You are the Company Commander, A Company, 1st Bn, 1st Marines. It has been two days since the two families of squatters living in COP Ritz hastily left their rooms in the outpost after a visit from two of their “cousins.” You have taken a team of three MUGA commandos, including Sgt Chef Benazzi. His seniority and experience remind you of an old-school infantry gunnery sergeant, and he has also proven to be one or your most savvy interpreters. You have been outside the wire since dawn meeting with Imam Mehmet Binouadoud, the Imam of the Al Mumeet Mosque, and Mkuu (chief) Uhuru Honore, the leader of the Albu Xuzuri tribe. You are determined to build on your relationships with these two very different local leaders to get to the bottom of the sudden departure of the squatters and to shore up local security in the neighborhood.
Your reports, based on many engagements over the past months, have helped confirm multi-source intelligence analysis findings that the leaders of the Albu Xuzuri tribe may be ready to openly support the MUGA and the CJTF. Your battalion CO has also “read you in” regarding diplomatic efforts at the U.S. mission in the capital, Minna Sultan Usween, to bring the Nuzuris into the MUGA. The Nuzuris are numerous and heavily armed, but they are a minority in the country. They have been historically ostracized as the descendants of enslaved mainland Africans brought to the country by the French in the 18th century. The Nuzuri are further stigmatized due to their unorthodox interpretation of Sufi Islam influenced by tribal and Christian practices. In response, they have developed a strongly self-reliant and isolated warrior culture with a reputation for violence, revenge, and criminal enterprises.
The three of you, along with Sgt Chef Benazzi, are all sitting on the floor of one of the offices on the third floor of the Imam’s compound due east of the mosque, drinking sweet tea. Your commandos, the Imam’s mosque police, and the Mkuus personal guard are posted outside. Soon after the noon call-toprayers, you hear two explosions and heavy small arms fire. You see smoke rising from the northern boundary of the COP, but you cannot make contact with your Marines on the company radio. More automatic weapons fire and several smaller explosions follow, now you are able to see smoke rising from north of the COP. You cannot see the action north of the COP and have no idea how many attackers are involved, what has caused the explosions, or what actions your Marines are taking.
You are still unable to raise your 3d Platoon Commander, 1st Lt Przyby, who you Iert in charge at the COP. As you silently recite the “mantra” of tactical reporting-“What do I know? Who needs to know? Have I told them?”- you use your local network cell phone to call the battalion’s CMOC (civil-military operations center) and, after a brief exchange with one of the contracted interpreters, you provide a “Flash” SITREP to the Battalion Operations Officer: “40-plus enemy; attacking COP Ritz from the north; time: now; automatic weapons and IEDs; COP in danger of being overrun.” You deliberately create a number of attackers to “work the system” the CFACC (combined force air component commander) uses to authorize CAS requests when there is a tactical unit in contact, or “TIC.” You know 30 enemy is the CJTF Commander’s threshold to immediately pull attack aircraft plus either rotary-wing or a UAS terminal controller from one of the “stacks” managed by the CFACC from their palatial combined air operations center at the international airport in the capital. Further, you add a “worse case” assessment about COP Ritz being overrun to ensure your Marines have the best chance for immediate support. As you finish your call, you hear the familiar sound of a .50 cal machingun and the crum-crump-crump of a MK19. You had been expecting the S-4A with a resupply convoy, and it sounds as if he has arrived and is joining the fight.
The Mkuu turns to you and, in heavily accented but perfect English, says, “My men can help you. My Militia is here protecting us at this meeting, and they are ready to fight and kill the terrorists attacking your Marines. I know you are only a captain, but at least you are here with us. I also know you understand what I am offering, and your generals and colonels will listen to you. You will make your reports, and you will see to it that 1 meet with the general of your ‘see jay tee eff.'”
He goes on to tell you that he has 30 militiamen with rifles and RPGs spread between the large, 4-story apartment building north of the Mosque and the COP. Mkuu Honore assures you that his men will support your Marines and help you get safely back to the COP. He goes on to report that the Albu Nuzuri are “blood enemies” of the terrorists and the tribes who support them, and that they are ready to secure this part of the city for the MUGA. Sgt Chef Benazzi and the Imam have been conferring Arabic, and while clearly caught off guard, they both appear pleased.
Suddenly, the Mkuu calls in one of his personal guard who is carrying a Styrofoam cooler held together with duct tape and wire. With obvious pride, he declares “to prove my point…” and opens the cooler to show you the severed heads of the two “cousins” who had visited the squatters at COP Ritz two days ago. Sgt Chef Benazzi starts cursing in Arabic, and Imam Binouadoud reels in shock. The commandos, mosque police, and Nuzuri Militia start screaming at each other in the hall way. You fight back the nausea and lean in to the Mkuu.
Realizing what this means to the CJTF and your battalion, do you accept his offer of support? “Deal, or no deal?”
If you do accept, how do you want to employ the militiamen in the apartment building between you and the COP? What are your instructions, and how do you communicate them?
If your ploy to get immediate CAS to support your Marines is successful, and with degraded communications, how do you plan to ensure effective terminal control of these aircraft?
Where do you put yourself in this fight? Do you get back to the COP as fast as possible, or do you “embed ” with your new allies?
How and when do you tell your battalion commander that your SITREP included deliberate fabrications?
Do you do something completely different?
Requirements
In 5 minutes or less, write your decision, providing a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions by email to gazette@???marines.org or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 09-17, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.
“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”
-GEN George S. Patton
During an October 2019 Lecture Series entitled Developing Leaders for Maneuver Warfare at Marine Corps University, former Secretary of Defense, James N. Mattis, was asked what he thought was the biggest threat to the preservation of democracy in the United States.1 His response included a thoughtful analysis of likely threats to democracy at home and abroad and how they would be mitigated in a future contested environment—through vicious harmony enabled by the human interface at all levels of command.2 He described the human interface as a system of feedback loops informed by intent and capable of learning and adapting.3 Echoing pages of MCDP 1, Warfighting, Secretary Mattis’ sentiments demonstrate how, through the integration of commander’s intent and the human interface, leaders can build trust, open lines of communication within their organization, and promote concepts of maneuver warfare—like mission command.
Threats to the United States’ command and control architecture reinforce an important principle regarding the effective application of commander’s intent: the greater the probability of conducting operations in distributed or communications-degraded environments, the greater the responsibility of our Nation’s commanders to skillfully issue clear and concise intent.4 The ability of our naval forces to persistently operate in contested, anti-access environments will require simple commander’s intent to promote intelligent initiative.5 Simplicity in orders and intent will clarify end states, increase speed in decision making, and generate trust in subordinate execution of operations in an anticipated communications-degraded environment.6
As LtGen Steven Boutelle points out in The Art of Command, “The effectiveness of today’s armed forces leadership will define the future of the nation.”7 To emphasize the importance of simple commander’s intent supporting future U.S. naval operations, this article examines ADM Lord Viscount Horatio Nelson’s use of commander’s intent at The Battle of Trafalgar and Field Marshal William Slim’s use of simple orders to unify the British 14th Army during World War II.
Commander’s Intent and the Human Interface
Emphasizing the role of individual behavior within the naval Services through organizing principles like commander’s intent can foster a culture of intelligent initiative. Studies of multi-domain battles throughout history highlight the importance of incorporating simple commander’s intent in future concepts of operations.8 The tactical art of ADM Nelson sheds light on the effectiveness of simple commander’s intent when combating a numerically superior naval force.
On 21 October 1805, ADM Nelson defeated the combined fleets of the French and Spanish navies during the Battle of Trafalgar off the coast of Spain.9 The victory concluded with all British vessels intact, 22 ships from the combined French and Spanish fleets destroyed, and French ADM Pierre-Charles Villeneuve taken prisoner aboard his flagship. It was described as, “The most decisive naval battle of the [Napoleonic Wars], conclusively ending French plans to invade England.”10 The victory was achieved through ADM Nelson’s belief in the value of commander’s intent and his deviation from formal ship-of-the-line warfare typical to 18th century fighting sail tactics.11
At the time, the British practice was for commanders to centralize control of the fleet under a single commander using line-ahead battle formations.12 Conventional line-ahead battle formations organized fleets in parallel lines that were good for communication but limited their dispersion.13 At the Battle of Trafalgar, ADM Nelson arranged his ships in columns, directing, “The Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle.”14 His unconventional use of column formations facilitated speed and independent maneuver of British ships—and allowed his fleet to approach ADM Villeneuve’s linear formation perpendicularly. Shaping actions afforded by his maneuvers created additional fields of fire for his broadside-mounted 24-pounder long guns, which supported feints and ultimately broke ADM Villeneuve’s lines.15
ADM Nelson unified the actions of his captains through commander’s intent, effectively overcoming anticipated degradations in communications through his use of a column formation.16 In his personal journal, ADM Nelson referred to his unorthodox methods of decentralizing authority as “the Nelson touch,” writing, “I am anxious to join the Fleet, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them the Nelson touch, which we say is warranted never to fail.”17 Prior to the battle, he created a common understanding of his objectives, enabling decisive actions at the captain level.
ADM Nelson organized the actions of his subordinates through simple guiding principles like, “No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” He decentralized authority to open fire down to his fleet’s captains and emphasized the importance of attacking effectively first.18 One recollection said, “If signals could not be seen from the flagship, [captains] had complete autonomy to engage the enemy as they saw fit.”19 On the morning of battle, ADM Nelson signaled to his captains: “Engage the enemy more closely.”20 The control of the battle was effectively handed off to his captains, bringing unmatched speed and decisiveness to the fight. ADM Nelson’s use of commander’s intent built trust and unleashed intelligent initiative by emphasizing short and concise guidance.
Modern applications of commander’s intent—shaped by LtGen John A. Lejeune’s 1920 philosophy of the relationship between officers and men, Gen Alfred M. Gray’s 1989 model of teacher-student relationships, and Gen David H. Berger’s 2019 emphasis on measuring the effectiveness of planning processes by the quality of their intent—continue to demonstrate the importance of enabling vicious harmony by promoting subordinate initiative.21 Through simple guidance based on a common understanding of objectives and decentralized decision making, our naval forces will continue to confirm the value ADM Nelson placed on intent by allowing decentralized operations to thrive in distributed and communications-degraded environments.
Defeating the Undefeated
Enhancing the lethality of the U.S. naval Services through proposed complex force packages will require organizing principles to endow a shared sense of responsibility across a large number of distributed military platforms.22 Harmonizing the actions of a large number of distributed military platforms can be accomplished through simple unified intent, as demonstrated by historical examples such as then-LTG Slim in his defeat of the Japanese 15th Army during World War II.23
In his memoir, Defeat into Victory, Field Marshal Slim highlighted the effectiveness of commander’s intent in leading the British 14th Army to victory over formidable Japanese forces during World War II.24 From 1942 to 1943, LTG Slim commanded the Burma Corps and the XV Corps, both of which faced critical defeats against Japanese forces during the Burma Campaign.25 Widely renowned in the Asiatic-Pacific theater for their training and discipline, LTG Ren’ya Mutaguchi’s Japanese 15th Army prioritized speed in tactics to exploit gaps in allied defensive positions, allowing them to beat back the British forces from Burma into India during the Arakan Campaign in 1943.26
Following the 1943 Japanese defeat of the British XV Corps in the Arakan Campaign, LTG Slim was assigned to command the British 14th Army and given orders to prevent Japanese seizure of British India.27 Upon assuming command, he identified many struggles his soldiers would have to overcome—from correcting a notably poor supply chain to altering his troop’s mindset that Mutaguchi’s forces were unable to be beaten. Most important to LTG Slim was his need to organize the British 14th Army—which comprised British, Gurkha, Burmese, African, American, and Chinese troops—into simple chains of command.28
Soldiers from the British 14th Army were collectively characterized by a vast medley of cultures, languages, and religions. LTG Slim unified this disparate force by establishing three transparent priorities for the British 14th Army which he nested in subordinate priorities in every level of his command: build a cohesive army, prioritize small-unit defeats of Japanese forces, and leverage coalition force capabilities.29 LTG Slim emphasized the importance of his priorities at the tactical level to support the achievement of his strategic objectives in Burma.30
To build a cohesive army, he reinforced the three aforementioned priorities by “speaking tirelessly to his men and [explaining] to them how each man’s contribution [to his priorities] played an important part in the overall result.”31 He regularly visited the front lines and delivered intent to his subordinate commanders in their own language, using interpreters when he was unable to do it himself. He decentralized control of his distribution network to ground maneuver forces to keep supply lines moving during Japanese attacks.32 Furthermore, considering the feedback he received regarding the needs of his troops, LTG Slim exploited his robust logistical network to provide culturally appropriate meals to his troops with religious dietary restrictions.33
Transparency in goals and decentralization of authority to competent subordinates generated quick wins at the small-unit level, allowing the British 14th Army to overcome the mindset that the Japanese were supermen and unbeatable. Deliberately limiting the size and scope of his tactical objectives, he emphasized the conduct of small patrols to build confidence in his troops’ abilities to move and fight in the Burmese jungle.34 The success of the British 14th Army from 1943-1945 during the Burma Campaign was the result of LTG Slim’s simple orders and organizing principles, ability to transform the army into a winning team, and unifying principles around a common cause.35 Utilizing the momentum of small-unit victories, LTG Slim adhered to the leadership advice he received as a young cadet: “Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain’t lookin!”36
With coalition support from American LTG Joseph Stilwell, USA, commanding Chinese forces and British American GEN Orde Wingate commanding Chindit forces, the Allied forces disrupted Japanese supply lines, limited Japanese freedom of maneuver, and stunted Mutaguchi’s ability to reinforce the Japanese 15th Army. Accordingly, “in March 1945, the British 14th Army took Mandalay and the Japanese stronghold of Meiktila.”37 By May 1945, the remaining Japanese 15th Army forces were successfully repelled from Burma and unable to seize British India, allowing Allied forces to establish critical supply lines into China.38
LTG Slim understood that true leaders do not inspire through writing or dictating their orders, but through leading their people and being with them.39 He built a leadership team where his army operated more from his commander’s intent than written orders, and he developed strong relationships that imparted trust in his leaders and earned trust in return. In a post-career analysis of his application of orders to his maneuver warfare mindset which contributed to victory in Burma, Field Marshal Slim notes,
I suppose dozens of operation orders have gone out in my name, but I never actually wrote one myself. I always had someone who could do that better than I could. One part of the order I did, however, draft myself—the intention … it is always the most important.”40
LTG Slim’s use of simple priorities provides a relevant example of how to establish command and control systems that are flexible, adaptable, and resilient.41 The anticipated speed of a future conflict reinforces the importance of decentralizing authority to the lowest competent authority.42 Emphasizing speed in decision making through simple priorities promotes certainty in uncertain environments and generates the bottom-up initiative necessary to maintain tempo in the absence of direct communications.43 Simple priorities nested in every level of command exploit the full potential of the U.S. naval Services’ junior enlisted and officers, and will no doubt enable success in a future contested environment.
Unleashing Intelligent Initiative
Maintaining the United States’ strategic advantage in the emerging operational environment will require tactical decision makers to intelligently respond to evolving threats impacting the U.S. naval forces’ operational and strategic objectives.44 Historical military operations during the Napoleonic Wars and World War II, modern guidance like Gen Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance, and even industry best-practices highlight the effective use of commander’s intent as an asymmetric advantage critical to supporting distributed and complex force packages.
FedEx chief executive officer and Marine veteran Fred Smith’s simple guidance to his employees integrates speed with control for a complex and distributed organization responsible for more than fifteen million shipments per day: “get all packages to their destination free of damage, in a cost-effective manner, and within the shipment period specified by the customer.”45 Smith’s use of simple intent promotes intelligent initiative for more than 450,000 FedEx employees worldwide and harmonizes subordinate execution of the FedEx mission in line with his priorities.
The gradual erosion of American technological advantages demonstrates the need to emphasize commander’s intent at the tactical level, in order to increase effectiveness during distributed operations.46 A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, highlights the importance of decentralized authority as a priority to maintain strategic advantage within a contested maritime domain.47 Achieving strategic victories in the emerging operational environment will require execution of intelligent tactical initiatives through quality commander’s intent because as Alfred Mahan noted, “[Subordinate] action by the various great divisions of the fleet [have their] own part contributory to the general whole.”48
As anticipated in Gen Berger’s planning guidance, the application of maneuver warfare philosophy will increase as we divest of legacy systems that no longer support the speed of our operational requirements.49 Leadership in the high speed and distributed operations of a future contested environment will require skillful judgement in the application of maneuver warfare through the use of succinct, effective, and easily-disseminated commander’s intent to promote the same intelligent initiative demonstrated by ADM Nelson off the coast of Spain and by LTG Slim in Burma.
Notes
Gen James N. Mattis, “Developing Leaders for Maneuver Warfare: General Mattis on Leadership,” (lecture, Quantico, VA, October 2019).
Ibid.
Ibid.
James Acton, “Command and Control in the Nuclear Posture Review: Right Problem Wrong Solution,” War on the Rocks, (February 2018), available at https://warontherocks.com; and Jeffrey Reilley, “Multidomain Operations: A Subtle but Significant Transition in Military Thought,” Air & Space Power Journal, (Maxwell AFB, AL:Air University Press, 2016).
Gen David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019).
Anthony Piscitelli, The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017); Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999); and “Multidomain Operations: A Subtle but Significant Transition in Military Thought.”
Harry S. Laver, The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010).
James Lacey, “An Historical Look at the Future,” (lecture, Quantico, VA, August).
John B. Hattendorf, Trafalgar and Nelson, (Newport, RI: The Naval War College Museum, 2006).
Dan Fogel, “Lord Nelson Can Teach us Lots About Strategy,” SP3, (May 2019), available at http://www.spthree.com.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Ship-of-the-line Warfare,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, (August 2010), available at https://www.britannica.com. See also Trafalgar and Nelson.
“Lord Nelson Can Teach Us Lots About Strategy.” See also “Ship-of-the-line Warfare.”
Staff, “Battle of Trafalgar: Napoleonic Wars,” Learning History, available at https://www.learning-history.com.
Horatio Nelson, Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October 1805, (October1805), available at https://www.bl.uk.
Trafalgar and Nelson.
“Ship-of-the-line Warfare.”
Oliver Warner, Nelson’s Last Diary and the Prayer before Trafalgar, (London, UK: Seeley, Service & Co., 1971).
Wayne P. Hughes and Robert Girrier. Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).
Christopher Gabel, Christopher Willbanks, and James Willbanks, Great Commanders, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014)
Ibid.
John A. Lejeune, Relations between Officers and Men. Marine Corps Order No. 29. 1920; See also Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997); and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance
John Paschkewitz, “Mosaic Warfare,” (lecture, Quantico, VA:, August 2019); DARPA, “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare,” available at https://www.darpa.mil; and Benjamin Jensen, “Innovation: Myths and Meaning,” (lecture, Quantico, VA: August 2019).
“DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare.”
William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1943-1945, (New York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 2000).
David Cotter, “Field Marshal William Slim,” (lecture, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2019.
Maj N. R. M. Borton, British Army, “The 14th Army in Burma: A Case Study in Delivering Fighting Power,” Defence Studies, (Milton Park, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2002).
“Field Marshal William Slim.” See also Thomas M. Jordan,The Operational Commander’s Role in Planning and Executing a Successful Campaign, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992).
Owen Connelly, On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
“Field Marshal William Slim.”
Ibid.
Thomas Jordan, The Operational Commander’s Role in Planning and Executing a Successful Campaign, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992).
Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1943-1945.
Ibid.
Andrew Knighton, “Bill Slim and WWII’s Forgotten Army—One of The Most Successful Commanders of the War,” War History Online, (December 2017), available at https://www.warhistoryonline.com.
Aivars Purins, “Uncle Bill of the Forgotten Army or the Leadership of Field-Marshal Lord Slim.” Baltic Security & Defence Review, (Tartu, EE: Baltic Defence College, 2008).
Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1943-1945.
“Bill Slim and WWII’s Forgotten Army—One of The Most Successful Commanders of the War.”
“Field Marshal William Slim.”
Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1943-1945.
Ibid.
James N. Mattis and Bing West. Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, (New York, NY: Random House, 2019); See also Commandant’s Planning Guidance.
“Developing Leaders for Maneuver Warfare: General Mattis on Leadership.”
MCDP 1, Warfighting.
Rob Wittman, “Backing the Corps: Ensuring the Future of the Amphibious Force,” War on the Rocks, (October 2018), available at https://warontherocks.com.
Chad Storlie, “Manage Uncertainty with Commander’s Intent,” Harvard Business Review, (November 2010), available at https://hbr.org. See also FedEx Corporation, “Corporate Fact Sheet,” FedEx, available at https://about.van.fedex.com.
John Kroger, “Charting the Future of Education for the Navy-Marine Corps Team,” War on the Rocks, (November 2019), available at https://warontherocks.com.
United States Navy, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, (Washington, DC: 2018); see also United States Navy, Navy Leader Development Framework, Version 3.0, (Washington, DC: 2019).
Alfred T. Mahan, Types of Naval Officers Drawn from the History of the British Navy, (London, UK: S. Low, 1902). See also Williamson Murray, “MCDP 7,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: November 2019).
Adam Elkus, “Man, the Machine, and War.” War on the Rocks, (November 2015), available at https://warontherocks.com. See also Commandant’s Planning Guidance.
War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant and methods we use evolve constantly … [o]ne major catalyst of change is the advancement of technology. As the hardware of war improves through technological development, so must the tactical, operational, and strategic usage adapt to its improved capabilities to counteract our enemy’s.1
This excerpt from MCDP 1, Warfighting, has proven particularly relevant with the advent of cyber warfare. Recent technological advances have allowed hackers to conduct cyber-attacks against the United States and countries around the world. The 2015 Office of Personnel Management hack, for example, resulted in the theft of 21.5 million Federal employees’ personal information. In 2007, a series of coordinated cyber-attacks crippled the Estonian government, banks, media, and other institutions, bringing the country “to a virtual standstill.”2 Most recently, Russia has employed cyber operations as part of the conflict in Ukraine.3
In the absence of treaties or statutes, the DoD and Marine Corps have taken steps to adapt to and regulate this new wrinkle in modern warfare. Several DoD documents relevant to this discussion are classified; those documents will not be addressed and limit this article’s permissible scope.
The United States does not stand alone in its quest to regulate cyberspace and cyber warfare. An international group of experts developed the Tallin Manual and Tallin Manual 2.0, which seek to establish an international code to govern cyber operations. While the Tallin Manual and the Tallin Manual 2.0 provide useful guidelines, they are not binding on the United States. It would benefit the United States to take a leading role in the development of domestic and international standards, both as a world leader and because such standards will improve America’s ability to act and react decisively, consistently, and in coordination with our allies.
Current Legal Framework
Modern warfare is analyzed under two primary sources of authority: the UN Charter and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Cyber warfare, however, presents several challenges that the definitions in the UN Charter and the LOAC may not adequately address.
The UN Charter. The UN Charter establishes many of the basic principles for international relations. Various interpretations of the UN Charter have occasionally resulted in political tensions, such as balancing a state’s right to sovereignty with a state’s right to preemptive self-defense. Sovereignty versus preemptive self-defense remains an ongoing source of friction in international relations and international law—a problem that will be exacerbated if the conduct of cyber warfare is analyzed within a framework that does not account for its intricacies.
Article 2 of the UN Charter grants states the right sovereignty, stating,
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.4
Article 51 grants states the right to self-defense. It reads, in part,
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security [emphasis added].5
The UN Charter, understandably, does not address issues specific to cyber warfare in several ways. The UN Charter does not define the “force” that may not be used “against the territory integrity” of any state nor does it define “armed attack.” Cyber-attacks resulting in physical damage, and thus having the effect of a physical attack, would likely constitute force in violation of Article 2. One could argue, however, that cyber-attacks that donot result in the manipulation of physical objects (such taking information from an electronic database) may not constitute “force” against a state’s “territorial integrity” as the terms are commonly understood. This represents a potentially dangerous gray area, and one that our enemies could exploit.
Additionally, as with traditional warfare, no clear guidance exists on how far the right to self-defense, as articulated by Article 51, extends. A state’s right to self-defense is not absolute, and it remains unclear when action in cyberspace crosses the line between “preemptive self-defense”6 and a violation of another state’s sovereignty.7
The LOAC. The DoD applies the LOAC to all military operations. The LOAC is a combination of the “Hague Tradition” and “Geneva Tradition.”8 Hague Tradition regulates the means and methods of warfare, such as the tactics, weapons, and targeting criteria.9 All military operations must be evaluated in terms of necessity; proportionality; distinction; and humanity.10
The LOAC applies to both international armed conflicts (IACs) as well as non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). However, the distinction between the two categories of conflict could prove critical to other issues such as use of force and the status of enemy combatants. The ability to attribute an attack to its source will be crucial in determining whether an IAC or NIAC framework applies.
IACs. The UN classifies armed conflict between two states as IACs. It bases this classification on Common Article 2,11 which is supplemented by Additional Protocol I.12 Cyber warfare in an IAC poses few legal problems. If a foreign military or government conducts cyber-attacks against the United States as part of a conflict, the United States could respond in accordance with UN Charter Article 51 and the LOAC, constrained only by the principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity. Those foreign operatives working on behalf of the state would be entitled to the same protections as any other prisoner of war.
NIACs. The more complex scenario would involve one or more non-state actors that conduct cyber-attacks against the United States. One can easily imagine a scenario in which a terrorist organization, or other organization operating independently of any nation-state, attempts to bring down all or parts of the DoD or Marine Corps network. These actions and actors would likely fall within the NIAC framework.
NIACs, or “armed conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,”13 trigger Additional Protocol II obligations for the state party involved in the conflict.14 NIACs have traditionally involved the imposition of international regulations on entirely internal conflicts, such as the Colombian government’s struggle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. But this definition has expanded in recent years; multiple international courts have recognized that NIACs may exist across international borders.15
Unlike combatants in IACs, combatants in NIACs do not receive combatant immunity or prisoner of war status or protections for their actions.16 Foreign cyber operatives will likely fall somewhere along a spectrum between “no state support” and “state or military employee;” and the Marine Corps should have a plan for how to classify actors at various points along this spectrum, providing various levels of support, and train Marines on what protections those actors are entitled to. Once we accurately categorize these actors, we will next have to determine at what point they become valid military targets depending on their actions in cyberspace. Commander’s intent should then empower decision-makers at the appropriate level.
Improving our Combined Arms
The Marine Corps relies on maneuver warfare to defeat its enemies. Part of this approach includes the use of combined arms, which MCDP 1 defines as “the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another.”17 Speed provides a crucial means to exploit the enemy’s gaps that the combined arms dilemma exposes. The cyber domain is no different.
The Marine Corps is aware that its reliance on electronics could prove to be a critical vulnerability in battle. A successful enemy cyber-attack could act as a force multiplier for an otherwise inferior force, drastically slow our operational tempo such that we lose relative speed over the enemy, and severely limit the Marine Corps’ ability to use combined arms. In a near-peer engagement, the ability to move our personnel and aircraft close to and into enemy territory both undetected and unimpeded will be critical for shaping operations. Developing cyber capabilities organic to the MEFs and empowering decision-makers at the MEF level would allow for a quicker response, thus improving our relative speed and exposing our enemies to a combined arms dilemma earlier in the fight.
Moving Forward
Domestically, the United States has recognized the immediacy of the cyber threat, as evidenced by the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). While discussing how to protect the United States in the cyber era, the National Security Strategy noted that information sharing and layered defenses will be key to deterring and defeating rogue actors.18. The NDS enacted this intent, stating that we will “invest in cyber defense, resilience, and continued integration of cyber operations into the full spectrum of military operations.”19 The Marine Corps Cyberspace Command addresses and develops defenses to cyber-attacks, assesses system vulnerabilities, and prepares to digitally “maneuver” in support of operational forces.20
Internationally, the Tallinn Manual distinguishes between “use of force” and “armed attack”21 and concludes that cyber operations can qualify as an armed attack, particularly in cases involving substantial injury or physical damage.22 Additionally, some members of the group posited that a “sufficiently severe non-injurious or destructive cyber operation, such as that resulting in a state’s economic collapse, can qualify as an armed attack.”23
These domestic and international measures represent a great deal of progress and a useful baseline in an emerging field. The United States should seek to lead the global community in this area. The DoD will benefit from having a set of rules for responses and engagement criteria. While not a necessity, signing and ratifying a single international framework can both improve relations with our allies and allow the DoD to improve interoperability during combined operations. Such a framework will also facilitate decentralized decision-making as to whether an “attack” has occurred and allow MEFs to respond quickly and decisively in fluid situations.
Decentralized decision-making remains especially important to the Marine Corps. Our structure and doctrine place decision-making responsibility on our personnel closest to the ground. Predictability and known rules of engagement may become critical considerations for these individuals. Our MAGTFs and MEFs would benefit from an organic cyber warfare element that could react instantaneously to an enemy cyber-attack, conduct a counterattack, and relay relevant information to the GCE, ACE, or LCE. Such decentralization is also consistent with the NDS’s directive to integrate operations “into the full spectrum of military operations.” Cyber and electronic warfare will likely take on an increasingly prominent role in future conflicts; we owe our Marines the power to make critical decisions with confidence and consistency so we may continue to win battles in any clime and place.
LTC Scott W. Beidleman, USA, Defining and Deterring Cyber War, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009).
Laurens Cerulus, “How Ukraine Became a Test Bed for Cyperweaponry,” POLITICO, (February 2019), available at https://www.politico.
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, (San Fransico, CA: October 1945). See Article 2 (4).
Charter of the United Nations. See Article 51.
UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston has stated that “[a] targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty [where] … the first, targeting State has a right to international law to use the force in self-defen[s]e under Article 51 of the UN Charter, [and] the second state is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory.” UN Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, UN Document A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, (Geneva, CH: May 2010). For other examples of preemptive self-defense in international law, see William H. Taft IV, The Legal Basis for Preemption, Council on Foreign Relations, (2002); available at http://www.cfr.org
In traditional warfare, absent consent, a “victim” state may only violate another state’s sovereignty in the name of self-defense if the host state is “unwilling or unable” to stop the threat to international peace. Additionally, the victim State’s operations must conform to the LOAC’s principles of necessity and proportionality. A similar standard would be useful cyber warfare, especially considering the clandestine and secretive nature of some hacking groups in countries like China and Russia. See Ashley S. Deeks, “’Unwilling or Unable’: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia School of Law, December 2011). (citing Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 11, 2002 from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1012/Annex (Sept. 12, 2002).
LTC Richard P. DiMeglio, Judge Advocate, USA, et al., Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, (Charlottesville, VA: United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2012).
Hague tradition consists of the Hague Conventions of 1899, as revised in 1907, the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, and the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention. Geneva Tradition focuses on respecting and protecting victims of warfare. Geneva Tradition focuses on respecting and protecting victims of warfare; Geneva Tradition is composed of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, each of which protects a different category of war victim. Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook: supra n. 8 at 19.
Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook.
“Common Article” refers to articles that are common to all four Geneva Conventions.
“[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [“Geneva I”] article 2 (1949). The United States has not signed or ratified Protocol I, in part because it expands Common Article 2 to include conflicts previously classified as non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Under Protocol I, Common Article 2 would include “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1, para. 4. The United States has resisted ratifying Protocol I because it expands liability for commanding officers for the actions of subordinates (id., at arts. 86, 87) and because it states enemy combatants have not distinguished themselves from civilians until they have engaged in preparatory or combat activities (id., at art. 44[3]). For a fuller discussion of the reasons that some States have chosen not to ratify Protocol I; see Harvey Rishikof, “Institutional Ethics: Drawing Lines for Militant Democracies,” Joint Force Quarterly, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009); see also David McGrogan, “Whither Now, Additional Protocol I?” International Law Observer, ( January, 2009), available at http://www.internationallawobserver.eu.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [“Geneva I”] art. 3 (1949).
Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook.
See Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, (Washington, DC: 2006). Holding that “the term ‘conflict not of an international character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations” and thus recognizing that Common Article 3 conflicts can expand beyond the territory of one States. See also International Court of Justice, 2005 I.C.J. 337,Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic. Republic of Congo v. Uganda), (The Hague, NL: December 2019).
For further reading, see Supreme Court of Israel, HJC 769/02, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, et al., v. The Government of Israel, et al., (Jerusalem, IL: December 2005).
MCDP 1.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017.
National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018.
James K. Sanborn, “Cyber Battlefield Grows in Importance,” Military Times, (April 2009); available at http://www.militarytimes.com.
Collin Allan, “Was the Cyber Attack on a Dam in New York an Armed Attack?” Just Security, ( January 2016) available at https://www.justsecurity.org.
The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG),published in July 2019, is the vision and strategy document that describes the Marine Corps’ current and future force operational strategy to fight and win in the next 5-15 years. Within the context of current operational realities and potential future force challenges, the document provides a foundational view for decision makers to follow and understand the direction the Marine Corps is driving toward over the next decade. The CPG recognizes the need to conduct command and control (C2) over contested networks, which can support maneuver forces in a distributed manner. The CPG also recognizes the growing threat of cyber warfare, and the Marine Corps’ reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to conduct operations across the MAGTF must be resilient.1 It further points out how operating in an environment where networks will be attacked, compromised, degraded, or denied is an operational reality.
Much of the focus of cyberspace operations in recent years has centered on the strategic and operational levels of war. Cyberspace is defined by Joint Publication 3-12 as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.2 Cyberspace constitutes three layers: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona. The physical network component is comprised of the hardware, systems software, and infrastructure (wired, wireless, cabled links, radio links, satellite, and optical) that supports the network and the physical connectors (wires, cables, EMS frequency, routers, switches, servers, and computers).3 The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network that are related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network. An example of the logical layer is the DOD’s nonsecure Internet Protocol router network. The cyber-persona layer consists of the people who are actually on the network. A single cyber-persona can have multiple users or many virtual locations, but normally not linked to a single physical location.4 In order for networked MAGTF operations to be successful, all three layers of cyberspace operations must work effectively. The operational entities within the Marine Corps that deal with addressing cyberspace operations are the MAGTF Communications Control Center (MCCC)* (*MAGTF can denote any operational level within the MAGTF or major subordinate element. For example, a MCCC could reside at the MEF/MEB/MEU levels or at the division, air, or logistical component. GOES AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE.) and the cyberspace and electronic warfare coordination center. Traditionally the Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Coordination Center supports MAGTF commanders use of EMS via integrated planning across the MAGTF’s operational environment to increase the operational tempo and achieve military advantages.5Currently, this role now falls inside the MEF Information Group.
Battlefields have traditionally comprised of four domains: land, sea, air, and space. The last few decades changed the warfighting landscape to include a fifth domain: cyberspace. Some believe EMS deserves its own domain, especially considering the impacts it has on the conduct of war. Spectrum is the invisible medium that saturates the area of operations upon which the use of Marine Corps’ electronic systems depend. Spectrum is a unique environment because it transcends all three levels of war and can shape tactical, operational, and strategic means and end-states on the modern battlefield. Whether the Marine Corps is operating unilaterally or as part of a joint coalition, spectrum has both enabling and restricting characteristics. Therefore, defending, controlling, and shaping the spectrum landscape can be decisive because if a unit can be seen or located electronically, it then can be attacked and destroyed.
Until very recent, the elements of the MAGTF, EMS frequency complexities surrounding cyberspace operations is given scant attention. There are many questions to consider as to the real practical impacts for maneuver forces within an EMS denied or degraded environment. Does the GCE possess the necessary capabilities to properly mitigate a spectrum contested or denied battlespace? What are the practical steps to mitigate the loss of critical C2 at the infantry battalion level or lower? Does the Marine Corps current maneuver warfare doctrine properly support the loss of network-centric C2? Are there specific training scenarios that would help mitigate the loss of networked C2? What technologies should the Marine Corps adopt or develop to support or reinforce maneuver forces at the tactical level? What are the likely scenarios near-peer adversaries attack to limit, deny, or degrade MAGTF C2? What investments in training and technology should the Marine Corps make in order to ensure C2 of its forces during likely cyber network attacks and spectrum denied battlespaces?
While the Marine Corps has taken steps to ensure freedom of action in EMS contested environments, it has not done nearly enough to mitigate challenges of a congested radio frequency (RF) spectrum environment and the likely threats first world adversaries will impose on the battlefield to the GCE and, specifically, front line units like an infantry battalion. If tactical units cannot tie into the overall operational design of a campaign, then achieving the strategic end-state is unlikely to occur. Therefore, this article contends the Marine Corps must reexamine its current technological based C2 capabilities that enable maneuver warfare through the lens of spectrum denied or degraded operating environments. Decision makers should consider integrating readily available dynamic spectrum allocating systems and RF mapping technologies, which would significantly address key vulnerabilities that negatively affect networked C2. If adopted, they may provide the mitigation steps required to maintain decentralized C2. By waiting or failing to take steps now, the Marine Corps risks the ability to conduct decentralize decisive maneuver warfare through the use of automated C2 systems.
Methodology of Study
With the above in mind, this article explores the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine within the context of an EMS denied or the degraded environment. The current command and control structure is an operating mental framework that uses mission command and control and offers the flexibility to deal with changing situations and to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity.6 First, the context is set by briefly examining Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine and key changes to command and control over the past fifteen years. Second, the framework examines the radio frequency spectrum challenges and the current communications capabilities at a typical Marine Corps infantry battalion to operate in spectrum congested environments. This article further examines some near-peer adversaries’ capabilities and likely threats posed by them. In order to properly scope the topic, the article purposely does not discuss the impacts of all EMS dependent technologies such as global positioning or reconnaissance satellites, both of which would have strategic impacts for U.S. military forces worldwide. However, it is recognized that a loss of either would have significant negative impacts on Marine forces both operationally and tactically. Finally, this article will examine some emerging technologies developed by the Defense Applied Research Agency (DARPA), which, if adopted by the Marine Corps, could positively affect its ability to operate in a spectrum contested environment. Though this article centers on front line tactical units, its concepts could further be applied to both air and sea domains, regardless of echelon or scale.
Maneuver Warfare Doctrine
The Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine centers on the concept of maneuver warfare and denotes the idea of gaining a positional advantage over an adversary. While not exclusive to geographical boundaries, “this positional advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial.”7 Maneuver warfare supports the philosophy of command, which requires subordinate commanders to make decisions based on higher command’s intent. A commander must develop his own understanding of this intent and utilize his own initiative in order to exploit opportunities as they present themselves.8 This concept ideally, when executed properly, generates a faster-operating tempo, which disrupts an adversary’s ability to effectively resist friendly actions. Maneuver warfare, at its core, is people centric and thus does not fundamentally require external systems in order to operate. However, it requires competent leadership and high degrees of trust at all levels of the organization to be effective when employed in a decentralized manner. In modern warfare, decentralized C2 requires communications equipment.
Operating at a faster tempo requires C2 systems and structures that provide for the speed of execution of key warfighting functions. In recent years, the Marine Corps, along with the entire DOD, has sought to reduce uncertainty by dramatically increasing the amount of information utilized through networking in order to make faster decisions. This insatiable appetite for copious amounts of information has pushed the Marine Corps to move from a “people-centric” model of C2 to an information or network-centric model of C2.9 This is evidenced by the enormous and overreliance on information systems technologies in order to operate in almost any capacity. For some, this overreliance has been seen as somewhat of an “Achilles heel” for the Marine Corps and the U.S. military as a whole. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal is to have effective C2 to mitigate the “fog of war,” friction, and uncertainty of enemy actions. Effective C2 is not simply a matter of generating enough information to make a decision but rather generating the information faster with more accuracy. Ironically, this dramatic increase of information flow now means commanders run the risk of information overload with more information than can be possibly assimilated. Therefore, information for effective C2 is valuable only insofar as it contributes to effective decisions and actions. The critical thing is not the amount of information but key elements of information that are available when needed and in a useful form that improves the commander’s awareness of the situation and ability to act.10 In this way, the use of automated C2 has helped commanders enhance what is considered essential information for decision making while at the same time made it more complex and often burdensome to acquire and share it.
Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine does provide for effective C2 with or without information systems. However, the solution relies on training commanders and subordinates to be very comfortable in fluid and chaotic environments. A high level of trust must exist between all elements of the MAGTF. It is likely that current and future operations will require the aggregation and disaggregation of forces over a distributed area of operations to conduct expeditionary advance based operations. The reality is any distributed operations require communications systems to extend the span of control of forces. Contested EMS environments limit the friendly span of control, and maneuver warfare requires thinking of the network as a maneuver element. This enables the performance of critical C2 functions throughout operations and prioritizes support to required C2 capabilities. That is, commanders must plan for and have the capability to maneuver and adjust the network to provide C2 at decisive points and times, much like shifting and concentrating fires to impart the desired effects on an adversary. C2 structures must allow for this flexibility, and commanders and staffs must train for this eventuality.11 Maneuver warfare theory is therefore uniquely suited for EMS contested environments because it fundamentally relies on implicit communication and mutual understanding to operate. Commanders must continue to hold to mission-type orders even while supported by networked control systems. As long as the Marine Corps continues to train with the realities of friction and uncertainty, then it is likely effective C2 will remain.
Changes in C2 over the Past Fifteen Years
Prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps generally followed the people centric C2 model and was comfortable relying on single channel radio, implicit communications, and commander’s intent to make faster decisions than its adversaries. However, the Marine Corps also recognized the necessity to use key technologies, which supported decentralized C2. As a result, since 2003 and because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps has expanded almost every method of communications technology available today. For example, in 2002, the average Marine Corps infantry rifle company only processed five Very High Frequency (VHF) tactical radios to facilitate C2. Today, almost every Marine possesses some type of communications device to support C2. Larger maneuver units have also increased the use of high bandwidth terrestrial and satellite systems for C2. This accounts for almost a 200 percent increase in communications technologies within the GCE. Therefore, without any formal change to its warfighting doctrine, the Marine Corps has shifted from a people-centric to information system-centric C2. On the surface, this is not a negative factor and, arguably, the rapid proliferation of communications technologies has directly facilitated the concept of maneuver warfare because these technologies have increased the operating tempo of all Marine Corps warfighting functions. Conversely, this dramatic increase in communications equipment has amplified the need for more expeditionary power sources to operate the demand. Large battalion command posts and company footprints require more tactical power sources that leverage a networked C2 posture. Additional power sources require more logistic trains such as fuel and create additional vulnerabilities that can negate the advantages of the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine. A case can be made the average Marine Corps infantry battalion is actually slower and more vulnerable today based on its overreliance on communications systems and the logistics tail required to support them. In addition, there is a generation of Marines who have grown accustomed to operating in large logistical footprints.
In practical terms, the average infantry battalion in the Marine Corps is the base unit for combat operations within the construct of the MAGTF. This design requires the Marine Corps operating in an integrated task force fashion, which will be ready to address any crises as they arise through the use of power projection from the sea and the use of expeditionary locations. The infantry battalion, with the use of its organic communications enablers, are designed to utilize maneuver warfare and conduct C2 in multiple ways. The use of line of sight (LOS) systems is the primary means for data and voice communications. In recent years, the use of beyond line of sight (BLOS) C2 systems has grown to meet the need for distributed operations. LOS systems are most closely related to tactical radio systems. BLOS systems are usually associated with satellite or tropospheric technologies. GPS are also included in BLOS systems but are mostly associated with the position, navigational information which facilitates friendly and enemy locations, fires, and other automation. For the purposes of this article, GPS is excluded from analysis but should be considered linked to other satellite technologies in terms of capabilities and vulnerabilities.
The Radio Frequency Spectrum
One of the biggest challenges for military communications is dealing with the RF spectrum. TheRF spectrum is a commodity that is infinite supply and heavily regulated, both in and outside the United States.12 Military communications equipment, civilian communications infrastructure, and countless other technologies, specifically anything with an RF emitter, must compete for available spectrum in order to operate. Entire government and commercial enterprises are centered around proper spectrum allocations. Communications technologies rely on the enforcement and regulation of spectrum access (Appendix 1, Figure 1 illustrates the congested spectrum in the United States alone). For the DOD there are specific RF spectrum areas that allocate for military use only (Appendix 1, Figure 2). Unfortunately, certain areas of the spectrum permitted inside the United States are not allowed in other countries. The U.S. military lacks authority to transmit on all desired frequencies while outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) because of interference with other host-nations’ communications infrastructures. Therefore, host-nation approval is required before utilizing those frequencies. Despite the escalating demands on available spectrum, only about five percent is used at any given time, which is an incredibly inefficient use of space.
Figure 1. APPENDIX A: Frequency Spectrum Charts. The United States Frequency Allocation Chart. Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Office of Spectrum Management, March 1996.Figure 1. APPENDIX A: Frequency Spectrum Charts. The United States Frequency Allocation Chart. Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Office of Spectrum Management, March 1996.
Military communications at the infantry battalion level fall at all ends of the RF spectrum range. Most tactical radio communications use a variety of high frequency (HF), VHF, and ultrahigh frequency (UHF). Almost all wideband satellite communications use super high frequency and extremely high frequency.13 Communication channels are often broken down further into narrowband and wideband channels in order to denote the amount of bandwidth available to operate. Narrowband technologies, under 25 kilohertz (KHz), usually support voice, positional, and limited data communications.
Narrowband technologies are used heavily to support maneuver and fires because of their reliability and mobility over uneven terrain. Wideband technologies are usually anything channeled over narrowband but also utilize all elements of the spectrum to support large amounts of data and voice communications. Most often they operated in megahertz (MHz) channel spaces and can often provide much larger bandwidth capabilities to support network-centric operations. Wideband technologies require significantly more power and are usually static in nature. However, in recent years, mobile wideband technologies have begun to emerge and show great promise for future MAGTF operations. As a rule, all military communications employ communication security protocols and encrypt both data and voice signals to ensure the integrity of information delivered. In addition, many narrowband systems utilize frequency hopping algorithms and sophisticated waveforms to thwart any adversaries’ attempts to frequency jam friendly communications signals. Finally, the manipulation of the RF spectrum has enabled C2 in many positive ways. The key is finding ways to optimize it once it becomes contested.
Spectrum in a Contested Battlespace
Since 2003, and as a counterbalance to the growing threat of insurgent attacks via IEDs, the Marine Corps began to adopt a host of jamming technologies in order to counter or defeat the threat posed by IEDs that are command-detonated by radio signals. During the early stages of the Iraqi campaign, Marine communicators at the infantry battalion level had to develop best practices for operating in highly congested spectrum environments like Ramadi and Baghdad.14 Eventually, the Marine Corps successfully integrated these systems into their C2 infrastructures, often through trial and error and planned design. Additionally, successful techniques, tactics, and procedures only developed once the campaign slowed to counterinsurgency operations operating from fixed forward operating bases. There were not spectrum sensing technologies available to ensure enemy forces were not denying or disrupting operations. Even today, there are no RF sensing tools organic to an infantry battalion’s communication platoon. Ideally, a reconnoiter of the spectrum environment would help Marine communicators understand if there is probable or current interference with their communications systems. As such, it is often through the arduous task of trial and error, loss of vital communications links, and placement of key retransmission nodes that a robust communications architecture can take form. The inability to conduct RF sensing operations does present a real and likely vulnerability for an adversary to exploit. The incapacity to quickly identify the source of interference and take mitigation steps could prove disastrous for maneuver forces.
Figure 2. APPENDIX B: Russian Land Based Jamming Equipment. (Not all inclusive). Location of Most Military RF Spectrum. Source: Borner, Katy, Atlas of Science: Visualizing What We Know, (2010). The MIT Press, page 112.)
Current and Likely Threats Posed by MAGTF Adversaries
Arguably, Russian and Chinese military forces pose the greatest near-peer technological threat to the Marine Corps’ ability to C2 its forces. Both countries have existing spectrum disrupting capabilities which could deny or significantly degrade Marine Corps tactical C2 systems. The negative impacts are many. A cursory examination of recent Russian and Chinese military activities can provide a sense of how each country could seek to counter the Marine Corps ability to C2 maneuver forces, conduct integrated fires, and maintain information superiority on the battlefield.
Russia. Russian military forces possess an array of jamming capabilities which operate across all areas of the spectrum. In every area where the Marine Corps operates its critical radio frequencies is where electronic countermeasures could be employed. An example of Russian military cyber warfare tactics manifested with its war with Georgia in August 2008 and most recently with its conflict with Ukraine. In both cases, Russian conventional military attack was complemented by a series of cyber-attacks targeting key networks of Georgian institutions, the media, and even the country’s government. When Russian tanks crossed the border into Georgia, network denial of service operations was conducted against the computer systems of Georgia. The targets of the cyber-attack were Georgian government websites and even included websites of the United States and British Embassies. The attacks initially came from Russian IP addresses, which resulted in a cyber blockade that perfectly correlated with the Russian military actions to make its offensive more successful. For these reasons, this type of cyber-attack should be considered an operational approach likely used by the Russian military that prepared the battle-space for a Russian military invasion of Georgia.15 The effects of the cyber operation had little to offer in the terms of severity. No one killed as a direct result of the operation and no property damage occurred, but it does offer a glimpse as to the combined armed nature cyber operations will be used in conjunction with traditional military forces.
Russia’s computer network attacks against Georgia during the South Ossetia conflict are best characterized as a digital blockade of information. As recent as last March, Russians have developed systems mounted on land-based vehicles, helicopters, and ships to jam military communications and weapons from several hundred kilometers away.16 It is likely, whether through the use spectrum interference or Internet style attacks, that the ability to ‘block” Marine Corps C2 systems is a tactic to be employed by a near-peer competitor like Russia. Therefore, strategic options and the operational design of any campaign may have to change for joint force commanders if cyber operations are likely to occur. For example, the strategic option of sea-based forcible entry operations, a core MAGTF mission, may be negatively affected if critical C2 systems are degraded or denied in an operational environment.
As recent as 2015, the Russian military has completely upgraded its suite of land-based jamming equipment capable of detecting and suppressing mobile satellite communications and navigation signals, as well as jamming tactical communications networks in the HF through the UHF range. Tactical impacts are clear, but operational and strategic maneuver are affected as well. By employing four different software-controlled jammers, it is replacing the earlier systems to cover the full RF spectrum. For example, the most recent Russian electronic warfare system is a multifunction system mounted on a BTR-80 armored personnel carrier (see Figure 3). It is designed to protect land units from mines and remote-controlled improvised explosive devices, as well as jamming tactical communications.17 Appendix B/Table 1 reveals Russia’s full spectrum capabilities to deny or degrade Marine Corps tactical communications systems.
Figure 3. The Russian military has the capability to employ the BTR-80 with mounted jamming equipment. (Photo by Vitaly V. Kuzmin and is licensed under Creative Commons Atribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license.)
Russia’s capabilities also extend into the counter-space capabilities sphere. As recent as December 2016, Russia conducted a successful test of an anti-satellite weapon.18 There may be a variety of ways to degrade or destroy a satellite. Russia has demonstrated the ability to simply develop kamikaze satellites designed to disable other satellites by crashing into them.19 Although the United States has a multitude of spacecraft that facilitate ground-based C2, the impact of disabling key wideband satellites over a particular geographic area would have negative impacts on Marine forces.
If the Marine Corps ever faced Russian conventional forces, it is very likely the ability to C2 would be severely compromised or denied. Even a non-kinetic confrontation could lead to a severe enough degradation of networked C2, which would inevitably limit the span of control and dramatically shorten lines of communications of ground forces. GCEs such as infantry battalions possess no organic ability to scan the RF spectrum in order to understand the impacts on their critical communications links. Since most direct combat formations conduct operations over voice and data communications links, Russian targeting whole frequency ranges and frequency hopping algorithms could lead to a virtual breakdown of C2. A breakdown of C2, therefore, eliminates the ability of the MAGTF to conduct maneuver and combined arms operations.
People’s Republic of China. China is another potential near-peer adversary who has demonstrated the capacity to target one of the most widely used communication technologies by the United States: satellite technology. Over the past fifteen years, the Marine Corps has dramatically expanded its use of digital C2 networks over satellite transmission links. First in 2007, and then later in 2013, China successfully tested the use of anti-satellite weapons.20 These tests illustrate a clear warning as to the critical vulnerability U.S. forces have against the loss of critical communications architecture. Furthermore, China is capable of developing ground-based lasers, space jamming technologies, and microsatellites to attack U.S. space assets.21 China recognizes the asymmetric benefit that U.S. forces gain from space—through the use of reconnaissance and communications spacecraft—and is employing counterstrategies designed to deprive the United States of this lopsided advantage. For example, Chinese military writings “emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance … and communications satellites.”22 Crippling or degrading these systems exploits a critical vulnerability for the United States.
The employment of anti-satellite weapons by China is problematic on two fronts. First, such action would completely change the ability of ground maneuver forces to communicate via BLOS digital or voice networks. As a result, almost all information superiority stemming from high capacity digital networks, which ride satellite transmission paths, are disrupted or denied. Second, distributed combat formations would necessarily shrink in order to keep critical lines of communications open. Mass distributions of information are then regulated to wideband terrestrial communication links and are traditionally limited to 30 miles or less. Only voice communications would remain. Couple the RF jamming threats referenced above by Russia, the average Marine Corps infantry battalion relegates C2 distances similar to World War II formation in the Pacific Theater. Given the distributed nature in which the MAGTF operates most effectively today, such a loss would dramatically weaken the combined-armed nature in which the MAGTF fights.
Emerging threats. Other potential adversaries that could employ technologies which would counter the Marine Corps C2 capabilities are actors such as Iran or North Korea. Each of these countries possesses electronic countermeasure capacities which are certainly a derivative of both Russia and China potential employment strategies. More recently, the commercial off-the-shelf software has allowed nations like Iran and North Korea to wage theoretically bloodless offensive cyber-attacks against well-established powers. For example, in December 2009, an unsecured downlink from a U.S. military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was intercepted by Iran using a $25 piece of file-sharing software, called “skygrabber,” originally developed to intercept satellite television feeds.23 Additionally, Iran, in December 2011, claimed it hacked the GPS signal of a U.S. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel UAV (see Figure 4).24 Iran landed it near Kashmar about 225 km inside northeastern Iran and then 12 months later, Iranian television broadcast footage of a Boeing Scan Eagle long-endurance UAV (see Figure 5), which they claimed had been hacked by Iran.25 Iran and North Korea are known buyers of sophisticated weaponry and are no less capable in their ability to disrupt C2. It is clear both countries view the EMS as an area to conduct combat operations.
Figure 4. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel UAV. (Drawing by FOX52 and is licensed under Creative Commons Atribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license.)Figure 5. Boeing Scan Eagle long- endurance UAV. (U.S. Navy photo.)
Radio electronic combat (REC) is the integration of signals intelligence, target acquisition, and electronic attack/protection.** (**The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea , [North] Korea People’s Army , the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chinese People’s Liberations Army (PLA), and the ground forces of the Russian Federation all employ variations of REC. BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE.) The core of enemy REC lies in the sequence of activities that attempt to selectively deprive MAGTF forces of tactical electronic support assets. REC priorities depend on the tactical situation and level of command but could include targeting fires and air forces. Command posts, key logistic sites, and point targets that menace enemy forces may also be possible targets. Likely tactics, techniques, and procedures may or may not include disrupting C2 links below the battalion level; however, given the trend of MAGTF operations in a dispersed manner, any disruption could be lethal for friendly forces. Simple direction finding can precisely provide the location of friendly forces, which can easily provide targeting information for adversaries. Any concentration of radio signals can paint a picture for enemy forces to exploit. The use of high-energy radio frequency guns can reach hundreds of meters or more through pulsed or continuous sine waves which can degrade or damage communication systems from high voltage spikes.26 The success of REC depends on many factors but does not need to be decisive to be completely effective. Merely limiting the effects of friendly intelligence gathering tools limits the ability of MAGTF forces to conduct detailed planning. Massing jamming of friendly narrowband radio circuits during amphibious operations or other maneuver operations strikes at the center of friendly concept of operations.
In terms of relative combat power, the United States is certainly dominating in many areas. However, adversaries such as Iran and North Korea only need to conduct a simple calculation of where to apply pressure in order to mitigate any U.S. technological advantages. By attacking or disrupting friendly C2, the speed and lethality of the Marine Corps maneuver forces are quickly diminished—if attacked properly. The question is not whether near-peer adversaries or other state actors possess the ability to affect Marine Corps C2, but rather, what steps can the Marine Corps take to mitigate against it. Although technology is not the only answer it does provide avenues to pursue and consider.
Technological Mitigation Techniques
Historically, uncertainty is considered a fundamental aspect of warfare. Despite this, the pursuit of certainty for more effective command and control information systems remains. The DARPA has recognized this problem for DOD and has some unique solutions to address spectrum denied/degraded environments. The challenge for DOD is not the ability to develop new anti-jam tactical radio systems but rather to make a business use-case for the defense industry to develop such technologies on their own accord. It is feasible to produce tactical radios at $1,000-1,500 per unit vice the $20-25K per average unit cost now. This is largely because of the adoption of low-cost field-programmable gate arrays and integrated circuits (ICs) which can implement complex digital computations and interconnects embedded microprocessors on current tactical radios systems. DARPA believes this industry trend of using field-programmable gate arrays and ICs will only increase the power and capabilities of radio systems.27 As the costs go down, so does the size. The radio circuit industry has continued to outpace the speed of delivery to Marine Corps tactical units. Newer ICs combine entire RF, analog, and digital front ends of radios with high-bandwidth heterogeneous multiprocessor-based computations all on one integrated circuit. The radio manufacture industry is capable of providing what the MOC infers needed for all Marine forces: C2 via voice/data that is ubiquitous with the equipment attributes of low size, weight, and power consumption.
Dynamic Spectrum Access
DARPA, through its next generation program, has developed technologies which utilize the EMS more effectively and thus may help the Marine Corps mitigate against those near-peer threats outlined above. These technologies come in the form of a cognitive radio technology, which dynamically uses available RF spectrum in a unique way. DARPA refers to the technology as dynamic spectrum access (DSA) radio technology. DSA is a cognitive radio system that has the ability to detect and recognize its settings—in order for it to adjust its radio operating setting dynamically and autonomously—and to learn from the results of its actions and its operating framework. A cognitive radio is a form of wireless communication in which a transmitter or receiver can logically detect which communication channels are in use and which are not and can transfer communications to the unused channels. This allows optimum use of the available radio frequencies within a given spectrum space while minimizing interference with other users. It can adjust the operating settings of the radio’s frequency in a network node. For example, the range of frequency, the type of modulation, and the power output all occur dynamically.28 Because of the enormous algorithmic computations that must occur, cognitive radios are software defined radios. A software defined radio is an enabling technology for cognitive radios because of the flexibility, reconfigurability, and portability inherent to the cognitive radio’s aspect of adaptation.29
The unique attributes of such a technology provide for a host of opportunities for the Marine Corps communications community. Specifically, for infantry battalions, this technology allows for mobile and static radios networks to adapt to unfavorable spectrum conditions, therefore offering network users simpler, effective, and complete access to clear frequencies. Cognitive radios using DSA technology also offer a solution to the problem of spectrum crowding (degraded communications) or jamming (denied communications) by giving priority to a spectrum owner, then allowing others to access it by using available parts of the spectrum. When unauthorized users are detected on the same channel, a DSA-enabled device instantly moves to vacant channels. Since many RF frequencies use only a small portion of the time and in a fraction of locations, DSA technology enables more networks to share a given spectrum band. This is particularly useful for dense urban terrain or in megacity environments. Since it is likely that future conflicts will occur in highly populated and littoral areas where spectrum availability are further complicated by host-nation internal rules or unfriendly neighboring states emissions, DSA technology provides the least intrusive method of spectrum dominance. Freedom of action in the electromagnetic battlespace will be the responsibility of spectrum managers who must carefully balance the requirements of Marine forces and the capabilities of each equipment set used for combat operations.
Marine Corps spectrum managers currently apportion CONUS and OCONUS frequencies based on national policy and regulations, unit priority, geographic location, system capabilities, and host-nation agreements. To assist in this management, DARPA also has shown that DSA-enabled radios can be programmed with policy modules so that no matter where in the world the radio is located, they can automatically adhere to spectrum usage policies. This is particularly useful for MAGTF G-6 planners because they can institute policies that more precisely enable or restrict communications within the particular geographic area. Ideally, cognitive systems would allow Marine communicators to enter into an environment not knowing anything about adversarial systems, understanding them, and even devising operational countermeasures rapidly.
Dynamic spectrum access technology mitigates an enemy’s ability to dynamically jam a whole range of friendly frequencies at the exact same time with variable levels of power because the cognitive nature of the technology will dynamically switch to areas of the frequency spectrum which are unmolested. Cognition in this space is essentially applying machine learning to make systems smarter than the enemy can react. If the enemy switches its radio countermeasures approach, the technology will dynamically move, based on preconfigured policies, without user knowledge and thus maintain vital communications services. Radio network operators can provision a range of spectrum management policies such as interference levels, transmit power, consumption limits, co-existence thresholds, and allocation methodologies. Such capabilities allow for realtime spectrum deconfliction with friendly counter radio electronic warfare systems and congested noise floors in urban environments.
Mapping the RF Environment
Adopting a new technology like DSA only provides a limited mitigation for spectrum denied or degraded environments. Although it uses the spectrum more efficiently for communications, it does not provide enough spectral situational awareness for the average Marine Corps infantry battalion. The vital question remains: how does an infantry battalion know what is affecting its radio network if it does not possess the capability to sense the spectrum in a meaningful way? Outside of the electron warfare or signals intelligence community, which reside outside the infantry battalion, there is no realtime ability for infantry battalions to understand its frequency battlespace. To date, the focus of effort for spectrum sensing technologies in DOD has been to facilitate targeting, electronic warfare, and intelligence collections activities. However, because of the limitations of doctrinal employment and security protocols, the trilateral synergy between those communities and the general communications systems community are very weak.
There are great advantages for spectral sensing for command and control systems planning and shaping. Understanding and planning electromagnetic spectrum operations based on seeing and sensing the spectrum environment can be a vital capability for infantry battalions. Currently, the infantry battalion S-6 sections operate blind, in a spectrum sense, when planning and executing communication plans. If, and when, RF inference occurs, there is no current way for Marine infantry battalions to determine whether it is occurring from urban noise, other transmitting systems, or jamming by adversarial entities. There is no current method in place which is organic to conduct a reconnaissance of the spectrum battlespace in order to ensure frequency assignments are optimal to support the communications plan.
Radio Map
DARPA has developed a technology called RadioMap that increases planning, de-conflicting, validating, or shaping spectrum support to the electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and C2 communities. At a minimum, there is a prospect to expand the scope of this capability to exchange realtime electromagnetic environment data with other C2 RF propagation tools and an opportunity to work on the collaboration piece of electromagnetic spectrum operations between operations, intel, and the communications communities within the Marine Corps.
The DARPA solution is quite unique and leverages existing RF sensing architectures and uses to act as distributed sensors on the battlefield. The approach centers on efficiently managing the congested RF spectrum by providing realtime awareness of radio spectrum use across frequency, geography, and time. The output of the technology is a map that gives an accurate picture of spectrum use in in any environment. This enabling technology can generate tempo and speed by identifying problems caused by spectrum congestion and potential interference problems. The program uses existing tactical radios and jamming devices deployed for other mission purposes and uses the capabilities of these modern radios to sense the spectrum when they are not communicating. Using distributed high-density sensors can generate very sophisticated views of what is going on in a complex and RF congested environment.30 RadioMap enables operators to see where RF conflicts exist, or even anticipate where they might occur, and find unused frequencies to utilize in order to improve the effectiveness of tactical missions.31
The creation of a realtime map can be likened to traffic cameras in urban areas that present the flow of traffic congestion during different periods of the day, providing awareness of a road. RadioMap is designed to help see and avoid congestion. Unlike DSA, RadioMap is not designed to deal with external transmission systems but rather to identify frequency usages and to help determine if preplanned or existing radio frequencies are clear or jammed. Hence, allowing better planning and allocation of the RF spectrum to units operating in RF congested, denied, or degraded environments. A significant derivative of RadioMap is the ability use existing radios or jamming equipment already used by infantry battalion units and, in essence, would conduct multiple functions to inform the Marines about threats and targeting opportunities that are visible in the RF spectrum. Ideally, future mapping systems would enable Marine operators to undertake realtime reconfiguration and simultaneously conduct jamming/transmitting or surveillance/receive missions, so that infantry forces can benefit from a range of tasks from electronic intelligence gathering, electronic protection/attack, communications jamming, or electronic support measures without having to rely on external attachments from the signals intelligence battalions.
Remote control improvised explosive devices use a variety of transmission systems to enable detonation. Any electronic device with enough power to detonate a blasting cap has been used to initiate attacks.32 Since RadioMap uses existing tactical radio networks to sense the electromagnetic environment, small tactical units such as infantry platoons could monitor radio transmissions and other RF transmitting devices in order to exploit opportunities and mitigate potential threats. The practical application of situational awareness in the RF environment can constitute a force protection measure for ground forces. From an intelligence gathering perspective, ground units outside the signals intelligence community would be able to observe transmissions and determine the type and characteristics of any RF emitting devices within a given radius.33 The benefits of seeing the “unseen” displayed on a graphical map would shape combat operations and allow small unit leaders to exploit enemy activities by rendering devices like remote-controlled improvised explosive devices less effective. Of course, improvised explosive device mitigation is but one of multiple applications RF sensing technologies could be used for. The ability to “see” how crowded the airwaves are allowed for Marines to understand how to optimize internal networks against outside interference.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The real challenge to C2 posed by contested EMS environments is not just about technology fixes or organizational changes but rather about recognizing critical vulnerabilities and hardening these areas to mitigate the threat from adversaries. The approach explored in this article posits there are specific technologies available today which can help Marine infantry battalions navigate likely electronic cyber-attacks on their tactical C2 systems. Just as a commander would use combined arms or reconnaissance assets to control or understand their operating environment, there should be efforts to help Marine communicators adjust to the electromagnetic operating environment.
As noted before, C2 is uniquely a people-centric enterprise, but one that is made more efficient through the use of information-centric systems. EMS is a unique operating environment because it transcends all three levels of war and because can shape tactical, operational, and strategic means and end-states on the modern battlefield. C2 systems allow for speed in the decision-making process as well as disaggregated operations which underpinned the Marine Corps Operating Concept; however, the heavy reliance on these information systems creates a new set of critical vulnerabilities which strike at the heart of the MOC.
We are competing against near-peer adversaries who possess disruptive EMS technologies and other methods to counter our traditional military advantages. The Marine Corps must invest in technologies that ensure it can dominate any EMS contested environments. DSA and RadioMap technologies are some methods in which this can be done. Both of these technologies have the potential to significantly offset the growing capabilities of our adversaries. They also expand the operating abilities of Marine infantry battalions’ communication platoons by providing cognitive adapting technologies which allow for greater battlefield awareness.
In the end, the challenge of operating in EMS contested environments is a topic which requires future research. Some recommended topics include a cost-study which examines the feasibility to rapidly upgrade or replace vulnerable information systems. Another would be the organizational changes in training and education which would be required to integrate these technologies into the GCE. If the Marine Corps waits to address this problem, then future adversaries will not and will continue to gain momentum in their efforts to thwart our military dominance. We must embrace this reality and adopt technologies that ensure the Marine Corps will succeed no matter which operating environment it fights in.
Notes
Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019).
Joint Staff Director of Operations, (J-3), Joint Publication 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2013).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-40.04, MAGTF Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, (Washington, DC: January 2015).
Christopher Tsirlis, “Overreliance on SATCOM,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: September 2011).
Paul Stokes, “The Will to Communicate,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: September 2016).
Ibid.
Christopher Tsirlis, “The RF Spectrum Battlespace,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: March 2011).
Ibid.
Author’s personal experience while serving as an Infantry Battalion S-6 for 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, Operations IRAQI FREEDOM I and II.
Joseph Bussing, “The Degrees of Force Exercised in the Cyber Battlespace,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal, (Sofi a,BG: Procon, Ltd., 2013).
Jaroslaw Adamowski, “In Shadow of Russian EW might, Baltics Take Action,” Defense News, (October 2015), available at https://www.defensenews.com.
Zòrd, “New Jammers for Russian Land Forces,” Journal of Electronic Defense, (Gainesville, FL: Association of Old Crows, 2016).
Weston Williams, “Russia Launches Anti-Satellite Weapon: A New Warfront in
Space?,” Christian Science Monitor, (Boston, MA: Christian Science Publishing Society, December 2016).
Ibid.
Yasmin Tadjdeh, “New Chinese Threats to U.S. Space Systems Worry Officials,” National Defense, (July 2014), available at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org.
Jeffrey Lewis, “False Alarm on Foreign Capabilities,” Arms Control Today, (2004), available at https://www.armscontrol.org.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” (Washington, DC: April 2015).
Staff, “Intelligence Intercepted,” Air Force Times, (Springfield, VA: December 2009).
Jeremy Binnie, “Iran Releases Footage from Captured RQ-170,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, (London, UK: 2013).
Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Claims it Captured U.S. Drone,” Wall Street Journal, (New York, NY: December 2012).
Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security, (New York, NY: ACM Press Books, 1999).
Discussion between John Flanagan, DARPA, Scientific, Engineering, and Technical Assistance (SETA)/Adaptive Execution Office (AEO), and author on 13 October 2016.
Benmammar Badr, and Amraoui Asma, Radio Resource Allocation and Dynamic Spectrum Access, (Somerset, US: Wiley-ISTE, 2013).
Ibid.
Geoff Fein, “Lockheed Martin Effort Links RF Receivers to Create an EM Spectrum Map,” Jane’s International Defense Review, (December 2016), available at https://www.janes.com.
Kevin McCaney, “Uncluttering the Spectrum by Putting it on the Map,” Defense Systems, (November 2015), available at https://defensesystems.com.
Author’s personnel experience in Iraq 2003-2005. Remote control improvised explosive devices have been denotated with a variety of transmission devices to include, cellphones (UHF), long-range cordless phones (VHF), and tactical radio equipment (HF/VHF/UHF).
DARPA, “DARPA’s Advanced RF Mapping (RadioMap) Program-RF Café,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, (November 2013), available at https://www.darpa.mil.
IHS Jane’s, “R-325U HF Automated Jamming System,” (April 2016), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
IHS Jane’s, “R-378A HF Automated Jamming
Station,” (April 2016), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
IHS Jane’s, “R-934B VHF Automated Jamming Station,” (April 2016), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
IHS Jane’s, “R-330T VHF Automated Jamming Station,” (April 2016), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
IHS Jane’s, “RP-377 Series Radio Reconnaissance, DF, and Radio Countermeasure Family,” (April 2016), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
IHS Jane’s, “SEL SP-162 ‘Batog’ Cellular Jammer,” (September 2015), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
IHS Jane’s, “AURA Mobile Communications GPS/WiFi Jammer,” (December 2015), available at https://janes-ihs-com.lomc.idm.oclc.org.
You are 3d Squad Leader, 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, deployed to Farah Province, Afghanistan. Your squad was tasked with finding and destroying a suspected Taliban weapons cache reported to be located somewhere in the village of Wadi Zai.
The last reported activity involving U.S. forces in the area is from an Army patrol which conducted a route clearance mission almost seven months ago. That patrol identified a possible IED on the road in vicinity of Building A5. However, when they dismounted their vehicles to investigate, one soldier stepped on a pressure plate IED located near the southeast corner of Building A4. A second soldier moved to provide first aid, but he also stepped on a pressure plate IED along the eastern wall of Building A3. In the ensuing minutes, both of them died of their injuries. The possible IED in vicinity of Building A5 was later confirmed and rendered safe.
During mission planning, through the use of sensors provided by unmanned aerial systems, and through reliable reports from intelligence sources, you have identified four possible IED locations in the village. These are marked by a red “X” on the map.
The remainder of your platoon is located 2km south at Forward Operating Base Driftwood. As your squad patrols into the village from the South, your Platoon Commander comes over the radio with the following information: “Intel reports indicate a high probability the enemy weapons cache is located in Building A3. Get there ASAP and search that building.”
As you approach Building A3 on foot from the south, you notice disturbed earth in three locations surrounding the building, specifically in locations that you identified as likely IEDs during mission planning. Your interpreter is also talking to a local man who claims to live in Building B1. He nervously tells you that you should not go in there because the entire compound is filled with “bombs.”
You report the situation back to your Platoon Commander and request explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support to further investigate and render any IEDs safe before entering the compound. He comes on the radio with this reply: “Negative. EOD currently unavailable. Find another way to get into that compound. You need to find that cache.”
The compound walls are about six-feet high, and you know your Marines can scale them with the help of a buddy. Through your interpreter, you ask the local man if he knows of a safe way to get into the compound while avoiding IEDs, but he says that he is not sure. He adds that the Taliban used to use the building, but they do not go in it anymore because they forgot where the “bombs” are. After you spend a few minutes talking with the local man, your Platoon Commander comes over the radio and says the following: “Quit delaying. Search that building or I’ll put someone else in charge of your squad who will.”
Troops and Fire Support Available
(1)Rifle Squad with (15) Marines
(1)Interpreter
155mm howitzer battery located 5km west
Squad-sized QRF with (4) MRAPs located 2km South at FOB Driftwood.
Requirements
How do you respond to your Platoon Commander?
In three minutes or less, develop a plan and give orders to your squad.
Considerations
What are the potential risks and benefits associated with obeying your Platoon Commander’s order to search the building? What are the potential risks and benefits of disobeying him?
T&R ITS Links
INF-ASLT-4003: Conduct a breach (T&R pg 7-10)
INF-FSPT-4001: Integrate fires (pg. 7-11)
INF-INT-4001: Conduct Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) (pg. 7-12)
INF-MAN-4213: Conduct a cordon and search (pg. 7-31)
INF-MAN-4301: Conduct a combat patrol (pg. 7-32)
0300-PAT-2007: Lead a unit in reaction to a detonated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (pg. 8-82)
0300-PAT-2008: Lead a unit in reaction to a undetonated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (pg. 8-83)
In the history of man, war has existed as a function of expression and a problem-solving solution. With a likeness to simplicity in this vague description, war is anything but. It is a timeless and ever-changing complexity with a constant nature that has multiple ways of being conducted.1 Current modern-era conflicts occur within a specific type of warfare of an irregular nature. Consequently, some believe current Marine Corps doctrine does not prepare Marines to perform maneuverwarfare concepts. However, Marine Corps maneuverwarfare concepts described in MCDP 1, Warfighting, adequately address the expanding forms of modern conflict and prepare Marines for irregular warfare by ensuring leaders are knowledgeable of the nature of war, theory of war, and preparation for war. The doctrine retains relevancy because it addresses the re-occurring themes of war as both an art and science, and it emphasizes decentralized command.
To prepare for war, it is best to understand its nature, theory, and the requirement needed to conduct it. Warfighting provides guidance over the nature and theory of war so the concepts can be applicable when identifying your enemy and how to defeat him. In irregular warfare, centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities exist. Warfighting describes the relationship between these as “wanting to attack the source of enemy strength, but [not] into that strength.” Additionally, it examines the attributes of war that can be combined and utilized to exploit the enemy. This vulnerability can be a tangible, technological piece of gear, or it can be the intangible willpower and morale of the community. Either can be exploited by maneuverwarfare concepts within irregular warfare conditions. Preparations for any conditions of warfare are done through training to address what is known (ballistics, weaponry, technology) and education to prepare for what is unknown (historical references for solutions). This allows us to balance the art and science of war.
Science is responsible for the types of weapons and technology that are created and used in war. The creative application of these weapons and technology is how art comes into play. Warfighting concludes “that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.” The human will is a constant between art, science, and an attribute described in the nature of war as the human dimension; it is central in war. This balancing of technology and creativity exists on the battlefield of irregular warfare as does our will to exploit and defeat enemies. The understanding of this balance and the concepts in Warfighting is important for all levels because Marine leaders follow the guidance it gives to decentralize their command from the top to the lowest level to ensure the greatest unity of force.
In an irregular warfare environment, a leader cannot be at every significant event or place. However, he can give his intent so subordinates make decisions that align within his started, goals, giving him the opportunity to influence a greater area through his followers. This increased unity of force can be an intangible factor in the exploitation of a critical vulnerability in irregular warfare. The greater the area, the greater responsibility a commander will have as the levels of war compress together because his actions can influence different levels. As a commander of a conventional force, irregular warfare generates fair amounts of “uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat,” but our doctrine provides the capability to combat this:
In order to generate the tempo of operations we desire, and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized.
It is the duty of Marine leaders to ensure the maneuver principles in Warfighting are implemented as they prepare for any type of war or conflict. To understand what is known about the nature and theory of war, we are given the edge against our enemies regardless of the type of warfare. Knowing these concepts will assist in the conduct of any war, as they affect the human will, which is a dynamic in all forms of war. Battle drills for combat, and the proper use of technology on the battlefield, contain known standards dictating how Marines should be trained. Education comes in the study of how art and science were paired in previous battles and understanding how decisions in these battles shaped their outcome PME can give references in unexperienced situations. All of this is achieved through a decentralized approach, with the intent lying within the pages of MCDP 1, Warfighting, to prepare Marines for modern conflict and irregular warfare.
Note
Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997). MCDP 1 is cited throughout this article.
Here we present a Tactical Decision Game from the pages of the June 1994 Gazette along with previously published solutions. Your mission is to critique the solutions. You may point out what you see as flaws in the proposed solution, highlight relevant tactical concepts, identify the effects new weapons or technology on the course of action or offer your own solution.
In response to LtGen Robert B. Neller’s letter commenting on “The Attritionist Letters” (MCG, Junll), let me quote MajGen Mike Myatt, who commanded 1st MarDiv during Operation DESERT STORM, “Maneuver warfare is not centralized decisionmaking and decentralized execution. It is centralized vision and decentralized decisionmaking.”
My name is (former) Capt Dan Brendel. As of 1 June my active service as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps has ended. As I shut this chapter of my life, I thought it would be appropriate to offer some parting thoughts that might be of some value to my fellow officers who remain in the proverbial fight.
The Marine Corps is a pretty great institution, as far as institutions go. I’m grateful for the lessons it taught me. That being said, there are a host of areas I think need some serious improvement, so much so that they were a primary factor in my deciding to leave. Foremost among them is leadership development. During my 6 years of service I became wholly convinced that Marines in general are neither as decisive nor as autonomous as they could and should be. There are plenty of Rowans who can carry a message to Garcia, but not nearly as many who will. Why? In my opinion, for all its rhetoric to the contrary, the Marine Corps as a whole does a bang up job of deterring decisiveness, initiative, and ingenuity. This isn’t just a problem. It’s a gargantuan problem. It threatens the very heart of maneuver warfare. And it’s our fault as officers.
Before I continue, let me make two things clear. First, I write with genuine concern not contempt. If I didn’t care, I wouldn’t have written anything other than my name on my checkout sheet. But no individual or organization is above reproach. We should not be so institutionally narcissistic to think the Corps is somehow the exception to the rule. Second, I would love to think everything I write about here goes without saying, given that we have all read Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, at some point. But that has not been my experience – at all. For all the endless talk about this tired subject, nothing changes; it’s all lip service.
Now let me tell a true story for anyone sitting on the fence about whether or not there is indeed a problem. When I checked into the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, in 2008, I attended the 2-week Series Commander Course. This course teaches incoming officers the intricacies of the recruit training environment. One morning my class went to observe the Crucible, the recruits’ final field exercise. I was standing off to the side watching a few drill instructors prepare their recruits to begin a hike. The recruits were wearing reflective belts in accordance with a depot regulation requiring them to do so until 0800. One of the drill instructors, a sergeant, wanted to know if he should enhance safety by having the recruits continue to wear their reflective belts past 0800, given that it was overcast and dim. He asked his senior drill instructor, a staff sergeant in charge of the platoon’s recruits and junior drill instructors. The staff sergeant shrugged, turned to me, and asked what I wanted him to do.
What do I want you to do? You’re a staff sergeant, a drill instructor, a senior drill instructor. This is a pretty trivial decision. What I want is for you to decide something and to march. I hate that you think you have to ask just because I have shiny stuff on my collar. Quite frankly, that scares me. This instance set the tone for the remainder of my tour.
Somebody reading this is thinking, “Well, that’s the drill field, not the real Marine Corps. That doesn’t happen with my Marines during real missions.” Really .^No duty station exists in a vacuum. I could enumerate many more “real” illustrative stories from my own combat experiences. But if the story above doesn’t convince you there’s a problem, I doubt any will. Trust me. There’s a problem.
Its root is our organizational preoccupation with control. Our leadership culture centers on achieving compliance. But consider for a moment that the most successful organizations in the private sector are moving away from the outmoded managerial technology that says managers think, workers tighten screws, and that’s just the way it is. That style worked for Henry Ford, when each guy on the assembly line only needed to know his one simple part. Tight control over workers meant screws were turned faster and more cars were produced. But today, the market is far more complicated, and blueprints change at digital speed. Workers today need to think quickly and across hierarchical and functional divides. Empirical psychology tells us that tight control is detrimental to this sort of creative work. (Read Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us, by Daniel Pink, Riverhead Hardcover, 2009.) And so creativity is replacing compliance as the primary aim of leadership in industry. But the Corps holds out. There is no threat of extinction from competing entities that have found a better way of doing business, so the impetus to change is reduced. That isn’t good news for our Marines in the context of fourthgeneration warfare. Like modern business, this type of warfare is increasingly complex and fluid, meaning it demands increasingly creative and autonomous people to engage in it. What follows are some interrelated practical thoughts regarding what Marine officers can do to better produce 21st century warriors.
Be More Deliberate About Developing Cognitive Skills
Don’t reduce leadership to a series of checklists. The Marine Corps has plenty of checklists for annual training, training and readiness events, etc. To a point, I understand their value, and I’m a huge proponent. Indeed, it is inadvisable to focus on cognitive skills without first securing a foundation of rote ability. However, it is essential that we, at some point, move beyond that. The reason is simple. Checklist training habituates checklist dependence. But we don’t need walking, talking manuals. We need artistic leaders – Gen Lees and Capt Kirks. More accurately, in the modern era of distributed operations, we need Sgt Lees and CpI Kirks. We need leaders who are practiced in creative problem solving, not regurgitation; practiced in inventing step Q without first checking off steps A through P; practiced’m audacity. It should be a truism to say we can’t expect our Marines to become practiced without actually allowing them to practice. But it’s not.
So let them practice. Offer minimal direction – on purpose. Next time you write a letter of instruction, consider sparing your Marines the five pages of coordinating instructions. Tell them to get a message to Garcia, and then shut up. Create situations where your Marines must actively design solutions and not simply apply the steps you or some manual has already given them. Do it often. Do it with all of your Marines, even the junior ones – especially the junior ones. If you think a staff sergeant, as a rule, will magically become a wellspring of creativity and initiative after 7-ish years of being told exactly what to do, I think you are mistaken. (There are indeed great Marines who shine despite the constraints. Imagine how much better they would be under fewer constraints.) Marines need to understand they can and must be thinkers and frontier shapers, not merely coal shovelers in the “Big Scarlet and Gold Machine.” Then perhaps they will leap at pressing the attack without any inkling of being driven or dragged. If you do it right, the less you tell people what to do, the less you’ll have to.
Demand Initiative and Autonomy
These things shouldn’t be icing on the leadership cake. A staff sergeant once submitted his Marine reported on worksheet (MROW) to me late and without any professional military education listed. When the college courses he was taking didn’t show up on his fitness report, he complained to me about it. I told him too bad. Had he ever heard of the Performance Evaluation System Manual, which explains how MROWs work? Yes, because I told him about it in his initial counseling. Had he ever read it? No. So whose fault was it that I didn’t know about his college courses? Some of my fellow company grades thought I set the Marine up for failure by not giving him a soup-to-nuts class about MROWs and not riding him to get it into me complete and on time. I disagree. He’s a staff sergeant. He knows how to read and how to look up an order. Why didn’t he? Probably because he had grown accustomed to his reporting seniors doing the legwork for him – filling in his Section C from scratch, tracking him down to find out his duty station preferences, etc. That became the norm for him. So did I set him up for failure, or did the reporting seniors before me? If he is unable to learn something simple about fitness reports without a captain spoonfeeding it to him, why do I want him to get a great fitness report and become a gunnery sergeant? I’m not just talking about fitness reports here. It’s your job to create an environment that affords Marines the enduring opportunity to fish, not to condition them to having someone else bait and cast their hooks.
Unplug Yourself
In the age of AN/PRC-119s, Blackberries, and Microsoft Outlook, you can be down in everyone’s weeds. But why? Maybe that decreases mistakes in the short term, but it impedes real learning in the long run. Think about the movie Master and Commander. Ships’ captains back in the day sailed with commander’s intent and then had to be creative and decisive because the admiral couldn’t e-mail them 50 times a day. Do you think everyone in al- Qaeda gets e-mailed 50 times a day? Ii you create an environment of centralization for your corporals, guess what’s going to happen when they become staff sergeants? Ten to one, they’re going to ask some random first lieutenant whether or not they should wear reflective belts. Don’t let your Marines become accustomed to remaining static unless you approve their dynamism. Don’t hover. I’m not suggesting you take yourself away from the decisive point, take the S out of BAMCIS (begin planning, arrange reconnaissance, make reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, supervise), or dismiss safety. But if you are always around, then your subordinate leaders aren’t really in charge. What’s going to happen when the wag bag hits the fan, and you aren’t there, and they actually are in charge? Are they going to take charge, or are they going to fumble over the radio to ask the command post what to do? Let them lead. Let them fall down, especially during training. Show me an organization in which junior leaders never fail because their seniors are calling or approving all the shots; I will show you an organization that plateaus at mediocrity because it doesn’t pay the price to let its junior leaders grow.
Learn How To Conduct Training
Do you know what the Navy Marine Corps 3500.XXseries is without consulting Google? Can you talk intelligently about the systems approach to training? Probably not. Company grade officers and SNCOs across the board are terrible at planning and executing training. (As a lieutenant, I certainly was, and so were my peers.) The reason is that we too often define training as an event rather than a process. A brief isn’t training. A “familiarization fire” isn’t training. Yet this is usually exactly what our training looks like. These events lack any meaningful feedback, evaluation, and remediation. This is unfortunate, since real training hasn’t occurred until these phases take place. Officers on the whole don’t really grasp that. Leaders should learn how to conduct standards-based training better. Keep in mind that, when it comes to higher level cognitive functions, the standard is the effect, not the method. Don’t get wrapped around the axle about one way to skin a cat. If I could do only one thing over again, I would make greater haste to learn how to conduct training properly.
Check Your Motives and Have a Voice
“Yes men” are in no way inspiring. They dowse boldness in their organizations. Hopefully you aren’t the presents under the Christmas tree, but high fitness report ranking isn’t a legitimate objective. Kudos if you get an end of tour award, but you should neither shoot for nor expect one. Good for you if you retire after 20, but that isn’t your mission. During my pumps to Iraq, I especially felt I spent more time fighting my own institution’s “wait to be told” and “check in the box” mentality than I did fighting any enemy. (I don’t say that with an air of superiority. Truly. I was by no means God’s gift to the Marine Corps. I made plenty oí significant mistakes and poor judgment calls. But what I’m talking about goes beyond mistakes.) This is a common misgiving among many junior officers I have met. Every time something trickled down that just didn’t make sense, the almost universal reaction up and down the chain was seemingly blind compliance, even though everyone admitted it didn’t make sense. I’m not positive, but the only reason I can figure is that no one wanted to risk an otherwise imminent award, promotion, or retirement by making waves. And that’s not okay. What do you think happens to a Marine’s boldness and bias for action when that’s what he sees from his officers?
I dug in my heels over a lot of things in my time. In hindsight, I was often too belligerent and public. And I wasn’t always right, either. As I have matured, I have come to better appreciate the wisdom in King Solomon’s admonition that there is “a time to be silent and a time to speak.” Sometimes silence is prudent, but not unendingly. There is a time to speak. I remain convinced that, in the end, a bold word is better than cautious silence. That’s part of audacious leadership. That’s how things change for the better. Why don’t we want that from ourselves and from our Marines? Now I’m not advocating mutiny or open dissention. I understand unity of command and that orders are orders. But I also understand that a rubber stamp from Staples costs a lot less than an officer’s salary. Don’t ever hesitate to say or do what you think or know is right because you are afraid of what it might do to your career. Be tactful, close the door behind you, and choose your battles wisely, sure. But choose battles.
Rounds complete. I hope you have not gotten mired in the yeah-buts and what-ifs, but have instead applied your own common sense. I hope you agree there is an immediate need for change in our leadership culture. The onus falls first on the officer corps. We need inventive, not prescriptive, leaders. All Marines have the intrinsic potential to be such leaders. But they don’t come prepackaged; they have to be conditioned in a better environment. I hope you take these things to heart when you lead your Marines. They deserve the finest.
A wise man once opined that what you see depends on where you sit. In the past few months the Gazette pages have been the location of an interesting debate that centers on the predeployment training program (PTP), certification of operations officers and, depending on how you look at it, necessary guidance to or lack of autonomy of subordinates. The catalyst for this debate has been “The Attritionist Letters”; the response to them, such as Col William F. Mullen’s June 2011 article, “Attritionist Letter (#10): A Response”; my editorials in this years February and May editions; and an exchange of letters initiated by Maj Peter J. Munson’s letter in the April issue. In June LtGen Robert B. Neller penned a response to Maj Munson.
The central point of the debate is whether the PTP and top-down planning and guidance run counter to the maneuver warfare doctrine that we espouse. The debate continues in this issue with a letter from Capt J. P. Steinfels. His letter is an interesting and articulate airing of the issue that many junior officers see as lack of special trust and confidence in subordinate leaders.
Both LtGen Neller and Col Mullen make an articulate case for the importance of a structured training program that provides commanders with the tools and resources they require to prepare their units for combat. F. Scott Fitzgerald once wrote, “The test of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposingideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless, but be determined to make them otherwise.” All of the Marines who have engaged in the debate have a first-rate intelligence. The answer may be a synthesis of both ideas. I don’t think there is a formula for the right amount of top-down planning and decentralized execution in training. I do know that the Corps is sending mixed signals to the deck plate by extolling maneuver warfare as our operating theory and then being extremely directive in training and garrison. The balance is somewhere in the middle, but it will take a policy-by-policy review to determine where lies the sweet spot. There is, however, a negative spillover of well-intended policies.
For just one example, consider the young corporal or sergeant in Afghanistan. A tremendous amount of faith and confidence is placed in that young NCO in combat. Return to home station though and he is treated quite differently. Think of the dichotomy of being completely trusted in combat but not being allowed to go on liberty until you sign your liberty pledge and sit through the vehicle safety lecture and the other unimaginative and boring training requirements that your commander has to report that you completed. Even a first-rate intelligence cannot hold those two disparate standards in his mind and be able to synthesize them into a coherent whole.
What the “Young Turks” are saying is that the message they are receiving will have an unintended consequence in combat when we are so directional in garrison. They fear we are developing Marines with a preference for direction rather than a bias for action. The other unintended consequence could be the failure to retain our best and brightest. Next month we have an article from a recently separated Marine who articulates what he saw as the disparity in what the Corps says and how it really operates. One man’s opinion for sure, but it certainly will provide food for thought.
In 331 B.C. on the plains of Arbela, near present-day Mosul, Iraq, a contingent of Macedonian cavalry led by Alexander the Great changed the course of history by shattering the ranks of a numerically superior Persian force commanded by Darius III. The subsequent disintegration of the previously unbeaten Persian Army paved the way for the Macedonian king to subjugate the vast expanses of the Persian Empire. To military historians, strategists, and practitioners of warfare alike, the significance of this epochal battle exists within Alexanders generalship and tactical skill. However, unknown to most students of modern warfare is the influence this single engagement had on the evolution inthe study and conduct of warfare.
Our present-day security challenges are framed within the context of four environments – irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, and traditional warfare. (See Figure 1 .) Each of these environments presents distinct problems, unique circumstances, and differing solution sets. Our current maneuverwarfare doctrine provides the foundation for developing a sound strategy to defeat an adversary operating within any of the four previously stated environments. As such, the purpose of this article is to study the contributions of three 20th century military strategists to the evolution of modern warfare and the development and continued relevance of maneuverwarfare with respect to the most likely challenge, irregular warfare (IW).
Marine Corps Doctrine
Current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine as articulated in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, advocates maneuverwarfare:
A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.1
Maneuverwarfare acknowledges the chaotic, uncertain nature of warfare and espouses the need to operate within this realm. Implicit in uncertainty is the understanding that conditions are rarely permanent and, more than likely, are temporary in nature, whereby adaptability is critical to success. Additionally, this warfighting philosophy views the enemy as a system – a system, which if its cohesion is shattered then panic and paralysis will ensue and will ultimately result inthe enemy no longer possessing the ability to resist.
Origins of ManeuverWarfare
The U. S Marine Corps’ adaptation of themaneuverwarfare philosophy occurred with the inception of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting, in 1989. This publication provided the foundation for the Marine Corps’ current warfighting philosophy. In addition, Bill Lind’s ManeuverWarfare Handbook, published in 1985, served as a catalyst in catapulting the tenets of maneuverwarfare to the war fighters of the day. Notwithstanding the contributions of Mr. Lind and other modern-day military theorists inthe development of FMFM 1 and MCDP 1, three noted military strategists are responsible for the genesis of maneuverwarfare and its underlying assumptions – J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, and John Boyd.
As mentioned previously, MCDP 1 states, “The aim of maneuverwarfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system.”2 It further asserts that maneuverwarfare‘s “ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.”3 The notion that the enemy is analogous to a system is largely a 20th century perspective. One of the earliest proponents of this belief was the renowned British military strategist and historian J.F.C. Fuller.
During World War I, as the chief general staff officer of the British Tank Corps, Fuller was instrumental inthe development of armor tactics devised to break the stalemate of the static, attrition-type trench warfare along the Western front. After the Allies’ limited success at the Battle of Cambria in 1917 in which massed tank formations achieved only local tactical gains, Fuller set about designing a scheme to exploit the advantages of a mobile massed armored force against less mobile entrenched infantry units. As a result, Fuller formulated “Plan 1919.” Regarded as the seminal document with respect to tank warfare by armor enthusiasts, in actuality, Fuller’s plan was more of a concept than a detailed strategy. “Plan 1919” focused on a force capable of rapid movement, the ability to deliver a decisive blow, and the capacity to withstand an equally devastating riposte from the enemy; the desired end state being the disruption of the enemy’s ability to organize a coordinated counterattack. Accordingly, destroying the enemy’s command and control structure was essential to the success of the operation.
In “Plan 1919” Fuller mused that inthe attainment of the strategic objective, which he stated as “the destruction of the enemy’s fighting strength,” two methods existed, “wearing it down (dissipating it)” or “rendering it inoperative (unhinging it).”4 He further elaborated that, unlike traditional attrition warfare, it was less costly and more effective to unhinge the enemy forces than it was to dissipate those forces. In order to unhinge the enemy, Fuller asserted that the attacker must destroy the enemy’s command to effect the disorganization of its forces.5 Fuller succinctly stated this inthe following:
As our present theory is to destroy personnel so should our new theory be to destroy command, not after the enemy’s personnel has been disorganized, but before it has been attacked, so that it may be found in a state of complete disorganization when attacked.6
Paradoxically, he argued that the greater the number of reserves massed by the enemy, the greater the success as the objective was to paralyze the enemy by disrupting his ability to command and coordinate subordinate units regardless of their size. Fuller aptly referred to this concept as “brain warfare.”
Fuller developed this theory based upon his understanding of the March 1918 German offensive characterized by the use of heavily armed small units that sought to bypass enemy strongpoints and penetrate deep behind enemy lines. Referred to as “infiltration tactics,” Fuller then combined this recent knowledge with his historical analysis of Alexander the Great’s triumph over King Darius’ Persian Army at the Battle of Arbela in 331 B.C. Numerically inferior to the Persian forces, Alexander sought to focus the attack upon Darius himself, the Persian king, leader, and ultimate director and coordinator of the enemy. Alexander’s singular “decapitation-type” strategy proved successful and effected the disintegration of the Persian Army. Ipso facto, Fuller deduced that a highly mobile, concentrated, powerful force (rapid, focused) that attacks the command and control segment of an army would cause its rapid demise.
A friend and protege of Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, expounded upon his theory of brain warfare. Liddell Hart developed a military strategy that combined both the physical and psychological aspects of warfare. Inthe physical realm one exploited an enemy by placing or matching strength against weakness and by doing so sought a “line of least resistance.” Liddell Hart surmised that indispensable to this approach was the element of surprise (unexpected actions) focused on the psychological sphere or “the line of least expectation.”7 Referred to as the “indirect approach,” this method of warfare sought to dislocate the enemy, both physically and psychologically; i.e., hit them where they are the weakest and when and where they least expect it.
In this method, the physical effects, such as severing the enemy’s lines of communications or disrupting his dispositions, combined with the element of surprise, accentuated the psychological effects, in which the enemy commander felt cornered. A sort of checkmate was in place, as the commander did not possess a viable option; only defeat loomed ahead. In a sense, Liddell Hart delved further into the psychology of the enemy than Fuller and thus set the stage for more incisive study.
A latter 20th century military theorist, the late Col John Boyd, USAF (Ret), built upon Fuller and Liddell Hart’s theory of the psychological and physical element of the enemy and developed what we refer to today as maneuverwarfare. As a former Air Force fighter pilot and military theorist, Boyd analyzed countless military battles throughout the ages and then synthesized the many lessons from these conflicts. He combined this study with his understanding of fighter tactics to create the famous OODA loop, arguably the foundation for maneuverwarfare theory.8 Boyd viewed warfare as a time-competitive event in which the successor consistently acted in a faster manner over time; i.e., created tempo until the opponent’s will to resist collapsed. Implicit in this understanding is the continuous cycle of action-reaction between adversaries, which highlights the iterative nature of war.
On the surface, Boyd’s theory appears simplistic, yet the details of how he arrived at this conclusion reveal its complexity. In his studies, Boyd believed it essential to understand the interaction of and the bonds forged between the moral-mental-physical forces governed by the nature of warfare and to direct actions to severing and isolating those connections in order to defeat the enemy’s will to resist.
The moral forces consist of the emotional or the psychological arena whereby the goal is to promote courage, confidence, and cohesion within friendly forces and concurrently to generate fear, uncertainty, and alienation within enemy forces. The mental field refers to the intellectual acuity to grasp and understand a situation and determine a suitable course of action in a timely manner. Although not explicitly described in his writings, one can presume Boyd defined physical forces as those relating to material and objectives in relation to the enemy; e.g., force ratios, terrain seized, personnel captured, etc.9 In sum, Boyd asserted that a successor’s actions must be aimed and synchronized against all three forces in order to defeat an enemy’s will to resist. Boyd cogently and unambiguously stated the relationship between the three inthe following:
Unless one can penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, and sever those interacting bonds that permit him to exist as an organic whole, as well as subvert or seize those moralmental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, one will find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to collapse adversary’s will to resist [create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation].10
He further stated:
Morally-men tally-physically isolate adversary from allies or any outside support as well as isolate elements of adversary or adversaries from one another and overwhelm them by being able to penetrate and splinter their moral-mental-physical being at any and all levels [shatter the enemy’s cohesion . . . with which the enemy cannot cope].11
As one can see, Boyd’s analysis and subsequent synthesis explicitly identifies the bond between the three forces and furthermore asserts the criticality in directing one’s actions toward them in a holistic, comprehensive manner. Moreover, implicit in Boyd’s statements is the imperative to “control” the tempo of operations. Although the current definition of maneuverwarfare states “rapid . . . actions,” speed of action does not equate to success in all instances. For example, while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the execution of military offensive operations based upon the misperception that speed of action against a perceived military target without regard to the impact upon the population writ large may cause more harm than good.
Each of the three strategists viewed warfare through a prism containing the physical and psychological forces with Boyd further dissecting the psychological arena into moral and mental spheres or domains. Arguably, relative to the three strategists discussed, Boyd has engendered the greatest to the study of warfare, development, and the definition of maneuverwarfare. Nonetheless, Liddell Hart’s and Fuller’s significant contributions cannot be overlooked. Whereas Boyd expertly described the need to “shatter the enemy’s cohesion” inthe moral, mental, and physical spheres and the criticality in creating a “deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope,” Liddell Hart and Fuller defined the need for “rapid, focused, and unexpected actions,” albeit predominantly inthe physical and psychological domains.
ManeuverWarfare and IW
So with the understanding of the evolution of maneuverwarfare, how do we apply this warfighting philosophy to current operations, such as IW? The joint operating concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, defines IW as:
… a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.12
The Marine Corps’ Center for IW has adroitly pointed out the contrast between conventional conflict and IW in regard to Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity.13 In Clausewitz’s concept of trinitarian warfare, three forces are constantly at work – the military, the government, and the population.14 In traditional or conventional conflicts with state versus state actors, the interaction between the military and the government prevails as our efforts are focused upon defeating our opponent’s military and thus influencing or compelling their government to cease resistance. Contrastingly, in IW the critical interaction occurs between the population and the government as the support or lack of support from the relevant population is intrinsically linked to the legitimacy of the government. (See Figure 2.) Furthermore, added layers of complexity are extant in IW as compared to conventional conflicts as there are by definition a greater number of participants, such as coalition forces, host-nation security forces, other government agencies, nongovernment organizations, etc. The increased number of participants involved, coupled with the intangible qualities and characteristics of gaining or eroding population support, presents an imposing challenge to those engaged in IW.
A way to approach this complex challenge is to view the forces at play in IW through the lenses of the moralmental-physical prism expounded upon earlier. For instance, while conducting COIN operations we should strive to mo rally-ment ally- physically isolate insurgent leaders, forces, and their supporters from the population while simultaneously directing actions that strengthen the moral-mentalphysical bonds between the relevant population, the government, and security forces. More specifically, we should endeavor to enhance unity, confidence, and legitimacy between the host-nation government, population, and security forces while concurrently promoting fear, uncertainty, and alienation between the relevant population and the insurgent group and within the insurgent group (delegitimize); developing and executing a plan in a timely manner that synchronizes disparate activities associated with COIN operations; and denying the insurgents sanctuary and support from the relevant population and external sympathizers.
Within the mental sphere, plan development necessitates the coordination between multiple dissimilar and unequal entities and the synchronization of unrelated activities. To overcome this conundrum, activities are grouped into common categories, such as economic development, governance, essential services, host-nation security forces, and combat operations/civil security operations.15 Commonly referred to as logical lines of operations, these activities permit planners to orchestrate disparate actions in a holistic manner and to ensure that interrelated activities do not produce outcomes that are counter to or deleterious to the desired end state.16
When applying maneuverwarfare to IW and specifically COIN operations, it is paramount to define the roles and relationship of the moralmental-physical forces at play. Understandably, the three are inextricably linked regardless of the type conflict. However, when conducting COIN operations with a goal of enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government and eroding the cause of the insurgents, all activities must be assessed based upon their ability to morally isolate the insurgents. To this end, the role of the physical force or actions taken is subordinate to and supports the role of the moral force. The primacy of moral isolation over physical destruction of an insurgent group cannot be overemphasized. Many practitioners of warfare believe that it is antithetical to subordinate physical destruction of the enemy to moral isolation; nonetheless, should we fail to do so then we may find ourselves in a protracted engagement. While the moral and physical forces are supported and supporting, the mental force functions as an enabler and facilitates the desired end state by focusing efforts and controlling tempo of operations.
The continued relevance of maneuverwarfarein current and future conflicts is indisputable; however, in order to successfully confront the exigencies of modern warfare we must perform the following:
* Clearly and unambiguously define the type of conflict we are involved in using the paradoxical trinity as a starting point, whereby all participants are assessed based upon their association with or support to the government, the military, and the population.
* Analyze friendly, neutral, and adversary forces or participants using the moral-mental-physical prism in order to establish the roles and relationships between the forces at play and to direct actions to develop and strengthen bonds or to sever and isolate existing bonds.
* Apply our maneuverwarfare doctrine with an emphasis on the ability to rapidly adapt to a given situation while simultaneously having the foresight to control the tempo of operations.
As the challenges of the21st century continue to emerge, develop, and mature, so too must our solutions, for just as the nature of warfare is immutable so the conduct of warfare is constantly changing. Consequently, critical to our success is the understanding of the changing relationships between the forces at play; if not, we will be forever mired inthe old think of the past and unable to adapt to the changing environments of the future.
4. Fuller, J.F. C, “Plan 1919,” Selected Readings in Military History: Evolution in Combined Arms Warfare, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985, pp. 144-145.
5. Ibid., p. 146.
6. Ibid.
7. Liddell Hart, B. H., Strategy, Second Revised Edition, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991, p. 327.
8. The OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop is described in various works to include its progenitor, John Boyd, in his compilation of essays, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, and in detail in his final brief, The Essence of Winning and Losing. Additionally, MCDP 1 gives a brief description of the O O DA loop. However, the most thorough and comprehensive description exists in Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, by Frans P.B. Osinga, Routledge, 2006. A more concise description may be found in William Lind’s ManeuverWarfare Handbook, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1985.
9. Boyd, Col John, USAF(Ret), Patterns of Conflict. Boyd focuses upon the moral forces and at times blurs the distinction between both moral and mental forces; however, the definition of physical forces is missing altogether. Nonetheless, MCDP 1 clearly defines and describes the three forces and their importance in warfighting.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Department of Defense, Joint Operating Concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Version 2.0, Washington, DC, 17 May 2010.
13. “IW 101” brief, Marine Corps Center for IW, accessed at www.mccdc.usmc.mil/ciw.
14. Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 89.
15. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 5-3 describes in detail generic logical lines of operations to use in COIN operations.
16. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 2001 (as amended through 31 July 2010), defines lines of operations with the following:
1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective (s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).
