MAGTF – Next, Part I
By: The Marines & Sailors of 26th MEUPosted on October 15,2026
A blueprint to restore MAGTF credibility (Part 1 of 2)
“I suppose, the future of the Corps lies within itself, because, however large or small its problems are, nobody else is going to find solutions to them.”
—LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret)
The Marine Corps stands at a strategic crossroads, caught between the imperative to modernize for a high-end future conflict and the immediate, non-negotiable demand to serve as the Nation’s premier crisis response force. Since 2020, Force Design has generated bold, necessary course corrections to prepare the Corps for a peer fight in the Indo-Pacific. With flat budgets and a ticking clock, the Service had to divest legacy systems to underwrite meaningful, timely investments in future capabilities at an appropriate scale. In the hard-knocks, zero-sum reality of time and resources, this exchange naturally incurred exposure to hazard, which time and circumstances have now unmistakably revealed. Modernization has introduced strategic risk, trading proven, near-term readiness for long-term concepts that have yet to mature as fielded solutions at scale. Compounding this challenge are persistent and systemic shortfalls in amphibious warship availability that have severed the crucial link between readiness and relevance. Forward-deployed MAGTFs—a traditional symbol of American resolve—have become scarce. For the Joint Force—eyeing acute geopolitical tension on many fronts—this scarcity means fewer immediately employable options, longer response times, and ad hoc sourcing during crisis. This is not a future risk; it is today’s reality.
Uncorrected, this trajectory threatens to fracture the Corps’ crisis response identity and diminish its strategic utility. The security environment gives no quarter; it is defined by accelerating change, the democratization of disruptive technology, and the return of great-power competition at pace. Adversaries now integrate precision fires, space, cyber, and information capabilities to contest every domain and compress decision cycles. To remain the Nation’s force-in-readiness, our Commandant has called the Corps to rebalance modernization with readiness to fight and win tonight’s crisis.1 This requires ruthless prioritization of trade-offs that improve our ability to deter and respond to crises now while continuing to develop, test, and field the capabilities needed tomorrow.
This article offers a practical, FMF–informed blueprint to thread this needle. Focusing on a five-year horizon, it outlines five pragmatic, achievable modernization imperatives that fuse the demands of readiness with the promise of modernization.2 A second, follow-on article—“MAGTF-Next: Posturing with a Purpose (Part 2 of 2)”3—confronts the growing gap between where Marines are needed and where they are available due to amphibious shipping shortfalls. It proposes a new force employment model to create an unbroken chain of integrated sea- and land-based expeditionary forces. While leaders develop a long-term solution, this model argues for a sustainable blend of forces using strategically located littoral pivot points to provide a persistent, responsive, and credible forward presence. Together, these articles frame a coherent blueprint to restore MAGTF crisis response credibility and ensure the Marine Corps remains what the Nation requires: a responsive, relevant, expeditionary force-in-readiness that delivers the Joint Force options at speed and scale.
Performance Over Promises: A Call to Action
The Marine Corps has long embraced bold reform, but history demonstrates that not all innovation produces battlefield advantage.4 In World War II, the Corps experimented with elite Raider battalions, parachute regiments, and other specialized units. While born of vision and often backed by political enthusiasm, most of these special units were disbanded, proving unsustainable or redundant when the war demanded scalable, balanced, combined arms combat power.5 That lesson is worth heeding today, and we must ask: are we preserving combat credibility or repeating history by trading near-term capability for long-term, unconfirmed promise? T.R. Fehrenbach’s uncomfortable indictment of post-World War II unpreparedness remains a stark warning: we must prepare for “this kind of war”—messy, limited, and brutal—not the one we prefer.6
This challenge is not new. During the early Cold War, critics argued that nuclear weapons rendered amphibious operations obsolete. The Corps responded by defining its value in the “in-between” crises below the nuclear threshold, providing presidents with scalable, ready forces when atomic weapons were unusable and heavy Army formations too slow. “At a time when the other services became increasingly specialized, the Corps thrived by being generalists, fighting for an increased role in every type of military operation, no matter how small.”7 Today’s parallel is uncanny. Replace nuclear weapons with precision-strike or hypersonic missiles and drone swarms, and the same dilemma emerges. The lesson endures: crisis response relevance requires credible, flexible options in the gaps where exquisite technological capabilities fall short.
Relevance demands intellectual honesty: future war will not be surgical or rapidly decisive—and it will not be solved by technology alone. This is why, as retired LTG H.R. McMaster warns, strategists often fall prey to four fallacies: (1) the “Vampire fallacy” that technology alone delivers victory; (2) the “Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that elevates tactical raids to the level of strategy; (3) the “Wild Kingdom fallacy” of overreliance on proxies; and (4) the “RSVP fallacy” that America can simply opt out of messy ground conflicts.8 War’s political and human dimensions are immutable. Modernization must be grounded in this reality, delivering a MAGTF that is not only technologically advanced but also resilient and agile, masterfully balancing mass and precision to impose decisive dilemmas on any adversary.
The following five imperatives provide that path forward: (1) assure decision dominance; (2) operationalize information; (3) forge effective Marine-SOF (special operations forces) partnerships; (4) elevate O-6 MAGTF command elements to deliver Joint HQ core capabilities; and (5) design MAGTFs that are balanced, forward, and flexible.
Each of these initiatives addresses tensions the Corps will face over the next five years:
Readiness vs. Modernization—ensuring today’s MAGTFs can fight tonight while integrating tomorrow’s capabilities at a pace the force can train to and employ.
Presence vs. Survivability—sustaining forward deterrence and crisis response without assuming permissive environments or guaranteed access.
Mass vs. Precision—regenerating scalable, combined-arms lethality while exploiting data, autonomy, and precision tools to multiply and compound battlefield advantage.
Speed vs. Sustainability—optimizing deployment cycles and surge capacity without outrunning staying power, authorities, or flexibility to adapt.
Technological Diffusion vs. Adoption—navigating the gap between the rapid pace of technological innovation and the capacity to effectively integrate, train for, and employ these capabilities across the force at scale.
While emerging technologies promise transformational impact, the challenge remains ensuring they are not only fielded but also adopted effectively at the right levels of command. This demands an emphasis on organization, doctrine, and readiness implications in the face of evolving threats. The five imperatives that follow minimize these tensions through deliberate, achievable actions. They fuse modernization with readiness, ensuring our MAGTFs remain ready, resilient, and responsive across the competition continuum.
I. Assure Decision Dominance: Out-Sense. Out-Think. Out-Fight.
To win in the modern battlespace, Marines must sense, decide, and act with initiative and greater tempo than any adversary. This requires assuring decision dominance: the ability to sense, make sense, and act faster and more effectively than an adversary, enabling commanders to seize and maintain the initiative under any conditions. Assuring this capability requires a decisive edge in command and control (C2) built on resilient networks, accelerated decision-making, and disciplined execution in denied, degraded, intermittent, or limited (DDIL) environments. The Joint Force’s aspirational goal of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control sets a strategic vector, but the Corps cannot afford to wait for others to achieve and implement this concept. We must act now. Assuring decision dominance centers on three efforts.
First, we must integrate data ecosystems to eliminate stovepipes—linking sensors, shooters, and decision-makers into a coherent kill web. Today’s MAGTF command, control, communication, and computer systems remain fragmented, forcing operators to fuse data manually. Solutions like Maven Smart System demonstrate what is possible, combining disparate data streams into a single interface accessible at all echelons. By fielding systems that automate data fusion, we can accelerate situational awareness from the pace of analogue processes to the speed of digital operations.
Second, we must empower AI and human-machine teams. Artificial intelligence should accelerate—not replace—human judgment. Properly employed, AI-enabled tools can process vast data streams to detect patterns and recommend courses of action, compressing the commander’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop. John Boyd’s decisive element was Orientation—the uniquely human capacity for sense-making amid uncertainty.9 Artificial intelligence sharpens this capacity, allowing machines to do what they do best (process data) while Marines focus on what only they can deliver: ethical judgment, adaptation, and initiative. This deliberate balance ensures technology enhances, rather than erodes, the bias for action and decentralized decision-making that is the battle-proven hallmark of maneuver warfare.10 Without this critical balance, we risk becoming slaves to our systems rather than masters of our own intellect, initiative, and enterprise.
Third, we must build resilient denied, degraded, intermittent, or limited communications. Adversaries will target our networks; accordingly, our C2 architecture must be redundant, self-healing, and capable of graceful degradation. This means fielding hardened, adaptive networks and, critically, training command elements to operate in isolation via mission command. By integrating data, empowering human-machine teams, and hardening communications, we will build a MAGTF C2 architecture that functions at machine speed yet remains guided by disciplined human judgment, allowing us to out-sense, out-think, and out-fight any adversary.
II. Operationalizing Information: From Function to Fight
Modern conflict is decided as much in the cognitive domain as on the physical battlefield. From Ukraine to Gaza, adversaries continue to prove that information—not just firepower—can dictate tempo, perception, and legitimacy.11 The MAGTF must therefore treat information as a weapon. This requires unifying information-related capabilities—such as cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, deception, and communication strategy—under a single, coherent command, trained to fight in the information environment with the same rigor we apply to fires.
A core challenge is organizational. Currently, information-related capabilities remain stove-piped across staff channels, frustrating the single battle concept and complicating authorities. Two organizational models offer a path forward. One model is a dedicated information combat element, a fifth MAGTF element that consolidates information forces under one commander. This would clarify ownership and ensure information operations are planned and executed with purpose. The alternative model is an enhanced, integrated command element that embeds information specialists within the existing staff, synchronizing effects via established processes. A recent debate over the efficacy of MEF Information Groups (MIGs) highlights the urgency of this choice. Critics argue MIGs have become “tactical holding pens” lacking the authorities and tempo to be effective; proponents contend MIGs are the essential nucleus of a true information maneuver arm that has yet to be matured.12
The Marine Corps must experiment aggressively with both models. Regardless of the final design, our mindset must shift. We must plan offensive and defensive schemes of maneuver in the cognitive and electromagnetic realms with the same discipline and scrutiny we impose across the physical air, land, and sea domains. Advantage in future conflicts will accrue to the side that best exploits the information environment. This is warfare at the speed of light, and the battle is already underway.
III. Forge Effective Marine-SOF Partnerships: Team Early, Integrate by Design
Success in strategic competition and crisis demands persistent, purpose-driven cooperation between MAGTFs and SOF, moving beyond episodic collaboration to habitual integration. Pairing conventional and unconventional forces, what Sun Tzu termed Cheng (the overt, orthodox, anchoring force) and Ch’i (the hidden, the unorthodox, unbalancing force), creates dilemmas no adversary can easily solve.13 The MAGTF embodies the Cheng—delivering balanced combined arms power, sustainment, and the ability to hold terrain. Special operations forces represent the Ch’i—providing precision access, unique influence, and low-signature options. Effective integration begins with mission logic. By aligning purpose-built MAGTF and SOF teams against theater-specific problems, the Joint Force gains credible, lower-risk options. This requires three concrete actions.
First, we must establish interoperable planning, targeting, and command, control, communication, and computer architecture. Unity of effort depends on shared data and networks. Rather than merely deconflicting operations, integrated processing, exploitation, and dissemination teams and common standing operating procedures will enable both forces to plan and strike on a shared battle rhythm.
Second, we must codify SOF integration into MAGTF pre-deployment training cycles. Any MAGTF-SOF integration must be a mission-essential task that is rehearsed in training and evaluated as a core competency—not a bolt-on, ad hoc, untested liaison function.
Third, and most important, we must build trust through shared purpose, not just proximity. True interdependence is forged through repetition, shared risk, and mutual respect cultivated through deliberate exchanges, joint professional military education, and integrated training. Field-grade leadership is decisive in bridging the cultural gaps between SOF’s emphasis on small-unit autonomy and the MAGTF’s focus on scalable combined-arms synchronization. When deliberately designed and habitually rehearsed, this partnership delivers a lethal, agile, and adaptive joint team capable of seizing the initiative and imposing devastating Cheng and Ch’i dilemmas.
IV. Elevate O-6 MAGTF Command Elements to Deliver Joint HQ Core Capabilities
Credible crisis response is measured in hours, not weeks. When the Nation calls, combatant commanders need a headquarters capable of integrating joint, interagency, and coalition elements immediately. The Joint Force, however, rarely has a fully operational joint task force (JTF) headquarters postured to respond at the onset of a crisis. The O-6-level MAGTF command element is purpose-built to close this gap. It is forward and capable of commanding across domains.14 The only thing missing is institutional recognition and certification of these elements as joint-ready core staffs.
This is not an aspirational concept but a proven requirement, validated in practice. During Operation Noble Obelisk in 1997, the 22nd MEU(SOC), commanded by a Marine colonel, was designated as the JTF commander and successfully led a noncombatant evacuation of over 2,500 people from Sierra Leone. The MEU command element served as the nucleus of the JTF, integrating Army Special Forces, naval assets, and interagency partners.15
To institutionalize this capability, the Corps should begin with three steps. First, we must design a tailored joint mission essential task list specifying the tasks an O-6 MAGTF command element must perform as an initial joint headquarters. Second, we need to institute a formal certification, verification, and validation process—modeled after U.S. Special Operations Command’s framework—to train and validate select MAGTF headquarters against joint standards in rigorous exercises. Third, Marine Corps component commands and the Service itself must deliberately promote these certified headquarters to combatant commands, ensuring they are visible, trusted, and integrated into theater campaign plans. This modest adjustment provides combatant commanders a credible C2 option in the crucial opening hours of a crisis—buying time, preserving initiative, and reaffirming the Corps’ role as a force that not only leads the way but stands ready to command.
V. Forward, Flexible, Formidable: Reclaiming Operational Reach
Operational reach is not defined by platforms alone but by foresight—the ability to preposition, sequence, and maneuver before a crisis ignites. Declining amphibious warship readiness and constrained strategic airlift demand that we mature a third force presentation model: dynamic force employment. This complements the traditional ARG/MEU model and our rotational deployments, enabling the Corps to project credible combat power without exclusive reliance on dedicated lift. It rests on three lines of effort.
First, operationalize access. The United States maintains a vast network of basing, access, and overflight agreements. We must transform these from diplomatic paperwork into executable options—identifying usable nodes, logistics corridors, and cooperative security locations that enable rapid maneuver. As naval strategist Wayne Hughes argued, “the home team has the advantage” in littoral warfare.16 We systematically develop a home team advantage abroad by building relationships, honing familiarity, and exercising access.
Second, enable the fly-in echelon. Forward stocks enable rapid deployment from home stations. By smartly prepositioning modular, mission-tailored sustainment kits and equipment, we allow MAGTFs to arrive light and begin operating within 24–48 hours. This scales the logic of our larger Maritime Prepositioning Force for the tactical realities of great-power competition, equipping smaller, distributed units for immediate crisis response.
Third, build mobility fluency. This is the MAGTF’s ability to plan and move by any mode—maritime, air, or land—at speed and under friction. It requires mastery of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, proficiency at reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, and the expertise to leverage commercial and host-nation contracting. Campaigns are fundamentally a series of movements; mobility fluency determines who gains and maintains campaign tempo.
Together, these three efforts create a force that arrives fast, gets to work immediately, and endures—ensuring the Corps remains the right force, in the right place, at the right time.
Conclusion: Performance Earns Confidence
The Commandant’s call to balance modernization with crisis response is a clear-eyed directive in the face of two stark realities: the degradation of near-term capability (to invest in ongoing modernization) and persistent shortfalls in amphibious warship readiness. The five imperatives outlined here are not a menu of options but an integrated, achievable blueprint to restore MAGTF crisis response capability while advancing Force Design. They are complementary reforms that bolster MAGTF balance, flexibility, and resilience. Assuring decision dominance, operationalizing information, forging Marine-SOF synergy, certifying O-6 headquarters for joint command, and building a more flexible force are practical, realistic efforts that build on our Corps’ enduring strengths: task organization, disciplined initiative, and the indomitable fighting spirit of our Marines.
Ultimately, our Corps’ credibility in the eyes of the Nation and its value to the Joint Force will be measured not by aspirational concepts, but demonstrated results under the real-world pressures of competition, crisis, and combat. By rigorously aligning our modernization efforts with these operational realities, the Marine Corps will remain not only relevant—but indispensable.
Notes
1. Eric M. Smith, “Maintain Momentum,” FRAGO 01-2024, Commandant of the Ma-rine Corps, April 2024, 2, https://www.cmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC39/FRAGO_01_2024.pdf (“By Balancing Crisis Response and Modernization, we will align and synchronize our Force Design advance-ments, while remaining unwavering in our commitment to persistent, global forward pres-ence and our Marine Expeditionary Units”); Eric M. Smith, “Statement of General Eric Smith, Commandant of the Marine Corps, as Delivered to Congressional Defense Commit-tees on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps,” written statement submitted to the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, 119th Cong., 1st sess., May 14, 2025, 23, https://docs.house. gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20250514/118229/HHRG-119-AP02-Wstate-SmithE-20250514. pdf (“Force Design modernization plans for the active and the reserves balance the need to maximize ‘Total Force’ lethality and capacity during a period of increased risk while optimiz-ing resource allocation”).
2. This article provides a surface-level intro-duction to these imperatives, which are de-veloped in significantly greater depth in a de-tailed, thoroughly researched report prepared by the Marines and sailors of the 26th MEU titled MAGTF Next: A Primer. The Primer is currently unpublished but will be available in a future edition of the Gazette.
3. Marines and Sailors of the 26th MEU. “MAGTF-Next: Posturing with a Purpose (Part 2 of 2),” Marine Corps Gazette, November 2026: 14–17.
4. Kendrick Kuo, “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” International Security 47, no. 2 (Fall 2022): 84, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms. Kuo warns that “military innovation is more dangerous than is generally acknowledged” and that, un-der the pressure of expanding commitments and shrinking resources, a military service may make “desperate gambles on new and relatively untested capabilities,” cannibalize traditional capabilities, and ultimately discover that it has “overspecialized in the new capability to its own detriment.” He further argues that this danger is greatest when a “commitment-resource gap” emerges—that is, when growing security commitments outstrip shrinking re-sources. See Kuo, 49, 54–57. His central warn-ing is that innovation is a tradeoff: what a force gives up in structure, doctrine, and proficiency may matter as much as what it gains.
5. This lesson is drawn from a historical review of specialized Marine Corps units in World War II, including the Raider and Parachute Battalions, which were ultimately disbanded in favor of standard, more scalable infantry formations. See Charles L. Updegraph Jr., Special Marine Corps Units of World War II (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972), PCN 19000413200.
6. Amos C. Fox and Franz-Stefan Gady, eds., Multidomain Operations: The Pursuit of Battlefield Dominance in the 21st Century (Howgate Publishing, 2026), 164; see T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 656: Fehrenbach details the United States’ na-ïveté and complacency after World War II and the harsh reality of a major ground campaign it was forced to fight without notice or adequate preparedness. U.S. superpower status did not deter conflict, nor did technological superior-ity assure a prompt, decisive victory. Rather, the Republic of Korea was saved by a grueling and, at times, precarious land campaign fought to a stalemate by the traditional instruments of combined arms.
7. Aaron B. O’Connell, Underdogs: The Mak-ing of the Modern Marine Corps (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 234–35.
8. H. R. McMaster, “Discussing the Con-tinuities of War and the Future of Warfare: The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum,” Small Wars Journal, October 14, 2014, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/discussing-the-continuities-of-war-and-the-future-of-warfare-the-defense-entrepreneurs-foru.
9. Ian T. Brown and Frans P. B. Osinga, Snow-mobiles and Grand Ideals: John Boyd’s Vision for Thriving in Chaos (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2025), 50–59, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Snowmo-biles%20and%20Grand%20Ideals_web.pdf.
10. John T. Hoffman, “On the Horns of Our Own Dilemma,” Marine Corps Gazette, No-vember 2001: 42.
11. Joseph D. Levin, “Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts,” Military Review, March–April 2025, 20, https://www.armyupress.army. mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MA-25/Information-Operations/Information-Operations-UA.pdf; Matthew Slusher, “Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict: Modern Warfare in the Age of Autonomy, Information, and Resilience,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-ukraine-conflict-modern-warfare-age-autono-my-information-and-resilience.
12. This debate is captured in recent articles by Dan Burns, Ray Gerber, Ian Fletcher, and Benjamin Jensen. Dan Burns, “Kill It or Fix It: Why Marine Corps Information Warfare Has Failed after a Decade of MIGs,” Information Professionals Association, August 20, 2025, https://information-professionals.org/kill-it-or-fix-it-why-marine-corps-information-warfare-has-failed-after-a-decade-of-migs; Ray Gerber, “Killing the MIG Is the Last Thing We Should Do,” Information Professionals Association, September 7, 2025, https://information-professionals.org/killing-the-mig-is-the-last-thing-we-should-do; Benja-min Jensen and Ian Fletcher, “Blinding First, Striking Fast: Why the Marine Corps Needs Information Groups,” War on the Rocks, October 13, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/blinding-first-striking-fast-why-the-marine-corps-needs-information-groups.
13. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 42–43; U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3: Tactics (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Ma-rine Corps, July 30, 1997), 46–47 (“Comple-mentary forces—the idea of fix-and-flank—are an important way of gaining advantage. The idea behind complementary forces is to use our forces as a nutcracker. We seek to crush the enemy between two or more actions. … Sun Tzu described this concept as the cheng and the ch’i. The cheng is the more direct, obvi-ous action. It fixes the enemy. The ch’i is the unexpected or extraordinary action. It is the bid for a decision, or, as we call it today, the main effort. These two actions work together against the enemy. The two actions are inseparable and can be interchangeable in battle; the cheng may become the ch’i”).
14. While readers may instinctively envision the command element of a MEU afloat aboard a three-ship ARG, the reality of the Nation’s amphibious-warship readiness has made this traditional force-presentation model scarce and inconsistent. The Marine Corps neverthe-less retains options to maintain ready, forward forces despite the enduring paucity of amphibi-ous warships. The concept proposed here—joint-ready MAGTF command elements—is not limited to traditional afloat command ele-ments aboard three-ship ARGs. In addition to MEUs, forward-deployed command elements from Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) or Alert Contingency MAGTFs (ACMs), pos-tured ashore at littoral pivot points or afloat on amphibious or nonstandard shipping, can provide key command-and-control nodes avail-able to the Joint Force as capable headquarters, buying time and options in the critical opening phase of a crisis.
15. William M. Kennedy, “Operation Noble Obelisk: An Examination of Unity of Effort” (graduate paper, U.S. Naval War College, February 5, 2001), 9, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA389782.pdf; James A. Burch, “Forward from the Sea . . . Intelligence and the Untold Story of Operation Noble Obelisk” (graduate paper, U.S. Naval War College, May 5, 2000), 17, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA382009.pdf.
16. Paul Westermeyer, ed., The Legacy of Ameri-can Naval Power: Reinvigorating Maritime Strategic Thought—An Anthology (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019), xv (Wayne P. Hughes Jr. discussing his seminal work, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations).