Close Combat
By: Mr. Charles D. MelsonPosted on October 15,2026
A U.S. Marine Corps legacy
Close combat occurs at the distance of a bayoneted rifle and is measured in feet rather than yards and in seconds rather than minutes. It is a calculated situation to be in rather than avoided and should be prepared for in a realistic manner. For Marines, this occurs when they locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver and repel his attacks by fire and close combat (the job of the infantry for those who do not know it). With every Marine considered a rifleman, use of close combat includes the whole of the Corps as well. The 20th and 21st centuries provided a series of wars that saw the continued need for basic fighting skills for armed and unarmed combatants, and skills for non-warriors given little time and training to prepare.
The subject of this introduction is skill-at-arms developed by the Marine Corps, addressing those that are sub-tactical, that is, not requiring fire and movement or team effort but related so closely they are inseparable. I will examine some noteworthy individuals who made contributions to the Marine Corps’ close combat legacy. These are the classics: Biddle, Fairbairn, Sykes, Stavers, Styers, O’Neill, and Applegate. This is not to assign them cause or effect, as institutions and situations were critical, as well as the efforts of those who made it work at the unit level. The same holds for doctrine, the written records consulted, used to provide a chronological framework. Other contributors have been acknowledged, including Marines Robert L. Carlin, Tom L. Curtis, Richard E. Hanley, William A. Kengla, James M. Masters, J.N. Swearingen, and Walter R. Walsh. Marines who benefited from this wartime instruction included martial artists such as Donn F. Draeger and Robert W. Smith. These time-honored methods are practical and still valid for the purposes intended. Here are solutions to close combat. Try them; they work.
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle was born in Philadelphia, PA, on 1 October 1874. He was married to Cordelia R. Bradley and lived in Philadelphia with his three children, where he died on 27 May 1948. Biddle’s legacy to Marine Corps close combat is essential background for those interested in “our style of fighting.” One way or another, all others were associated with the dean of Marine close-quarter combat instructors, Tony Biddle.
Biddle was an enthusiastic close-combat proponent between the First and Second World Wars, a socialite and sportsman of the “Christian athlete” style. He worked as a reporter and was an amateur boxer who sparred with well-known champions of his day like John L. Sullivan, Jack Johnson, Bob Fitzsimmons, “Kid” McCoy, “Philadelphia Jack” O’Brien, and George Carpentier.
Before America entered World War I, Biddle organized a military training corps of about 1,600 members that had instruction in close combat from the renowned William J. Herrmann. As a Marine reserve captain during World War I, Biddle served as a bayonet instructor at Port Royal, SC, adapting his style from boxing techniques. To meet bayonet thrusts, Biddle admonished, “You have to stop them all and make yours count.”1
Among those trained at Parris Island in 1918 was William A. “Ironman” Lee, who drew Biddle’s attention because “I happened to be the top pistol and rifle shot in our platoon.”2 Lee recounted that his later survival as a jungle fighter with Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller’s mobile gendarme company in Nicaragua with 36 ambushes and “50 to 100” close combat incidents was due in part to his expert marksmanship and knife fighting techniques honed by Biddle. Another well-known student was Marine reservist and boxer Gene Tunney.
Individual combat training and combative sports (shooting, fencing, boxing, wrestling, riding) were the focus of close-combat efforts for Marines from the turn of the century. There was strong European classical influence and even some Asian martial arts impact by World War I. Biddle’s background as a sportsman fit this mold and was reflected in his instruction to others. After a stint overseas and a return to Quantico, VA, Biddle was released from active duty as a major.
After the “War to End All Wars,” the Marines took part in peacekeeping, police actions, and small wars that put a premium on personal fighting abilities. This inspired Biddle to continue studying bayonet, sword, knife, club, and hand-to-hand fighting. Biddle’s daughter wrote that he traveled to Hawaii to learn jujitsu, and this eventually led to William E. Fairbairn in China. She recalled that by “the time he got back home, he was familiar with the numerous forms of defendu and judo.”3 This continued with Fairbairn’s visit to the States in 1925 to promote his Defendu and with Biddle’s trips to Shanghai with Bible-school obligations. However, Biddle and Fairbairn’s different approaches and personalities did not lead to collaboration, even though they were aware of each other’s efforts. Biddle felt Fairbairn provided a defense against the various Chinese and Japanese blows and holds.
Biddle was recalled to active duty for a time in 1928 as an instructor at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, where he prepared exhibition teams in bayonet, boxing, and “rough and tumble” fighting. He also instructed a generation of Marine officers at the Philadelphia basic school. Biddle’s reputation grew as he became well known from staged exhibitions of bayonet, knife, savate, and jujitsu fighting. He was considered a noted instructor of individual combat by the Marine Corps and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, despite the practical limits of techniques based more on reputation than results. In 1937, Biddle published Do or Die, as a supplementary manual “for those whose duties may lead them into a ‘tight spot’.”4 That year he again went on active duty at Quantico, VA, with mandatory retirement from the reserves in 1938.
At the start of World War II in 1941, the 67-year-old Biddle once more taught bayonet, knife, and hand-to-hand combat at Quantico, Parris Island, and San Diego. Though past his prime, his students spearheaded close-combat efforts for World War II. In 1943, he left active duty, commended by the Secretary of the Navy, who noted “a most generous giving of your time and energies.”5 His Do or Die manual was reprinted by the Leatherneck Association in 1944.
The Marine Corps felt he was “an internationally known swordsman for over 50 years, and considered the nation’s most distinguished master of the arts of jujitsu, sword, bayonet, and dagger fighting, served with the Marine Corps in both world wars demonstrating to newer Leathernecks the art of hand-to-hand combat.”6 Biddle’s critics questioned the usefulness of what was taught and his flamboyant approach, but later others, such as Stephen Stavers and John Styers, took what he presented and made it work for a majority of Marines in combat and hopefully for those who still need these skills.
The Shanghai Connection
LtCol William E. “Dan” Fairbairn (1885–1960) arrived in the Far East in 1901 from England with the Royal Marine Light Infantry. After service in Korea, he joined the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) in 1907. Fairbairn served as a constable, drill instructor, and firearms trainer. He eventually supervised the SMP armory, training, and reserve unit (riot squad). With these duties, he pioneered the use of ballistics, gunfighting, and close combat training, and what has been termed police special weapons and tactics. As he put it, “I was in police work in the Orient for 30 years. We had a tough crowd to deal with there, so you had to be prepared to beat every trick in the book.”
A noted collaborator was Maj Eric A. “Bill” Sykes (1883–1945), a professional hunter, Colt and Remington Arms salesman, and special police sergeant who ran the SMP sniper unit. Their approach evolved from practical experience that included some 2,000 fights over a period of 12 1/2 years in which 666 were shooting affrays resulting in 260 criminals killed, 193 wounded compared to 42 police killed, 100 wounded; with Fairbairn and Sykes present at over 200 of these.
Fairbairn recalled that “When I organized and trained riot squads for the Shanghai police I developed a system of fighting out of the methods that got results.”7 He went on to say, “In modern warfare, the job is more drastic. You’re interested only in disabling or killing your enemy. That’s why I teach what I call ‘Gutter Fighting.’ There’s no fair play; no rules except one: kill or be killed.”8
Between 1927 and 1940, American Marines, sailors, and soldiers were stationed in a turbulent Shanghai to protect American lives and property in an early example of international peacekeeping. This small war served to provide laboratory experience and expertise that would later be used by Marines and others in the larger crucible of World War. The arrival of the Americans provided the opportunity for Fairbairn to further refine his methods, this time in a military context with the Marines, taught “at my own hands.”9
Later known as Fearless Dan or the Shanghai Buster, the Marines knew Fairbairn as Delicate Dan and the Deacon. Two Marines who worked with him were Lts Samuel S. Yeaton and Luther S. “Sam” Moore. Yeaton met Fairbairn in 1931 and continued the relationship through the next two years with a shared interest in self-defense. In turn, he introduced Moore, who was another shooting enthusiast. Moore and Yeaton had gone to the U.S. Naval Academy together and were both on the Marine Corps Shooting Team, and Yeaton was also with the Shanghai Marine pistol team that dominated the Far East.
Activities centered on the Yangtsepoo armory and resulted in several exchanges and experiments with Fairbairn, his son John (with the police special branch), Bill Sykes, and the armorer Nicholas Solntsteff. The Marines and Fairbairn “swapped ideas and fighting methods” such as competitive marksmanship, boxing, and Mexican knife fighting, according to Fairbairn researcher Peter Robins. They addressed technical areas—armored vests, shields, holsters—and a prototype of a fighting knife in 1932.10 O’Neill stated that Lee-Medford bayonets were used to provide the stock for blades that were then worked by the armory staff to Yeaton’s requirements.
By 1935, Fairbairn was assistant commissioner for the reserve and training branch. Another Marine who worked with him was 1stLt Samuel G. Taxis, and both of them instructed large numbers of Marines and police in knife and unarmed fighting in the mid-1930s. Head of the regimental boxing team, Taxis was also a student of Biddle, took his Shanghai experience back to America, and passed it on to other Marines.
A direct relationship existed with Marine riot companies in Shanghai and the SMP’s reserve unit. Typical situations included intimidation through flag marches, show-of-force with street formations, and mob disruption with tear gas and baton charges—deadly force was an available last resort. Fairbairn’s riot squad used a 5-man entry team, backed up by snipers, tactical vehicles, a 14-man rifle squad, and a 46-man street formation. One riot company commander, Capt Wallace M. Greene, Jr., worked to find the optimum combination of men and weapons to allow for flexible but effective employment. Drawing on Capts Evans F. Carlson and Merritt A. Edson’s experience in Central America, Greene organized his riot company around four-man teams.
For all his promoters, Fairbairn also had detractors who considered him narrow, domineering, and egotistical. The relationship with the Marines was not always trouble-free. For example, in one incident, a Marine officer (Greene) punched a Chinese constable, and Fairbairn pressed for a court-martial—but Greene was exonerated and later commended for this action. Fairbairn’s unorthodox methods were not accepted by a prewar Marine Corps that valued boxing, wrestling, fencing, marksmanship, drill, and parade turnout as conventional military skills. The Marine’s Walla Walla newspaper mentioned no armed or unarmed defense, despite covering all manner of contact sports and competition.
The British military left Shanghai as the war in Europe began, while Americans remained there a little longer. By the time the war in Europe was well underway in 1940, Fairbairn and Sykes had returned to the United Kingdom from the Far East. Both were picked by the War Office as army instructors for the Home Guard, special forces, and intelligence services; later Fairbairn served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the United States.
Marine Capts Greene and Samuel B. Griffith (who translated Mao Tse Tung’s Guerilla Warfare while in China) went to the United Kingdom in 1941 to observe the British commando program, including close combat training at the special training center. Their report to the Secretary of the Navy in January 1942 influenced decisions to form similar American units, the Marine Raiders and Army Rangers. Other Shanghai Marine veterans commanded special raider and parachute units that later served as cadres for division combat forces.
As early as February 1942, Fairbairn and Sykes’ shooting techniques were shown in the 1st and 2d MarDivs. Individual American servicemen and the first Army Rangers actually underwent training in Scotland. The Marines used field firing as taught in Shanghai in the extensive training of its special parachute and Raider battalions and fielded its version of a fighting knife on the Fairbairn and Sykes pattern.
Stephen Stavers
Marine Corps close quarter combat instructor Stephen Stavers was born 13 November 1916 in New York City. Stavers attended Columbia University and was active in sports and as a sportswriter for The New York Times. He joined the Marine Corps Reserve in 1940 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in February 1941.
Like the “Three Sams” (Moore, Yeaton, Taxis), Stavers was trained in close combat by Col Biddle, who considered him to be “one of the three most proficient instructors in the United States armed forces.” In 1942, Stavers set up an individual combat school at New River, NC. This school put together the quick shooting, bayonet, knife, club, unarmed combat, conditioning, and swimming curriculum used by Marines throughout World War II. He improved on existing techniques and helped the Army infantry school revise its bayonet instruction.
Course principles stressed the attack. Doctrine expounded striking from as far out as possible, as quickly as possible, and with the best weapon available. Training was based upon conditioned reflexes through intensive practice “so that aggressiveness becomes instinctive and fighting responses become automatic.”11
One area of interest for Stavers was knife fighting that used the Marine’s Bowie-style Ka-Bar knife in “a slashing attack … with the knife pointing forward in a loose, flexible manner, the blade flat, and the cutting edge forward.”12 Because a smart, appropriately trained knife fighter could take on an unskilled bayonet fighter, mixed weapons techniques were taught that pitted the knife against another knife, a bayoneted rifle, or club, as well as unarmed opponents.
Stavers left New River in June 1943 and went on to establish the close combat course at Camp Pendleton, CA. Part of these duties included arranging demonstration conferences for then-Maj Fairbairn and his system of “gutter fighting.” At these, Fairbairn was introduced as “a friend of the old 4th Marines.”13 During training sessions, Fairbairn noted that he learned the Biddle principles of knife fighting in Shanghai from the Marines—the Three Sams again.
Stavers was a central figure in developing the fighting skills found here. In the seabag of history available on Marine close combat, Stavers updated Biddle’s pre-war methods and established the basis for Styers’ efforts after the war. Stavers was made captain and was assigned overseas. He was killed in action on 18 September 1944 with Headquarters Battalion, 1st MarDiv during the landing on Peleliu.
By that time, Shanghai and Raider veteran LtCol Sam Griffith was commanding Officers Candidate School in Quantico. Preparing leaders for combat required the same training given at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, resulting in the comprehensive Course of Instruction in Combat Conditioning (NAVMC 3660) published by the Marine Corps Schools in 1944. This manual provides all the close-combat lessons learned by Marines to that point in the war.
John J. Styers
John Jasper Styers was born on 6 April 1917. He was married to Marie F. Styers and lived in New York City. Styers enlisted in the Marines in 1935. During this time, he was a student of Col Biddle. Throughout his subsequent career, Styers passed these teachings on to other Marines as an individual combat instructor. Styers left active duty in 1939 and entered the reserves. He went back on active duty on 12 November 1943 and was a corporal with Headquarters Company, 5th Service Battalion, 5th MarDiv when it landed on Iwo Jima in February 1945. He was wounded in action, and after six months of hospitalization returned to civilian life on 11 September 1945.
Styers began a period of intensive research and analysis in developing more effective fighting techniques and training procedures. His instruction was based on what the Marine Corps taught as individual combat: bayonet, knife and club, unarmed fighting, “snap” or “quick” firing of small arms, and combat conditioning exercises. He realized the value and necessity of individual combat training and the need for a better method to instill confidence in the fighting man.
Styers’ determination and his enthusiasm for his subject eventually resulted in a course which he conducted at Camp Lejeune and other Marine, Air Force, and Army bases. More than 50,000 service personnel of all ranks received instruction in the close combat technique he refined. In May 1952, through the efforts of Leatherneck magazine editor Karl Schuon and photographer Louis Lowery, Styers published Cold Steel, which documented these techniques of close combat for a new generation of Marines. Styers covered the bayonet, knife, stick, unarmed combat, and knife throwing. The publisher noted: “Cold Steel is a recipe for death; use it wisely!”14
Styers’ experience and observation determined that the age-old practice of using the bayonet primarily as a pike left much to be desired. The principles advocated were designed for simplicity and naturalness of action, resulting in maximum confidence in the Marine in a minimum amount of time.
His technique of knife fighting was a product of American heritage. Styers did not borrow the methods used traditionally by other nations. He followed the development of the legendary James Bowie and Biddle in evolving what is “probably the deadliest knife fighting technique in the world.” Styers found the stick or club was useful in an emergency and for traditional law enforcement. He covered the versatility of this easily acquired weapon. Personal contact with the enemy when unarmed results in a fast, deadly action. Here again, simplicity of application and effectiveness of results were emphasized. Man’s natural weapons are described, vulnerable targets on the opponent are designated, and simple and effective methods of applying these natural weapons on the target are defined.
Writer Arthur Wise used Styers as an example of the modern technique of fighting with the single-edge knife that originated in America during World War II for “special forces and commando operations”15 and was still regarded as an important part of training for such troops. “Styers and [Sgt A.] Prizzi show that in competent hands knife-fighting is undoubtedly an art.”16 A new edition of Cold Steel was reprinted and available in 1974. It was this edition that prompted author William L. Cassidy to examine the knife-fighting renaissance that developed with Biddle and Styers. While presenting no new facts, Cassidy put Styers’ efforts in context with others and the Biddle school, which treated knife fighting as an extension of sword fighting.
Dermot O’Neill and Rex Applegate
Two other noteworthy close combat experts will be mentioned; both were Army soldiers and came into the Marine Corps picture after World War II: LtCol Rex Applegate and Maj Dermot O’Neill. It was these two that completed the Shanghai connection to the Marine Corps.
Dermot O’Neill was born 21 March 1905 in Dublin, Ireland. He died in the United States on 11 August 1985 and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. He served in the Shanghai Municipal Police and was a sergeant in the riot squad. Here he learned close combat fighting and shooting firsthand from Fairbairn and Sykes. O’Neill was later at the British Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, as part of its security detail.
When World War II began, O’Neill wound up with the coordinator for information (later Office of Strategic Services, the OSS) on the intelligence side of the organization. He went from there to the Army in June 1943 to the 1st Special Service Force (the Devil’s Brigade) as a close combat instructor and commanding officer’s bodyguard. O’Neill remained in the Army until February 1946, leaving as a major with several combat decorations. This was followed by a career as a police instructor for the U.S. Government with various foreign aid programs. In the course of this, a version of O’Neill’s close combat instruction was adapted in 1966 by the Marine Corps.
Rex Applegate was born 21 June 1914 and died 14 July 1998. He lived most of his life near Scottsburg, OR, and was survived by a wife and two daughters. At the time of his passing, he was a director of the National Rifle Association, inducted into the Cutlery Hall of Fame, and named an Outstanding American Handgunner. Applegate’s reputation is from his position in the development of close combat that stretched across more than half a century. He brought forward the methods of World War II, preserved them through the Cold War, and continued to make them available where others have come and gone. This was with doctrine, equipment, and the unselfish desire to prepare America’s fighting men (and women) for the moment of truth. No account of Marine close combat would be complete without considering someone who was neither a Marine nor directly connected to the Corps until recently.
Applegate grew up in the western gun culture and experienced a few bar brawls in his early days. When World War II began, he was a military police officer in Washington state, later moving to counterintelligence work in California. In March 1942, he was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services and sent by special orders to the District of Columbia. Applegate was tasked by Gen William (“Wild Bill”) Donovan to learn all there was about armed and unarmed close combat and teach it to OSS novices.
Working at Area B in Maryland, Applegate soon met up with British lend-lease instructor Fairbairn and went on to the United Kingdom for more direct experience with the commandos and the Special Operations Executive. There he met Fairbairn’s partner Sykes. Returning to the United States, Applegate was assigned to the Army Military Intelligence Division to set up a close combat program at Camp Ritchie, MD, based on what he had learned from the OSS and the Special Operations Executive.
After the war, Applegate moved to Mexico and continued making a living from mayhem, selling riot control equipment throughout Latin America. He returned to the United States in the 1960s to meet demands closer at home. Throughout his career, he has been the most lucid proponent of the Shanghai methods of Fairbairn and Sykes, beginning with the 1943 edition of his Kill or Get Killed, a manual of close combat, manhandling, and riot control techniques for the police and the military. Though few Marines were directly trained in these methods, the availability of this information has been used since World War II to supplement the dwindling level of instruction provided by the Corps up to the last decade.17
Lost Legacy
Despite demonstrated need, the Marine Corps departed from the proven World War II approach during the Cold War, weakening its techniques by 1957 with NAVMC 1135-AO3, Bayonet Fighting and 1146-AO3, Hand-to-Hand Combat. Both these systems were swayed by the growth of Asian martial arts and sports in the American armed forces. In turn, these were superseded in 1965 with FMFM 1-1, Marine Bayonet Training that adapted Dr. Armond H. Seidler’s bayonet fighting system. Seidler was convinced the Biddle system was unnatural and would be abandoned in combat. In 1966, FMFM 1-4 (proposed), Hand-to-Hand Combat prescribed O’Neill’s close combat methods. O’Neill’s approach included offensive-defensive movements including blows, kicks, falls, and take downs. Neither Seidler or O’Neill’s systems integrated the use of other weapons or firearms.
With this apparent close combat void, Biddle, Fairbairn, Sykes, Styers, O’Neill and Applegate were all cited by one side or the other as authorities for their chosen course of action. Sometimes these claims had value; in others, the analysis of actual techniques proves them misleading. The discussion led to looking to the past for needed solutions. In January 1990, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command reprinted Fairbairn and Sykes’ Shooting to Live as FMFRP 12-81 because “The volume presents an excellent review of standard techniques and some unorthodox methodology in the use of the pistol. Firing positions, loading, unloading, the building of combat ranges, known-distance ranges, types of holsters, and the wearing of pistols are delved into with great clarity and precision.”18 It was recommended for those Marines who were tasked with pistol training and marksmanship. China-veteran Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. recalled that Fairbairn’s system of pistol training and shooting was entrenched in the Shanghai Municipal Police “where it was picked up by many members of the 4th Marines who were on duty there at the time. In fact, this method, modified so as to apply to all hand-held weapons, was later used by several Marine units during the Pacific campaigns.”19
In September 1991, Marine Corps Combat Development Command went further with the republication of Applegate’s Kill or Get Killed as FMFRP 12-80 because “[a]t last there is one volume which speaks to the subject of unarmed combat (offensive and defensive), combat use of weapons, disarming the enemy, handling prisoners, the handling of mob/crowd disobedience, the use of chemicals in such situations, and how to establish a professional riot control unit. Every unit involved in these tasks should have a copy.”20 However, neither Fairbairn and Sykes or Applegate’s publication formed a basis for official instruction. For example, Maj Kelly McCann, a special operations training group instructor, cited Styers, Fairbairn, and David Ben-Asher as background for Marine thinking on hand-to-hand combat. These techniques “had a jujitsu base, a throwing and striking type of fighting,” concluding that “the only dirty fight is the one you lose.”21
Around this time, the Marine Corps opted for a more complex martial arts-based approach despite the availability of a relevant Army system (FM 21-150, Combatives, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1992). Originating with GySgt William (“Bill”) Miller’s judo and recruit depot background, it was an initiative at odds with previous experience and contemporary research. In 1993, the Marine Corps adapted the linear in-fighting neural-override engagement (LINE) program (FMFM 0-7, Close Combat). In an article on the LINE system, MSgt Ronald S. Donvito stated that “There is very little about it that is original. The close combat techniques of Fairbairn, Applegate, Sykes, Styers, Biddle, and Echanis have been thoroughly researched and tested, and the best of each taken and modified.”22
The complexity and difficulties in practice with the methods provoked a counter response both inside and outside of the Corps by those claiming the same legacy. Former Marine and martial arts instructor Robert C. Kasper asserted that “The Marine Corps hand-to-hand instructors of World War Two were trained in a system based on the teachings of Lieutenant Colonel William E. Fairbairn … who developed his system of combat from his 30 plus years of practical experience in the roughest seaport city this world has ever seen.”23 Another instructor, John Kary, believed a synthesis was needed of the “simple, effective methods of past masters like Fairbairn, Applegate, Styers, and Biddle.”24 According to former Marine and conflict analyst Morgan H. Norval, “It is the most advanced development of the World War II methods, and would be ideal for use by the military.”25 They, and others, believe that proven techniques should be the core of any Marine self-defense and close quarters combat system.
Antagonism to the LINE system resulted in further program revision in 1999 to create what was known as the Marine Corps Close Combat Training Program (MCRP 3-02B, Close Combat). Its chief proponent was MSgt Cardo V. Urso, who stated: “As the training progresses, we add martial culture.”26 Of note, neither Stavers nor the available Marine Corps World War II close combat references (including training films) were ever considered. A renewed look at these proven methods was to fill that void and provide some reality by which to test the techniques of others, for example, a reprint of NAVMC 3660 under one cover as Combat Conditioning by Paladin Press. Sometimes you have to go back to go forward. What the Marine Corps practiced before was still available. It did not require additional schools, instructors, or ranks to prove its worth if applied with the same focus and commonsense that the Marine Corps uses for other areas of military skill.
Despite renewed interest in close combat over the last decade, by 2000 the Corps was still undecided on which way to turn for expertise with this bedrock proficiency. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James L. Jones, directed the aggressive development of a martial arts program to include a belt system. To be emphasized are battle skill orientation, use of the bayonet, knife, weapons of opportunity, and unarmed combat. It is felt that the renewal of close combat classics would provide support in finding a suitable approach that would benefit the Marines who need it most. Meeting this challenge by 2001 were LtCol George H. Bristol and MSgt Urso. The result is the present Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCO 1500.54, 2002) now in its 25th year.
Conclusion
The theory and practice of individual fighting has common origins in technology, physiology, psychology, and necessity. The animal world relies on the hunt and kill; fight or flight. Man as a tool-using animal has progressed beyond this with the use of the fist, club, knife, and gun. With regional variations, this progressed from fighting to ritual and sport, whether one looks East or West for examples, but close combat does not involve equals in size, strength, skill, and numbers. It is not a match, duel, or contest to win—it is just a situation to survive. It is the only alternative to certain death, injury, or capture.
Like fire and maneuver, close combat is used to position oneself to your opponent’s disadvantage, to kill or be killed. Techniques are for trained personnel, using qualified instructors, practiced with coaching, and the realization that any system provokes specific counter moves. Remember that proficiency in close combat is not an end in itself; it is just one portion of an individual’s total arsenal—the biggest continued failure is splitting firearms from armed and unarmed physical instruction. Benefits are also in two parts: mental confidence and technical ability.
Provided is the background of the sources of this legacy. A review of the World War II background should provide a yardstick of real experience that carried Marines through the greatest conflict of the 20th century. These skills were taken from the classroom and refined on Pacific battlefields against a trained and ruthless adversary who did not hesitate to resort to the grenade, bayonet, or sword. This is not an appeal to ritual for tradition’s sake, but a call to get real about basic battlefield skills—to kill or be killed.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
>Mr. Melson retired as the Chief Historian, Marine Corps Headquarters and University. He was trained in the Seidler and O’Neill methods of close combat in use during the Vietnam War.
Notes
1. Albert Arsenault, “Colonel Biddle and the Bayonet,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 1983, 21.
2. William A. Lee, Oral History, Marine Corps Historical Center, n.d.
3. Cordelia D. Biddle and Kyle Crichton, My Philadelphia Father (New York: Pocket Book, 1963).
4. A.J.D. Biddle, Do or Die (Washington, DC: The Leatherneck Association, 1944).
5. Headquarters Marine Corps, “Colonel Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, USMC (Retired),” MCHC, 1948; Paul Hicks, “Fabulous Fighter,” Leatherneck, September 1948, 16–19, 54–56.
6. Headquarters Marine Corps, “Colonel Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, USMC (Retired),” 1948; Robert Roman, “Do or Die: The Hollow Legacy of A.J.D. Drexel Biddle,” Warrior, February 1983, 40–43.
7. William E. Fairbairn, “OSS Shock and Riot Police,” June 1943, National Archives and Records Administration.
8. William E. Fairbairn, Get Tough! (New York: Appleton-Century, 1943); William E. Fairbairn, William E. and Eric A. Sykes, Shooting to Live with the One Hand Gun (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1942).
9. Hal Bergman, “The Deacon Deals in Death.” Leatherneck, June 1944, 50–51.
10. Kelly Yeaton, Samuel S. Yeaton, and Rex Applegate, The First Commando Knives (Williamstown: Phillips Publications, 1996).
11. Stephen Stavers, “Individual Combat Course,” 1943 (GRC); Stavers, “Snap Shooting,” Infantry Journal, December 1944, 30; Stavers, “Hip Level Quick Fire,” “Hip Level Quick Firing,” n.d. (GRC).
12. Stephen Stavers, “Weapon of Last Resort,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1944, 61; Stephen Stavers and Louis B. Rutte, “Bayonet Fighter,” Infantry Journal, January 1944, 44–56.
13. Hal Bergman, “The Deacon Deals in Death,” Leatherneck, June 1944, 50–51; “A Marine Lieutenant,” New York City Mirror, 24 August 1942, n.p. Marine Corps Historical Center; “Bayonet Expert Killed by Sniper,” n.d. Marine Copers Historical Center).
14. John J. Styers, Cold Steel (Washington, DC: Leatherneck Association, 1952).
15. Arthur Wise, The Art and History of Personal Combat (New York: Graphic Society, 1972).
16. John Styers and Karl Schuon, “Cold Steel—The Bayonet,” Leatherneck, January 1952, 40–49; Styers and Schuon, “Cold Steel—Knife Fighting,” Leatherneck, February 1952, 48–57; Styers and Schuon, “The Stick,” Leatherneck, March 1952, 46–54; Styers and Schuon, “Knife Throwing,” Leatherneck, April 1952, 56–60.
17. Rex Applegate and Charles D. Melson, The Close Combat Files of Colonel Rex Applegate (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1998); Rex Applegate, Combat Use of the Double-Edged Fighting Knife (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1993); Rex Applegate, Kill or Get Killed (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1976).
18. William E. Fairbairn and Eric A. Sykes, Shooting to Live with the One Hand Gun (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1942).
19. Wallace M. Greene, “The Employment of the Marine Rifle Company in Street Riot Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 1940, 49–53, 62; Greene, “Shanghai 1937,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 1965, 62–63; Greene, “The Quick or the Dead,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1984, 67–72; Greene, “Fire Team–Comrades in Battle,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1984, 62–78.
20. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.
21. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.
22. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.
23. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.
24. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.
25. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.
26. Personal Communication, MCHC, 1998–2000.