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by William S. Lind

Over the past 10 years, Marines have made significant progress in understanding and applying the concept of maneuver warfare. Many Marine officers now devote substantial time and effort to studying tactics, reading military history, and thinking about the art of war. In terms of both level of interest and knowledge, the situation has advanced greatly from where it was in the mid-1970s.

At the same time, a number of misconceptions of maneuver warfare have arisen. This is a normal part of the process of change and innovation. But it will strengthen the debate and help move it forward if the misconceptions outlined in the following paragraphs can be corrected.

* Maneuver warfare is just some theory propounded by a small group of “armchair generals. “Maneuver warfare is not the- ory; it is historical fact. Everything that maneuver warfare proponents (who include many Marine Corps and Army officers) call for has been done, in combat, by armies-successful armies. Focus of effort, surfaces and gaps, and mission-type orders are concepts with long combat histories. All the theorists have tried to do is explain the common threads that run through these histories and relate the experiences of other times and nations to today’s Marine Corps.

* Maneuver warfare advocates claim that with maneuver, there need be no real fighting, no killing. A look at history lays this misunderstanding quickly to rest. Did Stonewall Jackson or George Patton avoid real fighting? Have the Israelis avoided fighting and killing? All war is bloody business, and maneuver warfare is no exception. It will involve plenty of hard fighting. What maneuver warfare advocates have pointed out is that maneuver can often reduce friendly casualties, compared to running head-on against an enemy at his strongest point; that in a campaign of maneuver, a relatively high proportion of enemy casualties are often prisoners (again, a historical fact); and that the amount and difficulty of actual fighting is situational, depending on the skill and toughness of the opponent. We need to prepare and train under the assumptions that our opponents will be skilled and the fighting, tough. If, as on Grenada, that proves not to be the case and maneuver alone is sufficient to collapse them, so much the better, but we cannot count on that.

* Firepower is not important in maneuver warfare. Nothing could be further from the truth. Firepower, often massive firepower, is highly important in maneuver warfare. Rommel’s Infantry Attacks describes cases where a few squads were given whole machinegun companies and artillery batteries for fire support Rommel constantly stressed plastering the enemy with tire as soon as he is encountered.

What changes in maneuver warfare is the use of firepower. It is used to open the way, to support maneuver by blasting a “gap” or fixing an enemy in place so you can maneuver around him, not just to cause enemy casualties. Perhaps the greatest change is the stress on immediacy of fire support. Tempo must not be sacrificed to the need for fire support control; fire support must accommodate the tactics, not the other way around. This places increased emphasis on direct fire weapons and implies a revolution in command and control of indirect fire weapons-including air support. A few rounds that are immediately available may be worth more than a massive bombardment hours or days later, after the enemy has had time to regain his equilibrium or prepare his positions. In sum, maneuver warfare will require that fire support be made more responsive, perhaps through more decentralization of control, but it in no way lessens the importance of firepower.

* Maneuver warfare is irrelevant to amphibious operations. Maneuver warfare relates directly to amphibious warfare at both the tactical and the operational levels. At the tactical level, it offers the landing point amphibious assault as an alternative to current doctrine. The landing point assault carries the infiltration attack over into the amphibious assault itself, with multiple deep penetrations on separate axes. At the operational level, maneuver warfare opens a vista on the amphibious campaign, which may be more important under modern conditions than the amphibious assault. It suggests that we look at amphibious warfare not only in terms of Tarawa and Iwo Jima but also of Moore and Wellington in Iberia.

* Maneuver warfare means heavying up-mechanizing the Marine Corps. Actually, for most of the Marine Corps, maneuver warfare means lightening up. It requires the conversion of most Marine infantry from line to true light infantry. That means getting rid of vehicles, cutting the Marine’s load to no more than about 46 pounds, reducing greatly the size and complexity of headquarters, etc. True light infantry is the most mobile type of force in close terrain, and maneuver warfare demands mobility. For mobility in open terrain, vehicles are required, but for the Marine Corps, these may be trucks, LAVs, and motorcycles rather than personnel carriers and tanks. The goal should be a mix of light infantry and mounted forces, from which a force appropriate to the terrain can be task organized.

* Maneuver warfare is just common sense tactics. Depending on one’s philosophical approach, everything that is successful in life may be termed “just common sense.” Common sense is certainly useful in maneuver warfare, but if that were all it required, history would have seen many more “Great Captains” of maneuver warfare. In fact, developing an accurate picture of the battlefield and figuring out how to outmaneuver the enemy in a specific situation requires considerable ability. It requires commanders and operations officers with what Clausewitz called a “talent for judgment,” composed of imagination, creativity, and intuition. It requires study of the enemy, his weapons, techniques, doctrines, and, if at all possible, his commander’s tendencies. It adds up to a good deal more than is usually meant by “just common sense.”

* Maneuver warfare is just a formula for flank attacks. In maneuver warfare, a usual goal is to attack the enemy in an unexpected place. But that does not just mean flank attacks. If you always attack his flanks, he will soon figure out the pattern you follow, and he will be waiting for you at the flanks. His flanks will, in effect, become his front.

More fundamentally, maneuver warfare is not a formula for anything. Maneuver warfare tactics never follow a checklist. Those who just make up a new checklist with “commander’s intent” and “focus of effort” on it do not understand maneuver warfare. It is a way of thinking, a way of thinking that recognizes that each combat situation is different and, therefore, requires a unique approach. Through education, training (especially free play, force-on-force training), and careful selection of commanders and operations officers, it cultivates the creativity, active spirit, and willingness to innovate and take risks that yields situational rather than checklist tactics. Maneuver warfare requires officers who have been taught how to think, not what to do or what to think.

* Focus of effort (or Schwerpunkt) is just a new buzzword for the main attack. It is much more than that. When a commander designates his focus of effort, he says, in effect, “This is the unit with which I will achieve a decision.” It is not a casual or simple decision, nor one to be taken lightly. Then he ruthlessly concentrates combat power to support that unit, often taking major risks elsewhere. This second element in particular is somewhat new to Marines, in that it often means depriving other units and sectors of what they regard as “their” assets. In Marine exercises, such assets are usually distributed so that everyone gets his “fair share.” That contradicts the concept of focus of effort. Focus of effort demands the total focusing of combat power at what the commander thinks will be the decisive point.

* Maneuver warfare advocates don’t consider techniques important. Not true. A military with sloppy techniques will be ineffective in combat, no matter how good its schemes of maneuver. Excellence in techniques is very important in maneuver warfare, and many maneuver warfare advocates strongly support such efforts to improve technique skill levels as the new Marine Corps Battle Drill Guide.*

At the same time, maneuver warfare brings some changes in techniques. Examples include the three-element assault, where a small assault element, supported by a strong suppression element, makes a small breach through which a large exploitation element is passed to collapse the enemy from the rear while pushing still deeper into his depth;** forward push logistics; and the use of ambushes in the attack.

* Advocates of maneuver warfare ignore the chaos and confusion of combat; they think battle is neat and orderly. Quite the contrary. Maneuver warfare is rooted in the realization that combat is dominated by uncertainty and rapid change, by what Clausewitz called “friction.” The very core of the maneuver warfare concept is that we can turn the confusion and chaos of battle to our advantage, but only by taking risks, using mission-type orders, allowing wide latitude for subordinates to act as the situation requires (and expecting them to do so), and by placing heavy stress on junior leader initiative. While attrition warfare usually attempts to eliminate the chaos and friction of war with centralization and strict control, maneuver warfare accepts chaos and confusion, seeking to work within it while magnifying it for the enemy. Maneuver warfare also recognizes that “friction” increases as you move up the chain of command and away from the actual scene of battle. Therefore, it stresses commander’s intent, commanders forward, and initiative and flexibility on the part of subordinate commanders who are closest to the actual fight.

* Maneuver warfare advocates are not interested in aviation, fire support, or logistics. In fact, all three are vitally important in maneuver warfare. However, all supporting arms and combat service support must be keyed to supporting the ground scheme of maneuver. The great challenge is embodied in the ideas of immediacy and decentralization. In the areas of aviation, fire support, and logistics, the state of the discussion is about where it was 10 years ago in ground tactics. We need to generate thought and debate in each area, beginning not by asking for answers but for the right questions. How can air support and artillery support be made more responsive? How can each be focused, not on following its own procedures and methods, but on the ground scheme of maneuver? Can logistical support be pushed forward, especially to the focus of effort? Are organizational changes and changes in institutional culture required?

Maneuver warfare advocates urge all Marines to join in the attempt to create thoughtful debate and discussion in each area-debate like maneuver warfare itself has generated in relation to ground tactics and operations. Clearly, maneuver warfare will bring changes in each area. What those changes need to be can best be thought through by Marines, especially Marine aviators, artillerymen, and logisticians.

Again, Marines have made great progress in understanding and beginning to implement maneuver warfare. The fact that some misconceptions have arisen is understandable and indeed inevitable. The task now is to clear up those misconceptions, deepening the understanding and expanding the experimentation. The achievements of the past decade are substantial. On the base they provide, progress can be steady and rapid toward the shared goal of improved combat effectiveness.

by Lt Col E. J. Robeson IV

War is far more complex than either the firepower-attrition or maneuver warfare models suggest. The campaigns of MajGen Nathan B. Forrest illustrate a third model that could prove devastating on the modem battlefield if we master the characteristics that made him successful.

The debate over the conflict in Indochina has prompted a renaissance in American military studies and has yielded essentially two schools of thought on how wars have been successfully fought throughout history; they are popularly known as maneuver warfare and firepower-attrition warfare.

The maneuver warfare school has been particularly vocal in advocating its position and in castigating firepower-attritionists. In fact, the debate has been singularly one-sided. Few strategists would openly advocate pure firepower-attrition (although several prominent leaders have come close in practice). Moreover, the skeptic must ask whether the firepower-attrition school is really nothing more than a “straw man” alternative developed by the maneuverists, for it has many detractors and no known champions.

I believe that warfare is much more complex than either of these two models suggests, and we should actually be striving to implement a third alternative. Let’s call it “Forrest war,” in honor of one of its foremost practitioners. MajGen Nathan Bedford Forrest, Confederate States Army (CSA).

Forrest war recognizes that both firepower and maneuver are essential components of warfare and that they must be integrated to obtain maximum effectiveness. Certainly, no one in the maneuver warfare school would argue with that; but there is a fundamental difference. Forrest war also postulates that firepower is not only essential, but that it must always come first. This is true because of the realities of war, especially at the level of the individual combatant. For the infantryman on the ground, every attack is a frontal assault. Here, weapons are for killing, wounding, or causing the enemy to cower. Assertions that a rifle is not for killing, but should be principally regarded as a means to maneuver are simply ludicrous. (Only when the rifle butt is placed under the arm and used as a crutch could a rifle be considered as a means to maneuver.) In truth, it is only after the enemy has been dominated by aggressiveness and firepower that maneuver can become an effective option at all. Educating the enemy to the consequences of firepower can be a brutal, personal struggle; but, if it is successful, it will make him susceptible to maneuver. Gen Forrest understood this very well and knew how to fully implement this third style of warfare to which we have attached his name.

Six characteristics quickly become apparent in an analysis of the art of Forrest war. These are: 1) fearsome reputation, 2) preparation and positioning, 3) surprise, 4) physical dominance through firepower, 5) moral dominance through maneuver, and 6) pursuit. Let’s look at each of these in turn.

Gen Forrest initially gained reputation during the fight for Ft. Donelson, where Union forces captured the Confederate garrison with one notable exception: Forrest‘s command, which was then a Tennessee cavalry regiment. Here, in February 1862, strong winds, sleet, and snow brutalized the Confederate garrison trapped inside the fort by superior Union forces. Forrest and other junior commanders advocated a breakout attempt, but the senior leadership faltered, even after the initial Confederate attacks were successful, and decided the garrison should be surrendered. As R. U. Johnson writes in his history of the Civil War:

Colonel Forrest promptly announced that he neither could nor would surrender his command. He requested permission from General Pillow to cut his way out. He assembled his men, all as hardy as himself, . . .moved out and plunged into a slough formed by backwater from the river. An icy crust covered the surface, the wind blew fiercely, and the darkness was unrelieved by a star. There was fearful floundering as the command followed him. At length he struck dry land, and was safe. He was next heard of at Nashville.

It is from such character and stamina that the first requirement for successful prosecution of Forrest war is derived-the establishment of a fearsome reputation.

Cultivating this irreplaceable commodity is also essential. It can only be done through demonstrated excellence in the performance of duties in the field. Forrest accomplished this at the end of the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862. Forrest‘s cavalry regiment was assigned to cover the Confederate retreat, but even here, he was a dangerous opponent. When Forrest noticed momentary confusion in Sherman’s pursuing infantry, he ordered an immediate charge. Firing their double-barreled shotguns, Forrest‘s men rode over their opponents, shooting down men by the score. Sherman himself, says W. Sword in Shiloh: Bloody April:

. . .was caught in the tumult and nearly killed. He said ‘My aide-de-camp was knocked down, horse and rider, into the mud, and I and the rest of my staff ingloriously fled pell mell. . .closely followed by Forrest and his men. . . .’

It was for actions such as these that Sylvanus Cadwallader in Three Years with Grant observed:

Forrest was the only one whom Grant sincerely dreaded, largely because he was amenable to no known rules of procedure, was law to himself for all military acts, and was constantly doing the unexpected, at all times and places.

An excellent case study that clearly demonstrates all six tenets of Forrest war can be found in the Battle of Brice’s Crossroads, MS, which took place from 10-12 June 1864, between the forces of MajGen Nathan Bedford Forrest, CSA and MajGen Samuel Davis Sturgis, USA.

By May 1864, Sherman had advanced deeply into the South and was becoming increasingly concerned over the vulnerability of his lines of communication to Forrest‘s predations. Having previously met him at Shiloh, Sherman wrote to Sturgis, “I expect to hear every day of Forrest breaking into Tennessee from some quarter.” Forrest‘s reputation had not been lost on Gen Sturgis either. When ordered to tie up Forrest in Mississippi, he reported:

The force sent out was in complete order and consisted of some of our best troops. . . .I saw to it personally that they lacked nothing to insure a successful campaign. The number of troops deemed necessary by Gen Sherman, as he telegraphed me, was 6,000, but I sent 8,000.

In fact, Sturgis sent 8,300-3 brigades of infantry, 2 of cavalry with the latest repeating carbines (“which would give them a big advantage in firepower over their butternut opponents”) and 22 field artillery pieces.

This force left Memphis on 1 June in an unrelenting rainstorm that soaked the men and flooded fields and roads, and began to slowly move south toward Tupelo, MS.

At Tupelo, Forrest made known his presence in the area (Characteristic 1), permitting his previously established reputation to begin to prepare the terms of the battle. He then demonstrated the second characteristic preparation and positioning, by collecting his 4,800-man division for the fight.

A study of the terrain, possible Union objectives, and the axis of advance of the Union troops provided Forrest the intelligence he needed to complete his preparations and position his force. He chose his battlefield just south of Tishomingo Creek, MS, now flooded by a week of rain, at Brice’s Crossroads.

Meanwhile, Sturgis’ forces continued to crawl along through the nonstop deluge and muddy roads. Discouraged by his progress, as well as by the thought of all the Confederate troops gathering ahead, Sturgis remarked in his official report that his delay could provide time needed by the rebels to “concentrate an overwhelming force against us.” Like Sturgis, Forrest was also having thoughts about the comparative force ratio. Even though Sturgis would have almost a two-to-one advantage in men, and three times as many artillery pieces, Forrest believed that boldness and the nature of the terrain, which he knew well, would make up for the numerical odds he faced. He said:

I know they greatly outnumber the troops I have at hand, but the road along which they will march is narrow and muddy; they will make slow progress. The country is densely wooded and the undergrowth so heavy that when we strike them they will not know how few men we have. . ..Their cavalry will move out ahead of their infantry and should reach the crossroads three hours in advance. We can whip their cavalry in that time. As soon as the fight opens, they will send back to have the infantry hurried in. It is going to be hot as hell, and coming on the run for five or six miles, their infantry will be so tired out we will ride right over them.

Forrest‘s sensitivity to weather and terrain is clearly seen in this analysis. He had selected a battleground to which the enemy had only one avenue of approach, the narrow, muddy Guntown Road that crossed the flooded Tishomingo Creek bottom on an elevated dirt causeway before climbing for about one-half mile in a southerly direction to Brice’s Crossroads. It was near this intersection that Forrest intended to meet the enemy, but from an easterly direction, requiring the Union forces to make a 90 degree turn as they entered the battle area. This radical change of direction would most assuredly create problems of command and control. Next day, as the rising sun began to bake steam out of the muddy fields and roads, Union cavalry moved up the hill to the crossroads to find a sense of foreboding in the air.

Forrest‘s march to this same location had begun well before dawn in the cooler hours of the day and on as many parallel routes as were available, for he had over twice as far to come.

Forrest initially had few forces available, but he opened his attack suddenly with lines of dismounted gray soldiers moving rapidly forward and fixing the lead Union cavalry units in position. These vicious frontal assaults were merely designed to buy time for his units to close and force Gen Sturgis to commit his entire force. In this, he was eminently successful. The Union cavalry brigade commanders were soon desperately crying for reinforcement or relief, and Gen Benjamin H. Grierson even asked that his division be withdrawn, as it was being “overwhelmed by numbers” and was “exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition for its rapid-firing carbines.” In fact, however, the Confederate “desperate charges” were being successfully conducted against Union forces that were much larger and which overlapped the Confederates on both flanks; the Union forces had six cannons in action and four more in reserve, while Forrest‘s guns had not yet arrived.

Meanwhile, on Guntown Road, the Union infantry brigades were marching to the sound of the guns. They were being hurried along by their officers and staff noncommissioned officers through the Mississippi summer heat. Gen McMillian was among the first to arrive at the crossroads, leading his infantry brigades and finding:

. . .everything was going to the devil as fast as it possibly could, he [McMillian] threw caution to the winds. Though many of his troops had already collapsed from heat exhaustion on the hurried approach march, and though all were blown and in great distress from the savage midday, mid-June Mississippi sun, he sent preemptory orders for his two front brigades to come up on the double quick and restore the crumbling cavalry line before the rebels overran it.

With these actions, Forrest had achieved the third important characteristic of surprise.

Physical dominance through firepower had become the key concern. Forrest had closed all his units on the battlefield, and he rode along putting the fire of battle into his lines of soldiers lying on the line of departure. At the bugle call, he had them up and surging forward. It was a brutal frontal assault, and everywhere “there was a grim struggle, much of it hand to hand, before the contest reached the climactic point and the time came to hit ’em on the ee-end.” The stage was set for the fifth characteristic-moral dominance through maneuver.

Forrest committed his final reserves, small units who were sent simultaneously around the right and left flanks of the Union lines to gain their rear. Because of the carnage occurring to their front, even veteran Union brigades were now susceptible to dislocation, and these actions “. . .made the whole line waver and cave in, first slowly, then with a rush.” As Gen Sturgis related in his official report:

Order gave way to confusion and confusion to panic. . . .Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear, and was soon altogether beyond control.

The Confederate battery along with a captured Union cannon were now playing with deadly effect along the Union escape route, and the closely pursuing Confederates ensured “. . .that every attempt to make a stand only brought on a new stampede.”

As Gen Sturgis related to Col Edward Bouton during this retreat, “. . .for God’s sake, if Mr. Forrest will let me alone, I will let him alone.” Forrest, however, had other ideas. He directed his commanders to “keep the skeer on “em,” and they did just that, past sunset and on into twilight and full night. Forrest later reported that after 8 p.m.:

It being dark and my men and horses requiring rest, . . .I threw out an advance to follow. . .after the enemy, and ordered the command to halt, feed and rest.

Pursuit was now in full operation, and unlike his contemporaries of that era, he did not see darkness as an insurmountable obstacle to further combat operations. By 1 a.m., Forrest had his troopers back in the saddle and hard on the equipment-littered trail.

By dawn, Forrest caught up with the last Federal rear guard about four miles south of Ripley, MS, and smashed it. His official report stated;

From this place, the enemy offered no further organized resistance, but retreated in the most coplete disorder, throwing away guns, clothing, and everything calculated to impede his flight.

One Union commander described it thusly:

On we went, and ever on, marching all that day and that interminable second night. . .we marched, marched, marched, without rest, without sleep, without food.

An Ohio regimental commander reported that his troops became so stiffened they needed assistance to walk. Some of them crawled upon their hands and knees. These accounts are starkly indicative of the dangers that come when units are both physically and morally beaten.

As one Union cavalry major put it:

. . .it is the fate of war that one or the other side should suffer defeat, but here there was more. The men were cowed, and there pressed upon them a sense of bitter humiliation, which rankles after nearly a quarter of a century has passed. . . Just over 8,000 troops had been thrown into a rout and driven headlong for nearly a hundred miles by just under 5,000.

What can we learn today from this exhilarating victory and tragic defeat?

First, success in combat requires an excellent professional reputation that is only obtained in peacetime through hard, uncompromising training. Secondly, preparation and positioning of friendly forces for battle must ensure that they will end the initial engagement where they are advantageously deployed for the next event. (Every billiards player understands this instinctively as he lines up his “next” shot with his current one.) This, of course, often requires modification of the open-ended mission-type orders that the maneuver school advocates. Stipulating the commander’s intent for the current battle is important, but ensuring that subunits are properly positioned for the next sequence of engagements is essential. This often requires specific instructions that detract from the freedom of subordinates. Maneuver warfare extremists decry such “how-to” instructions, but a Forrest war proponent would counter that there is a middle ground between chaos caused by subunit “free play” and rigidity caused by instructions that are unnecessarily restrictive. When Forrest chose Brice’s Crossroads as his battleground, he positioned his brigades so that he could meet the enemy there or respond to enemy initiatives elsewhere. He also enhanced the effectiveness of his surprise by permitting the enemy to extend before he struck at an unlikely time and place.

Achieving physical dominance through firepower is perhaps the single greatest difference between the contemporary definition of maneuver warfare and the tenets of Forrest war. Gen Forrest stated when describing his 30th victim in personal hand-to-hand saber/pistol combat:

You know, if that young fellow had had sense enough to give me the point, I wouldn’t be here right now; but he tried to slash, which was his last mistake.

Military commanders today should recognize Forrest‘s symbolic intent: sophisticated movement will never compensate for failure to give the enemy “the point.”

War is a grim and bloody business. Maneuverists seem to forget this fundamental fact. Clever schemes to gain the enemy’s flanks or rear may appear eloquent and even delay the day of reckoning, but sooner or later the shooting must begin. As the Germans discovered again and again during OPERATION BARBAROSSA in Russia during World War II, bold maneuvers did not disconcert Soviet soldiers. In fact, the Red Army continued to resist even when surrounded and often succeeded in getting out large bodies of troops. Soviet soldiers, cut off in severe weather for days at a time, lay without shelter on the frozen ground in defensive positions until a breakout or exfiltration could be successfully accomplished.

Failure to recognize this hardiness and professionalism in our most dangerous adversary and his relative immunity to being “dislocated” by flank attack or even encirclement is the maneuver school’s greatest error. Only after the shooting is well underway can the door to maneuver be opened with any guarantee of success against a competent adversary.

However, “giving ’em the point” through vicious application of firepower can unhinge even professional soldiers from their organizational security and ensure the disintegration that is required for total victory. Tough, not fancy, infantrymen are required for this task. Demonstration of physical dominance through firepower sets the stage for moral dominance through maneuver-and successful maneuver produces the conditions required for the culminating phase of Forrest war-the pursuit.

In summary, Gen Nathan Bedford Forrest‘s campaigns stand as fine examples of how inferior forces led by hardened commanders with proven character and reputation can dominate a larger enemy. The six characteristics or phases of Forrest warfare form a pattern of building blocks that prove devastating when properly woven together on the battlefield.

So, while maneuver warfare advocates continue to press the Marine Corps to radically change its traditional mode of operations, perhaps the more prudent action would be to have confidence and believe in ourselves, to resist the current vogue, and to remember that at the core of every conflict is a rifleman, whose every attack will be frontal and brutal, and whose weapon is for killing, not for maneuver. The more effectively we institutionalize this truth in the souls of all Marines, the better able we will be to fight, maneuver, and pursue on the battlefields of tomorrow.

by Maj Gary W. Anderson

In the past decade the maneuver–attrition debate has forced the Marine Corps to examine and reevaluate some of its doctrinal concepts. One major element in the debate is the use of the term “maneuver warfare” and its corresponding association with the Wehrmacht. Unfortunately, use of German terms offends older officers who remember the “krauts” only as twotime losers. Even worse, the maneuver label has a whole bunch of lieutenants looking for tanks and armored personnel carriers that the Marine Corps doesn’t own, can’t afford, and couldn’t get to an objective area on time. Word has it that the uniform shop at Quantico has run short of Rommel glasses.

Maneuver warfare, as I understand the term, has a lot less to do with maneuver than it does with exploiting the mental and physical weakness of one’s opponents. Maneuverists stress that the secret of victory is in the process of helping the enemy to lose battles and campaigns. This is really what novelist Gordon Dickson calls the “Tactics of Mistake.” Quite simply, most of history’s battles have been lost rather than won. This article attempts to take the concepts of tactical and operational employment away from the Hegelian extremes of maneuver and firepower attrition. It will explore the art of finding the enemy’s weak links and exploiting them by helping him to beat himself. It is not a rejection of maneuver, but seeks to examine the tactical and operational realm from another angle.

The term “Schwerpunkt,” or focus of effort, conveys the idea that there is an actual physical point where any enemy should be attacked. Maneuverists would admit that this point can be mental as well as physical, but this idea isn’t communicated well enough. The tactics of mistake can be applied defensively as well as offensively. George Patton realized that they are best applied offensively, but even he knew that there are other ways to get inside the enemy’s “turning circle.”

History is replete with examples of battles being won through simple tactical error rather than initiative and tactical flair. At Crecy, and later at Agincourt, English leaders found sound defensive positions and dug in for an attritional battle. Their order of battle combined the longbow, wielded by sturdy English yeomen, with armored knights. The decisive factor in the battle hinged not on the range of the longbows, but rather on the illdiscipline of the French noblemen, who persisted in launching a series of uncoordinated attacks on English positions where they were slaughtered piecemeal.

At Hastings, the battle turned not on William the Conqueror’s audacious, daring leadership, but on the excessive zeal of the Saxon’s right wing, which broke ranks at the moment of perceived victory to pursue the withdrawing Normans and was subsequently routed. William may not have fought Hastings brilliantly, but he took advantage of that single Saxon mistake to gain an empire. Douglas MacArthur emulated William on a grand scale in 1950 when he identified the North Korean weakness to be a supply line that was vulnerable from the sea. His decision to land at Inchon exploited this weakness to the fullest.

The ability to see the enemy’s weakness and exploit it is emphasized by Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), in his theory of the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) cycle, but Boyd does not effectively cover the whole potential of the tactics of mistake. Some enemies simply don’t have OODA loops that are complicated and efficient enough to disrupt. For instance, the Soviets have launched numerous combined arms campaigns designed to paralyze the command, control, and communications of the Afghan resistance, but the Afghans simply don’t have a system that is susceptible to conventionaltype attack. Some observers point out that the Soviets, realizing this, have adjusted their tactics accordingly. Hence, they are now attempting to remove the local population so the guerrillas won’t have any “sea of people” to swim in. Further, these observers believe that the current Soviet terror campaign is a calculated attempt to drive the population out of vital areas in order to repopulate them with Russians or other “safe” Soviet citizens. This ruthless method of dealing with a hostile population worked in the Baltic states following World War II. It is an example of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach in a most brutal form.

The ability to exploit the weakness and mistakes of an enemy is the mark of true military genius. Alexander the Great possessed it at the tactical and operational levels. On the tactical level at Arbela in 331 B.C. he spotted a break in the Persian lines that allowed him to lead a brilliant cavalry charge that disrupted his opponent’s command group, throwing the numerically superior Persians into confusion. Operationally, Alexander had already beaten the superior Persian Navy by marching over land and destroying its seaports with his army. Denied its ports, the Persian Navy died before the Persian Army could react to support it. In both cases Alexander had the foresight to see his enemy’s weakness and react to it before the enemy force could learn from its own mistakes.

In early 1945 George Patton was continually frustrated by Gen Eisenhower’s attempts to construct a theater reserve following the Bulge offensive in December 1944. Patton instinctively knew that the Germans had exhausted themselves in the Bulge campaign. He opted for attack everywhere with all available forces. He could see the weakness of the enemy and wanted to exploit it while the time was ripe.

Despite these examples of successful maneuver, there are numerous examples in military history of ill-conceived maneuver that led to disaster. In 1876, LtCol George Armstrong Custer divided his small command of the 7th Cavalry in order to surprise an Indian encampment on the Little Big Horn River. In other circumstances Sitting Bull and company might have retreated as had other Indian forces, but the desperate Plains Indians were fighting for their lives when they attacked Custer’s small party, and in all likelihood they would have attacked any U.S. force of even greater size out of sheer desperation.

In the heat of battle Custer made a decision that a good maneuverist would approve of; he issued a mission-oriented order to Capt Fred Benteen, one of two subunit commanders detailed to carry out Custer’s plan. The order, dispatched by Custer’s trumpeter, read as follows: “Benteen-Come on. Big village bring packs. P.S. bring pacs.” (Spelling incorrection Custer’s own.) Benteen and Capt Marcus Reno didn’t respond to that order in timely fashion. There are any number of speculations as to why the order wasn’t followed, and there is good evidence that the result wouldn’t have been much different had Custer’s order been obeyed. Despite this, it is obvious that Benteen and Reno had no idea of their commander’s intent.

Custer used a clearly maneuverist reconnaissance pull approach in a situation where the tactics of mistake would indicate that an attritionist method of deliberate pursuit with a far larger force would have been more appropriate. Custer and the Indians both fought a bad battle, but Custer ran out of troops before Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse ran out of Indians. One could score this as an example of firepower attrition over maneuver, but it would more appropriately be chalked up to the tactics of mistake.

The difference between Custer in 1876 and Patton in 1945 was that Patton had correctly identified the enemy’s weakness. Patton knew his enemy, and he updated his knowledge continuously. Custer used a formula that had worked before, but he didn’t update it to meet the existing situation. This is a superb example of a maneuverist being defeated by allowing his own weakness to be exploited.

Gen U. S. Grant is much maligned as an attritionist, but many historians forget his brilliant Vicksburg campaign that, as J. F. C. Fuller points out, was a splendid example of maneuver. When faced with a tactically superior Gen Robert E. Lee, Grant applied the tactics of mistake. Grant knew that Lee had two great weaknesses-a paucity of replacement soldiers and a vulnerable southern supply system. By using Sherman to disrupt the supply system, Grant solved the greatest strategic problem. Grant’s operational plan of fighting Lee anywhere he could be engaged may have been mediocre, but it addressed Lee’s other great weakness. Again, the tactics of mistake transcended the attrition–maneuver arena and compensated for the relatively less competent Union personnel.

The maneuverists have been accused of overemphasizing blitzkrieg tactics, but in reality that’s not the case. One of their favorite historical examples is the early Israeli-Arab conflict, where the Israelis learned that Arab forces wouldn’t stand against a bayonet attack. This seemingly un-Israeli frontal assault tactic had a “breaking glass” effect along the entire front, having an effect all out of proportion to the actual attacks. This condition was repeated in the Falklands where the threat of the Gurkhas was far more effective than their actual physical presence.

The failure of Japanese cold steel in the Pacific from 1942-1945 and the ineffectiveness of the Gurkhas in Afghanistan in the 18th century are other examples of the situational nature of the tactics of mistake. Disciplined troops and religious fanatics are usually immune to panic at the appearance of bayonets.

The real key to the tactics of mistake is to create an atmosphere of confusion among your enemies. Once this atmosphere has been created, timely exploitation should follow. The following paragraphs expand on this theme:

Knowing One’s Enemy

George S. Patton, Jr., often observed that the only way to truly learn about one’s opponent is to fight him in a real battle. This experience must be updated constantly, even in the heat of battle. This concept is inextricably tied to the principle of mission-oriented orders and the ability to learn from experience. Let’s take a scenario: In a mideast campaign our best estimate of the prebattle situation tells us that the enemy will not stand up to sustained firepower. In actuality he moves smartly through all our suppressive fire and uses his own firepower effectively to suppress ours. However, we discover that he slows and stops when he runs low on ammunition. The obvious reaction to this is to find a way to go after his ammunition supply or to make him outrun it. What can easily get lost in the analysis is the ability to recognize this as an enemy weakness at the high command level in the first place. This is only possible if a “real time” lessons-learned communications link exists from the platoon level to the highest echelons of command. Some Marine Corps units do this instinctively, others never get the hang of it. We must institutionalize this art.

Wargaming in peacetime can help systematize this link if it is properly employed. First, it can help to develop a true team approach in rapidly identifying an enemy’s mistakes and weaknesses. Second, it can show us how to quickly disseminate those lessons back down to all elements of the command. Finally, and most important, wargaming can encourage us to develop a mission-oriented approach to making the enemy’s weak points the real objectives of our operations. Wargaming lets us learn about the enemy in an effective way.

The Danger of Reconnaissance Pull

The maneuverists make a good point that warfare shouldn’t be a function of checklists, but even the very progressive 2d Marine Division has an element on its Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) checklist that reads, “Did they use recon-pull tactics?” Reconnaissance pull has caused its users as many defeats as victories, if not more. Custer at the Little Big Horn, Varus at the Teutoberg Forest, and Samsonov at Tannenberg were all using a variation of this form when each met his respective demise. Reconnaissance is only one element of intelligence, and it shouldn’t be used in the absence of a feel for the character of the enemy. In the hands of Alexander against Darius III at Arbela, reconnaissance pull was masterful. In the case of Custer against the desperate Plains Indians, it was disastrous. Reconnaissance pull can be a brilliant exploitation or a disastrous ambush-such are the tactics of mistake.

Cohesiveness or Groupthink; A Fine Line

Adm Nelson’s “band of brothers” concept was one of the first articulations of the concept of mission-oriented orders, but there is a dark side to the concept. The phenomenon of “groupthink” can develop where a team becomes so cohesive that it cannot accept ideas contrary to its preconceived notions. Irving Janis identified this as one of the contributing factors to the debacles at Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs. A military force that cannot update its perceptions to accept changes in the external environment is more than half beaten before it becomes decisively engaged.

Nothing dies harder than a preconceived notion. In any large military organization, hundreds of rice bowls get knocked over when an element of doctrine fails to live up to expectations, but true military tactical greatness is the ability to recognize these failures early and change them. Erich F. W. von Ludendorff, our own H. M. Smith, Erwin Rommel, and George Patton were masters at this. Each in his own way was a genius at recognizing the strengths and limitations of his own forces as well as those of the enemy. All of those great commanders could translate these lessons into effective battlefield action. The crux of these skills lies first in the recognition of the enemy’s true weakness and the second in the ability to exploit that weakness in a timely manner. Let’s take a look at a theoretical example:

In an attempt to break out of the force beachhead line (Figure 1), a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) commander encounters heavy resistance from enemy dug in a series of villages (A). Intelligence reports indicate that a reinforced Soviet-equipped motorized rifle battalion (MRB) is moving southeast toward the road junction (B). The MAB commander orders a reinforced rifle company from the MAB reserve to conduct a helicopterborne assault to seize (B) and delay the enemy MRB until (A) can be reduced. While flying over the brush country (C), the helicopters come under severe surprise attack from a squadron of Mi-24 Hind helicopters covered by jet fighters. Three CH-46s and two Cobras are lost; the attacking force turns back. In a hurried debrief, the surviving helicopter pilots and infantry officers confirm there was no ground fire or sightings of ground troops along the entire axis of (C). They also report numerous trails that didn’t show up on the maps. Reconnaissance teams inserted into the area confirm that it is free of enemy troops except for patrols; they further report that the woods are trafficable for armored and wheeled vehicles.

The MAB commander concludes that the opposing force is covering its flanks with airpower alone. Accordingly, he adjusts his main effort. Figure 2 shows the adjusted scheme of maneuver. The MAB commander knows that the enemy is surprised and is launching his counterattacks piecemeal; the MAB commander had identified the enemy’s counterattack force as the main area of weakness to be exploited through the medium of a two battalion attack through the woods at (B). This opens the Soviet force to the possibility of attack from the flank (Figure 2) or the rear (Figure 3) depending on the relative progress of the MRB making the counterattack. By employing a two-battalion flank attack, the MAB commander has changed the focus of his effort from a frontal attack to the flank in order to exploit the enemy weakness.

This quick identification of the source of enemy vulnerability is the real key to the concept of the tactics of mistake. In this case the combatants quickly reported the break on the MAB’s right flank, and the commander reacted to their observations in a timely fashion. This is much more easily written than accomplished. Despite what you choose to call it, maneuver warfare or the tactics of mistake, the success of such an operation depends upon early recognition of the enemy’s vulnerability, followed by the timely exploitation of that weakness.

Exploiting the tactics of mistake requires a true team effort. German buzzwords aside, a commander needs to keep asking one question . . . “How can these guys best be beat?” The key to victory resides in finding the answer to that simple question in a timely manner.

Bill Lind is correct when he points out that we can look backward for inspiration. In World War II up to the battle of Peleliu, Marines were able to use the Japanese banzai charge against the Japanese by inviting such forays over ground chosen by Marine commanders. These charges were generally considered to be the backbreaking climax of the battle because they drained the Japanese of their manpower. These defensive Marine Corps tactics didn’t celebrate firepower attrition any more than they rejected maneuver. By exploiting the Japanese tendency to play into the hands of our superior firepower, Marine planners validated the tactics of mistake . . . there is a lesson in that for us all.

The maneuverists have a lot of good ideas, but a position that ultimately rejects either firepower attrition or maneuver would be a step down the road to perdition. By thinking in terms of the tactics of mistake, we can start to develop a frame of reference that will help the enemy beat himself while allowing us to use our forces most effectively. The truly great organizations of military history have developed a corporate feel for the destruction of the enemy. Today’s training environment with assets such as the multiple integrated laser engagement system, modern wargaming, and the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms can come close to giving the Marine Corps that capability before the first shot is fired. If we don’t maximize those assets, we have no one to blame but ourselves.

Quote to Ponder:

The “Information War”

“The improvements in sensing, electronic warfare, and command, control, and communications bring the “information war” to the forefront. The attempt to gain an information advantage by observing the other side’s forces and activities while denying them such information about one’s own forces becomes a primary rather than an ancillary part of direct conflict.”

-Seymour J. Deitchman

in “Weapons, Platforms, and the New Armed Services,”

Issues In Science and Techology, spring 1985.

by Maj A. C. Bevilacqua, USMC(Ret)

This astute observation on the employment of maneuver to achieve a decisive advantage could be considered as a capsule discourse on maneuver warfare in general. While at first glance it might appear to be an extract from the sudden plethora of contemporary writings on mobile operations and the indirect approach, it is in fact one of the maxims of an American of an earlier time-LtGen Thomas Jonathan Jackson, CSA. Known to history as “Stonewall,” and to his devoted soldiers as “Old Jack,” Jackson, who never ceased seeking to employ this dictum on the battlefield, comes down through the years as one of America’s premier practitioners of the art of maneuver. His Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 and his last, greatest success at Chancellorsville the following year are still accepted as classic applications of maneuver in order to, “. . . hurl your entire force against only a part, and that the weakest part, of the enemy and crush it.”

This was Jackson’s appreciation of applying the maximum force at the critical time and placemaneuver not merely to dazzle the enemy but to create the opportunity to utterly and absolutely smash him. Far better than many of his day and ours, Jackson understood maneuver not as an end in itself but as the means to an end. That end being the exercise of tactical initiative in dictating the terms of battle.

A century and more have come and gone since Jackson sent his grey-coated infantry, “Howling,” in the words of one Union officer, “like all the demons from the pit set loose,” against the exposed flank of Gen Oliver O. Howard’s hapless XI Corps in the tangled woodlands below the Rappahannock. The intervening years have witnessed astounding changes in the technology of warfare. Today’s battlefields bear but a faint resemblance to those that Jackson knew so well. Still, the modern commander seeking to utilize maneuver to destroy an enemy remains faced with the same requirement that confronted Jackson as he sat in his last council of war with Lee in the lengthening shadows of a spring evening in 1863. Before the weakest link in the enemy chain can be smashed, it must first be identified and located.

Implications For Combat Intelligence

Thereby hangs the thread that inextricably weaves combat intelligence into the fabric of tactical operations in general and maneuver operations in particular. Perhaps more so than any other form of the military art, maneuver warfare poignantly illustrates that combat intelligence is decidedly not a combat support function. Instead, maneuver warfare provides solid evidence that combat intelligence is an integral component of combat, an element of combat power, and the prime means by which the commander can effectively apply that power at the decisive time and place. The critical areas of maneuver warfare, based upon the terrain to be negotiated and the enemy who must be destroyed, are without exception combat intelligence-dependent. Bereft of combat intelligence in these vital areas, the commander’s decisionmaking is reduced to haphazard guesswork, and maneuver becomes a minuet of the blind.

Yet it may justifiably be argued that these observations are not confined to a maneuver environment but are applicable to all forms of combat. Regardless of the specific form of combat, the commander is universally faced with the need for crucial information concerning the enemy and the environment. Command decisionmaking is a process of analyzing and evaluating risk. In this process, the objective of all combat intelligence is to eliminate or reduce the commander’s unknown risks.

Why, then, should there be any peculiar actions required of the intelligence structure in a maneuver environment if it creates no new or unique decisionmaking concerns for the commander? The answer lies in two distinct areas. First is the tendency of maneuver operations to encourage rnisperceptions of the purposes and procedures of combat intelligence. Second is that maneuver operations can change certain elements of the commander’s decisionmaking process.

Misperceprions and the Altered Combat Environment

Can a simple misperception of the purposes of combat intelligence be a near guarantee of failure? If this misperception exists on the part of the commander who directs the intelligence effort, the intelligence structure could go rocketing off in the wrong direction.

What misperceptions should the commander, or the intelligence officer himself for that matter, be on guard against? There are two such errors, and each is representative of an erroneous assumption of fact. First among these is the idea that the mission of the intelligence structure is to tell the commander what the enemy is doing, rather than what the enemy will be doing in the future. The second misperception can arise from regarding the enemy as a mere target array and considering the mission of the intelligence structure as designating an endless supply of targets for supporting arms.

What is quickly discernible is that in neither case is the command provided combat intelligence that will help resolve his unknown risks in the decisionmaking process. In the midst of an engagement in progress, the enemy situation is a known factor, derived from many battlefield reports. To rivet the efforts of the intelligence structure on this known element means that future enemy situations will remain unknown. Likewise, concentrating the intelligence effort on the acquisition of targets deprives the commander of vital decision-oriented intelligence. This latter condition encourages the enemy to be seen as nothing more than a passive, inert display of targets rather than a dynamic combat entity capable of the free exercise of will.

The potential for further aggravating these conditions is present in the very nature of maneuver operations, which, by their urgency and immediacy, tend to center command and staff attention on the engagement in progress. While this is a natural reaction to known events, it prevents the intelligence structure from looking at the future engagement that may take place this afternoon, tomorrow morning, or the day after. The mission of the intelligence structure in a maneuver environment remains unchanged: to provide the commander with decision-oriented combat intelligence of what the enemy will do at a given time in the future. Combat intelligence, then, is predictive, not reactive, in nature. This observation is especially valid in a maneuver environment where the commander must rapidly shift his thoughts to new missions and objectives.

In evaluating how maneuver operations alter the commander’s decisionmaking process, it is necessary to understand how maneuver operations alter the combat environment itself. In brief, maneuver operations dramatically alter the elements of time and space with which the commander must think, plan, and act.

The conduct of high speed, high intensity tactical operations reduces the time available for the commander’s decisionmaking process on a battlefield, where friendly and enemy forces are separated not only by space but also by time. Fast moving, highly mobile forces can rapidly traverse long distances and quickly shrink the time in which the commander may think, decide, plan, and act. Despite this, the requirement for the commander to arrive at timely, sound decisions remains unchanged.

Along with a reduced dimension of time, maneuver operations simultaneously expand the dimension of space in the employment of combat power and logistical support. The same mobile forces that are capable of such rapid movement can also operate over far larger distances, presenting the commander with much greater areas of influence and interest.

These same alterations to the combat environment that so markedly affect the commander’s decisionmaking process are transmitted directly to the intelligence structure. Simply stated, the intelligence structure will have less time in which to perform the same functions and produce the same material. Time, that most precious and most finite of battlefield commodities, will assume an even greater importance in the conduct of combat intelligence operations.

The increased dimension of space is also immediately transmitted to the intelligence structure. The vastly expanded areas of influence and interest facing the commander will confront the intelligence structure, requiring that the command intelligence effort encompass a far larger geographic area. First, the intelligence structure will be faced with collecting an increased amount of intelligence information from more widely scattered locations. For example, while a static tactical environment may present requirements for intelligence information collection no more than 30 miles forward of friendly forces, in a maneuver operation the collection of intelligence information could be undertaken as much as 300 miles or more in advance of the friendly force.

Operating in an Altered Environment

How does the intelligence structure perform in less time, and how does it produce intelligence of a greater geographic area with no increase in assets? This is the quandary facing the intelligence officer in a maneuver environment. Despite its seeming complexity, the problem is not insoluble.

Quite the contrary, the dilemma of attempting to do more in a shorter time with the same resources can be solved by applying one condition to the other. Specifically, the intelligence officer must use the increased dimension of space to offset the decreased dimension of time. The only way the intelligence structure can offset its reduced time is to extend the range of the intelligence effort in spacewhich automatically extends the commander’s available time.

To find the key in applying space to time, it is necessary to appreciate one of the most basic precepts of combat intelligence-namely, that all combat intelligence is derived from raw intelligence information, and that the resultant combat intelligence will be only as good as the intelligence information on which it is based.

Fundamental to this axiom is the requirement that all intelligence information collection be undertaken only as a planned effort. To fail in this requirement is to run afoul of the incontestable fact that intelligence information exists in staggering quantity and widely disparate quality. The unplanned, random collection of intelligence information in response to vague generalities will invariably result in paralysis due to information overload. Moreover, much of this information may be neither necessary, appropriate, nor accurate, and may or may not address command intelligence objectives and the commander’s unknown risks. Planning for the acquisition of intelligence information, an elementary task in all combat intelligence operations, is the critical element of combat intelligence in a maneuver environment.

With this in mind, it may be seen as necessary that each potential combat mission be analyzed by the commander, the operations officer, and the intelligence officer. This introduction of the intelligence officer into what is essentially the second step in the sequence of command and staff action may seem mildly surprising on face value. However, while it is readily understood that all missions generate tactical objectives, it is not as well appreciated that intelligence objectives are also generated. If these intelligence objectives are to in fact be the intelligence objectives of the command, the intelligence officer should be party to the decisionmaking process from the outset.

The need for the intelligence officer to participate in the analysis of the combat mission is doubly important, since all intelligence objectives are part and parcel of tactical objectives; the two are inseparable, each dependent upon the other. If such a procedure is followed, the intelligence objectives will appear as concise statements of the commander’s unknown risks-determining information requirements, which is the third step in the sequence of command and staff action. Following this process, the intelligence officer has laid down the needed groundwork for future efforts in applying the dimension of space to the dimension of time.

In compensating space for time, think of the commander who constantly evaluates situations in terms of time and space necessary to overcome an enemy force before it can be withdrawn or reinforced. He requires an accurate determination of how far away the enemy is in distance and how long it will take the enemy to make contact. In neither instance will a simple map location suffice. For each enemy force capable of influencing the mission, there must be a careful calculation of distance, which in turn must be converted into an element of time. Given, for instance, a friendly axis and rate of advance, how long will it be before the enemy force will be encountered? Or, given the present location of an enemy unit, how long will it take that unit to reach a position that might impact on the friendly course of action?

To ensure that this element of decisionmaking is available to the commander in time to allow him to act, the collection of intelligence information must be undertaken at far greater range and depth. The intelligence structure must extend its reach beyond the engagement in progress and obtain the information needed for combat intelligence bearing upon the next battle. If the intelligence structure is successful in extending the distance of its operations, it has automatically increased the dimension of time in which to function. Provided that the information thereby collected satisfies the identified intelligence objectives of the command, it will in almost every instance be possible to present the commander with decisionoriented combat intelligence in terms of hours . . . or yes, even days-instead of minutes.

It must be noted, however, that adequately extending the reach of the intelligence structure to overcome the compression of time is dependent upon the available means. Both the range and mobility of information collection agencies are important factors. Presently, aerial multisensor imagery, aerial electronic reconnaissance, and certain national-level overhead systems provide the most practicable means of realizing this requirement. These aerial information collection systems can project the collection effort hundreds of miles forward, shift from one area to another, and subject large areas to scrutiny. These systems represent the best means of stretching the range of the collection effort, and by so doing, expanding the dimension of time.

On the other hand, ground reconnaissance units and other ground-based information collection means are generally lacking in range and mobility. While the advent of the light armored vehicle (LAV) may open new possibilities in the employment of ground-based collection agencies, it must be recognized that, at present, these kinds of collection agencies are constrained to predominantly static roles. The employment of groundbased information collection agencies in depth will offer the best method of offsetting their inherent lack of mobility and range. In this fashion, amoving enemy force no longer within range of one collection element may be picked up by another and surveillance maintained.

It becomes apparent that the careful planning of the intelligence effort, with special emphasis on the collection of intelligence information, is the only guarantee of success. This requirement is fundamental to intelligence operations in any environment. But then, so much of all combat is basics, isn’t it? Regardless, if these fundamentals are provided for, the resulting collection effort will be able to trade space for time in a manner not usually associated with that term.

The Need for Conclusions

Eventually, as in all forms of combat, but particularly in a maneuver environment, the intelligence structure must present the commander with decision-oriented combat intelligence in the form of conclusions. These conclusions must state with reasonable accuracy what the enemy will do at a given time in the future.

However, the necessity for conclusions runs headlong into one of the most enduring arguments of the intelligence profession: should conclusions be strictly confined to enemy capabilities or should there be an appraisal of intentions in addition?

Or is it possible that there is an alternative consideration? Namely, that the argument is predominantly one of semantics.

The point has already been made that the enemy is an independent being with a will of his own. Further, the enemy is free to exercise his will and is not confined to one course of action. Of those capabilities available to the enemy, the one that will eventually be executed will be the one favored by time, space, terrain, and the situation. To identify this action, it is once again necessary to view the enemy situation as it will exist in the future, since it is for the future, not the present, that the commander must plan.

Can this be done? Provided that the proper steps have been taken to collect the intelligence information needed, the answer is always, yes. The enemy situation as it existed yesterday and as it exists now-the engagement in progress, expanded by the latest intelligence information collected in depthbecomes the basis for projecting the future enemy situation. In predicting future courses of action, the key lies in recognizing that the enemy will almost invariably undertake that course of action for which he has prepared. The constant question-and the central theme of the intelligence effort is this: What tactical activity is the enemy making preparations for?

What will the enemy do in the future? He will do what he is preparing for in the present. No military activity occurs spontaneously from a vacuum. Every tactical action requires certain logical, predictable, and identifiable preparations. If enemy preparations can be identified, the capability to be executed will be identified accordingly. Provided with an identification of the enemy’s future tactical actions, the commander can successfully compare his own future course of action with that of the enemy in reaching a combat decision.

It would seem that the argument of capabilities and intentions may very well be more one of semantics than substance. A carefully planned and properly conducted intelligence effort can unfailingly provide the commander with sound conclusions concerning the future enemy situation. In a maneuver environment such an effort is a precondition to success. Without it, the commander must be willing to accept an alternative spelling of maneuver-m-u-d-d-l-e.