Archives: Gazette Magazines

by the Staff, MCWL

The Marine Corps experience in the 21st century so far has been characterized by longterm stability and counterinsurgency operations against insurgent forces and terrorist organizations, a situation which necessitated a focus on the demands of land operations against such enemies. However, the evolving nature of the operating environment now requires a recalibration toward restoring our maritime focus and ensuring our decisive advantage over peer and nearpeer adversaries. The operating environment of the 21st century requires a MAGTF trained and equipped to counter emerging threats and exploit emerging technology and capabilities.

The Marine Corps Operating Concept {MOC), {HQMC, Washington, DC: 2016) guides our collective efforts to ensure the Marine Corps’ future readiness and relevancy. It is intended to describe in broad terms how the Marine Corps will operate, fight, and win in 2025 and beyond, as well as to shape our actions as we design and develop the capabilities and capacity of the future force. The MOC describes the 21st century MAGTF as one that:

conducts maneuver warfare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict to generate and exploit psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages over the adversary. The 21st Century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach that embraces information warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains-air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The 21st Century MAGTF avoids linear, sequential, and phased approaches to operations and blends maneuver warfare and combined arms to generate combat power needed for simultaneity of action in its full range of missions. The 21st century MAGTF operates and fights at sea, from the sea, and ashore as an integrated part of the Naval force and the larger Combined/Joint force.

Essential to how we operate is our identity as a maritime force. The Marine Corps operates as a forward naval expeditionary force allowing persistent engagement within potential threat areas. Operating forward, the Marine Corps is postured within contested space under potential adversary threats. In the event of potential conflict, the MAGTF can distribute and fight forward to hold key terrain and assist in maritime security, deterrence, and sea control by denying freedom of action along key sea lines of communication. The key to fighting forward is integrating into the naval/joint force, winning the battle of signatures, maintaining maritime domain awareness, and integrating Marine Corps strike capabilities (aviation, unmanned swarms, and missiles) in the naval fight for sea control.

Currently, MAGTFs employ effective and relevant capabilities across air, land, and sea domains. To make the MAGTF more relevant and capable ?n the future, the Marine Corps must integrate space and employ cyberspace capabilities ?n addition to enhancing our capabilities across all five domains. Once realized, the Marine Corps will achieve the vision laid out in theMOC to provide an enhanced, expeditionary, multi-domain force to the nation.

The Marine Corps is pursuing technological enhancements to support amphibious and expeditionary operations so that they may maneuver in a distrib- uted manner with reduced signatures in order to mass and concentrate effects as the mission dictates. Coincident with technology integration is the development of new and updated doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to fully realize the potential of the 21st century MAGTF.

This effort is underpinned by a campaign of learning that integrates force development and Operating Forces’ concerns to understand and solve our most vexing warfighting challenges. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, as a driver of innovation, has re-instituted the SEA DRAGON experiment campaign designed to explore the changes necessary to thrive ?n the future operating environment. Through the development of an innovation portal, MCWL captures the best ideas from individual Marines to identify best practices and incorporate emerging ideas into the experimentation campaign.

We have actively sought to create enduring relationships between concept developers and technology developers through our Advanced Naval Technical Experiment (ANTX) series. This series was started with the Ship-to-Shore Maneuver Experimentation and Exploration (S2ME2) Task Force, established by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. This process pairs Naval Warfare Center engineers with operational Marines in an in-depth examination of an operational problem set to see what capabilities are required and what technology is ?n the realm of possibility to help solve ?t. After a series of workshops, wargames, and exercises, best-of-breed technologies from industry, academia, and government labs are assessed and selected for rapid prototyping, limited fielding, or entry into the acquisition process.

In 2017, MCWL conducted a S2ME2 demonstration held at Camp Pendleton, CA. The S2ME2 provided a forum for civilian entrepreneurs and government scientists to showcase new and innovative technologies for Marine Corps evaluation in an innovative program to accelerate the identification of new, operationally relevant technologies. This initiative ?s one component of an expansive program to identify and advance promising capabilities in areas of networked command and control; networked sensors and weapons, autonomy, manned-unmanned teaming, and robotics; precision effects; and cognitive computing.

In 2018, the ANTX rapid prototyping process will be Urban 5th Generation (U5G) operations, focusing on the company level and below. At Camp Pendleton, CA, Operating Forces will assess technologies suited to urban operations over a two-week period. Promising technologies will be identified for rapid prototyping and inclusion in follow-on experiments or large-scale exercises. In 2019, MCWL will shift the ANTX series to look at technologies that will support expeditionary advanced-base operations.

Ultimately, it will be through these and other innovative efforts that the Marine Corps will develop the methods and means to achieve the following ideas as listed ?n the MOC:

* Integrate the naval force to fight at and from the sea: To support deterrence, sea control, and power projection, the Marine Corps must operate in all domains as part of an integrated naval force. To do so requires additional capability and capacity in a wider variety of naval platforms, integrated Navy/Marine commands and staffs, tailored capabilities that support sea control and power projection missions, integrated command structures, and shared naval concepts such as littoral operations in a contested environment.

* Devise and refine an approach to operate from more diverse platforms and expeditionary advanced bases as part of a naval campaign.

* Employ fire support systems (antiship missiles and unmanned swarms) to affect sea control.

* Integrate weapons, sensors, and command and control into naval command and control architecture, supported by expanded experimentation and naval exercises.

* Ensure the interoperability of Marine and Navy command and control systems while increasing integration with combined/joint force maritime component commands.

* Evolve the MAGTF: The 21st century MAGTF must retain the essential advantages conferred by its inherent flexibility. The MAGTF requires the ability to fight as an integrated naval and joint partner integrating command, control, and informational tools as well as MAGTF and special operations capabilities; the ability to rapidly composite MAGTFs ?n forward locations; the ability to fight as distributable forces; the exploitation of automation technologies; and a total force approach to readiness.

* Pursue an aggressive wargaming experimentation exercise program that leverages thinking adversaries, force-on-force training, and live, virtual, and constructive capabilities.

* Develop capabilities that support a forward expeditionary posture.

* Develop autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to enhance how we operate.

* Fully leverage advanced aviation capabilities that contribute to force protection through a layered a?r-defense capability, combining airborne defensive counter-air with persistent ground-based air defense and integrating command and control and networked sensors to allow target engagement closer to a weapon’s maximum effective range, effectively increasing the range and depth of protection coverage.

* Operate with resilience in a contested-network environment: The modern battlefield is saturated in information and digital network technology, which presents both opportunities and challenges. We must maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum, establish and defend networks that support increased situational awareness and higher-tempo operations, exploit networking for rapid and precise fire support, utilize the processing power of modern computers at the tactical edge, and expand and enhance military intelligence concepts.

* Reduce the electromagnetic signature of the 21st century MAGTF and employ low-signature, reliable digital communications networks.

* Provide persistent, multi-spectral battlespace awareness for the MAGTF through a family of sensorequipped manned and unmanned aircraft.

* Provide a protected, long-range, integrated command and control network that enhances the capacity to gain and maintain an understanding of friendly and enemy environments.

* Develop layers of persistent multispectral armed unmanned systems to cue, target, and provide kinetic and non-kinetic fires.

* Institutionalize the MEF information groups to employ informationrelated capabilities such as electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and spacebased systems.

* Develop and train a viable missioncommand framework to continue operations when communications are degraded or denied and positive control is not feasible.

* Enhance our ability to maneuver: Operating ?n all five dimensions requires maneuver in and through five dimensions. This includes naval and littoral maneuver, a broader concept of combined arms that includes information warfare, enhancing our ability to fight in and through urban environments and complex terrain, improving the mobility of ground combat and logistics forces, employing a mix of light and heavy forces, sustaining distributed forces through expeditionary logistics, and exploiting operational energy.

* Employ modern, highly mobile and protected vehicles, connectors, and mobility systems incorporating unmanned sub-surface, ground, and air vehicles.

* Enhance our armored mobility to support maneuver on land and from the sea.

* Develop effective stand-off detection and breaching capabilities for operations in the urban littorals.

* Develop a hybrid logistics system (built on existing capabilities + AM, unmanned distribution, sense and respond capabilities, and improved integration with naval, joint, and Defense Logistics Agency enterprises) to support distributable forces across a dynamic and fully contested battlespace-because iron mountains of supply and lakes of liquid fuel are liabilities and not supportive of maneuver warfare.

* Employ unmanned systems and automation at all echelons and in every domain because mastering the man-machine interface offers a revolution ?n military operations.

* Continue to experiment with concepts and emerging technologies to enhance energy storage, distribution, and throughput capability to support maneuver forces.

* Reduce our dependency on fuel using emerging energy generation technologies.

* Exploit the competence of the individual Marine: With the emergence and proliferation of new technologies and capabilities, the only distinguishing feature between our forces and our adversaries’ may be the qualities of the individual Marine. The power of the MAGTF rests squarely on the quality of our individual Marines. Current Marines have grown up and thrived in a digital, interconnected, federated, and fast-paced environment. Our young Marines are naturally adept at creatively employing an ever-changing set of tools. The Marine Corps must continue to adapt itself as an institution in order to take advantage of those strengths, from the bottom up, while we cultivate the strong moral and ethical foundation demanded by our complex operating environment. Recognizing that the U.S. Marine ?s the Marine Corps’ decisive and unique advantage, the Service must expand opportunities and mechanisms for Marines to reach their full potential, using the training and education continuum to leverage their unique strengths and skills. The Marine Corps can achieve this vision using tough and realistic training against a thinking and determined adversary and by incorporating technology that augments the capabilities of the individual Marine.

* Expand enlisted education opportunities and reinforce MOS progression training to foster Marines as tactical and technical experts in their field.

* Incorporate live, virtual, and constructive training events against a realistic and adaptive adversary to fully exercise and strengthen decision-making skills across the force.

* Adopt human resources systems to better foster unit cohesion, professional development, and readiness.

* Institutionalize “trust-based” tactics through leaders that coach and mentor through mission commandstyle orders and foster team-focused command climate at all levels.

* Set the moral, mental, and physical standards for Marines across the MAGTF through a mission-driven perspective that fully recognizes the demands on expeditionary forces conducting operations ?n austere and uncertain environments.

* Develop leaders at all echelons who know how to fight in the complex terrain of densely populated urban environments and understand the power of information and information warfare because “fighting hard” and “fighting smart” are mutually reinforcing.

* Design and implement manpower systems, policies, and processes to attract, develop, retain, and support highly qualified Marines and civilian employees prepared for the rigors of 21st century expeditionary operations.

* Utilize 21st Century Combined Arms across all domains: This requires using all available means across all domains to confront the enemy with multi-faceted, reinforcing, and rapidly shifting dilemmas in order to shatter his cohesion, corrupt his decision making, and increase friction. It ?s vítal that the Marine Corps achieves a tight level of integration combining the physical and cognitive effects, kinetic and nonkinetic, lethal and non-lethal, across all capabilities.

* Provide enhanced, long-range precision, lethal and non-lethal fires as well as the ability to mass effects at ranges beyond potential adversaries.

* Provide fires that deny access to sea lines of communication from expeditionary locations ashore.

* Develop swarming, armed air, surface, and sub-surface capabilities.

* Leverage networking to shorten the kill chain to the tactical edge by linking distributed forces to sensors and fires with the ability to rapidly provide precision fires and massed effects.

* Develop organizational and employment concepts for information warfare efforts to ensure the MAGTF has a cohesive, organic capability to employ effects across all five domains.

* Develop an organic air/UAS- and missile-defense capability.

* Organize, train, and equip all echelons to integrate information warfare as a combination of creative thinking and advanced technology.

* Provide expeditionary air and missile defense, to include counter-UAS.

* Integrate networks; Marine aviation should link sensors and shooters across the naval force, contributing speed and range to the combined arms capability of the MAGTF.

Conclusion

To fight and win the Nation’s battles in the future, we must innovate to meet the challenges of adaptive and innovative adversaries. To achieve this, we will leverage and exploit any and all military research labs, individual Marines, and commercial outlets. Ultimately our ability to successfully execute as a 21st century MAGTF greatly depends on the extent to which we accomplish the above points and:

* Integrate as a full partner with the Navy, special operations forces, and the joint force because Marines both contribute to and benefit from unique and complementary capabilities across the range of military operations and across all five domains.

* Master the implementation of 21st century combined arms as our means to conduct maneuver warfare across all domains because we will exploit every opportunity to gain an advantage.

* Design and protect our command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance networks as a multi-source information-sharing architecture that reliably serves disparate MAGTF elements because distributing actionable information keeps operations in chaotic environments from becoming chaotic operations.

* Configure the MAGTF to fight and win when it fluidly distributes and concentrates elements because maneuver warfare and combined arms create combat power at any scale.

* Enable small units to achieve greater effects because they can leverage the full combat power of the MAGTF and naval/joint forces.

* Overcome the enduring obstacles to leveraging and sustaining commercial off-the-shelf systems because affordable “70 percent” solutions now are better than outdated solutions 10 years from now.

The 21st century MAGTF is within our reach. Even as the Marine Corps defends the Nation abroad, the institution is driven to rapidly innovate to meet the challenges of the emerging operating environment. This comprehensive program, properly resourced and focused, underwrites the MAGTF’s contribution to the joint force and the Marine Corps’ role as our Nation’s expeditionary force ?n readiness.

by The Ellis Group

The Marine Corps Operating Concept calls for a 21st Century MAGTF [that] conducts maneuver warfare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict… through a combined arms approach that embraces information warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains-air, land sea, space, and cyberspace.^

This is an end point: a Marine Corps that employs the means necessary to win on the modern battlefield. What the concept does not do ?s provide a roadmap. It is, in and of itself, a missiontype order. The Commandant has given the Marine Corps a mission and has left it up to Marines to devise how the mission will be achieved. Nowhere ?s this more obvious than when it comes to information warfare. While ?t may not be new, information warfare is newly important. Marine Corps forces must begin to reflect that new importance. To cross the gap between the goals of the MOC and the Marine Corps as it is today, the Marine Corps must adapt and innovate.

The Marine Corps prides itself on its ability to adapt and overcome, but it has not always been an innovative organization. New equipment, ideas, and tactics have usually been implemented in response to specific challenges. At times, however, the Marine Corps has truly innovated. The development of vertical envelopment and the use of helicopters ?s one example where the Corps developed and embraced true “leap ahead” ideas. The difference between adaptation and innovation ?s key. Adaptation ?s reactive. Innovation is proactive. To maintain its relevance and its fighting ability, the Marine Corps must do both.

Adapting to the Information Environment

Integrating information warfare into combined arms requires an organization to employ information-related capabilities, just as the GCE and the ACE employ ground- and air-related capabilities respectively. Adaptations in ground and air combat already occur because there is an overarching structure interested in improving those operations. Information warfare has lacked that overarching structure.

An adaption approach for information warfare ?s made possible by the creation of MEF information groups (MIGs). The creation of MIGs consolidates information warfare functions, capabilities, and personnel under a single organization at each MEF. While this will serve to provide better direction for those capabilities in stride, the concepts, doctrine, and tactics will need to be developed by those Marines involved as MIGs begin to function and operate. Adaptations will have to emerge over time as the MIGs identify best practices, authorities, and processes for the employment of their capabilities.

Simultaneously, Marines not assigned to the MIGs will have to adapt to the new organization. Whereas ground or air units used to work with specific information-related units, they will now be able to direct requests for support to the MIG. Thus tactics, techniques, and procedures across the entire MAGTF will have to adapt. Many commanders and staffs view information warfare as an afterthought or an add-on to more familiar and traditional means. To adapt effectively, information warfare will have to be truly integrated into planning and operations. Training and education in information warfare can address this issue.

Innovating for the Information Environment

The Marine Corps reconnaissance community has a long and storied history in the Marine Corps which continues today. However, it has become increasingly obvious that the nature of reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will necessarily change due to proliferating unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, satellite imagery, and electromagnetic sensing capabilities. Marine recon units can no longer depend solely on visual means to ascertain enemy positions and actions. Simultaneously, the information revolution means that reconnaissance (gaining information about the operating environment) and counter-reconnaissance (denying information to the enemy) will become more important than ever before, and winning that competition is integral to Marine Corps operations.

Since there ?s already a pre-existing reconnaissance capacity, what is needed is an innovative concept to give new direction to that community. The Marine Corps is currently working on a new reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance concept to do just that. While reconnaissance is not information warfare, information-related capabilities offer both threats and opportunities for recon units. A conceptual solution for integrating and exploiting those capabilities is needed to better support information warfare efforts and the MAGTF mission.

Once the concept ?s finalized and finished, reconnaissance Marines will have to devise the best and most efficient way to execute the concept on the battlefield. That will require adaptations triggered by the adoption of the new concept.

Institutional Innovation and Adaptation

As should be clear from the above example, innovation and adaptation, while different, are nevertheless interrelated. Indeed, the proactive development of a recon/counter-recon concept has an emergent, adaptive quality to it, as the effort grew out of communication between leaders in the recon community and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

That this innovation did not occur according to a set process is a function of the fact that there is no set process. Various Marine Corps units in the Supporting Establishment perform various functions such as long-term (futures) planning, operational analysis, wargame analysis, exercise analysis, and experimentation, development, and procurement. These entities are organized along functional lines just as the Operating Forces are organized. Functional organization, however, is usually hierarchical, and hierarchical organizations are great at control. Its why our Operating Forces are organized along hierarchical lines. According to organizational theory, however, hierarchical organizations are bad at innovation. Innovative institutions are organized like networks. That’s why Silicon Valley companies are better at innovation than government ones. In order to drive innovation at the institutional level, the Marine Corps needs to release innovation from traditional hierarchical processes.

The Marine Corps War fighting Lab is already taking steps to drive innovation forward through the extensive use of wargaming and increased willingness to look farther afield for new ideas and capabilities. The Lab has set up a web-based innovation portal to harness ideas from across the Marine Corps and instituted the NCO Fellowship to ensure that the views of the enlisted Marines are heard. Last year, the Lab hosted an Advanced Naval Technology Exercise (ANTX) at Camp Pendleton to bring together commercial, industry, and military leaders to demonstrate cutting-edge technological solutions for amphibious and expeditionary operations. This year, the Lab will host another ANTX focused on urban warfare. These efforts are necessarily messy and chaotic, but it is through such different approaches that true innovation can be achieved. In this way, we apply the maneuver warfare philosophy of boldness and aggression to our innovation and adaptation processes just as we would on the battlefield.

Conclusion

While the Marine Corps has always been able to adapt and overcome, it has less often turned to true innovation to keep its cutting edge. Fortunately, its smaller size in comparison to other Services is actually a strength: both adaptation and innovation can occur faster given the smaller number of Marine Corps personnel.

Thus the Marine Corps has an opportunity, even as every military organization foreign and friendly is forced to adapt to the information environment, to seek true innovation to remain ahead of other organizations. As mentioned above, the Corps should not leave its traditions of adaptation behind; ?t has been and will continue to be a source of strength. However, as technological innovations and progress occur seemingly continuously-and even appear to be accelerating-?n the civilian sector, the Marine Corps will have to match its ability to adapt with an ability to innovate.

by Staffs, Lejeune Leadership Institute & Marine Corps History Division

In his 1989 letter to the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the CMC, Gen Alfred M. Gray, directed the rapid establishment of a Marine Corps University. Gen Gray outlined his intent “to teach military judgment rather than knowledge.”1 He foresaw that Marines in the 21st century would need to develop “a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action… [and] a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism.”2 Lifelong education for all Marines was Gen Gray’s vision. In this vein, this three-part case study analyzes a complex situation from an earlier time when military planners confronted what seemed an intractable problem: how to deal with yellow fever and malaria during construction of the Panama Canal.

French and American engineers learned that in order to complete construction of the Panama Canal, the devastating scourges of yellow fever and malaria would have to be reduced or outright eradicated. These tasks subsequently required great stores of leadership, intellect, moral courage, commitment, and perseverance as well as scientific and statistical analysis of complex data. The military leaders for this mission had to develop the capabilities to deliver and execute commanders’ intent; anticipate, ideology, and overcome obstacles; assess and shape the situation; analyze and leverage scientific and statistical data; and break a complex problem down into simple yet executable parts that could be understood and executed by subordinates. They also had to improvise and adapt. As the foundation of our maneuver warfare philosophy, MCDP I, Warfighting, explains, “providing intent ?s to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative-to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs-in a way that is consistent with higher commanders’ aim.”3 There’s much we can learn from this case.

Gen Gray’s vision for MCU was that “history should be used to teach officers [and NCOs] military judgment.”4 Accordingly, this case is not intended to make you and your Marines experts on yellow fever, malaria, or construction of the Panama Canal, although these subjects are certainly interesting. Rather, as you delve into the details of this fascinating story, consider some of our Corps’ modern “scourges” and how you, as a leader of Marines, will deal with them. Can we develop and execute a campaign plan? How will we break it down into simple parts and supervise it? How will we aggressively assess its effectiveness? Applying the tenets of maneuver warfare to solving complex problems is what the American people expect from their Marines to get better. The story of the eradication of yellow fever can help us do so.

> Editor’s Note: The three-part case study is available at https:Hwww.usmcu.edu/lli/ marine-leader-development/discussion-topics.

by Staff, Training Command

We need every Marine and Sailor to seek creative solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s complex problems. We need your ideas and your critical thinking. We need to change where it makes sense; adapt as quickly as possible, and constantly innovate to stay ahead of our adversaries.

-The Marine Corps Operating Concept1

Training Command touches the entire Marine Corps, both officer and enlisted. Its 19 major subordinate elements (see Figure 1 below) commanded by Marine colonels and Navy captains, and 90 formal learning centers (see Figure 2 on next page) responsible for 618 POI (programs of instruction), provide numerous touchpoints to instill the values, knowledge, and skills required of Marines and Sailors to tackle the complex problems the Commandant addresses in the MOC (Marine Corps Operating Concept). Training Command’s mission is to consistently produce officer and enlisted entry-level MOS, career progression, and career enhancement skills trained Marines and Sailors to meet force generation requirements. The command’s over 6,000 permanent personnel achieve this by training over 102,000 Marines and Sailors every year. As such, Training Command is in a unique position to influence the culture and future of the Corps. It is a mechanism for change.

Training Requirements

Training Command does not unilaterally determine the subject matter and capabilities in which it trains Marines and Sailors. The command develops its programs of instruction from the strategic guidance found in the MOC and the Commandant’s FRAGOs 1 and 2.2 It receives further operational guidance from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command/Combat Development & Integration Force Development’s, and Training and Education Command’s strategic plans. These documents provide broad guidelines on the topics that must be covered, but the manner in which the knowledge and skills are taught is determined by Training Command.

Additional input on generating talent for the Marine Corps is provided by Training Command’s customers and occupational field advocates. The Operating Forces and Supporting Establishment are Training Command’s primary customers. Their tactical requirements are derived from their missions, operational experiences, exercises, and experiments, all of which inform the development of the classes and skills taught at Training Command school houses. The occupation field sponsors, advocates, and proponents further provide Service-level input into production standards, quantity, and timing. Train- ing Command translates this guidance into force generation plans that sustain the transformation of entry-level and career Marines and Sailors (see Figure 3 below).

Mechanism for Change

Training Command’s diverse portfolio and wide span of control enable it to impact change in many different ways. The command constantly seeks improvement in its instructors, subject matter, training methodologies, and efficiencies in training the best force available within resource constraints. It is currently pursuing a number of initiatives to “gain inches” in improving the Marine Corps. The following three examples provide a small sampling of its efforts.

MCT (Marine Combat Training) Enhancement

Commanding the SOIs (Schools of Infantry) allows Training Command to reinforce the Marine Corps’ warfighting ethos while better developing basic riflemen. It intends to do this by adjusting the existing MCT (Marine Combat Training) POI to reinforce five themes: core values, leadership development, basic tenets of maneuver warfare, resiliency, and fitness. The SOIs will build on the core values learned by all enlisted Marines at recruit training to garner further inclusiveness and understanding of the contribution of all Marines to assist in the cultural change the Commandant seeks. The lock-step approach to training currently conducted by the SOIs during MCT will be replaced with a progressive tactical scenario in which students are organized into fireteams and squads with every Marine serving a minimum of one week as a fireteam leader under the coaching and mentoring of their 0913 combat instructors. The SOIs will introduce MCT Marines to the basic tenets of maneuver warfare at the junior Marine level. They will gain an understanding and appreciation of how their application of these tenets will assist their units in succeeding on the fluid battlefields of the 21st century. Although the Operating Forces train their Marines and Sailors to withstand the rigors of combat, the SOIs will train Marines in the coping skills necessary to overcome the stressors of life to improve unit readiness and assist Marines in successfully completing their terms of enlistment. The SOIs will also leverage the Marine Corps’ new physical fitness program and force fitness instructors to improve the overall fitness of their Marines while instilling the personal ownership of one’s fitness into every Marine. These MCT enhancements are expected to be implemented in fall 2017. Training Command intends to reinforce these five themes at its MOS producing schools as part of the transformation process and training continuum.

Force 2025: 06XX Communications FMP (Force Modernization Plan)

Understanding the need to adjust capabilities to compete on the modern battlefield, Training Commands MCCES (Marine Corps Communications-Electronics School) in Twentynine Palms developed a FMP (force modernization plan) under the cognizance of Marine Corps C4I (command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence). The MCCES reorganized legacy stove-piped communications fields into mu.jpgaceted network capabilities. This transformational change makes every 06XX Marine a “networked Marine,” professionalizes the 06XX force, and strengthens the Marine Corps’ overall cyber security. The FMP supports the generation of Force 2025 and consist of four paths: 062X-Transmissions, ОбЗХ-Network, 067X-Data Systems, and 068X-Cyber Security. Training Command, MCCES, C4I, and Marine Forces Cyberspace Command are also working together to develop a future 17XX Cyber Marine training program. Full implementation of the FMP is scheduled for spring 2018.

MAT (Marines Awaiting Training) Enhancement Program/Modernizing the Classroom

Training Command is leveraging technology and new training methodologies to enhance learning and achieve greater efficiencies. It is experimenting with and employing government and commercial off-the-shelf applications, WiFi, learning management systems, elearning systems, bring-your-own device technologies, simulations, and other tools to facilitate individually paced learning, provide more repetitions and sets, and assist Marines in more rapidly mastering skills. This will translate to reducing T2P2 (transfers, transients, patients, and prisoners) across the Corps, more rapidly getting Marines to the Operating Forces, keeping leaders in front of their units longer, and increasing overall unit readiness. The applications and opportunities offered by technology are endless, but they do require investment.

Investing in the Future

Training Command optimizes finite resources to support a complex and dynamic training continuum. It partners with many advocates and stakeholders to generate the individual talent that comprise successful units. It accomplishes this by investing in the quality and quantity of its professional instructor core-its center of gravity. Continued investment in the 0911 drill instructors needed at Officer Candidates School, 0913 combat instructors needed to train officers at TBS and enlisted Marines at the SOIs, and numerous other quality instructors across all occupational fields needed at Training Command’s many other schools will ensure its sustained ability to be a mechanism of change for the Marine Corps. The investment in sending the right number and quality of Marines and Sailors to be instructors at the school houses will pay dividends on their return to the Operating Forces. The increased knowledge, skills, and expertise they gained as instructors will manifest itself in the new leadership roles they fill in the Operating Forces.

The Partnership

Training Command is committed to implementing the changes needed to better develop and field the Marines and Sailors who will operationalize the MOC and sustain the Marine Corps’ success in the 21st century. However, it cannot do this alone. It will only accomplish this through a close partnership with and shared visions and support of the occupational field advocates, sponsors, and customers. Together we will generate and train an unbeatable force.

by Capt Timothy H Courchaine & 1stLt L. Glinzak

As Henry V surveyed the battlefield at Agincourt, he saw a sight he surely did not want to. Arrayed in front of him was the flower of the French King’s army, armor-clad knights and men at arms, thousands of whom had marched across Normandy and France and successfully cornered him here on a muddy, narrow field. He knew that his men were exhausted from campaigning, half starved, and most had unpleasant cases of dysentery, making their assembly area aromatic. He also knew, to a certain degree, the weapons capabilities of each side and the terrain he was fighting on. He could see across the field to the opposing commander’s standard and watch his enemy’s messengers move Irom battle to battle,1 relaying orders and observations. This picture paints an image of a commander who in reality had far more information, or at least felt that he had far more information, than what most commanders would feel today.2

Information saturation and the quest for information by commanders and the Marine Corps at large is a by-product of the proliferation of information-producing sources available to commanders in the field today. While these sources can be a critical asset, their overuse leads to two distinct drawbacks. First, the sheer volume of information one must process and the source management associated with its collection shifts the focus of the planning phase almost exclusively to an analytical approach. While thorough, it degrades a commander’s ability to make snap decisions when there are several hundred things that need to be considered. Secondly, by seeking to possess all of the potential information up front, a commander is centralizing decision making, a concept which flies in the face of the Marine Corps’ doctrine of decentralization. The quest of a commander in seeking information therefore should not be in collecting as much as possible but rather revolve around the question of what few, critical pieces of information their assumptions rely on. Similar to the priorities of reconnaissance, this question focuses data collection while narrowing the input necessary for a decision.

Just as warfare eventually caught up with the Industrial Revolution during World War I, the modern battlefield is increasingly influenced and dominated by the current Information Revolution. Computers and networks are now a necessary and common tool. ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets can be found on a wide range of platforms and the information they can now provide is staggering. Communications have increased in range and reliability, allowing a commander potentially hundreds of miles away to receive information reports in realtime.

The information these assets provide can be absolutely critical to making the right decision and plan. When unfocused, however, they provide a sensory overload. Sifting through these sources can become the job, and while intelligence shops producing significant analysis are powerful tools, they are one rarely available to the lower-level commanders trying to make a decision with this exhaustive inflow of information.

This overload is not merely a passive one. Military planners recognize that these assets are available and want to make use of them. With increasing spotlights on the strategic implications of small unit decisions and a zero defect culture, it is a way of insuring a commanders decisions are not seen as negligent, and that commanders did their due diligence if something goes wrong. The drive for that clear picture of the battlefield is a commander’s safety blanket. When he knows exactly what he is up against, he knows what he will receive. This feeling of intellectual comfort in decision making leads to an overreliance on an analytical decisionmaking processes. With this increased reliance, commanders are less and less likely to be comfortable with the snap judgment necessary for quick and intuitive decisions that must be made during information deficits.

Maneuver warfare is the bedrock of Marine Corps tactics. Out-cycling the enemy, moving faster, adapting, anticipating the enemy’s next move, achieving a decision, and then exploiting success have all led to the triumph of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare has been embraced doctrinally and contributed to the success of countless engagements. In order for maneuver warfare to continue to be successful, however, we must stay rooted in its tactical fundamentals and, even more importantly, not let today’s thirst for information interfere with our ability to quickly achieve a decision and adapt to an ever-changing battlefield and thinking enemy.

One of the tactical fundamentals in the Marine Corps is achieving a decision.5 Decisions must be made quicker than our enemy-a 70 percent solution now is better than a 100 percent solution that comes too late. Unfortunately, when Marines wait for technology to answer ever}7 question, our desire for more information before we make a decision hinders our ability to achieve a decision before the enemy. Technology is a powerful asset that can be used to achieve a decision, but it should not be the driving force.

Part of achieving the decision to act before the enemy relies on a commander’s military judgement, which is hampered the longer they wait for information. Military judgment requires a leader to conduct a thorough METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time) analysis, including looking at things from the enemy’s perspective in order to figure out the enemy’s most likely course of action.4 This allows a leader to analyze the situation and develop ideas. Such thorough analysis does not come only from technologically-provided information. Instead, it often comes from experience and the ability to use intuitive decision making.5 Instead of being over reliant on technology to paint a “perfect picture” of the enemy situation and the operating area, leaders should rely on their experience and intuitive decision-making skills to conduct a thorough analysis of that ever changing enemy and operating area. Leaders must be encouraged to use their skill sets to achieve a quick decision that may not be perfect but is more than capable of accomplishing the mission rather than a perfect solution that may come too late.

In addition to slowing down the decision-making process, the quest for information can harm our ability to adapt. MCDP 1-3 discusses how adapting means having flexible plans that avoid unnecessary detail, can be easily changed, and are simple.6 During the quest for information, leaders must ensure it does not over-complicate our plans and provide mundane details that, in the end, inhibit our ability to quickly change and adapt to a thinking, ever-changing enemy. Information can be an asset in developing critical aspects of plans, but it will never deliver a “perfect plan.” Such a plan will slow Marines down and prevent them from adapting. Instead, leaders should use the information gained to aid their METT-T analysis so that they can act as critical thinkers, ones who anticipate the enemy’s next move and are willing to improvise when a curve ball is thrown.

What commanders must realize is that as the battlespace continues to increase, so too will the information deficit inherent in command. The op posing will of the enemy is now spread across a wide front and is no longer visible in one look across the field. In order to combat this, the focus of information gathering must be laser like and identify only the decisive points of the decision-making process. In recreating the picture the ancient commander saw atop his horse, he saw a myriad of data points: the color or each banner, their jovial demeanor, and the flowers in the field. For a modern commander, however, which one is important? It will take too long and be too laborious to completely recreate the scene. At least two separate information sources could be required in such a scenario: image surveillance to show the banners and the flowers and human intelligence sources to reveal their demeanor. The prioritization of information is what will give the modern commander the equivalent decision-making power.

The Marine Corps preaches a doctrine of decentralization, one which should allow commanders to operate in this informational deficit because each or their subordinate leaders will have a closer view of the conditions in front of him. Essentially, they will have the view he is attempting to develop with all of the various information assets he is employing. “Mission tactics” is more than a task and a purpose statement given in case a situation does not develop according to plan-it is also a tool to make coherent and informed decisions effecting pivotal swings in battle when the commander is nowhere near, is unavailable, and quite possibly innocently uninformed as to the fact that his unit is even in contact.

As commanders seek information, the first place they often go is to their subordinates. This will either be with a task to go find information or a request to relay information back up to the commander. Tasked with gathering information, the subordinate leader is now diverted from making decisions in an area he is already adequately informed about for his own purposes to gathering, processing, and then relaying up to higher information that may or may not be critical. The over reliance on this dynamic creates a middleman in information development that results in both inefficiency and centralization in a removed leader.

Decentralization encourages bold, decisive leaders. Military judgment must be developed in our leaders so that they can quickly adapt and achieve a decision faster than the enemy. Technology is an asset that can aid in our success and decision making. It should not be relied on, however, to bring us to a “perfect plan” or to paint the “perfect picture.” Leaders must have confidence in their analytical and intuitive skills and be critical-thinking leaders. Such an environment should be rostered and encouraged within subordinates. Technology and information is a tremendous asset, but it is not as crucial as a critically-thinking leader who is able to take the information he is given-even if it is not all of the desired information-and use analytical skills to anticipate the enemy’s most likely course of action. This allows Marines to keep a quick tempo, one that is faster than the enemy and, in the end, is a foundation of maneuver warfare.

by LtCol Gregory A. Thiele

In the last 30 years, the Marine Corps has tied its warfighting capability ever more closely to the use of computers and the Internet. This development has had some benefits. Unfortunately, it has also created tremendous vulnerabilities potential adversaries may be able to exploit. While no communications system is ever entirely secure, the Internet and other computer-based information sharing systems have proven extremely vulnerable. The Marine Corps should reconsider its use of internet-based technology and employ it only in a carefully targeted manner compatible with the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy oí maneuver warfare.

The Marine Corps now uses computers and the Internet for nearly everything, both in garrison and in wartime. It seems that virtually every Marine has a computer, Internet connection, and email address. Everything from personnel records to maintenance records, annual training statistics to annual training classes are delivered and shared via the Internet and tracked, cataloged, and stored on computers and servers. When servers crash or the Internet fails for any reason, workflow virtually stops in affected units. Units now drag computers, servers, heating and cooling systems, and associated generators to the field in order to establish Internet connections with other units. The light, foot-mobile headquarters seems to be a thing of the past.

The Marine Corps’ use of computers and Internet-based information sharing systems for both garrison and wartime use has some beneficial aspects. A greater amount of information can be shared more rapidly among more Marines than ever before. Tasks that used to take a great deal of time or manpower can now be automated and conducted cheaply, quickly, and efficiently.

Unfortunately, the Internet’s benefits have not come without significant drawbacks. Our fascination with technology may actually be detrimental and make Marine units less capable. Commanders are now inundated with information. The increased information requires a corresponding increase in staff to process it. More staff officers mean that there are more individuals vying for a commander’s time. The plethora of information available is likely to result in a commander experiencing information overload, which may inhibit effective decision making.

Information sharing technology may also degrade unit performance in less obvious ways. The Internet provides higher headquarters with the means to monitor virtually any aspect of a subordinate’s actions it chooses. Nothing can escape the all-seeing electronic eye of Big Brother. To augment this electronic supervision, units are required, to send so many reports to higher headquarters each day/week/month/year that this effort can easily become a unit’s focus of effort in garrison. Higher headquarters’ appetite for information only increases during wartime with a corresponding potential negative impact on unit focus and initiative.

Perhaps the greatest drawback that comes with wedding warfighting capability to information sharing technology is that every network is vulnerable. In fact, it is quite impossible to create a network that is impervious to attack.1 Despite the financial resources of the United States and the extensive efforts made to protect important data, U.S. government files are routinely compromised. For instance, in 2015, it was revealed that the Office of Personnel Management’s files were hacked and the information of at least four million federal service employees may have been compromised. Even the U. S. Secretary of State at that time, John Kerry, once admitted that it was “very possible” that his email account had been compromised “and I certainly write things with that awareness.”2 Although Secretary Kerry’s actions may be no more than prudence, if the U.S. Secretary of State cannot be certain that his email is secure, what does this say about the ability (or inability) to provide secure communications in other areas, particularly where the scale of use is much greater (such as the Department of Defense)?

In such an environment, what may actually be required is for the Marine Corps to chart an entirely contrary course when it comes to information technology. The most secure option is for the Marine Corps not to use Internet-based technology at all. Given current trends and ever-greater desires for data communication, this is likely an unpalatable option. If the Corps is to continue to rely on information technology, it should be far more selective than is currently the case in how and when such technologies are employed. Marines ought to employ technology in a manner that contributes to the Marine Corps’ warfighting capacity while presenting or creating a minimum of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a potential threat.

The Marine Corps must place technology in its proper relation to war and to the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy. The best guide possible for the employment of technology is that provided by the United States’ greatest military theorist, U.S. Air Force Col John Boyd. Boyd used to say, “People, ideas, hardware-in that order.”3 Marines seem to have forgotten this lesson, if indeed they had ever truly learned it. The Marine Corps should work tirelessly to find the best people available (and then work even harder to incentivize them to remain in the Corps).4 These Marines can then develop concepts suitable for modern war and consistent with the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine. This group must then identify the equipment required to put the new concepts into practice so that it can be purchased or, if necessary, developed.

The preceding description probably sounds fairly logical, so it may be surprising that the Marine Corps rarely seems to follow this model in determining what equipment to buy. The MV22 Osprey, for example, is a testament to the Marine Corps’ tendency to fall in love with and buy technologically complex equipment and develop a concept of employment later.3 The same is true of the F-35 and Expeditionary Force 21. In each case, because no clear requirement existed for these aircraft, the Marine Corps created a concept and attempted to tie the equipment to the concept after the fact-however tenuous the links.

Marines need to employ technology in a targeted fashion. Each potential purchase needs to undergo a rigorous review process in which several important questions are asked: How will this piece of equipment fit with Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine? Is the equipment compatible with a decentralized philosophy of command and control (C2)? How will this piece of equipment actually be used in both peace and war-how does it fit into the way in which Marines will fight in anticipated future conflicts? Some may argue that these questions are already asked and exhaustively studied, but such a claim would seem to have little merit, as the preceding examples indicated. If equipment is incompatible with the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy or its C2 philosophy, the Marine Corps should not purchase it.

Breaking the Marine Corps’ addiction to technology will help Marines make better procurement decisions and permit the Corps to focus scarce resources on securing the technologies acquired. In the end, however, Marines must accept and embrace the nature of war described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP1). Among other attributes, war is chaotic, violent, and a clash of hostile, irreconcilable wills, each seeking to impose itself on its opponent. The enemy will seek to compromise our use of the electromagnetic spectrum or turn our use to their advantage.

Networks that rely on the electromagnetic spectrum can be compromised in numerous ways. The codes they use to keep information secure can be broken.6 Signal transmission can provide the location of the emitter inviting physical attack or targeted disruption. Servers can be attacked with malicious code or distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. Such attacks do not require an enemy with the same level of technology and resources as the United States; such capabilities are becoming increasingly available to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) adversaries.

Marines must prepare for a battlefield where the enemy seeks, and is able to interrupt or compromise any use of, the electromagnetic spectrum. Ever more complex and costly defenses are unlikely to be able to keep pace with the threat. The best security against disruption of the electromagnetic spectrum is to use it as little as necessary.

There is, perhaps, a simple answer to this dilemma. We should prepare Marines to rely on the oldest network in existence: the network that exists between individual human beings. Col Boyd used to say that, “Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.”7 Fluman networks consist of relationships between individuals. These connections can be extremely difficult to disrupt, can be surprisingly resistant to major shocks, and at their best can often be broken only through physical destruction. The resilience of human networks is maximized when paired with a decentralized C2 philosophy that allows individuals the autonomy to make decisions in an atmosphere of trust.

Unfortunately, one cannot simply buy an improved human network; connections between people must be built over time. Once forged, however, a unit utilizing decentralized C2 can function much more rapidly and effectively than a highly centralized network. A decentralized, less rigidly hierarchical organization that trusts its people will be more effective in combat-with or without the aid of the electromagnetic spectrum.

If the Marine Corps is to succeed in the future, Marines must take a more thoughtful approach to the acquisition of technology. The role of technology is to serve Marines, not enslave them or overmaster them. Over reliance on technology can be dangerous and can have devastating consequences. This is particularly true in the realm of Internet-based information-sharing technologies. The best method to safeguard information in a digital world is not to use computers or the Internet at all. Since it is unlikely that the Marine Corps will turn away from informationsharing technologies entirely, the best option remaining is to limit the use of such technologies and to target their use carefully. Such an approach will help reduce potential vulnerabilities and allow the Marine Corps to focus limited resources on securing the systems it procures. In the end, though, it is people that matter. The most powerful information-sharing network that can be created is among people, and so long as war is waged by human beings, it will remain so, no matter how technology changes.

by Mai David R. Dixon & 1stLt Matt Ford

“She will make a great Huey pilot in the Fleet.” An encouraging comment like this on a performance evaluation would certainly bode well for the career of a young aviator completing helicopter training. Unless, of course, that Marine happens to be a male in the AH-1W Cobra syllabus. While comical, this true example ofa a I comment (from an obviously aloof reporting senior) illustrates a painful fact that many of- us have experienced firsthand-young Marine officers often author maladroit fitness reports (FITREPs).

This anecdote also highlights one of the numerous issues discussed during the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s Innovation Symposium which convened in Quantico from 23 to 24 February 2016. The symposium assembled disruptive thinkers from across the DOD in order to address the myriad uncertainties and challenges that create barriers to innovation and to propose solutions in order to develop a learning organization that is ready to meet future warfighting challenges.1 This is a bold mission statement indeed, and in order to succeed as a military organization, it is paramount that we recognize, promote, and retain the most talented and fully-qualified SNCOs.

However, accurately assessing the quality of a SNCO is a difficult task for a promotion board, which relies almost exclusively on the FITREPs from the SNCOs reporting seniors and reviewing officers-many of whom have little or no experience writing performance evaluations. Frankly put, most lieutenants are unsatisfactory FITREP writers. Almost everyone reading this article has either once been a novice lieutenant or had one evaluate you at some point. How many sergeants and SNCOs have had their otherwise exemplary careers damaged or possibly ruined by a wellintentioned but overzealous companygrade officer whose limited knowledge of the Performance Evaluation System (PES) caused him to write an inaccurate appraisal? This problem has existed for decades yet there has been little done to address how we train lieutenants to write FITREPS. This article proposes a solution that costs zero dollars, adds zero time to the current periods of instruction for officers, and can be implemented within a month.

Years ago, students at TBS wrote peer evaluations on each other that were more affectionately known as “spear evals.” Alter an assigned training periods (usually every two weeks), the student squad leaders would rank his squad, each student platoon commander would evaluate the squad leaders, and so on. The ranking criterion was extremely subjective and shrouded in the personal biases of the student evaluator. The delivery method for these spear evals was even more obscure and awkward. At the end of the six month TBS syllabus, students would tape an empty manila envelope to their barracks door, and the lieutenants would surreptitiously slip their opinions into each other’s packets. You were never really sure who said what- you just woke up in the morning with a bunch of index cards where your platoon mates anonymously vented about how great or terrible they thought you were based on whatever grading standards each person deemed most important.

Needless to say, that was an absurd system that made it extremely difficult to obtain accurate feedback. Even worse, spear evals did nothing to teach lieutenants about how the PES actually works in the Marine Corps. The process today at TBS has evolved somewhat-the mouse and keyboard have usurped the notecard and envelope-and now the lieutenants use the five TBS “horizontal themes” to rank themselves against each other. These themes are:

1. A man or woman of exemplary character.

2. Devoted to leading Marines 24/7.

3. Able to decide, communicate, and act in the fog of war.

4. A warfighter who embraces the Corps’ warrior ethos.

5. Mentally strong and physically tough.

These themes are solid, and they may be adequate for lieutenant students to critique each other; however, this is not how we actually conduct evaluations in the Marine Corps. In other words, we are not training like we fight.

The solution is simple. TBS students should write training FITREPS on each other in order to intimately learn the Marine Corps PES, master brief sheet, and promotion process. Logically, fireteam leaders would RS (reporting senior) their fireteam, and the squad leader would RO (reviewing officer) fireteam members. Squad leaders would RS their fireteam leaders, and the student platoon commander would RO the fireteam leaders, and so on and so on.

By the end of the six-month syllabus, each student will develop a comprehensive RS/RO profile in addition to personally receiving dozens of training FITREPS-all of this would be reflected on the student’s training master brief sheet. After TBS graduation, these training FITREPS would be expunged from the system by the FITREP Division at HQMC.

If HQMC is unable or unwilling to cooperate by eliminating these training FITREPS, a pragmatic solution is for TBS to develop a program in Microsoft Excel that identically mimics the FITREP grading scale, RS/RO profile formulas, and master brief sheet profiles. We don’t need to hire computer engineers or bid out contracts to software companies in Silicon Valley. There are lieutenants at TBS right now who could easily write these formulas in Microsoft Excel. In order to get this program quickly online we could utilize the free market economic principle of competition. If the Commanding Officer, TBS, offered a Navy/Marine Corps Achievement Medal and a “96” to the student team who designed the most accurate model based on our FITREPS and master brief sheets, it would be done in less than one month. More importantly, the TBS lieutenant community would feel ownership of the process. If this does not work for some reason, then we could direct some of our bright captains and majors studying in the computer science or manpower systems analysis curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School to design this Excel program. The point is that we have the brainpower right now within the Marine Corps to get this up and running soon.

Training FITREPS will familiarize lieutenants with the arcane technicalities of the PES grading criteria and RS & RO rankings. Lieutenants would furthermore learn the even more befuddling intricacies of Master Brief Sheets (such as the “at processing” and “cumulative” FITREP averages, and the “upper, middle, lower”/”above, with, below” RS and RO profile scores). The profiles that students create on each other can then be used as a training aid during the promotion block to help young officers understand how their performance evaluations influence the promotion system.

Each lieutenant would surely get the uncomfortable opportunity to receive a few unjust or inaccurate training FITREPs. TBS lieutenants would then understand what it feels like to get rooked on a FITREP and how those few inaccurate FITREPS can inflict longterm carnage on their master brief sheet. These unsettling moments will emotionally seal the learning objectives into the lieutenant’s brains, thus making it less likely that they will give erroneous or half-hearted evaluations to their sergeants and SNCOs in the future. Moreover, by using training FITREPS and master brief sheets, the staff platoon commanders at TBS will have much more accurate means of evaluating their students’ leadership potential. Everyone wins.

TBS has already apportioned time in their syllabus for peer evaluations. The same amount of time will be spent evaluating, just using training FITREPs instead of the five horizontal themes. The bottom line is that the intent of this article can be met with zero money spent by the Marine Corps and zero time added to the TBS syllabus.

A very small percentage of lieutenants will actually fire their weapon in combat or call in an airstrike via a nineline, but every single officer will write FITREPS on sergeants and SNCOs. Yet, TBS devotes only a few classes to teaching this vital skill. FITREPS are highly technical and writing them can become an emotionally charged ordeal. Athletes can’t learn how to play football or basketball in a classroom, and lieutenants can’t become astute evaluators without feeling the pain over many repetitions.

Historically, lieutenants write clumsy FITREPs and do not understand the impact that a few inaccurate evaluations can have on a SNCO’s career and morale. This injustice to our enlisted Marines demands bold innovation and a better way of doing business. Change of any sort is typically unpopular, especially for a monolithic organization that highly values uniformity (such as the military). LtGen Michael Dana implored the Warfighting Lab Symposium to, “Be innovative despite the machine.”2 MCDP 1, Warfighting, also reminds us that,

Since war is at base a human enterprise, effective personnel management is important to success. This is especially true for a doctrine of maneuver warfare, which places a premium on individual judgment and action. We should recognize that all Marines of a given grade and occupational specialty are not interchangeable and should assign people to billets based on specific ability and temperament.^

We will never meet the intent of MCDP 1 unless we recognize, promote, and retain the most talented and fully qualified SNCOs-there are few things more important in our Corps. We can accomplish this only if company grade officers adeptly utilize the PES. In order to train like we fight, TBS should replace their five horizontal themed peer evaluations with a system that teaches about actual FITREPS, master brief sheets, and the promotion board process.

by The Ellis Group

What is perhaps the longest armored raid in military history occurred in August 2014 in Eastern Ukraine. Under then-Col Mikhail Zubrowski, the Ukrainian 95th Air Assault Brigade, which had been reinforced with armor assets and attachments, launched a surprise attack on Separatist lines, broke through into their rear areas, fought for 450 kilometers, and destroyed or captured numerous Russian tanks and artillery pieces before returning to Ukrainian lines. They operated not as a concentrated brigade but rather split into three company-sized elements on different axes of advance. Col Zubrowski is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and modeled the attack on a similar raid that occurred during the American Civil War.1

The story of Zubrowski’s raid demonstrates that certain principles of warfare hold true across military history. Since that time, however, the conflict in Ukraine has solidified. Russiansupported Separatist forces operate advanced capabilities, including electronic warfare (EW) and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) enabled by advanced commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) unmanned aircraft systems. Ukrainian positions have been reduced to a lengthy series of underground trenches reminiscent of World War I. During that conflict, the ubiquity of indirect fire artillery produced stasis in the lines through sheer imprecise volume of fire. In Ukraine, that same stasis is the result of precision-guided munitions married to persistent ISR that renders volume of fire unnecessary. No Ukrainian offensive has been able to repeat the success of Zubrowski’s maneuver.

Maneuver is the core of our maneuver warfare philosophy. It is also the core of our force structure: every MAGTF is built around a maneuver unit. Maneuver, however, is not just limited to a spatial definition, and maneuver units are certainly not the only units required to execute maneuver warfare. Maneuver is described in MCDP 1, Warfighting, as any means of attacking from a position of advantage.2 The original FMFM1-3, Tactics, identifies two general types of maneuver: in space and in time.3 The Marine Corps Operating Concept {MOC) identifies four ways to gain advantage: psychologically, technologically, temporally, and spatially.4 Maneuver warfare means that we favor any indirect or non-linear method to gain an advantage, whatever means by which we maneuver. In the years since the adoption of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy, spatial maneuver has been favored. In the 21st century, however, Marines must also master alternative maneuver spaces. What does maneuver mean in a strategic environment where every movement can be detected?

Strategic Context

To understand maneuver in the 21st century, we must examine it against a backdrop of the strategic environment in which it will be employed. The current and near-future operating environment has been described in the MOC and in this series of articles as being characterized by complex terrain, technol- ogy proliferation, information warfare, EW (“The Battle of the Signatures”)* and an increasingly contested maritime domain.^ These trends offer not only threats but also opportunities for maneuver-for us and our adversaries.

The proliferation of advanced weaponry and technology to even non-state actors is clearly an opportunity for our adversaries and, thus, a threat to us. Access to high-end weapons systems not only allow adversaries to mitigate our technological advantages but, due to other factors such as their willingness to accept or inflict civilian casualties, allows them access to advantages barred to us.

The global digital media environment enhances an already existing aspect of the nature of war, information, and influence. Even high-end peer competitors, like Russia and China, now routinely employ military deception in any action because of the potency of information warfare. EW will no longer be an option but will necessarily be central to large operations, both offensively and defensively.

Complex terrain limits traditional forms of maneuver but allows other forms. We see the rise of megacities, especially in the littoral environment, as a challenge and a limitation to maneuver. Adversaries, however, see megacities and their concentration of civilians as terrain to exploit in an attempt to negate our fire support and airpower advantages. Cities, however, are just one form of complex terrain; arctic, mountain, and jungle environments will see more conflict in the 21st century.

Lastly, because of the wide availability of advanced weapons systems, fortifications are returning to wide use, and every environment is contested. A network of trenches that would not be out of place during World War I now exists in Ukraine, and both sides in the ongoing Battle of Mosul are using fortification techniques. This trend reduces the ability of forces to employ spatial maneuver and places a new premium on armor and combat engineer units.

These trends combine to form two major conclusions. First, the line between conventional and irregular tactics is all but dissolved. The non-state actor known as the Islamic State holds territory that it won with our own weapons, and the Russian military in Ukraine employs as much, if not more, deception and information warfare as any terrorist organization. “Hybrid” warfare is no longer a special designation, but simply the normal form of warfare. Secondly, the combination of technology proliferation, automation of weapons, and constant aerial surveillance make the modern and near-future battlefield more dangerous than it has ever been, with the one exception of World War I.

Tactical Trends

These trends add up to a battlefield where protection and mobility are still important, but the need for units to operate in a dispersed and decentralized manner is vital. This is not to say that massing in order to concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities will not happen or will not need to happen. It will. Rather, units will need to operate on a dispersed base routinely and only concentrate as the mission and situation dictates. This means that a maneuver unit’s agility-its ability to transition quickly between concentration and dispersion-will matter more than its ability to do one or the other.

Consequently, legacy command and control (C2) hierarchies will be increasingly ineffective in modern combat. Because of both advanced cyber and EW that can disable the means of C2- communications-and the high tempo of tactical decision making required to survive the battlefield, decentralized C2 will become a matter of survival. When a maneuver unit’s survival on the battlefield depends on quick concentrations and dispersions, C2 hierarchies designed solely for top-down command will no longer be feasible. Some measure of hierarchical C2 necessarily remain, especially in non-maneuver units. The point is not to entirely favor one or the other, but our C2 system is no longer “one size fits all.” More organic and flattened C2 will need to be adopted based on battlefield realities.

A high tactical tempo and greater dispersion must be enabled by organic firepower at the lowest levels. Maneuver forces need the capability to use fire and maneuver without losing tempo and, thus, initiative. In other words, this means utilizing combined arms without sacrificing the ability to continue to move in space and/or time. This requires an organic combined arms approach down to the squad level-a mix of direct and indirect fire weapons, including high explosives such as grenades, out to roughly 800 meters. There will still need to be an ability to call for fire support from outside agencies and battalion/regiment mortars, but tempo should be sacrificed to leverage inorganic support only when absolutely necessary. A stationary unit is a detected unit. This translates to the greater use of shoulder-fired missiles and/ or rockets by infantry forces and places a premium on combat engineering at the bleeding edge of the fight.

Lastly, to be successful on this modern battlefield, sustained investment needs to be made in maneuver forces, particularly infantry units. As firepower and ISR drives a greater need for dispersal of smaller and smaller units of maneuver, the danger to those forces of being outnumbered and defeated in detail increases. To mitigate this risk, the training and employment of infantry forces must be modernized; increasing squad-level firepower is only part of the solution. The dilemma is how to increase the capability and potency of infantry forces without overburdening them with gear. In a recent book, retired Army MG Robert H. Scales laid out a plan to do just that. In Scales on War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), Scales describes numerous ways to increase infantry capabilities based on a modern, scientific understanding of the physiology of humans in combat that takes into account cognitive, physiological, and social aspects of the nature of infantry combat. In a recent issue of the Gazette, four infantry officers reviewed the book and offered detailed recommendations tailored to the needs of the Marine Corps. Many of these recommendations are inexpensive, or are only expensive in the short term, but still offer an asymmetric advantage that adversaries will be unable to match.

Maneuver Spaces

The technical capabilities of the weapons and systems that maneuver torces can bring to bear are important, but conceptually, the most drastic change is the need to expand our idea of maneuver space. As the Nation’s amphibious force, we inherently seek to leverage the sea as maneuver space. However, this is just one way by which we seek to gain advantage.

Psychological. We seek to gain a psychological advantage over the enemy by either removing his ability to react to our actions or corrupting his perception of our actions and the situation. We can accomplish the former through surprise and the latter via military deception efforts. Boldness and aggressive action also offer psychological advantages that cannot be discounted.

Technological. A technological advantage can be acquired and maintained both by ensuring that maneuver forces have both the organic equipment to outmatch their opponents (discussed above) and the ability to “reachback” and leverage inorganic support from across the MAGTF and the joint force. However, we should be wary about relying too much on technological advantages. They are always temporary as adversaries acquire similar technology or develop countermeasures.

Temporal. We gain a temporal advantage over the enemy by manipulating the relative operational tempo to our advantage and to gain and maintain the initiative and by preserving our ability to make decisions and act upon them faster than the enemy. We mitigate the enemy’s temporal advantage via countermobility and interdiction actions. If the enemy’s temporal advantage is that he can outlast us in theater-such as is the case with insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan-we must take steps to ensure we do not culminate or contribute to the culmination of domestic political support.

Spatial. Expanding our conception of maneuver space does not mean that achieving a spatial advantage over opponents by maneuvering against flanks, rear areas, and gaps in the opponent’s system will not remain an important tool. The ability to maintain our mobility in the face of enemy attempts to diminish it, such as improvised explosive devices, is of the utmost importance.

Informational. We seek an informational advantage by exploiting various information warfare means to selectively withhold and release information. We utilize operational security to prevent the enemy from gaining an awareness of our actions and operations. We seek to gain information about enemy forces not only to assist in our planning processes but also to use it to our advantage. Information regarding enemy actions that violate the Law of Armed Conflict, for example, can be released and highlighted in order to undermine the legitimacy of their goal among local and international audiences.

To be sure, these maneuver spaces overlap. For example, a temporal advantage allows us the ability to rapidly employ spatial maneuver, which contributes to the ability to surprise the enemy, creating a psychological advantage. Utilizing decentralized decision making assures our temporal advantage by forcing the enemy to react to increasingly inaccurate information as he is successively out-cycled. Additionally, because any enemy is a thinking and reacting entity, they will attempt to gain their own advantages in each realm as well. Evaluating the enemy system and identifying both surfaces and gaps in terms of maneuver space across these dimensions will be imperative for future fights.

21st Century Maneuver Forces

While 21st century maneuver involves more than just “maneuver forces,” they remain the core of our organization and the base unit of any operation.

True light infantry forces will be a necessity on near-future battlefields. The more complex the terrain, the higher the premium placed on light infantry. As improvised explosive devices, precision guided anti-tank guided missiles, and precision ordnance continue to proliferate, the use of motorized and mechanized infantry forces will become more restricted. Since light infantry forces lack protection and rapid mobility, air assault operations will become more prevalent. Additionally, the Marine Corps needs to make innovation focused on augmenting infantry units without overburdening them an institutional main effort. Manned-unmanned teaming will be the most lucrative area of investment, but weapons systems that contribute to combined arms operations at the squad level and modern training simulators equivalent to those used to train pilots will be important as well.

That being said, the proliferation of firepower systems-both improvised and traditional-demands the MAGTF employ highly-mobile mechanized forces alongside light infantry. It is especially important for the MAGTF to have a dedicated reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance task force able to both ascertain gaps in the enemy’s array and to protect friendly vulnerabilities (see “21st Century Reconnaissance,” MCG, January 2017). MAGTF commanders will also need a capable mechanized force to act as a reserve and to exploit enemy vulnerabilities identified by the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance task force. Being able to transport troops via armored personnel carriers is vital to both efforts. Additionally, the options available to “upgrade” an infantry unit’s mobility via vehicle transport will have to expand. Unarmored flat-bed trucks, like the MTVR, will not always be the best or even a viable option. Maneuver units will more and more often look to options such as the internally transportable vehicle (ITV), all-terrain vehicles, or other small mobility platforms. This means that infantry forces will need to be prepared to fight like dragoons (18th and 19th century units that travelled mounted on horses but fought as dismounted infantry once enemy forces were located).

Recent declarations that tank warfare is dead are false; tanks and tank warfare will remain a presence on the battlefield. Tanks themselves, however, will almost certainly evolve. Remotely-operated unmanned tanks are already in use in Iraq.6 With the rise of unmanned tanks, they will increasingly be employed more as a weapons system than a crew/unit. Once the unmanned tanks become common, the variety of tanks will increase. Light tanks, medium tanks, tank destroyers, and other tank concepts that were less than successful during the manned tank’s apex in World War II will become more viable. Unmanned tanks designed for specific complex terrain-urban terrain for example-will be both necessary and possible. Infantry operations in megacities becomes a little less daunting if every squad leader has a “hip pocket” tank small enough to be mobile in canalized urban terrain. In the long term, a modular tank chassis can be deployed and then outfitted with weapons systems 3D-printed on the battlefield based on the real time needs of forward forces.

One way to increase the capability of maneuver units without overburdening them is to revitalize combat engineering. The habitual relationships between infantry and combat engineering units in the division should be as intimate as those between infantry and artillery, if not more so. Combat engineers bring key mobility and countermobility solutions to the lead units, and as automation and robotics advance, the capabilities of combat engineers will only increase in both capability and importance.

Lastly, the importance of mortars as the maneuver commander’s “hip pocket artillery” will in no way diminish. Although precision-guided munitions will extend the range and increase the utility of mortars, especially in urban terrain, the ability to mass a high volume of indirect firepower will still play a key role in combined arms and maintaining tempo.

The Maneuver-Fires Relationship

As the characters of both maneuver and fires on the 21st century battlefield evolve, the relationship between the two will also need to evolve. Since some aspects of fire support lag behind adversary capabilities, the Marine Corps will increasingly need to maneuver to fire; fire support will require more enablers in order to be effective. Spatially, territory may have to be seized to get fire support within range of enemy forces. Maneuvering to fire will not just occur at the tactical level; Marine forces may be called upon to seize and hold territory in order to emplace anti-air defense or anti-ship cruise missiles emplacements that enable joint forces. Other maneuver spaces, such as informational and psychological spaces, will increasingly play a role and perhaps a more important role. As mentioned in “21st Century Reconnaissance,” recon units will be called upon to force the enemy to react so that Marine forces can detect his positions. Marine forces will also need to prevent enemy forces from do the same to us.

Using fires to enable maneuver will still be a key component of maneuver warfare but will be covered in detail a future article.

Conclusion

In some ways, equipping our maneuver forces-both physically and mentally-is the easiest way to prepare for the battlefields of the 21st century. The cost is less than even some single copies of higher-end platforms. In other ways, however, it is the most difficult. It will require innovative ideas and sustained effort, and it will mean traditions will have to bend. The hierarchical organization currently in use is flexible only to a point, a point that is being reached. More organic and modern command and control organizations are now necessary. (This will be addressed further in a future article, “21st Century Command and Control”).

Combined arms across five domains requires a greater variety in the type of weapons that the MAGTF can bring to bear. Greater diversity of arms, and thus flexibility, will be reflected within maneuver units as well not just among the wider Marine Corps. Maneuver is about attacking the enemy from an advantageous angle. The MAGTF itself is reflective of this as it is structured to shift between ground, air, and logistics efforts at any time. Maintaining our ability to maneuver in the 21st century is about maximizing the amount of options and arms available to the Marine on the ground.