The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

Thirty years of innovation

“Force Design remains the Marine Corps’ vehicle to create innovative formations, equipment, and concepts and ensures we remain lethal on any battlefield while optimized against the pacing threat.”

—Gen Eric M. Smith

The Marine Corps must continually evolve given the changing global balance of military capabilities, a proliferation of emerging technologies, and a growing assertiveness among the Nation’s strategic competitors. To address these core challenges, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) guides a process of innovation through concept development, experimentation, prototyping, research, analysis, and wargaming. 

For 30 years since its inception, MCWL has spearheaded innovation. From HUNTER WARRIOR in the late 1990s, which examined squads acting as independent elements on a dispersed battlefield, to counter-improvised explosive device experimentation and fielding that saved Marine lives in Iraq and Afghanistan, to today’s Family of Integrated Targeting Cells efforts that will support stand-in forces, MCWL continues to serve as the headlights of the Marine Corps. Those headlights are illuminating the way ahead for what Gen Eric Smith, 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps, has described as the “righteous journey” of force design. Force design—as a general, enduring modernization process rather than a particular set of investment or divestment decisions regarding specific platforms and organizations—requires the creative vision to foresee the future force that will be necessary to meet the challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield.

Under the leadership of BGen Simon Doran, MCWL generates and examines threat-informed operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities. The long-term modernization efforts of the lab are balanced with the understanding that FMFs are competing with adversaries today, and they must be equipped with the latest ways and means of operating to respond to any crisis that may arise.

As suggested by its name, MCWL pursues an empirical approach to force design akin to the scientific method. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s work begins with generating a series of hypotheses about operating in the future. It then seeks to test these hypotheses through rigorous experimentation methods such as wargaming, modeling and simulation, prototype development, and live-force experiments. External studies may provide additional data and insights. Ideas that are shown to be viable are then transitioned to adjacent units in Combat Development and Integration for further development and analysis. Solutions suitable for implementation across the Marine Corps are incorporated into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The personnel in each of MCWL’s divisions provide unique capabilities and expertise to aid this process. 

Concept-Driven Force Design
Generating hypotheses about future warfare first requires MCWL to make plausible assumptions about the direction of the operating environment over a ten to twenty-year timeframe. Rather than making specific predictions about the future, MCWL’s Futures Division identifies key trends and indicators that drive change in the operating environment. By synthesizing this internal analysis with that given in referential documents such as Framework for Future Force Design, Joint Strategic Assessment, Joint Operating Environment, and Navy Force Design 2045 as well as the work of future-oriented organizations such as the Office of Naval Research, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Army Futures Command, Headquarters Air Force A5/7 (Skunk Works), the Joint Staff and others, Futures Division identifies challenges at all classification levels as well as opportunities that can be explored during concept generation. 

The lab’s modeling and simulation (M&S) capability evaluates cutting-edge technology in various operating scenarios based on the manipulation of key variables to inform resourcing
decisions. The ability to conduct iterative, quantitative analysis to support concept development activities and science and technology investments increases MCWL’s efficiency in delivering war‑
fighting effectiveness. 

One of the most impactful aspects of M&S is its ability to provide real-time feedback during wargames and live force exercises. This feedback loop enables participants to adapt tactics on the fly, learning from data as it is generated. In a fast-paced combat scenario, the ability to quickly assess the impact of a decision can mean the difference between success and failure. 

Simulations, while realistic, cannot fully replicate the unpredictability of real combat. Simulations may lack the human factors, stress, and environmental unpredictability inherent in real-world operations. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory leaders remain cautious about over-relying on M&S-generated tactics without considering the nuanced realities of live missions. Incorporating feedback from field exercises, combat training, and real-world operations into M&S ensures models remain reliable in real-world contexts. 

When combined with the qualitative analysis of future-oriented thinkers, Futures Division transforms M&S data into meaningful programmatic insights that inform invest, divest, accelerate, or sundown decisions. Looking deep at possible futures allows the Marine Corps to make necessary investments in the near term to assess the viability of leap-ahead capabilities in the long term.

Based on this understanding of the future operating environment, MCWL generates operating concepts as expressions of how warfighters, using military art and science, might employ capabilities to meet future challenges and exploit future opportunities. An operating concept’s solutions to a military challenge or opportunity are hypothesized in its central and supporting ideas. Additionally, the operating concept describes the future capabilities required to realize its desired end state. These ideas and concept required capabilities are the base units against which the experimentation efforts of MCWL are applied. They are written with a level of abstraction to provide the experiment design teams sufficient flexibility to fully explore the proposed ways and means of operating. In this way, a concept matures through experimentation as insights are gained about the conditions and standards in which certain capabilities must perform.

A collection of operating concepts beginning with 2017’s Littoral Operations in Contested Environments (LOCE) illustrates the Service’s renewed focus on supporting naval operations in joint campaigns. LOCE called for higher levels of naval integration and set the stage for Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and A Concept for Stand-in Forces. These latter two concepts described the Marine Forces projecting power toward the seaward element of the maritime domain. Maneuvering these forces is described in the draft A Concept for 21st Century Amphibious Operations (21CAO) and sustaining Marine Forces for the future fight is described in the recently signed Marine Corps Concept for Logistics (MCCL). Taken as a whole, this family of naval concepts describes the shaping, decisive, and sustaining actions of an operational approach to future warfighting. Many parts of LOCE, Expeditionary Advance Base Operations, and A Concept for Stand-in Forces are being implemented in the FMF today while 21CAO and Marine Corps Concept for Logistics require continued experimental interrogation and development before moving into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy implementation. 

Analysis through Wargaming
One method to further examine the ideas expressed in these concepts is wargaming. Through wargames that are purpose-tailored in type, size, scope, and classification level, The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Wargaming Division derives insight from gameplay that can inform concept generation and development. These games leverage the subject-matter expertise of Marines, other Services, allies, and partners, the interagency, and inter-organizational partners. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s M&S capabilities can be used in conjunction with wargames to provide greater fidelity in game design and to provide additional gameplay iterations to test player ideas. 

In fiscal year 2024, wargames analyzed Marine Corps logistics operations in contested areas to include their interdependencies with allies and partners, examined different task-organized amphibious force formations regarding their ability to employ all-domain operations, and explored the role of Marine littoral regiments outside the Indo-Pacific theater. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, wargames focused on crisis response planning and how the Naval Service can generate sealift capacity in support of the Joint Force. 

To remain at the forefront of technological advancement, the Marine Corps established the General Robert B. Neller Center for Wargaming and Analysis (Neller Center). Located in Quantico, VA, this state-of-the-art 100,000-square-foot facility is designed to support not just the Marine Corps, but the DOD at large and for fostering collaboration with allies and partners worldwide. The Neller Center will harness cutting-edge technologies to create realistic, complex scenarios that mirror modern warfare’s multifaceted nature. Incorporating live, virtual, and constructive simulation technologies permits exploration and discrimination of an array of strategic, operational, and tactical questions before committing substantial resources for live-force experimentation.

Another significant impact of the Neller Center will be its ability to conduct wargames at all levels of classification, ensuring sensitive information is securely integrated into simulations while providing a comprehensive operational picture based on a full suite of capabilities. A cloud-based distributed capability will enable seamless collaboration across commands, regardless of location. 

At the heart of this transformation is the Next Generation Wargame concept. The Next Generation Wargame establishes a human-centric, technology-enabled, collaborative gaming environment. It leverages decision support tools, M&S, artificial intelligence, and visualization technologies to enhance quantitative and qualitative assessments. Participants will dynamically adjust variables, explore multiple courses of action, and witness potential outcomes in a controlled setting, thus providing invaluable insights unattainable through live experimentation or traditional analog wargaming.

Gathering enhanced data from multiple validated sources allows for demonstrable, repeatable, and defensible results. Insights gained from this approach are crucial for informing senior leaders and supporting their decision making. Collaboration with the Joint Force, as well as with allies and partners, will enhance collective readiness and interoperability—essential in an ever-changing global security environment. 

Experimentation By, With, and Through the Fleet
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Experiment Division (ExDiv) plans, executes, and reports the results of threat-informed, live-force experiments conducted to advance the future warfighting capabilities of the Marine Corps. Live-force experimentation builds on the analysis generated from M&S and wargames by providing a venue to test ideas under real-world conditions and standards. Through research questions and learning objectives developed and tailored for each experiment, ExDiv generates critical insights into experimental priorities as recently demonstrated during Phase I and II of Marine Corps Infantry Battalion experimentation and during Marine littoral regiment experimentation in a III MEF Force Integration Exercise. 

ExDiv has supported Marine Corps modernization through the conduct of numerous experiments; a sampling of noteworthy ones includes: 

Phase II of Marine Corps Infantry Battalion experimentation is underway to observe and collect data on recent modernization efforts that span the man, train, and equip spectrum. Additive capabilities that enhance all-weather direct and indirect fire weapons consist of Group 2 small unmanned aircraft systems, loitering munitions, and organic signals intelligence/electronic warfare. As the character of warfare changes, ExDiv continues to work with Headquarters Marine Corps stakeholders to train and equip the warfighter contributing to a more lethal, survivable, and resilient infantry battalion required for the modern-day battlefield. 

The conditions of the future threat environment place increased importance on winning the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance battle. The Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion experiment represents a critical step in reimagining the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct multi-domain reconnaissance. Experimentation with manned and unmanned platforms in the air, maritime, and land domains will advance the modernization of reconnaissance formations, allow stand-in forces to provide critical and timely information, and extend the commander’s operational reach. 

ExDiv, in partnership with 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, has experimented with the Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft (MMRC) to provide organic littoral maneuver capabilities, supporting surveillance, intelligence collection, target acquisition, and reconnaissance while reducing detectable signatures in high-threat areas. The MMRC’s modular design enables rapid configuration for various mission needs, allowing reconnaissance units to deploy advanced sensor suites or direct-action payloads as required. 

Additionally, ExDiv and 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion are preparing to incorporate the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC) into experimental venues. These autonomous platforms enable persistent, unmanned sensing capabilities within the contested littorals. The Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Crafts enhance reconnaissance operations by autonomously monitoring critical zones, detecting potential threats, and transmitting real-time data back to commanders. The MMRC and GARC provide the maritime reconnaissance platoons the platforms, sensors, weapons systems, and ability to maneuver to support MAGTF operations in the littorals. The integration of the maritime reconnaissance platoons under the maritime reconnaissance company concept of employment sets the stage for a robust, adaptable reconnaissance capability that strengthens the MAGTF’s ability to operate across complex multi-domain environments.

Project Convergence Capstone 4 represented a milestone in the Marine Corps’ journey toward modernization goals. This Army-hosted event emphasized advanced air and missile defense systems, sensor integration, littoral mobility platforms, unmanned systems integration, and Joint Force interoperability. ExDiv worked in collaboration with Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity to improve integrating joint and combined fires and multidomain operations. ExDiv also tested a multidomain corridor concept, creating maneuver space by establishing control from the seafloor to space. This concept is expected to play a crucial role in future littoral and contested environments. Notably, ExDiv partnered with multiple DOD entities to improve sensor integration and validated capabilities like the MAGTF command and control Minimum Viable Product, which executed joint fires and enhanced weapon track capabilities through advanced sensor data sharing.

VALIANT SHIELD 24 (VS24) underscored the importance of multinational, cross-domain collaboration for the Indo-Pacific region. Taking place in the summer of 2024 in locations across the first and second island chains, VS24 included forces from every branch of the military. This exercise emphasized interoperability in multi-domain operations and refined joint training across air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. During VS24, ExDiv assisted U.S., allied, and partner forces in developing regional and global power projection capabilities. Training scenarios focused on integrating the unique strengths of each Service, from cyber operations to naval maneuvers, thus enhancing interoperability and preparing joint and combined forces to respond to crises, contingencies, and complex missions.

Equipping Today’s Warfighter with Tomorrow’s Technology
Incorporating advanced technologies into live-force experimentation helps generate more insightful learning output. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Science and Technology (S&T) Division works with the Office of Naval Research, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DOD, Marine Corps Systems Command, Program Executive Office, Headquarters Marine Corps and industry partners to develop the vision, policies, and strategies needed to leverage scientific research and technological development in support of Marine Corps combat development and some of the operating forces’ most pressing needs.

Science and Technology Division’s approach emphasizes rapid development, testing, and integration of new technologies and operational concepts, mirroring the urgency and adaptability of wartime innovation to maintain a competitive edge. Significant advantages include rapid iteration, cost-effectiveness, and increased collaboration throughout the capability development process. Providing prototypes to the FMF facilitates real-world experimentation and bottom-up refinements that foster a culture of innovation essential in today’s environment. 

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory S&T projects bridge the gap between cutting-edge technology and practical application. For example, the Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel, a 55-foot, fully autonomous vessel designed for stealth and survivability, can deliver weapons and supplies over long distances. Inspired by semi-submersible designs, the Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel provides operational options in contested environments. Recent deployments to Okinawa underscore its utility in addressing logistical challenges in the Indo-Pacific and showcase the Marine Corps’ ability to rapidly adapt to evolving operational demands. 

The Stern Landing Vessel, a precursor to the Landing Ship Medium supports littoral maneuver in support of distributed forces. Recent testing proved the Stern Landing Vessel’s capability to sustain forward-deployed units in austere and contested environments. The Marine Corps also made significant advancements in loitering munitions, increasing small-unit lethality through over-the-horizon precision targeting. These systems, including air-launched swarming munitions, reduce risks to manned platforms while providing a decisive advantage in dynamic operational scenarios.

In an increasingly interconnected and information-driven world, Marines must have access to the information they need, when they need it, at the appropriate classification levels, with the necessary authorities to act on it. Science and Technology Division, in conjunction with MCWL’s Security Division, has made significant strides in providing that information within the combat development community and the FMF including developing capabilities that will enable improved decision making and enhanced war‑
fighting capability at all echelons. For example, the Family of Integrated Targeting Cells provides a more cohesive approach to command and control of multi-domain operations by integrating realtime targeting data from multiple sources into a comprehensive, common operating picture. Leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning, Family of Integrated Targeting Cells is crucial for maintaining the technological edge of distributed Marine Corps forces and for enhancing situational awareness and coordination among joint and allied forces.

The Marine Corps’ commitment to S&T experimentation represents a bold step toward aligning innovation with operational effectiveness. Through several MCWL initiatives, the Marine Corps is redefining how technology integrates into military operations. And the Marine Corps is not going it alone. Increased cooperation with allies and partners balanced with internal innovation ensures long-term resilience. By embracing this paradigm shift S&T helps ensure Marine forces continue to thrive in an increasingly complex and contested world. 

Conclusion
A force design amounts to a set of operating concepts depicting a force that does not exist today. This future force must be equipped with the methods for operating and cutting-edge technologies that will allow it to accomplish its assigned mission against adversaries who are likewise rapidly modernizing and increasing their warfighting capability and capacity. Correctly envisioning this future force is a notoriously difficult task, a challenge that is compounded by the need to maintain readiness for inevitable near-term crises. 

Today’s operating environment is markedly different than that of 30 years ago. Since its inception, MCWL’s charge to identify novel ways and means of operating remains consistent, but trends such as increased global strategic competition and the rapid proliferation and democratization of technology demand that innovation occur more quickly. Those innovation decisions, however, must be informed and supported by a thoroughly validated body of evidence to ensure that the Service is not accepting unnecessary risk or poorly utilizing its resources.

To this end, MCWL continues to aggressively chart the course ahead for the Marine Corps force design journey. Through wargaming, modeling, and simulation, science, and technology development, and live-force experimentation, the ideas expressed in future operating concepts are rigorously examined for their viability for implementation across the force. Continuous adaptation to change against an unstable backdrop of world events requires agility, creativity, and a mindset of risk acceptance. Through MCWL’s experimentation efforts across its divisions, the Marine Corps leads the way in innovation, simultaneously adapting to today’s realities and the ever-changing battlefield of tomorrow, allowing Marines to deter conflict, and when deterrence fails, defeat the Nation’s enemies in battle.

Project Sea Wolf

2024 LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest Winner: Honorable Mention

Marine boat squadron

Recent global security events have confirmed that we must accelerate preparation for contingencies. The Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Hamas conflicts are indicative of the volatile reality and delicate nature of the global security environment we currently live in. The Corps has a long tradition of achieving greater efficiency with fewer or less exquisite resources. As we prepare for potential conflicts, we must change our approach and deviate from traditional scenarios of large-scale attacks launched from the sea. The optimal advanced platforms and weapons required for the next major conflict may also not be readily available in voluminous quantities. We must embrace ingenuity and prepare to fight soon by pushing the boundaries of mature systems while creating an unfair advantage. In the words of Brad Smith, president of Microsoft, “Since the dawn of time, any tool can be used for good or ill. Even a broom can be used to sweep the floor or hit someone over the head.”1 Smith’s quote embodies how we must audaciously approach the subsequent application of solutions. 

Directives and Opportunity (Who and Where)
There is extraordinary transparency within the latest iteration of major fleet directives. The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Navigation Plan 2024 undoubtedly define the most imminent threat to the Naval Services. The CNO cautions that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is preparing for war by 2027.2 Gen Smith referenced the 2022 National Defense Strategy as an overarching directive and delineated the PRC as the primary competitor.3 The PRC remains a robustly resourced and complex aggressive global competitor. There are a variety of dissenting opinions on the U.S. military’s best counterforce response to the PRC if necessary. Overwhelming firepower is an obvious choice but an elusive retaliation plan against the PRC. However, it would be more advantageous for the Marine Corps to dissect the potency of the PRC with an alternative asymmetrical concept. 

Oddly enough, the CNO’s Navigation Plan 2024 provides insight into a new prospective priority Marine Corps mission area. ADM Franchetti illuminated the complexity of the PRC’s interconnected utilization of dual-use forces such as the Chinese maritime militia. 4 As reported by the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the Chinese maritime militia employs commercial fishing vessels to engage in coordinated aggressive sea denial swarming tactics in tandem with People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard ships.5

Reports also claim that Chinese fishing vessels frequently deceive maritime transponders and falsify their identity to evade detection.6 The Chinese maritime militia has created a Blue Ocean demand in business parlance without an existing market solution.7 Problem sets, such as the Chinese maritime militia, are best neutralized with non-kinetic resources in the advent of conflict. Neither the Corps nor the Navy have openly discussed a remedy for noncombatant vessels akin to the maritime militia in the past. Therefore, the Corps should have a vested interest in locating and interdicting fishing vessels, if necessary, as part of the overarching fleet campaign in the Indo-Pacific area of operations.

“MARSOC seeks to provide the joint force with the capability to share the operating environment; illuminate adversary actions, activities, and intentions; and provide options to impose cost, both kinetically and non-kinetically, from competition to conflict.” 8

—Gen David H. Berger

Raiders of the Lost Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) (Who 2.0 and What)
For the new project to succeed, the Marine Corps must depart from existing practices and create a spinout organization to support maritime reconnaissance.9 The traditional MAGTF construct has the potential for numerous friction points and competing interests. Traditionalists would say a new formation is simply a SP-MAGTF, but a familiar naming convention only deters progress. Therefore, a newly acquired Marine maritime reconnaissance platform and associated personnel should be a stand-alone formation. The force’s composition should remain as fluid as the virtues of the MAGTF but with an eye on externally proven structures. 

Our reverence for partners and allies is often discussed and mentioned as a strategic pillar. However, we can apply noteworthy value from our partners and capitalize on their lessons learned. In particular, the maritime expertise of the British Special Boat Squadrons.10 In experimental form, a Raider formation can reorganize in the footprint of a Special Boat Squadrons unit and be attached to an amphibious warship. The combined new formation and designated personnel would constitute a Marine Boat Squadron. Fortuitously, the Raider Regiment already has a distinguished history of operations in the western Pacific dating back to their reconnaissance collaborations with Coast Watchers during World War II.11

Raiders inherently possess the organic training, personnel, and organizational flexibility to establish a counterforce solution to the Chinese maritime militia network problem. In execution, this would reconnect the Raiders to their Indo-Pacific roots in a modern-day naval role. The optimal initial concept of operations also needs to depart from the standard ARG. Yet, the formation can remain close to the convenient and familiar accommodations of the San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD). Contrarians would argue that MEUs are already capable of special operations, but there is a distinction between special operations forces and special operational capability certification. The variance concerns mission authorities, proficiency, risk tolerance, and funding. 

The possibility of Marines operating small boats soon has quietly gained traction. The Corps has a rich history with small vessels and previously operated several purpose-built riverine boats. Recently, the Marine Corps Reserve and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory expressed interest in acquiring small boats for experimentation.12 Initial reports indicate the small boats are for littoral operations. Nonetheless, the combination of history and recent events does not arrive at fulfilling an over-the-horizon maritime reconnaissance role. Inevitably, including a small boat over the horizon equipped with reconnaissance operators changes the completion of the ARG-MEU team. It provides a means to close in on a problem set with a reduced signature and decreased risk-to-force.

The trouble with requirements is the struggle between aspirational and operational reality. The notional small boat platform needs to be more survivable than rigid inflatable boats with the potential combat power of World War II patrol torpedo (PT) boats. The main priority must be to acquire a small boat with sufficient operational endurance and compatibility with amphibious ships. Secondly, additional arguments over increased firepower and missile systems will only obstruct and delay the acquisition of a platform. The projected acquisition of the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) in FY2025 for 268 million dollars should serve as a cautionary tale for a maritime maneuver vessel initiative.13 The appropriate small boat acquisition is feasible through rapid prototyping of mature sea-frame designs or commercial options at a fraction of the cost of the LSM.

“Take an institution, a technology, or a method that has been forgotten or discarded and appropriate it for your own purpose. Revive something from the past by giving it a new purpose or to reinterpret and bring to life old ideas, customs, and traditions.” 14

—Stefan H. Verstappen

Sea Wolf and the Ghost
How much is extracted and applied from history is a matter of perspective. In recent years, the Navy has demonstrated some indifference to its small-boat history. The Navy never truly realized the MK VI patrol boat’s potential and ultimately killed the program as a cost-cutting measure.15 The utility of small maritime platforms is a topic of great consternation and debate. In 2021, OPNAV N95 deemed the now-divested MK VI patrol boats as non-essential in wargaming scenarios due to their limited firepower.16 However, wargaming scenarios or firepower should not be the metrics that determine a platform’s holistic utility. If those were valid metrics, the landing craft utility and landing craft air cushion would have been decommissioned several decades ago. Since the Navy disestablished the MK VI program, the Ukrainian Navy has reportedly received the boats and employed them for patrols in the Black Sea.17 The Marine Corps must not repeat the same errors the Navy made with its contemporary assessment of patrol boats.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict has challenged assumptions regarding missile firepower on a microscale and demonstrated the potential value of asymmetric warfighting capabilities. Ukraine’s tactical maritime creativity and employment of small commercial unmanned sea drones are a valuable example of asymmetric weapons innovation.18 The Houthis have also aggressively improvised irregular warfare at sea with unsophisticated technology.19 In June 2024, Houthis utilized an uncrewed surface vehicle disguised as a fishing vessel to successfully execute a kamikaze attack on the MV Tutor in the Red Sea.20 Conversely, during World War II, ADM John “Sea Wolf” Bulkeley achieved significant tactical-level
success against superior opposition as commander of the experimental PT boat unit, Submarine Division Two.21 ADM Bulkeley’s PT boats were a combination of simplicity and power. Bulkeley’s PT boats were outfitted with depth-charge racks and achieved a maximum speed of 55 knots.22 Given the emergence of irregular maritime activities, the Raiders are well-positioned to apply relevant elements from ADM Bulkeley, Ukraine’s tactical victories, and present-day asymmetrical threats. 

The required mature technology is already tested, prevalent, and available. The carcass of the Mark VI patrol boat requires postmortem examination beyond its utility in the littoral environment focused on the conceptual supplementary intersectional platforms capable of connecting sea-based operating forces with broader expeditionary advanced base operation activities. The MK VI’s sea-frame was among its best and most relevant qualities. In particular, the MK VI’s well-deck compatibility with amphibious ships; passenger capacity; 600+ nautical mile range; and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence capabilities.23 Significant untapped potential exists in disaggregated data link interoperability and common tactical picture integration. The MK VI also left behind a codified doctrinal procedure in the Navy’s Wet Well Manual for amphibious shipping well deck interoperability to be duplicated or modified for another sea-frame. Ultimately, the specific maritime platform is less important than the collective aggregation of the essential technical systems and functionality. 

Replicator and the Expendables (How)
Resource pairing and optimization are the foundational pillars of the Marine boat squadron concept. It principally combines operators with a menu of full-spectrum tactical options. Operationalizing the spinout is achievable by pairing the formation with a San Antonio-Class LPD deploying independently from an ARG. An independent deployer reduces the potential of mission creep and operational friction with broader MAGTF command element priorities. Secondly, it provides the Marine boat squadron the latitude to modify the personnel footprint without conceding shipboard space to other elements. The Marine boat squadron also provides force planners with a unique deployment package. 

The boat squadron and associated boat of choice are 50 percent of the prospective cumulative combat power available. The DOD is transforming the other 50 percent of the equation from aspirational to operational under the umbrella of the Replicator initiative.25 The Replicator program is devoted to fielding thousands of affordable autonomous systems across multiple domains.26 

Conversely, the Marine boat squadron’s boat would make an optimal host vessel for unmanned undersea, surface, and aerial Replicator systems. The notional squadron can be supported by its resource agent with mature technology to conduct multi-dimensional reconnaissance or kinetic tasking. Prepackaged containerized loitering munition launchers are also a realistic option.27 The Replicator systems could be loaded as expendable kinetic or non-kinetic as dictated by tasking and mission authorities. The fully developed technology available from the Replicator initiative is an upgrade from the MK VI’s MK38 machinegun system and reduces the demand for permanent weight and electrical power on the host platform. 

The parallels between the past and the potential future are often peculiar. The maritime guerilla tactics and ingenuity utilized by Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) over several decades ago are a prime case study. The squadron can draw upon the LTTE Sea Tiger, the Black Tigers group’s combined conventional swarm tactics, one-way explosive fast attacks, and electronic domain exploitation.28 The Black Tigers repeatedly proved the validity and lethality of coordinated asymmetrical attacks. A well-resourced Marine boat squadron could significantly improve the LTTE’s maritime guerilla tactics via tandem manned boat and unmanned Replicator system operations for various naval targets. 

“We need to conceive new ideas to address the problems and opportunities that surround us—and we need to defy the odds and make ideas actually happen.” 29

—Scott Belsky

Catalysts of Change (Why)
A Marine boat squadron with organic boats is a sensible and realistic choice at the tactical level. Patrol-size boats do not garner the adversary’s satellite and radar resources compared to an aircraft carrier or other higher-profile ships.30 In the same regard, skeptics often portray today’s anti-access/area denial challenge as an unsolvable problem.31 Yet, a patrol boat can serve as an appropriate tactical countermeasure under the right circumstances. Logically, a missile barrage is not the appropriate countermeasure for a patrol-size boat. The anti-access/area-denial missile threat is more likely a problem for an LSM than a patrol boat. Thus, the opportunity for Marines to influence and change behavior in the maritime environment is highly probable and available now.

The maritime domain is dynamic and replete with expansive operational opportunities for willing participants. That is why nefarious vessels continuously exploit loopholes and freely deceive maritime transponder protocols. The ships engaged in continuous deception are doing so with motive and intent. There are simply too many of these vessels operating unchecked. Recently, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released a report on Iranian weapons smuggling operations in support of the Houthis spanning nearly a decade.32 According to the DIA, the United States and its allies have successfully interdicted twenty Iranian smuggling vessels at sea.33 The most concerning aspect of the DIA report is that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force has been identified as the source provider for the now seized anti-ship and guided missiles and ballistic missile components for the Houthis.34 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force activities leave several questions unanswered. How many other vessels are out at sea engaging in smuggling? What other state and non-state actors are involved in smuggling missiles and high-capacity weapons? Are we doing enough to solve this dilemma for the Joint Force? 

A Marine boat squadron will undoubtedly change the Joint Forces’ options to surveil, interdict, or neutralize vessels as needed. A forward-deployed squadron on a maritime maneuver platform can extend the battlespace for an LPD and other warships. The operators and boats can facilitate more sea space for Navy ships to operate outside adversary missile ranges. Ultimately, the capability is dynamic enough to influence the patterns and behaviors of other vessels. 

Raiders are the optimal Marines to accomplish the specialized cross-training necessary for a Marine boat squadron faster than any other entity due to their extensive pool of personnel. Moreover, the Raider screening and selection process establishes an increased baseline for the individual operator’s capabilities. In addition, Raiders are more likely to own additional exquisite, portable technical systems complementary to a patrol-style boat and Replicator systems. The Raiders’ inherent access to expansive resources accelerates the functionality and employability of a forthcoming Marine boat squadron deployment. Moreover, designating this task to special operations forces ultimately bypasses the cumbersome procedural obstructions of the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities process.35

Initiating a project of this magnitude is less complicated or expensive than the alternatives. Formally funded programmatic systems too often suffer from budgetary casualties and industrial inertia. Moreover, a Marine boat squadron project does not require special policies. Instead, it requires trust that an elite organization within the Marine Corps has the experience and ingenuity to push boundaries. 

>LCDR Fermin is a Surface Warfare Officer and Amphibious Warfare Tactics Instructor serving as the Operations Officer onboard USS Portland (LPD-27). 

Notes

1. Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne, Tools and Weapons: The Promise and the Peril of the Digital Age (New York: Penguin Books, 2021).

2. Chief of Naval Operations, Lisa M. Franchetti, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy 2024 (Washington, DC: 2024).

3. Gen Eric M. Smith, 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: August 2024).

4. Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy 2024.

5. Umar Ahmed Badami, “Under the Radar: Weaponizing Maritime Transponders in Strategic Competition,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, January 13, 2024, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/under-the-radar-weaponizing-maritime-transponders-in-strategic-competition.

6. Ibid.

7. W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, “Blue Ocean Strategy,” Harvard Business Review, June 6, 2024, https://hbr.org/2004/10/blue-ocean-strategy.

8. Gen David H. Berger, “Statement of General David H. Berger Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the Marine Corps,” Marines.mil, March 28, 2023, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3360019/statement-of-general-david-h-berger-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-postu.

9. Clayton M. Christensen and Marc Benioff, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Press, 2024).

10. Samuel A. Southworth and Stephen Tanner, U.S. Special Forces: A Guide to America’s Special Operations Units: The World’s Most Elite Fighting Force (Cambridge: Da Capo, 2002).

11. Ibid. 

12. Irene Loewenson, “New in 2023: Small Boats for Marine Reserve Experimentation,” Marine Corps Times, May 5, 2023, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2022/12/28/new-in-2023-small-boats-for-marine-reserve-experimentation.

13. U.S. Naval Institute Staff, “Report to Congress on Navy Medium Landing Ship,” USNI News, April 26, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/04/26/report-to-congress-on-navy-medium-landing-ship-4.

14. Stefan H. Verstappen, The Thirty-Six Strategies (Toronto: Woodbridge Press, 2017).

15. Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Confirms It Wants to Ditch Its Very Young Mk VI Patrol Boats in New Budget Request,” The War Zone, May 28, 2021, https://www.twz.com/40844/navy-confirms-it-wants-to-ditch-its-very-young-mk-vi-patrol-boats-in-new-budget-request.

16. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “The Navy Wants to Get Rid of Its Nearly Brand New Patrol Boats,” The War Zone, February 15, 2021, https://www.twz.com/39240/the-navy-wants-to-get-rid-of-its-nearly-brand-new-patrol-boats.

17. Tayfun Ozberk, “Ukraine’s First Mk VI Patrol Boat Breaks Cover,” Naval News, January 26, 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/ukraines-first-mk-vi-patrol-boat-breaks-cover.

18. H.I. Sutton, “Suspected Ukrainian Explosive Sea Drone Made from Recreational Watercraft Parts,” USNI News, October 11, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/10/11/suspected-ukrainian-explosive-sea-drone-made-from-jet-ski-parts.

19. Howard Altman, “First Look at Houthi Kamikaze Drone Boat That Struck Cargo

Ship in Red Sea,” The War Zone, June 17, 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/first-look-at-houthi-kamikaze-drone-boat-that-struck-cargo-ship-in-red-sea.

20. Ibid. 

21. William B. Breuer, Sea Wolf: The Daring Exploits of Navy Legend, John D. Bulkeley (Novato: Presidio, 1989).

22. Ibid.

23. Staff, “Mark VI Patrol Boat,” Navy.mil, n.d., https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2173363/mark-vi-patrol-boat.

24. Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas Come From: The Seven Patterns of Innovation (London: Penguin, 2011).

25. Christopher Woodbridge and Vic Ruble, “Scuttlebutt Ep 164: Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2024,” MCA Scuttlebutt, September 26, 2024, podcast, website, 34:57, https://www.mca-marines.org/podcast/scuttlebutt/
scuttlebutt-ep-164-commandants-planning-guidance-2024.

26. U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Innovation Official Says Replicator Initiative Remains on Track,” Defense.gov, n.d., https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3657609/defense-innovation-official-says-replicator-initiative-remains-on-track.

27. Joseph Trevithick, “Shipping Container Launcher Packing 126 Kamikaze Drones Hits the Market,” The War Zone, June 17, 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/shipping-container-launcher-packing-126-kamikaze-
drones-hits-the-market#:~:text=The%20modified%20shipping%20container%20with,including%20in%20the%20maritime%20domain.

28. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, and Paul A. Povlock, A Guerilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War (Newport: Small Wars Journal, 2011).

29. Scott Belsky, Making Ideas Happen: Overcoming the Obstacles Between Vision and Reality (New York: Portfolio, 2014).

30. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette Books, 2022).

31. Future Joint Force Development, Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide (Washington, DC: 2016).

32. Defense Intelligence Agency, Seized at Sea: Iranian Weapons Smuggled to the Houthis (Washington, DC: April 2024).

33. Ibid. 

34. Seized at Sea: Iranian Weapons Smuggled to the Houthis.

35. Staff, “Dotmlpf Process,” Marines.mil, n.d., https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/889374/dotmlpf-process.

Lighting the Way

2024 LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest Winner: First Place

Marines, missiles, MPF boats, and the path through PRC defenses in the Western Pacific

 

The onset of World War II saw U.S. naval forces experimenting with new technologies to mitigate territorial advantages held by the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces. As the campaign in the Pacific unfolded, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps elements found themselves operating beyond the expanses of the open ocean, closer to coastal areas. When warships were pushed to navigate inside confined waterways, the newly developed patrol torpedo (PT) boat emerged as an unexpectedly effective capability to support maritime operations. Fast, highly maneuverable, and relatively inexpensive to build, hundreds of PT boats were organized into squadrons and deployed across the Western Pacific. They proved especially useful during the Solomon Islands Campaign, engaging Imperial Japanese Navy warships attempting to transit the narrow channels of Iron Bottom Sound.1 With their elusive speed, considerable firepower, and seemingly unescapable quantity, PT boats disrupted Imperial Japanese Navy resupply and other maritime operations. Eight decades later, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as the new competitor in the Western Pacific and seeks to capitalize on similar territorial advantages within the region. Given the ambiguity surrounding a potential conflict, U.S. naval forces may again need to leverage experimental capabilities to ensure freedom of maneuver in the Pacific.

The new era of conflict will require U.S. maritime forces to contend with traditional PRC warships and more obtrusive surface vessels. Limited means to predict the catalyst for hostilities will require U.S. forces to pull existing capabilities into the fight to achieve initial operating objectives. Small, fast, and flexible watercraft will be the key to bridging the gap between the activities of warships and vessels operating at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Fortunately, U.S. naval forces already possess the tools to build a capability to address emerging threats. Marine Corps stand-in forces (SIF), deployed throughout the Western Pacific, are well-postured to operate across the continuum of competition or conflict. The maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) utility boat (UB) is a small and versatile craft currently employed by the Military Sea-Lift Command. The Javelin missile, organic to designated Army and Marine Corps formations, can support offensive or defensive operations against various adversarial threats. Combining the attributes of these seemingly disparate resources will produce a uniquely suited capability to mitigate the challenges presented by intermediate PRC threats. Teams of SIF Marines, armed with Javelin missiles and employed aboard MPF-UBs, will provide the maritime component commander with a platform to disrupt PRC operations in contested waterways.

Within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility, the PRC continues to develop and employ maritime technologies to achieve an asymmetric advantage over existing U.S. naval formations. The intricate web of anti-access/area denial capabilities is designed to deny entry and prevent freedom of maneuver throughout the first island chain (FIC). Missile boats, patrol boats, and other small watercraft present significant threats to all classes of friendly vessels attempting to transit the waters of the South China Sea (SCS). Their small size, low signature, and high speeds allow for rapid approaches to warships to penetrate minimum weapons engagement zones and operate inside defenses. The ambiguous nature of purported law enforcement or other non-military vessels strains the ability to discern intent, inhibiting the rapid engagement of prospective threats. Hefty procurement costs associated with existing and emerging U.S. anti-ship capabilities render their use against smaller PRC threats inefficient. The employment of a flexible naval asset capable of responding to threats across the spectrum of conflict will be essential to defeating coordinated layers of PRC maritime defenses. 

The Type 022 Houbei-class missile patrol boat is a pivotal element of the PLAN near-seas defense strategy. The low draft, top speed of 42 knots, and a combat radius of 250 km make these boats the ideal platform to conduct operations around PLA bases and occupied territories throughout the FIC. Armed with up to eight YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), they are capable of attacking ships at distances out to 200 km.2 When employed under the cover of PLA integrated air defense systems, they can extend their operating ranges and further reduce the availability of vital maritime terrain. They attack by converging on a target with multiple boats, engaging in swarm tactics to destroy a U.S. Navy warship or constrain its ability to maneuver. Defeating the presence and effect of Houbei-class missile boats will be critical to enable the successful execution of the U.S. maritime strategy in the Western Pacific.

Another layer of the PRC maritime defense is executed by the China Coast Guard (CCG). Deployed from coastal bases and other inshore locations, its primary function is to enforce maritime laws within China’s proclaimed territorial waters. The Jiangdao-class cutters, created from repurposed warships, allow for easy conversion from law enforcement operations to a surface warfare platform.3 The equipping of Zhongtao-class patrol boats with large-caliber machineguns and high-capacity water cannons further obfuscates their perceived threat level, complicating rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for use of force (RUF) decision making when responding to their activities.4 The pervasive presence of cutters and other patrol boats also represents a persistent PRC intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR-T) capability. To operate undetected and freely maneuver across the FIC, U.S. Naval forces must develop the means to counter CCG patrols and other ISR-T activities.

The third component of the PRC maritime defense strategy is the China Maritime Militia (CMM). Within the SCS, CMM vessels execute a variety of grey-zone tactics to enable the achievement of larger strategic objectives. Though not an official component of the PLA, they have been employed in conjunction with PLAN and CCG vessels to reinforce territorial claims during designated operations.5 Their firepower is limited, but crews are equipped with various small arms and the hulls of their boats are constructed using reinforced steel.6 This allows for the employment of aggressive tactics against civilian or military support vessels, as they engage in overt anti-access/area denial activities to deny foreign vessel operations in disputed waterways. CMM boats can also be outfitted with radars, navigation equipment, and communications to facilitate their employment as an ISR-T platform. Interdicting CMM operations will limit the disruption to sea lines of communication, providing U.S. warships the ability to operate unmolested inside the contested waters of the FIC.

Each echelon of PRC maritime defenses presents unique challenges to traditional naval operations in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. The preponderance of existing U.S. Navy capabilities in the Western Pacific are designed to engage PLAN warships or operate against high-level threats. Attempts to overcome the density and volume of lethality afforded by the Type 022 missile boats would quickly exhaust the countermeasures of the deepest operational magazines. Mitigating the pervasiveness of CCG activities to limit PRC maritime domain awareness will require the deployment of substantiative counter ISR-T capabilities. Once hostilities unfold, the ambiguous nature of CMM operations will demand a measured approach to the application of the ROE and RUF to manage the potential for escalation. Addressing intermediate threats across the spectrum of conflict will be essential to the success of U.S. naval forces operating within the web of PRC maritime defenses.

Marine Corps SIF are specifically designed to operate within contested areas, conducting sea-denial operations
to disrupt the maneuver of an adversary’s naval forces.7 Forward positioned within the FIC, they represent a foundational component of the U.S. naval strategy to mitigate the presence of PRC maritime threats. When provided with a maneuverable and low-signature watercraft, SIF Marines will be able to rapidly move about contested waters within a given area of operations. Their vessels must be fast, agile, and possess a shallow draft to allow for rapid ingress and egress of low-water areas. Crew-served weapons and other small arms will provide the organic force protection capabilities needed to ensure their survivability. A moderately ranged high-explosive projectile will offer the fire support required to neutralize or destroy smaller enemy surface vessels. Equipping SIF Marines with the requisite capabilities to deliberately shoot, rapidly move, and effectively communicate will enhance their ability to degrade intermediate PRC maritime threats in the Western Pacific.

Maritime pre-positioning force utility boats are one of the best assets to support transportation requirements within coastal areas. As a component of the Improved Naval Lighterage System, they are used by the Military Sea-Lift Command to move personnel and equipment during MPF operations. With a length of just over 41 feet and a beam of 14 feet, they have a very low profile and produce a limited radar signature during the conduct of operations. Two 660 horsepower diesel engines power a waterjet propulsion system, giving these boats significant maneuverability as they reach speeds of up to 41 knots.8 Their draft of just under three feet allows for easy navigation into and out of shallow water areas. A ramp positioned at the center of the bow enables the rapid discharge of up to 10 tons of cargo, 30 combat-loaded troops, or other materials directly onto a beach.9 The characteristics of the MPF-UB make it an ideal platform to support the maritime maneuver requirements for SIF Marines within the FIC.

The Javelin Close Combat Missile System (CCMS) is the primary anti-tank weapon for the Army and Marine Corps. It is a lightweight, man-portable, fire-and-forget missile that can easily be employed from a small vessel. In the Marine Corps, they are assigned to infantry units and employed by anti-tank missile gunners. The 8.4 kg high-explosive anti-tank warhead is autonomously delivered against targets operating at distances as far as 2,500 meters.10 The reusable command launch unit enables rapid target acquisition while also providing an enhanced daytime or infrared night vision surveillance capability. The Javelin possesses the characteristics to be the desired lethal surface-fires capability for SIF Marines conducting sea-denial operations inside the contested waterways.

Combining task-organized SIF elements, MPF-UBs, and the Javelin CCMS into a single platform will create a highly lethal capability to provide the maritime component the means to disrupt PRC operations across the spectrum of conflict. These new Marine light assault missile patrol (LAMP) boats will have the maneuverability and firepower needed to engage and neutralize intermediate adversary threats in coastal areas. Their speed will allow them to rapidly close with Houbei-class missile boats and then attack them with a volley of self-guided anti-tank missiles. Their ability to outmaneuver CCG cutters and other small craft will place them in a position to interdict maritime patrol operations or disrupt ISR-T activities inside the FIC. Marine crews armed with various small arms and crew-served weapons provide the flexibility needed to contact CMM vessels, discern their intent, and engage them if determined to be hostile. When effectively organized and widely employed within SCS, Marine LAMP Boats will be able to create opportunities for Navy warships to maneuver.

This concept is not without some disadvantages, which could impede its development and limit successful implementation. Training will be one of the primary limitations to inhibit the widespread deployment of LAMP Boats. Though infantry units are already organized with anti-tank missile gunners and machinegunners, coxswains, and navigators are not widely present in any current Marine Corps formation. Leveraging the knowledge and expertise of the Navy’s assault craft units for exercises and training can increase nautical proficiency, providing time to build capacity and mature an organic capability. Survivability is another considerable challenge within the LAMP boat concept. The MPF-UB’s relatively small size and aluminum construction will make them susceptible to deck guns, surface-to-surface missiles, or other large-caliber weapons. Crews must be prepared to maximize the MPF-UB’s speed and maneuverability to evade PLAN warships and avoid potential engagements. The final challenge to the successful employment of this concept will be the requirement for maintenance. As with other surface vessels, MPF-UBs rely on daily preventative maintenance checks and services and occasional higher-level repairs to remain operational. Littoral logistics battalions with engineer equipment mechanics or the expertise of mechanics of allies and partners will provide the technicians needed to service the MPF-UB’s two six-cylinder diesel engines. This will ensure vessels remain operational and can quickly return to the station following preventative maintenance or repairs. Mitigating the identified shortfalls will facilitate the successful employment of the LAMP boat concept while remining perceptive of other challenges during maritime operations in the FIC.

Despite the apparent challenges, the numerous advantages of the LAMP boat concept encourage the maritime component to pursue further development of this initiative. Cost is one of the primary benefits, given the limited fiscal investment required to facilitate the fielding of this platform. The price for an MPF-UB is approximately $1M and an Javelin CCMS is less than $250K for the full system; less than $100K when procuring the missile only.11 This is considerably cheaper than the estimated $3M for each Block II Harpoon missile, $2M for a Naval Strike Missile, and other high costs associated with individual ASCM systems.12 Versatility is another key advantage to the employment of LAMP boats, as they can support multiple warfighting functions. The low draft, high-payload capacity, and convenient bow ramp enable MPF-UBs to perform a variety of enabling tasks during patrols. They can easily be configured to support supply delivery, medical evacuation, or other logistics functions when not engaged in offensive operations. The most significant advantage of this concept is the ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. At the high end of the spectrum, the delivery of a volley of Javelin missiles provides a level of lethality commensurate with that of an ASCM. At the lower end of the spectrum, the ability to apply ROE/RUF considerations allows Lamp Boat crews to interrogate vessels conducting grey-zone activities and classify their status as friend or foe.

Should hostilities commence in USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, the defense in depth created by PRC anti-access/area denial capabilities has the potential to inhibit the successful entry and maneuver of U.S. naval forces. Houbei-class missile boats, CCG cutters, and CMM vessels present a variety of challenges to traditional naval operations and require a new approach for a successful campaign. Though ASCMs and other exquisite weapons systems will be essential in the fight against the PLAN, their expense and long development period could result in their untimely delivery for the prospective fight. The LAMP boat concept provides the maritime component commander with an immediately available, cost-effective, and highly lethal platform to address intermediate PRC threats within the FIC. The MPF-UB has the speed and maneuverability to keep up with Houbei-class missile boats, and the Javelin CCMS warhead is more than sufficient to neutralize the threat. They are versatile enough to interdict CCG cutters and other purported maritime law enforcement boats, disrupting PRC ISR-T activities and allowing U.S. vessels to operate more freely in the contested waterways. The LAMP boats can directly respond to CMM vessels attempting to disrupt sea lines of communication or engage in maritime surveillance, applying the appropriate level of force to neutralize their effect without concern for inadvertent escalation. The LAMP boat concept will provide the means to chart a path through echelons of mutually supporting PRC defenses, opening waterways in the SCS for U.S. warships to safely maneuver. 

>Col Rainey is currently assigned as the AC/S G-9 for Marine Corps Installations Command, following graduation from the National War College in June 2024. Before being promoted to Colonel, he served as a Military Police Officer and completed various assignments within FMF and supporting establishment organizations.

Notes

1. Edmund B. Hernandez, “Fifty Tons of Fury: Bring Back the Patrol Torpedo Boat,” Proceedings, September 2018, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/september/fifty-tons-fury-bring-back-patrol-torpedo-boat#:
~:text=PT%20boat%20action%20during%20World%20War%20II%20is%20well%20documented.

2. Dr. Sam Goldsmith, Vampire, Vampire, Vampire: The PLA’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Threat to Australian and Allied Naval Operations (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022).

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023).

4. Caitlin Campbell and Ben Dolven, China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea, CRS Report for Congress IF12550 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023).

5. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019).

 

6. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023.

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand-In Forces, (Washington, DC: December 2021).

8. Staff, “Assault Craft Unit (ACU) 1: About Us,” Navy.mil, n.d., https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Ships/Assault-Craft-Unit-ACU-1.

9. Ibid. 

10. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-22.37: Javelin-Close Combat Missile System, Medium (Washington, DC: August 2013).

11. Missile Defense Project, “FGM-148 Javelin,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 21, 2022, last modified April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/fgm-148-javelin.

12. Jack Montgomery, “The Navy Must Build More Missiles Now,” Proceedings, August 2013,
 https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/
2023/august/navy-must-build-more-missiles-now.

A Worthy Investment in the Stand-In Force

MARSOC and Force Design

Modernization and force structure efforts for the Army resulted in plans by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to make cuts that would account for the entire size of the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) if applied by the Marine Corps.1 The Marine Corps, however, has made significant transformational efforts elsewhere with Force Design 2030, and the value of MARSOC has continued to provide a significant benefit to both the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the FMF. Marine Special Operations Command is highlighted as a key capability of the Stand-In Forces (SIF) concept in the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), “The unique capabilities contained within the MAGTF paired with the special operations capabilities of our Raiders forms a modernized warfighting capability with the agility and lethality capable of gaining and maintaining advantage from inside the [weapons engagement zone (WEZ)].”2 

Marine special operations companies (MSOC) like Marine littoral regiments (MLR) provide value at the Service level through their ability to sense, make sense, and communicate with the Joint Force. Marine Special Operations Command units offer theater special operations commands a unit of action for employment toward strategic, operational, and campaign objectives. Marine Special Operations Command additionally produces specialized human capital for the Marine Corps outside of Special Operations Officers, MOS 0370, and Critical Skills Operators , 0372, by training, manning, and equipping USSOCOM unique Special Operations Capability Specialists (SOCS), 8071, that subsequently integrate back to FMF formations. Furthermore, MARSOC leverages special operations-peculiar funding from USSCOM through Major Forces Program 11 to rapidly acquire unique capabilities to support real-world operations and preserve the force. By sustaining the integration of joint kill webs between MSOCs and the other joint SIF units, prioritizing manning through Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and driving modernization, the Marine Corps will continue to use MARSOC as a worthwhile investment as outlined by the 39th Commandant to fight and win today and set conditions to win in the future.

The problem of mature kill webs and a combined Joint all-domian command and control is not new to the Joint Forces’ efforts of modernization or USSOCOM. It is an effort where MARSOC plays a critical role, as highlighted by the 39th CPG, “Marines in the Stand-in Force, critically bolstered by our MARSOC Raiders, are the tip of the spear of the entire Joint and Combined Force.”3 Marine Special Operations Command and FMF units routinely participate in various operations, activities, and investments (OAI) in the first-island chain and throughout the globe to train against Joint Force objectives. Operations, activities, and investments like Exercise Balikatan—an annual exercise between the Philippines and the U.S. military designed to strengthen bilateral interoperability, capabilities, trust, and cooperation—demonstrate combined joint kill webs that culminate in real-world sink exercises at key maritime terrain in the first-island chain.4 The OAI further provides MARSOC units at the MSOC level to train and integrate adjacent to emerging transformational units of the Joint Force like 3d MLR, the U.S. Army 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, and Joint certified headquarters from the Marine Corps such as I MEF and 3d MarDiv, III MEF, FMF Pacific, as well as Joint headquarters from I Corps and 25th Infantry Division. Moreover, it can be stated that the problem of combined Joint all-domian command and control and kill webs, easily traced to the history of USSOCOM during Operation EAGLE CLAW, will continue to require investment and integration across the Joint Force to succeed and win during great-power competition.5

The 39th CPG states, “Ironclad discipline is the currency of our Corps. Ruthless adherence to standards is what makes us special as a Service.” This discipline and affinity toward ruthless adherence to standards and mission accomplishment are why Marines subsequently make another choice to start a journey toward a career or tour at MARSOC. Unlike the deployable units of Navy Special Warfare, Navy Special Warfare Task Groups, the MSOCs of MARSOC are enabled by a detachment of SOCS, who are special operations qualified by the Marine Raider Training Center or Marine Raider Support Group.6 The SOCS MOS has its unique pipeline based on its specialization of logistics, intelligence, communications, or fires. These Marines serve anywhere from three to five years at MARSOC before returning to the FMF. The value of a tour at MARSOC provides these SOCS unique, but operationally relevant experience that seamlessly translates to assignments at III MEF or other SIF units. A SOCS trained for intelligence gains all the skills necessary to sense and make sense for an MLR headquarters or MEU. A SOCS trained for communications can seamlessly bolt onto a task unit from a MEF Information Group or provide communication to contested logistics for a littoral logistics battalion. Manpower and Reserve Affairs must continue to assign a prioritized staffing goal at MARSOC units while incentivizing tours for Marines and those SOCS post-MARSOC to spread the knowledge and experience across the FMF. The tours at MARSOC must elevate to the equivalent of FMF by precept for career officers and Subsequent-Term-Alignment-Plan Marines to ensure talent does not transition from the Service or create an unnecessary demand for curtailed tours from a SIF unit as outlined by the Commandant to remain competitive for advancement and promotion.

A final unique characteristic of MARSOC as a part of the SIF is the ability to tap into special operations-peculiar funding for operational and training modernization, experimentation in command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, and Preservation of the Force and Family programs. The unique funding and access to USSOCOM continue to enable greater modernization for training and operational effects with FMF and other Joint SIF units as seen during the Service-Level Training Exercise and at forward-deployed locations. The command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting advancements and experimentation continue to align with FMF advances whether the touchpoints and engagements are through wargaming or implementation of assets in support of live, virtual, or constructive training at a newly established Special Operations Training, Exercise, and Simulation Center at Stone Bay, Camp Lejeune, NC, that shares similar capability to sites hosted by Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group or Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group. Furthermore, the expansion of Preservation of the Force and Family resources have served as a model to carry over to FMF units to maintain and sustain career-long readiness. The 39th CPG states, “No single issue is more existential for our Corps than recruiting and retaining high-quality Marines.”7 Marine Special Operations Command sustains this critical effort while efficiently employing SOF-peculiar resources to accomplish the assigned USSOCOM missions as well as providing benefits to the Service.

Manpower and funding will remain a constant for all the military services like the unchanging nature of war. For the Marine Corps, it must remain a priority to man, train, and equip MARSOC units like MLRs as both serve as the critical stand-in forces for competition and conflict. For the SOCS and those that are assigned to MARSOC, Manpower and Reserve Affairs must ensure stable and continuing careers like those in the FMF. The value of MARSOC remains that they are Marines first, and special operations are what they do. Like all SOF units, the resourcing of MARSOC by the Marine Corps will allow them to fight and win both now and in the future while upholding the Special Operations Forces Truth that Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.8

>Maj Fultz is an Infantry Officer serving as the Battalion Executive Officer for the 1st Marine Raider Support Battalion. He has served in all three divisions with a most recent tour with the Stand-In Force at III MEF Command Element and 4th Mar.

Notes

1. Cole Livieratos, “Cutting Army Special Operations Will Erode the Military’s Ability to Influence the Modern Battlefield,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/cutting-army-special-operations-will-erode-the-militarys-ability-to-influence-the-modern-battlefield.

2. Gen Eric Smith, 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: September 2024).

3. Ibid.

4. Embassy Manila, “Philippine, U.S. Troops to Kick Off Exercise Balikatan 2024,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, April 17, 2024, https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-kick-off-exercise-balikatan-2024.

5. Special Operations Warrior Foundation, “Operation Eagle Claw,” Special Operations Warrior Foundation, September 2024, https://specialops.org/operation-eagle-claw.

6. Joint Special Operations University Center for Engagement and Research, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 5th Edition (MacDill Air Force Base: November 23).

7. 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance.

8. Joint Special Operations University Center for Engagement and Research, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 5th Edition (MacDill Air Force Base: November 2023).

Archibald Henderson: An Era

>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, July 1960. Extracted from Chapter Four of The Compact History of the U. S. Marine Corps, by LtCol P.N. Pierce and the late LtCol F.O. Hough. Copyrighted by Hawthorne Books, May 1960. $4.95 

 

ON OCTOBER 17, 1820, MAJOR ARCHIBALD HENDERSON was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and became the fifth Commandant of the Marine Corps at the age of 37.

Under the blunt, outspoken Henderson the Marine Corps underwent some profound changes. The long span of years of his command were eventful ones, and through a series of dramatic events which commanded wide attention, the Corps established a high reputation with the people of the nation. The man who was to become known as “the grand old man of the Marine Corps” was largely responsible.

Morale was low in the Armed Forces of the 1820s. As usual after each war, the military had been shunted aside. The War of 1812 was rapidly passing into the limbo of forgotten things. It had been an unpopular war to begin with, as far as Americans were concerned. The war-torn era of Napoleon had ended at Waterloo, and the great powers of Russia, England, Austria and Prussia had combined in the Quadruple Alliance to “preserve the tranquillity of Europe” against a revival of revolution. The danger of being drawn into a European war appeared very remote. The Congress of the United States was much too occupied with internal expansion to pay attention to the relatively few people it hired for the defense of the nation. The strength of the Marine Corps stood at 49 officers and 865 enlisted men.

Immediately upon assuming command, Henderson, who had evidently given the matter considerable thought, set about improving the morale and efficiency of his Corps. He began by personally inspecting every shore station which included Marines and many of the ship’s detachments. He was a stickler for detail, and continually gave evidence of knowing thoroughly the job of everyone of his Marines. He insisted on the strictest economy in the expenditure of funds, and personally handled the majority of the Corp’s legal affairs. Although he had the reputation of being a martinet, he went to great lengths to insure that his officers and men were properly accorded their every right.

In the matter of training he was almost a fanatic. He had long realized that the key to the efficiency of any fighting organization lay in two inseparable and basic fundamentals—training and spirit. He ordered all the newly commissioned officers to duty at Marine Corps Headquarters, in order to personally supervise their indoctrination and training. During most of his tour of duty, the Army was unable to absorb all of the graduates of West Point. Henderson obtained as many of these officers as possible for the Marine Corps. To assist in the training of the new officers, and to act as a nucleus for a landing force, he kept a skeletonized battalion at Headquarters. This battalion was thoroughly trained in the latest developments of military weapons and tactics.

Archibald Henderson.

Henderson demanded, and received, the strict subordination of all his officers. He took no nonsense from anyone, including his superiors in the U.S. Navy. On one occasion, when the Navy Department countermanded his orders to a Marine Captain to go to sea, Henderson went directly to the President. He respectfully, and probably vigorously, explained that it was imperative that his orders be carried out in order to vindicate his position and authority. Four days later the captain in question reported for sea duty, and the Secretary of the Navy reported to the President for what might have been described as a unilateral conversation.

The agencies for maintaining law and order in the United States during the first half of the Nineteenth Century were few and far between. Those which did exist were poorly organized, and even more poorly trained. During this era the Marines were often called upon to lend a hand in local disturbances.

In the great Boston fire of 1824 they performed both rescue work and police functions in helping to stamp out the wave of pilfering and looting which followed the holocaust.

A short time later, Maj Robert D. Wainwright earned prominent mention in the classic school books of the era, McGuffey’s Readers. And, for the next 75 years, the nation’s school children received a lesson dealing with the heroic conduct of Marines.

The scene of the action was the Massachusetts State Prison at Boston. Having become thoroughly dissatisfied with their lot in life, some 283 prisoners staged a riot which rapidly got beyond control of the prison authorities. With the situation out of hand, the warden sent a frantic call for help to the Boston Marine Barracks.

Maj Wainwright, with a detachment of 30 Marines, soon arrived at the prison area. Making a hasty estimate of what was apparently a bad situation, Wainwright came up with a simple solution. Hastily forming a single rank facing the prisoners, he ordered his Marines to fire a warning volley into the air. The shots had the desired effect and the clamor subsided. As his Marines reloaded their muskets, the major addressed the rebellious prisoners, “These men are United States Marines,” he said. “They follow my orders to the letter.”

Turning to the Marines, Wainwright consulted his watch, and then issued his orders in a loud, parade ground voice, “Exactly three minutes from now I shall raise my hand over my head,” he bellowed. “When I drop my hand you will commence firing. You will continue to fire until you have killed every prisoner who has not returned to his cell.”

For three long minutes not a word was spoken. The only sound was the shuffle of the inmates’ feet as they dejectedly returned to their cells.

With the advent of the 1830s the traditional isolationist policy of America underwent an abrupt change. It had become apparent to the United States that many areas of commercial advantage lay beyond its own boundaries. This change in policy had a pronounced effect on the functions performed by Marines. As a result of it, the Marines, under the energetic leadership of their fifth Commandant, ranged far and wide to protect the interests of their country.

United States Marines of General Henderson’s era.

Late in 1831 the natives of Sumatra seized and robbed an American merchantman in the harbor of Quallah Battoo. This act of piracy resulted in the murder of several members of the crew. In retaliation the United States sent the frigate Potomac, especially outfitted for the job, on a punitive expedition against the Sumatran pirates. Arriving in February 1832, the Potomac put a landing force of over 250 Marines and sailors ashore. In two days of bloody warfare, the force captured four pirate forts and reduced the town of Quallah Battoo to a heap of smouldering ruins.

At the same time, on the other side of the Southern Hemisphere, Marines were having some difficulties in South America. Argentina was attempting to establish claim over the Falkland Islands. In pursuit of this claim, that country looked with extreme disfavor on American vessels conducting trade with the Islands. In an effort to discourage this practice, the Argentinians proceeded to impound three American schooners and jail their crews. Marines from the sloop Lexington waded ashore and through dint of considerable small arms fire, succeeded in impressing the Argentine officials that the United States did not look kindly upon such treatment of its ships and citizens.

  But, as far as the Marine Corps was concerned, the most far-reaching effect of the new anti-isolation policy of the United States was reflected in the Act of 1834. Passed by Congress on June 30, the legislation authorized a substantial increase in the strength of the Marine Corps. It also settled the question of its control, by placing it in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. In addition, it authorized the President to order the Marines into whatever action his judgment dictated, including duty with the Army. Within the year the President was to make good use of his newly granted powers.

      In the Everglades of Florida a bad situation of long standing was rapidly coming to a head.

    Over a period of many years runaway Negro slaves had found refuge with the Seminole Indians and many slaves and members of the tribe had intermarried. The southern planters, aware of this refuge for their escaped slaves, had made repeated petitions to the Crown of Spain, without avail. Unhappy with the refusal of Charles IV to take the necessary steps to return their slaves, the southern land owners began to petition their own government for the annexation of Florida. In 1819 a portion of Florida was purchased from Spain for $5,000,000. Immediately the slave owners renewed their demands to the government that their slaves be returned. Inasmuch as some 75 years had passed since their ancestors had taken refuge in Florida, it was a little difficult for the Seminoles to understand the claims of the planters. As a result, such demands met with a particularly unenthusiastic response by the Seminoles.

Under the political pressure eventually brought to bear by the slave owners, the Administration completed a treaty with the Indians, under which the government would take the tribe under its protection and assign the Indians to reservations. Perhaps things might have worked out if certain enterprising souls hadn’t become aware of the lucrative possibilities in the profession of slave catching. The “slave hunters,” in direct violation of the terms of the treaty, entered Florida in organized bands to catch runaway slaves who brought high prices on the slave markets. There is no evidence to indicate that the government made any attempts to stop this practice, although the Indians continually demanded redress.

In 1828 the proposal was made to the Seminoles to move to a reservation in the area now occupied by the state of Arkansas. Tribal chiefs made a reconnaissance of the area and returned with the report that “snow covers the ground, and frosts chill the bodies of men.” Their objections notwithstanding, the Seminoles were ordered to emigrate West. At which point, things got rapidly out of hand.

Determined to force the emigration, the government sent troops into Florida. Just as determined to remain where they were, the Seminoles made preparations for war. In December 1835 the hostilities began in earnest, and in a short time the horrors of the Seminole War were being chronicled throughout the land.

BGen D.L. Clinch, who was commanding the US troops in Florida, was charged with the responsibility of the removal of the Indians. The end of the year found the well-armed Indians, under the leadership of a colorful half-breed named Osceola, assembled in the almost inaccessible swamps of the Withlacoochee River.

Clinch, whose immediate problem was to protect the white settlers, decided to attack the Indians. Since his own force, which occupied Fort King near the present town of Ocala, was too small for the job, he sent to Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay for reinforcements.

The reinforcements, numbering 110 and under the command of a Maj Dade, answered the call of Gen Clinch with colors flying and bugles blaring across the swamps. With the possible exception of Custer’s debacle at Big Horn, the fate of this force is without parallel in the history of Indian warfare.

Shortly after Dade’s force crossed the Withlacoochee, they were met with an ambush so effective that only two survivors remained to crawl through the wire grass to safety. One was Pvt Clark of the 2d Artillery who, although badly wounded, is reputed to have crawled to Fort Brooke, a distance of 60 miles. The other was Louis Pacheo, a Negro slave who acted as guide for the force. There is reason to suspect that the escape of Pacheo from the ambush was something more than blind luck. Be that as it may the only man to survive without a scratch lived to the venerable old age of 95 without being taken to task for his treachery, if such it was.

On the same day as the Dade Massacre, Osceola and a small band invaded a dinner party given by Gen Wiley Thompson, who had been sent from Washington to oversee removal of the Indians, and murdered the General and his five guests. If there had been any doubts about the earnestness of the war in Florida, the Dade Massacre and the murder of Gen Thompson provided the clinching argument.

By the spring of 1836 the Army in central Florida found themselves in difficulty. Some 1,000 soldiers were trying to round up and deport over 3,000 Indians. The State militias, which had originally augmented the Army of the South, soon had their stomachs full of poor food, swamp fever and general discomfort. And, with the coming of spring, they left Florida for healthier climes.

To add to the general misery, the Creek Indians of southern Alabama and Georgia decided to go on the warpath. The results of this uprising were severe enough to cause the Army to shift its main effort from the Seminole country to the area occupied by the Creeks.

At this juncture Archibald Henderson volunteered the services of a regiment of Marines for duty with the Army. The offer was promptly accepted. On May 23, 1836, President Jackson, under the recently enacted law, ordered all available Marines to report to the Army. Henderson, never one to sit on the sidelines, insisted on leading the regiment personally. By taking practically all officers, reducing shore detachments to sergeant’s guard, and leaving behind only those who were unfit for duty in the field, Henderson was able to mobilize more than half the total strength of the Corps.

There is a tale, often related by Marines, that Col Henderson closed Marine Corps Headquarters during this period. It is said that he locked the door to his office, placed the key under a mat, and tacked a neatly lettered sign to the door which read:

Have gone to Florida to fight Indians. Will be back when the war is over.

A. HENDERSON
Col. Commandant
More reliable accounts indicate that the Commandant left the Headquarters in charge of LtCol Wainwright, with the Band to provide the guard. Among those deemed unfit for duty in the field was one Sgt Triguet, whom Henderson commended to Wainwright in a letter of instruction which began: “Sergeant Triguet is left to assist in attending to the duties at Headquarters. He is a respectable old man, and has no other failing than that which but too often attends an old soldier….”

Henderson, with a force of 38 officers and 424 enlisted men, reported to Gen Winfield Scott at Columbus, Georgia. Since the Commandant was under direct orders of the Secretary of War, he technically became an Army officer and was placed in command of a brigade composed of Marines, Army Infantry and Artillery, and friendly Creeks.

Presaging the modern Marine battle garb of dungarees, the troops wore white fatigues, rather than the green and white uniforms of the period. Armed mostly with muskets, they also carried some of the new-fangled Colt rifles which had a disconcerting tendency to explode spontaneously when carried loaded for any length of time in the hot sun.

Both the Marine commander and Gen Scott took an optimistic view of the final outcome of the campaign. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Henderson wrote: “It is now expected that the Campaign will be closed in the course of ten days or two weeks….” On the same day Gen Scott went on record to the effect, “war against the hostile Creeks is supposed to be virtually over.” One may well speculate as to the thoughts of Gen Scott a month later when he was recalled to Washington for an investigation of his conduct of the war against the Creeks and Seminoles. After a long, drawn-out investigation, Scott was exonerated and restored to his command. 

The end of summer brought with it the termination of the Creek Campaign. The Creeks were removed to a reservation in what is now the state of Oklahoma, and the Army of the South again turned its attention to the problem of the Seminoles in Florida.

On June 24 a battalion of Marines under LtCol W.H. Freeman reached Milledgeville, Georgia, and moved on into Florida. In October Freeman’s battallion was consolidated with the one Henderson had been leading into a six-company regiment and moved to Apalachicola, to garrison Fort Brooke. The Marines were augmented by a regiment of Creek Indians, some 750 strong, who had been mustered and were paid as militia. The regiment was officered mainly by Marines, and wore white turbans to distinguish them from the enemy during battle. The Seminoles were rather unhappy about being pursued by their blood relatives, and showed their dislike by scalping all Creeks who fell into their hands.

On November 21 the Creeks, under the command of 1stLt Andrew H. Ross, fought an advance guard action at Wahoo Swamp. From Wahoo a four-pronged advance, two columns of Army troops and two of Marines, pushed the Seminoles back to the Hatchee-Lustee River. Six days later the main body of Indians was located in the area of the Great Cypress Swamp, and was promptly attacked. The attackers managed to capture the horses of the enemy and 25 prisoners, most of whom were women and children. The braves slipped back into the swamp. Henderson left a detachment to guard the prisoners and horses, while the regiment pressed on after the warriors who had taken up positions on the opposite bank of the Hatchee-Lustee. The troops extended along the river bank and took up a cross fire, in an effort to dislodge the enemy. As soon as the Indians’ fire slackened, the troops crossed the river by swimming and by means of logs. According to Henderson’s report, “… we pursued the enemy as rapidly as the deep swamp and their mode of warfare permitted.”

Osceola, Chief of Seminoles.

The chase continued until nightfall when Henderson was forced to withdraw his troops from the dense undergrowth. The result of the day’s operations was the capture of the Indian women and children, already mentioned, 23 Negroes, a few horses and some clothes and blankets. The battle report states that one Indian and two Negroes were seen dead by the troops.

As a result of his routing of the Indian forces Henderson was brevetted a brigadier general and several Marines were promoted for “gallantry.” Four days later, Abraham, a Seminole Chief, appeared at Henderson’s camp under a flag of truce. This marked the beginning of several days of negotiations between Maj Gen T.H. Jesup, to whom Gen Scott had relinquished command upon being recalled to Washington, and the Indian leaders at Fort Dade. These meetings finally resulted in an agreement by the chiefs to assemble their people for transportation to their new reservation. The peace treaty was formally signed on March 6. Jesup, believing the war to be over, began to discharge his volunteers.

On May 22, 1837, Henderson received orders to proceed to Washington. Taking with him all Marines except two companies, which totalled 189 officers and men, Henderson left Florida the next day.

On the night of June 2, Micanopy, grand chief of the Seminoles, and several of his lesser chiefs who had encamped with their followers near Tampa Bay, the port of embarkation, were abducted and taken to the interior. The next day a report was received from the troops south of Hillsboro that the Seminoles encamped in that vicinity had disappeared. These two incidents were the signal of the renewal of hostilities. Gen Jesup reported, “This campaign, so far as relates to the Indian emigration, has entirely failed,” and requested to be “immediately relieved from the
command of the Army.” The Seminole War was far from over.

For the next five years Archibald Henderson vainly tried to get the remaining Marines recalled from Florida. His appeals were met with refusal by the Secretary of War, who felt that the need for Marines in Florida was more pressing than the need for their return.

Jesup was finally relieved and realized what had been his burning desire since the beginning of the campaign—to join his family and spend the rest of his life on his farm. He was replaced by Col Zachary Taylor, who was soon promoted to the rank of brigadier general.

The campaign wore on and the possibility of success appeared more remote with each passing day. Osceola, who had been arrested while conferring with Gen Jesup, died in prison at Fort Moultrie in October 1837. The next year some 4,000 Seminoles made the move to Oklahoma, though many of them slipped away from the New Orleans concentration camps and returned to the Everglades.

The two remaining companies of Marines put in four more years of duty along the coast and around the keys of Florida with the Mosquito Fleet. From June 1838 to the summer of 1842, this array of half a dozen small vessels, two barges and 140 canoes was manned by 68 officers and 600 men. The Marines of the fleet numbered about 130, and for the first two years of operation were commanded by 1stLt George H. Terrett who, seven years later, was to lead the way into Mexico City.

The object of the Mosquito Fleet was twofold, to intercept communications between the Indians and small boats operating off the Florida coast, and to conduct amphibious sorties into the interior of the Everglades. The fleet operated successfully throughout the remainder of the campaign, and the Indians came to have great respect for the “sailor boats” as they called them.

In the summer of 1842 the Seminole War gradually waned, without formal cessation of hostilities and with neither side clearly victorious. The Marines returned north in July, well pleased to be relieved of what had been six long years of extremely dreary duty. In the final accounting, 61 Marines had given their lives in the Seminole Campaign. Over half of them had died from disease, and one unfortunate soul had departed the scene, dispatched by a friendly musket ball—“discharged by accident.” In analyzing the success of the campaign, one need only reflect upon the fact that the Seminoles still occupy the Everglades of Florida.

The arrest of Osceola, who later died in prison.

With the Seminole War a matter for the record books, Henderson again turned his attention to strengthening and developing the Corps. His efforts were aimed at keeping the Marines in a state of readiness for any emergency, domestic or foreign. The remainder of his career was distinguished by such important events as the Mexican War and Perry’s Expedition to Japan. Under his direction Marines virtually covered the globe. To protect Americans and their commerce with China, they stormed the forts of Canton during the great Taiping Rebellion. In the South Seas they splashed ashore to bring the rampaging Fiji Islanders to heel. In the jungles of Central America they made their first contact with the Republic of Nicaragua, which was to see the repeated return of Marines over the next three-quarters of a century. Along the Gold Coast of Africa the slave traders, on more than one occasion, felt the bite of a Marine’s bayonet.

For the 50 years he wore the uniform of a Marine, Archibald Henderson preached the gospel of strong leadership and constant readiness. At 74, he dramatically demonstrated that advanced age was no deterrent to practicing what he preached.

The issues of the elections of 1857 were particularly bitter ones. In an effort to control the election in Washington, the “Know Nothing” Party imported a gang of hired thugs, known as the “Plug Uglies,” from Baltimore. The gang commenced activities by physically threatening the voters, and finally put a complete halt to the elections by taking possession of the polling places throughout the city. Civil authorities, unable to cope with the situation, appealed to the President who ordered two companies of Marines from the Marine Barracks to restore order to the city.

General Henderson facing up to the “Plug Uglies.”

The Marines met the “Plug Uglies” on Pennsylvania Avenue, in the vicinity of City Hall. The rioting thugs, who were armed with every conceivable weapon, dragged up a brass cannon, aimed it at the Marine formation and demanded that they return to their barracks. Capt Tyler, commanding the Marines, ordered a detachment forward to capture the cannon. At that moment, Gen Henderson, who had been mingling with the mob and was dressed in civilian clothing, walked calmly up to the muzzle of the cannon and forced the weapon around. Henderson addressed the “Plug Uglies,” warning them of the seriousness of their acts and telling them that the Marines would fire if it became necessary. In the hectic few minutes that followed, a number of rioters who fortunately were very bad marksmen, fired their pistols at Henderson. A platoon of Marines charged in to protect the Commandant and capture the cannon. One of the rioters, at point blank range, aimed his pistol at Henderson’s head. A Marine knocked the pistol to the ground with a butt stroke of his musket. The General promptly grabbed the culprit by the collar and the seat of his pants and marched him off to jail. With the riot getting out of control, the Marines opened fire. The rioters, suddenly convinced that the Marines meant business, beat a hasty retreat and order was restored to the city.

On January 6, 1859, the “grand old man of the Marine Corps,” who had served as Commandant under 11 Presidents, died in office at the age of 76. The impact of his strong personality and zealous devotion to duty remains to this day, indelibly engraved on the Corps to which he devoted over 50 years of his life.

The era of Archibald Henderson had encompassed two wars worthy of examination from the standpoint of the nation’s history. One, which had been purely internal, was the protracted campaign against the Creek and Seminole Indians. The other, which took place on foreign soil, provided the Marines with the first line to their hymn, and the nation with something it had long wanted—a western boundary that bordered the blue Pacific. 

30th Anniversary

Intelligence Plan of 1994

2024 marks the 30th anniversary of the Intelligence Plan of 1994. The purpose of the plan, approved by Commandant (CMC) Mundy in 1994, was not just to address the intelligence deficiencies that became apparent in Operation DESERT STORM (1991) but to professionalize the intelligence occupational field by structuring its manning and training the way other occupational fields were structured. This short article will focus on three areas: plan development, plan implementation, and the performance of intelligence in OIF/OEF.

For roughly the first 200 years of the Marine Corps, the role of intelligence was analogous to that of a volunteer fire department. Whenever a war or serious conflict arose, G-2/S-2 sections were manned by non-intelligence officers and enlisted personnel to augment the meagerly manned and poorly trained intelligence ranks. For the first 200 years, it worked well in the sense that we never lost a war.

It was not until advanced technical intelligence systems for collection, imagery, targeting, and analysis were developed that the volunteer fire department approach to intelligence was no longer viable. The first wake-up call came from BGen P.K. Van Riper in his June ’91 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “Observations during Operation Desert Storm.” He said, “The weakest area I observed was tactical intelligence; many of the problems are endemic and stem from the way we select, train, and educate our intelligence personnel.” He suggested changing the way we select and train our intelligence personnel. 

He also said, “Now is the time to reconsider whether we want to continue acquiring the majority of our intelligence officers through lateral moves.” This comment referenced the Marine Corps’ decision in 1978 to open the intelligence field to regular officers—not just limited duty officers. While this created an opportunity for regular officers to enter the intelligence field, the sourcing was based entirely on lateral moves. There was no dedicated sourcing of intelligence officers directly from The Basic School and, therefore, no manpower pyramid to sustain career progression in the occupational field.

In the spring of 1992, the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence became aware of deficiencies in Marine Corps intelligence and started sending questions for the record to Headquarters Marine Corps regarding its intelligence capabilities, or absence of capabilities. Ultimately, the Senate directed the Marine Corps to develop a five-year plan to correct the intelligence deficiencies that were identified during Operation DESERT STORM. MajGen Jenkins, Director of Intelligence (DIRINT) at the time, established a Program Objective Memorandum Working Group to develop a response to the Senate. Maj Dan Dietz, who was directed to write the response to the Senate based on the working group’s effort, admitted that the final report to the Senate “absolutely wasn’t a polished, staffed document, but provided a framework.” CMC Mundy approved the report in the spring of 1993.

When MajGen Van Riper became DIRINT in early 1993, one of his first initiatives was to establish the Intelligence Structure Support Group (ISSG) that would include senior officers from the FMF, Manpower, Training and Education, Systems Command, and the Doctrine Division to provide the rigorous analysis of the issues that the official response sent to the Senate did not include. He assigned Col Larry Burgess, a regular intelligence officer, as the lead for the ISSG which took place in August 1993. The findings of the ISSG were then turned over to the Resources Division of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence headed by Col Jim Clark (an infantry officer) and staffed with a talented group of intelligence officers including LtCol Gerry Hughes, LtCol Herb Strauss, Maj Buck Buikema, and Capt Rick Natale. 

Working closely and continuously with Manpower and Training and Education over the next year (1993–94), Resource Division developed a comprehensive plan to address the deficiencies and establish a professional occupational field. They were aided greatly by the publication of the Restricted Officer Manpower Study/Act that significantly changed the warrant officer and limited-duty officer program for the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps intelligence community. It provided the Resources Division the ability to convert the limited-duty officer structure to an unrestricted officer structure and the ability to finally establish direct accessions from The Basic School to develop the essential intelligence officer manpower Christmas tree to sustain the intel occupational field.

Other important elements of the plan included the establishment of four intelligence battalions (one for each MEF and one for the reserves), an additional radio battalion (at the time only two existed), and consolidated training for basic intel officers and enlisted at the Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Center in Dam Neck, VA. It also established separate MOS designations at The Basic School for ground, air, and counter-intelligence/human intelligence officers. Once these officers achieved the rank of Captain, they would return to the Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence
Center for the Marine Intelligence Officers Course where they would be designated as MAGTF intelligence officers (0202). 

The Intel Plan of 1994 was approved by CMC Krulak—thus ending the development stage of the Intel Plan and beginning the challenging implementation phase.

The implementation phase of the Intel Plan of 1994 lasted 14 years. It was a challenging and arduous task requiring close and continuous attention to the core elements of the plan in the face of numerous challenges on several fronts. To put it in combat terms, it was a battle of inches, not yards. Responsibility for implementing the Intel Plan fell to the Assistant DIRINT, Michael Decker, and the Intel Occ Field Sponsor staff. Number one on the priority list was to recruit, train, and field the 600 new enlisted Marines and 90 officers (sourced from The Basic School) every year until the four intelligence battalions and one signals intelligence (Radio) battalion were fully sourced, trained, and fielded. This involved working closely with Recruiting Command, Training and Education Division at Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the officer and enlisted assignments branches within Manpower, and required major adjustments to enlisted recruiting and staffing goal models and training input plans.

Initially, there was overall acceptance of the Intel Plan and little bureaucratic resistance. In the late 1990s, this began to change. It was a relatively peaceful time in the world and the operational imperative for a robust intelligence presence was no longer as pronounced as it was immediately after Operation DESERT STORM. The Intelligence Department had to overcome the institutional requirement in two CMC-directed Force Study Review Groups (1997 and 1999) to cut a table of organization and to find compensatory reductions in the structure to be added. The Intel Plan called for additional structure with no compensatory structure (other than 117 reserve officers that were converted to unrestricted officers by the Restricted Officer Manpower Study/Act directive) to offer up. It was an uphill battle. The CMC’s Force Structure Review Group of 1997 recommended a Marine Corps-wide, salami-sliced approach to downsizing irrespective of the fact the Intel Plan called for an increase. The Marine Corps Support Battalion was a target for reduction. Fortunately, several Marine generals who had commanded MEUs or had been in joint billets knew what the NSA did for the MAGTFs. Unlike command post exercises where the opposition force was a notional (Country ORANGE) threat, MEUs deployed against real-world threats. These commanders relied heavily on the embedded robust intel package that accompanied them to help define these threats. When the Force Study Review Group recommendations were presented at the General Officer Symposium, one MarFor CG with prior MEU command experience stood up in the face of the crowd in opposition to a cut to the Marine Corps Support Battalion and CMC took it off the list. It was a minor but important step in protecting further cuts to intelligence. The 1999 Force Study Review Group focused not only on cuts but also on capability gaps. Intel was still a large capability gap and once again survived any cuts despite opposition from many competing occupational fields.

The second priority in the Intel Plan implementation effort was to establish a paper trail documenting each step along the way. Much like mountain climbers drive pinions in rock to cement their slow advance up the mountain, the Intel Department created, received CMC approval for, and published ALMARS, MC Bulletins, table of organization cover letters, and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP 2, Intelligence) to officially document their progress. Anyone who has been involved in creating and getting CMC approval for this kind of documentation would appreciate the tedious work this requires.

The third priority was to remove the Marine Corps from under the yoke of the Office of Naval Intelligence which controlled funding from the General Defense Intelligence Program (run by the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]). The Navy determined how much funding the Marine Corps got (primarily for civilian hires). Up until this time, DIA recognized only the Army, Air Force, and Navy as recipients of General Defense Intelligence Program funding. The Intel Department was successful in getting the DIA to recognize the Marine Corps as a Service intelligence organization, separate from the Navy. This was a major victory that allowed the Marine Corps (with General Defense Intelligence Program funding) to increase its civilian intelligence workforce without requiring the Navy’s permission or to require offsets in the Marine Corps structure. The primary beneficiary of this was the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) which grew from 20 civilians in 1994 to 187 in 2009. 

The importance of this became evident in the work-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CENTCOM used an Army-generated trafficability and hydrologic study of the routes the 1st MarDiv could use in their advance to Baghdad. Much of the territory on either side of the MSRs between Basra and Baghdad had been declared “not available for tracked vehicles or heavy trucks.” The CG of 1st MarDiv tasked MCIA with an updated trafficability study. The MCIA, with help from the National Ground Intelligence Agency, developed a study that refuted CENTCOM’s study and 1st MarDiv was able to significantly alter their plans, freeing them from sticking solely to the MSR and advancing more quickly and safely toward Baghdad. 

Finally, the Nail in the Coffin

Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM delivered the operational imperative for a professional, robust intelligence presence. In 2005, CMC held an Operations IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM after-action review. The general officer support from ground and aviation combat commanders was overwhelmingly supportive of Marine Corps intelligence. This support put the Intel Plan of 1994 over the goal line. The institutional resistance to Marine Corps intelligence faded away and cleared the way to fulfill the remaining elements of the plan by 2008.

The real heroes of this arduous fourteen-year effort were not just Deputy DIRINT Michael Decker and his talented OccFld Sponsor staff but the combat commanders of OEF/OIF who were freed from command post exercises with notional Country ORANGE threats came to embrace the role and importance of intelligence.

Since 2000, eight intel colonels have been promoted to brigadier general and then to major general. Four advanced to lieutenant general (one as Director of DIA, one as J-2 JCS, one as CG Artificial Intelligence Command, and the fourth as Deputy Commandant C4I). Where do we go from here?

Except for the MC DIRINT billet, and most recently the Deputy Commandant C4I billet, all the other billets occupied by Marine Corps intel generals have been in the joint arena. In the early stages of the Intel Plan development, (then) MajGen P.K. Van Riper said, “Intel and Ops are like the 2 sides of the same coin and shouldn’t be separated.” Intel cells are now a permanent fixture in current ops, future ops, and targeting. The two are now inseparable. The green door syndrome became a thing of the past. The intelligence officers’ knowledge of the concept of operations should qualify them for more MAGTF operational billets. Unfortunately, the intel moniker remains an impediment to being assigned to these billets. The general officer assignments branch needs to get beyond the thought that intel generals can only fill intel billets. Between 1995 and 1997, command of the 3rd Force Service Support Group was given to an aviator and a public affairs general. When the need arises, intel generals are equally qualified. Given the close relationship between ops and intel, the Deputy MEF CG is one billet that should be at the top of the list, and there are others as well.

There is a saying that it takes a generation for a major organizational restructuring to become fully accepted. I argue now, in the fourth decade of the Intel Plan, that has happened. Without Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, I am not sure it would have turned out the same way. There is now a valuable capability and opportunity for the Marine Corps not to be overlooked and needs to be recognized. 

I salute those individuals and working groups that contributed to the success of the Intel Plan of 1994 and to the combat commanders of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM who provided the credibility that cemented the operational psyche of the entire Marine Corps. Well done!

Talent Management Engagement Platform

Our first step toward a modern talent marketplace

The publication of Talent Management 2030 in November of 2021 was a watershed moment in the Marine Corps’ transition from Industrial Era human capital management to 21st-century talent management. While over the last three years there have been significant efforts at the headquarters level to realize these initiatives, there have only been a handful of tangible results for Marines. The development efforts toward creating a talent marketplace are one such result. These efforts include the award of contracts to prototype two industry-leading marketplace solutions in addition to the release of an internally developed marketplace called the Talent Management Engagement Platform (TMEP). The TMEP has already been released to approximately 30,000 enlisted Marines and officers and is in use for the fiscal year 2025 assignment season.

The TMEP will enable the Marine Corps to reimagine and enhance career management by increasing the transparency of the assignments process, improving the education of the individual Marine on career options and progression, and enhancing agency throughout the assignments process.   

What Is TMEP and How Is It a Marketplace?
A talent marketplace is a platform that enables job seekers to match their skillsets and interests with available job opportunities. Many marketplaces have familiar names, like LinkedIn or Zip Recruiter, which use advanced algorithms to match prospective employees with organizations that can reach out to begin negotiations. Harvard Business Review describes internal marketplaces like TMEP as having two forms.1 The first allows employees to search through job listings while managers search through candidate profiles and when interests align the process moves forward. In the second version, the platform automates the matching process, providing a curated list of recommended matches to the employees and managers. The TMEP is being designed to leverage the best of both internal marketplace types.

The current deployment of TMEP is like the first version of the internal marketplace. Marines can search through available billets to find opportunities that match their interests and desires. Simultaneously, monitors can review the Marines available for assignment and find options that align with their preferences. As the system matures and collects enough data, TMEP will implement machine learning techniques to include functionality more like the second version of the internal marketplace. Here the platform will use available data to align Marines’ skills, education, experience, and necessary career growth with the Marine Corps’ warfighting needs. Regardless of version, TMEP is being developed to support a modern internal talent marketplace rooted in three core principles: education, transparency, and agency.2  

The level of transparency provided by TMEP is unprecedented in the assignments process. Education and transparency often go together since education is nearly impossible without transparency of information. Before TMEP, Marines only had persistent access to their personal service record information, which includes their past assignments, but they lacked access to current and future assignment availability. The TMEP addresses this by providing Marines the ability to access a live update of the same assignment availability as the monitors. This level of transparency allows Marines to tailor their preferences based on current availability. The freedom to change their preference outside of the annual mover’s survey also allows Marines to adapt their career plan as their life circumstances change. The TMEP also increases transparency by providing an asynchronous and persistent communication platform for Marines and their monitors providing continuity even as monitors rotate out of the billet.  

In the current assignment process, a typical Marine has very little agency. They may complete a short survey and have a quick conversation with their monitor, but that is the extent of their input during the assignment process. Increasing the available information creates an opportunity for Marines to educate themselves and have more agency in their career progression.  

The TMEP is a significant step in the right direction to increase transparency and agency in the assignments process and further educate Marines on available career opportunities. While TMEP creates the opportunity for Marines to be more involved in the assignments process, it does not change the priority to meet the needs of the Marine Corps. 

What We See Today
Although most readers had not seen TMEP before the summer of 2024 when access was expanded to 12,000 enlisted Marines and 16,000 officers, the Marine Corps has been working on this effort for nearly two years. In that time Manpower and Reserve Affairs has conducted industry research, created an actionable vision, gathered user inputs, and began building that vision to meet those user requirements. This methodology, called user-centered design, is arguably one of the greatest changes and most impactful actions the Marine Corps has taken when it comes to IT modernization. The TMEP is being designed by and for the user: the Marines and their monitors. The version available today via Marine Online represents the most basic functionality and will serve as the foundation for future iterations still being shaped through Marines’ feedback and ideas.

Today, Marines can log onto TMEP and access the same service data that the monitors use to make assignment decisions. Officers can view their projected move date as well as when they can expect to be on a promotion board and in what zone. All Marines can see a consolidated graphic that captures key information for making career decisions including the ability to see how factors like age, time in service, rank, and children’s school grade levels line up over time to facilitate informed career planning (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Career path display. (Figure provided by author.)
Figure 1. Career path display. (Figure provided by author.)

Instead of being limited to an annual conversation with their monitor, Marines can send direct messages that are archived within the platform. The TMEP also provides Marines the capability to search through available assignments to make a more informed decision on assignment preferences. Marines can see the same availabilities that their monitor sees, including billet descriptions the commands can edit for their specific unit. Registering assignment preferences and communications with a monitor is now consolidated in the same platform monitors use to conduct assignments. This means no more jumping between systems reducing the potential to lose communications.  

What We’ll See Tomorrow
What we see today in TMEP is just the most basic functionality. What TMEP will look like in the future is up to the users of the platform. The TMEP leverages a user-centered design methodology, allowing Marines to inform the requirements and prioritization of future features. Users have already provided some great ideas that have resulted in functionality resident in the platform today.

In addition to improving user experience through feedback, the platform must incorporate talent-based criteria and decision tools. If we are to truly move to a talent-based marketplace, the next step for TMEP must be to identify required skills and talents by billet and register and validate the talent and skills of our Marines. One of the key ingredients in any talent marketplace is the mapping of skills to jobs and people, also known as a skills ontology. Without this mapping, matching Marines to billets will continue to rely on rank and MOS as the primary selection criteria. Mapping skills also clear the way for TMEP to start leveraging machine learning to automate and optimize the assignment process.  

In this instance, the intent of machine learning goes far beyond simple optimization. As the platform learns the various career paths Marines can take, the system will generate dynamic career path options and recommendations Marines can use as a roadmap to reach their career goals. Machine learning would be used to generate a draft list matching Marines to future vacancies optimized based on preferences, priority, and relevant skills. Machine learning will offer Marines a much clearer picture of their choices and how those choices impact their career progression and support monitors in meeting the needs of the Marine Corps.

Summary
Three years after the publication of Talent Management 2030, the marketplace effort is moving at full speed with two contracts and TMEP competing for the future of the Marine Corps’ talent management solution. Assignment processes are being evaluated for business improvement opportunities and the transition to a modern talent management system has begun. This move is long overdue but in no way an indictment of the old systems or the professionals who made it work for so long through sheer will and dedication. In a short time, TMEP made great strides to consolidate information, streamline workflows, and improve the efficiency of the overall assignments process with every additional feature added the Marine Corps’ talent marketplace brings the Commandant’s vision in Talent Management 2030 closer to reality.

>LtCol Peterson is currently serving as the Manpower and Reserve Affairs MITSM Portfolio Manager and Modernization Officer in the Manpower Information Systems Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
>>Capt Figlioli is currently serving as the Talent Management Engagement Platform Product Owner and Project Officer in the Manpower Information Systems Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington DC: 2021).

2. Bo Cowgill et al., “How to Design an Internal Talent Marketplace,” Harvard Business Review, May–June 2023, https://hbr.org/2023/05/how-to-design-an-internal-talent-marketplace.

Units of Action

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the stand-in force

To implement the concepts supporting Force Design 2030 (FD2030), the Marine Corps must revise what it considers its key units of action while studying the emerging characteristics of modern warfare. Traditionally, the Marine Corps focuses on the infantry battalion and flying squadron as units of action for all basic measurements of capability and readiness. Those capabilities, however, do not provide what the Stand-In Forces (SIF) and Reconnaissance Counter-Reconnaissance (RXR) concepts need—especially during competition. They may in fact distract from the principal object of operations. Instead, in competition, infantry battalions and flying squadrons are enablers for the key capabilities of SIF and RXR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection resulting in targeting. The purpose-built SIF force performs operational-level ISR on behalf of the maritime and Joint Force: “Stand-in forces’ enduring function is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition continuum. Stand-in forces do this by gaining and maintaining contact (establishing target custody and identifying the potential adversary’s sensors) below the threshold of violence.”1 The units of action for that type of activity are the platforms and teams in the Marine Corps that perform intelligence and reconnaissance collection and the cells, teams, and units that perform intelligence analysis and support to targeting. Before the Corps can close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, if that ever becomes necessary, it must locate that enemy. 

The heart of the SIF and RXR concepts is ISR collection and analytical support for targeting. The Marine Corps fields such elements today in the MEFs. The MEFs have light infantry reconnaissance teams, maritime sensor elements, counterintelligence-human intelligence detachments, signals intelligence/electronic warfare teams, meteorological and oceanographic detachments, and increasingly cyber mission elements and space capabilities. Furthermore, the FMFs have the analytical specialties to support fusion and targeting as well as the transport and encryption of sensitive compartmented information and are performing these missions. Fixed-wing and unmanned squadrons can also perform ISR under the reconnaissance mission of Marine Aviation, just as light armored reconnaissance and engineers can, but most other squadrons and battalions are enablers to these functions, and none of them have the core mission essential task to execute ISR or intelligence on behalf of the fleet or Joint Force. They could provide the transport, security, or simply the cover story for ISR units of action. 

The Marine Corps, however, does not customarily assign ISR as a main effort, much less employ dedicated intelligence assets in support of anything other than the local commander. ISR does not appear as part of the core mission essential task list (METL) for the MEU; for example, it only appears as “Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations” on the METL for the CE.2 Despite what the concepts say about providing eyes and ears for the fleet and the Joint Force, there are no tasks requiring a commander, especially a MAGTF commander, to do that. For a SIF performing RXR, however, those dedicated intelligence and reconnaissance assets might be both the main effort and the only employable force.

The FD2030 original concept evokes a force “optimized for naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces, purpose-built to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of the fleets.”3 This suggests that this force will perform, above all else, maritime domain awareness (MDA) by sensing and making sense of their immediate environs. For the stand-up of the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) in Japan, the Commandant assured Congress that “this unit will possess advanced ISR capabilities as well as long-range precision fires capabilities, improving both maritime domain awareness and our ability to deter potential adversaries.”4 In competition and crisis short of shooting conflict, that description means a force with a particularly acute ability to sense and make sense: an exceptionally strong ISR force that can do all the necessary work to constantly and consistently hold potential targets at risk. Under maritime strategic doctrine, there is a direct correlation between this kind of targeting and intelligence. The principal challenge for the maritime reconnaissance force “relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is obvious that for this kind of operation, the most precise intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence, the most difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy’s fleet from day to day.”5 

Whether employed as part of a larger formation, as in the proposed MLR in Japan, or as independent assets, the Marine Corps needs to perfect its concepts against the characteristics of the real world to see whether it can bring the capability sets together to accomplish them. For the larger formations, the Service follows a logical progression beginning with the 3rd MLR in Hawaii, inside the confines of the United States, and then proceeding to the 12th MLR in the first island chain and weapons engagement zone (WEZ) for the pacing threat envisioned—the People’s Republic of China.6 If the 12th MLR does indeed possess “advanced ISR capabilities,” it will be able to execute real-world ISR in competition and practice exercise targeting cycles in its zone of crisis action. For ISR and intelligence support to targeting, the task of perfecting against live opponents is easier than for any other participants in the targeting cycle because the possible adversarial target sets are abundant, and real-world and realtime missions can be executed short of conflict. 

Stationing in the main competition space will develop familiarity with the problem set, but it is a conflict that provides the best driver of innovation, even conflict elsewhere. “A military force wins by seeing how general principles apply to a specific situation and being creative with combat solutions.”7 ISR, while sometimes provocative, could be employed on behalf of allies, partners, or the Joint Force without engaging the rest of the force in crisis or contingency. The fusion and analysis of the intelligence collected could produce both innovation and action. “There has been no dearth of reporting on the changing character of war and the potential for disruption by new technology to alter the landscape of conflict.”8

The pacing threat also surveys current conflicts to evolve its planning to match probable warfare trends. Before the Russians began their current campaign in the Ukraine, for example, it was clear that “Chinese strategists face an economic security problem in the Malacca Dilemma, describing the threat of a naval blockade of vital Chinese sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.”9 China—however confrontational it has been in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea, demonstrating tactics and procedures—is not currently at war. Another peer adversary, Russia has begun to explore new operating concepts in realtime conflict in a resource-constrained environment in the Ukraine and Black Sea. Because the war in Ukraine involves a peer competitor—Russia—that conflict would appear to provide an ideal case to inform FD2030. While it is possible that a robust classified effort is occurring, there is little public evidence that the Marine Corps is doing much more than accepting public lessons learned from Ukraine. 

With increasing multi-domain drone implications, Ukraine provides a hotbed of military innovation.10 “As drones started to be used extensively, new operational concepts started to evolve, radically transforming armed conflict. This is especially visible in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where drone usage dominates most of the highlights of the conflict.”11 Ukraine is also exercising littoral sea operations in the Black Sea, with particular success in the first few weeks of 2024 using surface drones against warships.12 Over that few weeks, a landing ship, a missile-armed patrol vessel, and a corvette were sunk by a special operations unit according to Ukraine as well as several Russian patrol craft.13 In 2022, Ukraine sank the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, using Neptune anti-ship missiles. Public reporting indicates that without a single warship of its own, Ukraine has sunk nearly a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.14 It is notable that the announcements of successful targeting have come first, and sometimes exclusively, from “Ukrainian Intelligence.”15 How this has happened, and how the targets were located and analyzed, ought to be of paramount importance to Marines, especially how the Ukrainians developed the maritime awareness through ISR to execute the actions.

There is an opportunity to support Ukraine alongside NATO allies in Europe. With another force doing the fighting, ISR from a distance and observation of procedures is still possible and best performed from a position of direct support. Ukraine also possesses a Marine Corps, organized into brigades, trained for the most part by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway.16 While it is not clear that Ukrainian Marines participated at all in recent Black Sea littoral-control operations, these forces in size and formation more closely resemble the Marine Corps than the commando forces that have volunteered to train them. If Ukrainian Marines participated in Black Sea maritime operations, however, the Marine Corps has not been training them at scale through its typical units of action and so has minimal relation to the results. 

The other possibility, then, for learning from the conflict would be through participating in Black Sea MDA by employing ISR and intelligence analytical units of action. There is no public evidence of such activity by Marines. Although two-thirds of the FMF is devoted to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the lack of attention to a peer-competitor conflict exhibiting the characteristics of contemporary littoral warfare seems particularly striking: “In times of war, front-line practitioners are agents of innovation and change if only through necessity. Because there is no way to fully anticipate what a dynamic and evolving adversary will do in a conflict, the fog of war requires adaptation.”17 Marine force concepts appear to ignore this aspect of contemporary conflict, instead developing the force focused exclusively on a perception of a pacing threat not currently at war. 

Three current Marine Corps trends converge to generate this inattention to current crises. First, the pressure of transformational innovation that FD2030 created, especially in terms of those within the Service who stand to gain or lose, required a particularly singular rationale: that the most dangerous potential adversary translated into the requirement. Divestments in any organization result in difficult decisions, so the Corps turned to its pacing threat to justify them. Cuts, the Commandant explained, are “sizing the force for what you need, what you think you’ll be asked to do in the future.”18 The tension created by divestment resulted in a singular focus for justifications, even as the force struggled to balance its SIF identity with its accustomed crisis response identity. Something had to support the case for predictive change. The singularity of focus resulted in resource decisions that have had consequences on the global availability of Marine forces, impacting the balance of force innovation and crisis response capability. Forces involved in innovation have not been available for crises elsewhere because the SIF is meant to be a standing capability forward deployed. Likewise, surging capacity in elements of non-core units of action like ISR, targeting fusion, and intelligence analysis for a crisis elsewhere has been out of the question. 

The second issue is the stress assumed by the force when setting aside units for experimentation, continuing to maintain existing global force management requirements, the deliberate reduction of the force, and the retention problems that followed. This kind of stress leads to readiness issues when a reduced number of units attempt to respond to the same or a growing number of requirements. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, analytical, and targeting support Marines tend to be high-demand, low-density assets, meaning the stress to the force overall is particularly acute among these specialties. As a result, units at all echelons, but especially the MEFs in this case, seek to husband their resources to preserve readiness by avoiding non-core mission requirements. Even if the MAGTF had a METL that included performing ISR on behalf of the fleet and Joint Force (which it does not), conflicts that do not directly involve the United States or its Marines are not core requirements, however interesting the lessons from them may be. So, the MEFs avoid smaller requests, like intelligence collectors or intelligence targeting cells to support Ukraine, that seem reasonable at first but rapidly deplete high-demand, low-density specialties in the formation. 

The third issue and the key to this discussion relates directly to the example of force stress mentioned earlier: correctly identifying modern units of action, especially concerning the SIF and RXR concepts. Marine Corps thinking might occasionally extend to artillery or logistics units but never to intelligence as a unit of action. It does not think of the types of intelligence and reconnaissance collection teams who perform the key sensing tasks of the SIF and RXR as anything more than adjuncts to a local commander. The Service thinks even less of analytical and targeting teams, the groups that make sense for the SIF in RXR, as usable units of action. For this reason, the Service resists requests for support involving collections or analysis alone, viewing them exclusively as enablers for the traditional pacing units whose focus is the local commander. Other Services, however, have begun to recognize an ability to apply portions of a unit against specified problem sets outlined in requests for support. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has organized echelon III and IV headquarters intelligence sections into usable Analytical Support Elements. The Analytical Support Elements of a unit can be applied to a problem set with which the remainder of the unit is not otherwise involved. Furthermore, the Army and Air Force are organized into global ISR enterprises, respectively in INSCOM and the 16th Air Force, able to both support Service units and source support globally. No such entity exists in the Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps, then, has not manned, trained, or equipped itself to provide an ability to sense and make sense of producing MDA. The Marine Corps instead has deemphasized and subordinated its intelligence apparatus into a new information warfighting function that it has yet to fully define.19 To create new information specialties including cyber Marines, all of whom require clearances akin to intelligence specialties, the Service took the easy path of converting the intelligence structure. The Marine Corps leads no national or military intelligence programs on behalf of the DOD and so receives orders of magnitude less intelligence budgeted funds than all other Services except the Coast Guard. Fielded Marine intelligence formations fall under the MEF Information Groups with unclear lines of authority between the staff intelligence and fielded intelligence capabilities, still less between the DOD agency functional managers (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, etc) and the units. Having purchased the MQ9a Reaper Group 5 unmanned aerial system, explicitly an ISR platform as previously employed by the Air Force and U.S. Central Command, Marine public statements emphasize instead its use for command and control: “the service also plans to have a capability on their Reapers which transforms the UAVs into relay nodes for forces to communicate and receive information.”20 It is possible that this is why the Service did not buy the increased payload capability of the MQ-9b, which could have carried more intelligence collection. Only the Marine Corps has no independent director of intelligence, having combined the duties into the Deputy Commandant for Information. Even the United States Coast Guard has an Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (CG-2).21 Since the Marine Corps is the only Service that does not promote colonels into Joint O7 positions, that means that no further intelligence officers are likely to form any part of leadership for the Service in the future, clearly demonstrating Service priorities. 

The question, then, is why any warfighting combatant command would choose a Service without emphasis on intelligence to fulfill an intelligence requirement in the WEZ in the first island chain? The SIF and RXR role and mission, akin to a kind of joint tactical air controller for the fleet and Joint Force, only provides value with an organic ability to sense, make sense, and fuse and correlate data into intelligence. If the SIF merely provides command and control for sensors and fires that are not organic to it, then there is no point in placing it at risk in the WEZ. For the analogy, the only reason for a joint tactical air controller is to provide positive confirmation by direct observation. Consequently, the ISR sensing and intelligence sense-making capabilities of the SIF are critical to its potential and deterrence value. As a result, a combatant command would likely choose a Service with an emphasis on intelligence. Why would the combatant command not pick the Army, for example, whose INSCOM and multi-domain task forces practically guarantee a measure of MDA coupled with a deep ability to support fires? The Army has been conducting demonstrations of maritime fires since 2018: “The 17th Field Artillery Brigade, alongside the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, conducted its first live-fire exercise here, July 12, during the biennial Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, exercise. The Naval Strike Missile was the first to launch as a land-based asset.”22 Likewise, the Defense Policy Review Initiative caps Marine forces and reinvests them away from the first island chain (“More than half of the billions of dollars of contracting for the construction of facilities to accommodate the relocation of U.S. Marine units to Guam from Japan has been awarded”),23 the Air Force is moving fifth-generation aircraft to Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa, which could serve as the eyes and ears as well as the fires for the fleet and Joint Force.24 

The Marine Corps requires a clarifying review to connect its operating concepts based on current events to its force capabilities. The current conflict, like that in the Ukraine, is the closest thing that military studies have to a proving ground. It is intelligence that analyzes the multi-domain operating environments in which the Service seeks to assert itself to generate the assessment that supports adapting to pertinent conditions for imminent conflict. The units of action for intelligence are the forward-deployed collectors and advanced analytical and fusion units that make meaning from the mass of data. Collectors can indeed be any Marine unit given for its main effort and standing tasks intelligence collection operations. Providing for that mission and the fusion and analysis that supports it within formations like infantry battalions only makes those battalions more formidable, especially in competition where an adversary must suspect any Marine element of providing “the eyes and ears for the Joint Force”25 at scale. While information, as a warfighting function, produces only an anomalous interplay of contradictory messages that may or may not bear on actual facts on the ground, intelligence has for its primary purpose establishing the actual facts on the ground and obscuring them from the adversary. Unlike mere information, intelligence derives meaning from raw data and information to create actionable insights in support of the commander’s decision making.26 Furthermore, intelligence is supported by a multi-agency, cross-government community, budgetary and procurements processes, and standing authorities and legal basis. The capabilities that the Marine Corps needs to emphasize above all else to achieve the vision set forth for a SIF conducting RXR are ISR and intelligence capabilities: these are the key units of action.  

The Corps, however, has spent several years de-emphasizing and drawing resources from precisely these communities. As a result, the Service at the moment possesses insufficient ISR and intelligence resources and does not consider those that it has produced to be units of action to implement its own concepts. Force Design coupled with stresses to the force has set in motion a cycle of processes that myopically focus on a version of the pacing threat provided by someone else without sufficient contemporary references to be relevant. There are several current examples of SIF performing RXR in the littorals of the world. One of them is a partner nation force at war with a peer competitor in Ukraine, but Marines are barely participating in support of that force, unlike the Army who will learn the lessons there along with the British, Dutch, and Norwegian Marines training the Ukrainian Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps has made it abundantly clear that it prefers only to close with and destroy the enemy, not to locate the adversary in competition. If that is the case, then Marines cannot be the SIF in the WEZ performing RXR. If the Service seeks to alter course to achieve its SIF and RXR vision, then it will have to find a way to make culture-adjusting investments in ISR and intelligence immediately. Marines would need a Service-wide intelligence structure, strategy, and architecture among many other major changes. A good starting point in such a change, however, would be for the Service to recognize its basic ISR and intelligence units of action and to give its major formations the core task of performing operational ISR and intelligence on behalf of the fleet and Joint Force. 

>Col David is the Deputy Director for Intelligence Division under the Deputy Commandant for Information/Director of Intelligence.

Notes

1. Gen David Berger, A Concept for Stand-In Forces, (Washington, DC: 2021). 

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, NAVMC 3500.99, (Washington, DC: 2012).

3. Gen David Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019). 

4. Gen David Berger, “Statement of General David H. Berger Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps Before the Senate Appropriations Committee,” Marines.mil, March 28, 2023, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3360019/statement-of-general-david-h-berger-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-postu.

5. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1991).

6. Jim Garamone, “Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence,” DOD News, June 2, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2641068/official-talks-dod-policy-role-in-chinese-pacing-threat-integrated-deterrence. 

7. Brian A. Hester, Dennis Doyle & Ronan A. Sefton, “Techcraft on Display in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, May 16, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/techcraft-on-display-in-ukraine.

8. Susan F. Bryant and Andrew Harrison, “Finding Ender: Exploring the Intersections of Creativity, Innovation, and Talent Management in the U.S. Armed Forces,” Strategic Perspectives 31, (2019). 

9. Lucas Myers, “China’s Economic Security Challenge: Difficulties Overcoming the Malacca Dilemma,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 22, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/03/22/chinas-economic-security-challenge-difficulties-overcoming-the-malacca-dilemma. 

10. Kristen D. Thompson, “How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict. 

11. Gloria Shkurti Özdemir and Rıfat Öncel, “The War in Ukraine Has Revolutionized Drone Warfare,” The National Interest, January 11, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-ukraine-has-revolutionized-drone-warfare-206095. 

12. Svitlana Vlasova and Brad Lendon, “Ukraine’s Drones Sink another Russian Warship, Kyiv Says,” CNN World Europe, March 6, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. 

13. Associated Press, “Ukraine Claims It Has Sunk Another Russian Warship in the Black Sea Using High-Tech Sea Drones,” Politico, March 5, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/05/ukraine-warship-russia-black-sea-00145037; and Newsweek, “Video Shows Moment Russian Black Sea Ships Destroyed in Naval Drone Attack,” Newsweek, May 30, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-fleet-magura-v5-naval-drones-crimea-1906280. 

14. Lauren Frias, “Ukraine Wiped Out Nearly a Third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet without Even Having a Real Navy, These Are the Warships Russia Lost,” Business Insider, February 7, 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/warships-in-russia-black-sea-fleet-that-ukraine-wiped-out-2024-2. 

15. “The War in Ukraine Has Revolutionized Drone Warfare.”

16. The Ministry of Defense, “British Commandos Train Hundreds of Ukrainian Marines in UK Programme,” Gov.UK, August 21, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-commandos-train-hundreds-of-ukrainian-marines-in-uk-programme.

17. Nina Kolars, “Genious and Mastery in Military Innovation,” Modern War Institute, April 3, 2017, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/genius-mastery-military-innovation. 

18. Meredith Roaten, “Marine Corps Commandant Defends Equipment Divestment, End Strength Cuts,” National Defense, September 1, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/9/1/marine-corps-commandant-defends-force-size-divestment.

19. There is no definition of “Information” as a warfighting function given in MCDP 8, Information—only characteristics are described. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 8, Information, (Washington, DC: 2022).  

20. Aaron Matthew Lariosa, “First Marine Corps MQ-9A Reaper Squadron Now Operational,” USNI News, August 8, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/08/08/first-marine-corps-mq-9a-reaper-squadron-now-operational. 

21. United States Coast Guard, “Assistant Commandant for Intelligence,” United States Coast Guard, n.d., https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Intelligence-CG-2.

22. Capt Rachel Jeffcoat, “Army Conducts 1st RIMPAC Joint Live-fire Sinking Exercise as Multi-Domain Task Force,” U.S. PACOM JTF Micronesia, July 25, 2018, https://www.pacom.mil/JTF-Micronesia/Article/1584462/army-conducts-1st-rimpac-joint-live-fire-sinking-exercise-as-multi-domain-task/#:~:text=The%2017th%20Field%20Artillery%20Brigade,as%20a%20land%2Dbased%20asset.

23. Frank Whitman, “Boudra: ‘We Have to Respond from Within the Theater of Operations’,” Pacific Island Times, November 16, 2022, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/boudra-we-have-to-respond-from-within-the-theater-of-operations. 

24. Unshin Lee Harpley, “Kadena Adds More Stealth Fights Amid ‘Increasingly Challenging Strategic Environment’,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, May 1, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/kadena-more-stealth-fighters-strategic-environment. 

25. Eric Smith, “Statement of General Eric M. Smith Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps Before The Senate Appropriations Committee,” Marines.mil, April 16, 2024, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3759255/statement-of-general-eric-m-smith-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-posture.

26. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” Congressional Research Service, May 9, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10574. 

A New Kind of Intelligence Analyst

Meeting the demands of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

Marine Intelligence professionals have always struggled to stay up-to-date with current developments and maintain relevancy. There is a consistent risk to the intel field of relying too much on grassroots efforts and personal talent to carry intelligence forward into tomorrow while doctrine and training focus on yesteryear’s war. Tactical intelligence traditionally focuses on establishing baselines and using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to detect anomalies, engage targets, and confirm or deny adversary courses of action in the battlespace. This approach is sufficient for low-intensity conflict in permissible environments, and for the past 25 years, the United States has optimized its processes through various supporting agencies. However, this has also meant military intelligence, at the tactical echelon, has not had to seriously consider the national-strategic mission their unit may be a part of and how military intelligence supports it or operates without the current level of support they are accustomed to.

With the introduction of Force Design and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), Marines down to the local commander level will be expected to support wider, protracted campaigns, in austere or possibly hostile areas, and across a spectrum inclusive of competition but at the other extreme involving outright conflict. Currently, Marine intelligence is not equipped or optimized to support the Naval Service as envisioned and will require these Marines at the lowest echelons to think more strategically and critically with fewer resources in their analysis to ensure that commanders and Marines can operate in these environments. Before identifying what intelligence Marines need, it is important to discuss what EABO is on paper and what EABO is de facto asking Marines to think and do. 

Expeditionary advanced base operations, as defined in the latest tentative manual, is a naval concept designed to improve maneuver, exploit control over key maritime terrain, and integrate the FMF with Navy capabilities.1 The spirit of EABO can be derived from the original EABO Handbook, which described it as an adversary-specific, cost-effective, advantage-focused concept of operations that could mitigate the risk from long-range precision fires while maintaining resilient forward forces—and thus move the Marine Corps away from relying on traditional, easily-targeted bases.2 However, another interpretation is that EABO is the enabler for larger campaigns. Supporting this approach is the nested concept of Stand-in Forces (SIF), which are forward deployed among allied and partner forces across the competition continuum. The SIF supports multi-domain awareness, information operations, and security cooperation efforts aiming to bolster partner-nation confidence and set conditions for advantage in conflict. 

Expeditionary advanced base operations are framed as an operational-level adaptation to China’s specific military threat. However, it encompasses a new approach to thinking about the crucial aspects of terrain, diplomatic, information, and even economic domains—marking the idea as more of a first step toward a geo-strategy, rather than just an operational concept. Geo-strategy has many schools of thought, but all rest on the idea that geographical factors inform and shape military planning.3 As a result, EABO requires a nuanced understanding of the key maritime and littoral areas. Expeditionary advanced base operations takes this approach in two ways: First, it is explicitly designed to maximize the use of chokepoints and the littorals, making its planning assumptions dependent on the terrain, its physical characteristics, and regional significance. For example, EABO provides a frame to understand where SIF could best operate and maximize the effect of their contribution to campaign operations across the competition continuum. Second, it assumes a certain level of austerity in its operating areas and proposes several methods in the planning process to overcome this issue. Marines may be operating in materially bereft areas devoid of much infrastructure but still must complete complex tasks as part of the overall naval commander’s campaign. 

What EABO requires of Marines, then, is ambitious. Task groups will be part of a larger interservice and multi-domain campaign, protracted and complex in its efforts to counter an adversary’s military strength or perform a variety of tasks in a minimally permissive environment—colloquially thought of as grey-zone activity. Although this campaign can be decisive, it will require interservice planning and execution at a level far more advanced than the Joint Force’s recent practical experience. Expeditionary advanced basing operations are also meant to be complemented by distributed maritime operations, a core Navy operating concept that explores dispersed, lower-signature methods of sustaining the SIF and other forces performing EABO. The littoral operations area envisioned by EABO also notes the multitude of avenues logistics may have to take to sustain units in expeditionary locations across key coastal points.4 The local commander presiding over the littoral operations area will likely find themselves in a difficult information environment. In that scenario, the commander will need to lean on military intelligence professionals. 

The requirements for intelligence support for EABO demand long-term, strategic thinking, and analysis to assist commanders in setting conditions for success across all domains of national power to enable their mission.5 Marine intelligence with SIF in these areas would need to know not only the local environment and its human terrain but how that human terrain interacts with regional, provincial, and national-level political entities, and how the implications of such actions further or hinder national strategy. This awareness is necessary to maintain access, collect relevant intelligence, and inform the wider defense and intelligence apparatus assessing the macropolitical picture. Explicitly or not, the SIF and their intel components are going to be de facto envoys of the United States. This dilemma may not appear to be an intelligence professional’s concern, but the role of intelligence in a task-organized group performing in this environment is much more complex and the Marine Corps intelligence enterprise may not be set up to easily support this. The current structure of Marine intelligence is sufficient for tactical decision making at the squad-leader level but does not provide room for serious consideration of the joint military or national-strategic mission a unit may be a part of and how their military intelligence supports it. Intel Marines may not be trained to the standard EABO tentatively asks of them and therefore cannot credibly inform the joint commander’s decision-making cycle. 

The future operating environment presents new and unique challenges to Marines. Partnering with a host nation for EABO may provide logistical advantages in remote or impermissible environments, but they are also susceptible to adversary actions beyond military means. The information environment, for example, can be exploited by an adversary to denigrate a SIF’s host nation and convince them to reduce the SIF presence, eliminate it, or redirect it away from the geo-strategic, crucial areas it was designed to operate in, effectively removing the SIF ability to serve as a deterrent. Marines on the ground may be quickly outmaneuvered by adversaries if intelligence and commanders do not understand the follow-on effects of their own actions, necessitating skills at lower echelons to hasten decision making.6 The intelligence professional supporting a SIF must understand the political risk of operating in a partner-nation territory, what the limits are on SIF operations in its borders, and how to maintain a favorable information environment. Some of these issues are further expanded on in the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance concept updated for Force Design.7 

At its core, Force Design, to be effective, will need the military intelligence professional to move  beyond the wars of the past two decades. With the growing role and presence of information and grey-zone warfare, the future operating environment requires intelligence Marines to add the role of geo-strategist to their portfolio. This will ultimately empower them to inform, adapt, and execute ambitious concepts—taking a more active role in intelligence preparation of the environment, rather than a passive one. The military intelligence professional in the field, supporting EABO, will more than likely be a non-commissioned officer (NCO) or staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO); therefore, these Marines must be trained, equipped, and enabled to think strategically, incorporating analytic techniques, knowledge, and expertise previously not currently associated with their grade. By better training and educating intelligence NCOs, SNCOs, and commanders, Marines at these levels can operate more autonomously in austere environments to support the wider campaign and national interests in a crisis. 

The Marine Corps could leverage the professional military education institutions at its disposal to better integrate Marines with the intelligence and policy world preemptively, and build up a deep bench of regional subject-matter expertise and technical proficiency for the future fight. For building the Indo-Pacific geostrategic expert, the Marine Corps could work with professional military education-associated research centers like the China Maritime Studies Institute or the China Aerospace Studies Institute; alternately, it could develop its own research center and mechanisms for convening outside experts. Working with academia to further intelligence training would allow the Marine Corps to better support building a deeper bench of competent and capable intelligence NCOs and SNCOs. This would be the initial step in integrating them with the fleet and intelligence community—and having them ready and equipped for tomorrow. 

>SSgt Campbell enlisted in the Marine Corps in March of 2017 from Charleston, SC. Currently stationed in the National Capital Region, he studies Strategic and Organizational Communication. 

>>Mr. Long is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Brute Krulak Center on Innovation and Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. 

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd Edition, (Washington, DC: 2023). 

2. Art Corbett, “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook, Version 1.1,” Marine Corps Association, June 1, 2018, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-EABO-handbook-1.1.pdf. 

3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs 76, No. 5 (1997).

4. Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

5. Ibid; and Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 6, Command and Control, (Washington, DC: 1996). 

6. MCDP 6. 

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030–Annual Update, (Washington, DC: 2023). 

>Authors’ Note: Their views are their own and do not reflect the opinions of the Marine Corps or the DOD. 

We Are Currently in the Most Dangerous Period of Force Design 2030

Balancing readiness and modernization

Divisions between the Marine Corps and Navy, divestments for Force Design 2030, and a rapidly rising China have created a situation that threatens the ability of the Marine Corps to be able to complete its mission. While Force Design 2030 is still in the transition phase, the Marine Corps needs to find a way in the here and now to be able to respond to a diverse array of potential threats, vastly increase its cooperation with the Navy, and be able to meet the needs of the country as its premier force in readiness. 

At the start of the Ukrainian-Russian war in 2022, European Command asked for a Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) to deploy to Europe to be a deterrence to the aggression that was rapidly unfolding. However, the Marine Corps was unable to fulfill that request. The ARG—comprised of USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), USS Arlington (LPD-24), and USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44)—were unable to be deployed until a month after they were asked to, with the latter ship still arriving later than the first two due to maintenance issues.1

Even more recently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps testified that the Marines were unable to send a crisis response force to Turkey after the disastrous earthquake because we did not have the ships, saying, “We didn’t have a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a MEU, nearby that could respond … I owe the Secretary of Defense, the President—we Joint Chiefs owe them options … all the time. Here, I felt like the best option, we couldn’t offer them because we have the Marines and the equipment and they’re trained, we didn’t have the ships.”2 Here, the Commandant is explicitly admitting that the Marine Corps has fallen short of the Nation’s expectations of them.

These two cases are concerning symptoms of a larger problem at bay in the Marine Corps and the Navy—and they hold clues about the readiness of our Service to counter the rising threats in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. Without a doubt, the MEU and the ARG are the core of the Marine Corps’s capability. These allow the Marine Corps to be the President’s crisis response force, a capability none of the other conventional Services have. A great example of everything offered by the MEU is in 1983 when a MEU headed to Beirut diverted halfway through its journey and conducted an invasion of Grenada to help save American students. Immediately after, they proceeded directly to Lebanon, where they assisted in humanitarian operations.3

The flexibility and versatility offered by the MEU, to rapidly transition from one mission to the next seamlessly, is the great strength of the Corps. But the Marine Corps can be the Nation’s crisis response force for one reason: American sea power. Marines embark on Navy amphibious assault ships, land on beaches using Navy LCUs and LCACs, and conduct flight operations off Navy flight decks using Navy landing officers. Thus, American sea power and the ability of the Marines to project power requires having the requisite number of ships. Without them, Force Design 2030 simply cannot take shape.

The threats facing this country are modern and rapidly evolving. President Xi has instructed his country’s armed forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, with some reports indicating that they could invade as early as 2024.4 Yet, the equipment the Marine Corps needs to counter a potential conflict is not operationally ready, and the Navy and Marine Corps are at an impasse as to who should provide it for them. The end product of Force Design 2030 creates a lighter, more mobile, faster responding Marine Corps capable of operating as a stand-in force inside the enemy’s weapon engagement zone.5

However, Force Design 2030 only works if they have the ships to do so. Divesting our tanks and reorganizing our artillery, aviation, and infantry to meet the needs of the coming threats are correct. However, this requires the Navy to have ships that are both practical and survivable in a contested area to bring Marines to the fight. For the last twenty years, the Marine Corps has been in sustained land combat, operating well away from the littoral zone in two landlocked countries. Those who criticize Force Design 2030 fail to see that the last twenty years of sustained land conflict have driven this divide between the Marine Corps and the Navy, and now we see the result of that. As such, the partnership with the Navy has been eroded and summarily forgotten in many regards.

There is now a divide between what the Marine Corps needs and the priorities of the Navy. This is illustrated in the fact that the number one item on the fiscal year 2023 budget request of the Marine Corps is amphibious warships, yet amphibious landing ships are being retired faster than they can be procured. Landing Dock Ships (LSDs) are on track to be entirely out of service by 2027. Additionally, the Navy has stated that the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock-32 (LPD-32) would be the last LPD produced and they would be ending that line of ship, a line which was initially expected to go until LPD-42.6 The former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Berger, stated that the requirements of the Marine Corps is 31 amphibious assault ships, whereas this current plan to end the line of LPDs and LSDs would bring that number down to 25 in the coming years, leaving the Marine Corps at least 6 ships short of being mission capable.7 Obviously, the Navy must make budget choices, and rightly so. The nuclear navy, including our submarines and carriers, rightly takes many resources and financing to acquire and maintain. However, the Navy should also understand that their relationship with the Marine Corps is symbiotic; it is not a zero-sum game.

Money invested in the Marine Corps is not necessarily money lost for the Navy. The Navy is not simply driving the Marines across the ocean and dropping them off on an island to conduct independent running operations. The actions the Marine Corps will be taking will help to protect naval shipping, including providing bases on which to refuel, and provide a defense in depth that will serve to protect our biggest naval assets like our carrier fleet. From the expeditionary advanced base operations handbook itself,

In order to enhance the speed of deployment and minimize infrastructure and logistical support requirements, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) will exploit passive defenses to the degree prudent and practical. Dispersion, decoys, cover, camouflage, and concealment will all be maximized to preclude effective enemy targeting of EAB-hosted assets.8

We see incredibly similar messaging that mirrors this within the Marine Corps’ own warfighting doctrine, MCDP 1, where it says, “We avoid enemy strength and focus our efforts against enemy weakness with the object of penetrating the enemy system since pitting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results.”9

This is exactly what EABO is intended to do. The nature of warfare has changed. With the onset of 21st-century weapons such as hypersonic (carrier killer) missiles, an aircraft carrier anywhere within that weapons’ engagement zone presents an inviting target. Operating inside that weapons engagement zone, we seek to disrupt the enemy’s system and out cycle the enemy—with the goal of avoiding taking casualties ourselves and inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy. China itself has even taken notice of this, admitting that the EABO concept will create, “a dense, multi-directional intersecting kill zone over large areas west of the island chain.”10 This EABO concept will help to navigate and hopefully avoid a potential war of attrition in the South China Sea where instead of trading an aircraft carrier for an aircraft carrier, our naval forces can cycle at a higher tempo and outmaneuver the adversary before becoming targets themselves. 

This begs the question, how can the Navy and Marine Corps team better cooperate to achieve mission readiness while meeting both the needs of the Marine Corps as well as all the other needs of the Navy? Eastern Europe is already at war, and as such, the timeline to become mission-ready is rapidly dwindling. Training in the Navy and Marine Corps must change to reflect the cohesion necessary in the coming fight. Expeditionary advanced base operations create a web of information, which is shared continuously between Marines, ships, satellites, aircraft, and commanders to better shape the battle space. However, this requires new tactics, techniques, and procedures, which means the Navy needs to understand Marine Corps capabilities and the Marine Corps needs to understand Naval capabilities, specifically, ship-related capabilities. The Navy cannot support the Marine Corps if they misunderstand our capabilities, and likewise, the Marine Corps cannot provide the Navy with the intelligence and data that they will need if we do not understand the operational requirements—in other words: the how we fit into the bigger picture. Currently, at The Basic School, hands-on training with the Navy is limited to an amphibious exercise, which is one day in Norfolk, VA. However, the interaction is limited to LCACs, LCUs, and LSDs. If we are expected to be integrating extensively with the Navy, however, it would be beneficial for young Marine officers to also be exposed to and learn the capabilities of Naval warships, such as cruisers and destroyers, as well all types of other amphibious assault ships.

In short, we need to know what the Navy needs to complete its mission. They should also have a deeper depth understanding of how those forces are employed, and how they work to support amphibious operations. This would allow young officers to get a better understanding of what the future battlespace may look like. Additionally, a majority of our guest speakers have all been Marine Corps generals and officers. If we are a naval force in readiness, then more Navy officers need to be included in these discussions so we can ask questions, and therefore better learn from them, and they learn from us. Joint interactions allow us to better understand each other capabilities and missions, which help to drive cooperation.

Lastly, The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations should be required for reading and discussion at The Basic School and concepts from that should influence the curriculum at MOS schools, especially the schools that are highly impacted by this, such as logistics, artillery, infantry, intelligence, and air defense. The bridge between the Navy and Marine Corps needs to be seamless for Force Design 2030 to work as intended, and as officers at The Basic School, at the very least we can do our part to make sure that happens.  

This transition zone is both an exciting and a dangerous time for the Navy and Marine Corps. The less time spent in this area of transition, the better. Just like in the transition from the offense to the defense, we are at our most vulnerable if we spend too long in this phase. If China closes its shipping lanes tomorrow, if Russia starts to drop bombs on Poland, or if Iran decides to flex its nuclear muscle, does the United States have the ability to respond? These questions must be answered, and if necessary, a hard look in the mirror must be taken. This response will require intestinal fortitude in the highest level of leadership. It will require admitting in front of Congress, the Nation, and most importantly, our fellow Marines that our force is not yet ready. The reputation of the Marine Corps was not given to us just by being Marines. It has been earned over many generations, and any time that we do not live up to that reputation we disrespect those who came before us and gave the highest devotion to duty. From the lowest level to the highest, there must be a sense of urgency in fixing these current issues of our operational shipping capability, and our lack of Navy/Marine Corps team mentality so that we give our Marines and our sailors the best to survive and win on the 21st-century battlefield. If we do not, the next force design’s lessons will only be written in blood by the failures of this one.

>1stLt Smith is a Student Naval Aviator currently assigned to Training Squadron 2 (VT-2) Doerbirds at NAS Whiting Field. He graduated from the University of Arizona in 2021 and graduated from The Basic School in May 2023.

Notes

1. Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet,” USNI News, April 26, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/04/26/marines-couldnt-meet-request-to-surge-to-europe-due-to-strain-on-amphibious-fleet.

2. Conor M. Kennedy and Scott E Stephan, “The PLA Is Contemplating the Meaning of Force Design,” Proceedings 149, No. 4 (2023).

3. Gary Wilson, William A. Woods, and Michael D. Wyly, “Send in the Marines? Reconsider Force Design 2030 Beforehand,” Defense News, Defense News, August 22, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/04/send-in-the-marines-reconsider-force-design-2030-beforehand.

4. John Culver, “How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan,” Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace, October 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/03/how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053.

5. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020). 

6. “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet.”

7. Ibid. 

8. Art Corbett, “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook Version 1.1,” Marine Corps Association, June 1, 2018, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-EABO-handbook-1.1.pdf.

9. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

10. “The PLA Is Contemplating the Meaning of Force Design.”

Positional Warfare

Prospects for Ukraine in 2024–2027

The Road to Here
Three years into the Ukraine War, it is worth recalling the breathless American and European estimates of Ukrainian collapse, including from then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley and President Joseph Biden.1 Germany and France reacted with a combination of disbelief and wish-casting. Germany wholly discounted the prospects of an invasion.2 This explains the volte-face that characterised Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech on 27 February, when per American estimates, Russian troops should have been in Kyiv.3 A serious French intelligence failure did occur, but France clearly viewed Russian aggression as a political opportunity, hence Emmanuel Macron’s high-speed dashes to Moscow.4  It is a testament to Macron’s political instincts that Macron ultimately transformed France’s strategic position, making it a crucial rhetorical supporter of Kyiv’s independence and European alignment.5 American intelligence failure was more explicable in one respect: the Russian campaign plan did very nearly succeed.6 Russia’s multi-axis assault, intelligence preparation, and country-wide air campaign were designed to overwhelm Ukrainian decision making, allowing Russian paratroopers to hold Hostomel Airport and Russian armored forces to enter Kyiv by 25 February. The Ukrainian military would dissolve into disconnected units that could be encircled and mopped up over the coming weeks, while the Russian Special Services would begin population control measures to occupy the country. Russia’s failure stemmed partly from planning complexity, much like Graf Schlieffen’s planned single-wing envelopment of French forces. Graf Moltke did weaken the right wing of the envelopment, but his moves never actually decreased German combat power on the right.7 But despite its theoretical merits, the Germans ultimately failed because of a number of friction points, primarily the need to neutralize Liege in 48 hours, conduct a high-speed advance through France on foot, and maintain momentum despite encountering battles. In the event, the third factor spoiled the operational plan. Much like Valery Zaluzhny and Oleksandyr Syrskyi assembled a defense of Kyiv after the shock of war dissipated, Joffre’s decision to drive forward and disrupt the German advance broke the battlefield theory of victory.8

Western planners should have understood the dangers of an overwrought, hyper-intellectualized view of battlefield maneuver.9 Even though Russian forces had pushed over the Irpin River, the capital remained in a defensible position, particularly since the Desna River narrowed Russian options in the east and the Dnipro prevented direct assault from the north. Moreover, absent the intelligence penetration that enabled Russia’s southern advances, there was little chance of Russian forces rapidly capturing urban areas. Hence Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv all resisted despite Russian encirclement, pressuring Russian supply lines running and forcing Russia to choose between an assault on the capital or methodical high-casualty urban combat elsewhere.10

Unsurprisingly, 2022 was a year of operational movement. Most wars begin with a movement phase. Even the World War, a partial exception, proves the rule: the Phoney War from September 1939 to May 1940 was a strategic interlude, finally broken with a rapid maneuver campaign.11 Indeed, the Wehrmacht’s Fall Gelb is also illustrative in the Ukraine case.12  Ukraine and Russia have fought since 2014 over the Donbas, generating well-constructed, multi-layered fortifications along the line of contact.13 Assaulting these locations is difficult and costly, as Russia’s combat record demonstrates: it took Russia three months to capture Severodonetsk, six months to take Bakhmut, and six months of concerted combat after a decade of war to take Avdiivka. Much like the Wehrmacht’s General Staff in 1940, the Russian General Staff generated an aggressive operational plan that bypassed positional defenses. Yet, even the World War, a supposed maneuver war, had static stretches, including German and British minefield breaching operations, Soviet-German see-saw engagements around Moscow, brutal frontal assaults against trenches in Italy, and the costly U.S.-UK punch through the Siegfried Line.14

The Ukraine War’s positional-movement dynamics are similar. Ukraine staged three counteroffensives in 2022: a limited operation in Kharkiv that broke Russia’s siege, a broader Kharkiv operation that liberated 12,000 square kilometers of territory, and a more methodical operation in Kherson that threw Russian forces back over the Dnipro. Yet, since that point, there has been little to no movement, and not for lack of trying. Russia has executed two major offensives, a winter-spring 2022–2023 offensive that sought to capture Vuhledar and Bakhmut, and the winter 2023–2024 offensive against Avdiivka and Kupyansk. Neither has resulted in a major operational change, and both have imposed enormous losses on Russian forces. Ukraine, meanwhile, launched a major offensive June–September 2023, which failed to deliver operationally significant gains at obvious cost.

Western military and security officials repeatedly anonymously criticized Ukrainian strategic and operational decision making during the 2023 offensive.15 Ukraine, of course, largely disengaged with Western advice after the opening phase of its offensive, rapidly judging after the failure of its first breakthrough attempt against Robotyne that Western advice was irrelevant considering combat conditions.16 For example, the West has never fought a war under mutual air denial, limited but prised long-range strike capacity, and the acceleration and fusion of reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fires complexes, all with a mass-mobilization army. Indeed, no Western country has executed a combined-arms breakthrough operation of the type Ukraine attempted since the World War or defended against one since the Vietnam War.

What, then, are the conditions that Ukraine faces? How can the advice and support effort be better calibrated to assist Ukrainian strategic planning and operational work? What might this tell us as a diagnostic for the battlefield and European policy over the next three years?

Positional Warfare
American advice and support missions have largely failed since Vietnam and notably failed in Iraq and Afghanistan.17 In the latter two cases, the United States refused to create a military organization that actually matched tactical and strategic requirements. The United States excels at Special Operations Forces (SOF) support. In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S.-trained SOF were, and in the latter case remain, the backbone of state combat capacity.18 Ruthlessly deployed as assault infantry with extensive U.S. enabling capabilities behind them, local SOF tactically outfought any adversary. But the issue was strategic. Absent an American-sustained support network around them, Iraqi and Afghan SOFs lose combat effectiveness. In the Afghan case, this led to the regime’s collapse: absent air support, the Afghan National Army SOF were overwhelmed once the United States ended its sustainment mission.19

We arguably see a similar pattern in Ukraine. The closest contact between the U.S. military and the Ukrainian military prior to February 2022 came in SOF training missions.20 U.S. operators have spoken since 2022 of their lack of surprise at Ukrainian success—their view of the Ukrainian military, for bureaucratic reasons, was never transmitted to higher command or to net assessment and combat forecasting teams.21

Yet, bureaucracy alone does not explain the shortcomings of American and allied perceptions of the Ukrainian-Russian military balance, or difficulties in the advice and support mission. Bureaucratic inertia matters: Western-trained Ukrainian soldiers did receive high-quality combat medical instruction, but their trainers, never having fought on a UAS-saturated battlefield, did not provide coherent tactical and operational guidance that applied to the Ukrainian battlefield.22

Understanding the gap between the American advice and support mission and the realities of the battlefield requires a return to military theory. Specifically, we need to understand the character of positional war, to which the Ukrainian battlefield has evolved, and from there, build out a series of analytical inferences and programmatic recommendations.

The recently relieved Valery Zaluzhny’s Economist piece last November offers a useful but incomplete starting point, particularly since he patterned his essay off Soviet military-theoretical models.23  His analysis centered upon the interlocking character of UAS, air defense, mines, electronic warfare, and counter-battery fire. When combined, they create a nasty problem for the attacker—dense minefields slow the attacker, persistent UAS surveillance identify attacking units rapidly while effective electronic disruption, counter-battery fire, and air defenses limit the offensive battlespace isolation. A breakthrough is possible with sufficient mass, but training and equipping that mass is difficult. Moreover, the combat power benefits of mass decline on the Ukrainian battlefield when massed forces are discovered and thereby attacked and destroyed, a reality Ukraine has amply demonstrated through its use of precision-guided munitions.

Zaluzhny’s piece is a relevant starting point because it identifies the fundamental positional logic of the Ukraine War. But Zaluzhny, to his detriment, never explicitly defines a positional war. This generates a significant difficulty since the term itself is not thoroughly defined elsewhere.

Anglo-American military thought often conflates position with attrition.  Attrition, in turn, is charged with significant negative implications. A war of attrition is often contrasted with a war of maneuver. The former is an unsophisticated slugfest akin to that of the Great War’s Western Front, in which materiel production and political resilience outweigh factors of military command.24 The latter is a model of military art, akin to Napoleon’s campaigns, in which tactical skill and aggression combine to create real examples of strategic and operational leadership.

The American bias toward maneuver over attrition is odd considering American military history. The greatest U.S. supreme commanders of the 18th and 19th centuries, George Washington and Ulysses Grant, were both masterful attritional fighters. Washington’s genius was in the retreat. While better-trained and equipped British forces won major engagements, Washington executed multiple successful retreats that preserved the bulk of Colonial forces. This was undoubtedly an attritional approach: by wearing the enemy down, Washington created the conditions for a more equitable strategic balance. Grant, meanwhile, embraced the logic of attrition. His Overland Campaign involved constant pressure on Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, compelling it to give battle multiple times in just a few weeks, ultimately locking the Confederate forces into a brutal static war they could not win. William T. Sherman, the third great general of the American tradition, fought an equally attritional war in the Confederacy’s heartland, slicing it in half and destroying its war-making capacity through his March to the Sea and subsequent Carolinas Campaign.

Moreover, the American military tradition lacks, in several fundamental respects, the concept of strategy given the United States’ commanding economic capacity. With the partial exception of the War of 1812, the United States has never engaged in a conflict from a position of structural weakness. The Confederacy did take with it well-trained officers and U.S. cotton production, but the Union’s industrial-mercantile northeast gave it a dominant advantage. Imperial Spain in 1898 was decaying. In 1917 and 1941, the United States did face significant adversaries, but America held advantages in population, industrial production, and resource wealth. Hence Franklin Roosevelt’s fundamental supposition, prior to December 1941, that ultimately American policy was simply to engage in the fight given its natural advantages.

The American strategy is, therefore, logistics, the skill of translating industrial capacity and population into combat power, and subsequently sustaining forces during engagements. This is an all-to-often neglected aspect of military science. However, it does not provide the American military practitioner with great fodder for theoretical inquiry.

The American tradition largely reaches to its German counterpart for examples of tactical military excellence. This began immediately after the World War, with the U.S. Army’s rational insistence upon debriefing German armored officers. Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State solidified the trend. It takes the Prussian-German General Staff as its modern civil-military model, viewing the military officer as a professional dedicated to the rational political control of violence.25

Tactically and operationally, American military art emphasizes initiative, aggression, and the application of superior firepower and simultaneity between armor, artillery, and airpower, today coupled with cyberspace operations to collapse enemy cohesion and win a rapid, decisive victory akin to DESERT STORM or IRAQI FREEDOM. The Marine Corps equally embraced maneuver warfare and arguably drove beyond the Army’s obsession with it by the 1990s.26

This view self-evidently embraces maneuver warfare for partly self-serving reasons. Maneuver engagements are expressions of true military skill, embodied by Patton, Guderian, or Rommel—but they also keep wars short, crucial for U.S. democracy. Moreover, U.S. political authorities, per Huntington’s model, provide general objectives, while the military identifies the most rational combat solution to the problem presented. The military commander becomes capable of challenging the political leader on ostensibly objective military grounds, thereby abdicating responsibility to understand the totality of the combat environment in a manner Clausewitz would find inexplicable.

Yet, the dichotomy between attrition and maneuver, while common in American and Western military thought, is unhelpful intellectually. For one, attrition is the basic state of conflict, both from combat realities and due to Clausewitz’s friction.27 For another, the maneuver paradigm has prevented American strategists from coherently linking ends and means. By overwhelmingly emphasizing American combat methods, U.S. maneuver warfare departs from the contextual factors, political and military, that actually color combat.

The Soviet tradition conceived of maneuver and attrition rather differently. Most valuable is the work of AA Svechin, the first—and arguably the most intellectually coherent—of Soviet theorists.28 His text Strategy counterposes not attrition and maneuver, but attrition and destruction, the latter being a form of war in which the object is the destruction of the enemy’s combat capacity in direct engagements, the former being any other way of prosecuting an armed conflict. Svechin’s point is to demonstrate the limited context under which a war of destruction may be waged.

Historical comparison in military arts is difficult, hence Clausewitz’s demand that analogy should be sought from cases near in time.29 War is a political phenomenon, hence its nature is by necessity fixed, as is the nature of politics. But the character of politics, namely the organization of the political unit and the sorts of political and economic technologies employed, change over time, as does the character of warfare. The period of late 18th and early 19th century warfare thus marked the high point of the destruction approach, exemplified by Napoleon. Army size greatly expanded by the late 18th century due to changes in political technology and sustainment, but communications and transportation limits meant that tactical engagements could retain a direct link to strategy. Moreover, the 18th and early 19th-century state was personalized and post-feudal, not bureaucratic. Napoleon could win transformational victories because his enemies, as sovereigns or near-sovereigns, commanded their forces in combat, creating a direct link between the tactical and the political. This explains Napoleon’s success at Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstadt, and Wagram: in each engagement, he defeated an enemy sovereign and was, therefore, able to impose a peace. By contrast, Napoleon’s ultimate defeats from 1812 to 1815 stemmed from his inability to generate political effects from tactical victory. Borodino lacked it, while even Napoleon’s victories during the German Campaign were never overwhelming enough to achieve political reverberations. Subsequent examples of tactical engagements with direct political effect do exist, namely the Prussian victory at Koniggratz and the German victory at Sedan. But there are obvious differences between these victories and that of Austerlitz and Wagram. For in neither case did defeat lead to immediate enemy capitulation. After Koniggratz, it took Bismarck’s restraint to end the war on favorable terms. The French fought on for a year after Sedan, despite Napoleon III’s abdication.

Svechin grasped that the Great War’s brutality was a result of this loss of the tactical-political link that dominated the age of linear tactics.30 The battlespace had expanded in width and depth, through a combination of societal mobilization, advances in communications, and the advent of indirect fire artillery to necessitate an organizing principle for combat well beyond that of individual engagements. The Prussian General Staff model did provide some help, particularly with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau’s political emphasis—an approach Prussian military genius Graf Moltke the Elder missed. However, the Prussian model did not successfully provide a logic for large-scale modern combat. Svechin’s objective was to demonstrate that, rather than emphasizing a decisive point and harmonizing all efforts toward that goal, modern war would typically be a societal contest of attrition in which victory would go to the side capable of winning the final engagement, not the first one.31

Svechin’s understanding of positional warfare is couched within these terms.32 All wars have either offensive or defensive aims, which often change through a conflict, as tactical actions have strategic reverberations that compel a shift in political goals. A positional war occurs when at least one side adopts, even if temporarily, defensive objectives and digs in, creating Western Front-style layered fortification systems. Although offensives remain possible, a well-constructed defense requires excellent planning to conduct a breakthrough and exploitation operation at a high cost to the attacker. We can see this logic in action during the Soviet offensives from 1943 to 1945, when the Soviets were able to maintain the operational momentum from Kursk to Berlin through the careful management of reserves and staging of attacks, thereby preventing the Wehrmacht from reconstituting a stable defensive line.

Svechin distinguishes between two types of positional offensives, those that are conducted still under positional conditions and those that break a positional war and return it to conditions of manoeuvre. His examples for the former include some of the highest-cost battles in human history, namely Verdun and the Somme.

Transforming a positional battlefield into a manoeuvre one therefore requires immense effort and careful planning. Svechin’s analysis is instructive on the conditions necessary to prepare a positional offensive. There are two fundamental mistakes a commander can make in a positional war. First, a positional commander can reduce strategic and operational questions to those of logistics, viewing the positional fight as a contest with a static adversary that hinges upon production. Positional combat does demand a materiel focus. Yet, war is a non-linear and human phenomenon, requiring focus on far more than just materiel factors.

Second, and more dangerously, a positional commander can retain an unwarranted commitment to the offensive. Under maneuver conditions, commanders often decline the offensive, falling back to positions in the hope of making an enemy fight on unfavorable ground. This impulse, in Svechin’s view, is often taken to the extreme, although there is some good sense in it: had Lee followed it during the Gettysburg Campaign, the Army of Northern Virginia might well have retreated with its forces intact and compelled the Army of the Potomac to follow. However, under positional conditions, the scale of planning, coordination, and sequencing necessary for a breakthrough demands preparation beyond a single engagement or scrap of ground. But positional commanders rapidly become wedded to the ground upon which they fight, creating a dynamic where each side leans on the other.33

Commanders maintain positions on unfavorable ground to use them for a future offensive, even if eminently defensible territory exists just a few hundred meters behind the current front line. Limited positional offensives can succeed with proper patience and planning to unpick an enemy defensive system. But positional conditions demand the careful accumulation of resources for an ultimate offensive, with force preservation and the limitation of adversary attrition being the tactical priority.

Attrition and Decision
The Ukraine War is locked in a positional phase, with fortifications dominating the battlefield. The question, however, is whether Ukraine or Russia has any prospect of breaking the war’s positional character or whether or not the contest will continue in this manner until external political factors compel one or both parties to change their strategic calculus and accept a settlement.

Russia and Ukraine face distinct geographic problems. Viewed purely economically, and bracketing diplomatic issues and political pressure, Ukraine could accept a peace that ceded most occupied territory to Russia. Prior to 2022, Ukraine had already moved much of its industrial production away from the Donbas. Russian gains do jeopardize both Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, but Ukraine can shift production elsewhere. Moreover, Ukraine has successfully reopened the Odesa port and expanded its rail links to Romania, reducing its reliance upon Kherson and the Azov Sea ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

Russia, however, cannot conclude a peace in this fashion. It lacks a wide enough land corridor between the Donbas and Crimea to maintain coherent logistics under Ukrainian pressure, as the war has demonstrated in ample fashion. In the east, it lacks an anchor for defensive lines by virtue of geographic chance, as well as sufficient strategic depth. Ideally, the Oskil and Siverskyi Donbets would anchor the line in the north, while at minimum Slovyansk and Kramatorsk would anchor the line in the center.34 Ideally, Russia would push to the Dnipro, bisecting the country and establishing that as a long-term defensive shield from Ukrainian strikes in depth. Russia requires greater territorial gains to stabilize its strategic position, or it risks—much like from 2014 to 2022—facing an insoluble strategic problem that its regime seeks to solve through conquest.

Russia has clung to the tactical offensive with the exception of Sergei Surovikin’s command during late 2022 and the summer 2023 defense in the south. Russia’s offensive results have been remarkably poor—the Russian military has lost north of 300,000 men killed and wounded, has burned through nearly all of its high-end armored vehicle stocks, and has turned to North Korea and Iran to provide it with ammunition. The difficulty is that absent a long refit period, better command-and-control structures, and improved planning, Russia will struggle to conduct and exploit a major breakthrough despite its materiel superiority.

Svechin provides two points of additional reference for commanders in a positional, attritional war. This war is undoubtedly one of attrition for Ukraine, if not for Russia, since Ukraine is incapable, for political and strategic reasons, of conducting a destruction campaign.

First, in a war of attrition, the decisive point in a post-Clausewitzean sense does not exist.  Svechin does not mean that Clausewitz’s center of gravity is irrelevant—as authentically understood, Clausewitz’s center of gravity is not a physical piece of ground, but the nexus between moral cohesion, political objectives, economic capacity, and military power.35 In an attrition campaign, it is exceptionally difficult to identify a specific decisive point, because the objective is the overthrow of the enemy’s system. Hence per Svechin, the conditions for a decisive point must be created over time.

Second, in a positional war, the most crucial element of planning and operational art is the ability to manipulate enemy reserves. Positional defenses are extraordinarily difficult to break. If they are to be broken, the enemy must be corroded over time, with his forces divided, placed off balance, and attrited cumulatively to enable a final, decisive breakthrough that transforms the character of the war into one of destruction, rather than attrition.

Prospects
2024 will be a year of defensive planning, fortifying, and attrition. Russian resources are finite, and more specifically, broader economic constraints will begin to impinge upon Russian planning. Hence a successful strategy from Ukraine and the West must use this year to build combat capacity in anticipation of actions in the future.

Russia’s strategy is to buy time and keep up pressure in anticipation of a Western unraveling. Yet, it seems increasingly unlikely that this will occur. Aid is stalled in the U.S. Congress due to a combination of politicking and moral absurdity, for which blame is unevenly but collectively distributed between the Biden administration, House Republicans, and Congressional Democrats. However, the European powers look to have finally woken up. Ukraine has secured defense pacts with the UK, France, and Germany, while Central and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia are aggressively expanding defense production. Even if the United States abandons Ukraine, expanding European support and declining American leverage make this unlikely to end the war.

Russia, however, has a ceasefire as its objective for obvious reasons. The Russian labor market is already extraordinarily tight and tightening daily with more losses in Ukraine and subsequent conscription for the war effort. Military product quality has dropped as a result. Moreover, much of Russian production is instead refurbishment from Soviet stockpiles. This is enough to keep Russia in the fight, to be sure, and an old tank or artillery piece is just as deadly if employed en masse. Yet, attrition is cumulative—additional stresses on the system will unravel it.

General mobilization in Russia would place the Kremlin in an increasingly insoluble bind, particularly in light of solidifying European support for Ukraine. Russia is unlikely to win the ground war absent a period of reorganization, planning, and stabilization. But accepting this would require reducing front-line pressure, all as Ukraine executes public drone attacks embarrassing to Putin. Hence the pressure must be maintained.  However, this will demand greater mobilization—soon, given the sheer number of casualties Russia has taken. A mobilization will lead to another round of human and capital flight, squeezing an already tight labor market, and triggering another round of inflationary pressure.36 As the rouble depreciates, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to purchase foreign supplies, military and otherwise. This raises the odds of a domestic that Russia has continuously sought to prevent since February 2022. This crisis will destroy the state if left to fester long enough, demanding that Russia either win the war, a proposition beyond its capacity or pause the war, a move within its power if the Europeans do fragment.

Ukraine, meanwhile, must execute a well-organized active defense that inflicts severe casualties on Russia, forces it into a mobilization cycle, and maintains the pressure during that cycle to expand societal stress. Avdiivka is an example of this. Ukraine inflicted severe attrition upon Russian forces during the six-month engagement, committing several brigades, including 47 and 110 Mechanised Brigades, elements of 10 Mountain Assault Brigade, and other smaller units to the city’s defense, against a dozen Russian line brigades and regiments, likely a half-dozen territorial brigades, and a variety of Storm-Z units. The extraction from Avdiivka, conducted by the 3 Assault Brigade, came at a cost, including 200 stranded Ukrainian soldiers, while the 110 Mechanised Brigade in particular took a beating. But in return, Ukraine inflicted north of 30,000 casualties on the Russians, in exchange for around 6,000 Ukrainian dead and wounded—a rate of two Ukrainian brigades to around ten Russian brigades depending upon precise combat strength and combat medicine.

A slow, methodical defense during which Ukraine cedes ground in a careful, painstaking manner is the best way to inflict this degree of trauma upon the Russian military. Yet, the issue is a political one. Ukraine will lose more ground this year, as Russia hopes to press Ukraine back to Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and then take it, and drive Ukraine back over the Oskil in Kharkiv Oblast. Russia will trumpet every victory, especially in the lead-up to the November 2024 U.S. elections. It is up to Ukraine and its partners, in Washington and Europe, to cultivate the political will to recognize the reality of the battlefield.

Ukraine can win a positional war—if it fights smart.

>Mr. Halem is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Fellow at Yorktown Institute, Senior Fellow in Defence and the London-based Policy Exchange, and Title VIII State Department Black Sea Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He holds an Master of Arts (Hons) in International Relations and Philosophy from the University of St  Andrews, and an Master of Science in Political Theory from the London School of Economics.

Notes

1. Jacqui Heinrich and Adam Sabes, “Gen Milley Says Kyiv Could Fall Within 72 hours if Russia Decides to Invade Ukraine: Sources,” Fox News, February 5, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/us/gen-milley-says-kyiv-could-fall-within-72-hours-if-russia-decides-to-invade-ukraine-sources; and John Bowden, “Biden Warned Ukraine’s President Kyiv Could Be ‘Sacked’ By Imminent Russian Invasion,” The Independent, January 28, 2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/biden-ukraine-kyiv-invasion-russian-troops-b2002442.html.

2. Michel Duclos, “War in Ukraine–France Needs to Reassess its Foreign Policy Options,” Institute Montaigne, June 8, 2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/war-ukraine-france-needs-reassess-its-foreign-policy-options; Bernhard Blumenau, “How Russia’s Invasion Changed German Foreign Policy,” Chatham House, November 18, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/how-russias-invasion-changed-german-foreign-policy; Justin Huggler, “Embarrassment as Head of German Intelligence Trapped in Ukraine after Failing to Foresee Invasion,” Telegraph, February 26, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/26/embarrassment-head-german-intelligence-trapped-ukraine-failing; and Laura Pitel, “Robert Habeck Adds to Criticism of German Intelligence Blunders,” Financial Times, August 24, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/cc0b1300-89fc-4df8-863b-f691e0aac758.

3. Bastian Gigerich and Ben Schreer, “Zeitenwende One Year On,” IISS, February 27, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/sv/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/02/zeitenwende-one-year-on.

4. Maia de la Baume, “France Spooked By Intelligence Failures,” Politico, April 6, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-military-intelligence-failure-russia-invasion-ukraine; and Luke Harding, et al., “Macron Claims Putin Gave Him Personal Assurances on Ukraine,” The Guardian, February 8, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/08/macron-zelenskiy-ukraine-talks-moscow-denies-deal-to-de-escalate.

5. Office of the President of Ukraine, “Agreement on security cooperation between Ukraine and France,” Office of the President of Ukraine, February 16, 2024, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ugoda-pro-spivrobitnictvo-u-sferi-bezpeki-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-89005.

6. See Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Unconventional Operations During the Russo-Ukrainian War, February 2022–February 2023 (RUSI: 2023).

7. Terence Zuber, “The Schieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6, No. 3 (1999).

8. Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, “The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv,” War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv.

9. Napoleon’s campaigns provide ample evidence of this reality, particularly his victory at Austerlitz. See Frederick W. Kagan, The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801–1805 (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2007).

10. See ISW’s tactical updates, 3 March 2022–30 March 2022, for a fuller analysis of the predicament facing Russian forces in northern Ukraine.

11. Winson Churchill, The Second World War, Volume 1: The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1949).

12. Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (London: MacMillan, 2001).

13. The only English-language assessment of the Donbas War from a military viewpoint is the Ukrainian National Defence University’s assessment.  See Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in the East of Ukraine, 2014–2016 (Kyiv: 2016).

14. See William Schneck, Breaching the Devil’s Garden: The 6th New Zealand Brigade in Operation Lightfoot, the Second Battle of El Alamein (DTIC, 2005), accessed via: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA447540. Unfortunately, the only version of this study is the linked one, which has a number of formatting errors, rather than a full-text PDF. The 300-page appendix is accessible as a PDF, but the original study is not. David Glantz and Mary Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Ernest F. Fisher Jr., Cassino to the Alps (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993); and Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993).

15. Washington Post, “Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning by U.S., Ukraine,” Washington Post, December 4, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war.

16. For another example of snide criticism, see John Hudson and Alex Horton, “U.S. Intelligence Says Ukraine Will Fail to Meet Offensive’s Key Goal,” Washington Post, August 17, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/08/17/ukraine-counteroffensive-melitopol.

17. Rachel Tecott Metz, “Why Security Assistance Often Fails,” Lawfare, April 23, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/why-security-assistance-often-fails.

18. Jonathan Schroden, “Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel 14, No. 1 (2021); and David Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,” Brookings, June 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iraqi-counter-terrorism-service.

19. SIGAR, Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed (SIGAR, 2023).

20. Adrian Bonenberger, “Ukraine’s Military Pulled Itself Out of the Ruins of 2014,” Foreign Policy, May 9, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/09/ukraine-military-2014-russia-us-training.

21. See from the early war, Michael Lee, “The U.S. Army’s Green Berets Quietly Helped Tilt the Battlefield a Little Bit More Toward Ukraine,” Fox News, March 24, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-armys-green-berets-have-lasting-impact-on-fight-in-ukraine.

22. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,” RUSI, September 4, 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/stormbreak-fighting-through-russian-defences-ukraines-2023-offensive.

23. Valery Zaluzhny, “Modern Positional War and How to Win It,” The Economist, November 1, 2023.

24. Pat Garrett and Frank Hoffman, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” USNI Proceedings 149, No. 11 (2023).

25. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957).

26. Antulio J. Echevarria II, War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

27. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

28. The edition of Svechin referenced is Alexander A. Svechin, Strategy, Kent D. Lee (editor) (East View Information Service, 1992). This edition is accessible as a PDF, but unfortunately it lacks page numbers. Section titles and subtitles are cited where appropriate to provide the reader with an idea of a specific quotation, although the interested reader will need to access the text independently to find the precise passage referenced.

29. On War.

30. Strategy.

31. Ibid. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Ibid.

34. As of this writing, Russia is engaged in an offensive to throw Ukrainian forces back over the Oskil. See Riley Bailey and Fredrick W. Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward, “The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis,” Institute for the Study of War, February 21, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis.

35. On War.

36. Anastasia Stognei and Polina Ivanova, “Russia’s War Economy Leaves Businesses Starved of Labour,” Financial Times, November 9, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/dc76f0bb-cae2-4a3a-b704-903d2fc59a96.