marshaled so that we can carefully integrate them. Instead, the object should be to devise an asynchronous operation that allows each moving part to operate at its own best speed and without having to wait or slow down for others. A unit does not have to wait at a phase line for adjacent units to come abreast, but instead protects its own flanks and charges ahead. A unit does not have to hold up its advance for a scheduled air strike, but continues to advance and employs on-call air when needed. Bravo Company does not have to be standing by ready to fall in directly in trace of Alfa and directly in front of Charlie in the march column, but instead all three move separately to the common destination.

Second, asynchronous operations minimize the effects of friction, that bane of all military operations. Synchronization means that components are closely integrated, whether in space or in time; this is precisely how synchronization seeks to achieve optimal effect. In other words, the components are in close contact. In a military operation as in any physical system, where there is close contact between moving parts there is friction. The closer the contact, the greater the friction. The greater the friction, the greater the coordination required to make things work. The more coordination required, the slower the operating tempo. Asynchronous operations in effect minimize the direct contact between moving parts and therefore minimize the friction and increase the tempo.

Third, asynchronous operations maximize the opportunities for initiative. This is important since we recognize that the ability to exploit fleeting opportunities is vital to success. In synchronized operations, commanders are constrained by the requirement to maintain a certain relationship (spatial, temporal, or otherwise) with other units-to keep abreast of another unit, to guide off or maintain contact with another unit, to remain within supporting distance of another unit, or to wait for another unit to accomplish a given task before acting oneself. In other words, synchronization promotes an inward focus and limits freedom of action; commanders cannot act in any manner that could throw the other parts of the system out of whack. Less freedom of action means less variety of action, and less variety of action means greater predictability. Commanders not limited by the constraints of synchronization have greater freedom. They are more concerned with the requirements of the situation than with maintaining the proper relationship with other units. Not concerned with being at the designated place at the specified time, they have time to actually look at the situation and consider what needs to be done. Greater freedom of action implies the freedom to be unpredictable-obviously a good thing when it comes to dealing with the enemy. We want our commanders to act primarily in relationship to the enemy rather than in relationship to friendly units.

A Simple Example: Targeting

The synchronizationists have argued that opponents reject any sort of planning or preparation-that those opposed to synchronization insist on always “winging it.” This is untrue. We can clear up this point and also illustrate the distinction between synchronized and asynchronous operations using targeting as a very simple example. Prearranged targets and targets of opportunity are the two basic types of targets. Prearranged targets are planned in advance. These targets are given designators known both to firing units and the maneuver units that may request fire support. The firing data for these targets is calculated in advance, and the targets may even be registered by adjusting rounds to ensure the accuracy of the data. By contrast, targets of opportunity are targets that appear during combat and against which fires have not been prearranged. Opportunity targets clearly are not synchronized, but are done “on the fly.” To refuse to do any target planning and to rely only on targets of opportunity would definitely be to “wing it.” But opponents of synchronization are not opposed to target planning (or any other kind of reasonable planning), and target planning does not necessarily equate to synchronization. Prearranged targets may or may not be synchronized, as we will discuss.

There are also two basic types of prearranged targets-scheduled targets and oncall targets. This is where the distinction between synchronized and asynchronous comes in. Scheduled targets are those prearranged targets fired according to a predetermined timetable or schedule. The idea behind scheduled fires is to ensure that the fires occur at precisely the proper time to support another scheduled event, such as a deliberate attack scheduled to kick off at a specific time. In other words, the intent is to synchronize the two events through scheduling to achieve the optimal cooperative effect. But scheduled fires by their nature lack flexibility. In theory, if the attack is delayed, we can also delay the fires; or if the situation develops differently than we expected, we can change the fires but in practice, as we all know, these things are more easily said than done. On the other hand, on-call targets are planned in advance but are fired only when requested. The firing data is calculated in advance to ensure that the fires can be provided quickly when needed, and if the target is a priority target the firing unit may even lay its guns on that target, awaiting only the command to fire. But the firing of the mission is triggered by a request and not a predetermined schedule or causal event. Despite the fact that they are prearranged, on-call targets are by definition asynchronous. They are designed to be fired at any time for any reason, independent of any schedules or other events. Their execution is not linked to, and therefore not constrained by, any other action or event. They are not fired according to a synchronization matrix. On-call fires are thus inherently more flexible than scheduled fires. But this is not to say that they are necessarily any less coordinated. A unit can use on-call fires quite effectively to support an attack-hasty or deliberate. But the point is that the fires are not linked directly to the attack, so as the situation changes we can change the fires without disrupting the attack or can alter the attack without disrupting the fires. The fires and the attack are asynchronous.

This is not to say that all scheduled fires are bad. There will be some situations, namely the occasional deliberate operation (like the occasional corner kick in soccer), in which some scheduled fires can be useful. This is simply to make the point that in typical, fluid operations, we would do better to rely more on flexible, on-call targets than on scheduled targets. This is also to recognize that we cannot possibly anticipate all our fire support needs and must have the additional flexibility to engage targets of opportunity-sometimes we will have no choice but to wing it.

“Tight” and “Loose” Coupling

Another way to compare synchronized and asynchronous operations is by a discussion of “tight” and “loose” coupling. Coupling refers to how the components or moving parts of a system come together. Synchronized systems tend to have “tight” coupling, meaning that the various moving parts mesh together precisely. When they are working properly, tightly coupled systems are efficient and precise; there is little wasted energy. But tightly coupled systems also have little or no tolerance for deviation or friction. A tightly coupled system runs like a Swiss watch, an apt simile since we are talking about synchronization. The gears in a Swiss watch mesh with a jeweler’s precision. But a watch is a closed system that has no interaction with the outside environment. What happens to the Swiss watch when a piece of grit or sand gets inside the mechanism? The gears grind to a halt. The obvious problem is that war, unlike the Swiss watch, is hardly a closed system. It is an open system susceptible to countless outside forces-the enemy, the terrain, the weather, to name the most obvious-that will get in among and screw up the gears of a tightly coupled military operation.

Tightly coupled systems have difficulty compensating for problems. In fact, tightly coupled systems tend to compound those problems. Even a minor problem in one component of the system can cause a ripple effect that eventually leads to the catastrophic failure of the system – just as a driver who merely taps his brakes on a rush-hour interstate can bring all traffic to a sudden stop a couple miles back.

The more tightly coupled and complex a system is, that is, the more moving parts it has and the more tightly they mesh-the greater the potential for friction. Compare this with a system with “loose” coupling, in which the components fit together loosely. Loosely coupled systems have “slop” or “wobble” built into them. Consequently, they are generally less efficient than tightly coupled systems-efficiency defined as smooth internal functioning-but they have a greater capacity to cope with friction, and they have greater room for deviation and variation (initiative, in military terms). Loosely coupled military operations do not depend on precise timing, phasing, or close coordination. They allow commanders greater latitude to deviate from the original plan without fear of throwing the rest of the plan “out of whack.” Loosely coupled systems also tend to be selfcorrecting. When the above driver taps his brakes on a lightly traveled interstate (on which the following distance-“coupling”-between cars is much greater), it does not cause a traffic problem at all. The flow of traffic absorbs the momentary deviation in speed.

Or, let me give a military example. Consider the Blue Angels precision aerobatics team. The Blue Angles fly in a tightly coupled formation and execute closely synchronized maneuvers. The pilots must guide off the flight leader precisely; they have no freedom of action whatsoever. The flight leader is equally constrained: any improvisation or deviation on his part will upset the entire formation. The pilots’ entire focus is inward, on maintaining the proper relationship with the other planes. And, of course, it has to be this way: the smallest error can cause a disastrous midair collision. The Blue Angels do not have to worry about being shot down by enemy fighters-they constitute a closed system. But do we apply this approach to air-to-air combat? Of course not. For combat we adopt a combat spread that is more loosely coupled and therefore gives the pilots greater freedom of action and allows them to focus outward on the hostile situation rather than inward on maintaining the formation.

A Musical Analogy

As a further analogy, let us compare the music of an orchestra with that of a jazz band. The music of the orchestra is synchronized or, as the very name indicates, orchestrated. Each member plays his or her music exactly as scored on the music sheets (a sort of musical synchronization matrix) and in precise synchronization with the other members. The members answer to the precise, positive direction of the single, all-important conductor, often called maestro because of his preeminence and his ability to synchronize all the various instruments. Synchronization is absolutely essential. There is no room for improvisation, or any kind of variance at all for that matter. Each musician plays each note as composed. The orchestra must exactly rehearse each piece of music numerous times to gain the level of synchronization necessary to perform the difficult, refined, and complex symphony with any sort of competence. The orchestra plays in an acoustically designed concert hall under optimal conditions to achieve the optimal effect-the perfect sound. The audience listens in reverential silence. Without argument, when done well, the results can be spectacular-a finely meshed, delicate, and exact performance.

Now consider the jazz band, such as the Preservation Hall Jazz Band in New Orleans. Preservation Hall is a cramped storefront joint off Bourbon Street in the French Quarter. It is dark, dingy, smoke-filled, and noisy from both the crowd inside and the bustle outside. Not only does the audience not listen silently; it will sway to the beat, stamp its feet, clap and sing along, and the musicians will interact with and feed off that atmosphere. The band members will change from one performance to the next-a different piano player, a different sax player-never the same band. Although the band will play the same standards from one set to another, no two performances are remotely the same. Any given number will have a simple beat or baseline (or bassline, if you will), but the musicians will depart from it freely to improvise and experiment creatively, relying on their intuitive “feel” for one another rather than the music sheets to hold the sound together. The sound is anything but orchestrated; it is “loose” and “rough” and sometimes disjointed. Yet the results can be every bit as spectacular as with the orchestra in a raw, rather than polished, sort of way. The result comes not from the precise and refined synchronization of different musicians in the performance of a masterfully orchestrated symphony. Hardly. Rather, it comes from the soul (in military language we would call it coup d’oeil) and the improvisational skill of the members and the intuitive harmony they share with each other and with the audience.

I am not suggesting that one form of music is inherently superior to the other. That is a question of aesthetics. Each, in its own vastly different way, can achieve virtuosity. Each, in its own way, requires a high level of skill from its performers. Rather, the question that concerns us is which approach to music more resembles the reality of military operations and the battlefield? Do we want to adopt an approach that requires detailed and centralized orchestration and repeated exacting rehearsal to achieve a precise, synchronized, and optimal result performed without variation under optimal conditions? Or do we prefer a flexible approach specifically designed to work under far less than optimal conditions with continuously changing members-one that relies on improvisational skills and maintains its harmony through the shared understanding of its members?

Clearly, given the chaotic, frictional, uncertain, random, and unpredictable nature of war (as described in FMFM 1 and other places), we definitely want to be more like the jazz band than the orchestra. To carry the analogy further, the reality is that there will be very few situations (Operation DESERT STORM is an example) in which we will have the opportunity to compose, rehearse, refine, and perform an intricate military symphony. Rather, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the requirement will be for a comeas-you-are military jam session.

How Do We Devise Asynchronous Operations?

It is one thing to talk about asynchronous operations in theory; it is another to describe how to put them into practice. There are no simple techniques or procedures that make it easy. There is no process called “asynchronization.” You cannot “asynchronize” something. The ability to devise plans that are “loosely” coupled and that allow subordinates freedom of action while at the same time providing them with adequate focus is no mean ability. It is largely a matter of judgment and experience and falls under the heading of the art rather than the science of war. But several related techniques can help:

The first suggestion is to make extensive use of mission tactics or mission control. In mission tactics, the senior tells the subordinate what to accomplish but leaves the subordinate broad latitude in the manner of accomplishment. We all know the importance of commander’s intent to effective mission tactics. By explaining the intent behind his designs, the commander provides subordinates the essential logic on how to act as the situation begins to develop and change. Commander’s intent is a device designed specifically to enhance the broader quality that computer scientist Gelernter has called “topsight”-the ability to understand the big picture and to see how all the pieces fit. Topsight allows us to act with initiative yet in harmony with the other components of the operation. Mission tactics involve far more than simply assigning a mission with an “in order to” statement tacked on the end. If we subsequently issue lots of control measures, detailed coordinating instructions, and other restrictions, we have defeated the whole purpose.

The second suggestion is an organizational one that we can call the “unit principle.” If a senior is going to give a subordinate broad latitude in the accomplishment of a mission and is going to hold that subordinate responsible for the accomplishment of the mission, then he is obligated to provide the subordinate with the assets needed to accomplish that mission. By providing each “moving part” with all the assets it needs to perform its task, we create self-contained task forces (or “asynchronous ensembles” as Gelernter would say). In so doing, we minimize the need to coordinate and request support from external sources. In other words, we make each “moving part” as self-reliant as possible-because self-reliance allows independence of action.

The third suggestion is to simplify operations by minimizing the number of moving parts in each operation. The more moving parts a plan has, the more contact points it has-that is, the more points where parts contact one another. The more contact points a plan has, the greater the requirement for coordination. The greater the requirement for continuous coordination, the less the independence of action and the more time spent coordinating instead of executing.

The fourth suggestion is to minimize the number of control measures we need and use. We should seek to minimize the use of limits of advance, phase lines, coordinating points, contact points, restricted fire lines, “on-order” missions, and so on. In short, we should avoid any measure that requires a commander to stop and request permission to continue or to coordinate before continuing. This is not to suggest that we simply eliminate the use of control measures because control measures wisely used serve an important purpose. However, we should eliminate the widespread overuse of restrictive control measures. We sometimes have a tendency to draw boundaries or phase lines where they serve no purpose other than to allow the commander to delude himself into believing that he is really in control. But there is more to this than just that. Rather, the object is to devise tactics and operations in which such control measures are not necessary. Given the choice between a scheme of maneuver that would require two units to coordinate closely to avoid interfering with each other or one in which the two units move in such a way that there would be little risk of interference, we should chose the latter, all other things being equal.

The fifth suggestion is to consciously design operations that allow each “moving part” to focus first and foremost on the enemy. As I have discussed earlier, synchronized operations are by their nature inwardly focused; the emphasis is on being in the designated place, in the proper sequence, at the prescribed time in relation to other friendly units. That is precisely what it means to be synchronized. What does it mean in practice to devise enemy-oriented operations? It means that as a rule we express the mission, intent, tasks, concept of operations, and other guidance and instructions in terms of the enemy rather than in terms of other friendly units. We minimize the use of tactics that require instructions such as “guide off 1st Platoon on your right,” “follow in trace of Echo Company but in advance of Golf,” or “Keep contact with 1st Squad on your left flank and 3d Squad on your right.”

The final suggestion is that we should leave many details of coordination unspecified. This goes against our training. We are trained that a good order provides instructions for every possible requirement and covers every conceivable detail. If the concept of operations creates the requirement for two subordinate units to coordinate, then higher headquarters will slap down a control measure between them-a boundary, contact point, whatever. That control measure then often becomes an imposition for both subordinate units. Higher headquarters are like big government in this respect. Getting the Federal Government involved is rarely the best way to work out local issues, yet the Federal Government seems to think that any worthwhile program should be a Federal program. In general it is not a bad idea to leave the details of coordination to the parties involved: “Bravo, remember you’ve got Charlie operating on your right flank; make sure you coordinate.” Consider again the pinpoint passing between the soccer players mentioned earlier. How effective could it be if the coach tried to synchronize the passes from the sideline? Trained subordinates gifted with topsight will see where the “moving parts” meet and, if they are one of those “moving parts,” will recognize the need to coordinate and will effect that coordination in the most expeditious manner.