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By Jody Barto, Shawn McCann, Damien O’Connell & Micaiah Roydes

The Information Age comes with many surprises, including events and technologies seemingly ripped from the pages of science-fiction novels. Along with radical technological innovation, the Marine Corps will see flashfire wars, opportunistic terrorist attacks, and sudden natural disasters. How might the Marine Corps prepare Marines for these challenges? How, in particular, does Training and Education Command (TECOM) foster the cognitive capabilities required for tomorrow’s increasingly uncertain, complex, and decentralized operating environment?

This article explores the Innovative Instruction Workshop (IIW): one of TECOM’s answers to these questions. This ten-day workshop puts participants (both trainers and educators throughout TECOM) in control of their own learning on how to think, decide, act, and develop ways to facilitate similar learning for others. In this article, we address the origins of the IIW and the Marine Corps’ current learning model, examine the design of the IIW, analyze data and findings from its first year, and describe the next steps.

The Need for Higher-Order Thinking The Marine Corps recognizes the need to develop the capacity of Marines to engage in higher-order thinking with the ability to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate. In 2011, the Small Unit Decision Making (SUDM) initiative determined that, to overcome tomorrow’s challenges, Marines need certain cognitive competencies and relational skills.2 In spite of the promises of future technology, Marines must apply these mental capabilities in action or quickly find themselves outthought and, consequently, outfought. How do we develop such skills? Active learning-which puts the student, not the instructor, at the center of learning-provides our best means.4

In 2017, TECOM sponsored the IIW to fulfill the work of the SUDM initiative and related efforts. The IIW aims to positively shift, expand, and enhance the perspectives of those who train and educate Marines to develop the SUDM competencies and relational skills in their students.4 The IIW marks a radical departure from the traditional Marine Corps approach to instructor development and underlying learning philosophy.

The Current Model

Generally, the Marine Corps follows a teacher-centric or “pouring in” approach to instruction that philosopher and education reformer John Dewey critiqued some 102 years ago. Paulo Freire, the highly influential Brazilian educator, later termed this the banking model of education.5 This model treats education as an act of depositing information, where “the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing and storing the deposits.”6 Marines may recognize this in practice: students passively sitting in receive mode, focused on the instructor and his performance; the instructor, as the sage on the stage, attempting to convey his knowledge through lectures, PowerPoint, and discussions with predetermined conclusions.7 The banking model, despite enjoying widespread acceptance and doctrinelike status, fails to develop higher-order thinking. While we do not entirely deride this approach, it ultimately lacks effectiveness and efficiency.8

The IIW: A Learner-Centered Workshop

In contrast, the IIW employs a learner-centered approach. Learner-centered facilitation treats Marines like adults who are capable of learning and developing themselves while simultaneously supporting the same for others.15 A learner-centered approach inherently involves active learning, or the participants’ critical and creative engagement with concepts and problems. Learning, more than just knowing and being able to recall information, requires Marines to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate the concepts presented.10 By leveraging active learning, the IIW aims to enable participants to further their own development, as well as develop the decision making, adaptability, and critical thinking abilities of their students.

The IIW team designed the workshop using threshold concepts, or fundamental and powerful concepts about a profession that-when comprehensively understood-demark a moment of significant increase in competency.11 The team identified two threshold concepts as a point of transition for facilitators: the role of the facilitator in the learning process and the role of the student in the learning process.

By developing a complex understanding of the learning process and their role in it, participants cross a threshold that denotes a significant increase in their level of competency as facilitators. Threshold concepts act as the red thread that holds the IIW together, providing the rationale for the inclusion-or exclusion-of workshop topics, exercises, and assignments. Each day’s topics serve as building blocks to further develop participants’ understanding of the adult learning process, enable them to effectively facilitate learning and design programs, and further the learning and development of themselves and others upon their return to their schoolhouses. The topics of the ten-day workshop include:

* Understanding the adult learner.

* Establishing the learning environment.

* Encouraging critical thinking.

* Coaching.

* Master instructor development (MInD).12

* Decision games (e.g., decisionforcing cases, tactical decision games, wargames, etc).

* Program planning.

* Political savvy.13

* Communities of practice.

Participants learn how to facilitate learning by experiencing various interactive methods, such as decision-forcing cases, wargames, tactical and ethical decision games, terrain-model exercises, role playing, and other experiential learning exercises. Workshop facilitators leverage writing, drawing, active listening, and other creative forms of discourse to enable participants to stretch and grow as facilitators of learning. Students receive repeated opportunities to facilitate exercises and discussions and teach their peers with the support of the facilitation team.

Theory in Use

Designed with a constructivist lens to adult learning, each exercise and assignment in the IIW purposefully places participants in their own contexts to capitalize on prior experiences.1^ This design reinforces the acquisition of new knowledge and allows participants to explore their new roles, relationships, and actions-as both learners and facil- itators-in deeper and more meaningful ways. Once participants recognize alternative roles of the facilitator and student in the learning process, they can begin to reflect on how to assimilate the new framework into their own practice.

The IIW provides the conditions to foster transformative learning for participants’ views of the role of a facilitator and the student role in the learning process. Transformative learning, an adult learning theory, explains how adults experience higher-order learning through deep and meaningful, lifechanging learning experiences. 13 Learning in the informative sense changes what we know; however, transformative learning changes how we know.16 In other words, informative learning pours content into the cup, and transformative learning changes the capacity of the cup.17 {See Figure 1.)

IIW participants often report experiencing a disorienting dilemma at the onset of the workshop. On day one, they gather in small groups to list characteristics of their best and worst learning experiences on posters.18 Without exception, the groups report examples of learner-centered facilitation as their best experiences and teacher-centered instances as their worst. By creating the lists, seeing others create similar examples, and then hearing the explanations, participants reflect on their practices as facilitators. The recognition of their role in contributing to the worst experiences of others presents them with a disorienting dilemma. On day two, participants consider student perspectives as they create lists of barriers to learning.19 After constructing lists of institutional, situational, and dispositional barriers, the participants begin to see-in their contexts-the complexity associated with learning and begin to empathize with their students.

In moments like these, the facilitators support participants while still leaving them responsible for drawing connections and making their own meaning. The facilitation team further supports participants by trusting them and by providing a supportive learning environment, a critical reflection of assumptions, discourse among participants and facilitators, interactive learning exercises, and space for reflection.

Space for reflection happens in class-individually and amongst peers-through journaling and in a final reflection assignment submitted a week following the final day of the workshop. These assignments involve audio recordings, videos, drawings, or other creative forms to encourage participants to make meaning of their experiences in an effort to stretch and grow. The journal provides a platform for the facilitators to challenge the participants’ thinking through probing questions and give support through encouraging comments. Facilitators also use the “Critical Incident Questionnaire” at the end of every other workshop day as a formative assessment to collect anonymous data on participant experiences.30 This data directly results in the team making meaningful changes to further support learning. These changes, moreover, take effect the very next morning. Whether through journal responses or Critical Incident Questionnaires, this immediate interaction with the participants’ work allows them to feel validated, heard, and supported.

Data Collection

Data collection and analysis efforts provided significant insight into the extent that the IIW fostered transformative learning for participants, and participants implemented changes in their practice and at their school houses. Data collected from the first year consisted of reflective journals, a final reflection assignment, and the Learning Activities Survey (LAS).21 The LAS measured to what extent participants experienced transformative learning as a result of attending the IIW and identified aspects of the workshop that influenced the perspective change. Follow-up interviews-conducted four to seven months after the conclusion of the workshop-served to:

* Validate the LAS results.

* Provide understanding of the perspective transformative learning experiences.

* Highlight the post-workshop actions taken by participants in their development of self, others, or their curriculum.

Twenty-eight participants {four to six from each workshop) participated in follow-up interviews.

In its first year, the team conducted six workshops: four at Quantico and one each at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. The 73 participants included instructors, course chiefs, curriculum developers, and academic officers. Sixtyfour out of 73 participants completed an LAS on their last day of the workshop. {See Figure 2.)

The Results

As a result of mixed-methods analyses of the LASs, final reflection papers, and follow-up interviews, three major findings emerged from year one of the IIW:

Finding #1: Participants experienced transformative learning. An overwhelming majority, or 79.7 percent of participants (n = 51), experienced transformative learning with respect to their views of the role of the facilitator and the role of the student in the learning process. These participants mentioned developing an enhanced perspective of their role as a facilitator in several ways. One participant described seeing himself as a more learner-centered facilitator:

Its not about me against you like, This is the knowledge that I have and I’m going to teach you and you’re going to learn it.’ It’s more like, ‘This is what I have to offer. Let’s read about it. Let’s learn about it. If you have any questions, I can definitely help you … get in the right direction, try to see what I can do to help you learn it.’

Another participant spoke of developing a new understanding of teaching approaches:

Being in the Marine Corps for so many years, we’re used to teaching the same way every time … there’s [an] instructor in front of you, there’s a PowerPoint, look at the PowerPoint, read the PowerPoint, and then they check [for understanding] by either questions or by a test at some point. Going in the workshop gives me a different view, different ways to facilitate the learning experience for the students … It just made me realize … there’s more than one way to do this. You just got to find the right way for your target population.

Others shared how they now envision greater possibilities for implementing changes to their facilitation practice. One participant stated,

Once we got into the TDGs (tactical decision games) … it opened my eyes to some of the things that could be applied to the course. And then I started thinking back, ‘Well if I can do this then I can incorporate some of… the other stuff that we learned.’

Participants described obtaining a new perspective on understanding the adult learner and the factors involved in the learning process. One participant shared,

[I] thought students needed/appreciate [d] a more teacher-centered environment, but [my] thoughts have changed because I experienced how valuable student-centered learning can be. [I was] impacted by learning how to implement a student-centered environment, how barriers affect learning … [and] know now that there are several factors that impact how involved students are in their own learning.

Another participant described gaining a new appreciation for peer-to-peer in learning that “sometimes it takes somebody on their level that’s just learn- ing at the same time … to better explain it to them … [and] help them grasp the concept.”

Statistical analysis of the LASs revealed that all participants who experienced transformative learning {N – 64) were influenced by the workshop design, exercise(s), or assignments. In particular, the greatest impact derived from the class exercises, discussions, self-assessments, and journaling. An overwhelming 82 percent in – 41) felt influenced by challenging or supportive actions by facilitators and participants. One participant spoke of the impact of the learning environment created by the facilitation team, stating, “The students were able to participate a lot, ask questions, voice our opinions, without the instructors ridiculing our ideas; instead, they helped us build or develop better ideas.” Another participant spoke of the value of engaging in “conversations with students from different schoolhouses and learning from different[,] unique perspectives of peers.” In addition to attending the IIW, 21.6 percent of the participants who experienced transformative learning (n = 11), also credit this to a significant change in their life such as a billet change.

Finding#2: For participants who did not experience transformative learning, learning still occurred. For 20.3 percent of the participants {n – 13), transformative learning did not occur as a result of attending the IIW. Follow-up interviews revealed that many of these individuals already recognized the need for change in the training and education system. A minority of this population saw no need to change what, in their view, is an already-proven system. While these individuals may not have experienced a perspective shift, each stated finding applicability and value in the facilitation techniques encountered in the workshop.

Finding #3: Participants influenced change post-workshop. All participants interviewed (N =28) reported implementing changes to improve teaching and learning as a result of attending the IIW. Interviewees reported effecting changes at three levels: the individual level, the course level, and the schoolhouse level.

Following the IIW, 78.6 percent of those interviewed (n = 22) described implementing changes to their individual teaching practices. Changes included creating a learning environment by interacting with students as adult learners; introducing group norms exercises; encouraging questions and experimentation; mitigating learning barriers; facilitating dialogue between students; coaching students; using less PowerPoint; using more questioning to encourage critical thinking; employing peer and small group learning exercises; using metaphors to facilitate learning;22 teaching decision-forcing cases, tactical decision games, and terrain model exercises; and using student-generated examples.

Of those interviewed, 46.4 percent (n= 13) reported influencing changes at the course level. These participants described sharing knowledge and collaborating with other course instructors to improve facilitation, designing courses using learner-centered methods, and co-facilitating using learner-centered methods.

Fifty percent of the interviewees (n = 14) described influencing changes at the schoolhouse level. This includes training other instructors to utilize learner-centered facilitation methods, coaching other instructors for their professional development, changing program planning and evaluation methods to improve the quality of student learning experiences and outcomes, influencing leadership and academics on ways to mitigate learning barriers and incorporate learner-centered facilitation methods throughout courses, and recruiting others to attend the IIW. While TECOMs support for this workshop signifies institutional-level change, changes that go beyond the scope of individual schoolhouses have yet to be reported from IIW participants.

Going Forward

For the second year of the IIW, TECOM implemented two significant changes to further support institutional-level change. One addition included using Moodle, a learning management system, to serve as courseware and a virtual platform for IIW alumni to share ideas, ask questions, and find resources. Moodle enables the IIW alumni to share knowledge and resources for the purpose of improving the quality of teaching and learning at their schoolhouses. The IIW team also developed five- and seven-day variants of the ten-day workshop to address the limited white space that some formal schools provide for staff and faculty development.

In the End

In 2018, MajGen W.F. Mullen, CG, TECOM, charged TECOM to

[use an] approach that is focused on active, student centered learning that uses a problem posing methodology where our students/trainees are challenged with problems that they tackle as groups in order to learn by doing and also from each other. We have to enable them to think critically, recognize when change is needed, and inculcate a bias for action without waiting to be told what to do.2^

Detractors of this guidance argue that enlisted Marines, by and large, can neither facilitate nor learn the skills that MajGen Mullen calls for. If the data from IIW participants demonstrates anything, it establishes that learnercentered methods of facilitating higherorder learning do belong at all levels of the training and education system, to include entry-level training. Research confirms this and points to the ability of first-term Marines to participate in reflective thinking for the purpose of solving ill-structured or wicked problems.14

The methods used in the IIW inherently create efficiencies that make space for reflection or reflective exercises. Past IIW participants continue to use the facilitation methods they experienced in the IIW with much success as they shift the focus from themselves to the learner and assume a supporting role. The disorienting dilemma experienced by most of the participants also demonstrates that the IIW differs widely from current practices. Much of the difference comes from scheduling time for and treating reflection as a significant part of the learning, and we as an institution cannot afford to cut this exponentially impactful time from our respective programs of instruction. We do not pretend that the IIW will solve all of the existing training and education challenges. However, it does begin to tackle MajGen Mullen’s guidance to decrease the “dissonance between what we are doing with regard to training and education, and what we need to be doing based on the evolving operating environment.”2^

by Capt Isaiah J Berg

During World War II, LtGen A.A. Vandegrift distributed a pamphlet entitled Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders} This pamphlet was published by the Third Marine Division, summarizing lessons learned by Marines engaged in fierce combat in the Solomon Islands. The pamphlet contains 41 proverbs of combat leadership, proven in the brutal infantry warfare of the Pacific islandhopping campaign. The final leadership proverb in Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders is perhaps the most important: “Battles are won during the training period.” In combat, our Marines demand decision making from their leaders. Decision making and mission tactics are the fundamental responsibility of officers and leaders in combat. Yet the decisive moment of preparation arrives before the last 100 yards to the enemy. Training İs critical, and, therefore, the fundamental responsibility of leadership outside of combat is education and mentorship. Horace wrote that “learning increases inborn worth, and righteous ways make strong the heart.” Great leadership outside of combat must teach more than it tasks. Commanders must be professors of their Marines’ minds, bodies, and spirits.

Gen John A. Lejeune s famous letter on the relationship between Marine officers and enlisted members, published in the Marine Corps Manual, 1921, İs helpful in illustrating this mandate.2 He describes a spirit of “comradeship and brotherhood” that “must be fostered and kept alive and made the moving force in all Marine Corps organizations.” He rejects leadership as superiority over those being led or as an excuse to demand servitude. A leader is to be a “teacher and scholar” who serves his Marines, responsible for their physical, mental, and moral welfare as well as their discipline and military training. This İs not to neglect the other dimensions of a Marine officer’s leadership. Officers shoulder a burden of moral and legal authority for killing. They must demonstrate character, endurance, resilience, and technical and tactical proficiency. Fundamentally, leaders İn combat must be able to make good decisions quickly. Our Marines demand this leadership İn combat.

However, time spent in training and preparation vastly exceeds time spent in combat. During this time of training and preparation, our focus must be on education and mentorship. This can be a challenge for some young Marine officers. Young officers are specifically prepared to supervise the tasks that fall within their occupational specialty, but mentorship and education are often murky by comparison. Very little of their training directly prepares them for it. Training schedules can still be compiled and submitted. Counseling letters and fitness reports and awards can still be written. But how can leaders rise above this bland, formal, procedural leadership and deliver the training and education that their Marines need?

One of the best gunnery sergeants I have ever worked with once said to me, “When I think of a great leader, I think of someone who can really teach me something.” An officer can wear shiny rank and be appointed to a position of authority, but he cannot fake competence. There İs no shortcut to earning trust and credibility. Teaching İs an excellent way to develop and evaluate one’s Marines. It also builds the teacher s own capabilities and reinforces the trust that makes teams lethal. My company commander once put me and our rifle company’s weapons platoon commander through a fire support tactical decision game during a large-scale field exercise, purely on his own initiative. The whole company was tired and thirsty after a few hot days of establishing our defensive positions and patrols. The tactical decision game was good training for us, and İt gave our company commander a tool for evaluating our capabilities. Most importantly, it reinforced for us that (1) our company commander was proficient enough that he could not only do but also teach at a high level, and (2) that he valued our development and training, not just in his words, but in his actions. When the new infantry battalion executive officer checked in, one of his first actions was bringing the battalion’s officers and SNCOs together on a regular basis for real professional military education. We would have some food and drinks and work through a case study or tactical decision game facilitated by company-grade officers and SNCOs. We were doing what a warfighting organization needs to do. I would go anywhere with leaders like that. They prioritized my learning and development and, in turn, the learning and development of our Marines. Good leaders carved out time in the schedule to prioritize the study of warfighting and tactical decision making.

The history of military education can also offer us some insight into effective training and education. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Europe was gripped by the Napoleonic Wars. Mass conscription, the rise of the nation state, technolog}7, and professionalization had transformed the character of war. This was fundamentally a social and political transformation. Leaders were being raised up in France on their own merit as opposed to their birth. Gerhard von Scharnhorst was a Hanoverian-born military officer who was hired to work with the Prussian military institute İn Berlin, the Militärische Gesellschaft. The Prussian aristocracy and ruling class was hobbled by social and cultural prejudices. This aristocracy dominated the military but disdained education and ignored the threat posed by Napoleon’s France. Scharnhorst was brought from Hanover on the strength of his reputation as a military leader who could think, teach, and make reforms.

Scharnhorst instituted a number of reforms, but his chief influence was on the students of the Militärische Gesellschaft who would go on to lead the transformation of Prussia’s military, especially after the Prussian defeat at Jena İn 1806. Among his pupils was the revered theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz.

In Scharnhorst, Clausewitz recognized qualities and achievements to which he himself aspired: a successful career in spite of humble beginnings, intellectual authority, manliness-a soldier who was not the passive agent of events, but one who tried to understand and guide themV

Scharnhorst’s work revolutionized the Militärische Gesellschaft and Prussian military education. His students studied philosophy, literature, and history in addition to technical and military subjects. Hard training in the field and academic study under Scharnhorst led Clausewitz to describe him as “the father and friend of my spirit.”4

Scharnhorst’s influence was especially remarkable because of his lack of combat experience. HİS first fifteen years of military service were spent reading, teaching, editing three professional journals, and publishing three books. He was commissioned İn 1777 and first went to war in 1792. He joined the First Coalition against France and demonstrated excellent leadership under fire until his return from the war İn 1795. The disciplined intellect that allowed him to write, teach, and study was the same intellect that prepared him for leadership in combat. Nothing could be more relevant to Marine officers today. There İs a famous image of Defense Secretary James N. Mattis as a Marine Captain, a few years after the end of the war in Vietnam, boasting a single ribbon and two shooting badges. He lacked experience, but he possessed the mind and mindset that he needed to lead his Marines İn war. Gen Matris would later write a famous letter to all officers who lamented that they did not have time for reading:

We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their experience. ‘Winging it’ and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As commanders and staff officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach anything if we dont know a … lot more than just the [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures]? What happens when you’re on a dynamic battlefield and things are changing faster than higher [Headquarters] can stay abreast? Do you not adapt because you cannot conceptualize faster than the enemy’s adaptation? (Darwin has a pretty good theory about the outcome for those who cannot adapt to changing circumstance-in the information age things can change rather abruptly and at warp speed, especially the moral high ground which our regimented thinkers cede far too quickly in our recent fights.) And how can you be a sentinel and not have your unit caught flat-footed if you don’t know what the warning signs are-that your unit’s preps are not sufficient for the specifics of a tasking that you have not anticipated?-‘

If the men and women who lead Marines fail to build a teacher-scholar culture İn their units, Marines will deploy with procedural competency but without the creativity, judgment, and decisiveness required to win. Let us return once more to the young officer, recently graduated from his occupational specialty school, confident in his procedural acumen but uncertain about his capacity for training and education. What does he have to teach given his lack of experience?

Officers of any rank will be prisoners and victims of their own experience if they do not read widely and seek the experiences of others they wish to learn from. They have to be scholars hrst if they hope to be professors later. The hrst necessary step for all men and women who lead Marines is to read. Marines have no other choice if they aspire to be what Gen Mattis called the “‘coaches and sentries” of their units. Simple reading can form the foundation for some of the best training at the platoon level in the Operating Forces. Critical thought is the difference between mindlessly hitting the right codes İn a training and readiness manual versus understanding your future enemy and preparing to fight him and win İn an uncertain, chaotic, violent, and timecompetitive environment. Resources abound, whether in MCDP l, the Commandant’s Professional Reading List, Marine Corps University, or the Marine Corps Gazette’s, library of tactical decision games. Senior officers should prioritize the development of a digital library for their units, where tactical decision games, case studies, articles, books, and creative held training events can be widely shared and discussed without being lost. Time must be devoted to officers and SNCOs learning and studying together in order to “get a good rep” in making tactical decisions. If a unit does not prioritize its learning, İt will fail İn its warhghting.

Great leadership outside of combat must teach more than it tasks. Ask yourself, what have my Marines learned from me lately? What have I done to build their minds, bodies, and spirits? If you cannot conceive of anything beyond the procedural “what” of your daily routine, you are missing the “who” and the “why,” which are the foundations of an effective warhghting organization. Col John Boyd’s famous axiom was, “First people, then ideas, then things, in that order.” Attack your weaknesses through self-study, and share what you have learned. Pay close attention to your Marines and attempt to probe their weaknesses and strengths. Discuss and practice maneuver warfare. If you hope to succeed, this must be a team effort. Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “The soul environs itself with friends, that İt may enter into a grander self-acquaintance or solitude.”6 Men and women who teach will hnd themselves learning more than they thought possible. They will enjoy the fruits of solitude and self-study, the camaraderie of fierce bonds, and the soldierly affection that belongs to any father, mother, and friend of their spirit.

by LtCol Gregory A. Thiele

As the Marine Corps entered a period of fiscal austerity, a previous Commandant attempted to reinvigorate the Corps’ intellectual efforts. In late 2012, Gen Amos released White Letter 4-12, which reinforced the importance of reading. This was a useful step in creating a professional force. If the Marine Corps is truly serious about improving the military education possessed by Marine leaders, there is an additional measure the current Commandant could take. The Commandant should encourage wargaming.

In the late 1990s, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, encouraged Marines to play games provided by the Corps. In Marine Corps Order 1500.55 “Military Thinking and Decision Making Exercises” (dated 12 April 1997), Gen Krulak laid out his vision. Marines were encouraged to have tactical discussions each day and to play wargames. This was a worthy initiative. As Gen Amos attempted to reinvigorate the professional reading program, Gen Neller should encourage wargaming to allow Marine leaders to exploit every available opportunity to enhance their professional military education.

The Marine Corps requires leaders of all ranks to have a deep understanding of war and the employment of force. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP-1) reminds all Marines that

The military profession is a thinking profession. Every Marine is expected to be a student of the art and science of war. Officers especially are expected to have a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it.”1 MCDP-1 goes even further in describing the importance ol intellectual development for Marine leaders:

… every Marine has an individual responsibility to study the profession of arms. A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory of warfare-the intellectual content of the military profession-is a leader in appearance only. .Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical condition and should receive at least equal time. This is particularly true among officers; alter all, the mind is an officer’s principal weapon.Marine

leaders of all ranks have a fundamental responsibility to continuously study the art and science of war, on duty and off, in or out of formal schools, as part of a command-directed education plan or individually.

As always, the key component of this program is the involvement of commanders. According to MCDP7, “All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command.” ‘ MCDP-1 goes further and states that, “Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.”4 (Emphasis in original.) Commanders must exhaust every avenue in order to teach their Marines and prepare them for war. Wargames can be an excellent tool in this respect. Without emphasis from the Commandant, however, an initiative to encourage wargaming is unlikely to gain traction, and the potential benefits will go unrealized.

Wargaming can provide Marines with a better understanding of the nature of war. While the conduct of war changes, the nature of war (friction, uncertainty, violence, etc.) does not. In addition, MCDP-1 reminds Marines that, “the enemy is not an inanimate object … While we try to impose our will on the enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose his own will on us. Appreciating this dynamic interplay between opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature ofwar’.’s (Emphasis added.) It is critical that Marines find ways to incorporate a hostile, independent will into train- ing if we are to be prepared for the battlefield.

One method of introducing an opposing will into training events is to conduct free-play force-on-force exercises. Although MCDP-1 recommends free-play force-on-force exercises, very few Marine Corps units train in this manner.6 Current training often takes the form of attempting to master techniques and procedures. While there may be some value in this, it is far outweighed by the inward focus that results. Exposed to such a training regime over time, Marines acquire a distorted view of war as a one-sided affair in which the actions of the enemy are largely inconsequential. Such sterile preparation is a poor environment from which to draw an understanding of war. Wargaming is a simple, lowcost method of introducing an opposing will into training. Ideally, wargaming complements a training regime that consists largely of free-play force-onforce exercises.

When played against an opponent, wargames allow participants to experience conflict with a hostile, independent will. In order to win, Marines will be forced to think constantly about the enemy, how they can thwart the enemy’s plans, and how they can accomplish their own. Marines will also learn to remain flexible in their approach. Wellbalanced games will force players to be creative and resourceful, maximizing any advantage-no matter how slight- in order to win. Wargames will develop in participants an outward focus on the outcome desired, rather than an inward focus on process and methods.

Wargamers will also gain a better understanding of other characteristics of war. The internal focus that predominates in many Marine Corps units often leads to processes that are ineffective in combat (for instance, an operations order that is too long, too detailed, or too prescriptive). Playing wargames will remind Marines that military actions rarely occur exactly as planned. Wargaming helps develop an understanding of the need for plans that are adaptable. Wargaming should help leaders to craft a flexible plan, a clear commander’s intent and an order that enables subordinates to use their individual creativity in unforeseen circumstances.

Wargaming will also provide Marines with the vicarious experiences that are very difficult, or too expensive, to accomplish under normal conditions. How many Marines have maneuvered a brigade, division or MEF/corps on the battlefield? Wargames allow Marines to simulate such maneuvers and, with careful thought, Marines can begin to glimpse some of the challenges that they may face in leading such organizations or in planning their employment. More, they can gain an understanding of the context within which smaller units decide and act.

Wargaming can have a synergistic effect when paired with a carefully structured professional reading program. Because wargaming often requires a greater degree of involvement than does reading, the fidelity of the vicarious experience may be greater than that provided by reading a book on the same subject. Marines can select battles and campaigns that interest them, read about the campaign, and then play a wargame dealing with the same battle or campaign. Due to the great variety of wargames available, many battles can be wargamed at the tactical level and the campaigns of which they formed a part can be gamed as well in order to provide operational-level context regarding how and why the battle occurred. Such structured gaming may lead to a greater interest in the battle or campaign and even more reading, lighting a fire of interest in the individual Marine as he tries to understand historical events.

By their very nature, wargames are also progressive tactical decision games. As the game develops, each player is presented with situations with which he must cope and for which he must devise solutions. Players are required to make a large number of decisions in each game. Every new situation acts as a template that may assist leaders in making recognition-primed decisions in similar real-life situations.

When played as a team, wargames can assist seniors and juniors in building implicit communication. In such team games, decisions must be clearly communicated to subordinates so that orders may be properly executed. As time goes on, subordinates will begin to develop a sense of what their leaders expect from them with shorter communications and perhaps even when orders are entirely lacking. Such implicit communication will build trust between leaders and led and facilitate decentralized decision making.

In a fashion similar to the Commandant’s Professional Reading List (CPRL), the Commandant should create a list of recommended wargames. One option is to divide the games into categories based upon the traditional levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic). Such a list would allow Marines to select the appropriate games for their rank and billet. Such a list ought to serve as a guide and should not be considered prescriptive or all encompassing.

What would such a list of recommended wargames look like? There are a variety of games available to Marines off-the-shelf. Many computer-based games can be found online, and these games can often be downloaded and played in minutes. There are games that Marines can play on their smart phones, tablets, or computers. For example, just imagine Marines playing wargames and developing their decision-making skills as they wait in line for a routine screening at sickbay! Just as important, these games are fun, so Marines will want to play them even in their off-duty time. A list of currently available titles is listed below. In a manner similar to the CPRL, any list of wargames should be updated every few years to provide an opportunity to add the most up-to-date wargames available.

Marines must seize upon every opportunity to advance their professional growth. Wargaming offers Marines a fun and enjoyable way to increase their understanding of war and conflict. When paired with a thoughtful individual reading program, wargaming offers rich opportunities to gain insights into how and why historical events unfolded as they did. Such knowledge is of inestimable value to Marine leaders. Given the low cost and the potential benefits, it is time for the Marine Corps to reenergize the wargaming effort and encourage Marines to play games.

Recommended Games

Smart Phone.

* Frontline: Road to Moscow (Slitherine): a simple tactical-level game that simulates early battles on World War II’s Eastern Front between the German and the Soviet armies.

* Frontline: The Longest Day (Slitherine): similar to Road to Moscow above, but it simulates World War II battles on the Western Front in 1944.

Tablet.

* Panzer Corps (Slitherine): a simple, yet enjoyable series of computer games that can be learned quickly but will prove difficult to master.

* Desert Fox (Shenandoah Studios): an area movement game that is simple but surprisingly subtle, simulating World War II campaigns in North Africa.

* Drive on Moscow (Shenandoah Studios): area movement game that simulates Operation Typhoon, the German drive on Moscow in the Fall of 1941.

* Battle of the Bulge (Shenandoah Studios): area movement game that simulates the Battle of the Bulge on Western Front in World War II.

* Vietnam 65 (Slitherine): an attempt to simulate the duality of counterinsurgency and large-unit operations in Vietnam in 1965. Allows players to “buy” and employ a variety of units-at a cost to domestic U.S. support-in an attempt to defeat the Viet Cong and pacify South Vietnamese villages.

Home Computer /Laptop.

* Panzer Corps (Slitherine): same as above, but for a computer. There are no differences in graphics or game play.

* War in the East (2×3 Games): a massive operational-level simulation of the Eastern Front in World War II. Extremely playable for its size but loaded with detail.

* War in the West (2×3 Games): does for World War IFs West Front (from Sicily to the invasion of Germany) what War in the East (above) did for the Eastern Front.

* The Operational Art of War (Slitherine): an older game that simulates campaigns from across history.

* Close Combat series (Slitherine): this series of games puts players in tactical situations and attempts to model the real behavior of soldiers in combat.

by 2ndLt Robert D. O’Neill

You are the platoon commander tasked with clearing in zone a sector of Dharavi, Mumbai, one of the most densely populated slums in Asia, let alone on earth: an estimated one million people live in one square mile of what used to be a mangrove swamp. There are both civilians and potential threats everywhere. The area is contaminated with human waste; the water is toxic with heavy metals; the alleyways are maybe six feet wide; and the hodgepodge of wood, cardboard, and tin shanties offer no true cover from enemy fire. Your map is a satellite image, and your Marines are down to fire teams and buddy pairs throughout the maze of alleyways to maintain dispersion. You can’t get comms with your squad leaders because the shanties make your reception nonexistent. You start taking contact! What are your geometries of fires and overpenetration concerns, especially to avoid civilian casualties or hitting one of your Marines in adjacent alleyways? Do you use tracers or smoke grenades and risk setting the entire slum on fire? Where and how do you casevac your wounded?

Welcome to the nightmare battlespace.

The Marine Corps’ fights in the near future will be in the sprawling and broken coastal cities of the developing world. Humans are war’s lowest common denominator: where the people are, so too will be the conflict. The shantytowns of the developing world house over 1.3 billion survivaloriented urbanites.1 Slums are the most densely populated areas on the planet, the product of weak state capacity and neglect, and are the physical and spatial manifestations of socioeconomic marginalization and urban exclusion. As the primary means of crisis response in an increasingly complex and uncertain world, the Marine Corps will inevitably find itself woefully unprepared to be the bringers of security and stability to the slums that surround and penetrate megacities like Lagos, Manila, Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town, Dhaka, Caracas, and Mumbai. These urban agglomerations represent potential epicenters of human suffering on a massive scale (whether as a result of conflict, disease epidemic, or other human emergency spurred by a natural or industrial disaster), but more importantly embody the “nightmare battlespace” concept.

Such slums are “nightmare battlespaces” because they offer the worst combination of mission sets (in terms of lethality and complexity) in the worst possible environment, where the full spectrum of conflict against myriad opponents and/or threats is entirely possible. Any expeditionary operation to littoral slums of the developing world, from HA/DR (humanitarian assistance/disaster relief) to large-scale combat operations, would be necessarily a Joint and coalition amphibious operation. Operations would immediately transition into chaotic urban engagements-which are already time-, resource-, and manpower-intensive-in some of the most expansive, densely populated, impoverished, polluted, and complex environments on earth. Many of these slums are dominated by gangs, slumlords, mafias, and other such non-state armed groups, thereby necessitating a combination of counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics mission sets. Urban operations in the nightmare battlespace will be an extremely lethal and brutal “three-block war amongst the people,” only made more complicated by additional contemporary players such as the media, nongovernmental organizations, and the complex adaptive system that is the local sociopolitical structure.2

The ultimate goal of the nightmare battlespace concept is to use it as a framework for action and education; it is a starting point to address some of the complex and ambiguous characteristics associated with the role tactical-level leaders play in such an environment. Individual combat skills and small unit leadership will be strained to the extreme, and existing notions of command and control and combat leadership will be disrupted. Marines and small-unit leaders will face unique tactical, emotional, moral, and ethical challenges in an extremely dangerous and chaotic operational environment on a level unlike any previously faced.

At the broadest level, there is a considerable spatial difference between the urban combat for which we train and slum fighting.3 Not only are slums often a dense hodgepodge of tightly packed structures that will force the disaggregation of Marine units down possibly to fire team or buddy-pair levels, but they also add a vertical component to the crushed yet simultaneously expansive lateral battlespace. While there will not be the subterranean dimensions or multistory hardened structures like in the business or residential districts of a megacity, consider the favelas surrounding and penetrating Rio de Janiero or the Petare slum in Caracas as examples of how elevation on top of a chaotic layout of shanties offers a three-dimensional chessboard like no other battlespace. Oftentimes, there are only mazes of narrow pathways that are barely wide enough for a Marine in full combat gear.

An added element of the nightmare battlespace is the oversaturation of noncombatants. Even those without hostile intent can overwhelm the force, especially in a HA/DR mission set where survivalist and apocalyptic mindsets take over. The sheer masses of humans in such dense proportions and the likelihood that we will face nonstate armed groups and a multitude of other non-uniformed opponents will not only make it impossibly difficult to tell friend from foe from the disinterested, but it will also guarantee civilian casualties at an astronomical rate. Slum dwellers are tied to the location for job and eviction security, or myriad other reasons; they already have nowhere else to go, so evacuation prior to the commencement of combat operations is not a likely solution. Extensive collateral damage will be regrettably commonplace.4

Such a complex and unknown battlespace offers a whole host of unique planning considerations and commandrelated issues for tactical-level leaders. In terms of enemy-centric planning, who and where is the enemy, and how do you get there? What does the area of operations look like? With such a vast and overwhelming amount of structures and people, how effective is ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) ? What are your ingress and egress routes? Are there ground vehicles at your disposal? If so, which vehicles can go where, and how close to your objective can they get you? What about masses of people in the streets and alleyways- how will they inhibit your movement? Can aircraft be used? Aviation is vital to mobility, intelligence, and the delivery of focused fires in urban environments, but rotary wing assets can be especially vulnerable in this environment.

There are unique logistical concerns as well. What does chow and water resupply look like in an environment where great masses don’t have access to clean water or food? How can Marines get resupplied with ammunition and in what quantities? What about casevac-where and how can air or ground casevac happen? How do you ensure wounds do not get infected in an environment contaminated with industrial and human waste, not to mention the general immune health of Marines who are entirely not used to such an environment? Will Marines be able to evacuate their wounded through the narrow alleyways with the pole-less litters currently issued or will they need to find another way to get them to the AAVs (assault amphibious vehicles) that can barely squeeze along an “MSR”?

During the conduct phase, every fight develops differently than expected; the nightmare battlespace requires ultimate decentralized execution by well-prepared low-level leaders down to fire team leaders.5 The broken spatial qualities of slums fragments units and compartmentalizes encounters and engagements. The platoon commander and his subordinates’ span of control can easily collapse, and it is exceedingly hard to maintain an accurate picture of the multidimensional battlespace.6 Accountability and control of units thus becomes a severe issue. Battle tracking and using tactical and/or restrictive control measures is critical for ensuring good geometries of fire while maneuvering becomes nearly impossible. Simple firefights and tactical-level engagements within the slums will offer an array of unique and extremely difficult challenges: over-penetration of rifle and machinegun fire through multiple shanties to the use of tracers, explosives, and/or supporting arms and their potential for collateral damage, fratricide, civilian casualties, and the ignition of a slum fire. There will likely be severe restrictions on the use of large caliber direct fire weapons and indirect fire assets. Much of that falls under engagement criteria, restrictive control measures, and the rules of engagement; however, it is imperative to know that when the casualties mount, units historically loosen their restrictions on fires.

Command and control in the nightmare battlespace is an illusion, which will further deteriorate by poor communications: if one cannot communicate, one cannot command. Units will be disaggregated and isolated, unable to use basic hand and arm signals, and with no radio communications while potentially only dozens of meters apart; the three pillars of “move, shoot, and communicate” will be almost non-existent. Can leaders effectively communicate up, down, and laterally through the chain of command? Leaders need combat reporting to inform their decisions without overwhelming them with data, because without information, no leader can make sound decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Many questions have been posited intentionally: the nightmare battlespace concept is meant to initiate a discussion on how to better prepare tactical-level leaders throughout the Marine Corps for the worst possible conditions they could face. As the focus for fighting tomorrow’s conflicts shifts downward to squad leaders, fire team leaders, and individual Marines, so too must the systems that educate Marines, enable their decision-making skills, and increase their autonomy to more effectively deal with uncertainty and chaos as embodied by the nightmare battlespace. But what does that actually entail?

By using the nightmare battlespace as a training paradigm, leaders must prepare their Marines for the chaotic, uncertain, and brutal tactical realities they may face in a nightmare battlespace well before they get there. In order to be combat effective in the nightmare battlespace, “conditions must be set,” in a sense, well before arrival. However, since Marines have not been engaged in such a battlespace, expectations and experiences will come up short. Significantly more trust between the leader and the led is required in an environment where leaders cannot exercise direct control over their Marines, and have no choice but rely on subordinate leaders to make “dependent decisions” based off of initial guidance and the constantly developing situation. Unit cohesion and the will to fight and win must be created in advance, and one’s subordinates must be trained beyond the fundamentals and given tools to enhance their decisionmaking capabilities.8

The use of tactical decision games (TDGs) provides an effective mechanism to develop individual ability to make decisions under physical and mental stress as well as offer opportunities for leaders at all levels to hone their decision making skills. This also has the ability to build concrete examples and experiences our Marines can call upon to inform their intuitive decision making while in the nightmare battlespace. TDGs can reinforce doctrinal procedures and a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as provide an opportunity for subordinates to gain insight into how the leader thinks about tactical problems.9

As Sun Tzu writes: know thy self and in one hundred battles you shall not be in peril. In the nightmare battlespace, combat can happen at bewildering speeds and rapid decision making is essential to capitalize on increasingly fleeting opportunities. In order to be effective, Marines can and should fight those one hundred proverbial battles well before they get to the nightmare battlespace.

However, we must not confuse combat readiness with combat effectiveness. We must also realize that discussion of leadership is inherently idealistic-what it ought to be-while crisis response is wholly pragmatic-“come as you are.” The nightmare battlespace is, above all, disintegrative; the stresses on the individual Marine and small-unit leaders will be incalculable.10 The imperative is that we continue the discussion and prepare Marines for the worst possible conditions as embodied by the nightmare battlespace. As Adolf Von Schell says in Battle Leadership, “dangers that are thus foreseen are already half overcome.” The challenge for leaders is to overcome the inherent friction from the multitude of competing ideas, wills, tasks, and requirements from superiors, peers, subordinates, and the institution.

You are the commander, 1st Platoon, Alpha Company.

General Situation

Company A is on the far right (northern) flank of the battalion as it clears from east to west in order to (IOT) prevent the Centraban Resistance Force (CRF) from destabilizing the Centraban government. The CRF has been conducting a guerrilla campaign that has been marked by small units operating independently to strike government forces quickly and then withdrawing. The CRF has occasionally massed to company strength to conduct deliberate attacks. CRF forces have occasionally conducted deliberate defenses when they can muster significant strength, and the area defended is critical to their operations. The CRF has been operating in this area for approximately 1 year and is seeking to prevent us from advancing westward into their key territories. 1 st Platoon is on the far right (northern) flank of Company A and is the northernmost unit in the battalion. The company is approximately 2.5 kilometers to the south of 1st Platoon. Since your attack will take place prior to the main efforts attack, you will have priority of fires for the company 60mm mortars until the main efforts attack commences.

Orientation

You arc currently located in Assembly Area Silver in Area ol Operations White (AO White). The map shows the entirety of your AO. The Deep River is swiftflowing and crossable only where there are bridges. North and South Bridges are identical footbridges of wood construction. The Western Swamp is mired in chest-deep mud in almost all areas except for some footpaths that are known to the locals and are nearly invisible. Visibility in open areas is 100 meters, 50 meters in the swamp, 50 meters in the thinner tree line, and 25 meters in the thick tree line. Visibility from the high ground is 100 to 200 meters, but essentially stops at the tree line and 100 meters into the swamp. Within the tree line next to the river, visibility is 25 to 50 meters. Sunrise tomorrow is at 0620, sunset today is at 1726, end of evening nautical twilight today is at 1801, moonrise is at 2106 tonight, illumination will be 50 percent tonight, beginning morning nautical twilight tomorrow is at 0532. It is early winter in the Quantico Highlands and the temperature tonight will be 43 degrees Fahrenheit with light cloud cover and no precipitation. Your probable rate of march in the Eastern Forest is 1 kilometer per hour.

Situation

Enemy: Composition, disposition, and strength: Intelligence reports indicate that a squad of CRF in green camouflage utilities is present in AO White and a platoon may be present 10 ro 20 kilometers to the south. The squad is reportedly armed with at least 1 PKM, one or two RPG 7s, and AK-74s. They may have a single antiquated Soviet 50mm mortar system with a maximum range of 800 meters. They are communicating via cellular phones and handheld radio systems with a maximum range of 5 kilometers. They do not have night-vision capabilities.

lasks

1st Platoon: You are [SE3]- No later than 2000, destroy the enemy in AO White IOT prevent them from interfering with die company’s main-effort attack in AO Black.

2d Platoon: You are the main effort. On order, destroy the enemy squad on Company Objective A IOT protect the battalion’s right flank.

3d Platoon: You are [SEI]. On order, destroy the enemy listening posts/observation posts on Company Objectives B and C TOT prevent them from interfering with the company’s main effort attack on Company Objective A.

Weapons Platoon: You arc [SE3]. On order, support by fire 2d Platoon TOT allow them to close with and destroy the enemy on Company Objective A.

Time is now 1600.

by Majs William W. Yates & James P. McDonough

Command post exercises (CPXs) for units at the battalion level and below frequently rely on a master scenario events list (MSEL) to drive the staff decisionmaking process. MSEL events are initiated or activated by the exercise control team as the staff undergoing training executes the operations order on which the exercise has been built. The result of activating an MSEL event may cause the commander to branch or sequel from the plan and, in the context of a CPX MSEL-driven exercise, provide a simple framework to stimulate action by the training audience. Though simple in design, the success and benefit of driven MSEL CPXs depend in large part on the experience of the exercise control team and the MSEL manager. Even experienced exercise controllers and meticulously developed MSELs cannot provide the level of realism necessary to support some training objectives for staff decisionmaking.

Combat Models

Almost 30 years ago the Marine Corps began using combat models executed in computer simulation to add realism and detail to CPXs for large units, primarily the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) staff. The first fielded simulation model for training was the tactical warfare simulation, evaluation, and analysis system or TWSEAS. TWSEAS provided a realistic simulation of friendly and enemy unit behaviors on the battlefield. TWSEAS concentrated primarily on accurately modeling movement rates, weapons effects, and sensor ranges for detection. Rather than relying on a human judgment or a dice roll to adjudicate the attrition from an engagement between two forces in a skirmish, TWSEAS could quickly and accurately assess the outcome of kinetic engagements using probabilistic algorithms.

TWSEAS was replaced by the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) tactical warfare simulation (MTWS) in the early 1990s. MTWS is a more powerful and flexible model that provides higher resolution for the factors influencing the outcome of simulated combat and information to the commander and staff. MTWS continues to be the Marine Corps’ primary aggregate combat model for training, and it is also used by the militaries of several allied countries. MTWS can simulate not only enemy and friendly forces but also up to a total of 10 different sides that may behave in a friendly, neutral, or hostile fashion to other factions. MTWS can model simple tactical engagements to train units down to the company level or can model very complex environments, including electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. MTWS also adds realism to training by its accurate modeling of the consumption of fuel, ammunition, water, and other supplies that would be very laborious to calculate manually. Recent updates to MTWS have added compliance with the Department of Defense high-level architecture protocol for exchanging data between disparate models that will eventually enable the Marine Corps to use MTWS for exercises in the joint training community. (see sidebar on CAS, p. 14.)

Despite the robust capabilities of combat simulations, MSEL events still play a valuable part in CP training because of the factors that aren’t simulated well by kinetic computer simulations. Most, if not all, of the data feeds to the CP regarding civil affairs are more practically introduced into the exercise via MSELs. Interactions with the civilian populace and many aspects of stability and support operations are exercised in a CPX through MSEL events because the appropriate response is often a combination of communications of intent and allocation of logistical assets. Although computer-driven combat simulations have become very capable, it is still essential that the outcomes assessed by the simulation are monitored and verified by real-world experience to ensure that they are realistic and support the training objectives of the commander.

Tactical Simulations

Since the late 1980s there have been many commercial computer games in the domain of tactical decisionmaking. Some of these games, such as TacOps (Tactical Operations), have been of sufficient quality to be of use as tools for tactical decision training in preference to other formats, such as sandtable exercises. As the power of desktop computers has grown, the fidelity of some tactical game software has approached the level of simulations like MTWS. Tactical simulations that began in the domain of gamers and hobbyists have migrated into the realm of training tools.

Training and Education Command (TECom) has sponsored the development of the MAGTF XXI tactical decision simulation to bridge the gap between a stand-alone desk-top training simulation and a multiple workstation simulation for driving CPXs, such as MTWS. The software is licensed for free use by Marines. The latest release of MAGTF XXI is capable of interfacing directly with command and control personal computers and providing simulation-driven feeds to the tactical interface. This capability will allow key staff members to use their actual tactical equipment and software during the exercise as opposed to looking at a simulation screen. While MAGTF XXI does not possess the level of detail and the functionality of MTWS, it does provide the capability to plan and execute a computer simulation-driven CPX without the necessity of conducting the exercise at a battle simulation center (BSC). The niche that MAGTF XXI intends to occupy is as a tool to drive a CPX for the key members of a staff before undertaking a more complex exercise at a BSC using MTWS. In addition, since MAGTF XXI can run on most laptops, it can be used in a deployed setting as well.

MAGTF XXI requires about 1 gigabyte of disk space, a 1-gigahertz processor, 512 megabytes of random access memory, and a DirectX 9.x video card to run optimally. The software has been designed such that it is tolerated by the software policies on Navy Marine Corps Intranet workstations with user-level privileges. TECom sponsors a web site for technical support and sharing of training scenarios for MAGTF XXI at <http://www.magtf-xxi-marines. com/MAGTF>. MAGTF XXI has recently been used as the simulation of choice for student tactical exercises at Expeditionary Warfare School. In addition, the School of Infantry-East, Advanced Infantry Training Company, has begun using MAGTF XXI during the unit operations chief course to train future battalion-level and above operations chiefs for CP operations.

Simulation-driven CPX is becoming more accessible to commanders and their staffs at levels below the major subordinate commands. The BSCs at most Operating Forces installations are available with advanced notice to support CPXs with simulation and new tools, such as MAGTF XXI, and offer the potential to use simulation for staff training within the unit headquarters. Using simulation for staff training is one of many tools available to the commander to qualitatively improve the staff’s decisionmaking ability.

by Cavalry Captain Patrik Schaathun, Norwegian Army

I was once asked to teach a handful of junior leaders some aspects of military operations on urbanized terrain. Time constraints and lack of training areas and units to lead made me want to try out something a Danish colleague once described that the Danes call “the tactical trainer.” I believe that the tactical trainer is something Marines will find helpful in developing tactical decisionmaking skills and learning tactics.

Preparing the Tactical Trainer

An umpire is appointed to prepare the maps, one of which is distributed to each participant on each side. A commander is designated for friendly forces and given a mission and a radio. Subunit leaders are appointed and also given a radio each. Friendly forces then make a plan within a given time limit. The same procedure applies to the opposing side. Depending on the size of the enemy unit, the leader of the opposing forces may or may not have subunits to command. A third party may also be involved, playing a neutral side. The umpire checks out the plans for all sides and marks all deployments on his own map. The umpire must appreciate which success criteria will apply to both sides. The players are placed in such a way that they cannot hear each other by voice or see the umpire map. Face-to-face communications between participants will only be allowed if the units in question are at the same location on the map.

Execution

The umpire keeps track of all unit movements on his map in accordance with orders and plans. He also decides when units can observe each other and referees the outcome of contacts. When a unit makes an observation or is fired upon, the units in question are called to the umpire’s map and informed about the incident. For example, the leader of 2d Squad is told, “As you deploy to Building 19, you see two men in civilian clothes armed with Kalashnikovs run from this point to that point.” (The umpire points to Buildings 21 and 22.) “What do you do?” The squad leader then has to choose a course of action and send any messages on the radio. When informing participants about what they encounter, photographs may also be used in place of verbal descriptions. (“What you see in this photo just moved from this building to that building.”)

The umpire ends the scenario when one of the sides has achieved a decisive result. He then leads an after-action review where all parties reveal their plans with rationales and go through the sequence of events. Last but not least, lessons learned are concluded.

Scenario Example

Use the map in Figure 1 showing an abandoned industrial area. All buildings are made of concrete, have two floors, and have doors and windows facing all directions. It is 1200. The sun goes down at 1900.

Situation. You command 1st Platoon, Company A. Your company is securing an airfield against a terrorist threat. Your platoon is currently the company quick reaction force and is mounted on HMMWVs. You are located 3 kilometers south of the map and may enter the map from any direction.

Orders to the Marine forces. The company commander gives you the following orders:

“A tipoff has revealed that two terrorists are hiding in the abandoned industrial area. They have a portable surface-to-air missile and intend to shoot down friendly aircraft. Civilians often loiter in the industrial area as it is not fenced in.

“You have a sniper team attached. Your mission is to apprehend or neutralize the terrorists in order to make it possible to reopen the airfield to air traffic as quickly as possible.”

Orders to the opposing force. “You lead a group of four people. Each of you has civilian clothes, an MP5 submachinegun, night vision goggles, binoculars, and a radio. Also at your disposal are a black van and a motorcycle. You are currently in Building 21 (safe house) guarding two portable surface-to-air missiles (Stingers). At 2100 an agent will arrive to pick up the Stingers in preparation for a strike. You must guard the missiles until then. A Marine unit of unknown size is guarding the airfield 3 kilometers to your south. Their most dangerous course of action is to mount patrols to your area. Plan guard duty and actions on contact.”

Orders to the neutral side. “Deploy the following on the map and where applicable plan their movements: three buddies taking a stroll, a motorcyclist going from south to north, a person walking his dog, a vagrant searching for things of value, six; children playing soccer, and three; car wrecks.”

Observations

The tactical trainer is a good training technique because it requires participants to take an active part by making decisions, sending messages, and giving orders. Participants must formulate clear and concise descriptions of events in order to give friendly forces situational awareness. I have noticed a significant improvement in the quality of reporting during tactical trainer participation. A colleague explained that during a field training exercise. where a unit he was part of was required to cordon and search an area, he felt as if he had done it before because of a tactical trainer session. Its competitiveness is also motivating. Most soldiers enjoy the opportunity to outwit the opponents and will do their best. It is a way to “spice up” your tactical decision games, making them more demanding. Not only must you make a plan, you must also execute it while facing the friction and fog of war that will result from it being two-sided and free play.

Naturally, these sessions are no substitute for training with proper units, but they are a good warmup exercise for Marine leaders before taking charge of men in the field.