Archives: Gazette Magazines

by Majs Gordon C. O’Neill and Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr.

In March 1989, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made maneuver warfare doctrine for Marines when he published FMFM 1. Over the past two years the Gazelle has published numerous articles addressing Marine aviation and its role in maneuver warfare. These articles and the general interest in maneuver warfare have stirred up quite a bit of controversy about Marine aviation and its supposed reluctance to accept maneuver in its training programs. In truth, Marine aviation is undergoing a healthy period of self-reevaluation, one that will help it learn to “fight smarter” and deal more effectively with declining defense dollars.

On future battlefields, one of the keys to success will be how well Marines communicate within and among each element of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). In fact, the better we communicate, the better we’ll be able to make timely and sound decisions in the heat of battle. Maneuver concepts include mission-type orders, commander’s intent, focus of effort, center of gravity, surfaces/gaps, reconpull, logistics push, and more. As aviators, we must understand these concepts and use them to communicate with our ground counterparts, the ground combat element (GCE). The aviation combat element (ACE) can successfully adopt maneuver warfare and all that it represents. In order to accomplish this, however, Marine aviation must improve its MAGTF training programs.

This article will examine some of the precepts of maneuver and what they mean to Marine aviators. Obviously, our thoughts are not all-inclusive of everything that maneuver represents. In fact, only three of the six Marine aviation functions are discussed due to time and space considerations. Our hope is to provide a starting point and help resolve part of the maneuver controversy.

The Marine Corps is a unique and widely envied military organization throughout the world. It is the only air-ground-logistics team in the world task-organized to deploy and fight against any threat to our Nation. When the MAGTF goes to war, it will fight for one of the unified combatant commands throughout the world. In order to succeed in this arena, the MAGTF commander and his staff must be able to operate in this joint and possibly combined environment. They must be able to ask the right questions when tasked to perform a mission and at the same time educate our sister-Service counterparts about the MAGTF’s capabilities. In order to do this we must be familiar with the different levels of war and where the MAGTF fits in.

Through strategy, or the strategic level of war, our government achieves its national policy and objectives; the ends of strategy are the vital interests of national policy.

Tactics, or the tactical level of war, is combat and the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives through fire and maneuver. As Marines, we take pride in our ability to excel at this level of war. The means of tactics include the hardware we design to destroy the enemy; the ways include the techniques and tactics we develop to defeat the enemy in order to achieve the end-victory. Tactics is the art of winning battles and engagements.

Operations, or the operational level of war, is the one at which campaigns are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within a theater of war. The operational commander’s primary tool to organize and synthesize all military efforts in his theater of operations is the campaign plan. The operational commander decides when and where to give battle to the enemy, or conversely, not to give battle.

The essence of operational art is the enemy’s center of gravity, his critical vulnerability, and the application of our superior combat power against that source to achieve the strategic aim over time through the campaign plan. As Marines, we seek to put our strength against the enemy’s critical weaknesses-supporting units, supply depots, lines of communication, airfields, command posts-in order to exploit these weaknesses and force him to lose cohesion. Marines call this maneuver warfare; it is our philosophy of warfighting. We use maneuver, in time as well as in space, to gain an advantage against the enemy commander and exploit it by operating at a higher tempo than the enemy. The precepts of maneuver warfare apply equally at the operational and tactical levels of war.

Where do Marines fit into this picture? The MAGTF commander will operate at both the operational and tactical levels of war. The commander’s area of influence is described as that area in which he can influence combat operations through maneuver or fire support organic to his command. The GCE commander’s area of influence is roughly 18-20 kilometers, which is the maximum range of his organic artillery. On the other hand, the MAGTF commander’s area of influence is several hundred miles beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). This influence is achieved by the long spear of the ACE‘s combat power-the AV-8Bs, A-6s, F/A-18s, AH-1Ws-as well as the other components of Marine aviation. This makes the Marine Corps unique and very lethal and is reflected in the MAGTF commander’s role as a fighter and not just a facilitator. For these reasons, the ACE‘s combat power must communicate with the GCE and combat service support element (CSSE) in order to synthesize their individual combat power into a hammer and anvil delivered with speed and sustained with a system of logistics push.

Antiair Warfare

Antiair warfare (AAW) is one of the six functions of Marine aviation; the others include offensive air support, assault support, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. Every MAGTF Marine will participate to some degree in AAW, which is subdivided into two phases called air defense and offensive AAW. Air defense includes all means, active and passive, to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles and to nullify or reduce their effectiveness if an attack is made. Active air defense is a direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking enemy aircraft and missiles, including aircraft, air/groundlaunched missile intercepts, air defense artillery, automatic weapons, small arms, and electronic countermeasures. The MAGTF employs passive air defense to reduce the effectiveness of air attack and includes the use of cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and protective construction. Marine aviation seeks to conduct offensive AAW against enemy air, air defense assets, and installations before they can be used against us.

The ACE commander, acting through his tactical air commander (TAC), executes the six functions of Marine aviation in order to support the MAGTF commander’s intent and focus of effort against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. The TAC’s first priority in this process is to dedicate assets to AAW. This fact confuses and upsets many Marines and military reformers because they interpret AAWs priority to mean there will be no assets for the other five functions of Marine aviation and therefore no close air support (CAS). This simply is not the case. The ACE must accomplish all MAGTF requirements with its available assets, but it cannot do this unless it survives the enemy air threat. AAW is vital to the success of the MAGTF mission and really separates the Marines from our sister Services because the MAGTF commander owns these tactical air assets. Perhaps a couple of AAW historical examples might help clarify this situation.

The Yom Kippur War of 1973: At 1400 on 6 October 1973, the Egyptian armed forces achieved strategic and tactical surprise as they launched a preemptive attack against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) stationed along the broad front of the Suez Canal. Simultaneously, the Syrian armed forces attacked the IDF in the Golan Heights in northern Israel. Both the Egyptians and Syrians used their air defense commands (ADCs) as the primary weapon against the vaunted Israeli Air Force (IAF). Following the Six-Day War in 1967, the Soviets had outfitted the Arab ADCs with new surface-to-air missile (SAM) equipment such as the SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, SAM-7, and the ZSU-23/4 mechanized antiaircraft artillery system. Thus, during the first three days of the Yom Kippur War, the IAF flew into the most formidable air defense umbrellas since Hanoi-Haiphong in Vietnam. The Israeli ground forces desperately needed air support to blunt the Arab attacks on two fronts, but the initial Israeli airstrikes met with disaster. The Syrians and Egyptians shot down approximately 25 A-4 Skyhawks and 5 F-4 Phantoms within the first 90 minutes of combat. At 1600 on 6 October, Gen Elazar, the Israeli Chief of Staff, suspended all tactical sorties until the IAF could devise new tactics that would counter this Arab air defense threat. By 1730, the IAF was airborne again using new tactics that involved staying away from the surface-to-air threats. However, IAF losses continued to rise at a staggering rate.

By the end of the first day the JAF had lost 40 aircraft (30 Skyhawks and 10 Phantoms). By 10 October, after 3 days of combat, the IAF had lost approximately 70 tactical aircraft to the surface-to-air threat, primarily the SAM-6 and ZSU-23/4. This was the IAF’s darkest hour, since it started the war with only 240 jet aircraft. Even more critical, the IAF lost 50 frontline combat pilots. Although the IAF owned the skies against Arab MiGs, it had failed to suppress the Arab air defense barrier and did not gain air superiority. The IAF suffered prohibitive combat losses while providing air support. This was a very hard lesson the IAF would not soon forget; it changed tactics on 10 October, destroyed the Arab surface-to-air threat, and then significantly helped the IDF win the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973.

The 1982 Israeli “Peace for Galilee” Operation: On 6 June 1982, the IDF attacked into southern Lebanon. The IDF mission was to demilitarize the area from all enemy forces up to a range of 40 kilometers in order to prevent further shellings into northern Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian Army manned this area in Lebanon. The PLO consisted of 15,000 fighters equipped with infantry weapons, some artillery and tanks, and a large number of antitank and antiaircraft weapons. The Syrian Army consisted of a division-size force that included 2 tank brigades; 2 infantry brigades; and more than 20 air defense batteries that included SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, SAM-7, and hundreds of antiaircraft artillery pieces.

On 9 June, after two days of beating back the PLO, the Israeli ground forces encountered heavy fighting against the Syrian Army in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. At this point the IAF decisively entered the battle. The IDF needed CAS for its heavily engaged ground forces. However, from lessons learned in the 1973 war the IAF knew it had to neutralize the Syrian surface-to-air missile threat in order to gain local air superiority prior to flying any CAS missions.

In the afternoon of 9 June, the IAF launched a massive airstrike against the SAM sites in the Bekaa Valley. Within 10 minutes the IAF destroyed 19 SAM sites and severely damaged 4 more. At this point, the IAF began a steady flow of CAS sorties for the Israeli ground forces. The Syrian Air Force reacted immediately, and over the next three days the largest air battles since World War II took place. When they were over, the Syrian Air Force was shattered. Amazingly, the IAF shot down 86 Syrian MiGs without any losses.

In combat the ACE commander will face many difficult decisions. Based on the MAGTF mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, and the enemy’s center of gravity, he must make an intelligent recommendation to the MAGTF commander about the apportionment and allocation of his assets. The ACE commander must ask himself, “How can I best support the MAGTF focus of effort, and how can I best employ my aviation assets to decisively defeat the enemy?” AAW priority is not “some abstract rule” as the military reformers suggest, but as history clearly shows, it is a necessary requirement to achieve mission success. Successful MAGTF AAW ensures that enemy air does not impede the other five functions of Marine aviation.

Offensive Air Support

Marine aviation conducts offensive air support (OAS) against enemy ground forces in order to neutralize or destroy their installations, equipment, and personnel. OAS is divided into two areas depending on the proximity of friendly troops when the ordnance is delivered; these are deep air support (DAS) and CAS. DAS is an air action conducted against enemy targets located beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL) in order to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy from attacking our GCE units. DAS does not require detailed coordination with the fire and movement of Marine ground units, but it must be integrated with the MAGTF commander’s overall focus of effort. CAS, either preplanned or immediate, is an air action against enemy targets in close proximity to friendly troops and requires detailed integration with the supported unit’s scheme of maneuver and fires for each CAS mission. As we have noted, in order to successfully conduct both DAS and CAS, Marine aviation must gain and maintain air superiority. As the air threat diminishes, more AAW sorties can be diverted to OAS.

What is the best employment of Marine aviation performing OAS? Should all the assets be dedicated to CAS at the expense of DAS? If so, how does the MAGTF commander shape the battlefield 12-72 hours away? Marine aviation decisively affects the outcome of battles and engagements at the tactical level of war by delivering ordnance in support of the GCE during CAS. In the defense, CAS supports the GCE commander and is a last resort, almost worst-case, scenario. Its use means that DAS and GCE indirect fire has failed to destroy the enemy. In the offense, the GCE will use aviation and artillery to shape the battle.

DAS, on the other hand, supports the MAGTF commander and his ability to affect or shape the battlefield 1272 hours away (or more). DAS sorties decisively affect campaigns and help the MAGTF commander achieve strategic objectives at the operational level of war. The ACE and GCE commanders must integrate and synchronize their efforts in order to maximize the destructive capabilities of both DAS and CAS. Numerous campaigns in World War II and Korea show the importance of integrating the air campaign with ground maneuver.

The Korean War: On 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) stormed south across the demilitarized zone and began a war to unify the Korean peninsula. Gen Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations commander, requested Marine reinforcements to help beat back this NKPA preemptive attack. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by BGen Edward A. Craig, embarked on Navy transports one week after receipt of orders. It arrived in Korea on 3 August 1950, less than 30 days after receiving the initial warning order. This brigade was the advance unit for the follow-on 1st Marine Division/1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) team, which arrived in Korea in early September 1950.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, composed primarily of the reinforced 5th Marines and the squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 33, went to the Korean War as a truly integrated airground team. During their first month of combat, the 5th Marines fought three battles in the Pusan perimeter. These included counterattacks against the NKPA in the Chinju corridor as part of Task Force Kean, 7-14 August; in the Naktong Bulge at Obong-ni, 17-20 August, and again at Obong-ni, 3-5 September. Flying F4U Corsairs from the carriers Sicily and Badoeng Straits, Marine aviators flew CAS missions for each of these counterattacks. They used highly successful World War II, Marine-developed CAS tactics, which they had practiced after the war. Repeatedly, Marine aviators provided the margin needed for victory as they consistently destroyed enemy armor, machinegun nests, artillery, and other targets. The low-flying Leathernecks became heroes to the 5th Marines they supported.

On 6 September, 8th Army Headquarters pulled 5th Marines out of the line so the regiment could join the rest of the 1st Marine Division embarked on Navy transports at Pohang. On 15 September, the 1st Marine Division landed at Inchon and began a 10-day campaign to retake Seoul. In a model for successful air-ground tactics, the Marines took Seoul in a bitter fight. Following this operation, the division made an unopposed landing at Wonsan, North Korea, on 25 October and attacked north toward the Chosin Reservoir and the Yalu River. It then fought the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s 9th Army Group. The Marines destroyed seven enemy divisions in freezing-cold mountain warfare during the 1st Marine Division’s fighting withdrawal.

The Marine successes during the last five months of 1950 once again verified the concept of the air-ground team. Marine aviation integrated air support into the ground scheme of maneuver with devastating results for the North Korean and Chinese communists. Unfortunately, later in the war Marine aviation fell under 5th Air Force as part of “theater air,” and its ability to provide air support to the 1st Marine Division was significantly reduced. The 1st Marine Division’s wait for CAS rose from an average of 15 minutes with 1st MAW to as high as 45 minutes.

OAS cannot be planned and executed in the dark without a clear understanding of what the MAGTF commander wants to achieve and how he visualizes air support affecting the battle. When the GCE is the MAGTF’s focus of effort, which will be most of the time, the ACE cannot plan OAS sorties alone. The ACE and GCE staffs must work together to integrate their efforts in support of the MAGTF’s focus, not just to avoid conflict among their actions. Campaign success depends on the ability to closely integrate ground maneuver, DAS, and CAS.

Assault Support

The Marine Corps first employed helicopters in a combat role during the Korean War. When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived in Korea in August 1950, its aviation assets included several light utility helicopters. During their withdrawal from Chosin Reservoir, the Marines used these helicopters for command liaison and medical evacuation. During the summer of 1951, HMR-161, the first helicopter transport squadron, lifted infantry companies to and from the frontlines. In 1952, the Marines employed helicopters to execute troop movements, combat resupply, and tactical inserts. In virtually every combat operation and major exercise since the Korean War, Marine units have used assault support aircraft. As we look to employ MAGTFs in maneuver warfare, assault support will continue to play a critical role providing operational mobility for the MAGTF. The ACE commander will employ his assets to accomplish the MAGTF commander’s intent, both in support of GCE/CSSE missions and as a maneuver element. In what manner can helicopters be employed as a maneuver element?

A MAGTF commander is not likely to employ a helicopter squadron as a separate maneuver element. Transport helicopters move troops and equipment in order to accomplish tactical, logistical, and administrative missions. They may be an integral part of a maneuver element, but transport helicopters do not lend themselves to independent action. Attack helicopters, however, are ideally suited for maneuver roles, such as screening a flank or conducting deep operations against armored or mechanized threats. However, the relatively small number of attack helicopters in a Marine wing limits the scope and duration of these operations. The ACE commander can better accomplish these missions by task organizing fixed- and rotary-wing units to achieve the synergistic effect of combined arms.

By executing a heliborne assault, the MAGTF commander extends the area that he can influence with the GCE. Normally, the GCE can influence an area of about 18-20 kilometers in depth. Employment of unrefueled CH-46s extends this to a depth of approximately 80 nautical miles. This heliborne assault incorporates surprise and swiftness; it also neutralizes the effects of natural and manmade obstacles on GCE mobility. Employing forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), the helicopter unit can make itself available on short notice to withdraw or reposition the ground maneuver element and to provide resupply, casualty evacuation, and close-in fire support (CIFS).

A heliborne assault will normally include provisions for the inserted maneuver unit to link-up with mechanized or motorized forces. An employment option that does not require linkup is the heliborne raid. MAGTFs are well suited to conduct such raids. The fixed-wing support requirements, particularly AAW and OAS, are planned along with assault support requirements under a single command, the ACE. CAS and CIFS aircraft are available to the ground maneuver units immediately upon insertion. Additionally, artillery units are helilifted into positions in order to support the raid force mission, and command and control is enhanced through the use of utility helicopters equipped with command communications modules.

In future combat operations the MAGTF will likely encounter an enemy who possesses a superior armored and mechanized capability. The MAGTF commander will have to employ superior combined arms and maneuver skills in order to defeat this threat. Two Marine Corps Gazette articles in August 1989 suggested adopting battlefield air interdiction (BAI) within our OAS doctrine in order to enhance the Marine Corps’ combined arms capability. BAI is an Air Force term that encompasses airstrikes against targets short of the FSCL, but not directly under control of the ground maneuver element. In a BAI mission the ACE would employ its assets as a maneuver element. But what does this have to do with assault support?

Although BAI is largely an OAS mission, the ACE could easily integrate helicopter assets into this operation. For attack helicopter employment, Army doctrine calls for a joint air attack team (JAAT). (See FM1-112, Attack Helicopter Battalions.) On a JAAT mission, attack helicopters, Air Force CAS aircraft, and field artillery conduct simultaneous attacks against the same target. Army doctrine calls for artillery indirect fire to engage the target while helicopters move into attack positions. Once there, the helicopter flight engages the target, and then the helicopter flight leader coordinates the air support between the ground commander and the CAS flight leader. The ACE could easily use similar tactics in support of the MAGTF.

BAI takes the fight to the enemy and disrupts his scheme of maneuver before he can make contact with the GCE. This gives the GCE commander time and maneuver space to accomplish the MAGTF commander’s mission and intent. If required, transport helicopters can lift artillery into position to support the JAAT. The ACE can improve JAAT responsiveness to identified targets by positioning FARP packages before mission execution. The MAGTF commander possesses built-in flexibility for this mission since all required aviation assets come under a single tactical commander, the ACE.

Screening a flank is a “maneuver mission” that the MAGTF commander might assign to the ACE. The light armored infantry (LAI) battalion conducts screen, guard, and cover operations, which are traditional security missions. Although the speed and agility of the light armored vehicle (LAV) make it suitable for these missions, it is vulnerable to direct fire weapons, particularly from enemy armored or mechanized forces. The ACE can augment the firepower of the LAI battalion with attack helicopters. With MAGTF approval the ACE can integrate AH-1W Cobras, using overwatch techniques, into the LAI mission. Cobras provide CIFS and antiarmor punch using both the TOW and Hellfire missiles. A habitual relationship developed between the ACE and the LAI battalion would provide the MAGTF commander with an enhanced ability to shape the battlefield.

Assault support assets provide a great deal of flexibility and mobility to the MAGTF commander, if they are effectively used. As such, helicopters play a major role in concentrating combat power against enemy critical vulnerabilities. Helicopter effectiveness may be degraded when requirements exceed the assets available. The ACE must ensure that the allocation and employment of its helicopters most effectively supports the MAGTF commander’s intent.

Future assault support aircraft will expand the maneuver capability of the MAGTF. The MV-22, currently under flight test, will have a minimum combat radius of 200 nautical miles and a cruise speed of 250 knots. This is far superior to the 120-knot cruise speed and 80-nautical-mile combat radius of the CH-46. The MV-22 will give Marine commanders a far better capability to conduct air assaults deep into enemy territory. Current fiscal constraints may jeopardize MV-22 procurement; however, we should continue to develop tactics in line with tilt-rotor capabilities. Just as Marines developed doctrine for transport helicopters in 1947, we should plan for the tilt-rotor concept in 1991. While the Marines may not procure the MV-22, this technology clearly represents the new generation helicopter we will take into any future conflict.

Recommendations and Summary

The MAGTF has an awesome arsenal of weapons and well-trained Marines to carry out any mission. Clearly, the ACE maintains the preponderance of the MAGTF’s “Sunday punch.” This combat power allows the MAGTF commander to influence what will be on the battlefield 12-72 hours in the future as well as support the GCE’s battle right now. The MAGTF commander owns these aviation assets and will use them to best achieve the strategic aim. Although not used frequently in the past, the MAGTF commander may use the ACE as the MAGTF focus of effort or as a maneuver element. This is not new. History is full of successful examples of using air as a maneuver element. On today’s battlefield, there are many examples of missions the ACE could perform as a maneuver element; these include screening forces, direct support CIFS/ CAS aircraft, deep raids, LAI/helicopter reconnaissance, and more.

During the summer of 1989, the Marine Corps University instituted maneuver warfare training at all Marine schools. This education, coupled with the Commandant’s new warfighting doctrine articulated in FMFM I, is increasing all Marines’ knowledge of, and experience in, maneuver warfare. As recent graduates of Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College return to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), they will also share their knowledge of maneuver from the academic environment. However, is this enough? Are there any other ways we in Marine aviation can increase our knowledge of things maneuver? We think so.

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1) is the Marine Corps’ collection of duty experts regarding the best employment of Marine aviation. Twice a year, MAWTS-1 conducts a Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course at MCAS Yuma. Marine Corps captains from all the wings attend the course; they are chosen based on tactical performance in their fleet aircraft and their career potential. Upon completion of the very rigorous WTI syllabus, they return home and assume the duty as their squadron’s tactics instructors.

Over the last two years, MAWTS-1 has conducted command element training for several Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) staffs. This training centered on the best employment of the ACE; it followed the WTI course, but took place before the aircraft returned home. In this fashion, a MEB staff had available more than 100 Marine aircraft that represented a typical force structure in combat, coupled with the extensive training areas of Marine Corps Air Station Yuma. Additionally, over the last year the Marine Corps University has conducted MEB battle staff training with each MEB prior to the training conducted at MAWTS-1. These programs are invaluable and an ideal way to get experts, not only in weapons and tactics, but also in maneuver, back to the FMF.

The common “sheet of music” for all Marines, whether it be in training or in combat, is maneuver warfare and the concepts that make up maneuver. As Marine aviators, we must communicate with our ground brethren in a clear, concise manner. Maneuver warfare concepts will enable us to accomplish this at the operational and tactical levels of war. In FMFM 1, Gen A. M. Gray states that maneuver

. . . represents not just guidance for actions in combat, but a way of thinking in general . . . a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty.

For 75 years, Marine aviators have answered Marine infantrymen’s call while engaged in mortal combat. In the future this will not change as Marine aviation adopts maneuver and learns to fight smarter, pitting strengths against enemy weaknesses in order to make him lose cohesion and the will to fight.

by Maj John F. Kelly and Capt Philip E. Smith

Teaching light infantry concepts is not an easy task. In some ways, it involves teaching Marines a whole new way of thinking, of acting, of solving tactical problems. However, if the Marine Corps is expected to fully implement its new maneuver warfare doctrine, this is what needs to be accomplished.

Training effective light infantry must begin with a thorough understanding of tactical concepts. Most Marine Corps schools, however, traditionally have emphasized specific techniques and procedures and have not addressed the conceptualization issue to any large degree. The “how to” has been stressed over the “why” of tactics. In addition, the techniques and procedures have largely been presented as if they were timeless and appropriate to every war, battle, and skirmish.

Commencing with the initial drafts of OH 6-1, Ground Combat and particularly with the publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting, an evolutionary process of change was initiated at the Infantry Officer Course (IOC). As this process continued, and as we responded to such realities as the expeditionary nature of the Marine air-ground task force, limited war, and low-intensity conflict, a move toward light infantry techniques became inevitable. Fundamental to these changes was the decision to teach not simply the technical details of the infantryman’s trade, but to teach the fledgling infantry officer how to think.

This process begins when the student is first designated a future infantry officer about halfway through The Basic School (TBS). At this point, he receives a required reading list that includes, among many works, Perspective On Infantry, Battlefield Central Europe, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Leavenworth Paper #4), and the Maneuver Warfare Handbook. This process of reading and reflection continues during IOC in the form of additional books and smallgroup discussions.

Throughout the length of the course, students are also issued a number of weekend readings (e.g., book excerpts or articles from the Gazette, Infantry, Armor, etc.) in support of material that is scheduled for presentation the following week. For example, several readings are required on various techniques associated with countermechanized defense. The authors present differing points of view on the “best” way to execute this tactic or how to accomplish this task in a given environment. The instructional point is to increase the student’s perspective on the topic. This process of thought development continues for the duration of the course and is reinforced in sandtable and map exercises, tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs), TACWAR, short tactical decisionmaking exercises (similar to the series that began in the April 1990 edition of the Gazette), and, of course, in all field exercises. Although most of these methods of reinforcement have been standard fare at IOC for a decade or more, they now reflect the doctrinal philosophy of maneuver warfare and modern techniques.

A key factor in teaching any individual to think for himself is the establishment of an environment of open discussion and communication. It is also important to avoid suggesting that a student’s solution is right or wrong, providing a “yellow” or “recommended” solution, or even for the instructor to muse on how he might have accomplished the task. In the first case, it will inhibit students from offering solutions in the future; in the second case, suggesting an institutional right answer will restrict the students’ options if given a similar situation again.

Beyond the aspect of teaching the student how to think is the task of exposing him to the tactical concepts, techniques, and procedures that will ensure his effectiveness as an infantry leader. Any individual attempting to execute maneuver warfare or operate as a light infantryman must be provided, through training and historical perspective, as full a “bag of tricks” and as many techniques and procedures as possible. Procedures are relatively simple, and instruction on them at IOC covers technical tasks such as an in-depth introduction to both the 60mm and 81mm mortars, call for fire, 60mm mortar fire commands, plotting board, all aspects of machinegun employment to include qualification and defilade fire, and “sapper” level assault/field expedient demolitions. Tactical techniques are more difficult, as there is always more than one solution, and the “right” one is personality and situational dependent.

It is clear that modern techniques change as the situation demands. They cannot be codified and expected to apply forever. The first step is to make clear the concept behind the tactic, ensuring that it is fully understood, then introducing a variety of applicable techniques. An understanding of the overall concept allows this “bag of tricks” to be modified as the situation dictates. Instruction in tactical formations is an example of a technique (various formations) too often given precedence over the concept. Only if the concepts that drive unit movement (e.g., thick or light vegetation, open or close terrain, enemy contact likely or unlikely, possible air threat, etc.) are completely understood will the present tactical formations be recognized as only a set of techniques to use as starting points and not restrictions.

Training at IOD commences with mission-type orders, not just in the teaching of tactical skills, but in every aspect of the training day. The focus is on the development of decisiveness, self-reliance, and initiative in the individual and a fostering of team identity in the group. The training environment supports the natural and individual instincts of the students rather than attempting to make them all think in an “accepted” fashion. Field training is emphasized over classroom and application over lecture. Maximum use of the Socratic method is the teaching style and is viewed as critical, as it serves to place the students in continuous decisionmaking situations.

Most field-training exercises at IOC occur at night. Unlimited objective infiltration attacks, extended tactical movements over difficult terrain, and squadsized patrolling exercises are emphasized. These training techniques increase the number of individuals responsible for decisionmaking and navigation, begin the process of building proficient night fighters, reinforce the most infantry-intensive skills, and create unit bonding at the fire team and squad levels.

The course stresses that security and protection are gained not necessarily through the donning of helmets and flak jackets, or by burrowing deep in the ground with massive defensive fortifications, but by moving frequently and stealthily, remaining invisible, and exploiting the micro aspects of terrain. Although the relative advantages and disadvantages of both are addressed, in most cases students seek the reverse rather than forward slopes for their defensive positions.

Although there is little or no differentiation between offensive and defensive operations as they are presented at IOC, it will be useful for clarity’s sake to treat them as separate entities here. The defense is viewed with an ambush mentality that seeks to draw an enemy into the defense and to strike and shock him before he even realizes he is at risk. At this point, his only thought is for survival and not immediate action or calculated response. This approach suggests that it is the minimum ranges of weapons that are important-and they are. The student further understands that the key to any defense is the counterattack. In the case of an antiarmor defense, for example, the students look first to take advantage of the terrain. Most often they will seek to draw the tanks and other armor in close and execute the technique of massed surprise fires rather than the more traditional approach of ever-increasing concentric volumes of fire using heavy, medium, and light antiarmor weapons. In the first case, the secrecy of the ambush is maintained until the defender elects to act; in the second, the ambush is compromised by the defender’s own action. The first suggests nonlinear tactics, while the second employs a linear orientation.

Operations with a generally offensive bent take the form of infiltration attacks, although more traditional operational techniques (e.g., mechanized attack, strongpoint neutralization, urban combat, etc.) are also included. Platoons break down to squads, and sometimes into fire teams or smaller, to conduct lengthy moves at night over long distances. If the enemy is encountered during the infiltration, the unit might attack, depending on the mission and commander’s intent. In most cases, if an enemy unit is identified and is beyond the students’ capability to destroy, they might seek to establish ambushes along likely avenues of enemy egress or reinforcement and call observed supporting arms fire to drive the enemy from their positions.

Consistent with maneuver warfare and light infantry tactics, students come to realize that artillery and air support should not and cannot serve as a substitute for good tactics but as an adjunct to them. The functions and capabilities of various fire support agencies are conceptually grasped prior to any attempt at teaching specific methods of employment.

The most difficult task encountered when the IOC staff embarked upon the reorientation of the curriculum was that the staff themselves required philosophical reorientation. The guiding principle was established that maneuver warfare philosophy is different and that it is unlike anything the Marine Corps had done previously. This is important, as effective trainers require a full understanding of the concepts and historical perspective of maneuver warfare and light infantry. Fundamental to this understanding is an appreciation of the various styles and generations of tactics. This can only be accomplished by a thorough familiarity with military history and current military thought gained by focused reading, discussion, and study. It became immediately obvious that the teacher could no longer afford to be a bare semester ahead of the student. The answer was a comprehensive staff development program that initially oriented on specific areas that were immediately required to initiate the transition and then grew broader in perspective. This program remains in place for new instructors and, as is the case with future IOC students, it begins months before an instructor reports for duty.

These are some of the training prescriptions IOC found most effective in implementing the teaching of maneuver warfare doctrine and light infantry techniques in a formal school. This effort has also been somewhat horizontal, as a number of staff noncommissioned officers from both Schools of Infantry, Officer Candidates School, and the Marine Corps Institute have audited the complete course in order to share information, publications, and experiences. Something akin to this effort is required if the Marine Corps is seriously considering “converting” its present infantry units into light infantry. It is obviously much more demanding in almost every aspect to train and operate at light infantry standards. However, along with the much increased tactical capabilities attained by training and operating as light infantry, these units can also execute traditional “line” infantry missions with minimal preparation.

Effective employment of Marine light infantry units requires leaders imbued with the maneuver warfare philosophy. It is therefore a requirement that increasing effort be applied throughout the Marine Corps to increase the speed at which maneuver warfare is institutionalized as our operating philosophy. There are essentially two points of view on how to accomplish this, The “chipping away” method consists of training the entry level personnel (TBS, IOC, the Recruit Training Regiments, and Schools of Infantry) and only a minority of more senior personnel through squad leaders and platoon sergeants courses, Amphibious Warfare School, and the Command and Staff College. This process takes the long view and requires waiting 15 to 25 years for the newly trained lieutenants to become generals and the privates to become sergeants major. This view also assumes that entrylevel Marines (privates and lieutenants) will maintain this “revolutionary” orientation in spite of pressures from above (real or perceived) to conform to the “old way.”

The other method is to do it now. This process requires targeting not only the entry-level Marine but also every other rank through general and sergeant major. This is the most effective means to change rapidly in the short term and institutionalize the ideas quickly.

To do this, every infantry-oriented school that has as part of its curriculum the teaching of topics relative to infantry operations, must conduct a detailed course evaluation with a goal of eliminating superfluous instruction and/or any instruction that does not specifically lend itself to developing self-reliance and initiative as a way of life. The ultimate goal of all schools must be a vision of what the institution wants the graduate to be. The schools must be staffed with only the best and most experienced personnel who are themselves strong on the character traits described above and share the vision of the institution. As an example, the entirely new concept of control as it is articulated in FMFM 1 (i.e., mission orders and commander’s intent) would be emphasized. When a course includes instruction or use of electronic communication assets, the technical and procedural instruction would be moved as far toward the end of the course as is possible. This would allow entry-level Marines to concentrate on tactics and the concepts of communication without getting overwhelmed by procedures that sometimes appear to restrict rather than aid in communications. The use of communication by absolute exception would also be emphasized.

The concept of the program of instruction (POI) needs to be changed from one that inhibits development and change to one that assists in the evolution of change. This means eliminating the reliance on lesson plans that spell out a single way to do specific tasks through such things as enabling learning objectives (ELOs) and terminal learning objectives (TLOs). These do not lend themselves in any way to the teaching of tactics as an art as per the Commandant’s training and education memo dated 1 July 1989.

IOC is the only officer school that focuses exclusively on tactics and tactical techniques and procedures, although TBS has more of this instruction than ever before in its history. The Amphibious Warfare School, of course, teaches tactics, but must focus instruction on the majority of the students who do not have combat arms specialties. This reality orients the program toward basics and makes it less challenging for combat arms specialists than would be possible in different circumstances. Command and Staff College focuses, not on tactics, but on staff functioning and interaction. The tactical frame of reference for the vast majority of officers, regardless of rank or occupational field, is therefore what they learned at TBS or IOC. The Marine Corps must establish a system of cradle-to-grave resident refresher courses for infantry officers similar to the system currently in force for our noncommissioned and staff noncommissioned officers at the Schools of Infantry.

In the case of infantry captains, a four- to six-week resident course organized and conducted at Quantico should be established as soon as possible. The class size should be no more than 30 attendees, with the course condueled two to four times a year. This course should involve a great deal of focused reading and discussion, guest lecturers and seminars, TEWTS, and map and sandtable exercises. The point of the course would be both conceptual and practical. Rather than making this a return-to-the-Fleet Marine Force (FMF) course with all infantry captains attending en route, it should be filled by quota assignment to each individual infantry, light armored infantry, and reconnaissance battalion with the commander sending his best captain. Similar in concept to the Weapons Training Instructor Course for selected aviators at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, the intent would be to have this officer return to his unit and serve as a catalyst for training and education. A similar course for field grade officers would be conceptually identical to the course for captains but would in fact be a return-to-the-FMF course. This would ensure that all potential battalion commanders can understand and operate using maneuver warfare philosophy that is so critical for light infantry units.

While the Marine Corps considers these broader changes in teaching tactics, IOC is continuing to move ahead, teaching the tactics and techniques of light infantry. It is our belief that the future of Marine infantry is primarily as modern light infantry. Training our infantry units to the exacting standards of light infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures will provide the most versatile force possible, and one that is at the same time absolutely adaptable across the spectrum of conflict. The transition involved will be a major one, as it has been at IOC. Light infantry warfare is not simply “business as usual” with new buzzwords, but a new and different way of thinking and fighting. It is, in the view of the IOC staff, what the Corps’ new doctrine of maneuver warfare means for infantry. As such, it should be the focus not only for IOC, but for every Marine Corps infantry unit as well.

by Capt Eric M. Walters

If you responded to my article, “Studying Military History With Wargames” (MCG, Dec89) and are thinking about augmenting your professional reading with wargaming, you can expect to be dazzled at least initially by most of the games produced today. You may find your library of books and games quadrupling in size every couple of months as your reading causes you to search out more games and your wargaming experiences prod you to read more books. But sooner or later the novelty will wear off, and the limitations of most board wargames will come home to roost. By this time you’ll have a basic mastery of tactical fundamentals; you’ll be winning in your games fairly often, and when you do lose it will have been by a squeak. If maneuver warfare terminology and ideas previously seemed to be vague and inconsistent to you, you will begin to understand them better and be looking for ways to test your comprehension of these principles on the gameboard. And you will find that this will be somewhat difficult, given the limitations of most board wargames.

Once this happens to you, you will have graduated from “grammar school” wargaming and be ready for something more challenging. The purpose of this article is to introduce you to advanced techniques in search of better ways to simulate the conditions of war and apply maneuver warfare on the gameboard.

Better Simulating the Conditions of Warfare

Most wargames are designed to please people with an intimate “book knowledge” of the weapons and terrain involved in a particular battle. These specific aspects of combat are relatively easy to quantify and understand; the game is focused on the “weapons effects” of units against each other, especially in regard to combined arms applications. This is what usually fascinates newcomers to wargaming. Perfect intelligence, perfect command and control, and the ability to move all of a player’s forces before his opponents can react represent sacrifices of reality made for greater attention to weapons effects and are often at first overlooked or forgiven by the wargaming novice.

The clash of forces working under

different philosophies of doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) is much more difficult for both the designer to model and for the player to comprehend. Such considerations don’t lend themselves to a numerical analysis so easily. Games that do address them in detail tend to be complex and scare off potential players.

In most wargames, the only way to get inside the opponent’s OODA (observation, orientation, decision, action) loop is to think faster and further ahead. While this is certainly realistic to an extent, even brilliant generals have to contend with the limitations of their forces and the fog of war. Securing victory is limited to attacking immediate or potential weaknesses in the opponent’s spatial disposition of forces, not through achieving a higher tempo of operations aimed at paralyzing his control over the situation. Combat ineffectiveness of a force is only reached when there are too few pieces on the mapboard to adequately defend vital territory-the rest have been eliminated from the game solely through combat losses or isolation from supply sources. There is no way to render an opponent ineffective by any means other than the direct and systematic destruction of his pieces in these games.

This undercuts the basis of maneuver warfare philosophy as applied on the gameboard: deceive the opponent, attack his most critical weaknesses at the most critical times, use friction and the fog of war to advantage in order to overwhelm the opponent’s decisionmaking capacity. Make him not only lose whatever initiative he might have, but ultimately rob him of the chance to effectively react to friendly actions. Nimbleness and finesse, in time as well as in space, should be able to bring down an opponent with numerically superior forces on the mapboard.

Most games can’t accurately show how this is to be done. In an effort to take into account better doctrine, C3I, organization, initiative, etc., these games crudely equate such advantages in “weapons effects” terms, usually giving the better force higher combat values and movement ability than what were strictly historical. Such games, by their very nature, downplay the roles of reconnaissance units, reserves, and deception, and so distort the simulation of combat. In short, playing such games seems to feel less like war and more like just a game, and the player tends to feel that he is acting less like a commander and more like a gameplayer.

Elsewhere in this article is a listing of the handful of games that, by virtue of their system design, most successfully address the conditions of warfare and allow you, the player, the best opportunity to practice maneuver warfare. Nearly all of them have fairly long and sometimes complicated rules, and so are not recommended for beginners. Yet any wargame can more realistically reflect the conditions of warfare-without such involved systems-by the addition of an umpire or referee. When an umpire is available, each player uses his own copy of the game and can only see the position of his forces and those of the enemy he would realistically have under observation. The umpire has a third copy of the game with the positions of both forces. He determines which units are observed for each player and handles all bookkeeping functions, such as combat resolution.

If you don’t find a third player expert in a particular game or willing enough to be an umpire, try one of the games recommended in the listing. Either way, you’ll be getting a better simulation of the conditions of warfare. How this is done is explained below.

* The Fog of War. Wargames that simulate this aspect of warfare deny players perfect knowledge of enemy dispositions, sometimes even of the enemy order or battle and mission. Pieces are inverted and mixed with dummy units to confuse the opponent and can only be revealed when observed or detected by his units using rules for that purpose. In umpired games the referee determines which units can be seen and cannot be seen by using his own expert judgment. Veteran umpires usually have their own homemade rules and charts to aid in reflecting the relative difficulty of seeing motionless units in cover or seeing out of a buttoned-up tank, and so on. Reconnaissance units, practically worthless in most games, take on crucial significance.

* Friction. One of the best games to simulate this aspect of warfare, Advanced Squad Leader, has provisions for crew-served weapon malfunctions, throwing tank tracks, ammunition depletion, unit surrender in desperate circumstances, intermittent communications, units losing their way at night, etc. Strategic games may include political constraints on operations, limiting the grandiose plans of the player in a realistic way. Murphy’s Law seems to run amok, and players often anguish over how to do the simplest of operations. In refereed games the umpire can inflict varying degrees of friction on opposing forces using his own system, kept secret from the players. For example, if he tells one side that his supply status is critical, during combat resolution the unit of that side may not consistently fight at full strength-depending on how long it has been in contact.

* Fluidity. In most wargames, a player can move all his units before his opponent can react with a single piece. Games like Fire Team confront a player with an action-reaction sequence of movement in which he can only move a fraction of his force before the opponent reacts. With an umpire, both sides may write movement and combat orders for their units which the referee resolves on the gameboard simultaneously. Both sides are constantly faced with fleeting opportunities and sudden retribution for mistakes. Keeping a large reserve in order to exploit unforeseen opportunities or to deal with unexpected crises is very important in these games. Each move made is fraught with promise and peril, and the moves mesh together into a flowing continuum of combat.

* Morale. Cardboard pieces no longer blindly attack or defend to the last gasp. Some units are more steadfast than others, but no unit is ever completely reliable under fire. Today’s heroes may be tomorrow’s cowards (and vice versa). Units become more fragile as they take losses, and leader pieces are needed to rally demoralized men when they break under the shock and fatigue of combat. National will may falter, lessening a commitment to a war and restricting the actions of units in the field. These considerations can arbitrarily but realistically be incorporated into an umpired game, while some board wargames like Squad Leader and Vietnam simulate this aspect of combat well in their own right.

* Leadership. For games with leader units, such as Fire Team or 1809, the player must wrestle with decisions on

where to place his good and mediocre leaders. In umpired games with multiple players, the supreme commander of each side must determine which player is best suited to each mission and force he must command. Forces and tasks must be matched to the capabilities of their commanders; giving a leader/player more than he can handle is a real possibility to be guarded against.

* C3I Effectiveness. No longer do all subordinate units automatically do what the player wants when he wants. Different formations complete tasks at different rates, depending on a quantified effectiveness rating of their staffs and communications. A player can offset the disadvantages of numerical inferiority if the C3I and organizational structure of his force allows him to perform more actions than his opponent. Games, such as 1809 and Tank Leader, graphically demonstrate the effectiveness of superior C3I through simple but realistic rules. This consideration is harder to simulate in an umpired game if the wargame played has no C3I rules unless it’s multiplayer-one way often used is to require the side with the poorer C3I system to not only write this turn’s orders for his units, but next turn’s as well. In a multiplayer game, the umpire can enforce communications restrictions on the participants of each side that reflect historical communications constraints.

Practicing Maneuver Warfare Principles

With the conditions of warfare accurately simulated by these methods, at last you have the opportunity to successfully apply maneuver warfare on the gameboard. If you thought that executing basic tactical principles when you first began to play wargames was daunting, the uncertainties with which you now must deal often paralyze many players into indecisiveness and inaction. You will always be looking at the board and cringing at your own pitiful situation-how easily your opponent could make mincemeat out of you! But he is no doubt thinking the same thing, and do either of you really know each other’s weaknesses? And even if one or the other (or both) of you do, are forces poised to take advantage of them? Wargaming at this advanced level sees players less occupied with making the perfect move in clockwork precision and more worried about finding the enemy, discovering or creating a weakness, making sure there is appropriate force to exploit that weakness, and mentally trying to see a way through all the obstacles to success. The latter ensures that each contest is ultimately a psychological one, as players not only battle each other over the tabletop, but also battle within themselves to overcome their own fears and doubts. If nothing else, the experience is quite character forming.

How do maneuver warfare principles translate onto the gameboard at this level of wargaming? Probably better than in any other medium short of actual combat, as the following discussion demonstrates.

* Shaping the battle. You must get yourselves oriented to the situation so you won’t flail around getting oriented when the unexpected happens. Look at the gameboard (terrain). Look at the victory conditions (your mission). Look at your forces (troops available). Look at how many turns the game or scenario is going to last (time available). And most important, try to estimate what type of force your opponent has and how he will use it (the enemy). The umpire may give you some intelligence concerning the latter, but if you aren’t playing with one, the scenario instructions might provide a good enemy order of battle. Yet even if you have a detailed order of battle for your opponent’s forces, you probably won’t be sure of his dispositions once the game starts. You must identify your own strengths and weaknesses and try to at least narrow down the probable ones of your opponent. Some quick time/distance calculations on the board may give you some indications as to where battles are likely to take place. Key terrain must be identified and a basic plan developed. While no plan survives contact with the enemy, you must have some general idea of how you want the battle to go and build into your play enough flexibility to take advantage of unexpected oppor-unities while minimizing unexpected misfortune. If this isn’t done you’ll probably lose the game to a competent opponent even before you start, for you will be reacting to his moves-he will be shaping the battle to his desires. You can’t afford to let him have the initiative before the first move is made.

If you are playing in a multiplayer game as the supreme commander, issue a clear estimate of the situation (this articulates your fundamental assumptions), a clear commander’s intent (what you want to have happen to the enemy), and simple mission-type orders (what each subordinate must accomplish in order to achieve the commander’s intent-not how to accomplish it). It will take some practice to do this correctly; you will find the first few times that your subordinate may understand what you want before the game starts, only to be lost in incomprehension once contact is made. Be a subordinate commander a few times and you’ll see what I mean.

* Finding the soft spots. Well, you do have reconnaissance units of some kind. You’ll need a plan for using them, not only to find the enemy, but also to find out where he is weak. This effort will involve your whole force, to include your brain. Units on the board will find the spatial gaps in your opponent’s dispositions, but it will be you who notices that he is sluggish in his movements in this sector here but not that sector there or that he mounts a better attack than he builds a defense, and so on.

* Decisionmaking. You are going to have a lot of information to go on, so much of your appreciation of the situation is going to be based on your intuition. The more you know your opponent and his methods, the more accurate your intuition will be. Does he like to attack no matter how foolish it may look? Is he the rash type, or is he more cautious and methodical? His every quirk is both a strength and a weakness-avoid circumstances that play to his strengths, and create ones that magnify his weaknesses.

Don’t let your lack of information paralyze you into indecisiveness and inaction, leaving your pieces nearly motionless on the gameboard, because you want to have a better picture of the unfolding tactical situation. Lots of players do this. Let this natural tendency of your opponent be something you can use against him; for yourself, be firm in applying your decisions, but be flexible enough not to pursue what turns out to be a bad course of action.

* Focus of effort. If you are playing a multiplayer game, it is important that all the players on a side recognize what the focus of effort means and their target. Otherwise each participant goes sallying off to fight his own little

war, and the operations of a side are without a sense of purpose and unity. If you alone are playing a side, you must fix your goal firmly in mind, think about and designate a focus of effort for all your operations, and stick to it as long as it remains relevant to the situation at hand. A mistake many players make is to continue on with a given focus of effort despite failure, even when something else looks to be much more promising. Mostly this happens out of a fear of the unknown and the unwillingness to change plans in the face of a changing situation.

* Speed, surprise, deception. If you aren’t making any headway, don’t lapse into inaction or push on with failure. Keep looking for a vulnerability or try to create one. No matter how strong your opponent may appear, he is weak or can be made weak somewhere. Find it. Configure your units you know to be seen by your opponent in such a way that they can threaten him one way or another. Perhaps he can only react to one move or the other, not both. Perhaps he will hesitate in order to “develop the situation.” Let your opponent fall into a “wait and see” posture: feed him a deception, then hit him at the decisive point when he is committed to a course of action based on an erroneous assumption. Force him to dance to your tune, react to your operations, and keep him from initiating his own. Inflict on him many small setbacks, building the foundation for the big setback that will give you the game, or at least cause him to throw in the towel. You should try to create in his mind the impression that he is losing the game, whether he actually is or not.

Do remember, though, that wargames are just that-games-and that they aren’t worth losing friends or opponents over. If you are too blood-thirsty you will soon run out of opponents willing to play you, and thus many learning opportunities will be lost. Temper your desire to win with common courtesy and the greater desire to learn from the experience.

As you can see, the broad principles of maneuver warfare work well in games that accurately simulate the conditions of war. Some readers might want concrete examples of how this translation of theory to the gameboard is done, but it varies from game to game and from opponent to opponent. There are no magic checklists or formulas to be discovered, just as in actual combat.

Quite a few Marines toss around maneuver warfare terminology with a vague idea of what it means but usually aren’t able to articulate how these ideas might be applied practically in combat. Those somewhat versed in military history will cite the well-known historical examples as illustrations of maneuver warfare principles in action, but any detailed explanation of how these concepts could be executed against any specific foe is rarely given. Part of the problem, admittedly, is that we Marines aren’t as knowledgeable about our potential enemies as we should be, but there is also a practical unfamiliarity with maneuver warfare concepts as well. This isn’t surprising-how often are we given “hands-on” opportunities to really practice these principles in peacetime? Unless you play wargames, these opportunities are few, if they even exist at all.

Once you have achieved a basic mastery of wargaming, and if you fancy yourself to be a serious student of military history or an advanced tactician, you will have your tactical problem-solving ability severely challenged by the kinds of games this article describes. These games are so successful at simulating not only the dynamic nature of combat, but also its uncertainties, that you can only hope for success if you apply tactical solutions that would work in real life. Your first few playings may overwhelm you with the unknowns and possibilities, but with practice you will be able to confidently deal with them. You will realize that while superior tactics vis-a-vis your opponent do not always earn you victory, inferior ones certainly guarantee you defeat. Soon you will notice an increasing ability to instinctively sense the true situation, to grasp its essentials quickly, and to correctly perceive the possibilities for action with their attendant risks and benefits-both in yourself and in the Marines you train using these games. Over time you and they will be able to make tactical decisions better and faster, both on and off the gameboard. There is simply no other medium as powerful and yet as inexpensive that can so realistically test your military judgment and practical understanding of maneuver warfare.

by Col John R. Moore

Much has been written in professional journals and military literature about maneuver warfare, its theories, its orientation, and its dynamic approach to the business of warfighting. The Marine Corps has in particular adopted it as operational philosophy. One needs to look no further than works like OH 6-1, The Ground Combat Element, or the latest publication, FMFM 1, Warfighting, to see the truth in this last statement. However, the role of communications and its relationship to maneuver warfare have not been examined or discussed anywhere in these and other publications.

An old saw says “Congress makes them generals, but communications makes them commanding generals.” Nowhere is this more true than in maneuver warfare, which emphasizes upfront leadership, independent action, and situational awareness. Maneuver warfare requires a new approach to tactical communications. This article seeks to provide some useful ideas about that as Marines pick up the banner of maneuver warfare and march off into the 21st century.

Today’s communications equipment can barely keep up with the initial demands of maneuver warfare, let alone the fast-paced actions certain to emerge in the future. VHF/FM radios, the mainstay of the units conducting maneuver warfare, have been in service since the Vietnam era. The promised replacement, SINCGARS (single channel ground and airborne radio system), languishes in fiscal “never-never land.” The VRC-12 series of VHF radios has just had its service life expectancy extended to 1998. Age breeds maintenance problems and a lack of reliability. Lack of reliability restricts the commander engaged in the freeflowing kind of warfare envisioned by the maneuverist. Other equipment items are not mobile enough to keep up with rapidly displacing units and command posts. The size, complexity, and length of the logistic train frequently eliminate the use of other equipment. Command posts (CPs) designed around World War I tentage are not conducive to emerging doctrinal concepts.

Any new approach to tactical communications requires an examination of communications from the viewpoint of the commander and his staff. The relationship between the commander and his communicator, the bureaucracy that produces communications equipment, and the system that educates commanders and communicators need also to be parties to this examination. Only when we have brushed the dust and mold from our doctrine and the inertia and lack of awareness from our headquarters can communications begin to support maneuver warfare.

The commander and his staff must approach communications as both a limiting factor and as a force multiplier. Communications as a factor limiting maneuver warfare should be obvious. While the tenets of maneuver warfare urge the commander to command from the front and not to be confined to his CP, if the commander cannot communicate, he cannot control, regardless of the principles of maneuver warfare. The commander and his communicator must be acutely aware of the communications environment created by every scheme of maneuver.

As a force multiplier, a properly designed and supported communications system allows the commander to take advantage of the tactical situation, revise his task organization, and pursue an advantage momentarily offered. Communications is too important to be left only to the communicator; the commander and his staff must become proficient users of their communications system, understanding the capabilities and limitations of the equipment they employ. The days of handing the problem over for the communicator to solve must never return. Maneuver warfare requires reliable communications for “recon pull” and other techniques and tactics to work against the surfaces and gaps it creates. Exercises can succeed in the face of poor communications; armed warfare cannot.

It is also useful to view the command and control system at every level as composed of a series of “range rings,” much like the range rings of concern to a fire support coordinator. Beyond certain distances commanders cannot communicate with any degree of reliability. These range rings of communications may pose unavoidable iimilations on the commander that, in turn, may cause him to revise his scheme of maneuver. The commander must also realize that his commander is also making the same estimate and will want to increase the radius of his own communications rings. But the laws of physics are inflexible; no amount of badgering or ignoring will change or modify them. The commander goes beyond his communications range at his own peril. Just as the wise commander does not exceed his span of control, the wise commander does not exceed his communications range.

Maneuver warfare places unusual requirements on the unit communications officer in lerms of organization, equipment techniques, and leadership. No longer can the communications officer be content, or be forced, to chase the arrows of up and down radio nets. He must think in terms of his frontage, the location of his units today and tomorrow, his commander’s intent, and his own personnel and equipment. No longer can he afford the coffee-drinking, bean-counting, business-as-usual approach to communications that the less demanding requirements of static operations allowed in the past. Maneuver warfare requires the communications officer to train his noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to solve today’s problems, while his staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) prepare for tomorrow, and he prepares for the day after tomorrow. The communications officer must anticipate his commander’s intent through careful coordination with the staff, frequent liaison visits, briefings of the commander and his operations officer, and learning the spirit of the unit. The communicator’s focus of effort must be his commander’s information requirements.

The communications officer must be both a leader and a manager. As a leader he must learn to do the correct thing, while as a manager of a multimillion dollar inventory he must learn to do things correctly. The communications officer must know the details of his equipment, but must not let himself become only a technician. He must be a generalist as well, aware of the environment about him, its requirements, its spirit, its philosophy, and his commander’s intent. The communications officer must be able to understand the tactics of the G/S-3, the logistics of the G/S-4, the control measures of the fire support coordinator, and, most importantly, the intent and focus of effort of his commander.

While he leads his Marines in their usually unheralded duties, the communications officer must also manage the communications system. he must be able to translate the plans and intent of his commander into the realities of frequencies, call signs, nets, links, and circuits; yet he cannot let himself become bogged down in the details of today’s battle. Hopefully his Marines have trained to function this way long before it was required. This also presumes that the commander has allowed his communicator time to train his Marines in their speciality.

The ability of communications to support maneuver warfare directly depends upon the suitability, reliability, and appropriateness of its equipment. Maneuver warfare requires smaller, better, lighter, cheaper, and more capable equipment than in the past. Only when equipment developers and maintainers recognize that the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) must live and die with their mistakes can communications begin to support maneuver warfare. The current process of developing, fielding, and maintaining equipment only marginally supports the FMF. Communications equipment in the inventory today was designed in the 1970s, based on 1960s experience, funded with 1980s money, and will probably be poorly supported by the fiscal realities of the 1990s. Some of this equipment no longer meets the needs of commanders who rapidly displace, operate on the move, and communicate only when absolutely necessary. The communicator and his commander are being promised and fed sophisticated equipment that will not last nor be used on a fastmoving battlefield. The emphasis seems to be on the complex and the complicated at the expense of the simple and the reliable. In addition, training is not in synch with equipment fielding due to funding delays, training delays, and the lack of an integrated approach. One year after the recent reorganization of the development, acquisition, and support organizations, the situation has not measurably improved. No equipment should be fielded until the FMF can use it. Equipment complexity is another issue that does not need to be repeated here. Communications equipment must be designed to be operated by a fighting Marine, not by a graduate engineer.

Professional schools must also approach maneuver warfare with the view that communications can support or cripple the commander’s intent. The curriculums of our professional schools must teach not only the technical details of communications, but also the effective use of the communications system, the system that carries information. The staff officer who routinely demands that historical reports be transmitted with immediate precedence and who complains that his messages are not getting through obviously does not understand the limitations of the system. The schools must teach students to distinguish between information that is indispensable and that which is nice to have. Information cannot be routinely demanded-the use of filters, areas of interest and influence, liaison officers, and key indicators must all be used to tailor the information for the commander.

Our schools must also teach that decisions must be made at the lowest possible level, that information flows up and down the chain of command; that headquarters and command elements need to actively search for information rather than rely on reports; and that electrical communications should be used only for information that is critical in nature and time-sensitive in urgency. Finally, organizational techniques, task organization, supervisory management, and battlefield leadership must be taught lest the student not have the time to develop and grow on his own.

Communications can support maneuver warfare if there is a desire to excel, a positive outlook, and a systems approach to problems. Realistic expectations and awareness of equipment capabilities and limitations will do a lot to reduce both perceived and actual communication problems. Only when the commander and his communicator understand this and use their communications assets intelligently will the true potential of maneuver warfare be realized.