Archives: Gazette Magazines

by Col Christopher Woodbridge USMC(Ret)

Last month, Gen Alfred M. Gray, USMC (Ret), the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, turned 90years old. In late April, the editors of the Marine Corps Gazette and Leatherneck had the chance to spend several hours with the General for a wide-ranging conversation about his decades of service as a Marine. Gen Gray’s commandancy in the late 1980s came at a pivotal time for the Nation and the Corps.

As Commandant, Gen Gray shaped the Corps’ warfighting philosophy and professional military education in comprehensive ways that prepared the Marines for the 21st Century. The approach to “leading by example” expressed by this tough, thinking warrior was developed over a career spanning enlistment in 1950, service as a infantry Marine and reconnaissance NCO through commissioning, command at every level, from the Corps’first signals intelligence unit and later 1st Radio Battalion in Vietnam to Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic and IIMEF, and ultimately to the Commandancy.

In retrospect, the ability to execute much of what wouldfollow for the Corps throughout the 1990s and into the new century, from victory in DESERT STORM to the concepts of the “Three-Block War” and from “The Strategic Corporal” to the hard-won battlefield successes of nearly seventeen years of continuous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can be traced back to Gen Gray’s initiatives.

Maneuver Warfare

When asked about the movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s that led to the development of the Corps’ warfighting philosophy and doctrine based on maneuver warfare, Gen Gray was clear about the “bottom-up” approach to affecting this kind of change in the Corps’ thinking.

“It was very clear coming out of Vietnam that we had to make some changes to our thought process about warfighting. No question about our history- our history was so great. No question about the value of the individual Marine or anything like that. One of the great tricks trying to get some of these things done by those of us who wanted to see some change, and there were many, but the art of really getting it done was to get it done from the bottom up within the context of the situation. You have a lot of senior people, for example, who don’t like change. You had to do this in such a way as not to alienate them because it doesn’t do the Marine Corps any good to have that kind of division. You have to preserve a sense [of] one Corps going forward. And so İt was very difficult. That’s why in the 70s and 80s, particularly in 1981 through 1986, we opted to to try to bring the new thought process of warfighting into being from the ground up instead of developing doctrine and going through all of the layers and challenges of bureaucratic thinking, staffing, and having papers approved at multiple levels. When you do that, you can have a lot of people who didn’t believe İn İt and a lot of dissent, all that kind of thing. We went the other way. The interesting thing was that we really gained “disciples” through exercises and application because the approach really worked in practice. This practical discussion of what really works was more than theory like Col John Boyd’s “OODA” loop, and this is what some people have missed in the way the change really came about.

“There were examples when wellknown leaders, who in some cases opposed our ideas, changed their mind during field maneuvers. An illustration of what we called recon pull’ instead of command push’ was in 1981 while 8th Regiment was training at Camp Pickett (Virginia) on how to break out of an encirclement. We had the regimental headquarters and one of the battalions reinforced with tanks, reconnaissance, and artillery. The other elements of the regiment were the opposing forces surrounding us with the rest of the tank battalion and recon and other supporting forces. The Regimental S-3, then Maj (later MajGen) Ray Smith, put out reconnaissance teams in a 360-degree type environment, and one of the recon teams reported, ‘Were out here by Checkpoint 16 … There’s nobody here.’ Smith grabbed the radio-we had the PRC-25 radio İn those days-and said, ‘the focus of the main effort is now through Checkpoint 16.’ They escaped the encirclement, and Smith became a believer. Well, when you get a young guy like Smith, who won the Navy Cross İn Vietnam, you’ve won a good guy over and you’re on the right track there.

“Whether İt was a platoon or a regiment, İt was freeplay with an opposing force, and İt was never scripted. You had to use your own reconnaissance to provide your own intelligence and use your own security and your own logisitcs and the like. At every level, the MEF always trained as a MAGTF, and we came to be known as “the Carolina MAGTF.’ It was a tremendous time and it was exciting for the young officers and the staff NCOs and the young NCOs because they were allowed to do things. We had already attacked the so-called mistake-free or zero-defect mentality. We said, ‘You know you can’t let people do things and learn without allowing them to make some mistakes.’ Of course we don’t want them to make mistakes, but when we care more about how we look rather than how we are, well that İs careerism and it is the antithesis of what we were trying to do.

“We were also trying to teach our officers and our noncommissioned officer leaders that you need to think one or two levels up the chain of command and be ready to take over at any time. We had talked a good game about that, but we never really practiced it. So we changed and routinely practiced this kind of thing in training. Very important to this is your understanding of the mission two echelons up and, of course, understanding the commander’s intent is crucial. Because that way you can operate on your own under the umbrella of intent without disrupting the whole overall game plan.”

Professional Military Education

Always a strong proponent of self-education and PME throughout his career> as Commandant, Gen Gray made the education of Marines one of his highest priorities. The impact of this focus remains with us today in the Commandant’s Professional Reading List and in the continued world-class caliber of the colleges and schools of Marine Corps University.

“In my own experience, we had learned a lot through reading. Most of what I learned through the years, I learned through reading. You can’t send everybody to school, so reading was a good way to learn. I wanted that for everybody. I said the privates and PFCs should read the Guidebook for Marines. Everybody else has to be in the reading program. And so from lance corporals on up, we had the reading program. And my thought was very simple: what I was trying to do was hook them on reading.

“I wanted to establish Marine Corps University to include non-resident courses for a Warfighting Skill Program, AWS {now EWS), Command and Staff College, and to have a Staff NCO Academy. I looked at what they taught at Fort Leavenworth {U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), and I looked at what they taught at Carlisle {U.S. Army War College) and at Fort McNair {National Defense University), and I paid a great deal of attention to what they were doing at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama {USAF War College). So hand in glove with our thinking through the years was to have a powerful non-resident program and the ability to grant accredited degrees to our graduates. We looked at all of the universities we could find that were involved in what was called ‘alternative non-traditional education’ like Thomas Edison University in New Jersey, Syracuse University, as well as programs at Oklahoma, California, and Florida for ideas on the non-resident programs and regional accreditation.

“Fet me say a bit more about my relationship with Maxwell, which is related to professional reading and the university. We couldn’t have an accredited university because we didn’t have a first-class library at Quantico. We had a small library on the second deck of Breckinridge Hall, the Command and Staff College. I had seen the library at Maxwell, and that was the genesis of the idea for the research center, so I set a ‘task force’ and sent Col Gerry Turley down there to see their facility. Then I approached Representative Ike Skelton and the other people İn Congress to support our research center-“library” has an administrative connotation, and I knew Congress wouldn’t buy that. There were several proponents of military education in Congress at that time, and I worked with them. So I got a lot of backing even though some people thought I knew nothing about Congress.”

In 1989, FMFM 1, now MCDP 1, Warfighting, was first published as the Corps’ capstone doctrine as the result of the bottom-up intellectual “insurgency”that embraced maneuver warfare, spearheaded by Gen Gray. Today, the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center is among the finest military research libraries. It also houses the Corps’ archives and the History Divison of Marine Corps University. MCU is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to grant graduate degrees with resident, distance for both EWS and CSC; and the Staff NCO Academy has developed into the College of Enlisted Military Education as part of a campaign plan to modernize enlisted PME. This legacy of learning continues to build Marines who are thinking warriors, better prepared for the uncertainty and unknown challeges of future warfare-all thanks to the vision of our 29th Commandant.

>Authors’ Note: Gazette readers can access Col Mary Reinwald’s companion article on Gen Gray in this month’s Leatherneck at www. mca-marines. org/leatherneck.

by BGen William J Bowers

On behalf of Marine Corps University, I want to compliment the Marine Corps Gazette’s editorial staff on the outstanding articles they’ve published recently The Gazette is being true to the spirit in which Gen John A. Lejeune created it: to serve as a forum for new ideas intended to improve our Corps. Several of these recent articles have focused on improving the Marine Corps’ professional military education (PME) system. Our PME system is in a constant state of review and refinement, and we need recommendations from the force to help us develop and deliver the most professional, current, relevant, and challenging curriculum possible in order to prevent stagnancy. The purpose of this letter is twofold: 1) to inform the Gazette’s readers on what we’re doing about many of the excellent ideas raised, and 2) to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing their ideas because, as you’ll see below, they do make a difference.

First, it’s important to note a powerful movement that’s quietly occurring across our Corps that will significantly impact the future of PME: enlisted Marines are demanding, receiving, and exercising a greater role in how our Corps educates Marines. For example, SNCOs authored three of the four articles devoted to improving PME in the March 2018 Gazette. Enlisted Marines submitted more than half of the 41 essays we received for the just-concluded Belleau Wood Centennial Essay Contest and penned two of four winning articles. The days in which SNCOs and NCOs feel “‘intellectually under-nourished” by our Corps’ PME system (as a Staff Sergeant Career Course student told me in fall 2017) are gone. At the start of this academic year, the Commandant challenged us to tap into the intellectual potential of our enlisted Marines-what he called “the unexplored gold mine of our PME system”-and in the spirit of MCU’s founder, Gen Alfred M. Gray, we’re moving out. The College of Enlisted Military Education (CEME) staff will cover these reforms in a separate article, but they’re coming-and fast.

Second, SSgt Matthew P. Petitgout’s March 2018 article, “The Reading List and Quarterly PME,” suggests revamping both the Commandant’s Reading List and Quarterly PME programs to achieve greater educational benefit for Marines. For the Commandant’s Reading List, he suggests “some sort of short answer questions to not only inquire about the information gleaned from the book but to stoke the fire of creative thinking much the way guided discussion does.” This is an excellent idea. MCU can (and shall) create a “lesson card” for each of the six books the Commandant personally selects annually to be read by Marines, and these cards will be used as a vehicle to generate discussions and/or used by unit leaders for writing assignments. For the Quarterly PME program, while we would not advocate making this “mandated training for all units,” we do believe that by creating relevant, valuable, and useful tools, MCU can enhance a unit’s PME program by enabling and empowering leaders to run their own PMEs. Our goal for next year is to publish one case study per trimester (see LLI’s (Lejeune Leadership Institute’s) website at www. usmcu.edu/lh for what we’ve done so far) to emphasize a theme important for our Corps.* Case study leader discussion guides will further enable a small unit leader to guide the conversation so that it contextualizes the lessons in ways important for his unit.

Third, GySgt Jay C. Barnard’s “Educational Value” asks our Corps’ leaders, ” [I] s PME really challenging our [enlisted] members as much as it should?,” lamenting a “[PME] check in the box’ mentality” in which “commanders are not willing to send Marines to receive an irrelevant education.” GySgt Barnard specifically challenges MCU to “consider revising the program of instruction provided to our enlisted Marines” by including such subjects as sociology, psychology, and ethics and studying the dynamics of human behavior. The Commandant and Sergeant Major agree with GySgt Barnard. As he suggests, we will add more “relevant, difficult coursework to the [enlisted] curriculum[s],” but as we desire for all Marines to succeed, we will also provide more resources, such as: 1) communications instructors, 2) expanded opportunities for seminar programs, and 3) improved network access. As noted above, these reforms will be covered in detail elsewhere by the CEME staff but they are coming-fast.

Fourth, SSgt Thomas Maddoxs “The Future of Education is Now” rebuts an article written by an academic questioning the value of online writing classes. SSgt Maddox concludes that “online or distance education works,” and that while professors might not “see” the cross-talk and discussions that occur in a physical classroom, learning takes place virtually via email and chat rooms “in a manner that may be transparent to the professor.” He calls on professors to be “flexible enough in their thinking to adapt to new ideas, methods of teaching, and ways of learning.” Another winning idea. We have actually been talking about some of our distinguished MCU professors offering courses online to Marines across the Corps-why should this expertise stay bottled up aboard the MCU campus? SSgt Maddox’s article tells us it’s tíme to stop talking about it and execute, so that’s what we’re going to do. Next fiscal year, we will begin to offer online courses to Marines across the Corps, and credits will be coming shortly after we complete phase I of elective development. More details will be forthcoming on this initiative.

Fifth, Maj Breck L. Perry s “Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare Through PME” provides “a model that attempts to reinvigorate maneuver warfare at the battalion level” with a “formalized PME plan.” Maj Perry proposes five lines of effort; an approach, method, and end state to execute the plan; and roles and responsibilities within the battalion to ensure it gets done correctly. He even includes an example six-month PME plan, so he has clearly seen what right looks like. So how can MCU support such a unit PME plan as Maj Perry proposes? By creating and making tools available for Commanders and SNCOs to execute-that’s how.

We’ve covered above how we will create lesson cards for the Commandant’s annual book selections, produce case studies available on the LLI website, and expand opportunities for online learning. We can also help with staff rides by either: 1) making an expert available to travel and conduct the staff ride, or (even better) 2) publishing guidance and expertise on how small unit leaders can do this on their own. We have expertise here, and we will take this task on and post the product on the LLI website.

Sixth, the Marine Special Operations Command Commander and Staff published an article in the January 2018 Gazette calling for measuring Marines’ “ability to think, adapt, and collaborate with allies and partners” by leveraging “time spent in the existing Marine Corps education continuum.” The authors correctly point out that “Marines use many of these skills in educational venues as they interact with classmate peers.” These, again, are excellent points. We have already submitted a waiver to DC, M&RA to write observed fitness reports on our Corps’ doctoral candidates (and have been observing them regularly), and perhaps it’s time to expand this mindset to more of our resident PME students-to include those in CEME. Having observed and/or participated in seminar discussions at every school and having read student papers, there are some students who “stand out” in the areas the MARSOC Marines note. While Faculty and School Directors do typically put some comments on their students’ fitness reports, we’ll get with M&RA and explore ways to more formally document Marines’ student performance in their OMPFs.

In conclusion, the Corps’ Young Turks are once again on the march, and they’re not half-stepping. Moreover, their restless energy and vision is being fueled and nourished by the Commandant, who’s simultaneously telling the Corps’ senior leaders to “Go faster!” This letter explains how MCU is responding to our Marines’ ideas to improve the quality of education we provide to all Marines. We have much vrork to do. We also encourage your feedback on how we’re doing and where we can improve. Finally, we want to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing. As LtGen Victor “Brute” Krulak once wrote:

Progress in military affairs has ever been the product of the curiosity, impatience and iconoclasm of youth. Were this not true we might still be using the phalanx, the ramrod or the hollow square. If young Marines are indeed challenging the status quo I can only declare that they are behaving in the tradition of their forebears, and wish them well.1

Stay after it Marines-we’re listening and executing!

Notes

by Capt Austin Duncan

The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization, a taskorganized. force tailored in size and capability to accomplish any mission across the range of military operations. The Marine Corps Operating Concept, published by HQMC in September 2016, asserts, “The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach … across five domains-air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.” Currently, MAGTFs of all sizes and capabilities are unable to execute maneuver warfare through combined arms in cyberspace. To prepare for armed conflict in the cyberspace domain, the Marine Corps must stop conceptualizing conflict in cyberspace as a primarily defensive operation, enable MAGTFs with organic cyber capabilities, and demand an extension of cyber authorities to the tactical level in support of MAGTF operations. Should the organization evolve, the 21st century MAGTF can, and will, succeed ?n the cyberspace domain.

The essence of maneuver warfare is conducting both offense and defense, simultaneously and ?ndiscernibly. To date, MAGTFs focus efforts in the cyberspace domain almost exclusively on defense of friendly communications networks and safeguarding information. What MAGTFs lack ?s an offensive capability or striking power. A critical component of any defense is the inclusion of offense, the threat of a decisive counterattack to seize the initiative. Similarly, an effective offense requires defensive characteristics to conceal the main effort and achieve surprise. Offense and defense must co-exist. Despite the recognition of cyberspace as a new domain, the principles of warfighting remain the same. Cyber professionals are not only network defenders, but they must be armed and capable of transitioning from defense to offense, rapidly and unremittingly. The Marine Corps cannot continue to emphasize network defense as the primary focus for MAGTF cyber professionals; it must make a concerted effort to also train and equip cyber warriors on offensive principles in order to gain and maintain the initiative in combat.

MAGTFs require organic cyber capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations in a contested-network environment. MAGTFs are currently unable to effectively operate in cyberspace because of a limited number of cyber personnel, rudimentary equipment, and a lack of intelligence support. Present deficiencies are addressed through reachback agencies or an arduous request process for specialized support from the newly created Cyber Mission Force. These shortterm fixes are not viable solutions for a forward deployed MAGTF operating in contested-network environments ?n the 21st century, especially against a potential near-peer adversary. Untimely support requests, technological restrictions on connectivity and bandwidth, and inherent security risks while communicating with a reachback entity represent only a fraction of total concerns. While the cyber mission force may serve as a viable force provider in the near term by attaching support teams, the Marine Corps’ vision must be one which seeks a permanent cyber-force solution inherent within all sizes of MAGTFs. To fight and win ?n the cyberspace domain, MAGTFs require organic cyber personnel and equipment.

The Marine Corps must lead the charge to extend limited cyber authorities down to the tactical level in support of the MAGTF. Critics allege that the inherently sensitive nature and complexity of cyberspace operations require authorities to reside at a very high level. This ?s a valid argument for some operations in cyberspace. However, cyberspace operations span a large continuum of complexity and destruction, ranging from something as benign as network mapping or a denial-of-service attack at a local W?-Fi to catastrophic permanent destruction of critical services. MAGTFs do not require broad cyber authorities, much like they do not retain the authority to indiscriminately engage every target with all fire support assets. MAGTFs simply require limited authorities, captured within clear rules of engagement, to execute cyberspace operations on planned targets and targets of opportunity directly pertaining to the accomplishment of the mission. The Marine Corps must contest senior policy leaders1 current stranglehold of cyber authorities. If left unchallenged, cyber authorities will remain at too high a level for a MAGTF to employ.

The 21st century MAGTF can win in the cyberspace domain. As the Marine Corps’ premier organization, task organized to fight and win across the range of military operations, success in cyberspace is a no-fail mission for the MAGTF. To better prepare for future armed conflict, the Marine Corps must empower MAGTFs to assume the offensive in cyberspace, train and equip them with organic cyber capabilities, and aggressively seek delegation of limited cyber authorities to the tactical level. Evolving the MAGTF by preparing to fight in the cyberspace domain will ensure Marines continue to win in any clime and place.

by Maj Breck L Perry

There are far too many units in the Marine Corps that fail to prioritize and formalize PME. Focus of effort goes to training and developing techniques and procedures in correlation with training and readiness mission-essential tasks. Perpetual turnover, fluctuating training exercise and employment plans, and surging operational tempo typically consume commands, and PME becomes a “nice to have” instead or a priority. This is counter to our maneuver warfare doctrine and a disservice to the Marines and Sailors İn our charge. Fortunately, there is a movement underway to reinvigorate maneuver warfare in our Corps’ culture. In his FRAGO 01!2016 Advance to Contact, the Commandant of the Marine Corps decried: we will re-emphasize that Marines and Sailors of all ranks have the responsibility to educate themselves. Commanders will enable educational opportunities and will conduct unit level PME for all ranks.1

The Commandant’s vision implies the need for commanders at all levels to design and institute a formalized PME plan within their respective units. The purpose of this article is to assist in that endeavor and provide a model that attempts to reinvigorate maneuver warfare at the battalion level. This model is undergirded by our warfighting doctrine and organized along five lines of effort (LOEs): history, will, leadership, adversary, and advanced warfighting, with the end state being to create the best thinkers, decision makers, trainers, planners, and teachers in the Marine Corps. (See Figure 1.)

Approach

Training and education are mutually supporting terms, but they are not synonymous. Training is about skill, focusing on task performance and effectiveness, techniques and procedures, and the building of effective habits of thought and action. Education is about the will, concentrating primarily on thinking and decision making, aimed at cultivating military judgment, implicit communication, and trust. Doctrine provides the common language and philosophy, while education provides the understanding of the doctrine within fighting organizations. The amalgamation of intellect, audacity, and tactical proficiency has produced victory in battle for over 4,000 years. It is a moral imperative that officers and SNCOs possess an insatiable desire to “teach and learn, coach and be coached, and possess and cultivate an innate curiosity and appetite for understanding.”

MCDP 1, Warfighting, should be the first resource thoroughly studied prior to developing a PME program. MCDP 1-3, Tactics, should be the second. MCDP 1-3, Chapter 8 vividly describes the systemic, mutually supporting relationships between doctrine, education, training, and operational employment.

Doctrine establishes the philosophy and practical framework for how we fight. Education develops the understanding, creativity, military judgment, and the background essential for effective battlefield leadership. Training follows doctrine and develops the tactical and technical proficiency that underlies all successful military action. Individual and group exercises serve to integrate training and education, producing a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The lessons learned from training and operational experience then modify doctrine.2 (See Figure 2.)

Commanders intent. The cornerstone to PME plan development is the commander’s intent. It is also recommended to go two levels up when conducting an initial analysis on crafting the model. The commander’s intent should be interwoven throughout the model, and the commander’s end state articulated up front. Today’s generation of officers and SNCOs should understand the purpose for the PME program and what İs expected of them.

Commander’s guidance. Dialogue pertaining to LOEs needs to occur between the PME coordinator and the commander to achieve the objectives or end state of the unit’s program. Recommended LOEs are described below:

* LOE 1-History. Focused on the lessons learned from over 4,000 years of recorded military history, in pursuit of developing the 4,000-year-old mind. As Gen Alfred M. Gray told us: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.”3 Central points: history and legacy of the battalion and lessons learned in previous conflicts.

* LOE 2-Will. Focused on the development of decision makers who can thrive in chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction. Central points: nurturing the maneuver–warfare mindset and truly understanding the human dimension of war.

* LOE 3-Leadershİp. Leadership is the foundation of any command. Focused on developing the moral, mental, and physical capabilities of the battalion’s leaders. Central points: building of trust and the warrior ethos.

* LOE 4-Adversary. Oriented on the ever-pervasİve and mutating enemy threats that seek to eradicate the American way of life, from radical, terrorist groups to near-peer competitors. Studying the current operating environment and potential scenarios the battalion may fight İs essential. Central points: transnational terrorist groups and near-peer state actors.

* LOE 5-Advanced Warfighting: This LOE İs loosely coupled from the PME program. It İs a weekly seminar that is strictly voluntary and managed by the operations officer. The purpose of this LOE is to have discussions on doctrinal warfighting articles and publications in order to discuss creative and adaptive ways to fight and win. It corresponds directly to the tactical tenets in MCDP 1-3, is focused on the tactical level of war, and aims to stimulate outside-the-box thinking. Central points: offense, defense, shoot/move/ communicate-related topics. In addition, outputs from this LOE drive training and experimentation for future field exercises and facilitate SOP refinement.

Methods. The PME program utilizes multiple educational techniques employed across the breadth of the program. These techniques include but are not limited to guided discussions, staff rides, guest speakers, decision-forcing case studies, videos, and critiques. Most PMEs will require a “read-ahead” for preceding preparation. PMEs are recorded and archived for a podcast that Marines can access and reference at their leisure.

Writing requirements. There should be a monthly writing requirement for a Marine Corps Gazette article submission for the battalion, apportioned by company. For example: Fox CompanyNovember, Goli Company-December, etc. The topic İs of the company commander’s choosing. (See Figure 3 for an example.)

Assessment and redesign. The PME schedule is published semiannually with a quarterly assessment conducted. The assessment consists of the PME coordinator and CO having a dialogue on ways to improve the program, projecting the next six months, and canvassing the commanders and staff for feedback on the rough-cut schedule provided by the PME coordinator. This assessment is vital to ensure the PME program remains relevant and correlates with the operational requirements for the battalion. For example, a battalion compositing as a battalion landing team might want to focus effort on the Leadership LOE İn order to build cohesion and esprit de corps and inculcate commander’s intent to the SNCOs and officers newly integrated into the team. The next month’s PME plan may want to focus effort on the history of amphibious operations in the History LOE, then transition into the Adversary LOE to discuss recent enemy tactics against coalition forces İn Iraq and Syria. The top-down guidance is given. Bottom-up refinement İs provided. The result intended is buy-in and stewardship of the program.

Roles and Responsibilities

PME coordinator. The officer and SNCO PME coordinator should be the battalion executive officer. As the second in command of the battalion, the XO is responsible for the leadership development and mentorship of the staff and officers. The XO has the pulse of the unit, a close relationship with the sergeant major for senior enlisted counsel, and a high-fidelity grasp of the commander’s intent. The XO should have adept teaching and coaching skills and a drive to instill those traits İn others. The XO is responsible for a PME plan focused on four of the five LOEs: History, Leadership, Will, and Adversary.

Assistant PME coordinator. This is a collateral duty usually assigned to the assistant intelligence officer (S-2 Alpha). This officer İs ideally one of the best educated young officers in the battalion and İs skilled in organizing, coordinating, and communicating. Primary responsibilities for this billet are to coordinate logistical support for offsite PME, record each PME, supervise the coordination of guest speakers and distinguished guests, and archive the PME for future use.

Advanced warfighting coordinator. The Advanced Warfighting LOE is the province of the operations officer. The operations officer fights the battalion and always seeks to gain advantage over the enemy to lead to their collapse and defeat. Associated with the battalion TEEP, the operations officer provides weekly articles, topics, and coordinating instructions centered around the CO’s guidance. The operations officer collaborates with the CO on teaching seminars and preparing the appropriate resources: maps/interactive tactical decision games, media, etc.

Derivatives: Implicit Communication and Military Judgment

There are many obvious benefits to a formalized and deliberate PME plan. Critical thinking, teaching, and reasoning skills become sharpened and refined. Creativity İs enhanced. Verbal and written communication skills mature. However, the two most essential abilities developed through a consistent PME program are implicit communication skills as they relate to a command and military judgment as it relates to the individual decision maker. MCDP 1-3 points out that Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson didn’t lead the British fleet through semaphore. He invested time İn developing understanding, sharing experience, coaching, and instilling his commander’s intent amongst his captains.

Implicit communications must be developed over time. This requires actions that strengthen unit cohesion and mutual trust. This requires keeping people together in their units and stable in their assignments. It implies keeping good teams together. It means developing a band of brothers in our units, as Admiral Horatio Nelson did. He spent many evenings with his captains gathered in the cabin of his flagship talking over tactics, ways they might fight different engagements, how they would defeat this or that opponent. From those evenings came a shared way of thinking so strong that, at Trafalgar, Nelson needed only to signal ‘England expects every man will do his duty,’ and ‘Close action.’ Sometimes words have meaning beyond the normally obvious meaning because of shared experiences and understanding.^

Military judgment is the other derivative skill of PME. It İs the nucleus of adept decision makers and tacticians and the catalyst of decisive action.

Military judgment is a developed skill that is honed by the wisdom gained through experience. Combined with situational awareness, military judgment allows [Marines] to identify emerging patterns, discern critical vulnerabilities, and concentrate combat power … Marine leaders must be able to cut to the heart of a situation by identifying its important elements, developing a sound plan, and making clear decisions.^

Most young officers have limited combat experience. Formalized unit PME provides a vehicle by which Marines can harvest wisdom from the vicarious experience of historic military leaders, educate themselves on an adaptive enemy, or garner lessons learned from recent tactical experiments with emerging technology.

Conclusion

All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Commanders should foster a personal teacher-student relationship with their subordinates. Commanders are expected to conduct a continuing professional education program for their subordinates that includes developing militaryjudgment and decisionmaking \siĄ and teaches general professional subjects and specific technical subjects pertinent to occupational specialties. Useful tools for general professional development include supervised reading programs, map exercises, war games, battle studies, and terrain studies. Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.^

MCDP 1 gives resounding and unblemished guidance on PME expectations for all commands İn the Corps. This article focused solely on an officer and SNCO PME plan with the intention of assisting and supplementing units with a purpose-driven PME model to employ. This model is far from perfect, but it is modular, sustainable, and an enduring priority of the command.

by 1stLts J.L. Currie & Matt Hartley

We observe a conversation happening across the Marine Corps, a conversation that asks, “Is the Marine Corps heading in the right direction?” Within the context of this broader question, devoted and enthusiastic officers and enlisted Marines are asking: What ?s the future of amphibious warfare? How can we adapt to (the elusive concept of) fourth generation warfare? How can we marry the rapid pace of technological development with a traditional warfighting organization? This, we believe, ?s a positive response to the Commandant’s call for disruptive thinkers. Much of this debate is centered around questions that are as interesting and exciting as they are large in magnitude, for which no obvious answers or solutions exist. This has been evident in the debate surrounding Capt Joshua Waddell’s article, “Innovation: And other things that brief well” (MCG, Febl7). As young lieutenants, we feel the frustrations expressed ?n Capt Waddell’s argument, but we also acknowledge Capt Jeffrey E. Little’s logical response ?n “A Modest Rebuttal: Response to ‘Innovation: and other things that brief well.'”

Like many thinkers across the Marine Corps, these questions have been the background to our own conversations. In this article, we hope that our analysis offers something unique: a specific focus on individual Marines operating at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. Instead of attempting to address the apex question (“Is the Marine Corps heading in the right direction?”) or other, larger questions, like the ones previously mentioned, we address practices on our level by asking, “How does cell phone and email use affect the way we operate and plan?” This question may seem trivial, innocuous, and possibly silly, but we believe it contains broader moral and existential importance.

We are not arguing for a return to simpler communications technology or, in the extreme, none at all; we argue for discipline: rules on using these technologies consistent with our warfighting philosophy and modern science. We purport to fight maneuver warfare, but ungoverned availability and access to these communications technologies is antithetical to our warfighting philosophy. They deprive us of initiative, reduce efficiency, and degrade effectiveness. A total ban is regressive, but rules and etiquette for bounded use are both practical and necessary. The first section of this article sets the foundation, reviewing maneuver warfare theory, introducing fundamental documents, and defining key concepts. In the second section, we offer comments and observations from our own experience. In the final section and conclusion, we reiterate that discipline is critical, providing useful recommendations for regaining the initiative in daily operations.

Concepts & Definitions

The foundational publication of the Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine, MCDP 1, establishes maneuver warfare as the standard by which the organization executes military action. MCDP 1 defines maneuver warfare as

a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot coped

Recent Marine Corps publications such as Expeditionary Force 21, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2014), and Marine Corps Operating Concept, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2016), review and reinforce maneuver warfare‘s central tenets of speed, decentralized command, and rapid decision making. The Marine Corps Operating Concept reaffirms maneuver warfare as the method to ensure the Marine Corps defeats its future enemies.2 Theory and practice, however, hardly align. Juxtapose the central tenets of maneuver warfare against daily battalion operations across the Marine Corps. We believe we fail at the lowest levels to execute the maneuver philosophy envisioned by theorists such as Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret).

Maneuver warfare is ultimately about disrupting and out-cycling an opponent’s observation-orientationdecision-action process, also known as the OODA loop. Col Boyd developed the OODA loop as a theory for how human beings make decisions. He first explained it in Destruction and Creation. He further examined this concept and fleshed out the implications and principles inherent in maneuver warfare in his groundbreaking brief, “Patterns of Conflict.” These ideas laid the intellectual basis for Capt John Schmitt’s publication, commissioned and endorsed by Marine Corps Commandant Gen Alfred Gray as FMFM 1, Warfighting. Throughout the creation of Warfighting, Schmitt conferred with fellow maneuver enthusiasts, including Gen Bernard Trainor, Col Mike Wyly, and Gen Paul Van Riper, to refine and capture the major tenets of maneuver warfare.3 First published in 1989 as FMFM 1, it was later revised in 1997 to become MCDP 1, Warfighting.

In this article, we focus on three key concepts from maneuver warfare theory: initiative, decentralized command, and commander’s intent. In our analysis, we use these concepts as the standard for measuring our daily operating effectiveness. Initiative, as defined ?n MCDP 1, is “the willingness to act on one’s own judgment.”^ Boyd argued initiative was a requirement for shaping and adapting to change, that the warfighter must avoid passivity.3 Decentralization ?s a prerequisite for inspiring initiative. Decentralized command enables high tempo in the face of uncertainty, disorder, and the ever-changing events of combat.6 The imperative for action, however, must still be in harmony with the larger organization’s goals. To achieve this effect, commander’s intent harmonizes initiative with the overarching tactical, operational, or strategic goal. It is the commander’s intent that allows subordinates the freedom to deviate from the original plan as circumstances change yet remain focused on achieving the end state.7

Practiced ?n concert, these concepts have the unifying effect of rapid decision making; and the ability to make decisions faster than the enemy is the essence of Boyd’s theory and maneuver warfare. The combatant who acts quickest generates the tempo and controls the momentum of the conflict. The Marine Corps, down to the smallest unit, moves through this decision-making cycle. As such, it is imperative we understand and analyze the effect communications technology has on this cycle and our ability to make decisions.8

Email &? Cell Phones: What’s the Big Deal?

Despite the focus in recent months and the previous few years on disaggregated operations, it remains unattainable if access to cell phones and email remains unconstrained in training. Warfighting asserts that, “In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training-like combat-should be decentralized.”^ Even in peacetime, training must mirror combat. Warfighting continues,

subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed downT

Unrestrained email and cell phone use eliminates the need for clear commander’s intent; it strips the decision-making power from subordinates. It ruins our ability to communicate clearly and implicitly. The end result ?s an organization that does not train like it fights. The daily habits and practices needed for decentralized operations are slowly whittled down. When the day of reckoning comes and we find ourselves again involved in a conflict, will we have the experience or understanding to create a coherent decision-making cycle? Who needs an enemy to disorient us when we can do it ourselves? In the words of Pogo, “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”

Too often, our ability to work in solitude and think through our most difficult challenges is interrupted by the constant stream of emails cluttering our inbox. If, as stated in MCDP 1, “the mind is an officer’s principal weapon” and “the military profession ?s a thinking profession,” then only through solitude can we discover the solutions that will truly make us a better force. We often avoid our most difficult problems, inadvertently choosing the distraction of email. Rather than taking the time to face truly essential problems and improve our units, it appears we are merely reacting to the day s email traffic. In the book Focus, Daniel Goleman references a Harvard business study that examined the inner work lives of a team tasked with completing innovative challenges. The study found the most critical aspect to the team’s success was protected time to think freely within a “creative cocoon.” 11 As William Deresiewicz argued in his speech “Solitude and Leadership,” leaders need protected time to think through problems, focus their efforts, and decide which actions are truly important for success and improvement. Solitude allows us the time to clarify our thoughts and beliefs, enabling us to focus our efforts with greater resolve and precision.12 Gen Moshe Dayan, an Israeli Defense Force commander who helped orchestrate the exemplary display of maneuver warfare by the Israeli Defense Forces during the 1967 Six Day War, was known to reserve time to think in solitude.13 We have too few leaders who spend time deeply thinking and too many reacting to distractions.

We confuse busy work with progressive work. Answering and receiving emails (busy work) gives the illusion of progressive work because it ?s a timeconsuming endeavor leading to a constant shift ?n focus. As Herbert Simon, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, said, “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.”14 With email, each new “ding” becomes a new priority. As a result, we cannot focus on one problem long enough to develop a solution, “Patterns of Conflict” advises maneuver warfare practitioners to “present many simultaneous and sequential happenings to generate confusion and disorder.”13 Every time a message pops into our inbox, we are forced to orient on an entirely new information set, inflicting damage to our own OODA loop. To paraphrase Warfighting, email creates a rapidly deteriorating situation in which we are no longer able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. Instead, we are left with the impression that we accomplished something because we were busy throughout the day.

To be clear, cell phones and email are not inherently problematic-how we use them is. Ultimately, how we use communications technology is a direct reflection of how we communicate:

We believe that implicit communication-to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each others thoughts-is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.

This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people-“actuals”-should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate in how we talk-our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.1*’

We wager that the entire Marine Corps violates these four practical implications. The misuse of communications technology decreases face-to-face interaction, preventing the necessary development of familiarity and trust. We observe our seniors, subordinates, and even ourselves choosing to use a cell phone or landline to speak with someone across the street or even in the same building. Furthermore, orders and warning orders passed through text message increase uncertainty, confusion, and disorder-explicit communication at its worst.

Without disciplined structures governing the use of emails and cell phones, we will continue to delay decisions, shift priorities, and inhibit our ability to think through complex challenges. Rather than operate off implicit communications, staffs increasingly turn to the explicit communications found in email, slowing tempo and increasing the time for action. Leaders become more hesitant to make decisions, waiting until they have complete information. This dependence on explicit communications creates a mentality that centralizes command and develops a pattern of behavior grossly opposed to the guidance expressed in MCDP 1. A flood of email traffic or the constant access to a cell phone reduces the clearness of commander’s intent.

The Information Age brought us the Internet, the smartphone, and email. As these technologies have progressed, instantaneous access has become commonplace. Knowing when and how to use and access these technologies is the key; otherwise, undisciplined use results in intellectual, cognitive, and psychological torpor. Furthermore, access to this technology without restraint has operational side effects. It robs us of initiative and lessens the importance of commander’s intent. It degrades the quality of our communications, placing emphasis on explicit communications. Finally, it inhibits our ability to practice decentralized command and therefore disaggregated operations.

Conclusion Recommendations

There ?s great value in the speed, range, and ease of use provided by cell phones and email. These systems can enhance command and control in Marine Corps units but only through discipline and clearly defined boundaries. The rampant email abuse and cell phone addiction throughout the Marine Corps destroys our ability to solve the right problems. We regress as a warfighting organization and fail ?n our execution of maneuver warfare by remaining addicted to and dependent on these systems.

Discipline ?s what separates mobs from armies. As John Keegan points out ?n The Face of Battle, discipline has created and upheld victorious military units for decades:

Inside every army is a crowd struggling to get out… For a crowd is the antithesis of an army, a human assembly animated not by discipline but by mood, by the play of inconstant and potentially infectious emotion which, ifit spreads, is fatal to an army’s subordination.12

Gen John A. Lejeune draws a clear connection between discipline and morale in his 1921 address to the Army General Staff College: the more disciplined a unit, he argues, the higher their morale.18 Rules, limits, and guidance for cell phones and email are not merely matters of efficiency and effectiveness. As Lejeune points out, the morale of the fighting unit is at stake.

Although anecdotal, we believe the doctrinal argument compelling: Constant access to cell phones and email degrades our ability to implement maneuver warfare. The addiction to cellular devices has other pernicious effects: it worsens sleep,^ mirrors substance addiction,20 and increases anxiety.21 Rules need to be written based on operational concepts and scientific evidence.

As a starting point, we propose the following recommendations for managing cell phone and email use at the battalion level:

* Personal cell phones will not be used between 0800 and 1600 during the work day.

* Limit email use to two hours during the work day.

* Communication should be done in person.

* Communications required to occur over a phone will be made through a DSN (Defense Switched Network) number.

As a result of these (or similar) boundaries, we believe units will improve their ability to solve problems, increase individual initiative, exploit implicit communications, and generate a faster OODA loop consistent with commander s intent.

Writing and enforcing rules for email and cell phone use consistent with history, science, and our warfighting philosophy seems to be common sense. We believe the effect will be dramatic and immediate. We encourage all commanders to institute and enforce stricter rules governing cell phone and email availability during accepted working hours.

For our part, we already have and will continue to do so.