What Military Revolution?

Not by Technology Alone

Drones have provided significant tactical advantages to both sides during the three years of brutal fighting in the Russo-Ukraine war. So, it is not surprising that uncrewed autonomous and first-person view drones and other uncrewed platforms are being heralded as the war-winning technology of the future.1 This euphoria was magnified by Ukraine’s June 2025 Operation SPIDERWEB, which masterfully employed drones to attack Russian air bases approximately 2,500 miles from the static front.2 This led some commentators to declare that the attack was Kiev’s Pearl Harbor.3

Moreover, two authors have proclaimed that the “drone era” is a military revolution and will remove the element of fear from war.4 This is an astonishing statement given that human beings fight wars to intentionally inflict violence on others out of “greed, fear, and ideology,” making it unlikely humans will disappear from tomorrow’s battlefields.5

This article contends that drones and artificial technology (AI) will continue to transform how future wars are fought; however, technology alone is unlikely to generate the required vic-tories to qualify as the next revolution in military affairs (RMA).

Evolution or Revolution?

Drones have transformed the battlefield in Ukraine, but in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary fashion, as their impact falls short of the truly disruptive change that constitutes an RMA.6 Neither side has been able to decisively break through their opponent’s fixed, layered defenses and transition to sustained offensive operations necessary to achieve their respective political aims and “theories of victory.”7 A recent RUSI study concluded between 60–80 percent of Ukrainian first-person view, tactical drones failed to reach their target in 2024.8 Those that did were unable to destroy the armored vehicles they were trying to kill due to Russian electronic warfare jamming, poor weather, unfavorable terrain conditions, and operator error. A lack of Ukrainian artillery often prevented suppressive fires from being effectively employed with drones against Russian air defenses and dismounted soldiers protecting key targets. All told, first-person-view drones have proven most effective against enemy troops in the open. However, armies that disperse, conceal, maneuver with stealth, and deceive will likely lessen the effectiveness of adversary kill chains in the future.

… two authors have proclaimed that the “drone era” is a military revolution …

Technology + Operational Concepts + Organizational Adaptation = RMA

Revolutions in military affairs occur when a new technology is combined with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to fundamentally alter the character and conduct of conflict.9 The RMAs dramatically increase the combat potential and military effectiveness of fighting forces relative to a specific adversary, but these three ingredients must be amalgamated before a true RMA is born.10

Revolutions in military affairs are rare occurrences—Andrew Krepinevich cites only ten since the 14th century.11 Nevertheless, premature pronouncements that a new RMA has arrived are not new. In 2004, Stephen Biddle cited six such examples: the inventions of dynamite, the machinegun, the naval torpedo, the airplane, strategic bombing, and the atom bomb.12 Biddle believed these new technologies led military thinkers of their day to overestimate the impact they would have on warfare.

This trend continues today and, on one level, it makes sense. War’s inherent brutality has long incentivized humans to seek short wars and “silver bullets” that can reduce its cost in casualties and national treasure. Moreover, the reliance on advanced technology has been a central pillar of the American Way of War since at least World War II, as the United States places greater emphasis on technology in planning and waging war than any other nation.13

Yet, in the context of the Russo-Ukraine War, drone performance has been exaggerated despite compelling evidence otherwise. Amos Fox argues that drones in protracted land campaigns, like Ukraine and Gaza, have proven strategically irrelevant given their inability to take or retake territory, hold ground, seal borders, and protect populations.14 Other studies question drone reliability and effectiveness.15 Thus, claims that drones have revolutionized the character of war deserve closer scrutiny.

Generating Leap-Ahead Combat Capabilities

As noted above, RMAs change the character of war because they generate an asymmetrical advantage in combat capabilities vis-à-vis one’s adversary. What is revolutionary is not the pace of change, but rather, the character of the change and the degree of overall improvement in military capabilities.16

Such improvement can occur absent new technology, as was the case with the 18th-century French “levee en masse” (i.e., forced conscription) that tripled the size of Napoleon’s Army in less than a year.17 It can also result from repurposing and imaginatively using old technology, as Germany did with tanks—first employed by the British in the 1917 World War I battle of Cambrai—by integrating armor with radio communications, airplanes, and mechanized infantry to generate a potent combined-arms team that became the blitzkrieg.18

Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the introduction of new technology is a key incubator that can alter the character of war, as witnessed with the precision-strike revolution that came of age in the 1991 Gulf War.19 Some three decades later, the precision strike RMA enabled the United States to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER.20 But battlefield context matters, as it took eleven weeks of bombing from fourteen NATO nations (some 40,000 aircraft sorties flown) along with the threat of ground invasion during Operation ALLIED FORCE before Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, backed down.21

Coming of Age

In almost all cases, new technologies mature more slowly than military planners and operators desire. The 1972 Linebacker II bombing campaign against North Vietnam expended approximately the same number of laser-guided munitions as the 1991 Gulf War.22 The qualitative improvements that allowed the same number of munitions to be exponentially more effective than their forbearers took nearly two decades.

The same is true with ground-launched anti-tank weapons systems. What started in the late 1970s with the Dragon and family of wire-guided missile systems eventually matured into the “fire and forget” Javelin that proved so effective against Russian armor in 2022.23

… RMAs change the character of war because they generate an asymmetrical advantage in combat capabilities vis-à-vis one’s adversary.

Drones, too, have a long lineage that traces back to 1917–1918 when the British and American’s respectively, developed the Aerial Target and Kettering Bug pilotless aerial platforms.24 Yet, it was not until the Vietnam War that drones were deployed in relatively large numbers.

In sum, a lengthy maturation process ensues before new technologies, innovative warfighting concepts, and organizational adaptations successfully combine to ignite revolutionary, leap-ahead combat capabilities. This time-consuming process is not exclusively the fault of tech developers, engineers, and an unwieldy defense acquisition process. Rather, lengthy, but essential, military experimentation must also occur to provide the Services and Joint Force practical insights into how its concepts and organizational design should be adapted to effectively campaign with the new technologies.25

Maintaining Asymmetrical Advantage

The competitive asymmetrical advantages new technologies bring to warfare are fleeting. Being a “first mover” or early adopter of enhanced capabilities incentivizes competitors to counterbalance, especially if the new capabilities are widely proliferated.26

Today’s rapid diffusion of technology means smaller powers and non-state actors can easily and cheaply manufacture or commercially acquire drones, satellite imagery, global communications devices, and a host of other technologies for battlefield use. The Houthis recently demonstrated this with their drone attacks against Red Sea shipping.27 Thomas Mahnken describes this phenomenon as one of “emulation,” which will continue to erode, if not eliminate, the comparative asymmetrical advantage drones and other emerging technologies afford the U.S. military.28

When the barriers of emulation are too high, adversaries will attempt to develop countermeasures to thwart new combat methods.29 As an example, to offset U.S. firepower and mobility advantages in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy’s weapon of choice was the improvised explosive device (IED)—the legacy “boobytrap.”30 Decades earlier in Vietnam, the Viet Cong used the low-tech entrenching tool to turn the Cu Chi area outside of Saigon into 155 miles of underground tunnels and mini-subterranean cities to counter America’s air power advantage.31

Thus, smart adversaries will rapidly emulate or develop countermeasures to negate the asymmetrical advantages afforded by real or faux RMAs. In Ukraine, the world has watched this process play out in realtime, which makes the Russo-Ukraine conflict a revolution in adaptation war vice a universal RMA.32

Weighing the Risk of Military Innovation

Military innovation is a “balancing act between destroying traditional ways of war and creating new ones,” a gamble that risks losing more by abandoning legacy capabilities than is created with new innovations.33 Past, but flawed high-risk bets about the changing character of future wars include the development of British armored doctrine before World War II;34 the U.S. Air Force embracing the long-range nuclear bombing mission in place of close air support and air superiority competencies needed in the Korean War; and the U.S. Army restructuring itself into Pentomic formations to fight on a nuclear battlefield.35 According to Kendrick Kuo, in each case, militaries divested themselves of critical capabilities and competencies they needed in the next war.36

… prudent observers of modern war are right to question any technology being championed as a “war-winner”…

Fear of missing the next military revolution and being relegated to “second mover” status can seductively entice force planners to bet and invest in the wrong RMA. Sir Lawrence Freedman argues that Ukraine’s drone environment is context-specific and may not be germane to future battlefields that are not characterized by static front lines and slow-moving, long-range drones that have trouble penetrating well-defended targets—in need of more effective integration with other traditional military capabilities such as aircraft, armored vehicles, and artillery—to prove decisive.37
Freedman is not alone in his thinking, which makes it risky to adopt the drone tactics, techniques, and procedures from the stalemated Russo-Ukraine War as a perfect template for future conflicts.

The Pitfalls of Technological Determinism

Historians Williamson Murray and McGregor Knox believe the lessons of history demonstrate that technological superiority does not guarantee success in war.38 In World War II, U.S. materiel and technological dominance still required grueling battles across the Pacific to the Japanese homeland before an exhausted and starving adversary ultimately capitulated.39 More recently, technologically-backward states like North Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan denied the United States its war aims, notwithstanding the latter’s overwhelming firepower advantage.

Clausewitz argued that war is fundamentally a contest of human wills, which means there is more to war than simply “blowing up targets.”40 Ultimately, human factors such as leadership, training, discipline, and doctrine—not weapons—are the final arbiter of battlefield success or failure. Thus, underestimating the tenacity and staying power of a technologically inferior underdog comes with a high price tag.

Forward into the Unknown

Until the Russo-Ukrainian War ends, both sides will continue to rapidly adapt. Lessons observed during the war’s early years may provide new insights that will help inform how the United States and other nations transform their militaries for future conflicts. However, rushing to judgment about the efficacy of specific technologies in a protracted war that has no clear end in sight only impedes this learning process. Thus, prudent observers of modern war are right to question any technology being championed as a “war winner” until the war being used as an exemplar is won.

The late British historian, Sir Michael Howard, remarked in a 1973 lecture on Military Science in an Age of Peace, “that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.”41

Hopefully, Sir Michael’s prescient words will stimulate continued sober analysis of the strengths and limitations of drones and AI on the modern battlefield. This will require some intellectual humility that we may all be wrong, including this author.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Col Greenwood is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He was an Infantryman who commanded the 15th MEU (SOC), served as Director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and completed multiple assign-ments in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff.

NOTES:

  1. Tomas Milasauskas and Livdvikas Jaskunas, “FPV Drones in Ukraine are Changing Mod-ern Warfare,” Atlantic Council, June 20, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrai-nealert/fpv-drones-in-ukraine-are-changing-modern-warfare.
  2. Kateryna Bondar, “How Ukraine’s Operation ‘Spider’s Web’ Redefines Asymmetric Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare.
  3. Roger Boyes, “Kyiv’s Drone Attack is a Pearl Harbor Moment,” The Times, June 3, 2025, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2025/06/02/ukraine-drone-strike-at-tack-russia-pearl-harbor/83987304007.
  4. Antonio Salinas and Jason P. Levay, “Military Revolutions from the Spanish Tercio to First-Person View Drones,” War on the Rocks, May 15, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/military-revolutions-from-the-spanish-tercio-to-first-person-view-drones.
  5. Margaret MacMillan, War: How Conflict Shaped Us (New York: Random House, 2020).
  6. Stacie Pettyjohn, “Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine,” Center for a New American Security, February 2024, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57900.
  7. Thomas C. Greenwood, “Why Ukraine’s Breakthrough Operations Are So Difficult,” The National Interest, December 31, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-ukraines-breakthrough-operations-are-so-difficult-207815; and J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” Parameters 38, No. 2 (2008).
  8. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukraine War,” Royal United Services Institute, February 2025, https://www.rusi. org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war.
  9. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, No. 37 (1994).
  10. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Toll, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1994).
  11. “Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions.”
  12. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
  13. Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
  14. Amos Fox, “Drones Are Game-Changing, But They Are Not the Answer to the Inherent Challenges of Land Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, August 6, 2025, https://smallwarsjournal. com/2025/08/06/drones-are-game-changing.
  15. Jakub Jajcay, “I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck,” War on the Rocks, June 26, 2025, https://warontherocks. com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck.
  16. Andrew W. Marshall, “RMA Update,” Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: May 1994).
  17. Williamson Murray, “Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1997).
  18. Mark Cartright, “Blitzkrieg: The Lightning War Tactic of Combined Arms,” World History, November 28, 2024, https://www.worldhistory. org/Blitzkrieg.
  19. David R. Mets, The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolu-tion in Military Affairs (Montgomery:
    Air University Press, October 2001).
  20. Joseph Rogers, “What Operation Midnight Hammer Means for the Future of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 23, 2025, https://www.csis. org/analysis/what-operation-midnight-hammer-means-future-irans-nuclear-ambitions.
  21. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: Nato’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
  22. “Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions.”
  23. Charlie Goo, “American Dragon: This Missile Launcher Turns Tanks to Dust,” The National Interest, June 30, 2021, https://nation-alinterest.org/blog/reboot/american-dragon-missile-launcher-turns-tanks-dust-188853.
  24. John F. Keane and Stephen S. Carr, “A Brief History of Early Unmanned Aircraft,” Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab Technical Digest 32, No. 9 (2013).
  25. Tom Greenwood and Jim Greer, “Experimentation: The Road to Discovery,” Strategy Bridge, March 1, 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/trecms/AD1223471/index.html.
  26. John D. Maurer, “The Future of Precision-Strike Warfare: Strategic Dynamics of Mature Military Revolutions,” Naval War College Re-view 76, No. 3 (2023).
  27. Alison Bath, “Navy Fired More than 200 Missiles to Fight Off Red Sea Shipping Attacks, Admiral Says,” Stars and Stripes, January 16, 2025, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2025-01-16/houthis-navy-red-sea-missiles-drones-16500246.html.
  28. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus 140, No. 3 (2011).
  29. “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime.”
  30. Jason Shell, “How the IED Won: Dispelling the Myth of Tactical Success and Innovation,” War on the Rocks, May 1, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/how-the-ied-won-dispelling-the-myth-of-tactical-success-and-innovation.
  31. MSW, “The Cu Chi Tunnels,” WarHistory. Com, July 15, 2020, https://warhistory.org/@ msw/article/the-cu-chi-tunnels.
  32. Mick Ryan, “The New Adaptation War,” Substack.com, April 16, 2025, https://scsp222. substack.com/p/adaptation-war-with-mick-ryan.
  33. Kendrick Kuo, “How to Think About Risks in US Military Innovation,” Survival, February-March 2024, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2024.2309077.
  34. Kendrick Kuo, “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” International Security 47, No. 2 (2022);
  35. “How to Think About Risks in US Military Innovation.”
  36. “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness.”
  37. Lawrence Freedman, “Are Drones the Future of War?” Substack.com, July 29, 2025, https://samf.substack.com/p/are-drones-the-future-of-war.
  38. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
  39. Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993).
  40. Pat Garrett and Frank Hoffman, “Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve,” Proceedings, November 2023, https://www.usni. org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/maneuver-warfare-not-dead-it-must-evolve.
  41. Michael Howard, “Military Science in the Age of Peace,” The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal 119 (1974).

Edge of the Web

How LAR Wins in the Deep Fight

2025 LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest: Second Place

On an early morning outside Jõhvi, Estonia, a Marine Corps light armored reconnaissance (LAR) company occupies a screen along a narrow corridor of farmland interspersed with pine forest. One hundred kilometers to the southwest, a MEU and a NATO battlegroup stage to seize key terrain across the Baltic. Bound to the road network due to heavy forest, the company pushes its eight-wheeled, 25mm armed light armored vehicles (LAV-25) forward, establishing observation posts and seeking to gain and maintain contact with the advance guard of an approaching enemy battalion tactical group. Mounted in vehicles designed in the 70s and fielded in the 1980s, the company’s mission is straightforward but unforgiving: provide early warning of enemy activity and provide decision space for higher-echelon commanders.

Within minutes, the company is in contact. Overhead, small drones loiter freely, marking positions for enemy artillery and dropping shaped charges onto the static and exposed LAVs. First-person-view (FPV) quadcopters slip under the dense canopy, striking the vehicles concealed in hasty hide sites. Enemy infiltration teams mounted on civilian all-terrain vehicles probe the screen line, dismounting to bypass the company’s fixed observation posts to sniff out routes for exploitation. What began as a classic security mission for which LAR has trained for 40 years, unspools into a disaggregated unmanned aerial system (UAS) and sensor fight for which the Marines are ill-equipped. As the fight deteriorates, radio nets clog with reports of enemy precision fires, mobility kills, and rapid attrition. The company evaporated faster than any retrograde or recovery plan could absorb.

As the firefight built ashore, unmarked commercial watercraft, part of a “shadow fleet” operating under layered ambiguity, sailed the coastal traffic patterns north of Jõhvi.1 Exploiting flags-of-convenience paperwork, Automatic Identification System gaps, and routine harbor clutter, a 30-person raid force disembarks, quickly moving inland along forest tracks to harass the main NATO supply routes. Using low-power radios, commercial quadcopters, and cached munitions, the infiltration team stages hasty ambushes, lays counter-mobility obstacles, and cues indirect fire from standoff positions. Their aim is tempo vice destruction: delay, disrupt, seed doubt. In under two hours, the LAR company is combat ineffective. Friendly vehicles are fixed, the MEU’s screen penetrated, and LAR is violently pulled into a reality its design and doctrine were never built to endure.

What happened outside Jõhvi was not just a tactical failure—it was a systems failure. It exposed the growing gap between legacy platforms and modern threats, between the doctrine we have and the fight that is already here. Additionally, it also clarified the path forward. This article proposes a restructured four-platoon LAR company: two security platoons, a reconnaissance platoon, and a fusion platoon. This practical and immediate concept bridges the gap to evolve the LAR force from a platform-bound screen line into a modern sensor-enabled, reconnaissance-integrated network. By leveraging fieldable technology and rethinking organizational structure at the company level, this model provides MAGTFs with a scalable advantage: sensing earlier, making decisions faster, and imposing costs across domains and environments. This evolution of LAR is more than a one-off fix; it reflects a broader challenge across the Marine Corps: how to adapt legacy systems and structures to meet the demands of a rapidly changing fight without waiting for the perfect solution.

The Challenge

The issue facing the Corps’ LAR community is not direction; it is velocity. The ongoing transformation within the LAR community mirrors the larger shift across the Marine Corps. Central themes include disciplined experimentation under Force Design: aggressive use of accessible, often commercial off-the-shelf technology; preparation for new vehicles and tools; and the development of concepts of employment that meet today’s tasks while anticipating tomorrow’s fight. Force Design’s message to the LAR community is unambiguous: transition from platform-centric LAR to all-domain mobile reconnaissance inside the emerging mobile reconnaissance battalion—integrating land, maritime, and unmanned reconnaissance to link sensors to shooters and build joint/combined kill webs in contested littorals.2 This shift pushes LAR into the multi-domain fight while demanding we fully embrace new ways of sensing and communicating. These shifts enable us to generate aimpoints and close kill chains without friction and redundant reachback. Layered over this is a familiar strain of insecurity about identity and purpose, an unease that has long shaped debates inside the Corps, which some (half-jokingly) call the “platypus syndrome.” Change is assumed; tempo is the test; LAR must evolve fast enough to preserve core advantages while integrating pervasive digital capability.

Much good work is already on the table, but more must be done in the near term. LtCol John Dick and 3d LAR demonstrated the value of a bottom-up approach: building organic FPV strike teams inside the ground com-bat element, training to a repeatable cue-confirm-strike drill, treating power, electromagnetic action, and airspace as fire-support problems, and deliberately using commercial tools to balance cost, sustainment, and risk.3 Maj Brent Jurmu, Maj Brandon Klewicki, and LtCol Matthew Tweedy emphasize the structural need for change: move now toward the mobile reconnaissance battalion, prioritize sensing over platform identity, organize for teaming between manned and unmanned systems, open-architecture command and control to enable any sensor to feed any shooter, and resource resilient communications, power, and logistics as combat enablers rather than afterthoughts.4 Retired Col Philip Laing’s earlier thesis reinforces this by asserting that LAR is a mind-set, not a hull. The focus must be on reconnaissance pull, tempo, deception, dispersion, and mounted—dismounted integration—while warning against let-ting the vehicle define the unit.5

A company of UTVs and LAVs occupy positions in a densely forested hide site. (Photo provided by author.)

What these contributions do not fully solve is the immediate bridge between what LAR and the MAGTF currently retain and what we need next. We require a tactical force construct that operates with legacy LAVs and available light vehicles yet delivers stand-in sensing and fast sensor-to-shooter handoffs. This includes a practical gear list, training progression, and command-and-control habits that work tomorrow morning, not just in the out-years. Additionally, we must prioritize survivability, particularly armor survivability, ensuring that our vehicles can withstand emerging threats while maintaining operational flexibility. That is the bridging solution.

The Bridging Solution

What follows is a concept of employment and equipment, validated by Apache Company’s role within 2d LAR’s Task Force Destroyer during our Baltic deployment in the summer of 2025. The concept preserves LAR’s core reconnaissance and security functions while providing a practical framework to integrate enhanced sensing, fusion, and shaping capabilities expected of next-generation formations. Drawing on recent conflicts and years of community experimentation, the design postures usable capabilities now with the equipment on hand while providing on-ramps for the force to swell additional kit to expand our force offering. The result is a highly mobile, flexible formation that leverages existing assets and tactics, creates clear on-ramps for accelerated fielding of new sensors and systems, and reduces operational risk while preserving maneuver and survivability. The design works at the company level for MEU and MAGTF requirements and scales to a three-line company battalion construct. Finally, this sensor-laden formation travels well. It nests naturally within the Joint Force and exploits the Marine Corps’ inherent strength, our expeditionary character.

How Apache 2d LAR Fights

Apache Company was organized around three complementary platoon constructs that executed concurrent reconnaissance and security. The company can cover a 20 km² land area of operations and sense more than 30 miles off the coast. In effect, Apache fielded a multi-domain, long-range sensor company and stood up company-level command, control, communications, and computing with mostly on-hand equipment. The company was reinforced by 2d LAR’s intelligence section, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, II MEF 2d MarDiv enablers, and a few proactive contract partners. This concept has been greatly influenced by the vision outlined by Dr. Jack Watling in his book Arms of the Future.6

Reconnaissance Platoon

Built on ultra-light vehicles and operating near/on the contact line, the platoon carried long-range communications, Group-1 sUAS, multi-domain sensors, and medium direct-fire weapons (machineguns and recoilless rifles). Small in signature and highly mobile, it served as the company’s contact element—confirming or denying information requirements from higher and contributing new information to feed the intelligence cycle through timely ground reporting to the fusion platoon. It executed rapid ambushes to harass, disrupt, and buy time in restrictive terrain. By trading armor for speed, the platoon consistently punched above its weight.

Security Platoon

Positioned in depth behind the reconnaissance platoon, the security platoon operated LAV-25 and anti-tank variants. It preserved the company’s freedom of maneuver by providing armored overwatch and reinforcement for the reconnaissance platoon. From a relative standoff, it employed stabilized, long-duration sensors and Group-1 sUAS to detect and track enemy axes of advance. This posture enabled us to orient killing systems without becoming decisively engaged. As the company’s backstop, it delivered the armored punch to interdict maneuver, absorb pressure, and maintain tempo.

Fusion Platoon

Operating from a suite of LAVs tailored to specific mission requirements and a small complement of utility task vehicles (UTV) for last-mile mobility and logistics, the platoon provided Group-2 sUAS, mesh communications to tie into higher headquarters, a light surveillance and reconnaissance coordination center package, and expeditionary sustainment and maintenance inherent to any LAR formation. It was also where, as Apache dubbed it, a “Reconnaissance Integration Network” was exercised: information drove decisions, and mission command stayed forward. The fusion platoon pulled feeds from the furthest-forward sensors and pushed critical data across the battalion network, working in near real time with the S-2 to turn raw detections into targetable tracks. With our company dispersed to provide significant “depth by default,” our maritime domain awareness team employed sensors, meshed with partner-nation feeds, and flew group-2 sUAS over the littorals. Fusion packaged and distributed; battalion prioritized and matched effects. The result was a rapid targeting rhythm by which reconnaissance, security, fusion, and the S-2 moved as one system.

We did uncover a few key gaps, however, in lethality and sustainment. To supercharge the next iteration, the company must leverage the full potential of our force by enhancing both capability and reach. First, field command-launch units to amplify our armored killing power, enabling faster, more agile responses to emerging threats. Expand UTV capacity for increased power generation and cargo carry, allowing for sustained operations in austere environments. Integrate additional sensors to broaden our sUAS screen and strengthen the fusion network, improving situational awareness and intelligence flow across units. Bring in the next wave of sUAS and counter-UAS tools to stay ahead of evolving threats in the air. Finally, provide access to, and training for, modernized data-driven targeting software that seamlessly connects company-level targeting with MAGTF and joint fires, ensuring precise and synchronized engagements. These enhancements would not only elevate LAR’s operational capabilities but also ensure it is an even more effective and indispensable asset to the broader mission, increasing efficiency, accuracy, and the ability to project power across the deep battlespace.

Advantage

Together, these three elements produced a survivable, organically supported company that sensed, decided, and acted at the tempo the deep fight demands; feeding higher headquarters while shaping the fight in front of it. Following the Baltic deployment, Apache stood up a second security platoon, establishing one reconnaissance platoon, two security platoons, and a fusion platoon, for a total of 31 vehicles: 20 LAVs and 11 UTVs.

This concept of employment shows how LAR can evolve from a legacy cavalry formation into a modern stand-in sensor ecosystem. It retains traditional reconnaissance and security capabilities while posturing to absorb new technology as it arrives. Light reconnaissance brings agile, low-signature sensing and harassment. Armored security preserves freedom of maneuver, provides lift and power, and delivers the kinetic punch. Fusion, as the sensor and sustainment hub, closes the sensor-to-shooter chain and keeps the company supplied and computing forward.

The outcome is a formation that can operate independently for ten to fourteen days, answer commanders’ priority information requirements in stride, and sustain operations across littoral terrain while contributing to the broader kill web. It aligns with past experimentation proposals while refocusing on the enduring tasks of reconnaissance and security. This modern formation turns today’s kit into near-term advantage.

A LAV-25 followed by a UTV make movement along a wooded corridor in the Baltics. (Photo provided by author.)
The Counter

At the tactical edge, legacy hulls with bolt-on tech are delicate. Power and computing are often the first to fail; when they do, the “sprint” stops. Edge-level processing, exploitation and dissemination and target formatting can compress time but widen risk: deconfliction with close air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; long-range fires on a tight MSR turns into information overload, and one bad grid buys fratricide. A LAV used as a node is still a hot, loud, tall target, often easier to find than to fuel. Adding maritime domain awareness to land feeds risks data overload and slower decisions, and roles blur: infantry battalions already field scouts and recon battalion owns the deep fight. Where does an LAR stand-in sensor company end and its missions begin?

This construct is built to fight through the loss of fragile links, with Group-1/2 feeds treated as temporary: valuable when up, replaceable when not. We layer sensors and plan graceful degradation, reverting to traditional methods if the network fails. First-person-view provides precision fires, task-organized and rationed by target value, with conventional fires as backup. Edge-level processing, exploitation, and dissemination safeguards ensure target packets follow rules of engagement, grid-quality checks, and restricted-operating-zone discipline to prevent fratricide. Light armored vehicles as nodes operate from defilade, acting as generators and routers before becoming targets. Endurance is key, supported by low-mobility screens, low signature-long duration observation, and pre-staged supplies. Light-armored reconnaissance is self-sustained, with maintenance, recovery, power, and logistics under armor that outranges infantry battalions. Maritime domain awareness is just another sensor lane, with priority information requirements and named areas of interest feeding into a fusion platoon, which in turn generates tracks and releasable aimpoints for higher echelons. Light armored reconnaissance and recon overlap naturally in the deep fight, but LAR is uniquely equipped to push deep and extract without relying on external lift or sustainment, supporting operations beyond a single frontage.

The stand-in sensor company concept is not a concept for the distant future. It is a working answer to today’s problem: how to turn legacy formations into lethal, relevant forces across all domains. Apache Company’s construct shows that with the right organization and fielded tools, a LAR unit can deliver the decisive advantage MAGTFs need: sensing early, striking fast, and shaping tempo in complex, contested terrain. It proves that innovation doesn’t always mean waiting on new platforms; it means rethinking how we fight with what we have. The LAR community’s evolution is a microcosm of the Corps-wide challenge: adapt fast, fight smarter, and build toward the future without waiting for the perfect solution. This is not about replacing cavalry, it is about making it and the MAGTF writ large matter in the fight ahead.

Reconnaissance platoon occupies a hide side and inserts dismounted teams. (Photo by Cpl Xavier Alicea)
Tomorrow’s Fight

Capt Ellis awoke with a start and quietly replayed the dream where his legacy company was torn apart; unprepared for the battlefield he now faced. Reality would be different. He stepped into his enhanced LAV-C2 and oriented on the sensor displays and the common operational picture.
Hours before the enemy advance guard pushed toward Jõhvi, geospatial stand-off sensors flagged movement along likely avenues of approach. Tucked into hide sites with vehicles camouflaged, Apache’s reconnaissance platoon confirmed with Group-1 systems and set hasty ambushes to disrupt the axis of advance. As the column entered the kill zone, direct-fire systems killed the lead and trail vehicles, fixing the formation. At the same time, Group-2 platforms observed and adjusted long-range fires, streaming feeds to the fusion platoon and higher.

While the fight built ashore, the maritime picture stayed warm: Automatic Identification System and coastal radar returns, rapid reports, and Group-2 pay-loads over the water fed the battalion to track craft along the coast. A suspected grey-fleet vessel broke pattern north of Jõhvi; the cue moved from S-2 through fusion to the northern security screen. A UTV team maneuvered to the beach exits, found the landing sites cold, and laid obstacles and observation to deny a raid force its easy off-ramps.

Ten kilometers behind the FLOT (forward line of troops), security platoons screened in depth, watching the contact forward and reorienting on alternate approaches as the enemy tried to bypass the kill zone. In coordination with fusion, they finalized a rearward passage once reconnaissance platoon finished its harassment and shaping mission against the lead trace.

Inside the company’s architecture and surveillance and reconnaissance collection cell, Marines worked with the battalion S-2 (intelligence section) in near realtime: pushing critical data up and pulling refined intelligence down. Targets were packaged, prioritized, and effects queued for ultimate impact. At higher echelons, commanders saw rapid updates and live feeds through the shared portal. Decision cycles accelerated with expanded options made possible by a symbiotic relationship between sensors, intelligence, and higher echelon fires. In practice, the stand-in sensor construct bought time and space for follow-on forces now shifting from one area of operations to the next and shaping the fight before it fully arrived, ashore and along the coast.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Capt Marshall is the Company Commander of Company A, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d MarDiv.

NOTES:

  1. Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “Russia’s Growing ‘Dark Fleet’: Risks for the Global Maritime Order,” Atlantic Council, September 30, 2025, https://www.atlanticcoun-cil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-growing-dark-fleet-risks-for-the-global-maritime-order.
  2. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: 2020).
  3. John Dick, “From Concept to Capability–Building an Organic FPV Strike Team in the Ground Combat Element (Part I),” The CX File, July 9, 2025, https://thecxfile.substack. com/p/from-concept-to-capability-building.
  4. Brent Jurmu, Brandon Klewicki, and Mat-thew Tweedy, “Equip the Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion Now,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 2024, https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Jurmu-May24-WEB.pdf.
  5. Philip Laing, “More Than a System: LAR as a Mindset” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, 2011).
  6. Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023).

Drone-Delivered Minefields

Precision obstacles for future Marine operations

2025 LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest: First Place

As a Chinese amphibious task force advances toward a narrow chokepoint in the Western Pacific, a Marine littoral regiment positions itself to deny access. Traditionally, combat engineers relied on labor-intensive minefield emplacement. Alternatively, they used scatterable systems such as the Family of Scatterable Mines, which often had unreliable timers. Both methods left hazards that outlived their purpose and slowed friendly maneuver.1

Instead, a coordinated operation unfolds. A swarm of drones—ranging from small first-person-view (FPV) platforms to larger attritable aerial and ground vehicles—launches from cover. Carrying anti-tank (AT) and anti-personnel (AP) charges, they create a precise, reversible minefield in minutes. Command and control of the operation is meticulously structured; commanders authorize deployments after thorough assessments and monitor drone movements through secure communication channels. Support drones sustain concealment and command links, ensuring continuous oversight. Commanders maintain the ability to reseed or recover mines as the fight evolves, adjusting operations dynamically in response to battlefield developments. The enemy halts long enough for fires and maneuver to destroy the force.2

What once required days is now achieved with tempo and accountability, setting the stage for new operational approaches. Drone-delivered minefields—leveraging commercial swarms, quantum navigation in GPS-denied environments, and human-in-the-loop autonomy—transform mines into adaptive tools for distributed operations.3 By imposing disproportionate costs at minimal expense to Marines, they embody asymmetric warfare and deliver the “unfair fight” envisioned by Force Design 2030.4

Background

Minefields have long shaped combat. In World War I, belts of barbed wire and mines slowed offensives across no man’s land, forcing attackers into corridors exploitable by machineguns and artillery.5 During World War II, vast mine belts were used in North Africa, where both British and German forces emplaced hundreds of thousands of mines to control maneuver across the open desert.6 These examples demonstrate how obstacles amplify combat power by channeling an adversary into predetermined kill zones.

Legacy systems carried significant costs. During the Gulf War, scatterable mines produced high dud rates—over 1,900 unexploded mines were recorded at Al Jabar Airbase sector alone, with similar patterns across six other sectors in Kuwait—leaving hazards that risked civilians’ safety and delayed reconstruction.7 In Kosovo and Iraq, unexploded ordnance likewise undermined legitimacy and fueled political backlash. To mitigate such risks, the International Committee of the Red Cross codified restrictions in Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.8 As Marines consider innovations in mine deployment, it is essential to anticipate how humanitarian backlash could shape future rules of engagement. Building reversibility and accountability into mine warfare ensures operational effectiveness while preserving political credibility.

Recent U.S. policy shifts provide an opening. Executive Order 14307, Secretary of Defense guidance, and the revocation of National Security Memorandum 17 collectively restored authorities for drone integration and limited landmine employment.9 Together, these measures provide Marines with both the legal authority and strategic mandate to reinvent mine warfare. The challenge is to adapt these restored authorities responsibly, balancing combat effectiveness with humanitarian considerations.

Discussion

Drone-delivered minefields offer Marines decisive advantages over legacy systems. First, they provide precision and accountability. Using realtime kinematics Global Positioning System or quantum-enabled navigation, aerial and ground drones can emplace mines exactly where doctrine requires while producing digital logs that ensure accountability.14 Human operators play a critical role throughout this precision workflow, ensuring oversight and control. During deployment operations, human authorization occurs at key decision nodes, such as the initial activation of the system, confirmation of target coordinates, and upon any reseeding or retrieval of mines. This human-in-the-loop approach aligns with the emerging Department of War autonomy policy, providing reassurance to those skeptical of fully autonomous operations. In Europe, Marines supporting NATO could seed a river crossing in under an hour, delaying adversary armor long enough for fires to strike.15

Second, these minefields deliver dynamic control. Unlike fire-and-forget scatterables, drone-delivered obstacles can be armed, disarmed, and redeployed in minutes.16 This allows commanders to deny an avenue, reopen it for maneuver, and then reseed it as the fight evolves. Such reversibility ensures Marines preserve tempo while denying it to the enemy.

Third, drones enable doctrinal versatility. They can mass mines across a chokepoint to block reinforcements or cluster AT and AP mines to disrupt breaching efforts.17 This flexibility provides commanders with a scalable toolset for shaping enemy movement.

Fourth, drones create opportunities for deception and camouflage. Spray drones can obscure emplacements with terrain-colored coatings, while decoy mines generate false signatures.18 In practice, false fields force hesitation at critical moments and complicate adversary decision making.

Finally, drone-delivered minefields integrate seamlessly into the MAGTF and Joint Force. Obstacles become dynamic elements that complement fires, maneuver, and electronic warfare. Small FPV drones, such as the Neros Archer, offer an affordable near-term option for testing terrain-shaping tactics at the company level.19 By employing FPVs today, Marines can validate doctrine and reinforce the engineer community’s role as the Marine Corps’ countermobility specialists.

Technology Enablers

Civilian industries already demonstrate the feasibility of drone-delivered minefields. Drone swarms, such as those by companies like Verge Aero, synchronize hundreds of aircraft with centimeter accuracy during public light shows.20 These algorithms can be adapted for military use, enabling engineers to deploy mines with doctrinal precision. Proven swarm techniques provide Marines with an immediate advantage, eliminating the need for lengthy research cycles.

Commercial logistics proves scalability. Companies such as Zipline operate fleets of drones that navigate complex airspace and deliver payloads with precision and accuracy.21 These operations show drones can reliably carry ordnance-sized weights, providing confidence that swarms can sustain repetitive sorties in contested environments.

Artificial intelligence (AI) further enhances swarming potential. Vision-based AI allows drones to recognize terrain and optimize mine placement, while machine learning enables swarms to adapt mid-mission.22 This autonomy allows commanders to designate intent—“fix armor here” or “block this pass”—while swarms execute with minimal supervision.

Command-and-control resilience remains a decisive challenge. Army experimentation during MSPIX 2025 revealed that stacked drone swarms and RF decoys generated significant com-munication demands and integration challenges.23 Marines must learn from these lessons by prioritizing mesh networks, relay drones, and training in degraded environments. Building trust in autonomy and resilient communications will ensure these systems function under electronic warfare pressure. To mitigate electronic warfare threats, Marines will implement advanced electronic warfare training programs that simulate electronic attacks, equipping personnel with the skills to rapidly adapt and sustain operations. Regular drills will integrate electronic warfare scenarios with standard procedures, ensuring that Marines are adept at maintaining operational capability and communication integrity even when contested by adversarial electronic tactics.

Finally, quantum navigation and sensing offer a breakthrough. Recent demonstrations using magnetometers and gravimeters achieved centimeter-level accuracy without satellites, proving navigation without GPS is no longer theoretical.24 Russia and China have already been jamming and spoofing GPS in Ukraine and the Pacific, but ruggedized systems from companies such as SandboxAQ, Q-CTRL, and Infleqtion are being accelerated by DARPA and allied militaries.25 For Marines, quantum-enabled navigation ensures drone-delivered minefields remain accurate and accountable even under electronic attack.

Employment Options

Drone-delivered minefields enable doctrinally precise obstacle deployment. Using realtime kinematics Global Positioning System or quantum-enabled navigation, unmanned aerial system swarms can seed mines in fixing, turning, blocking, or disrupting patterns with each emplacement digitally logged for accountability.26 A commander could seed a river crossing in under an hour, delaying an adversary long enough for long-range fires to attrit the lead elements. Such speed and precision impose dilemmas without committing large forces.

Separate or clustered mines expand tactical flexibility. The AT mines delay armored formations, while AP mines deter dismounted infantry and breaching engineers. When clustered, these systems magnify effects, as engineers clearing AT lanes are disrupted by nearby AP threats.27 This layered approach forces adversaries to expend time and resources while Marines preserve tempo.

Reversibility provides commanders with dynamic control. Drone-emplaced mines can be armed, disarmed, and redeployed in just minutes rather than days.28 For instance, commanders have historically faced delays stretching up to 48 hours to reposition traditional mine systems. This rapid redeployment enables Marines to close a corridor to delay an advance, reopen it for friendly maneuver, and reseed it to deny pursuit. Such flexibility directly addresses long-standing criticisms of minefields as static liabilities by significantly reducing response times and enhancing operational tempo.

Drones also enable deception and counterattack facilitation. False mine-fields and decoys can create uncertainty across the battlespace, while commanders can predesignate corridors to allow counterattacks and then reseed behind them.29 These techniques transform obstacles from static hazards into adaptive enablers of maneuver.

Combat engineers must remain the primary operators of these systems. Countermobility, demolition, and terrain shaping are core engineer tasks and already own the training and readiness standards and demolition authorities.30 Anchoring these systems in the engineer community ensures doctrinal integrity and synchronization with fires. If the capability scales, a dedicated military occupational specialty for unmanned aerial system obstacles may be explored, but initial investment must remain engineer-led.

Lessons from Current Conflicts

Ukraine highlights both the utility and costs of legacy mines. Russian scatterable mines disrupted maneuver but left farmland contaminated for decades.31 Dud rates and the absence of digital control created hazards that slowed civilians and friendly forces long after combat. By contrast, Ukrainian forces adapted commercial drones to deliver precision charges against armored vehicles, demonstrating the potential of adaptive drone-enabled obstacles.32

Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 underscored the vulnerability of static defenses. Armenian mine belts slowed Azerbaijani advances, but swarms of Turkish-supplied drones systematically destroyed armor and artillery supporting the defense.33 The lesson for Marines is clear: without adaptability and synchronization with fires, modern reconnaissance-strike complexes will render fixed minefields ineffective.

Adversaries are rapidly innovating with unmanned deception. Russia has combined decoy drones with live systems to saturate defenses, while China’s precision drones demonstrate the potential for swarm deception at scale.34 These experiments show that adversaries are already exploring the same technologies Marines must adopt, and delaying risks ceding initiative in countermobility.

Coalition partners also highlight the importance of accountability. NATO allies in Eastern Europe and humanitarian groups in post-conflict zones face heavy clearance burdens from unexploded ordnance.35 Drone-delivered minefields, equipped with digital emplacement records and remote disarmament capabilities, could alleviate these challenges, reducing political costs while enhancing alliance interoperability.

Doctrine

The Marine Corps should update MCWP 3-17, Engineer Operations, and MCWP 3-12, Combined Arms Countermobility, to codify precision, reversibility, and deception as core tenets of mine warfare. Engineer units must add scalable “drone obstacle platoons” capable of supporting MLRs and MEUs. MARADMIN 416/25, which announced the fielding of the Neros Archer FPV drone, illustrates both the opportunity and the challenge of integration—momentum toward low-cost drone employment, but also the risks of dependency and doctrine lagging behind capability.36

Organization

The pioneer battalion provides the ideal structure for experimenting with drone-delivered minefields. Its littoral engineer reconnaissance teams and littoral explosive ordnance neutralization sections are already tasked with countermobility and terrain shaping.37 Embedding drone-enabled obstacle platoons within this formation would align with its campaign of learning mandate and validate swarming minefields in littoral terrain.

Doctrine and Concept Alignment

The Maritime Terrain Shaping and Area Denial (MTS-AD) Functional Concept emphasizes that the Marine Corps is not currently organized, trained, or equipped for scalable terrain shaping.38 Drone-delivered minefields directly fulfill these requirements by providing reversible, deception-enabled, and recoverable obstacles that assure friendly maneuver.

Joint Integration

The Army is investing heavily in terrain-shaping prototypes through the Army Applications Laboratory and MSPIX. Experiments have shown that stacked drone swarms, RF decoys, and autonomous unmanned ground vehicles are viable engineering tools.39 Marines should observe and shape these efforts while avoiding redundant costs—“let the Army spend, Marines adopt”—and focus resources on doctrine, naval integration, and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures.

FPV Options

The FPV drones, such as the Neros Archer, provide a near-term, affordable method to validate terrain-shaping tactics. They can deliver explosive charges, reinforce countermobility lanes, and be integrated into Service-level training exercises. By employing FPVs now, Marines can refine doctrine, build trust in autonomy, and accelerate field adoption without waiting for larger programs of record.40

Operator Ownership

Combat engineers must remain the primary operators of drone-delivered minefields. Countermobility and demolition are core engineer tasks, and the community already owns the training standards and authorities required for safe and effective obstacle employment.41 Anchoring these systems in the engineer community ensures doctrinal integrity and synchronization with fires. If the capability scales, a dedicated unmanned aerial system obstacle military occupational specialty may be explored, but initial investment must remain engineer-led.

Training

The Engineer School curriculum should incorporate swarming, digital accountability, and AI-enabled planning. Training must include degraded communications scenarios and integration into Service-level and coalition training exercises. Reserve units, drawing on civilian drone expertise, are particularly suited to accelerate adoption.

Materiel

Attritable drones with modular mine kits should be prioritized, supported by 3D-printed components to reduce logistics burdens. A pilot program fielded in both an active-duty and a reserve engineer unit within 24 months would validate the concept and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures.42

Facilities and Policy

The Marine Corps should establish ranges for inertly emplaced drone minefields. Current executive guidance permits experimentation, but accountability and coalition releasability must remain central. Early NATO integration will ease interoperability and strengthen legitimacy.43

Roadmap

Implementation should follow a phased approach. Year 1: demonstrate commercial swarming, Year 2: equip pilot units, Year 3: integrate into exercises, Year 4: establish a program of record. Future systems must incorporate resilient command and control, deception, and reversibility as mandatory features while framing employment as compliant and humanitarian focused.

Conclusion

In the 1950s, basketball slowed until the introduction of the shot clock forced tempo and creativity back into the game. Legacy scatterable mines have created a similar problem in maneuver warfare. They are static, unreliable, and strategically costly—slowing friendly operations, creating enduring hazards, and undermining legitimacy.44 Without reform, the Marine Corps’ countermobility capability risks irrelevance in an era defined by tempo and adaptability.

Drone-delivered minefields are the shot clock for maneuver warfare. They enable Marines to emplace, camouflage, arm, disarm, and redeploy obstacles in minutes. The opening scenario illustrates the point: a Chinese amphibious force was delayed for 36 hours, then destroyed in a withdrawal kill zone. The same logic applies globally: NATO shaping Russian maneuver in Europe, FPVs denying approaches in the Middle East, or drones rapidly seeding choke-points in the Arctic.45

The Marine Corps cannot afford to lag behind adversaries already experimenting with swarms and deception. Maintaining tempo and adaptability will determine whether Marines impose costs or suffer them. Drone-delivered minefields impose disproportionate costs on adversaries at minimal expense, embodying the essence of asymmetric warfare.46 Just as the shot clock revitalized basketball, these systems will revitalize Marine Corps obstacle warfare—ensuring engineers deliver the unfair fight envisioned by Force Design 2030.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Capt Trossen is a prior-enlisted Combat Engineer Officer with over 22 years of experience in the Marine Corps engineer community, serving in both enlisted and officer capacities. He has previously served as a Company Commander in an engineer company within a Marine Wing Support Squadron and as a Company Inspector-Instructor in South Bend, IN. He currently commands Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion.

NOTES:

  1. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War, GAO-02-1003 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002).
  2. David Hambling, “Mine Craft: Ukrainian Drones Add a New Dimension to Mine War-fare,” Forbes, April 3, 2025, https://www.forbes. com/sites/davidhambling/2025/04/03/mine-craft-ukrainian-drones-add-a-new-dimension-to-mine-warfare.
  3. Army Applications Laboratory, Engineer Operations: Autonomy Cohorts and Terrain Shaping Experimentation (Austin: May 2025); and Headquarters Marine Corps, MARADMIN 416/25, Guidance for the Fielding of the Neros Archer (Washington, DC: September 2025).
  4. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: 2020).
  5. Gary Sheffield, The First World War in 100 Objects (London: Imperial War Museum, 2017).
  6. Ian Gooderson, A Hard Way to Make a War: British and German Minefields in North Africa, 1941–43 (London: Routledge, 2001).
  7. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War.
  8. International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II to the CCW) (Geneva: October 1996).
  9. The White House, “Executive Order 14307: Expanding Drone Integration to Increase Efficiency and Productivity,” June 6, 2025; Secretary of Defense, “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” (Washington, DC: July 2025); and The White House, “Revocation of National Security Memorandum 17 on Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” (Washington, DC: July 2025).
  10. Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, No. 2 (2004).
  11. Staff, “China Celebrates Lunar New Year with 3D Dragon Drone Display,” South China Morning Post, February 2021.
  12. U.S. Army, Final Report–MSPIX 2025: Deep Terrain Shaping and Remote Breaching of Obstacles (Fort Leonard Wood: Army Applications Laboratory, May 2025).
  13. Engineer Operations: Autonomy Cohorts and Terrain Shaping Experimentation.
  14. Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War.
  15. David C. Isby and Charles Kamps, Armies of NATO’s Central Front (London: Jane’s, 1985).
  16. Emma Dodd and Caitlin Welsh, “Demining Ukraine’s Farmland: Progress, Adaptation, and Challenges,” CSIS, December 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/demining-ukraines-farmland-progress-adaptation-and-needs.
  17. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: 2020).
  18. Staff, “Operation False Target: How Russia Plotted to Mix a Deadly New Weapon among Decoy Drones in Ukraine,” Associated Press, November 2024, https://apnews.com/video/ukraine-drones-russia-aerospace-and-defense-industry-war-and-unrest-76742f121c4d-4081a87b504b1a48afc7.
  19. Force Design 2030.
  20. Staff, “Flight Control System,” Verge Aero, n.d., https://verge.aero.
  21. Staff, “About Zipline: Drone Delivery Service,” Zipline, n.d., https://flyzipline.com.
  22. Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018).
  23. U.S. Army, Final Report–MSPIX 2025: Deep Terrain Shaping and Remote Breaching of Obstacles (Fort Leonard Wood: Army Ap-plications Laboratory, May 2025).
  24. David Hambling, “GPS Just Became Optional for Military Navigation. Quantum Sen-sors Are Why,” Forbes, September 2025, https://www.forbes.com.
  25. U.S. Department of Defense, “DARPA’s Robust Quantum Sensing Program,” Defense. gov, 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/research/programs/roqs-robust-quantum-sensors.
  26. Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War.
  27. International Committee of the Red Cross, Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? (Geneva: ICRC, 1996).
  28. Emma Dodd and Caitlin Welsh, “Demining Ukraine’s Farmland: Progress, Adaptation, and Challenges,” CSIS, December 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/demining-ukraines-farmland-progress-adaptation-and-needs.
  29. “Operation False Target: How Russia Plot-ted to Mix a Deadly New Weapon among Decoy Drones in Ukraine.”
  30. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Task List (MCTL), Engineer Section (Washington, DC: 2023).
  31. Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?
  32. “Mine Craft: Ukrainian Drones Add a New Dimension to Mine Warfare.”
  33. Michael Kofman and Leonid Nersisyan, “The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: Lessons for Future Conflict,” War on the Rocks, December 2020.
  34. “Operation False Target: How Russia Plotted to Mix a Deadly New Weapon among Decoy Drones in Ukraine;” and “China Celebrates Lunar New Year with 3D Dragon Drone Display.”
  35. International Committee of the Red Cross, Amended Protocol II to the CCW (Geneva: October 1996).
  36. Headquarters Marine Corps, MARAD-MIN 416/25, Guidance for the Fielding of the Neros Archer (Washington, DC: September 2025).
  37. U.S. Marine Corps, Pioneer Battalion Concept of Employment (Quantico, VA: Capabilities Development Directorate, February 2024).
  38. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Func-tional Concept: Maritime Terrain Shaping and Area Denial (Quantico, VA: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, July 2022).
  39. Final Report–MSPIX 2025: Deep Terrain Shaping and Remote Breaching of Obstacles.
  40. MARADMIN 416/25.
  41. Marine Corps Task List (MCTL), Engineer Section.
  42. U.S. Department of Defense, “Drone Operator Career Field Development,” Defense. gov, 2025.
  43. “Executive Order 14307: Expanding Drone Integration to Increase Efficiency and Productivity”; Secretary of Defense, Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance (Washington, DC: July 2025); and Revocation of National Security Memorandum 17 on Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy.
  44. Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War.
    Force Design 2030.
  45. “Operation False Target: How Russia Plot-ted to Mix a Deadly New Weapon among Decoy Drones in Ukraine”; and “China Celebrates Lunar New Year with 3D Dragon Drone Display.”

SIF HMLA: Why The Marine Corps Needs to rethink H-1s

The Commandant’s Rapid Response Essay Contest: Second Place

The Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) has long served as the Marine Corps’ rotary-wing utility and attack aviation workhorse. Centered around the UH-1Y Venom and the AH-1Z Viper, the HMLA structure was born of Cold War legacy platforms updated to meet post-9/11 operational demands. While the H-1 upgrade program succeeded in modernizing those platforms with improved powerplants, rotor systems, and avionics, the strategic environment has since changed. As the Marine Corps pivots to great-power competition, the legacy of the H-1 plat-form must be re-evaluated.

The 1990s decision to continue with the Bell H-1 Upgrade Program instead of shifting to the Sikorsky H-60 series was appropriate for its time. It allowed for parts commonality, reduced acquisition costs, and leveraged existing maintenance infrastructure. However, the assumption underpinning that decision—that the HMLA structure could meet future expeditionary and distributed warfare needs—no longer holds.

Background: Proven Performance in a Changing World

The H-1 aircraft have served admirably across decades of conflict. The UH-1Y offered a major step up in survivability, digital cockpit integration, and mission flexibility, especially when paired with the AH-1Z. The platforms boast 85 percent parts commonality, a critical enabler in logistics efficiency during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and MEU deployments.

However, those successes were rooted in a context of low-intensity conflict, permissive airspace, and robust forward operating bases. Today’s reality is defined by dispersed operations, denied logistics chains, anti-access/area-denial environments, and contested maritime domains.

In parallel, the Marine Corps has introduced the Stand-In Forces (SIF) concept—a doctrinal shift focused on persistent, forward-deployed units operating inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. These forces must be agile, survivable, and interoperable with joint and partner forces.

The Role of Rotary-Wing Close Air Support in the Future Fight

The Marine Corps possesses a deeply rooted close air support (CAS) culture, forged through decades of joint operations and integrated fires. This institutional knowledge enables Marine aviators to work seamlessly with ground forces and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, making the Marine Corps the go-to Service for CAS in the Joint Force. The enduring emphasis on combined-arms operations reinforces the value of rotary-wing CAS as an essential tool in contested and austere environments.

Marine AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom helicopters with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 263 (Reinforced), 22nd MEU (Special Operations Capable), fly in a formation during operations underway in the Caribbean Sea in September 2025. (Photo by Sgt Tanner Bernat.)

As unmanned aerial systems proliferate and prove effective in conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, questions have emerged regarding the enduring relevance of rotary-wing CAS. While drones offer low-risk, long-endurance surveillance and precision strike capabilities, they cannot fully replace the flexibility and responsiveness of manned rotary platforms.

Rotary-wing CAS provides commanders with realtime decision making, coordinated fires, and the ability to adapt to dynamic ground combat conditions. Helicopters are not only weapons delivery platforms; they are versatile airframes that can deploy and support drone operations, serve as airborne command and control nodes, and offer casualty evacuation or resupply under fire.

Moreover, CAS conducted from helicopters fosters joint terminal attack controller integration and enhances combined arms effectiveness. This layered approach ensures redundancy and resilience on the battlefield—qualities that are critical in peer or near-peer engagements. A hybrid model that combines rotary-wing CAS with drone capabilities will likely dominate future battlefields.

The MH-60S platform, especially with the armament kit making it an Armed Black Hawk (ABH), supports this hybrid future. It can deliver suppressive fire, coordinate strikes, or act as a launch and relay platform for unmanned aerial systems. Its ability to integrate into naval operations and expeditionary bases makes it a critical enabler of persistent close air support in contested environments.

The Case for the MH-60S/ABH: Flexibility, Interoperability, and Logistics

In addition to its combat utility, the MH-60S enhances the Marine Corps’ ability to contribute to joint operations in other mission areas. When embarked aboard amphibious shipping, Marine-operated MH-60s can augment search and rescue capabilities, providing rapid response and recovery for personnel in distress. This dual-purpose role strengthens naval force protection and humanitarian assistance during expeditionary missions.

MH-60S Sea Hawk on the fl ight deck of the world’s largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78). (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Brianna Barnett.)

The MH-60S with the ABH kit offers substantial operational and logistical benefits over the current HMLA construct:

  • Multi-role Capability: The platform performs armed reconnaissance, vertical assault, medevac, ISR, armed escort, and anti-armor missions when equipped with the ABH kit.
  • Naval Integration: Designed for shipboard use, the MH-60S seamlessly operates from amphibious ships (LHDs, LPDs) and other amphibious platforms.
  • Logistics Commonality: Shared components with the MH-60R/S enable integration into the Navy’s global sustainment architecture.
  • Interoperability: Already fielded by partner nations, the platform enhances joint and coalition mission execution.
  • Growth Potential: Capable of incorporating mine detection systems, extended range tanks, and directed energy weapons in the future.

Since logistics often relies on commercial services and contracted sustainment pathways, the Marine Corps would benefit from the MH-60’s alignment with allied logistics infrastructure. The widespread use of H-60 variants across more than 30 countries enables the Marine Corps to tap into allied nations’ parts programs, boosting availability and mitigating domestic logistical shortfalls in a contested or resource-constrained environment. Logistics operations could also hide in plain sight by leveraging the parts commonality with host-nation inventories, allowing Marine Corps supply and maintenance activities to blend with existing allied infrastructure, reducing the visibility and vulnerability of logistical nodes in contested environments. The Marine Corps could also further increase resilience by prepositioning key supplies with allied forces who operate the same platform, ensuring rapid access to critical components in theater and enabling quicker recovery from attrition or supply chain disruption. This global adoption also enables greater coalition interoperability and access to multinational sustainment hubs during joint operations.

Furthermore, the H-60’s operational pedigree is unmatched among rotary-wing platforms. The platform’s modularity has allowed for adaptations across mission sets—from humanitarian assistance to special operations. Most notably, a stealth-modified version of the Black Hawk was used in Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR—the mission that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden. This high-risk, high-precision operation demonstrated the H-60’s adaptability, stealth modification potential, and elite mission success under extreme conditions.

Another distinct advantage of the H-60 platform is its ability to conduct aerial refueling, reducing the reliance on aviation-delivered ground refueling. In distributed maritime and expeditionary environments where forward arming and refueling points may be limited or compromised, this capability allows for greater operational endurance and tactical flexibility. Aerial refueling extends mission range and dwell time for rotary-wing platforms, enabling deeper penetration into contested areas without the logistical risk associated with groundbased refueling operations.

The Marine Corps already has VH-60N pilots stationed at HMX-1. These pilots could act as the instructor cadres during the transition. These seasoned pilots possess institutional knowledge of the H-60 platform and could assist in converting both the training pipeline and the fleet, ensuring a smoother and faster implementation of the MH-60 transition.

Organizational Implications: From HMLA to HMMA

Adopting the MH-60S would require structural changes to the HMLA designation and table of organization and equipment. The HMLA designation would need to shift to Marine Medium Attack Helicopter (HMMA) Squadron, reflecting the new platform’s capabilities and dual-role nature. The Marine Corps would require table of organization and equipment changes, as well as updates to training pipelines and maintenance protocols. Since the MH-60 variant can perform both utility and attack missions, the total number of aircraft fielded may be reduced allowing for streamlined fleet management.

Additionally, the reorganization of personnel will be necessary. Fewer aircraft could lead to a surplus of qualified aircrew and maintainers. Rather than reduce manpower, the Marine Corps should repurpose this talent to establish an aviation liaison company modeled after air naval gunfire liaison companies. Instead of coordinating fires, this unit would consist of experienced pilots and maintainers focused on building aviation capacity with allied and partner nations. These teams could deploy to enhance coalition air interoperability, provide training, and strengthen forward aviation operations in alignment with SIF objectives.

This transformation is not without cost, but the benefits are profound. In an era of constrained logistics, dispersed operations, and joint warfighting, the Marine Corps cannot afford to field legacy systems that fail to meet the threat.

Recommendations

  1. Initiate a phased replacement of H-1 aircraft with MH-60S variants equipped with ABH kits.
  2. Redesignate HMLA squadrons as HMMA and revise the table of organization and equipment accordingly.
  3. Integrate training and maintenance pipelines with Navy MH-60R/S programs.
  4. Enhance forward-deployed logistics nodes to support MH-60 operations under SIF doctrine.
  5. Partner with allied forces operating MH-60 variants to standardize coalition interoperability.
  6. Stand up an aviation liaison company to expand partner capacity and joint mission support.

A New Acquisition Opportunity: Capitalizing on Army Transition

The Army is transitioning from the H-60 platform to the Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor, a move that will phase out thousands of existing Black Hawk helicopters. The Marine Corps could take advantage of this transition by acquiring surplus Army H-60s at a reduced cost and converting them to the MH-60S variant. This would accelerate modernization while avoiding the cost of new airframe production.

Additionally, the Marine Corps could mothball the legacy HMLA fleet. By placing H-1 airframes in long-term preservation, the Service would retain surge capacity for major conflicts while focusing current efforts on building a more integrated and survivable rotary force aligned with SIF doctrine.

The Bell V-280 Valor. (Photo: Courtesy of Bell/U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center.)

Conclusion

The H-1 program has served the Marine Corps with distinction, yet the emerging operational environment demands more. The MH-60S variant—with its modularity, interoperability, and logistical advantages—provides a pathway to modernize Marine aviation. Combined with doctrinal shifts like SIF, adopting the H-60 strengthens the Corps’ ability to operate forward, fight distributed, and support allies and partners across the globe.

Modernizing to the MH-60S not only responds to current operational needs but also prepares the Marine Corps for future contingencies by leveraging the broader DOD ecosystem. If the Marine Corps acquires surplus H-60s from the Army, then it allows for cost-effective transition and rapid fielding. With the excess aircrew and maintainers, the Marine Corps has the capacity to establish liaison elements modeled after air naval gunfire liaison companies and enhance strategic partnerships while preserving legacy platforms for potential large-scale conflict and providing depth in the force.

This transition supports the Marine Corps’ enduring role as a premier crisis response force, ensuring aviation remains a lethal, flexible, and forward-postured capability. Rotary-wing CAS—when aligned with SIF principles and integrated across the naval and Joint Force—remains indispensable. Rethinking HMLA is not merely about replacing platforms but evolving the Corps’ posture to prevail in the contested, distributed fight of the future.

> Maj Healy is a Faculty Advisor at Expeditionary Warfare School.

Crowdsourced Kill Webs

Human-enabled targeting within the first island chain

Humans are more important than hardware, and every human is a sensor. Focusing on humans as a meansof crowd-sourcing intelligence, by as-sisting them with technology (both old and new), Marine Forces Special Op-erations Command (MARSOC) can fundamentally transform the way we gather intelligence as an organization. Below are three vignettes, all taking place in a futuristic scenario of a cross-strait invasion, that highlight potential use cases of a crowdsourced, versatile, and human-centric platform to find, fix, and finish. All the vignettes incen-tivize intelligence gathering on threat networks and utilize crowdsourcing to both source and verify information. The proposed crowdsourced kill web is persistent and reliable, offering cel-lular capabilities in a contested environ-ment and high frequency (HF) digital capabilities in a denied environment. Overall, a crowdsourced kill webs offer MARSOC the ability to transform the way we do intelligence gathering by turning every human in the contested littoral environment into a thread in the kill web.

Vignette 1: Freedom of the Seas

Somewhere in the Philippine Sea: Capt Remy was steaming toward his favorite fishing grounds north of his hometown in Luzon. He had been fishing these grounds since he was a kid, but he had not been back here in a couple of months. Back in the day, he did not have to worry about getting boarded by Chinese Coast Guard vessels, but their patrols of this area had kept Remy away for the past couple of months. Remy was not a political guy, but when someone came after him and affected his ability to make a living and feed his family, it felt like a personal attack. He was struggling to make ends meet, and every time he got pushed off the fishing grounds, all he could think about was the sunk cost going down the drain. Last week, his buddy showed him this app on his phone. He said this was a way of making some quick cash out on the boat in case you got run off by anyone while trying to stand up for his fishing rights at the same time. He was not too sure at first, but after a couple of days of mediocre catches, Remy was warming up to the idea of standing up for his fishing grounds, and it did not hurt that he could make a quick buck at the same time. Just then, through a break in the fog, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel appeared, cutting a collision course straight across Remy’s bow. As he changed course to avoid a collision, Capt Remy pulled out his phone and snapped a pic of the Chinese Coast Guard vessel. As the loudspeaker harassed him in broken propaganda, he changed his course for home and resigned himself to another day without a catch. Once he had cleared the vessel, he took out his phone to look at the picture. Remy was done dealing with getting chased off his fishing grounds; he was done coming home without anything to show for it. With bitter resolve, he opened the app and uploaded the picture, filled out a couple of details, and hit the submit button. Remy’s report was quickly validated via AI, and he was rewarded with $50 into his PayPal.

Operations Center: Got another one, Capt Kim said to himself. Reports had been flooding in since his intel fusion cell had launched the crowdsourced intel program earlier this week. Higher (headquarters) did not seem as bought off on the idea as he had initially hoped, but they did grant him and his team two months to beta test it, and he knew that was all the time he needed to show how game-changing this capability would be. As the reports flowed in, Kim and his team assisted the AI program in sorting and grouping the reports as it automatically compiled intel summaries and updated the common operation picture accordingly. Reports came in of varied qualities, but users were incentivized financially to provide as much detail as possible, and once the report was corroborated via other modes of intelligence, they were rewarded.

“I still don’t get why you’re wasting your time with this,” Kim’s coworker, LT Smith, snarled.

“You still don’t get it, do you? We have essentially created a crowdsourced intelligence platform for the entirety of the Pacific. Fishermen, merchant marines, recreational pilots, sailors, everyone that is out there with a smartphone in the littorals is a sensor working for us.” Kim retorted defiantly.

He knew it would work; nobody bought an idea on the first sell. Everybody said it would be too expensive, but unmanned sensors could be expensive too and often less reliable. Drones crashed, sensors broke, and weather caused delays, but humans could persist and prevail.

An HC-130J Super Hercules airplane crew from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak observes two Russian Border Guard ships and two Chinese Coast Guard ships approximately 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island on 28 September 2024. This marked the northernmost loca-tion where Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been observed by the U.S. Coast Guard. (Photo by
Petty Officer 1st Class Travis Magee.)

Vignette 2: Return of the Coast Watcher

Two weeks have passed. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Taiwan and established a total blockade of the first island chain. In addition to the blockade, PLA Cyberspace Forces eliminated all cellular and satellite services.

Ishigaki Island: On the island of Ishigaki, Henry Smith, an Australian studying abroad, just summited the final step of the Tamatorizaki Observation Platform. This is crazy, Henry said to himself as he set down his backpack and started setting up his kit. Henry’s grandfather was one of the legendary Australian Coast Watchers in the Solomon Islands during World War II. Maybe I’ll get a shoutout in the his-tory books one day too, Henry thought to himself as he finished tuning his five-watt QRP (ham radio speak for “reduced power”) HF radio. He pulled out his old bird-watching binos and focused them on a Chinese warship on the horizon. Henry had flown into Ishigaki about three weeks ago, unaware of the global turmoil mounting in the South China Sea. Cell and satellite services had been nonexistent for at least two weeks; he figured this was pretty serious and he might as well try to make a difference. Luckily, he happened to bring his ham radio equipment along, hoping to get some Summit on the Air contacts from this remote Pacific island during his short vacation. Summit on the Air was an amateur ham radio organization that rewarded people based on their ability to establish “contacts” from remote summits utilizing portable ham radio equipment. As both a ham radio and outdoor enthusiast, Summit on the Air was the perfect hobby for Henry to challenge him both physically and intellectually. Until this moment, he had not realized it also happened to be the best preparation for being a modern-day Coast Watcher out there. He jotted down the description, heading, and estimated speed of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Warship on his notepad and quickly translated the message into Morse, connected his paddle, and started transmitting.

Operations Center: Beeeeep-Beeeeep-Beep-Beep-Beep. GySgt Johnson shot up from his desk and flipped over his coffee as the squawk box in front of him burst to life, beeping out Morse code in a hurried tone. Johnson could hardly contain his joy as he opened SOF-Chat to translate the message. He was not sure if he was more excited about the first intelligence report they had received in days or because of his absurd idea to monitor the ham radio Military Auxiliary Radio System band had actually yielded fruit.

“Sir, you’ve got to get a load of this,” Johnson hollered, motioning to Capt Kim furiously with one hand as he copied down the message with the other.

“This is the gold,” said Kim as he alerted the command operations center, resulting in a flurry of battle drills. Once the strike had been prosecuted, Kim came back over to Johnson and said flatly, “We need more intel, our system hasn’t yielded any reporting since the blockade started, and the cellular networks went down. Is there a way to pair our app with ham radios so we can get back to crowd-sourcing intel and building targeting data?”

“I’m glad you asked, sir. I have been going back and forth with VK7JQP, that’s our boy on Ishigaki, and I think we may have a solution. Unfortunately, not everyone out there has a ham radio kit like our man VK7JQP, but he recommended an existing low-cost commercial-off-the-shelf kit for under $200, pairing a small five-watt QRP HF radio, smartphone, a small solar charger, and a simple set of instructions. The smartphone will be preloaded with our app capable of pulling targeting data from a video of the target and then automatically sending that data in an HF data package through the radio. Sir, if you can get your team to adjust our system to receive reports over HF digitally, we’ll be able to build back the kill web and end this blockade.” Johnson sat back, excited that his ham radio knowledge had finally paid off.

Vignette 3: Contested Littoral Coast Watchers

On the outskirts of Hualien in Taiwan: It was early morning, and the fog was thick along the eastern coast of Taiwan. Weilong walked down the shore with his younger brother, Yi, and looked for a break in the surf where they could cast their lines. The PLA soldiers had not made it to Hualien yet; for now, the mountains protected them. The coast was a different story; the PLAN patrolled there and would harass anyone along the beach, forcing them to fish in the morning fog. Food had grown short in the city, but luckily, Weilong and Yi’s father, who came from a line of indigenous Taiwanese people, taught them at an early age not to rely on the grocery store. As Weilong and Yi walked toward their morning fishing spot, Wei-long spotted a strange box floating in a tide pool. Before he could caution his younger brother to be careful of the foreign object, Yi jumped upon the box, hauled it to the dry sand, and ripped it open. Weilong hurried over and peered inside, reached into his hand, and pulled out a small, cheaply made smartphone, something that looked like an old radio with a string of wire, a small solar char-ger, and an instruction manual. Weilong opened the instruction manual and read the introduction page:

To the People of Taiwan, you have been unjustly occupied, and the United States is here to help. Inside this box is a ham radio, a phone, and a solar power charger. If you follow the simple instructions in this manual, you will be able to fight back and reclaim your homeland in a peaceful manner. All you must do is follow these simple instructions. Every report you send up is a day closer to breaking the blockade and reclaiming your homeland.

Weilong flipped through the other pages and skimmed the instructional graphics as he went. He had played around with walkie-talkies when he was younger, but that was about the extent of his radio knowledge. The graphics clearly laid out how to set up the antenna, utilize the radio, and send reports via the phone. What the hell, he thought. Might as well do something instead of sitting here waiting for the PLA to come take our land.

“Come on, Yi, we got work to do,” Weilong said to his brother, and they headed up into the mountains to break out of the fog layer and start their unknown journey to submit the first intel reports on PLAN movement on the east coast of Taiwan since the war had begun.

The crowdsourced kill-web system would prove pivotal in turning the tide of the PLAN blockade, providing crucial targeting data on PLAN vessels that would facilitate the joint kill web and lead to the liberation of Taiwan. It was entirely instrumented by allies, partners, and concerned citizens submitting crowdsourced intelligence reports of PLAN ship movements along the coast. Opening the app and following a set of simple instructions, users take a video of the enemy threat system. Artificial intelligence analysis built into the app pulls all relevant targeting information from the video and transmits that data to the paired radio system in binary code. That code is then sent via HF digital transmission to a distributed network of processing centers where AI and human analysts sort the data and compile firing solutions. Even after the PLA found such radios and learned of the existence of the program, they were unable to hinder the mass influx of reporting.

Conclusion

Overall, crowdsourced kill webs will give MARSOC the ability to transform the way we do intelligence gathering by turning every human in the contested littoral environment into a thread in the kill web. Through this simple, low-cost, resilient, and commercial off-the-shelf solution, we will enable allies, partners, and concerned citizens to report on threats in a timely, safe, and nearly untraceable manner. The crowdsourced kill web system is built on the premise of open-source intelligence gathering, utilizing both smartphone and ham radio technology to build intelligence awareness in both permissive and denied environments. Humans will be more important than hardware in the fight to come. Crowdsourced kill webs will enable allies, partners, and concerned citizens across the littorals to join the fight to protect their homeland.

>Capt Ignotus is an officer serving in MARSOC. He is writing under a pseudonym due to security concerns.

Non-Combat Attacks on the Marine Corps

No respect for the Marine Corps 

Throughout its 250-year history, the Marine Corps, in the words of 1980s comedian Rodney Dangerfield, “Don’t get no respect.” Dangerfield’s line describes the treatment of the Marine Corps by four presidents, congressmen, the Army, and the Navy. Non-combat battles for Marines took place between the 1780s through the 1950s. Challenges included proposals to move the Marines into the Army, eliminate the Marines, reduce the size of the Marines, and pull Marines from ships.

After only eight years in operation, the United States disbanded the Marine Corps on 3 September 1783. That was the same day that Great Britain formally recognized the independence of the United States by the Treaty of Paris. President George Washington returned the Marines to action in 1789.

A major attack on the Marines came from President Andrew Jackson. On 8 December 1829, Jackson addressed Congress. He recommended merging the Marine Corps into the artillery or infantry, thus “curing the many defects in its organization.” The Marine Corps Commandant, LtCol Archibald Henderson, defended the existence of the Marine Corps. Henderson said, “As the commandant of the Corps, if I thought such a change necessary for the public interests, I should be among the first to recommend it. It is my fixed opinion that no such change will eventuate in the promotion of either economy or utility.” Henderson’s response led to Congress passing legislation placing the Marine Corps under the Secretary of the Navy in 1834. Jackson signed the bill, ending the placement of Marine functions into the Army.1

In 1864, during the Civil War, a resolution came before Congress to transfer the Marine Corps to the Army.  The Marine Corps Commandant, Col Jacob Zeilen, once Henderson’s aide, gathered support from senior Navy officers. That resolution died in a House committee. Three years later, Zeilen faced a new challenge—legislation to abolish the Marine Corps. Again, Zeilen gathered the support of senior naval officers. That legislation failed to get out of committee.2

While the Army and Navy had four-star leaders since 1866, Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps, became the first Marine to earn a fourth star in 1945. That was 89 years after GEN Ulysses S. Grant and ADM David C. Farragut received their fourth stars.3 

Between 1894 and 1908, the Marines faced a reduction in responsibility when naval officers wanted Marines off ships. Then, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt agreed with those officers. In 1908, President Roosevelt acted by ordering Marines off the Navy’s ships. Roosevelt’s 9 November 1908 order came one day before the Marine Corps’ 133rd birthday. Under Roosevelt, the Marines were landbased only.4 Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, former Secretary of War under Roosevelt, reversed his predecessor’s decision on 26 March 1909.5

While researching generals in the Marine Corps, author Glenn M. Harned said, “Before 1916, the United States Marine Corps did not have a general officers corps. Five Marine officers served as Commandant in the grade of brigadier general or major general, but none of them advanced to the permanent grade above that of colonel.”6

In 1933, ADM William V. Pratt, chief of naval operations, called for “amalgamation of the Marine Corps into the Army.” Pratt explained that Marines were once needed to suppress mutinies by sailors in what was called the “Pratt Memo.” According to Pratt, “As the world became more settled and as colonization settled, the need for small expeditionary forces grew less.” Pratt said other nations abolished or reduced the size of their Marine units, while the United States built “a small Army” within the Navy. Pratt added, “The principal weapons of the larger proportion of the Marine Corps are the rifle, bayonet, and machine gun, exactly the same for the infantry of the Army.” Pratt’s argument suggested that cost savings would result. Pratt said, “Everything except the combat element of the Marine Corps could be eliminated,” adding that administration, training, and supply could be handled by the Army in existing facilities.7

Even during World War II, Gen Vandegrift had to defend the Corps when he spoke to the House Select Committee on Post War Policy on 11 May 1944, 34 days before Marines landed on Saipan. Vandegrift explained the Marine Corps had to fight for its existence throughout its history. Vandegrift reminded committee members of the 1867 proposal to abolish the Marine Corps and assign their responsibilities to the Army. That failed, Vandegrift added.8

Post World War II, the War Department reorganization into the Department of Defense nearly ended the Marine Corps. The 1947 reorganization created the United States Air Force from the Army Air Force. Leaders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were named full members of the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Marines were not included. Gen Vandegrift battled to keep the Marine Corps a separate Service. On 6 May 1946, Vandegrift spoke before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee during a hearing on bill S. 2044 to place the responsibilities of the Marine Corps under the Army. Proponents of S. 2044 included President Harry S. Truman, War Department leaders, and Army Chief of Staff GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower. Vandegrift made his case to senators in what became known as the “bended knee” speech. Vandegrift spoke about the impact of S. 2044 on the Marine Corps. The general explained that the bill would “spell the extinction of the Marine Corps.” Vandegrift added, “For some time I have been aware that the very existence of the Marine Corps stood as a continued affront to the War Department general staff.” Pointing to the World War II victories in the Pacific, Vandegrift outlined the Marine Corps’ amphibious capabilities. Speaking from a historical point of view, Vandegrift explained the impact of the Marine Corps. The general said the Marine Corps forecasted a pattern of war with Japan in 1921. Vandegrift said:

In conjunction with the Navy, we provided the nation with a doctrine, technique, method, and equipment which became the standard pattern of amphibious warfare adopted not only by our own Army but by the armies and navies of eight United Nations as well. It proved to the key to victory in every major theater of the war.

With a backhand to the Army, Vandegrift described the Marines as a “skilled body of specialists” who received “world-wide professional prestige without benefit of West Point tradition or War Department direction.” Again, referencing the Pacific in World War II, Vandegrift explained the Marines are the nation’s “primary force of readiness.” He added that the operation at Guadalcanal could not have been launched by the Army, as that Service was not trained for an amphibious assault landing. Vandegrift explained the end of the Marine Corps would be offset by “the part-time assignment of Army troops for naval purposes.” He praised the Army’s ability to organize and prepare operations “with care and deliberation.” Vandegrift argued, those abilities did not “make up an effective mobile, amphibious force.” He added, “The Marines have always viewed the landing operations as a specialty—their specialty.” Continuing his case against the Army taking on amphibious operations, Vandegrift pointed to the Army’s Field Service Regulations. It had only eight of 1,084 paragraphs covering amphibious operations. In response to the War Department’s contention that Marines’ amphibious efforts “are an invasion of the Army’s sphere,” Vandegrift said, “The Army is not and never has been in the amphibious field.” The general also reminded the Senate Committee that Army troops who carried out amphibious landings used Marine Corps techniques, and in some cases were trained by Marines. Vandegrift concluded with an emotionally charged statement:

The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go. But, I think you will agree with me that he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him asked by the War Department.9

Five days after Vandegrift’s Senate presentation, an Associated Press reporter asked GEN Eisenhower his take on Vandegrift’s statement. Eisenhower replied, “No one has paid more tribute to the Marines’ record,” than he (Eisenhower) did.10 Vandegrift’s speech paid off. Despite the War Department’s efforts, the Marine Corps stayed a separate Service. The Marines still did not have a position on the JCS.

With the unification of the Services finalized and the Marines still in business, the fight for the existence of the Corps continued. Alan Rems, writing in a June 2019 article for the magazine Naval History, described the post-World War II intra-Service efforts to minimize the role of the Marine Corps. For example, the Nation’s first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, held a meeting with the Service chiefs in Key West, FL, in March 1948. Forrestal did not include Gen Clifford B. Cates, Vandegrift’s successor. Truman wanted deeper defense cuts. Louis B. Johnson, Forrestal’s successor, advocated moving the Marines under the Army and placing Marine aviation with the Air Force. Legally, it was pointed out, Johnson could not do that. The battles among the Service chiefs led to hearings before the House Armed Services Committee in October 1949. The JCS Chairman, GEN Omar Bradley, told the committee that amphibious operations of the Navy and Marines would not be needed.11

While Vandegrift’s efforts helped keep the Marine Corps as a separate branch of the military, Pratt’s memo did not die due to retired Army GEN George Van Horn Moseley. Mosely served as GEN Douglas MacArthur’s Army’s vice chief of staff in the 1930s. In a 15 February 1949 letter to Eisenhower, Moseley mentioned Pratt’s memo. Moseley summarized the memo and added his view when he wrote:

The idea that Marines can be landed on the shores of a foreign nation without committing an international breach, is all baloney. It is perfectly absurd and entirely incongruous to maintain two armies. The continental existence of the Marine Corps adds greatly to duplication and expense. Why should the Marine Corps have a separate air force?

Moseley blamed the Marines’ Capitol Hill influence when he said, “This question would have been adjusted years ago.” Moseley took one more shot at the Marine Corps with this comment, “You (Eisenhower) accomplished all of your victories in Europe without a single Marine.” (Moseley’s comment was inaccurate, according the Royal Marines’ history that said, “While few in number and often forgotten, around 700 United States Marines were present on D Day either ashore [Omaha Beach] or as part of ships crews.” In addition, Marines served in London and Iceland. Other Marines were assigned to Navy ships.)12 Finally, Mosely mentioned he sent a copy of the “Pratt Memo” to former President Herbert Hoover, chairman of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch. The former President thanked Moseley for his letter and expressed “appreciation for his views.”13

Letters between Van Horn Mossley and Eisenhower; Pratt Memos calling for amalgamation of Marine Corps with the Army. (Photos provided by author.)

On 19 February 1949, Eisenhower replied to Moseley. While not directly agreeing with Moseley’s view, Eisenhower offered insight into his feelings about the Marine Corps issue with this statement:

The whole trouble with this question of the Marines, the distortion with which it is treated when it is dragged out into the open. It becomes a subject to which is applied a great deal of emotionalism, prejudice and hysteria, but very little logic and good sense.14

Eisenhower’s 8 April 1950 answer to World War II Marine veteran Richard W. Courchaine took a different tone than his response to Moseley. Courchaine wrote Eisenhower in April about a Saturday Evening Post article, “The Marine Corps Fights for Its Life.” Courchaine said, “I was very surprised to find it (the article) that you were for it, such as regulating it (the Marine Corps) to a very small size.” Eisenhower replied that he had not read the Saturday Evening Post story. He said, “I have never in anyway advocated the abolishment of the Marine Corps. I tremendously admire the Marine Corps.”15

Before the Korean War, Secretary Johnson called for a reduction of the Corps to six battalions and six squadrons. The onset of the Korean War stopped Johnson’s plan.16 When the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea in June 1950, the Nation needed the Marine Corps. Cates offered Marine ground and air forces and obtained Truman’s authorization to activate Marine reserves.17

On 29 August 1950, California Republican Congressman Gordon L. McDonough wrote President Truman asking him to place the Commandant of the Marines on the JCS. McDonough stated, “The United States Marine Corps is entitled to full recognition as a major branch of the Armed Services of the U.S., and should have its representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense.” President Truman angrily replied in a letter to Congressman McDonough. Truman said:

For your information, the Marine Corps is the navy’s police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is about equal to Stalin.18

Marines in the field had a response to Truman’s propaganda comment. One example came from retired Marine Col Warren Wiedhan. Wiedhan, a private serving in Korea in 1950 before the Inchon Landing, said that Marines felt this way about Truman’s comment, “The Marine Corps propaganda machine is BETTER than Stalin’s.”19

On 6 September, nine days before the Inchon Landing in Korea, Truman issued a written apology and addressed the Marine Corps League’s national meeting in Washington, DC. Gen Cates told Marine Corps League members, “We in the Marine Corps appreciate courage, especially personal courage.” On the same day, Truman sent Cates a letter. Truman said, “I am profoundly aware of the magnificent history of the United States Marine Corps, and of the many heroic deeds of the Marines since the Corps was established in 1775. I personally learned of the splendid combat spirit of the Marines when the Fourth Marine Brigade of the Second Infantry Division fought in France in 1918.”20 While the president attacked the Marine Corps and then had to walk back his remarks, the Marines received high praise from a surprising source, GEN MacArthur, commander of the United Nations forces during the Korean War. MacArthur said this about the Marines in a statement confirmed by the MacArthur Memorial: “I have just returned from visiting the Marines at the front, and there is no finer fighting force in the world.”21

The Marine Corps hymn includes the words “We fight our country’s battles on air, on land, and sea.” Post-World War II Marines should have added five words to the hymn: in the halls of Congress. The battle to gain a seat on the JCS continued in the early 1950s. In 1951, two Marine veterans serving in Congress battled to add the Commandant to the JCS. Congressman Mike Mansfield, a Montana Democrat, and Illinois Democratic Senator Paul Douglas joined forces with the Marine Corps League. Mansfield served as a Marine Corps private in the early 1920s. Douglas enlisted in the Marine Corps at age 50, earned a commission, and served with the 1st MarDiv in the Pacific, earning the Bronze Star and receiving two Purple Heart Medals. 

Mansfield supported the Douglas-Mansfield Bill H.R. 2034 (S. 677-the Senate version) in his 24 January 1951, House speech. Mansfield said his proposal “would in unequivocal terms establish an organizational structure for the Marine Corps that would not be subject to the whims of the appropriations.” The bill called for establishing four combat divisions and four tactical air wings with a cap on total Marines at 400,000. Mansfield said that the 400,000 limit “is in this bill to emphasize that fact that we are not trying to develop a second army.” Speaking about Marine tactical air, Mansfield listed three reasons to establish four air wings. First, Marine aviation “originated dive bombing.” Second, Marine aviation developed “close air tactical air support. Third, helicopter use “from a tactical standpoint came about from Marine aviation. Referring to the Korean War, Mansfield said, “If this force had been in readiness, ready to move at the outbreak of the Korean incident, the situation might have been drastically altered in our favor.” In addition, Mansfield called for making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a permanent member of the JCS. While acknowledging that the Senate’s version of the bill had been amended to make the Commandant a JCS consultant “on all matters pertaining to the Marine Corps,” Mansfield argued for the House version. He posed this question, “Would not the commandant of the Marine Corps, a man thoroughly trained in ground, sea, and air war, fit into this group as a catalyst?” Mansfield added, “The commandant of the Marine Corps would add great experience and scope to these councils.”22

While Mansfield’s proposal had Congressional support, the JCS opposed adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a permanent JCS member. On 12 April 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall sent a letter to the Committee on Armed Services, Senate Chairman Senator Richard B. Russell, a Georgia Democrat. Marshall said the JCS unanimously opposed the proposal as “unnecessary, undesirable, and impracticable.” Secretary Marshall added that he concurred with the JCS. Marshall also explained,

In addition to the fact that full consideration is now given to the views of the commandant of the Marine Corps, the combat element of the Marine Corps are part of the operating force of the Navy and the headquarters of the Marine Corps is not staffed to consider all of the problems confront the Joint Chiefs of Staff.23

Also on 12 April 1951, Senator Douglas mentioned the letter he sent to his colleagues advocating adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a permanent JCS member. Douglas told fellow Senators that adding the Commandant “will place two voices trained in naval and amphibious matters in an organization which is now dominated by services that have little knowledge or interest in the problems of naval warfare.” Douglas highlighted the success of the Marines in the Korean War.24 Douglas pointed to the overwhelming Army influence within the JCS from Chairman, Army GEN Omar Bradley, and Army Chief of Staff GEN Joseph L. Collins. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Hoyt Vandenberg graduated from West Point.25 Mansfield’s bill wound its way through the legislative sausage grinder. Truman signed the final bill, Public Law 416, on 28 June 1952. The law called for no less than three combat divisions and three air wings in the Marine Corps. Regarding the status of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the amended Senate version won out. The Commandant “shall indicate to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any matter scheduled for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which directly concerns the United States Marine Corps.”26 For the Marine Corps, the new law was a step forward. The Marines remained a separate branch of the military and did get a larger force. The successes of Marines at Inchon, Seoul, and the Chosin Reservoir, along with World War II victories in the Pacific, earned the Marine Corps its new status. In addition, political winds were at the backs of the Marine Corps. Politically speaking, 800 Marine Corps League detachments worked with Douglas and Mansfield, demonstrating Marine influence with Congress. For Truman, then in his final months as a lame duck president, it was quite a change from his 1950 attitude about the Marine Corps. In the end, Truman’s intemperate remarks about the Marine Corps in 1950 likely helped the cause of the Marine Corps more than they hurt. 1952 was an election year and opposing the Douglas-Mansfield bill was not politically helpful. 

In 1958, a new challenge to the existence of the Marine Corps arose. President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, the former president of consumer-packaged goods giant Procter and Gamble, called for streamlining the DOD and boosting research efforts. One aspect of the change concerned the Marine Corps. That provision would allow McElroy to order the abolishment or transfer of combat functions. Gen Randolph M. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps, blasted the proposal when he said that an official could “rationalize the Marine Corps out of a job.”27 Pate, a veteran of World War II battles on Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, faced a bureaucratic war. House Armed Services Chairman Congressman Carl Vinson argued against giving the defense secretary that power. Vinson’s 51-year career in Congress included 14 years leading the Armed Services Committee. Pushing back against Eisenhower’s reorganization plan, Vinson changed the proposal to allow Services to appeal decisions to Congress. Vinson’s bill included this provision,

However, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no functions which have been or are hereafter established by law to be performed by the Department of Defense, or any officer or agency thereof, shall be substantially transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated until thirty days after a report to the Congress in regard to all pertinent details in each instance shall have been made by the Secretary of Defense.28

Getting A Permanent Seat at the JCS Table
When World War II Medal of Honor recipient Gen Louis (“Lou”) H. Wilson became the 26th Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1975, he called for Marines to be a full member of the JCS. To avoid giving the impression he wanted that for himself, Wilson waited until late in his term. “I was doing it for the Corps and my successors,” said Wilson. Wilson’s idea called for him to reach out to fellow Mississippian Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a few friends in the House of Representatives. Gen Wilson’s objective was legislation making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a full member of the JCS. An action in May 1978 spurred Wilson to move forward earlier than planned. When a JCS meeting was about to take place with the chairman unavailable, the Army’s vice chief of staff was named acting chairman. Wilson, who outranked that general, was upset and wanted to know why he could not chair the meeting. The answer: no one who is not a member of the JCS could be acting chairman. Wilson said that was the “catalyst” that he needed. “I determined to pursue it (full member of the JCS) vigorously,” Wilson added.29

To start, Wilson contacted the House Armed Services Committee ranking minority leader, California Republican Congressman Bob Wilson. The congressman, no relation to the Commandant, offered this guidance. Congressman Wilson said the authorization bill to fund the DOD had passed the House of Representatives. The congressman suggested getting the Senate to add the clause making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a full member of the JCS. Congressman Wilson said he could get that provision passed in the House. Gen Wilson worked closely with his legislative aide, BGen Albert E. (Al) Brewster. In 2023, Frisco Lakes Lifestyle wrote a cover story about Gen Brewster, who recalled his role in getting the legislation passed. 

General Wilson’s assignment to Al was to implement a change to make the commandant an equal full-time member of the JCS. Leveraging an existing relationship between General Wilson and Senator Stennis that dated back to World War II, Al requested a meeting with the Senator and Frank Sullivan, SASC staff director. That meeting with Stennis set the effort underway. As a result, Stennis instructed Sullivan to draft the changes.30  

After Brewster’s meeting, Wilson contacted Oklahoma Republican Senator Dewey Bartlett to introduce the measure. Bartlett, a World War II Marine pilot in the South Pacific, was, according to Gen Wilson, “delighted to comply.” Bartlett won the support of Georgia Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, who agreed to co-sponsor the provision.31 On the House Armed Services Committee side, New York Democrat Sam Stratton, a World War II veteran and a retired Navy reserve captain, supported the provision. Stennis said he asked Bartlett to speak on behalf of Gen Wilson’s idea. One hitch developed when Gen Wilson realized Stennis appeared to have forgotten about their discussion. Wilson questioned the senator. Gen Wilson told Stennis that “this means very much to me and I would deeply appreciate it if you would do it, and I will be very disappointed if you do not do this.” Stennis said that he would “see about it.” In fact, Stennis did more than see about it when he made this statement on the Senate floor:

I recognize that it may not be germane, but nevertheless this the time to make the commandant a full member. The Marine Corps has not had the opportunity in the past to express themselves and I think this bill should be passed tonight.”32

Bartlett’s remarks supporting the Marine Corps cited recent JCS history when he said, “In the past two years, the commandant of the Marine Corps has participated in every decision made by the Joint Chiefs, and his participation in recent years has averaged over 99%.” Bartlett said the amendment “would simply remove an archaic legal distinction.” According to Bartlett, the Marines were the only Service with air, sea, and ground combat forces. Bartlett added that the Marine Corps Commandant understands soldiers, sailors, and airmen.33

Wilson did not discuss his proposal with anyone in the DOD except Navy Secretary William G. Claytor, Jr., something he did in confidence. After the amendment passed the Senate, Wilson heard from the JCS chairman, Air Force General David Jones. Jones was unhappy that the amendment had not been discussed with him. Wilson told Jones he could call Stennis and express his opposition. Jones told Wilson, “Why, you know I can’t do that. But you used your influence with Senator Stennis to get this through.” Wilson sensed that the Army also did not agree with the amendment. However, ADM Tom Hayward, chief of national operations, supported the effort, according to Wilson.34

This was the second time Wilson tapped into his relationship with Stennis to equalize the Marine Corps with the other Services. Until 1975, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps held the rank of lieutenant general. The second-in-command of the other Services held the four-star rank. Both Stennis and Congressman Wilson supported that effort. During Wilson’s first year as Commandant in 1975, LtGen Sam Jaskilka became the Assistant Commandant and received a fourth star.

After the bill passed the Senate, media interest followed. Columnist Robert D. Heinl, Jr., a retired Marine colonel, praised Bartlett’s speech in support of making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a full JCS member when Heinl wrote Bartlett’s speech “represents a final act of loyalty to his old Corps.” Heinl added, “Don’t be surprised, one of these days when some future Marine becomes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”35 Ted Bell, a reporter for the Sacramento Bee, asked Gen Wilson about an opposition argument to the amendment offered by the Air Force and Army that meant the Navy would get two JCS votes. Wilson replied, “I don’t recognize that the Marine Corps is not a separate service.”36 

The bill went back to the House of Representatives, then to the conference committee, and finally passed both the House and Senate. President Carter vetoed the bill due to the authorization of a nuclear carrier that Carter opposed. Wilson thought that the next bill might give opponents a chance to “dissect the bill.” That did not happen. The amendment remained in the revised bill. On 20 October 1978, President Carter signed the bill with the amendment so important to the Marine Corps. Responding to a question about the Carter administration’s role with that amendment, Gen Brewster said, “They were not involved in any way in the change.”37 Wilson served as a full JCS member until his retirement in 1979.

After the bill was signed into law, the Army found another law that might have kept a Marine off the JCS. That law pointed out that the senior members of the armed forces included only the chiefs of staff of the Army, the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was not listed and therefore could not be the chairman. Wilson asked for a ruling from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown regarding that issue. The Commandant threatened to go to Congress to get that resolved. Secretary Brown ruled in favor of the Marine Corps position. Finally, the Commandant was ruled a full-fledged JCS member.38 Wilson’s Washington success eventually paid short and long-term dividends to the Marine Corps.39 In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter nominated Gen Robert H. Barrow to serve as Commandant of the Marine Corps and the first Marine to serve on the JCS for four years. Two months before Wilson died in 2005, President George W. Bush nominated Gen Peter Pace to become the first Marine to serve as chairman of the JCS. From 2001–2005, Pace held the post of vice-chairman of the JCS. Pace was also the first Marine to serve in that role. President Bush also named Gen James L. Jones to serve as United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe. As of 2025, Gen Jones is the lone Marine to hold that position. By 1981, veterans of the Army, Navy, and Air Force served as president of the United States.40 No Marine was ever elected president or vice president until the 250th year of the Marine Corps, when Ohio Republican Senator JD Vance became the first Marine to serve as vice president. 

>Mr. Mesches is the author of The Flying Grunt, the Story of Lieutenant General Richard E. Carey, United States Marine Corps, (Ret) and Major General James A. Ulio, How the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army Enabled Allied Victory. An Air Force veteran, he served as a Public Information Officer with the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, NC, between 1972 and 1975.  He is a graduate of Grove City College and the Defense Information Officers School (now Public Affairs Qualification Course).

Notes

1. R.D. Heinl, “The Cat with More Than Nine Lives,” Proceedings 80, No. 6, (1954), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1954/june/cat-more-nine-lives.

2. Ibid. 

3. Rhapsodyinbooks, “July 25, 1866–Ulysses S. Grant Becomes the First Four-Star General in U.S. History,” Legal Legecy, July 25, 2017, https://legallegacy.wordpress.com/2017/07/25/july-25-1866-ulysses-s-grant-becomes-the-first-four-star-general-in-u-s-history; and Staff, “David Glasgow Farragut,” Naval History and Heritage Command, n.d., https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/people/historical-figures/david-glasgow-farragut.html. 

4. “The Cat with More Than Nine Lives.”

5. Staff, “President Taft Restores Marines on Board Ships,” Sacramento Daily Union, March 27, 1909.

6. Glenn M. Harned, Marine Corps Generals 1899–1936 (North Charleston: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2024).

7. Moseley Correspondence, DDEPre-l File Box 84, Moseley File.pdf, from the Eisenhower Presidential Library.

8. Staff, “The Marine Corps, An Essential, Integral Element of the Naval Service,’ Statement to the House Select Committee on Postwar Policy,” published in The Marine Corps Gazette 78, No. 6 (1994).

9. Alexander A. Vandegrift, “Bended Knee Speech,” (speech, Washington, DC, May 6, 1946).

10. Associated Press, “‘Ike See U.S. Pacific bases hinging on UN,” The Atlanta Journal, May 11, 1946.

11. Alan Rems, “A Propaganda Machine Like Stalin’s,” U.S. Naval Institute, June 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2019/june/propaganda-machine-stalins.

12. Si Biggs, “The USMC on D Day,” Royal Marines History, June 4, 2024, https://www.royalmarineshistory.com/post/usmc-on-d-day. 

13. Moseley Correspondence, 31-hhpp-ic-b156-1 partial, pdf, Hoover Presidential Library.

14. Moseley Correspondence, DDEPre-l File Box 84, Moseley File.pdf, from the Eisenhower Presidential Library.

15. Courchaine Correspondence, DDEPre-File Box 19, Coury-Courtn. (Misc.) File. Pdf, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

16. Nathan Parker, “Congress and the Marine, an Enduring Partnership,” MCU Journal 8, No. 2 (2017).

17. “A Propaganda Machine Like Stalin’s.”

18. Staff, “Letters to the Commandant of the Marine Corps League and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,” Harry S. Truman Library Museum, September 6, 1950, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/235/letters-commandant-marine-corps-league-and-commandant-marine-corps.

19. Email between author and Col Warren Wiedhan on August 17, 2024.

20. “Letters to the Commandant of the Marine Corps League and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.”

21. Email between author and James Zobel, MacArthur Memorial, on March 5, 2025.

22. Statement of the Honorable Mike Mansfield,” Series 1, Box 11, Folder 3, Mike Mansfield Papers, Archives and Special Collections, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.

23. Marine Corps Personnel Strength Act of 1952: Hearings on S. 677, Days 1, 2, 3, Before the Subcomm. On Armed Services , 82nd Cong. (1951). 

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. 

26. Marine Corps Personnel Strength Act of 1952, Pub. L. 461, 61 Stat. 502 (1952).

27. John Jarrell, “Ike To Get Less Than He Wants,” Omaha World Telegram, May 4, 1958.

28. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, H.R. 12541, 85th Cong. (1958).

29. Oral History Transcript, General Louis H. Wilson, United States Marine Corps (Ret), History Division, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 2008.

30. S. Sanderson and M. Yordy, “The Sky is Not the Limit for this Marine,” Frisco Lakes Lifestyle, July 2023.

31. Senator Sam Nunn was the great nephew of Representative Carl Vinson, long-time chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

32. Oral History Transcript, General Louis H. Wilson, United States Marine Corps (Ret), History Division, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 2008.

33. Speeches, Defense, 1978, Dewey F. Bartlett Collection, CAC_CC_003_4_46_7_0000, Carl Albert Center Congressional and Political Collections, https://arc.ou.edu/repositories/3/archival_objects/5499.

34. Oral History Transcript, General Louis H. Wilson, United States Marine Corps (Ret), by Brigadier General Edwin Simmons, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978. History Division, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Accessed January 19, 2025. 

35. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., “Marines March to the Top,” The Arizona Republic, August 11, 1978.

36. Ted Bell “Top Marine Pushes Attack Capability,” by The Sacramento Bee, August 1, 1978.

37. Email from Brigadier General Albert E. Brewster to the author, December 13, 2023.

38. Oral History Transcript, General Louis H. Wilson, United States Marine Corps (Ret), by Brigadier General Edwin Simmons, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978. History Division, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Accessed January 19, 2025.

39. Oral History Transcript, General Louis H. Wilson, United States Marine Corps (Ret), by Brigadier General Edwin Simmons, 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978. History Division, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. Accessed January 19, 2025. 

40. Presidents by Service: Army—Presidents George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, John Tyler, Zachary Taylor, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, Rutherford B. Hayes, Benjamin Harrison, William McKinley,Theodore Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Navy—Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush. Air Force—Ronald W. Reagan served in the Army Air Force, and George W. Bush served in the Air National Guard. These presidents served state militias: Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James K. Polk, Millard Fillmore, James Buchanan, Abraham Lincoln, and Chester A. Arthur. Vice Presidents who served in the military and did not become president:  Aaron Burr (Army), George Clinton (militia), Richard M. Johnson (militia), Henry Wilson (Army), Charles G. Dawes (Army), Spiro T. Agnew (Army), Walter Mondale (Army), Dan Quayle (National Guard), Al Gore (Army-only president or vice president to serve in Vietnam).


Forward, Flexible, Formidable, and Relevant

Today’s Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit

Since its inception, the MEU has embarked on an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and continues to serve as the preeminent example of the contribution of the Navy-Marine Corps Team to national security. An inherently versatile, agile, and persistent formation, the ARG/MEU is the most responsive and flexible expeditionary power projection option the Navy and Marine Corps can provide the Joint Force. As the Nation’s premier forward-deployed crisis response force, ARG/MEUs provide scalable and rapidly responsive modern combat power in competition, crisis, and contingency, all from sovereign, afloat U.S. territory. As great-power competition, rapid technological change, and instability in the global littorals threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad, the ARG/MEU offers the right tool for the Joint Force during highly complex and dangerous times, following in the footsteps of its highly successful predecessors and bridging to future emerging capabilities as the character of war rapidly changes. This article explains how the current ARG/MEU contributes to homeland defense, deters Chinese coercion, and enables effective burden-sharing among our allies and partners. 

The Strategic Environment
Today’s strategic environment poses multiple threats and demands a correspondingly diverse range of solutions for national leaders. Most acutely and for the foreseeable future, China presents a pervasive danger. The Chinese Communist Party’s military modernization, coercive behavior in Southeast Asia, and expansion of overseas military infrastructure threaten U.S., ally, and partner security and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific region. China also presents an increasingly global threat. Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative has laid the framework for China to project force not just throughout Asia but across the sea to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Such efforts are designed to challenge U.S. interests globally and at multiple levels. For example, China’s vast illegal fishing vessels operate throughout the Indo-Pacific and as far as South America and Africa, including recently engaging in violent confrontation with the Argentinian military. These gray-zone activities are used to influence and control vulnerable nations through coercion and demand a U.S. presence to counter. 

As the United States addresses the Chinese Communist Party’s military ambitions, it cannot ignore other threats to U.S. security. Russia’s continued pursuit of its war of aggression in Ukraine underscores its willingness to recklessly undermine European security, including ignoring international borders and indiscriminately attacking civilians. North Korea remains a persistent threat to allies, partners, and the U.S. homeland. In the Middle East, Iranian support of terrorist organizations and proxy groups endangers freedom of commerce in global maritime chokepoints as well as the safety of our citizens and those of our allies and partners. Meanwhile, terrorist groups—some with the capability and intent to attack the United States—destabilize key terrain in multiple regions. 

The proliferation of advanced weapons systems further complicates these regional threats, lowering the bar for entry into modern lethality. Long-range precision weapons, including unmanned systems, expose easily identifiable landbased facilities to new and frequently asymmetric dangers. Cyber and open-source data collection make it increasingly difficult to conceal forces or strike with impunity. 

Agile, Responsive, and Modern
The MAGTF construct, with the organic maritime mobility and sustainment offered by amphibious warfare ships, and the increased lethality provided to our Marines by Force Design, meaningfully meets the demands of our challenging operating environment. Optimized for rapid operational maneuver, versatile employment, and self-sustainment, ARG/MEUs offer a balanced and scalable combined-arms formation that can easily integrate with or support other joint formations. 

The Marine Corps has a Title 10 responsibility to man, train, and equip its forces to fulfill the requirements of combatant commanders. Consistent among these requirements has been the demand signal for continuous ARG/MEU presence. A 3.0 ARG/MEU—
defined as heel-to-toe deployments from the East and West Coast and regular patrols by forward-deployed Naval forces in Japan—is the first step toward meeting the combatant commanders registered, Joint Staff-validated requirements for a 5.0 presence. 

The three-ship ARG provides the optimal structure for the full MEU mission set needed to meet these demands. Embarked on a three-ship ARG, a MEU is a self-sustaining MAGTF that provides the Joint Force with a formation that can conduct unilateral operations across the full range of military operations. Able to move rapidly to and loiter near theater hot spots, these inherently multi-domain formations offer national leadership a full array of sovereign options, including expeditionary strike, sea denial, seizure of advanced naval bases, raids, embassy reinforcement, and non-combatant evacuations. Unlike landbased or rapid-response formations reliant on strategic air mobility, an ARG/MEU operates with reduced requirements for logistical support and access, basing, and overflight. 

The ARG/MEUs can also serve as a force multiplier or provide additional capacity for missions that have, in recent years, been tasked to special operations forces (SOF), including strikes, raids, and non-combatant evacuation. The ARG/MEUs possess the capability to handle conventional crisis response tasks, reducing the burden on SOF. Additionally, the ARG/MEU employs unique capabilities to enhance SOF operations, including long-range sensing and strike, all from an over-the-horizon platform not reliant on access, basing, and overflight. 

Today’s ARG/MEUs benefit from recent modernization, deploying to the joint and combined battlefield with multi-domain sensing and reconnaissance, fifth-generation aircraft, long-range precision fires, and a range of unmanned and counter-unmanned systems. They enable Joint Force operations through advanced command and control and embedded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and can conduct strikes into contested environments. A force always on patrol, they are experts at enabling the advanced joint systems and those of our most capable U.S. allies and partners, including nations in NATO, Australia, and East Asia. Such interoperability aligns with current strategic guidance stressing burden-sharing with allies and partners, a framework in which the United States will commit only critical but limited resources to lower-priority regions. 

Most importantly, ARG/MEUs serve as the leading edge of larger MAGTFs. They can reach back to the growing lethality of their parent MEFs or laterally within the MAGTF to the unique capabilities of the Marine Littoral Regiments. So, although ARG/MEUs operate forward, they leverage the full weight of the MEFs as a crisis builds toward conflict. This combination takes a modern and aggressive approach to winning in the littorals. Linking its ship-to-shore capabilities, long-range sensing and fires, and organic aviation with other weapons and sensors designed for denial, the ARG/MEU can impose dilemmas on adversaries seeking to set the theater against the Joint Force or dominate the maritime commons and increase the resolve of allies and partners that can share regional security burdens. The ARG/MEU could enable Joint Force operations against lower-tier threats or steal a march on a peer threat escalating toward conflict and set the theater for larger, more strategic lift-dependent, decisive operations. In economic warfare, this could include controlling key maritime chokepoints, holding at risk adversary forces, and commerce. Overall, only the ARG/MEU can offer the Joint Force this same degree of mobility, sustainment, and range of capabilities.

The ARG/MEU in Action
In recent years, the ARG/MEU has demonstrated the relevance of its inherent advantages and new capabilities, most prominently in the Indo-Pacific. From the 31st MEU’s amphibious operations in the Solomon Islands to the 15th MEU’s use of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle and cooperation with the Australian Army, to the 13th MEU’s integration of sensing from expeditionary advanced bases in the Philippines, the MEU has implemented the logic of Force Design using existing platforms and capabilities. The 13th MEU also projected sensing expeditionary advanced bases on four occasions, demonstrating an enhanced MEU mission, born from Force Design. 

The impact of the ARG/MEU in the Indo-Pacific has gone beyond modernization to include dramatic gains in interoperability with the Joint Force and key allies and partners. The ARG/MEUs in the Indo-Pacific regularly lead efforts to develop MAGTFs into a potent joint and combined enabler, detecting threats and passing targeting data from any sensor to any shooter, all while incorporating the capabilities of our allies and partners. During recent exercises like KAMANDAG, BALIKATAN, TALISMAN SABER, and IRON FIST, ARG/MEUs rehearsed coalition operations, clearly demonstrating the interoperability needed to deter aggression by China. In 2023, the USS America ARG and the 31st MEU participated in TALISMAN SABER, embarking troops from Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and the UK before rapidly responding to a disaster relief mission after the eruption of Mount Bagana in Papua New Guinea. In 2024, the USS Boxer ARG and the 15th MEU exercised with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Japan, on the doorstep of China’s anti-access/area- denial systems. This ARG/MEU also integrated the USS Miguel Keith Expeditionary Support Base into MEU exercises and assisted in the disaster response following Typhoon Krathon in the Philippines, providing aid to remote locations throughout the archipelago. This year, the 31st MEU is afloat again operating in the Coral Sea. 

The impact of the ARG/MEU expands beyond the Indo-Pacific. During the Gaza and Iran contingencies, the 26th MEU provided crisis response options in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Earlier, the 24th MEU supported Sixth Fleet maritime operations and was postured for non-combatant evacuation operations during the Israel-Lebanon conflict. In EUCOM, ARG/MEUs provide the fleet commander with a purpose-built capability designed to respond to crises across multiple combatant commands through maritime, multidomain reconnaissance constructs and activities. In 2022, Exercise NORTHERN VIKING integrated Marines and sailors from the USS Kearsarge ARG and 22nd MEU, the 22nd Naval Construction Regiment, and Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft, with German, Norwegian, and French warships, United Kingdom Royal Marines, and the Icelandic Coast Guard into a coherent and capable unit. Exercises like these enable burden sharing by ensuring interoperability with our most willing and capable security partners. 

The ARG/MEUs also provide key capabilities to the Joint Force during times of crisis. In 2017, the 11th MEU provided its artillery unit to support SOF in Syria during Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, firing more rounds in combat than any other U.S. artillery unit since the Vietnam War. In 2020 and 2021, the 15th MEU and the USS Makin Island ARG executed amphibious withdrawals to reposition U.S. forces around Somalia while maintaining pressure on violent extremists and enabling partnered forces as part of Operation OCTAVE QUARTZ. And as recently as August of this year, the 22nd MEU supported forward homeland defense operations in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, showing the significant operational flexibility of this formation. The ARG/MEUs afloat also provide multi-domain sensing operations in support of the Joint Force through its intelligence enablers and embarked reconnaissance capabilities which are frequently employed to capacity while underway. These examples not only demonstrate the agility and capability of the ARG/MEU but also its unique value proposition: a flexible forward-deployed force, operationally relevant, with multi-domain capabilities. 

An Effective MEU Needs a Ready ARG
Today, a shortage of ready amphibious warfare ships precludes achieving the needed 3.0 ARG/MEU presence. In response, the Marine Corps has employed Special Purpose MAGTFs to fill the resulting gaps. While better than having no force available, this is a sub-optimal solution: lacking organic mobility and sustainment, and the flexibility of acting from a sovereign naval platform without the need for access, basing, or overflight permissions. This loss of mobility requires the MEU to use other Joint Force options and places additional stress on already limited strategic airlift assets. Finally, to be a true replacement for the MEU, an Special Purpose MAGTF requires additional resources to compensate for the loss of naval command and control systems—resources that are already in short supply and high demand for other military operations. 

Both the Navy and the defense industrial base have struggled in recent years to maintain AWS readiness and capacity. Today, leaders from both the Executive and Legislative branches recognize the national security risk of our dilapidated domestic maritime industrial base. Congress continually recognizes the need for AWS construction, and the President’s Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance Executive Order seeks to address shortfalls in commercial and military shipbuilding. Additionally, the bipartisan SHIPS Act, currently working its way through Congress, seeks to address maritime shipping shortfalls. The issues affecting our Nation’s maritime industrial base and the Navy’s maintenance, repair, and overhaul enterprise will not be fixed overnight. Greater long-term investment in AWS, in terms of both new construction and maintenance, would expand leaders’ options for employing MEUs to advance national interests while providing a reinvigorated energy to the American manufacturing sector.

Ready in Hours—Not Days
An ARG/MEU on patrol around the world is the ultimate expression of the Navy/Marine Corps Team and the global reach of U.S. military power. When disaster strikes or conflict brews, Marines must mobilize within hours—not days. From humanitarian assistance in the Philippines, to contingency response in the Eastern Mediterranean, to homeland defense operations in the Caribbean, the ARG/MEU remains the Joint Force’s premier crisis response force: America’s 911 Force. Whether operating independently or as part of an integrated naval expeditionary force, the MEU provides our national leadership and combatant commanders with scalable, mission-tailored, and combat credible forces that are persistently on-scene and contribute to deterrence, crisis response, power projection, and combat operations.

Amphibious forces are multi-domain by nature. We organize at every level for combined arms, fully integrating capabilities in such a way that if the enemy attempts to counteract one, they leave themselves vulnerable to another. Because of their inherent and unique versatility, flexibility, and speed, wherever amphibious forces go, they introduce uncertainty into the calculus of our adversary. We must continue to invest in amphibious capability to ensure consistent deployment of ARG/MEUs, a time-tested asset vital to national security. In competition and conflict alike, the ARG/MEU on amphibious ships remains first to fight—because when the Nation needs a flexible, lethal force in readiness, there is no substitute.

Decision-Advantage

The case for Marine Corps ISR enterprise transformation

The Marine Corps stands at a pivotal crossroads, a moment of profound transformation that will define its relevance and effectiveness in the 21st century. As the Service reorients to its naval roots, this shift is not driven by nostalgia but by the pressing demands of a changing strategic landscape. The challenge of great-power competition, particularly in the vast and dynamic Indo-Pacific region, necessitates a Marine Corps that is agile, lethal, and capable of thriving in contested environments. Through the foundational concepts of Force Design and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, the Marine Corps envisions stand-in forces that are maneuverable, low-signature, and persistently positioned within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. These forces are not expeditionary in the traditional sense; they are designed to operate as the Nation’s premier crisis response force in the most contested environments on Earth. 

These stand-in forces will serve as the linchpin for the Joint Force, providing a forward-deployed, combat-credible presence that creates opportunities for sea control and sea denial. By imposing dilemmas on adversaries, they will shape the operational environment before conflict begins. However, this ambitious strategy hinges on one essential capability: decision advantage. 

In the fast-paced, information-saturated environment of modern warfare, the ability to out-see, out-think, and out-maneuver an adversary is decisive. To achieve this, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has set a bold vision: the Marine Corps will become the “JTAC [Joint Terminal Attack Controller] of the Joint Force.” This transformation positions the Service as a distributed, all-domain sensor network capable of finding, fixing, and enabling the targeting of enemy forces across vast distances. Imagine a small team of Marines dispersed across a remote island chain, detecting an enemy surface group and relaying targeting data to a submerged Navy Virginia-class submarine, enabling a stealthy, long-range Tomahawk missile strike. Picture another Marine element identifying a critical enemy command and control node, then cueing a cyber operator to conduct a non-kinetic attack. This is the future of combined arms—a seamlessly integrated joint force capable of delivering effects from any domain, at any time, in any place.

Success in this expanded role is not optional; it is essential for the survival of Marine Corps forces and the Joint Force’s ability to prevail. Achieving decision advantage requires a fundamental shift in the Service’s institutional mindset. Intelligence must evolve from a supporting effort to a prioritized warfighting function, driving operations and decisions at every level. The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE) must lead this transformation, transitioning from a provider of information to the enabler of decision advantage. This is not merely a call for incremental improvement or bureaucratic reshuffling; it is a mandate for aggressive and decisive change. 

Part I: The Unforgiving Battlefield
The era of uncontested American military dominance is over. For decades, adversaries have studied U.S. methods, identifying vulnerabilities, and designing their forces to exploit them. They aim not to meet the United States head-on in a symmetric fight but to dismantle the American way of war by targeting its reliance on information, extended logistics, and decision-making processes. 

Modern battlefields are global and multi-domain, with no front lines or secure rear areas. Adversaries will wage persistent campaigns to induce paralysis and confusion, achieving their objectives before U.S. combat power can be effectively employed. This strategy, an all-domain ambush, attacks U.S. forces across every vector.

In the space domain, adversaries have demonstrated their ability to disrupt U.S. capabilities. China’s 2007 anti-satellite weapon test highlighted the vulnerability of GPS satellites, which underpin U.S. precision navigation and munitions. Adversaries are developing counter-space capabilities, including directed energy weapons and co-orbital jammers, to blind U.S. forces at critical moments.

In the cyber and electromagnetic domains, adversaries will target networks and infrastructure to disrupt deployments and logistics. The war in Ukraine has underscored the contested nature of the electromagnetic spectrum, with both sides adapting tactics and technologies to survive and operate. Rapidly closing kill chains by fusing intelligence from multiple sources has proven decisive.

In the information environment, adversaries are waging sophisticated disinformation campaigns to manipulate public opinion and undermine political will. These efforts exploit societal divisions, creating friction that can derail operations.

The pacing threat, China, is constructing a military meticulously designed to deny U.S. forces access to the fight and achieve its objectives without resorting to a traditional conflict. Their doctrine of Systems Destruction Warfare is a blueprint for inducing strategic paralysis. The goal is not just to sink a ship; it is to make a U.S. Navy admiral hesitate even to enter a contested sea. This doctrine is backed by a vast and multi-layered anti-access/area-denial network, an arsenal of long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and sophisticated sensors, all networked to contest and threaten U.S. ships, aircraft, and bases at unprecedented ranges. This military expansion is supercharged by a national strategy of Military-Civil Fusion, which creates a technological development cycle that threatens to outpace America’s innovation cycle. This hard power is coupled with a gray-zone strategy of coercion, using their maritime militia to enforce illegal territorial claims through persistent, aggressive action that stops just short of conventional war. 

Meanwhile, the persistent threat, Russia, continues to refine its playbook of New Generation Warfare, a doctrine for creating chaos and dismantling a state from within. We witnessed its brutal application in the seizure of Crimea and see its continued evolution in the ongoing war in Ukraine. They skillfully combine electronic warfare, cyberattacks, deniable special forces, and political subversion to create a state of perpetual instability. Russia, guided by Chekist principles, considers the United States as the “main enemy” and is determined to undermine American influence globally. Russia has elevated the art of weaponizing confusion, significantly expanding the opaque fog of war. 

Part II: An Honest Self-Assessment
A warfighting organization’s greatest strength lies not in its technology or doctrine, but in its ability to adapt swiftly to the changing character of war. The MCISRE is staffed by dedicated, intelligent, and patriotic Marines who are committed to the mission. However, they are constrained by a structure, culture, and set of processes that were designed for a different era. To achieve decision advantage and maintain operational relevance, the Marine Corps must critically examine itself and address four interconnected challenges with clarity and resolve.

The first challenge is the Marine Corps’ ability to sense in close and mid-range environments. To fulfill their role as the JTAC of the Joint Force, Marines must first understand their targets—their strengths, vulnerabilities, and the environment in which they operate. The current sensor architecture lacks the extended range, resilience, and persistence required for contested environments. The reliance on a limited number of high-demand, low-density ISR platforms has created vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the recently acknowledged “drone gap.” The divestment of organic platforms, such as the RQ-21 Blackjack, has left tactical units with critical ISR shortfalls, forcing them to rely on contractor-operated systems—a dependency that adversaries could exploit during a crisis. Stand-in forces, the centerpiece of the Marine Corps’ future warfighting concept, must be equipped with organic, low-signature tools to sense their environment without becoming electronic beacons for enemy targeting systems.

The second challenge is the MCISRE’s ability to transform data into actionable intelligence. On the modern battlefield, opportunities are fleeting. A mobile missile launcher may only be vulnerable for minutes. If the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination cycle takes hours, the opportunity is lost. This is not merely an intelligence shortfall; it is a mission failure for the Joint Force. Currently, analysts are forced to manually sift through vast amounts of data on disconnected, outdated systems, which limits their ability to produce timely insights. The MCISRE must modernize its tools and processes to turn raw data into actionable intelligence at the speed of relevance. Data that does not inform a decision is merely noise, and in combat, noise creates confusion and risks lives. Expanding efforts to integrate intelligence capabilities globally and equipping analysts with tools that can aggregate and correlate disparate data will be essential to producing opportunities for decisive action against adversaries. 

The third challenge is the Marine Corps’ reliance on industrial-age training and manpower practices while trying to prepare for information-age warfare. This persistence reflects some of the Service’s most valued traits—loyalty and resistance to compromise—but also highlights vulnerabilities as the Corps reorients toward great-power competition. The mind of a Marine is the Corps’ greatest weapon. Yet, the deeply ingrained Taylorism of the personnel system impedes the growth and retention of top talent. Intelligence Marines are not interchangeable parts, and a loss of an experienced analyst cannot be offset by a recruit fresh from training. When a tech company offers a brilliant young corporal triple the salary to do the work he loves, the Corps loses not just a Marine but a critical warfighting capability that cannot be easily replaced. The Marine Corps’ Talent Management 2030 initiative acknowledges that the system is overdue for a fundamental redesign. Recognizing the evolving role of technical specialists is vital. In the 21st century, the Marine operating a keyboard to counter enemy networks in cyberspace plays a role as critical to mission success as the Marine on the front lines. Cultivating career paths and talent management processes that reward and retain our intelligence experts will ensure they feel as valued as proven combat leaders. 

The fourth and final challenge is a modernization gap that places Marine forces at risk. The MCISRE has a key role in ensuring that our force development process equips Marines with capabilities required to meet the challenges of future conflicts, rather than focusing solely on incremental improvements to legacy systems. This raises an important question: Is the Marine Corps building the force for the war it will face, or is it polishing a relic of the past? Institutional processes for developing warfighting concepts must be continuously informed by intelligence about adversary capabilities. Without this, the Marine Corps risks designing solutions for yesterday’s problems. Additionally, assumptions about future conflict must be rigorously tested. New systems should be validated against thinking, uncooperative red teams that employ tactics and technologies reflective of real-world adversaries. A reactive approach to modernization, where countermeasures are developed only after adversaries exploit vulnerabilities, locks the Marine Corps in a perpetual cycle of playing catch-up. A force that fails to modernize based on a clear-eyed assessment of the threat is not modernizing at all—it is preparing for defeat.

A Call to Action: Forging a Decision-Centric Culture
The history of the Marine Corps is one of adaptation and triumph in the face of overwhelming odds. From the island-hopping campaigns of World War II to the counterinsurgency operations of the 21st century, the Marine Corps has consistently demonstrated its ability to evolve and overcome. Today, the transformation of the intelligence enterprise is not merely a bureaucratic initiative—it is a strategic imperative that will define the Marine Corps’ ability to prevail in future conflicts. This transformation is not the responsibility of a distant headquarters or a faceless bureaucracy; it is a collective effort that begins now, with every Marine.

To overcome the challenges outlined in this article, the MCISRE must lead the charge with bold and decisive action. Addressing the sensing dilemma requires the development of a resilient, multi-layered architecture of organic and national sensors that stand-in forces can employ with a low signature. These sensors must be capable of operating persistently in contested environments, providing Marines with the situational awareness they need to survive and thrive. This effort will require not only technological innovation but also a cultural shift that prioritizes sensing as a core warfighting capability.

Achieving sense-making at the speed of relevance demands equipping analysts with modern, AI-enabled tools that automate data processing and enable predictive intelligence. These tools must be designed to integrate seamlessly with existing systems, allowing analysts to focus on producing actionable insights rather than wrestling with outdated technology. The Marine Corps must also invest in training programs that prepare intelligence professionals to effectively leverage these tools, ensuring they are equipped to meet the demands of information-age warfare.

Winning the war for talent necessitates a fundamental rethinking of the Marine Corps’ approach to personnel management. Intelligence Marines are not interchangeable parts; their expertise is a critical warfighting capability that must be cultivated and retained. The Marine Corps must establish viable career paths for intelligence professionals, providing them with opportunities for advancement and recognition that reflect the significance of their contributions. This effort must be supported by a broader cultural shift that values technical specialists as integral members of the warfighting team, on par with proven combat leaders.

Closing the modernization gap requires embedding intelligence professionals and a red-teaming mindset at every stage of the force development process. New capabilities must be designed from the start to overmatch the threats Marines will face, rather than being validated against static requirements. This approach will require a willingness to challenge assumptions and embrace innovation, ensuring the Marine Corps remains one step ahead of its adversaries.

The stakes could not be higher. The character of war has changed, and the Marine Corps must adapt more intelligently and aggressively than its adversaries. The race for decision advantage has already begun, and it is a contest the Marine Corps cannot afford to lose. This transformation will not happen overnight, nor will it be easy. But with the dedication, ingenuity, and fighting spirit that have defined the Marine Corps for generations, it is a contest the Marine Corps will win.

>Ms. Schwendeman is an Intelligence Specialist in the Intelligence Integration Branch, Intelligence Division, under the Deputy Commandant for Information at Headquarters Marine Corps. She has supported the Marine Corps since 2010, first as a contractor and now as a civilian Marine. Before joining the Marine Corps, she served as an Intelligence Analyst in the Army from 2003 to 2010, where she supported operations in Iraq. She holds a Master’s Degree in Intelligence Studies.

Sensing in the Shadows

Integrating autonomous and human intelligence for decision superiority in the Pacific

Modernizing Intelligence for Distributed Littoral Operations
In April 2023, in response to former U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 24-hour visit to Taiwan on 2 August 2022, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a large multi-domain military exercise near Taiwan, simulating a “joint firepower strike campaign” that integrated long-range rocket artillery, unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Chinese military officials emphasized compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline to neutralize the enemy’s response before maneuver. The exercise revealed more than strategic signaling; the drills demonstrated a maturing strike architecture designed for contested littoral terrain. Without faster detection, assessment, and action, Marine Corps units operating forward risk being neutralized before engagement.1

To maintain forward presence and decision advantage in such an environment, intelligence professionals must reassess how they support maneuver forces. Force Design 2030 compels Marine Corps intelligence professionals to reconsider operational methods in the Indo-Pacific’s maritime battlespace. The environment—defined by long-range precision fires, persistent ISR coverage, and a rapidly evolving adversary kill chain—has rendered legacy intelligence models obsolete. Decision superiority requires integrating autonomous ISR platforms and human-derived reporting within a low-signature, real-time network optimized for distributed maritime operations.2

Adversary Targeting and the Operational Mandate
China’s PLA has developed a reconnaissance-strike complex rooted in the concept of “informatized warfare,” which prioritizes identifying, fixing, and engaging targets more quickly than adversaries can respond.3 The PLA employs space-based sensors, coastal radar arrays, cyber and electronic warfare units, and unmanned systems across all domains. Each capability reinforces a doctrine designed to paralyze opponents through persistent surveillance and precision engagement, rather than attrition.4

Marine forces operating within the first and second island chains now face a threat that challenges traditional maneuver. Force Design 2030 directs Marines to persist in contested maritime spaces and to sense, assess, and act in real-time while minimizing exposure to detection.5 Intelligence structures that rely on slow processing, hierarchical workflows, or bandwidth-heavy systems no longer provide a responsive or survivable foundation for operational decision-making.

Fusion at the Tactical Edge
Autonomous ISR platforms—such as long-endurance drones, loitering munitions, and seabed sensors—now deliver capabilities once reserved for national-level assets. Many operate with onboard AI, autonomously detecting, classifying, and prioritizing maritime targets. Intelligence Marines at the tactical edge fuse machine-generated data with human-sourced inputs—such as coastal reconnaissance updates or partner force reporting—and augment them with open-source intelligence. Commercial tools like synthetic aperture radar and Automatic Identification System vessel tracking enable Marines to monitor maritime activity without relying on national tasking cycles or bandwidth-intensive systems. Chinese analysts have tracked U.S. Navy surface combatants using free satellite imagery and wake analysis alone.6 Open-source Automatic Identification System feeds have also revealed the Chinese research vessel Zhu Hai Yun operating within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan’s east coast.7 In contested littoral environments where Marines often operate without persistent SATCOM or responsive access to classified systems, fusing autonomous sensors with open-source intelligence allows forward units to build decision-quality situational awareness and act independently within the commander’s intent.

For example, a Marine littoral regiment conducting island-based surveillance in Luzon might integrate commercial satellite imagery, signals intercepts from unmanned surface vessels, and local reporting from partner forces to develop a near-real-time maritime picture. The resulting fused intelligence can cue fires or prompt asset repositioning—all without higher headquarters intervention.

The war in Ukraine provides instructive evidence. Ukrainian forces used commercial drones, open-source tools, and mobile apps to close the sensor-to-shooter loop.8 Improvisation and decentralization enabled responsive targeting against a more heavily resourced opponent. Pre-dating Ukraine, Azerbaijani forces in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict similarly leveraged ISR and loitering munitions to dismantle conventional formations, demonstrating that technological asymmetry, when paired with adaptive operators and mission command, can offset material inferiority. 9

Marine littoral regiments, as envisioned under Force Design 2030, require the fusion of autonomous ISR data with human-derived reporting to generate timely, actionable intelligence at the tactical edge. Tactical survivability and effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific depend on operating as semi-autonomous nodes within an integrated sensing and fires network. Intelligence sections must synthesize inputs from unmanned platforms, signal intercepts, and field observations into immediate tactical insight, independent of higher headquarters. Commanders must train Marines at the lowest echelons to operate as autonomous intelligence cells—fully empowered to support fires and maneuver without delay or dependency.

Signature Management as a Condition of Operations
Detection provides little advantage if it compromises the sensor’s survivability or cannot be acted upon rapidly and securely. A Concept for Stand-In Forces emphasizes that forward elements must extend the Joint Force’s reach while avoiding detection and classification.10 To remain survivable and effective in contested environments, intelligence elements must adopt low-signature sensing, passive collection, burst-transmission protocols, and electronic deception as routine features of the collection cycle.

Intelligence planners must design and employ autonomous systems with electromagnetic discipline. Operational value depends not only on what a platform can detect, but on whether it can do so without emitting a detectable signature or degrading friendly operations. Collection teams must train for communications-denied environments by mastering concealment, terrain masking, route selection, and sensor camouflage. Electromagnetic silence must become the tactical default—not the exception. Intelligence frameworks must abandon assumptions of persistent, high-bandwidth network access and instead prioritize survivability, latency management, and deception.

 

From Innovation to Doctrine
Marine Corps modernization must link technological development with doctrinal reform. While Force Design 2030 and the Stand-In Forces concept both emphasize decentralized execution and forward ISR capability, the current doctrine does not yet fully account for sensor saturation, cognitive overload, or the role of artificial intelligence in shaping battlefield awareness. Marine Corps doctrine affirms that intelligence is inseparable from operations—not subordinate—but functioning as a coequal warfighting function.11 Modernization must redefine intelligence’s role in maneuver and operational decision making—not merely focus on acquiring ISR systems. Intelligence must maneuver—not in isolation but as a fully integrated force enabler capable of shaping tempo, anticipatory action, and lethal fires.

Modernizing intelligence requires pushing ISR capabilities below the battalion level and training Marines across all occupational fields to collect information, conduct basic analysis, and report in support of maneuver. Intelligence responsibilities must become standard battlefield functions rather than duties confined to the intelligence community. Without an updated doctrine that reflects decentralized execution, new ISR platforms and analytic tools risk being misused or sidelined. When operational concepts lag behind available capabilities, tactical units lack the structure for effective employment. Gaining and maintaining advantage in contested maritime environments demands a doctrine that treats ISR as integral to maneuver—a core combat function, not a supporting task.

Conclusion: Intelligence as Maneuver
Marine Corps intelligence modernization must reflect the operational realities of the Pacific theater—prolonged exposure to peer ISR, contested littorals, and degraded communications. Gaining decision advantage requires integrating autonomous platforms with human-derived reporting in ways optimized for speed, dispersion, and electromagnetic discipline. Procuring ISR systems without adjusting doctrine, force structure, or training pipelines will yield technical capacity without tactical consequence. Intelligence overmatch depends on institutional commitment to treating intelligence as maneuver—training Marines to collect, assess, and act at the tactical edge, with the doctrinal authority to do so at the point of need.

>Sgt McCue is an Intelligence Analyst in the Executive Support Section, Information Intelligence Division, Office of the Deputy Commandant for Information. He has supported operations in the CENTCOM and INDOPACOM theaters, including deployments with SPMAGTF-CR-CC 19.2, the 31st MEU, and a Joint Task Force in Iraq. He is currently completing a Bachelor of Science in Legal Studies. 

Notes

1. Kevin Kusumoto, “China Concludes Its Largest Military Drills Near Taiwan,” TRADOC G-2, October 10, 2024, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/china-concludes-its-largest-military-drills-near-taiwan; and James E. Fanell, “China: Growing and Going to Sea,” Proceedings 149, No. 5 (2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/china-growing-and-going-sea.

3. Gen. David H. Berger, Force Design 2030 Annual Update (Washington, DC: 2023), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_2030_Annual_Update_June_2023.pdf.

4. Kitsch Liao, “Informatized Wars: How China Thinks About Cyber,” American Enterprise Institute, March 15, 2022, https://www.aei.org/articles/informatized-wars-how-china-thinks-about-cyber/.

5. J. Michael Dahm, China C4ISR and Counter Intervention (Arlington: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, March 2024), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/J.Michael_Dahm_Testimony.pdf.

6. Force Design 2030 Annual Update.

7. Christopher McFadden, “China Can Track U.S. Navy with Public Satellite Imagery,” Interesting Engineering, July 16, 2024, https://interestingengineering.com/military/china-tracks-us-navy-via-free-satellite-images.

8. Christina Lu, “Chinese research ships increase activity near Taiwan,” Financial Times, August 30, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/0dfb94d7-e140-4d6c-97b9-18ec410d6a7c.

9. Harry Halem, “Ukraine’s Lessons for Future Combat: Unmanned Aerial Systems and Deep Strike,” Parameters 53, No. 4 (Winter 2023–24), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/4/.

10. Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Lessons for Future Warfare,” CSIS, December 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-war-nagorno-karabakh-lessons-future-strike-and-defense.

11. Headquarters Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand-In Forces (Washington, DC: 2021), cited in Force Design 2030 Annual Update.

12. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 2, Intelligence (Washington, DC: April 2023). (Foreword by Gen. Charles C. Krulak, USMC (Ret.), dated June 7, 1997).

Mobilizing the Marine Corps

Why the Service is incapable of repeating June 1950

When the Korea People’s Army stormed across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, the Republic of Korea Army and the U.S. Far East Command were caught off guard. The Marine Corps’ rapid response in July 1950 and the 15 September 1950 landing at Inchon are the pinnacle of Marine Corps history and lore. However, the tactical and operational victories in late 1950 were the ends of the lesser-known but critically important ways and means of Service-wide mobilization. Today, the Service is consumed by a focus on tactical-level technologies, experimentation, and endless pursuit of operations, activities, and investments while being hamstrung by years-long acquisitions, delays in production, and structure design based on how many things purchased and not the enemy. If the Marine Corps does not plan for total mobilization, the next large-scale, unexpected enemy attack will result in the Corps weathering the initial storm, then looking over its shoulder and finding nothing there to carry on the fight.

Tactical technologies and tactical-level victories are for naught if not woven into operational objectives to achieve strategic ends. The fundamental concept of massing combat power more quickly than the enemy and applying that combat power at a time and place of your choosing is how conflicts are won. When the size of the force in the conflict is insufficient, the force that can rapidly flow and sustain the most combat power seizes the advantage. Throughout the history of warfare, this is done via mobilization, defined today as “the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.”1 Often mistaken as the simple act of placing a reserve component (RC) Marine into an active-duty status, mobilization is in fact a whole-of-Service task tied to strategic and operational concepts and codified in the requirements of Title 10, U.S.C. §10208: Annual Mobilization Exercise.2 Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has lulled itself into the mistaken belief it is capable of mobilization because it has achieved battlefield successes over the last 85 years of modern conflict.

Marines with Golf Company, 2/24 Mar, 4th MarDiv, Marine Corps Forces Reserve, undergo a safety brief before a live-fire range event at Fort McCoy, WI, 21. (Photo by Cpl Maxwell Cook.)

The reality of the last 85 years is that the United States has delayed entry into every major conflict except one, the Korean War. World War II began in September 1939, with the United States not officially entering until December 1941. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 with advisors, the number expanding in 1962, with major combat actions not occurring until 1965. DESERT STORMsucceeded thanks to DESERT SHIELD, a five-month buildup of combat power that the enemy was kind enough to sit and observe. Finally, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), authorized on 16 October 2002 via Congressional Joint Resolution, did not see combat operations commence until 20 March 2003.3 Each of these conflicts provided the Marine Corps with the benefit of time. Time to plan, build, and position forces to assure the successful commencement of combat operations. When the Marine Corps looks around the globe today, time is not a benefit. The United States’ competitors are positioned to strike quickly and with significant combat power. It is for this reason that the initial stages of the Korean War must be the priority case study if the Marine Corps wishes to wake from its mobilization slumber.

An assessment of June 1950 and today reveals many similarities throughout the Corps. The 1946–1950 drawdown saw active component (AC) end strength decrease from 155,592 to 74,279 (52 percent decrease).4 Current AC end strength has also decreased from 183,417 in 2015 to 172,300 (6 percent decrease) in 2024.5 The Marine Corps Organized Reserve (Ground and Air) of 1950 totaled 39,869 personnel, with the 2024 Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) end strength equaling 32,000 personnel.6 In both eras, military technologies entered a new age of innovation. With Far East Command, the United States positioned itself forward under a unified combatant command to counter Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China. Today, unified commands around the globe campaign forward with modern technologies to deter competitor aggression, with Marines present in all theaters. Unfortunately, these surface-level similarities mask massive underlying contrasts and a glaring critical vulnerability for the Service.

Two critical factors are missing from today’s Marine Corps that existed in 1950. First, in 1950, there was a base mobilization plan.7 Today, the last signed DOD-level mobilization plan is dated May 1988, and the Service has no single-source plan, policy, or Marine Corps Order addressing how it will pick up the entire force, take it to war, while simultaneously preparing for protracted conflict. Second, as early as November 1947, studies of Reserve availability provided data for use in force flow planning in the immediate days and weeks following the surprise assault by the Korea People’s Army on 25 June 1950.8 When the commanding generals of Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, and Camp Lejeune were given the warning order to expect 21,000 and 5,800 reserve Marines, respectively, the extensive surveys of facilities and supplies necessary were conducted. More importantly, the arrival of RC forces was integrated with the arrival of 3,600 AC Marines from 105 varying posts and stations and the movement of 6,800 Marines of 2d MarDiv from Camp Lejeune to Camp Pendleton, who arrived within a 96-hour window. 

The scope, scale, and timeline of execution for this effort are staggering and were made possible only because the Service deliberately planned in time of peace for mobilization in time of war. Following the 26 June 1950 authorization for the employment of military forces in Korea by the President of the United States (POTUS), the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) set sail from Camp Pendleton on 14 July. On 20 July, 22 RC units were ordered to active duty, with the entire Organized Reserve (138 units in total) ordered to active duty by 4 August. The first Organized Reserve (Ground) Marines arrived at Camp Pendleton on 31 July and reported for active duty through 11 September at a rate of 702 per day, seven days per week. The first of 1,392 Organized Reserve (Aviation) Marines arrived at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro on 1 August alongside the AC Marines of MAG-15 and VMG-212 from Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point to build 1st MAW to wartime strength. When the 15 September landing at Inchon began, seventeen percent of the force was from the RC.9

Cpl Cedrick Chan, of Weapons Company, 2/24 Mar, 4th MarDiv, Marine Forces Reserve, calls in a mortar strike during a fire support coordination exercise at Integrated Training Exercise 4-24, Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, CA. (Photo by LCpl Aaron TorresLemus.)

When viewed in relation to the two most recent large-scale conflicts, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORMand OIF, the gravity of the 1950 mobilization is evident. From 28 October 1990 to 13 January 1991, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, the SMCR activated 22,703 personnel.10 This process took 25 days (48 percent) longer than the actions of 1950 and included 9,411 fewer (-29 percent) personnel. From January to May 2003, in support of OIF, the RC activated approximately 17,000 personnel on top of the roughly 3,000 already activated between November 2001 and December 2002. This four-month spike was the largest during the entire conflict, took 98 days (185 percent) longer than the actions of 1950, and included roughly 15,800 fewer (-48 percent) personnel.11 In both conflicts, fewer RC personnel were activated over longer periods, with the enemy static in both cases. This makes clear that the Marine Corps should not evaluate its ability to mobilize against an actively advancing peer threat using either of these modern conflicts as a case study.

Were the Marine Corps to begin actively planning for the actions accomplished during the early days of the Korean War, detailed above, it would at best only achieve operational relevance within the Joint Force and the eyes of our Nation’s competitors. In the era of competition and campaigns to deter, strategic relevance for the Service is not made through quickly aggregating initial response forces but by demonstrating the ability to rapidly aggregate, grow, and sustain the force in protracted conflict against a peer.

To understand the strategic relevance the Service created during the Korean War, an additional layer of analysis beyond the process for aggregating forces for the 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW must be studied. As the Marines at Camp Pendleton and El Toro fulfilled unit requirements and built the foundational cadre necessary for additional unit creation, such as the 7th Mar, Headquarters Marine Corps actively planned and executed policy and long-term force flow decisions. United States policymakers moved quickly following the POTUS decision to intervene militarily. On 30 June, Congress approved the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, nullifying the guarantee that RC personnel would not be called to active duty except in time of war or national emergency.12 On 19 July, the day after the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Rein) set sail for Korea, POTUS authorized the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of AC end strength and call up RC personnel, and the Commandant, with the Secretary of the Navy’s approval, halted the discharge of RC personnel.13 The same day, the Division of Plans and Policies drafted a delay policy based on the mobilization force flow plan. One day later, those instructions were distributed across the Service. The Marine Corps’ strategic relevance had begun.

The Marine Corps’ strategic planning accelerated even as the operational planning hit the pinnacle of its fervor. As AC and RC forces flowed west within the continental United States (CONUS) from 20 July to 4 August 1950, policy maker decisions continued to unfold. The 25th of July saw the chief of naval operations authorize a 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within CONUS. On 27 July, Congress passed Public Law 624, giving POTUS the authority to extend enlistments.14 The next day, the CMC directed the extension of one year for all enlistments set to expire before 9 July 1951, and Marine Corps RC members were prevented from joining another reserve or regular component of a sister Service. At the beginning of August, Headquarters Marine Corps established the Board to Consider Requests for Delay, which began meeting daily. These decisions not only supported the sourcing of combat forces over time but also set conditions for a critical next step.

This step came in mid-August 1950 with the decision to begin activation of the Volunteer Reserve and planning for that force to arrive at CONUS screening stations on the heels of the Organized Reserve (Ground and Air). This phase shifted the Marine Corps from operational to strategic-level importance. The Volunteer Reserve, which in today’s Marine Corps is best described as a combination of the Individual Ready Reserve and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program, held 89,920 Marines on 30 June 1950.15 On 15 August 1950, one day after the first attack transports carrying 1st MarDiv set sail from California and two days before the 7th Mar activated, all E-5 and below Marines of the Volunteer Reserve were ordered to active duty. Only two weeks prior, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had ordered the Marine Corps to bring 2d MarDiv to wartime strength and increase the number of flying squadrons. With Camp Lejeune already depleted of forces now sailing with 1st MarDiv, long-range building of forces was dependent on the RC.

Mobilization history was made on 15 September 1950, with the landing at Inchon, but the true benefits of mobilization planning would not be realized until the night of 27 November, when the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force attacked at the Chosin Reservoir. On 25 October, a month before the attack, the Commandant directed all Volunteer Reservists to be ordered to active duty with a 30-day delay. By 8 November, the Service, believing it was in a “short war,” adjusted those plans to include a four-month delay.16 Following the 6–11 December Chosin breakout, it was clear the short war was now a long war. Although the four-month delay policy was suspended on 6 January 1951, because of enemy action, the previously made mobilization decisions had already enabled a continuous flow of Marine Corps forces as the war took a new direction. 

Confident in its ability to continue combat operations despite an ongoing Chinese People’s Volunteer Force, which would last until April 1951, on 10 January, the Service approved RC enlisted members enrolled in officer candidate programs to continue, enabling long-term officer procurement. On 10 February, RC members with contracts expiring between 28 February and 9 July were not ordered to active duty. By March, the preliminary plan to release reservists from active duty was drafted, and by June, the plan was put into action. A largely RC effort now transitioned to a long-term Selective Service solution thanks to robust and detailed mobilization planning. 

It must be acknowledged that the Marine Corps of 1950 was not like the Marine Corps of 2025. The AC in June 1950 consisted of 74,279 personnel­­—just 43 percent of today’s authorized end strength of 172,300.17 Active component units in June 1950 were reduced in personnel numbers to a peacetime structure, with billets intentionally unfilled unless brought to wartime standing. A Marine division in peacetime had 45 percent fewer Marines and 41 percent fewer sailors than the wartime totals of 20,131 and 997, respectively. In June 1950, actual AC staffing meant that 1st and 2nd MarDiv combined could not produce a full wartime division.18 Today, there is no differentiation between peace and wartime structure. Marine Corps units, both AC and RC, are held to readiness reporting requirements in the areas of personnel, equipment supply and condition, and training.19 Within today’s RC, the SMCR, as previously mentioned, is 80 percent of the 1950 Organized Reserve (Ground and Air). The Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentee combination of approximately 57,000 personnel is 63 percent of the 89,920 Volunteer Reserve of 1950. By the numbers, the Marine Corps has reduced the size of its 1950 RC by approximately 40,000 (129,000 to 89,000) while increasing the 1950 AC by approximately 98,000 personnel. The surface-level, and incorrect, conclusion is that this shift of RC to AC manpower over the last 75 years has created a total force more capable of meeting mobilization requirements.

Analysis beyond the simple numerical increase of AC personnel reveals that today’s Marine Corps has less relative combat power than the Marine Corps of 1950. This is evident when comparing the two most powerful arms of the MAGTF, the infantry battalions and fighter squadrons. In 1950, the AC had three infantry regiments (2d, 5th, and 6th) with a wartime structure of three battalions each. The RC had 21 infantry battalions with an additional 16 individual rifle companies.20 Assuming three rifle companies form a battalion, the combined AC and RC infantry battalion strength of the 1950 Marine Corps was approximately 35. Today, the combined AC and RC infantry battalion strength is 28, including 3d Littoral Combat Team, or 80 percent of 1950. Fighter squadrons in 1950 for the AC totaled 15, with another 30 in the RC for a combined total of 45. Today, the combined AC and RC fighter squadron strength is 19, or 42 percent of 1950. In terms of the Corps’ most recognized form of combat power throughout history, the modern Marine Corps is lacking in both when compared to the Corps of 1950.

In addition to the 20 percent fewer infantry and 58 percent fewer fixed-wing strike aircraft than in 1950, the modern Marine Corps risks being out of position when the next conflict begins. Relentlessly pushed outside CONUS in campaigns to deter, repositioning the 45,000+ personnel of I MEF or the 22,000+ personnel of III MEF would be significantly more challenging than the movement of only 800 outside CONUS personnel to complete the 7th Mar upon their arrival in-theater in September 1950. If the enemy chooses to begin the next rapidly evolving peer conflict outside the location where the Marine Corps has hedged its bets, the mobilization planning of 1950 will be dwarfed in complexity by the next iteration as the Service attempts to mobilize and aggregate forces from around the globe.

The modern Marine Corps has further undermined its ability to mobilize by neglecting equipment modernization in the RC. Readiness of the AC and RC in 1950 was instrumental in the successful mobilization of forces. Although at peacetime strength, the material readiness of 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW was 98.3 percent and 95.6 percent, respectively.21 The delta for wartime tables of equipment was made up by using the 30-day replenishment stock, air and ground units arriving from Camp Lejeune bringing their equipment, a long-range policy for resupply with the Army and Air Force, and 30-day incremental resupply by Marine or Navy agencies for Marine-specific equipment.22 Most importantly, during the inter-war period of World War II and Korea, the RC “operated up-to-date equipment”23 when training. When the mobilization plan went into execution, the AC and RC were on a level playing field, enabling seamless integration into forces deploying forward and assignment of AC and RC personnel within CONUS to serve as cadre for newly activated units and training cadre for volunteers and those Marines requiring accession training. Today, the RC is consistently last, if included at all, in the fielding of modern equipment and trains with a training allowance, a lesser amount than a full table of equipment. If the RC were called upon again as it was in 1950, it would not arrive trained on modern equipment, and it would bring insufficient numbers of legacy equipment.

If the Marine Corps wants to be relevant at the operational and strategic levels of war in the next peer conflict, it must learn and apply the lessons from June 1950 and establish a base mobilization plan and a properly equipped RC. Planning must include how the Service will execute seamless transition between initial response, RC call-up, end strength increase, arrival of volunteers and/or Selective Service System inductees, and rotation considerations. More importantly, a total force mobilization plan must identify key policy decisions and be rehearsed and exercised under Title 10 requirements. This sends a message to strategic competitors that the Marine Corps is not a tactical-level force with a handful of exquisite weapons, but a strategic-level consideration capable of rapid expansion and prepared to seamlessly flow combat power in a well-orchestrated symphony of destruction.

“Without the reserves, the Inchon landing on September 15 [1950] would have been impossible.”

—MajGen Oliver P. Smith,
Commanding General,
1st Marine Division

>LtCol Toulotte is currently assigned as the Inspector-Instructor for 3d Civil Affairs Group. He is an Infantry Officer who has served in both the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and Active Reserve (AR). In his previous assignment as an Operational Planner to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), he represented the command in both Service and Joint-level mobilization planning efforts.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 2025).

2. Title 10, §10208: Annual Mobilization

Exercise.

3. H.J.Res.114-Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 107th Congress (2002). 

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict 1950–1951 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1967). 

5. Nicholas Munves, “FY2025 NDAA: Active Component End-Strength 21 Oct 2024,” Congress.gov, October 21, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12449.

6. Nicholas Munves, “FY2025 NDAA: Reserve Component End-Strength 21 Oct 2024,” Congress.gov, October 21, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12448.

7. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict 1950–1951.

8. Ibid.

9. Staff, “History: Marine Forces Korea,” Marines.mil, n.d., https://www.marfork.marines.mil/About/History.

10. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment of Reserve Component: Extracts of Lessons Learned (Fort Eustis: Joint Deployment Training Ctr, 1998).

11. Department of Defense, RC Support to GFM Operational Requirements (Washington, DC: January 2010).

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid; and “FY2025 NDAA: Active Component End-Strength.”

18. Ibid.

19. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 3000.13B, (Washington, DC: July 2020). 

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid. 

22. Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, Volume II (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1955). 

23. Ibid.

Mobilization as a Theory of Victory

Deploying all elements of national defense

Vignette
 On 1 August 2027—the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army—the Chinese Communist Party launches a preplanned invasion of Taiwan. The operation begins with covert special forces infiltrating Taipei, paralyzing communications, and severing Taiwan’s offshore internet cables. Simultaneously, the United States suffers from coordinated cyberattacks on its power grids, financial networks, and transportation systems, resulting in widespread disruptions. As Chinese stealth bombers and nuclear submarines posture for escalation, the United States mobilizes its Pacific forces. However, the United States struggles to project sufficient combat power across the 12,000-kilometer (7,456-mile) expanse of the Pacific amid domestic chaos. The crisis deepens as North Korea joins the fray, launching tactical nuclear strikes that incapacitate U.S.-South Korea command centers, raising the specter of a broader nuclear confrontation. Despite escalating threats, allied coordination falters and diplomatic avenues close under Chinese and Russian vetoes at the UN Security Council.

Facing strategic paralysis, the U.S. president issues involuntary mobilization orders under Title 10, but years of neglect toward large-scale mobilization planning quickly manifest. The U.S. military, particularly the Marine Corps Reserve, finds itself unable to respond with the necessary speed or cohesion in a contested homeland. Communication lines collapse, Reserve service members remain unreachable, and infrastructure buckles under pressure. Mobilization plans, long outdated and designed for permissive environments, falter as civilian contractors and logistical nodes are overwhelmed by chaos. Amid the turmoil, reserve units struggle to assemble beyond the company level or move toward embarkation points, hindered by fragmented staffs and command structures. The lack of deliberate, large-scale rehearsals leaves the force staggered at the outset—dangerously unprepared to project and sustain operations deep into the first island chain.

Marines with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 2nd MarDiv inspect craters made by time-explosive charges during exercise AGILE SPIRIT 23 in Georgia. Exercise AGILE SPIRIT 23 is designed to support theater security cooperation and interoperability among NATO allies and partners to improve joint and multinational readiness, scale, and capabilities by exercising rapid mobility and posture combat credible forces across the European theater to the country of Georgia to bolster their defense efforts and deter aggression in the Black Sea region while exercising the enduring U.S. State Partnership Program with the Georgia Army National Guard. (Photo by Cpl Christopher Doughty.)

Purpose
The critical-case scenario reveals that large-scale mobilization is fundamentally an active component (AC) problem requiring a total force solution that integrates the reserve component (RC), contracted support (CS), and host-nation support. Without a practiced, coordinated mobilization framework, the United States risks being unable to project and sustain combat power in contested theaters. The objective of this article is threefold: first, to clarify key terms to establish a shared vocabulary; second, to highlight historical fallacies, such as the overreliance on peacetime structures or exquisite technologies at the expense of preparedness for mobilization; and third, to recommend conceptual frameworks and analytic approaches that help identify and close capability gaps in the Services’ current force generation models. 

A Marine with Golf Company, 2/24 Mar, 4th MarDiv, Marine Corps Forces Reserve, shouts to another machinegun team during a live-fire range event at Fort McCoy, WI. (Photo by Cpl Maxwell Cook.)

Marine Corps Today
The Marine Corps lacks doctrine, organizational structure, education and training frameworks, policy guidance, and funding to build the depth required for an organized, timely, large-scale mobilization. The present-day AC alone cannot meet the force demands of a sustained conflict against any single peer adversary without immediate augmentation from the Ready Reserve. This is exacerbated by outdated policy and infrastructure that do not allow for the rapid expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.1 Should a conflict become protracted, the Services lack a formal plan or policy to generate combat-ready forces from inductees processed through the Selective Service System. Within the Marine Corps, no unified command or logistical support structure currently exists to oversee the mobilization of reserve forces, Selective Service inductees, and CS. If left unaddressed, delays will likely occur in generating combat-capable, follow-on forces at scale. These gaps will severely jeopardize the tempo, momentum, and initiative required to sustain overseas campaigns and maintain the operational advantage in a conflict with a peer adversary. 

Baseline Concepts
Mobilization is a broad, total force effort encompassing far more than the activation of RC personnel.2 It involves assembling, organizing, and deploying all elements of the DOD—active and reserve forces, retirees, civilians, contractors, and host-nation support—to respond to national emergencies or contingencies.3 Activation, by contrast, is a legal and administrative subset of mobilization that places RC members on active duty under specific authorities.4 While activation is necessary, it is insufficient; mobilization integrates logistics, infrastructure, and command and control to generate and sustain combat power.5 Effective mobilization requires deliberate, synchronized employment of the entire total force following Total Force Optimization principles.6 

The Past Is Not a Prologue for the Future
World War II: 8 December 1941–2 September 1945
During World War II, the United States mobilized over sixteen million service members, an unparalleled effort in scale. The attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized bipartisan support and unified public opinion, enabling President Franklin D. Roosevelt to rapidly exercise sweeping war powers.7 The United States leveraged alliances and global outrage against Axis aggression to rally the Allied powers.8 Wartime propaganda and censorship preserved morale while the War Production Board repurposed America’s vast industrial base to produce war materiel at a record pace.9 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 established preemptive conscription, laying the groundwork for rapid manpower expansion.10 Strong institutional frameworks, a vast logistics network, including the Merchant Marine and national rail system, and an arsenal of democracy preserved national morale and cohesion.11 

Today, the conditions that enabled the mobilization for World War II have largely eroded. Diplomatically, the cohesion once found among Allied powers has given way to fragmented global alliances and a decline in trust in multilateral institutions. In the information domain, centralized control and narrative discipline have been replaced by media fragmentation and disinformation, making maintaining national morale and cohesion challenging. Economically, the U.S. industrial base no longer possesses the surge capacity of the 1940s. Infrastructure critical to mobilization, such as rail and sealift, has degraded. Militarily, the existing sustainment infrastructure is not optimized for large-scale, rapid deployment. As a result, the foundational elements that once enabled the United States to mobilize at scale are now fractured, posing significant challenges to replicating that success in a modern conflict.12 

Korean War: 27 June 1950–27 July 1953
The Korean War era presented a unique confluence of political, diplomatic, military, and economic conditions that no longer exist today. These conditions enabled swift legislative action to authorize reserve mobilization and extend enlistments.13 Diplomatically, the United Nations (UN) provided legitimacy, allowing the United States to quickly galvanize a coalition—an opportunity shaped by the Soviet Union’s absence from early Security Council votes.14 Today, the fractured state of great-power relations and eroded multilateral trust make such diplomatic cohesion far less plausible. Additionally, the Cold War’s clear ideological framework enabled a decisive narrative for U.S. intervention, whereas modern conflicts suffer from ambiguity.15 

Militarily and economically, the United States retained the industrial strength and manpower depth to remobilize quickly, even after significant post-World War II drawdowns. A large pool of World War II veterans, maintained stockpiles of supplies and equipment, and robust strategic sealift and airlift capacities supported rapid force generation.16 Reserve integration and political willingness to spend “large sums of money” further sustained mobilization despite doctrinal friction and inter-Service rivalry.17

The conditions that enabled rapid mobilization during the Korean War have deteriorated. Diplomatically, deepening great-power competition and weakened trust make coalition-building far less feasible.18 Strategically, the ideological clarity of the Cold War has given way to fragmented narratives, complicating public and international support for intervention.19 Militarily, reduced force structure, lack of practiced large-scale mobilization, and fragile defense supply chains hinder rapid force generation.20 Economically, minimal prepositioned stores, an efficiency-focused industrial base, and supply chain vulnerabilities undermine the Nation’s ability to sustain operations.21 The synergies that enabled successful mobilization in 1950—political unity, narrative clarity, and industrial depth—can no longer be assumed.

The Gulf War: 7 August 1990–28 February 1991
The Gulf War showcased the rapid assembly of nearly a million U.S. and Coalition forces following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but its success rested on conditions no longer prevalent. Diplomatically, the United States secured a UN mandate, rallied a 35-nation coalition, and received logistical and financial backing from Saudi Arabia, Japan, and others.22 The conflict was presented through a unified media as a just and necessary war, reinforcing public support.23 Economically, the Cold War-era defense structure and coalition burden-sharing offset much of the operation’s cost.24 These advantages—powerful diplomatic legitimacy, unified media narratives, and partner-nation financing—are less accessible in today’s increasingly fragmented global environment. Militarily, the Gulf War benefited from prepositioned stocks, robust host-nation support, and uncontested access to ports and airfields—none guaranteed to be secure during conflict with a peer adversary. Since then, much of the surge capacity, particularly in sealift, airlift, and industrial readiness, has atrophied.25 

Global War on Terror: 11 September 2001–30 August 2021
Mobilizations for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) were extensive but fundamentally different from those of past great-power wars. Politically, the 9/11 attacks briefly unified bipartisan support, which fractured as the wars dragged on and strategic aims became unclear.26 Diplomatically, the Afghanistan coalition unraveled during the Iraq invasion as key allies publicly opposed U.S. actions.27 In the information domain, prolonged conflict and media fragmentation eroded U.S. narrative control.28 Economically, the wars relied on deficit spending and outsourced logistics rather than large-scale industrial mobilization.29 

The OIF and OEF operations used the Global Force Management (GFM) model. This tiered readiness approach accepted non-mission capable units in the sourcing pool if they could meet operational timelines.30 After the height of OEF in 2011, the Marine Corps disestablished the Marine Corps Mobilization Command (MOBCOM), as part of a force structure realignment following heavy Ready Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve activations under various Title 10 authorities. While adequate for counterinsurgency and stability operations, the current GFM model, lacking a unified mobilization command, will most likely be paralyzed by the speed and scale required for a protracted, large-scale peer conflict, especially in a contested homeland environment. 

The erosion of bipartisan unity after 9/11 created an unstable policy environment that weakened institutional support for national mobilization. Diplomatic fractures isolated the United States, leaving it to shoulder logistics and sustainment largely alone. Militarily, modular rotations and contractor-heavy sustainment models emerged, unsuitable for protracted, high-intensity war. The GFM model, sufficient for counterinsurgency, is dangerously misaligned to the demands of peer conflict, yet persists as a critical strategic fallacy.31 The GWOT featured heavy reliance on the RC and CS, with contractors sometimes outnumbering U.S. troops, rather than rapid, force generation.32 Economically, deficit-financed wars left the defense industrial base untested for surge capacity.33 

Post-9/11 wars have featured smaller peak troop deployments sustained over far more extended periods than earlier conflicts like Vietnam, as shown in Figure 1.34 Unlike Vietnam’s mass-conscription model, which peaked at ~537,000 U.S. troops in 1968, OIF/OEF relied on a lean, all-volunteer force with repeated deployments, heavily supplemented by the RC and contractors (at a near 1:1 ratio, compared to 1:8 in Vietnam).35 These campaigns also saw a decline in Allied participation. The 2003 Iraq invasion was led primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom, unlike the 16 U.N. sending states in Korea or the 32-nation Gulf War coalition.36 Meanwhile, the United States maintained a constant overseas presence with tens of thousands stationed in Germany, South Korea, and Japan.37 

So what? The past is not a prologue. The shift from mass mobilization to prolonged, modular deployments has stressed the force differently. A future peer conflict will likely require rapid expansion of troop strength and industrial capacity exceeding today’s sustained deployment model, and demands renewed focus on preparedness, large-scale force generation, and industrial mobilization for a protracted, high-intensity conflict from a contested homeland.

Impact of Force Modernization on Mobilization Capacity
Since 2019, DOD investments have overwhelmingly favored advanced sensor-to-shooter technologies and high-end combat capabilities designed for a limited-duration, high-intensity fight. While these systems offer an advantage in early engagements, they are insufficient in number, and the Defense Industrial Base cannot sustain long-term campaigns. The winner of the first fight may be the loser as they expend too many resources and will not be able to reconstitute in time to be ready for a counterpunch.38 Marine Corps modernization efforts have emphasized long-range precision fires, small-unit lethality, reconnaissance-strike networks, and expeditionary advanced basing operations. However, these initiatives lack corresponding investments in mobilization infrastructure, large-scale mobilization training exercises, and force generation pipelines. The Marine Corps’ readiness for the opening salvo has improved, but its ability to absorb attrition, scale operations, and transition to strategic depth remains dangerously underdeveloped.

The absence of a deliberate strategy to sufficiently balance modernization with mobilization preparedness has created critical vulnerabilities. The Marine Corps must account for risk in forgoing investments in mobilization planning, deployment infrastructure, and the human capital needed to convert surge capacity into actual combat power. Without such scrutiny, technological overmatch becomes brittle when confronted by an adversary willing and able to contest in time and space over the long term.

Figure 1. U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades. (Figure provided by author.)

Conceptual Framework
A coherent conceptual framework must encompass five mutually reinforcing lines of effort to address the Marine Corps’ current mobilization deficiencies. These lines of effort are derived from existing policy gaps, organizational shortcomings, and the imperative to adapt force development for sustained competition and conflict. Collectively, they form the basis of a deliberate Capability-Based Assessment methodology and serve as a foundation for institutionalizing strategic mobilization as a core competency.

First, the Marine Corps must pursue comprehensive policy reform and synchronization. Reform begins with establishing a robust, Service-level, large-scale mobilization policy that reflects contemporary realities and aligns with ongoing doctrinal reforms. Critical to this effort is revising and integrating MCO 3061.1, Total Force Mobilization Deployment Plan, and MCO 1235.1A, Administration and Management of the Individual Ready Reserve to define clear authorities, roles, and responsibilities across Headquarters Marine Corps, the operating forces, and the supporting establishment. All commands must also identify and train to Mobilization Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to standardize and operationalize planning. For example, Schools of Infantry East and West should be assigned METs, such as be prepared to conduct combat refresher training for additional trainees throughout the conflict and be prepared to augment staff with additional instructors and contracted support to sustain increased student throughput. This will result in a coherent family of mobilization plans nested within the DOD and interagency structures.

Second, a modernized command-and-control architecture is essential for generating unity of effort and streamlining wartime force generation. This command should oversee the activation and integration of RC forces, Individual Ready Reserves, inductees, CS, and critical infrastructure. It would unify key mobilization nodes—such as deployment processing centers, regional support programs, and select inspector-instructor sites—under a framework optimized for scale and responsiveness. A general officer with delegated authority from the Commandant should lead this command to coordinate directly with the Joint Staff, Service component commanders, and supporting establishment leadership.

Third, a dedicated officer and enlisted talent structure is required to institutionalize total force integration. This entails creating a new military occupational specialty, the Total Force Integrator (TFI), within the 05XX MAGTF occupational field. The TFI would consolidate mobilization planners responsible for integrating the RC into the AC at all echelons. Officers and senior enlisted with RC experience are ideal candidates, particularly active-reserve officers (all of which hold a Title 10 mandate to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the RC).39 Selection should mirror the foreign area officer experience track board to ensure only high-performing candidates with the requisite attributes are selected. A formal education pipeline, such as at the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, would provide doctrinal expertise and joint operational fluency.40 Unlike MOBCOM’s past centralization, TFIs should be organized into cells under the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, led by an active reserve O-6 at a Mobilization Plans Branch, with integration into each MEF and MARFOR G-5 Plans section under AR-led TFI cells.41 

Fourth, the Marine Corps must integrate mobilization readiness into its training, education, and wargaming systems. Large-scale mobilization scenarios must be incorporated into Command and Staff College curricula, the Marine Corps War College, and other professional military education venues to build shared understanding across the Total Force. Mobilization METs must also be an inspectable item, reportable to the Commandant at a venue such as the Quarterly Readiness Board. The Marine Corps should conduct regular, large-scale mobilization exercises to validate force generation plans under contested conditions. Supported by a campaign of learning, these efforts will drive informed investment in mobilization requirements and foster a culture fluent in transitioning from crisis response to major combat operations.

Finally, force development and capability investment must be recalibrated to achieve a sustainable balance between initial lethality and strategic depth. While advancing critical high-end capabilities, the Marine Corps’ modernization must be paired with talent management, surge logistics, force generation, and sustainment investments. Iterative Capability-Based Assessment is necessary to identify and prioritize these gaps, aligning operations, activities, and investments across the Future Years Defense Program. Only through this dual-track approach—modernization paired with mobilization preparedness—can the Marine Corps build the resilient, scalable force needed to win a protracted conflict against a peer adversary.

The conceptual framework, Figure 2 (on the following page), is not intended as a prescriptive end-state or a comprehensive operational approach but as a reference model to guide the Marine Corps’ strategic transformation. By adopting these lines of effort in an integrated, sustained manner, the Service can recover its ability to generate and sustain combat power at scale, reinforcing its role as an effective contributor to the Joint Force in high-end conflict.

Figure 2. Conceptual framework diagram. (Figure provided by author.)

Conclusion
The United States Marine Corps stands at a strategic inflection point. The 2027 Taiwan Strait scenario underscores a fundamental vulnerability: the potential inability to execute an organized, large-scale, contested mobilization on pace with a peer competitor. Historical advantages in diplomatic consensus, industrial capacity, and military readiness no longer exist at reliable levels. Force modernization efforts have improved tactical lethality but at the expense of strategic depth.

To remain a credible contributor to Joint Force operations in great-power competition, the Marine Corps must reframe mobilization not as an afterthought but as a theory of victory if deterrence fails. The proposed framework provides a path to institutionalizing mobilization as a core competency of the Service. If implemented with urgency and sustained investment, the Marine Corps will regain its ability to scale, surge, sustain, and prevail in high-intensity, protracted conflict.

>Col Murata is an Active Reserve Infantry Officer currently assigned as the Director of the Office of Marine Corps Reserve within Headquarters Marine Corps. 

>>Maj Ryu is an Active Reserve Logistics Officer currently assigned as a Plans Assessment Officer, focused on the Korea Plans Set, within the War Plans Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, Policies, Plans, and Operations. 

Notes

1. Title 10, U.S. Code §8063(c).

2. Title 10, U.S. Code §129a, General Policy for Total Force Management. Total Force is the organization, unit, and individual that comprises the DOD resources for implementing the National Security Strategy. It includes DOD active and reserve component military personnel, military retired members, DOD civilian personnel (including foreign national direct-, indirect-hire, and non-appropriated fund employees), contractors, and host-nation support personnel. Total Force recognizes that no single component can generate or sustain combat power alone in protracted, high-end conflict.

3. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Total Force Optimization for Strategic Competition, Memorandum, (Washington, DC: October 2024). Total Force Optimization is the deliberate, synchronized use of all elements of the total force—AC, RC, contracted support, and host-nation support—to ensure maximum effectiveness, readiness, and resilience. This includes aligning human capital, capabilities, and resources to mission requirements over time, while preserving strategic depth and surge capacity.

4. Department of Defense, DOD Instruction 1235.12, (Washington, DC: 2017). Activation is the legal and administrative process by which members of the reserve component are ordered to active duty. Activation authorities encompass voluntary and involuntary mechanisms under various statutes (e.g., Title 10 §§ 12301, 12302, 12304, 12305) and necessitate coordination across multiple levels of command.

5. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, (Washington, DC: 2018). Mobilization is the process of assembling, organizing, and deploying personnel, units, and material in response to a national emergency or contingency. Mobilization includes the activation of reserve forces, the coordination of logistics, infrastructure, and command-and-control elements, and may extend to the broader industrial base and national resources. 

6. Total Force Optimization for Strategic Competition.

7. David. M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

8. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

9. Ralph E. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1964). 

10. Kent R. Greenfield, Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987).

11. Why the Allies Won; and The Army and Economic Mobilization.

12. Freedom from Fear: The Army and Economic Mobilization; and Command Decisions.

13. Headquarters Marine Corps, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 1967). 

14. Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010).

15. Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 

16. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951; and The Army and Economic Mobilization.

17. Command Decisions.

18. The War for Korea, 1950–1951.

19. Victory at High Tide.

20. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951.

21. The Army and Economic Mobilization.

22. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

23. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf War: Strategy, Air Power, and the Challenge of War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

24. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993).

25. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; and The Gulf War.

26. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 

27. Kate Phillip, Shane Lauth, and Erin Schenck, U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation (Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2006).

28. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Penguin Random House, 2013).

29. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: High-Level DoD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces (Washington, DC: 2006). 

30. Department of Defense, CJCSM, 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance (Washington, DC: 2019). 

31. Ibid.

32. T. Christian Miller, “Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq,” L.A. Times, July 4, 2007, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jul-04-na-private4-story.html; and David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008). 

33. Kristen Bialik, “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades,” Pew Research Center, August 22, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades.

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid.; and Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq (Washington, DC: CBO, August 2008).

36. Ivo H. Daalder, “The Coalition That Isn’t,” Brookings, March 24, 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-coalition-that-isnt.

37. “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades.”

38. Col Kevin H. Hutchison, interview by authors, April 2, 2025.

39. Title 10, U.S. Code §12310 titled “Reserves: Duty with Organization of the Ready Reserve” authorizes members of the reserve components, including the Marine Corps Reserve, to be ordered to active duty to perform duties that contribute to the readiness of their reserve component. Subsection (a) provides that a reservist is activated under this authority to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the reserve component. Subsection (b) provides that reservists activated under this authority are considered to be serving on active duty for all intents and purposes, and their duty may be performed full-time. MCO 1001.52K Management of the Active Reserve Program states that AR Marines are primarily assigned to inspector-instructor staffs, training commands, recruiting support, and mobilization planning billets (italics added).

40. The Eisenhower School, “Mission: Forging a New Generation of Strategic Leaders,” The Eisenhower School, n.d. https://es.ndu.edu/About/Mission. 

41. The Marine Forces Reserve Mobilization Command of the past was tasked to: (1) manage the Individual Ready Reserve accountability and readiness; (2) execute mobilization processing for involuntary and voluntary activations; (3) standardize mobilization procedures under Title 10 authorities; (4) develop and maintain mobilization plans and procedures in coordination with Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Corps Forces Reserve; (5) provide infrastructure and administrative oversight for mobilization processing centers. Mobilization Command centralized but professionalized mobilization efforts that had previously been handled in a more fragmented or ad hoc manner, streamlining readiness verification and improving the responsiveness of reserve force generation. The key distinguishing feature of the proposed framework is decentralizing mobilization planning from the Service. Ideally, the selected AR total force integrators disperse throughout Marine Corps Forces and the FMF, which are at the forefront of contingency planning in support of combatant commanders, to provide dedicated total force integration subject-matter expertise. 

>The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the authors and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Headquarters Marine Corps or the Service.