Archives: Gazette Magazines

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret)

Part 1 of this article was published last month. In it the author discussed how amphibious doctrine must change if we are serious about adopting the basic concepts of maneuver warfare. He then identified six structural/organizational trends that must accompany a transition of this kind: In brief, he believes the Corps will have to break with mirror image infantry battalions and organize its ground combat elements in three different forms-light, foot-mobile infantry, tight armored forces, and heavier mechanized combined arms forces. He sees a new emphasis on heavy-lift helicopters (a trend already begun by the acquisition of M198 artillery), a need for new command relationships with helicopters, and a seabasing logistics concept. In this article he continues his analysis describing how an amphibious landing force might be organized for maneuver warfare and presenting examples of how it might conduct operations.

Task Organization of Landing Forces

Concepts of employment and tactical applications are inevitably linked to the capabilities of the amphibious task force (ATF) and its component landing force (LF). The LF component, a Marine air ground task force (MAGTF), may range in size from a MAU to a MAF. The basic concept of task organizing the LF is sound and should remain constant. However, what should change is the perception and application of the doctrine. The problem is that the doctrine is the essence of flexibility while applications have been stereotyped. Requirement documents such as the Marine Corps mid-range objective plan (MMROP) present notional MAU, MAB, and MAF troop lists (i.e., one list for each “representative” MAGTF). Prior to publication of the Commandant’s White Letter 1-80 and the assumption of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) tasking, contingency planning was based on the basic assumption that MAFs would deploy as organizational entities. Both of these examples portray stereotype MAGTF task organization.

Now there is a new ballgame called the “composite MAF.” It provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to demonstrate the flexibility of its doctrine. MAGTFs can be tailored (sized and task organized) for the specific contingencies they are tasked to support by drawing from the assets of all three MAFs. Equally important, requirements documents can reflect the wide range and differences represented by these contingencies through the use of several representative troop lists at each MAGTF level.

In order to illustrate the difference in perception and application, let’s look at the MAF exclusively. First, assume that each of the three ground combat trends identified in Part I results in a minimum of two regiments in the total force structure; i.e., two mechanized combined arms task forces (MCATFs), two light armored task forces (LATFs), and two foot-mobile infantry commands. Also assume that all six of these reinforced regiments are available to deploy in an amphibious mode. Given these assumptions, the flexibility of the basic doctrine can be illustrated by the following description of the MAF-level forcible entry capability.

The MAF

The MAF is built around two to four RLTs and a task organized aircraft wing. The smallest MAF contains five BLTs. The largest MAF configured for seaborne forcible entry operations could contain 12 BLTs and 2 tank battalions-this upper limit set by anticipated amphibious shipping constraints.

The MAF can be task organized in a wide variety of ways to meet the terrain conditions and anticipated threats associated with specific contingency tasks. For example, the largest and heaviest MAF could contain two heavy MCATF RLTs and two LATF RLTs. The maneuver warfare potential of this MAF in suitable terrain far exceeds the sum of its parts. In areas where restricted terrain is the dominant characteristic, a MAF containing two foot-mobile infantry RLTs and one or two LATF RLTs also has exceptional maneuver warfare potential.

For purposes of this article, a MAF containing one heavy MCATF, one LATF, and one foot-mobile infantry RLT will be used as the illustrative example.

General Concept of Employment

The overall concept of employment involves seaborne forcible entry and a maneuver style of warfare ashore while seabased. Focus is on defeating a numerically superior tank-heavy mechanized force on terrain that is largely unrestricted and on gaining control of the operational area. There appear to be eight definable steps (Figure 1) implicit in such operations. A brief discussion of each step follows:

* Step 1-Gain and maintain air and naval superiority. Although this remains a fundamental part of doctrine, tactics may be much different if the enemy force is numerically superior in either category, or if a situation of approximate parity exists at the time the initial engagement commences. A multipurpose ATF would, as feasible, directly assist other naval forces in achieving the necessary air and naval superiority.

* Step 2-Determine the place and time of the main ship-to-shore attack. Use of demonstrations, feints, raids, covert reconnaissance, and overt reconnaissance-in-force operations ashore would be used in almost all seaborne forcible entry operations. These operations would seek to gain detailed information, and perhaps deceive or confuse the enemy as to when and where the main attack will strike. However, the primary purposes are to ensure accurate knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the enemy defense and test enemy reactions.

* Step 3-The main ship-to-shore attack. The main attack is fundamentally characterized by the landing of the heavy (nonhelicopter-transportable) MCATF. Because the MCATF is very difficult to extract once it is committed ashore, its landing signals a main attack and the intention to maneuver ashore indefinitely.

*Step 4-Early operations ashore while outnumbered. An understanding of this step is critical to the survival of the landing force. A numerically superior enemy with heavy tank and mechanized forces will surely understand (as his doctrine clearly indicates) that his best chance of defeating a landing is through large-scale, early counterattacks. Therefore, during this step, recon-pull tactics are used to ensure that the landing force is not trapped into a firepower-attrition contest nor defeated piecemeal. The principle of security is emphasized in coordination with maneuver.

* Step 5-Parity operations. When approximate parity exists between forces, the immediate goal should be to increase enemy hesitation and decrease his initiative. Parity does not mean that the enemy’s “cohesion has been shattered” or even seriously impaired. Also, remember that although a senior enemy commander may be or may appear to be confused, his tactical units and smaller commands will follow orders loyally and fight with intense determination. History shows that such behavior sometimes turns apparent defeat into victory.

* Step 6-Superiority operations. Obviously, this condition permits an increase in the tempo of maneuver and attack at times and places of your choosing. However, defeat of the enemy is through focus on his vulnerabilities rather than on one “grand, command-push attack.”

* Step 7-Mission fulfillment. Once the enemy has been defeated, other explicit or implicit elements of the mission can then be accomplished. This could include continuing control of the landing force area of operations (LFAO) for an indefinite time, conduct of ground and air interdiction operations, or reconnaissance-in-force operations.

* Step 8-Amphibious withdrawal. This step is designed to imply that the best use of landing forces in a maneuver style of warfare is as a continuing component of an ATF-an ATF supporting the naval aspects of a joint campaign. It does not mean that landing forces would never be committed to sustained land combat, only that such commitment should not be viewed as the doctrinal norm.

Sample Concepts of Employment/Tactical Applications

The examples presented below are based on the ground maneuver elements of a reinforced division task organized as shown in Figure 2. They focus exclusively on the ground maneuver elements in order to simplify the presentation. Also, it will be assumed that a CH-53E type helicopter is the primary transport helicopter of the landing force, and that the numbers (estimated ‘to be 85-95) are sufficient to transport the scheduled serials of one LATF BLT in one lift. Such numbers would also be sufficient to transport 2,700-3,000 foot-mobile infantry Marines in one lift-a figure estimated to equate to the entire foot-mobile RLT. In addition, the ATF is assumed to contain 70 landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles, sufficient to transport all tanks of one tank battalion in one lift, or the scheduled serials of an entire LATF or foot-mobile infantry RLT.

The first example illustrates reconnaissancein-force applications related to step 2, determination of the time and place for the main ship-to-shore attack. (See Figure 3.) This illustration portrays the flexible options provided by the lighter RLTs in conjunction with the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC. Repeated overt reconnaissance insertions/extractions and reconnaissance-in-force attacks/extractions could lead to a reconnaissance-in-force operation without a predetermined extraction. In such case, the commanders would have the option of landing the heavy MCATF in lieu of extracting the reconnaissance-in-force elements; i.e., recon-pull of the main ship-toshore attack.

In most cases, however, it is believed the main ship-to-shore attack would be a coordinated command-push operation in an area containing an undefended or lightly defended surface landing site (i.e., a portion of the shoreline where AAVs and LCAC can land). Before illustrating the main attack, it is useful to keep in mind that throughout step 2 operations and at the commencement of the main attack, the ATF is maneuvering to pose a threat to land anywhere in the LFAO (Figure 4).

An example of the main ship-to-shore attack is illustrated in Figure 5. Depending on the “situation and terrain,” the lighter RLTs are landed to ensure control of the surface landing site in preparation for the on-call landing of the MCATF RLT. Although the LCAC-landed RLT may be landed at H-hour when one is sure of an unopposed touchdown, the more common technique would probably be to land the helicopterborne forces first to ensure an unopposed LCAC landing.

In order to further illustrate the flexibility and complementary nature of the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC combined with a LATF/foot-mobile mix, envision a night landing in which on-site, covert reconnaissance has verified an undefended surface landing site. At the risk of preaching to the choir, note the LCAC force could be landed first to secure nearby LZs to ensure their security for the touchdown of the helicopterborne force.

A second phase of the attack is characterized by the unopposed landing of the heavy MCATF RLT. As envisioned here, the normal concept would involve (1) LCACs return to the shipping (which has closed somewhat from the original launch area) to pick up the second lift, the tank battalion; (2) on-call, orchestrated launch of three mechanized battalions in AAVs and the tank battalion in LCACs. Underway launch of the AAVs is conducted as close to the landing site as possible. Which lands first, the AAVs or LCACs, is a function of the specific situation, not a function of doctrine. The only doctrinal tenet envisioned here is that LCAC and AAV waves are not mixed. Upon landing, the mechanized infantry and tank units proceed to assembly areas or preattack positions in accordance with predetermined cross-attachment orders; (3) LCACs return to the shipping to bring in the third lift, self-propelled artillery attached to, or in direct support of, the MCATF RLT.

Before leaving the main ship-to-shore attack, it is appropriate to reflect on the basic complementary nature of the LCAC/AAV equation. In projecting the heavy MCATF RLT ashore, the fundamental goal is to land the ground maneuver elements of the entire RLT intact-one lift-with the tactical integrity required to begin maneuver or execute task force mission assignments shortly after landing. Piecemeal buildup of the MCATF ashore is unacceptable in light of the capabilities of the expected enemy-therefore, the basic nature of the equation is the simple logic of quantity.

The primary problem in the early stages of operations ashore is to expand the maneuver area against a numerically superior enemy (step 4). Although specific tactics would vary greatly, two general examples will be used to show potential contrasts in tactical techniques.

The first example is illustrative of a situation where forces have landed relatively far from major enemy units (See Figure 6.) In this case, expansion of the area is achieved rapidly through offensive action. The action could be either recon-pull or command-push. In most cases, it would attempt to expand the maneuver area along the littoral to a greater distance than expansion inland. In the illustration, note (1) the mobile reconnaissance screen, (2) combined vertical/two-dimensional attack of the LATF RLT, and (3) the retention of one maneuver battalion of the MCATF RLT as division reserve.

The second example is illustrative of situations in which major enemy elements are relatively close to the landing area. In this case, the basic concept is designed to focus on one fundamental of amphibious warfare: the shoreline is a natural and insurmountable obstacle to the enemy. With the landing force no longer tied to a NIS-type beach and a vulnerable beach support area (BSA), the shoreline offers a distinct advantage; the maneuver area of the landing force extends seaward; that of the enemy does not. Figure 7a depicts the general unit dispositions. The MCATF RLT is in a TAOR with the mission of delaying and canalizing an enemy attack toward the shoreline. The foot-mobile RLT occupies major ambush/blocking positions in restricted terrain. The LATF is the division reserve located in an area which would be a logical objective of the main enemy attack, or the shoreline terminus of a major corridor to the coast. In Figure 7b, reconnaissance elements and the MCATF RLT conduct ambush and delaying actions to impede progress of units in the shoulder of the attack while permitting more rapid progress in the center. During this phase, some enemy units are drawn toward a major ambush (temporary blocking) position in restricted terrain where a foot-mobile BLT extracts a toll and withdraws under the cover of MCATF ambushes and/or limited counterattacks. The LATF is extracted by helicopter and redeployed either deep on an exposed flank or near the rear of the enemy force. It attacks selected elements of the enemy force using hit and run tactics. The LATF might be redeployed by helicopter several times during this period; it could also be extracted in some situations.

In Figure 7c, we see that when the enemy attack approaches or hits the shoreline, it must stop or turn. In either event, it becomes most vulnerable. Should it turn in the anticipated direction as indicated in the figure, it will be drawn toward restricted terrain and the MCATF will counterattack in conjunction with a deep thrust by the LATF. Should the enemy turn in the opposite direction, the lighter forces withdraw toward a helo/LCAC extraction area, and at the right moment, the MCATF RLT attacks into the rear of the enemy force. In such case, the extracted forces would be redeployed to support the MCATF attack.

These illustrations should suffice to begin to picture a maneuver style of warfare for future landing forces. Wild?-Maybe not. Exaggerated?-Yes, to illustrate principles and the contrast with conventional landing doctrine, but not beyond possibility if we prepare for it.

Conclusion

This article is essentially a roadmap toward a maneuver style of warfare for landing forces. Evolving the doctrine, tactics, and techniques which would define the Marine Corps’ roadmap is your challenge.

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret)

Part 1 of this article was published last month. In it the author discussed how amphibious doctrine must change if we are serious about adopting the basic concepts of maneuver warfare. He then identified six structural/organizational trends that must accompany a transition of this kind: In brief, he believes the Corps will have to break with mirror image infantry battalions and organize its ground combat elements in three different forms-light, foot-mobile infantry, tight armored forces, and heavier mechanized combined arms forces. He sees a new emphasis on heavy-lift helicopters (a trend already begun by the acquisition of M198 artillery), a need for new command relationships with helicopters, and a seabasing logistics concept. In this article he continues his analysis describing how an amphibious landing force might be organized for maneuver warfare and presenting examples of how it might conduct operations.

Task Organization of Landing Forces

Concepts of employment and tactical applications are inevitably linked to the capabilities of the amphibious task force (ATF) and its component landing force (LF). The LF component, a Marine air ground task force (MAGTF), may range in size from a MAU to a MAF. The basic concept of task organizing the LF is sound and should remain constant. However, what should change is the perception and application of the doctrine. The problem is that the doctrine is the essence of flexibility while applications have been stereotyped. Requirement documents such as the Marine Corps mid-range objective plan (MMROP) present notional MAU, MAB, and MAF troop lists (i.e., one list for each “representative” MAGTF). Prior to publication of the Commandant’s White Letter 1-80 and the assumption of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) tasking, contingency planning was based on the basic assumption that MAFs would deploy as organizational entities. Both of these examples portray stereotype MAGTF task organization.

Now there is a new ballgame called the “composite MAF.” It provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to demonstrate the flexibility of its doctrine. MAGTFs can be tailored (sized and task organized) for the specific contingencies they are tasked to support by drawing from the assets of all three MAFs. Equally important, requirements documents can reflect the wide range and differences represented by these contingencies through the use of several representative troop lists at each MAGTF level.

In order to illustrate the difference in perception and application, let’s look at the MAF exclusively. First, assume that each of the three ground combat trends identified in Part I results in a minimum of two regiments in the total force structure; i.e., two mechanized combined arms task forces (MCATFs), two light armored task forces (LATFs), and two foot-mobile infantry commands. Also assume that all six of these reinforced regiments are available to deploy in an amphibious mode. Given these assumptions, the flexibility of the basic doctrine can be illustrated by the following description of the MAF-level forcible entry capability.

The MAF

The MAF is built around two to four RLTs and a task organized aircraft wing. The smallest MAF contains five BLTs. The largest MAF configured for seaborne forcible entry operations could contain 12 BLTs and 2 tank battalions-this upper limit set by anticipated amphibious shipping constraints.

The MAF can be task organized in a wide variety of ways to meet the terrain conditions and anticipated threats associated with specific contingency tasks. For example, the largest and heaviest MAF could contain two heavy MCATF RLTs and two LATF RLTs. The maneuver warfare potential of this MAF in suitable terrain far exceeds the sum of its parts. In areas where restricted terrain is the dominant characteristic, a MAF containing two foot-mobile infantry RLTs and one or two LATF RLTs also has exceptional maneuver warfare potential.

For purposes of this article, a MAF containing one heavy MCATF, one LATF, and one foot-mobile infantry RLT will be used as the illustrative example.

General Concept of Employment

The overall concept of employment involves seaborne forcible entry and a maneuver style of warfare ashore while seabased. Focus is on defeating a numerically superior tank-heavy mechanized force on terrain that is largely unrestricted and on gaining control of the operational area. There appear to be eight definable steps (Figure 1) implicit in such operations. A brief discussion of each step follows:

* Step 1-Gain and maintain air and naval superiority. Although this remains a fundamental part of doctrine, tactics may be much different if the enemy force is numerically superior in either category, or if a situation of approximate parity exists at the time the initial engagement commences. A multipurpose ATF would, as feasible, directly assist other naval forces in achieving the necessary air and naval superiority.

* Step 2-Determine the place and time of the main ship-to-shore attack. Use of demonstrations, feints, raids, covert reconnaissance, and overt reconnaissance-in-force operations ashore would be used in almost all seaborne forcible entry operations. These operations would seek to gain detailed information, and perhaps deceive or confuse the enemy as to when and where the main attack will strike. However, the primary purposes are to ensure accurate knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the enemy defense and test enemy reactions.

* Step 3-The main ship-to-shore attack. The main attack is fundamentally characterized by the landing of the heavy (nonhelicopter-transportable) MCATF. Because the MCATF is very difficult to extract once it is committed ashore, its landing signals a main attack and the intention to maneuver ashore indefinitely.

*Step 4-Early operations ashore while outnumbered. An understanding of this step is critical to the survival of the landing force. A numerically superior enemy with heavy tank and mechanized forces will surely understand (as his doctrine clearly indicates) that his best chance of defeating a landing is through large-scale, early counterattacks. Therefore, during this step, recon-pull tactics are used to ensure that the landing force is not trapped into a firepower-attrition contest nor defeated piecemeal. The principle of security is emphasized in coordination with maneuver.

* Step 5-Parity operations. When approximate parity exists between forces, the immediate goal should be to increase enemy hesitation and decrease his initiative. Parity does not mean that the enemy’s “cohesion has been shattered” or even seriously impaired. Also, remember that although a senior enemy commander may be or may appear to be confused, his tactical units and smaller commands will follow orders loyally and fight with intense determination. History shows that such behavior sometimes turns apparent defeat into victory.

* Step 6-Superiority operations. Obviously, this condition permits an increase in the tempo of maneuver and attack at times and places of your choosing. However, defeat of the enemy is through focus on his vulnerabilities rather than on one “grand, command-push attack.”

* Step 7-Mission fulfillment. Once the enemy has been defeated, other explicit or implicit elements of the mission can then be accomplished. This could include continuing control of the landing force area of operations (LFAO) for an indefinite time, conduct of ground and air interdiction operations, or reconnaissance-in-force operations.

* Step 8-Amphibious withdrawal. This step is designed to imply that the best use of landing forces in a maneuver style of warfare is as a continuing component of an ATF-an ATF supporting the naval aspects of a joint campaign. It does not mean that landing forces would never be committed to sustained land combat, only that such commitment should not be viewed as the doctrinal norm.

Sample Concepts of Employment/Tactical Applications

The examples presented below are based on the ground maneuver elements of a reinforced division task organized as shown in Figure 2. They focus exclusively on the ground maneuver elements in order to simplify the presentation. Also, it will be assumed that a CH-53E type helicopter is the primary transport helicopter of the landing force, and that the numbers (estimated ‘to be 85-95) are sufficient to transport the scheduled serials of one LATF BLT in one lift. Such numbers would also be sufficient to transport 2,700-3,000 foot-mobile infantry Marines in one lift-a figure estimated to equate to the entire foot-mobile RLT. In addition, the ATF is assumed to contain 70 landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles, sufficient to transport all tanks of one tank battalion in one lift, or the scheduled serials of an entire LATF or foot-mobile infantry RLT.

The first example illustrates reconnaissancein-force applications related to step 2, determination of the time and place for the main ship-to-shore attack. (See Figure 3.) This illustration portrays the flexible options provided by the lighter RLTs in conjunction with the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC. Repeated overt reconnaissance insertions/extractions and reconnaissance-in-force attacks/extractions could lead to a reconnaissance-in-force operation without a predetermined extraction. In such case, the commanders would have the option of landing the heavy MCATF in lieu of extracting the reconnaissance-in-force elements; i.e., recon-pull of the main ship-toshore attack.

In most cases, however, it is believed the main ship-to-shore attack would be a coordinated command-push operation in an area containing an undefended or lightly defended surface landing site (i.e., a portion of the shoreline where AAVs and LCAC can land). Before illustrating the main attack, it is useful to keep in mind that throughout step 2 operations and at the commencement of the main attack, the ATF is maneuvering to pose a threat to land anywhere in the LFAO (Figure 4).

An example of the main ship-to-shore attack is illustrated in Figure 5. Depending on the “situation and terrain,” the lighter RLTs are landed to ensure control of the surface landing site in preparation for the on-call landing of the MCATF RLT. Although the LCAC-landed RLT may be landed at H-hour when one is sure of an unopposed touchdown, the more common technique would probably be to land the helicopterborne forces first to ensure an unopposed LCAC landing.

In order to further illustrate the flexibility and complementary nature of the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC combined with a LATF/foot-mobile mix, envision a night landing in which on-site, covert reconnaissance has verified an undefended surface landing site. At the risk of preaching to the choir, note the LCAC force could be landed first to secure nearby LZs to ensure their security for the touchdown of the helicopterborne force.

A second phase of the attack is characterized by the unopposed landing of the heavy MCATF RLT. As envisioned here, the normal concept would involve (1) LCACs return to the shipping (which has closed somewhat from the original launch area) to pick up the second lift, the tank battalion; (2) on-call, orchestrated launch of three mechanized battalions in AAVs and the tank battalion in LCACs. Underway launch of the AAVs is conducted as close to the landing site as possible. Which lands first, the AAVs or LCACs, is a function of the specific situation, not a function of doctrine. The only doctrinal tenet envisioned here is that LCAC and AAV waves are not mixed. Upon landing, the mechanized infantry and tank units proceed to assembly areas or preattack positions in accordance with predetermined cross-attachment orders; (3) LCACs return to the shipping to bring in the third lift, self-propelled artillery attached to, or in direct support of, the MCATF RLT.

Before leaving the main ship-to-shore attack, it is appropriate to reflect on the basic complementary nature of the LCAC/AAV equation. In projecting the heavy MCATF RLT ashore, the fundamental goal is to land the ground maneuver elements of the entire RLT intact-one lift-with the tactical integrity required to begin maneuver or execute task force mission assignments shortly after landing. Piecemeal buildup of the MCATF ashore is unacceptable in light of the capabilities of the expected enemy-therefore, the basic nature of the equation is the simple logic of quantity.

The primary problem in the early stages of operations ashore is to expand the maneuver area against a numerically superior enemy (step 4). Although specific tactics would vary greatly, two general examples will be used to show potential contrasts in tactical techniques.

The first example is illustrative of a situation where forces have landed relatively far from major enemy units (See Figure 6.) In this case, expansion of the area is achieved rapidly through offensive action. The action could be either recon-pull or command-push. In most cases, it would attempt to expand the maneuver area along the littoral to a greater distance than expansion inland. In the illustration, note (1) the mobile reconnaissance screen, (2) combined vertical/two-dimensional attack of the LATF RLT, and (3) the retention of one maneuver battalion of the MCATF RLT as division reserve.

The second example is illustrative of situations in which major enemy elements are relatively close to the landing area. In this case, the basic concept is designed to focus on one fundamental of amphibious warfare: the shoreline is a natural and insurmountable obstacle to the enemy. With the landing force no longer tied to a NIS-type beach and a vulnerable beach support area (BSA), the shoreline offers a distinct advantage; the maneuver area of the landing force extends seaward; that of the enemy does not. Figure 7a depicts the general unit dispositions. The MCATF RLT is in a TAOR with the mission of delaying and canalizing an enemy attack toward the shoreline. The foot-mobile RLT occupies major ambush/blocking positions in restricted terrain. The LATF is the division reserve located in an area which would be a logical objective of the main enemy attack, or the shoreline terminus of a major corridor to the coast. In Figure 7b, reconnaissance elements and the MCATF RLT conduct ambush and delaying actions to impede progress of units in the shoulder of the attack while permitting more rapid progress in the center. During this phase, some enemy units are drawn toward a major ambush (temporary blocking) position in restricted terrain where a foot-mobile BLT extracts a toll and withdraws under the cover of MCATF ambushes and/or limited counterattacks. The LATF is extracted by helicopter and redeployed either deep on an exposed flank or near the rear of the enemy force. It attacks selected elements of the enemy force using hit and run tactics. The LATF might be redeployed by helicopter several times during this period; it could also be extracted in some situations.

In Figure 7c, we see that when the enemy attack approaches or hits the shoreline, it must stop or turn. In either event, it becomes most vulnerable. Should it turn in the anticipated direction as indicated in the figure, it will be drawn toward restricted terrain and the MCATF will counterattack in conjunction with a deep thrust by the LATF. Should the enemy turn in the opposite direction, the lighter forces withdraw toward a helo/LCAC extraction area, and at the right moment, the MCATF RLT attacks into the rear of the enemy force. In such case, the extracted forces would be redeployed to support the MCATF attack.

These illustrations should suffice to begin to picture a maneuver style of warfare for future landing forces. Wild?-Maybe not. Exaggerated?-Yes, to illustrate principles and the contrast with conventional landing doctrine, but not beyond possibility if we prepare for it.

Conclusion

This article is essentially a roadmap toward a maneuver style of warfare for landing forces. Evolving the doctrine, tactics, and techniques which would define the Marine Corps’ roadmap is your challenge.

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret)

A number of articles have appeared in professional magazines over the past two years or so which constitute a refreshing refocus on the art of war. Maneuver warfare and the Boyd Theory are in the “spotlight” of this dialog. The purpose of this article is to stimulate further thought on the tactical implications of a maneuver style of warfare as applicable to the landing forces of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). It is presented in two parts. Part I deals with doctrinal implications and force structure/task organization trends believed to be inherent in any adoption of maneuver warfare concepts. Part II will attempt to portray those trends in terms of concepts of employment and tactical applications in amphibious warfare.

It is also noted in introduction that the terms “maneuver warfare” and “Boyd Theory” are sometimes used as “buzz words” (words or phrases that become popular primarily because nobody within hearing knows what they really mean). The point is that the maneuver style of warfare and Boyd Theory are important to the Marine Corps. That they are also elusive at this stage of their development is one of the primary reasons for writing this article.

A Point of Departure

The basic literature on maneuver warfare is contained in contemporary professional publications and military history. Specifically, the Apr81 issue of the Marine Corps GAZETTE is of particular interest to Marines, and it is not believed necessary to review that issue or other writings here. However, it is appropriate to have a consensus on a point of departure relative to the fundamentals of a maneuver style of warfare. As this is written, the basic dichotomy in the dialog focuses on the psychological aspects of maneuver warfare theory as advanced by Mr. William S. Lind. It is very difficult for most Marines to embrace that aspect at the tactical level.

However, it is not necessary to embrace the psychological aspect (or discard it) at this time. What is necessary is agreement that at least some of the fundamentals offer the beginning of a path toward tactical applications through which one can fight outnumbered and win. Therefore, let’s start with the Marine Corps’ current perception of the fundamentals as the only logical point of departure. This perception is currently contained in Operational Handbook (OH) 9-3 (Rev A), Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF), March 1980, and Education Center Publication (ECP) 9-5, Marine Amphibious Brigade Mechanized and Countermechanized Operations, 20 January 1981.

Table 1 depicts extracted portions of the basic tenet of these documents. Note that they exclude direct focus on the psychological aspect. With all due respect to Mr. Lind, this exclusion is believed helpful at this time, due to the nature of the dichotomy. It is critical to get more Marines embarked on USS Maneuver before it leaves port. Ah abandon ship drill during the embarkation phase would be disastrous-the doctrinal Marine alternative may not be firepower-attrition; it may better be described as adherence to frontal assault tactics. Also, keep in mind that maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps will be a unique style, built by Marines, for Marines-a style that will fit Marines.

Doctrinal implications

As used herein, doctrinal implications include basic contrasts, believed to be explicit or implicit, between the fundamentals of maneuver warfare as depicted in Table 1, and codified doctrine, tactics, and techniques reflected in current Landing Force Manuals (LFMs) and Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs). Not all contrasts are included, only the basic or more obvious. Collectively, they constitute an indictment of current doctrine and a challenge to change it.

* An amphibious forcible entry operation is an attack launched from the sea-it is not an assault and should contain no phase with that title.

* Frontal attack and assault are the antithesis of maneuver warfare. Frontal attacks are to be avoided; you hold (or delay, or withdraw) in front of the enemy, you attack his flank and rear. Assaults, when used, are not only conducted on a flank or rear, but should be conducted with something near a 10:1 force ratio advantage vice a 3:1 ratio, and should be conducted against hasty-vice-prepared defenses. Prepared defenses are to be avoided like the plague-bypassed, left stranded-or the enemy must be enticed to leave them.

* The force beachhead line (FBHL), normally drawn from a trace of the final terrain objectives of the landing force, is not applicable to the conduct of a maneuver style of warfare by landing forces. It must go. Also, the advent of the vertical envelopment concept (how many years ago?) and now the landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC) make the term beachhead obsolete. The lodgment is by no means a beachhead and, in the context of maneuver warfare, is much better defined as a landing force area of operations (LFAO).

* The shape and size of the LFAO should be influenced by maneuver warfare concepts. Obviously, the size will vary significantly between different types’ of missions, threat forces, and between different-sized MAGTFs. However, it is believed the general shape will be constant; that is wider than it is deep. There are many reasons for this, but the primary ones relate to the umbilical cord to the sea. The Navy portion of the amphibious task force (ATF) remains a vital part of the maneuver concept and capability throughout the operation. Deep inland thrusts stretch the umbilical cord to a point where the landing force ashore becomes ineffective no matter what tactics are employed. However, operations along the littoral do not stretch the cord. They take full advantage of assets at sea such as naval gunfire (NGF), LCACs, and helicopters. (See Figure 1.)

* Maneuver warfare by ATFs and landing forces (LFs), combined with real world deployment and mount-out techniques, mandates a basic doctrine wherein the ATF and LF missions are assumed to be received while afloat, not prior to embarkation.

* Rehearsals after receipt of the forcible entry mission are to be avoided if possible. Exceptions to this general principle would be rehearsals to deceive the enemy. For a comparison of potential phases of future amphibious operations with contemporary phases, see Table 2.

* Recon-pull tactics are critical to the initial projection of power ashore. If the commander amphibious task force (CATF) and commander landing force (CLF) are not confident of “landing where they ain’t,” they simply feint until they are confident.

* Once a CATF and CLF are confident of “landing where they ain’t,” the initial projection of power ashore is a coordinated, command-push operation designed to facilitate initial maneuver, security, and the resumption of recon-pull tactics ashore as soon as feasible.

* Fixed installations, particularly aviation facilities, logistic facilities, and large semifixed command posts (CPs), cannot be phased ashore in a maneuver style of warfare. If frontal attack and assault constitute the antithesis of maneuver warfare on the tactical side of the house, then fixed installations ashore constitute the corollary on the support side. (Please do not begin to rebut this with preconceived bias related to the inevitability of “subsequent operations ashore.”) During the entire amphibious operation, to the last minute before termination, the LF must be free to maneuver unhampered by a rear area jammed with fixed installations. In addition, fixed installations are easy targets for a numerically superior enemy force regardless of who has air superiority. The entire theme of pushing command and control, aviation, and logistics facilities ashore is ludicrous in the context of a maneuver style of tactics. The adage should be to keep them afloat where they are mobile and much more likely to survive and perform their basic functions.

The magnitude of this basic (incomplete) list of doctrinal implications suggests that it is foolish to expect an immediate, or “miracle” LFM on maneuver warfare. This is not intended in any way as a “put-down” of Capt G.I. Wilson’s excellent article in the April issue; it simply means we need a deliberate and comprehensive approach to the challenge. A rapid, frontal assault on the doctrine will only result in inconsistency at best, and chaos at worst.

Force Structure/Task Organization Trends

Three force structure trends implicit in maneuver warfare directly affect the ground combat elements of landing forces. Two of these are apparent trends, the third is less obvious:

The first trend is toward the heavy mechanized combined arms task force (MCATF). Although this is an obvious development, it is still far from complete in concept, programming, or training. It is obvious because, until the tank becomes obsolete, a heavy tank/mechanized capability is required to provide the shock/exploitation action associated with main attacks. It is simply a capability needed to sustain the offensive flavor of an amphibious forcible entry operation against a mechanized/mobile enemy force. The MCATF is a task-organized, tactical entity, built primarily around tanks, mechanized infantry units, and self-propelled artillery, all of which are not helicopter transportable. However, it is still only a trend. This is best illustrated in a MAF level amphibious operation wherein a surface-landed RLT should be fully configured as a MCATF. Remember the definition. It is a mechanized combined arms task force; it is not a mobile task force plus supporting arms.

The second apparent force structure trend is the light armored task force (LATF) concept. Exactly where this trend will wander is unclear at this time. Also unclear is whether the LAV family development will be primarily targeted on nonamphibious or amphibious tasking. The Marine Corps has been placed on the horns of a programming dilemma due to the nature and timing of the nonamphibious tasking related to the MPS concept. The near-term concept places a duplicate set of scarce (inadequate) LVT assets aboard the deployed ships. It is not possible to bring an LATF brigade, equipped and trained, into the force structure as the basis of a 1983 MPS brigade. Therefore, the 1983 MPS brigade will also involve the LVT in further nonamphibious tasking with duplicate equipment sets. The temptation to program LATFs for dedicated, nonamphibious tasking (MPS and/or strategic airlift) is almost irresistible in order to swing the scarce LVT assets back to an amphibious mode. The problem may be further complicated by an institutional fear that programming the LAV family development in other than a nonamphibious/strategic airlift mode might place the development in direct competition with further LVT development.

Despite these complications, it is believed that the Marine Corps should anchor its LAV family development under its Title 10 charter-namely, amphibious warfare. The LATF and LAV family development are crucial to landing force capabilities in a maneuver style of warfare. In amphibious operations, the LATF is needed to complement and enhance the effect of an LVT/tank-configured task force. Given that about one-third of a MAGTF would be fully mechanized as a heavy MCATF, it is obvious that the MCATF alone could not sustain the offensive posture of an amphibious operation against a mechanized/mobile enemy.

The fundamental purpose of the LATF in amphibious forcible entry operations is to combine the vertical envelopment capability with a highly mobile, two-dimensional envelopment capability in order to maintain constant and confusing pressure on the flanks and rear of a very mobile and numerically superior enemy force. Given sufficient L-AV family assets to form several LATFs at the regimental level, the flexibility of the LATF, in size and weight, would give the Marine Corps additional rapid deployment capabilities related to strategic airlift. This flexibility may obviate the requirement for excessive nonamphibious ship building under the MPS concept-but its logical, primary purpose is in amphibious forcible entry.

The third trend implicit in a maneuver style of warfare is foot-mobile infantry. First, an adequate definition of the term may be required because some confusion has apparently developed over time with respect to what these people do best and what they cannot do very well at all. What they can do very well is operate both offensively and defensively in restricted terrain (mountains, jungle, and built-up areas). However, to be effective in these environments, foot-mobile infantry must be truly tailored for those environments. They must not be roadbound in jungle or mountainous terrain-not encumbered with organic weapons systems they cannot maneuver in built-up areas. The definitional focus here then is on infantry battalions that are exclusively foot-mobile/man-pack outfits.

In order to emphasize the point of foot-mobile infantry as a trend implicit in a maneuver style of warfare, let us take time to reflect upon the foot-mobile infantryman in his purest form:

* He can climb mountains, scale and rappel cliffs, maneuver on ridgelines inaccessible to “standard weapons sytems.”

* He can move crosscountry through swamps and jungles, maneuver through dikes and paddies.

* He does not need roads, in fact, he avoids them because he knows they are enemies, not friends.

* He can enter buildings from their roofs, open large vents, open doors/windows, climb/descend staircases, rappel down elevator shafts.

* He can move from doorway to doorway, move across or down railroad tracks, move across or through parks, climb fences, enter and move through sewers, etc.

* He consumes no fuel and expends very little ammunition.

* He is easy to insert and extract tactically by helicopter-he is easy to resupply exclusively by helicopter.

What he obviously cannot do very well is attack tank-heavy mechanized forces on their turf. Give him enough antitank assets, and he can defend well against those forces on his turf, but not really well on their turf. The point is that the contemporary infantry battalion is not structured or tailored for its original purpose and greatest strengths. Therefore, the maneuver style of warfare implies a trend toward a truly foot-mobile capability, applicable to landing force operations wherein restrictive terrain is a significant factor in success or failure.

Three additional trends are crucial for other elements of the landing force if maneuver warfare capabilities are to be enhanced. First is the trend toward the heavy-lift (CH-53E) helicopter as the primary transport helicopter in amphibious operations. This trend is illustrated by the procurement of M198 artillery in direct support battalions and by the LAV development. Either the HXM must be capable of lifting the M198 and the LAV, or the CH-53E program must be greatly increased. When related back to standard infantry, we must forget the “crowd killer syndrome” and learn to fly and land “where they ain’t,” with greater tactical integrity, over a shorter period of time.

The second trend is the requirement to place dedicated helo assets (attack and transport) in direct support of separated and maneuvering ground units.

Third, the doctrinal implications, as addressed, drive combat service support and landing support to seabasing. What is needed is a concept to support amphibious operations (no subsequent operations ashore) that will fit on the amphibious shipping expected to be available.

Conclusion Part I

The Marine Corps traditionally has contained a standard infantry battalion; i.e., all 27 infantry battalions are programmed to be mirror images. Fluctuations in the structure have been made across the board (three- or four-company battalions, with or without a weapons company). However, in recent years micromanagement techniques required to cope with constrained manpower have caused the infantry battalions to be less than mirror images in real life (e.g., manning levels, reduced “R” series T/Os). Also, in real life, the fleet assistance program (FAP) changes the composition of the battalions as they rotate into and out of unit deployment cycles. The differing trends outlined above, seen in conjunction with constrained manpower and the “facts of life,” suggest that a new approach to structuring the infantry be considered. Specifically, it is believed that if a number of battalions and regiments are tailored to each of the three infantry trends addressed, the Marine Corps would achieve a more effective force for each capability desired in the total force structure. It is also believed that rigid adherence to the concept of a standard battalion, amidst these developing trends, will inevitably result in more manpower (and equipment) than is needed in the total structure-the “standard” battalion is less effective in any one mode and less efficient in all modes.

by LtCol R. H. Voigt

I agree with your editorial comment on recent maneuver warfare articles in the Jan82 issue that many contain discussions that are “naive (and) divorced from the realities of the battlefield.” In support of this comment I would like to offer some brief observations on the most often mentioned maneuver warfare concepts.

The maneuver warfare battlefield is described as being fluid, turbulent, and rapidly changing. These adjectives are normally used to support the contention that by presenting a rapidly changing environment to the enemy we will severely, if not totally, upset his reaction capability. This premise fails to appreciate the fact that it will be at least as difficult for us to successfully control our forces in such an environment as it will be for the enemy to react to the fluid situation that confronts him.

Most discussions fail to give the professionals on the enemy side their due. it should not be assumed that enemy commanders will lose control of the situation and their forces disintegrate when faced with rapidly changing situations. I might suggest that our commanders will be as affected by rapidly changing situations as the enemy commander in spite of the fact that the fluid situation is self-imposed.

Many maneuver warfare discussions place the enemy force in some type of “linear” mode. In many cases, maneuver warfare concepts can only be validated against this mode. Enemy commanders are not idiots and it is highly unlikely that, given the appropriate maneuver terrain, they will employ their forces in anything resembling a “linear” formation.

I have a difficult time with the comment that our actions on the battlefield should be directed towards destroying the enemy’s mind not his body. I do not believe that the lessons of history will support this concept to any practical degree. Certainly, all U.S. attempts at this strategy have met with failure and at a minimum have prolonged the conflict and increased our casualties, perhaps unnecessarily. The lessons of Stalingrad, Tobruk, Dresden, Chosin, and Khe Sahn are clear. A professional and determined enemy will continue to fight in spite of being faced with a disastrous logistics or command and control situation.

There appears to be a gross overemphasis on misson-type orders. This emphasis is well-intentioned but fails to grasp the true confusion which will exist on any moderate (or greater) intensity battlefield. In most cases commanders on both sides will not be able to perceive the current or future tactical situation with any real degree of clarity. Certainly, tactical imagination will be required at all levels, but I do not believe that any relaxation of command and control will be appropriate. Without a “big picture” planning and control apparatus, subordinate units will attack low priority targets, will be easily misled by enemy deception tactics, will outrun logistics and supporting arms capabilities, and perhaps will not be available to the commander when a high priority objective presents itself. Voluminous written orders will not be appropriate in the next battle, but the requirement for direction and control measures will certainly increase.

The constant reference to our punching through the enemy’s organization at a weak point or gap is misleading. This comment again assumes a linear type enemy deployment which is unlikely. It is also contradicted, to some degree, by the assumption that the Marine Corps will face an enemy superior in numbers and materials.

An enemy force that possesses this superiority and a commander with some degree of competence will offer few, if any, weak points. He certainly will not expose his logistics and command and control apparatus to any appreciable degree. In addition, the idea of rebounding from a presumed weak point, which turns out to be not so weak, then pursuing another presumed enemy vulnerability, fails to appreciate the difficulty of breaking contact with strong, mobile enemy forces and the hazards of shifting units under fire.

Placing a great amount of trust and reliance on our subordinates is certainly an ideal worth pursuing. I would recommend, however, that all maneuver warfare authors consider the comments of LtCol Batcheller in the Jan82 GAZETTE. In addition, those authors whose FMF experience is limited might benefit from an onsite observation of a battalion or regimental combined arms exercise including our much vaunted combined arms exercises. A realistic appraisal of the tactical proficiency of the average small unit leader will show deficiencies in many basic areas of expertise much less the expertise required to command successfully in fast-moving, fluid situations. Let’s start dealing with reality and not with an ideal.

In conclusion, I feel that many maneuver warfare concepts are valid to some degree. We must, however, base our future discussions on this topic on reality-on the battle as it has proven to be and not on the battle as we would like it to be.

by CWO-2 Bryan N. Lavender

You fight the way you train. If you train with misconceptions, those misconceptions will follow you into combat, where reality will disabuse you of them at a severe price. This price can be more than you are able to afford.

For several years now, we have been told that we are going to fight the first battles of the next war outnumbered. This assertion appears time and again in civilian and professional military publications, in U.S. Army manuals, in Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) publications.

As Operational Handbook (OH) 9-3, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF) so succinctly puts it:

In many situations, MCATFs will be out-numbered and outgunned. An attrition contest, relying on firepower, is not likely to bring a positive result. Therefore, MCATFs must be prepared to USE MANEUVER WARFARE.

In light of our current training practices, this brief statement does not bid well for the future, because we are not training for the conditions described above. When was the last time your unit conducted an exercise against an aggressor force that outnumbered and outgunned you? When was the last time your unit faced an aggressor force that was not restricted in its actions by a script, i.e., a scenario?

Just what are we training for? Exercise after exercise puts units in the field that enjoy such a preponderance of combat power that the issue, scenario aside, could never really be in doubt. There is little or no suggestion of maneuver or finesse; we just blast our way from one hill to the next, with the aggressor forces conveniently placed in time to obligingly “die” for us. This situation actively encourages the firepower/attrition style of warfare that our latest publications tell us is obsolete! To paraphrase the French observer at Balaclava, “Magnificent! But it isn’t maneuver warfare!”

In addition to encouraging firepower/attrition, the scenario-driven exercise is training operational/tactical initiative and flexibility out of the Marine Corps. There is no challenge, if you know you are going to “win,” because the scenario will prevent the aggressor forces from interfering with the “training objectives.” Where is it written that Marine units must always “win” their exercises? This is an unwritten rule that results from the “zerodefects” or “be careful” mentality described by Capt G.I. Wilson, in his Apr81 GAZETTE article.

It is ironic that this approach to training not only will prevent us from mastering maneuver warfare, it will also degrade our ability to conduct firepower/attrition warfare. When mistakes are forbidden in training, then the only place left to make mistakes is in combat. This is certainly an expensive approach to learning, to say the least.

If we accept Mr. William Lind’s definition of tactics as “a process combining learned techniques with an educated understanding of the art of war, all applied in a unique way to the unique circumstance that is each opponent, each battle,” then the fallacy of scenariodriven exercises is apparent.

OH 9-3 (Rev.A) offers the following definition of maneuver warfare:

an overall STYLE OF WARFARE. It seeks to DISLOCATE, DISRUPT, and DISORIENT the opponent, DESTROYING HIS COHESION, rather than destroying him piece-by-piece with firepower. In maneuver war, the MCATF seeks to create SUCCESSIVE UNEXPECTED and THREATENING situations for the opponent. The opponent should be brought to see his situation NOT JUST AS UNFAVORABLE OR DETERIORATING; he must see it as DETERIORATING AT AN EVER INCREASING PACE.

Education Center Publication (ECP) 9-5, Marine Amphibious Brigade Mechanized and Countermechanized Operations continues this theme:

The commander must orient on the enemy rather than the terrain. He must exploit every advantage afforded him by the ever changing terrain and enemy to achieve his assigned mission.

How can we continue to develop and utilize detailed scenarios and continue to think it is realistic tactical training? The enemies we will face in the next war will not be following our script.

The field exercises alluded to above are only part of the problem. The combined arms exercises (CAXs) conducted at Twentynine Palms are a valuable training vehicle for refinement of fire support coordination techniques and represents the most realistic live-fire training currently available; but since the course of the CAX is totally scenario-driven, there is little or no tactical training derived. We have to accept the risk of firepower/attrition reinforcement in the minds of the participants, though a more forceful or detailed definition of what is being accomplished in the conduct of a CAX may be helpful to mitigate this reinforcement. As it is, too many Marines come away with the idea that the movement they made was maneuver and the techniques they practiced were tactics.

Another evolution to be addressed briefly is the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES). This is also a scenario-driven exercise that is giving more Marines than one might think the idea that they are participating in a tactical exercise, though unit commanders are very aware of the purpose of the MCCRES. LtGen A.S. Collins, USA(Ret), in his book Common Sense Training, has this to say about checklist-type evaluations:

All units have to undergo tests from time to time and it is proper that they should. Too often, training is oriented toward the checklist and the actions of the umpire rather than being sure the soldier knows how to do his job right . . . It is obvious that the major concern of [the] commander was not how well his platoons executed the missions; it was how they scored on the checklist.

In other words, training is sometimes directed toward MCCRES, not toward combat. While recognizing that MCCRES as a scenario-driven exercise is designed to evaluate procedures and not tactics, one must be led to the questions: Is an evaluation that does not include tactics a valid measure of combat readiness? What does test or evaluate tactics?

Command post exercises (CPXs) are an economical means of exercising organizational staffs; but as these, exercises are scenario-driven, operational tactics again are neglected. Often, the entire course of the “battle” is spelled out in advance by an operations order that, more often than not, resembles a telephone directory for a major city. That superlative infantryman Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is quoted in The Rommel Papers (edited by B.H. Liddell Hart) . . .

When two armies meet on the battlefield, each of the opposing commanders has his own particular plan according to which he intends to engage his enemy, and the battle develops out of the two opposing plans. Only rarely in history has a battle gone completely according to the plan of either side and then usually because either the victor has had absolute quantitive or qualitive superiority or the loser has been utterly incompetent.

Our CPX scenarios usually give the friendly forces this superiority; and to remove all possibility of “defeat,” i.e., not meeting the training objectives, the opposing forces are rendered “incompetent” by not giving their commander more than token freedom of action. Wouldn’t a more realistic exercise of the staffs involved result from the constantly changing and often unpredictable situations that result from the unfettered tactical interplay of two opposing forces? If we continue to protect staffs by means of a scenario in training, how will we be able to justify any expectation that those same staffs will be able to function effectively in a fast-moving situation where detailed plans cannot be made for days in advance, i.e., in combat?

The CPX scenario has the added disadvantage in that, by detailing the course of an operation for days in advance, it must of necessity key on terrain objectives. This is in direct opposition to the concept delineated in ECP 9-5 and quoted above. Fixation on terrain makes it easy to fall into carefully orchestrated fire-support coordination assaults that, once again, reinforce a firepower/attrition mindset at the expense of maneuver.

Similar to the CPX, and frequently utilized to support the CPX, is the Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System (TWSEAS). LtCol M.D. Wyly, in his Apr81 GAZETTE article, has already pointed out the “body-count,” i.e., firepower/attrition, mind-set that TWSEAS can foster. It is necessary only to point out again that tactics are not really present in a scenario-driven exercise. The TWSEAS computer will require an expansion of its capabilities before it can be used to simulate tactics. As this is not possible with the present system, thought should be given to a follow-on system that can simulate the conditions of maneuver warfare.

So where are we? We seem to be in the curious position of saying we’re going to fight outnumbered and win by using maneuver warfare, while we continue to train in firepower/attrition warfare against outnumbered aggressor forces. Serious consideration must be given to rectifying this situation, and the following suggestions are made with this in mind:

* Remove “walk-before-we-run” from our vocabulary. It is an insidious phrase firmly rooted in the “be careful” mindset. If repeated often enough, it will result in a slow plod down the road to extinction. Make mistakes! What better way to learn?

* Institute a Marine Corps-wide policy for the study of military history, compulsory if necessary, beginning at The Basic School (TBS). A military man without an understanding of, and a background in, military history is fighting with one hand tied behind his back if he attempts maneuver warfare. Many officers pursue such an education on their own initiative, but “many” is not “enough.” It is encouraging to note that some progressive commands conduct tactical seminars regularly. This, too, should be policy.

* Remove the toy store onus from wargames or conflict simulations. Those familiar with wargames will assure you that the more advanced games on the market are not only a tough challenge for the adult mind, but also provide a valid teaching tool. Complexity varies from game to game, but overall, they are by far the most economical means of laying a groundwork for further training. Wargames also lend themselves to a better understanding of military history, since virtually all games are based on past conflicts. For those individuals that still depreciate the wargame, a closer study of military history will reveal that, for more than 100 years, several major military powers have successfully used wargames as an integral part of their training and operational planning process.

* Make training exercises realistic in regards to opposing forces. Put aggressor forces in the field that have a reasonable prospect of being able to “win” if properly employed, but remember that there are no “winners” or “losers” in a peacetime exercise; there are only Marines gaining knowledge and experience through either mistakes made or operations successfully conducted. It is unreasonable to expect units accustomed to a four to one (or more) superiority to take the field with the odds reversed and gain anything more than a sense of futility, but start training for those odds by working up from two to one or one to one. The opposing forces commander should be given a realistic mission to accomplish and no restrictions on his execution of that mission, i.e., a “free-play” vice scenario-driven exercise.

[black right triangle] Integrate operational tactics into CPX/TWSEAS exercises. Make these exercises recon-pull vice command-push, and staffs will be more challenged by the unpredictable, unique situations that result. The experience gained will be more valid. Again, the tactical development of these exercises should be “free-play.”

[black right triangle] Stabilize our units. Unit rotation is a major step in the right direction, but personnel turbulence is still a major obstacle to advanced training in maneuver warfare. People have to know each other to work effectively together. It should be noted that the phrase “breaking in a new staff” is easily translated to “walk-before-we-run,” and so should be regarded with suspicion. If staffs are stabilized to the maximum extent possible, this can be avoided. Unit stabilization will enable commanders at all levels to develop a training program that steadily increases the odds in favor of the aggressor forces until the ratio accurately reflects the three to one (or more) odds we are constantly being told we may have to face in future conflicts.

[black right triangle] Reexamine the concept of task organization. OH 9-3 states:

THE SKILL IN CONDUCTING MCATF OPERATIONS WILL BE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE AMOUNT AND QUALITY OF PREPARATORY TRAINING. It is estimated that, with untrained staffs and forces, it could take as much as forty-five to ninety days to form a MCATF into a viable fighting force. Forces and staffs previously trained and practiced in MCATF operations should be able to field a MCATF in thirty days or less.

The time estimates given above are certainly reasonable, though it must be kept in mind for the latter figure that “or less” will be valid only if the previous training was recently conducted. If the Marine Corps is to be presented as part of the Nation’s rapid deployment force (RDF), it will not be credible as such if one to three months’ advance warning is required to field a “viable” MCATF. Establishing permanent MCATFs at the MAB level, complete with all supporting arms and combat support elements would enable the Marine Corps to field a viable MCATF on short notice. A highly trained and effective combat force could thus be embarked, sealifted, and landed anywhere in the world in the same amount of time (or less) than a comparable force obtained through task organization could finish training.

These suggestions are directed towards improving mechanized maneuver warfare capability. It is essential to keep in mind that, in regard to maneuver warfare, there is no real difference between mechanized and nonmechanized formations; the basic principles are the same. Erwin Rommel handled motorized formations in virtually the same manner as he handled light infantry; the difference in speed and distance was relational. Marine infantry regiments not included in the MCATFs will not suffer for lack of mechanized training. They will be better off in that they will be able to concentrate their attentions on light infantry maneuver warfare, which is just as important.

The only major factor not discussed to this point is time. As we continue to debate the relative merits of maneuver warfare, time is passing us by. If ultimately maneuver warfare as a concept is embraced by the Corps, the major obstacle to its implementation will come from the “be careful” school, which will demand a slow, careful, step-by-step approach. “Walk-before-we-run” will be the justification used to delay the implementation. A sense of urgency needs to be conveyed here. When your advance guard is engaging the advance guard of an enemy motorized rifle division, it’s too late to break out Von Mellenthin’s Panzer Battles for a quick course in maneuver warfare. There is no physical obstacle to training in maneuver warfare now. Training at all levels, actual field training, is essential to mastering maneuver warfare. Discussion and debate is desirable and necessary, but should not be prolonged at the expense of training. As Field Marshal Rommel, describing the difficulties of the inexperienced American forces at Kasserine Pass in World War II, remarked:

Commanders whose battles have so far all been fought in theory tend as a rule to react directly rather than indirectly to the enemy’s moves. Beginners generally lack the nerve to make decisions based on military expediency alone, without regard for what is weighing most heavily on their minds.