TWS Meeting Minutes 22 November

TECOM Warfighting Society

Agenda and minutes:  TWS 22 Nov 2019  

Board of Officers:

                -Director:  LtCol Nathan Dmochowski

                -Secretary/Librarian:  Mr. Chris Woodbridge

                -Information Officer:  LtCol Roy Draa

                -Wargaming Officer:  Dr. Ben Jensen

Attendees:  LtCol Dmochowski, Col Woodbridge (ret), LtCol Roy Draa, Mr. Lehmann (MCWL), Mr. Don Vandergriff, Mr. Russ Evans (CSC CDET), Dr. Ben Jensen

Dialed in:  Maj Kent (PACFLT), Mr. Riccio (CLNC CDET Warfighting Chapter), Maj Robichaux (Naval Integration, DCI), LtCol Ryan Benson (Req/Assessment Branch, CDD), LCDR John Ruggiero (NECC, N3), Mr. Mark Riccio (CLNC CDET Chapter), LtCol Scott Cuomo, Capt Walker Mills

1.  TWC Business

      a.  Finalizing script for TWS promotional video with STRATCOM.  Will be released to total force once complete.

      b.  TWS website (MCA&F) and online collaboration tool (Concept Board), getting finalized.  Once complete we will load all the content and send out the link.

2.  Previous discussion:

22 Nov Minutes:

EABO OAG:  Lead is DC CD&I (CDD), formed out of the Maritime Working Group.  Working to coordinate USMC/Navy POCs at the action officer level.  LCDR Ruggiero and LtCol Ryan Benson are leads for coordination.  TECOM Warfighting Society can/will contribute to EABO OAG, however, will be at the UNCLASS level.

Tie in with US Army, requirement for EABs in the Pacific will be more than the USMC can source, this will be a Joint mission with the Army?  Will require INTEROPERABILITY for EABO/Inside Forces.

“Pushing red to blue kill box” EABs/Inside Forces could push enemy forces into Naval kill boxes in the littorals.  Possible TTP for USMC support to sea control/denial.

Deception packages/TTPs will be critical to success of Inside Forces.  Need to develop and/or re-invigorate TTPs for our inside forces.  Specific capabilities may quickly lead to a classified discussion, however, TWS should explore deception at the conceptual level ISO EABO.

Is “Littoral Maneuver” a term we need to explore?  If so, what does it mean?  Is it different from our current understanding of maneuver?

EAB/Inside Forces are “a ship that doesn’t sink” for C2 purposes and approval of fires, integrated into the integrated maritime defense.

TWS Wargaming Plan:

Contact Layer:

-Integrate with SAW wargame to examine EABO/Inside Forces role in the contact layer.  How do we establish an EAB?  What is our plan to integrate our sea control/denial capabilities with our MDT allies and partners?

“Our engagement with our MDT allies will look like how we plan to fight.”

Scenario needs to articulate how inside forces have been trained to transition from steady-state contact layer (Security Cooperation/FID) to blunt layer (support the Navy in sea control/denial).  Credible deterrent.  Also integrate current/future MDT allies (get away from using “host nation”) capabilities to fight in the contact/blunt layers.

USMC needs to adjust exercise design to support transition from contact to blunt ISO our MDT allies.  This will change our forces/capabilities we deploy as inside forces in support of TSC.  This will be a large shift in how we think about our forward deployed forces, they would need to be deployed with full combat loads and resources available to conduct EABO.

Transition from contact to blunt:

Will fight the Heavy/Light Littoral Combat Team, need to include a DDG for an air defense platform, using configuration TBD but based off of our “tin can” graphics.

Wargames conducted by SAW/CSC, focused on details of how to shoot ships from a shore based platform.  Shoot, displace, re-arm.  Ammunition capacity becomes an issue, where do we store it?  How is it distributed to firing platforms?  Will this require infrastructure investment on host nation soil?

EABs potentially NOT survivable from a cruise missile attack, ammunition and fuel storage vulnerable

Littoral Combat Team:

-Needs to be larger than what is depicted in our “tin can graphics” with addition of more robust air defense capability

-one month into contact layer in an exercise posture

-More forces embarked than ashore

-Mix up packages to simulate networked sensor/shooter fight

-Experiment with sensor/shooter networks

Previous discussion from Nov meeting minutes:

                -Littoral Combat Team:

                                -Forward positioned conducting security cooperation and man/trained/equipped to transition to EABO.

                                -Need to articulate how LCTs are supported with Logistics.  (Maj Pena/NEXLOG).  Need to for the concept of support with the Navy.

                                                -Ground/Aviation/Navy logistics

                                                -Pre-positioned logistics?

                                -Use current inventory of merchant ships and/or Army ships as logistics platforms?

                                -Potential for LCT to operate with an allied/partner force (AUS platoon as the maneuver element?)

                -Inclusion of the Coast Guard will be key to EABO/Inside Forces, must be part of Navy/USMC doctrine, especially C2 (Composite Warfare construct)

                -Coast Guard should be part of the LCT, will assist with providing access for the joint force in conducting security cooperation and EABO

                -USMC has a gap in taking an operating concept and translating to man/train/educate/equip.  Recommend the service begins experimentation focused on the TRAIN/EDUCATE and NOT exclusively on the EQUIP.  Training and educating the force will take time, however, will also institutionalize the operating concept.

                -Need to conduct more wargaming via Command to refine required capabilities, potential focus could include decoys, force laydown (current and future), NECC, logistics, etc.

       f.  Future Events

            1)  Build and conduct wargame simulations via Command to refine Littoral Combat Group/Team requirements/capabilities

           2)  IPR to CG TECOM, tentatively scheduled for 13 Dec.

           3) Review/publish C2 paper from CLNC CDET Chapter

Professional Event Series: Ep 11 Gen David H. Berger "Inside Force"

At the 2019 MCA&F Ground Dinner, The Commandant, General David H. Berger, provided an overview of the Marine Corps’ planning process for the next 10 years to emphasize its roll as an “Inside Force” in control of “Contested maritime space in support of fleet operations.”

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Information Age Learning?

Photo Credit: https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/naval-subjects-collection/l39-places–us/l39-18-02-02-classroom-instruction.html

The Navy and Marine Corps are asking a lot of hard questions about learning.   We are faced with a future operating environment in which we will have neither a technological nor numerical advantage over our adversaries in Great Power Competition.  What we have come to realize is that the Naval Service will only win if it is better trained and educated than our adversaries.  We need to out-cycle them; to observe, orient, decide and act with greater relative speed.  We need an intellectual advantage.

“What is needed is an information age approach that is focused on active, student-centered learning using a problem-posing methodology where our students/trainees are challenged with problems they tackle as groups in order to learn by doing and also from each other.”

Gen David H. Berger
38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance

The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) clearly states that our current industrial model of education is not producing a force that is prepared for the modern battlefield. Why is this? Is it merely a question of tablets in the classroom and on the training range or does this go deeper? The statement of the Commandant suggests that we are still squarely rooted in industrial-age practices, “lecture, memorize facts, regurgitate facts on command…what to think and what to do instead of how to think, decide and act.”
How then should the Naval Service move from the classrooms of the 19th century into the 21st?

“We must transform our legacy approach of training and education to advance the intellectual edge of our Marines and the combat effectiveness of our units. Going forward, we must leverage (more fully) the growing bodies of knowledge in adult learning, human performance science, and talent management…”

Maj Gen William F. Mullen, III
TECOM Vision and Strategy, 2019

So what does this mean for the Marine Corps? What is this information age model? How does it bring us into the 21st Century? What will it allow us to do? How does it prepare us for the modern battlefield?

“New classroom delivery models allow us to re-imagine new combinations of educator expertise, time, instructional materials, research, physical space…and (yes) technology in ways that achieve optimal outcomes for students. They begin not by assuming the current model but rather by understanding what it is we want students to be able to do, the measures of success, the resources we have to work with, and our own sense of possibility.”

Joel Rose
How to Break Free of Our 19th-Century Factory-Model Education System, The Atlantic

So what does this look like? Have you looked at the Commandant’s Reading List? Why are Ender’s Game and Ready Player One on there? These books are just children’s science-fiction. What could they possibly tell us about learning in the future? What do you think?

Book Review: "Holding the Line: Inside Trump's Pentagon with Secretary Mattis" by Major R.W. Pallas

Commander Guy M. Snodgrass (USN, Retired) provides a mixed bag with his memoir, “Holding the Line: Inside Trump’s Pentagon with Secretary Mattis”, capturing his time as a speechwriter during the tenure of Secretary of Defense Mattis. Fred Kaplan categorizes the work as, “a weirdly schizophrenic book–half swooning hagiography, half bitter critique.” I would say this holds true but the manner to which he approaches the work is respectful throughout. Anyone serving in the DoD can glean valuable insight and catch a rare glimpse behind the curtain as to what it means to serve on a senior staff at the heart of the U.S. Government.

The biggest question I had throughout the book was, “Would this book be written should Captain or Admiral Snodgrass still be in uniform?” A common theme throughout the book was his desire to tone back his hallmark career as a fighter pilot, TOPGUN instructor, and speechwriter for greater family time and a less chaotic work schedule. His desire to command a wing was overlooked as he found himself as one of a handful of select officers destined to command the future nuclear fleet. One can’t ignore his career seemed riddled with high profile jobs of someone who has put a tremendous amount of effort into the naval service. What I struggled with was his initial commitment to join OSD as I couldn’t help but imagine this billet would be extremely useful for the development and exposure of someone looking to serve longer than the 20 year mark, or at least had the aspirations to try.  I also struggled to understand the warning he received early in the book that working for Secretary Mattis would be at a breakneck pace, and still went along willingly.  

I wrestled with this dichotomy throughout the book, his desire to tone back his career, but his acceptance to progress with a high impact billet such as speechwriter for the Secretary of Defense. The retention of high caliber personnel in the military becomes more pronounced when he makes mention of the CNO, Adm. Richardson, who was quoted as saying, “Future leaders are merely the best of what’s left as people make the decision to seek greener pastures in the private sector.”  Seemed like a self-fulfilling prophecy as he transitioned to a GS-15 position with two highly lucrative job offers when he decided to leave OSD’s front office when things go awry and the job offers dissolve.

My initial thought was Commander Snodgrass did in fact desire to stay in uniform, but as the pages turned I spent more time thinking his plan was to position himself to transition from a high visibility billet within the Pentagon.  I can’t fault anyone for planning for the future, but it seemed on one hand he wanted a quieter, slower pace, but when posed with the question to join the SECDEF’s staff, he was all in.

Commander Snodgrass does provide gems of wisdom with his work, and for those interested in the behind the scenes meetings with members of the President’s staff, there’s plenty to digest.  One cannot overlook his career, talent, and hard work put towards the success of the Secretary, both in the office and on the road, countlessly traveling the globe working through time zones and jet lag.

The most valuable lesson was one given by Secretary Mattis,

“Bus, never forget that we all have an expiration date.  Every day that passes brings you one day closer to the end of your tenure.  Especially in a political job.  You never know when the end will come, so make the most of the time you have.”

My favorite quote, which I think any person, in or out of uniform can relate to was:

“Always treat people well on your way up the ladder, as they’ll be the same people you see when you inevitably come back down.”

This book was a very quick read, easy to digest, and enjoyable.  I understand the embodiment of both the good and the bad as any good chronicler successfully captures.  A mentor once told me, “If you don’t tell your story, someone else will.”  Commander Snodgrass tells his story, and that’s probably something anyone reading this work should keep at the forefront, this is his story.

I give “Holding the Line” 4/5.  Think it’s an honest reflection about his time as a speechwriter and he does his best to accurately portray the people, events, and encounters that occurred around him creating one of the most developmental experiences of his career.  If anyone has read the NDS, one can’t argue–the guy has talent, and a book–that’s more than I can say I’ve done.

The Old and the New

“Now belatedly obsessed with hardware attacks, the Navy had ordered the Zumwalt to have any suspect prewar systems removed and destroyed. That the Z and the other ships in the Ghost Fleet had not received the past few years of upgrades had suddenly become one of their strengths. It’s all about making the old the new gear blend together.” Ghost Fleet p. 109

Of the lessons conceptualized in Ghost Fleetmaking the “old and new blend together” is the most powerful. The theme weaves throughout the novel covering a wide spectrum of concepts. Retired personnel, outdated weapons systems, and ancient stratagem mix with the employment of modern combined arms throughout multiple domains. Warfighters leverage the latest of technologies and human performance enhancements while exercising primitive tactics in the World War III scenario. As the main characters move from the depths of the Mariana Trench to advanced space stations, it is clear the future battlefield will encompass terrain foreign to battles of the past century. Ghost Fleet forces the reader to consider the current path of our service, and question if we are  prepared to operate effectively in this future environment.  

The nature of war as an act of force to compel an adversary to our will endures, but the character of warfare is evolving. This delta is where the historical nature of war mixes with the modernization of armed conflict. The relevant question becomes–how does the Marine Corps appropriately mix the old and new in order to meet the requirements of the future battlefields as described in Ghost Fleet?  

The Commandants Planning Guidance (CPG) is the pathway to prepare for the evolving character of war. Although the CPG is a full encompassing document, the call for the limiting of signatures, the emplacement of low grade sensors and employment of long range unmanned systems, along with a broad array of stand-in forces highlights the need for progress in leveraging the 3d offset capabilities of Automated Intelligence (AI) and sensing in the information environment. These advanced technologies combined with the requirement to conduct command and control in a contested cyber environment necessitates new forms of expertise. Advancing such capabilities does not occur simply for the sake of using technology, otherwise to support Marines effectively conducting Distributed Operations and the spectrum of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations inside the enemy weapons engagement zone. 

Success in the modern way of warfare described in the CPG however, is very much rooted in the fundamental principles of old. Distributed Operations require independent and creative subordinate commanders operating on mission type orders. Increased sensing capabilities elevate the importance of good intelligence to drive collection and consequently operations. Limiting signatures forces a reexamination of the way and the amount of communication that is conducted in a combat zone. Such concepts; mission command, full spectrum reconnaissance, covered communications, and broadcasting in silence are as old as warfare itself. Only the devices change. 

Ultimately Ghost Fleet is a story of the triumph of man over machine. While technologies evolve, it will always be the individual behind the weapon, the joystick, the computer screen, or sitting in the Commanders seat ultimately making the difference between success and defeat in battle. This axiom was not altered with the invention of gunpowder, artillery, airplanes, nuclear weapons, or precision guided munitions. It will additionally not be changed with the militarization of the information domain. As always, it will be the lethal implementation of all available technologies that will bend the enemy to our will and lead to ultimate victory in war.

—Lt Col Bradley Fultz      

This is your Ghost Fleet Moment

by Major Ryan W. Pallas

PART I : A personal reflection

For anyone who peruses the world of Twitter, August Cole (@august_cole) will post Ghost Fleet moments. If you’ve never read Ghost Fleet , then it may be hard to know if you’ve ever had one. For me, it was Saturday, January 13, 2018.

I recently PCS’d to Hawaii and was spending a year at U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific as a staff officer being a newly selected field grade. Not a bad gig, and either way my wife and I were over the moon to be serving in the heart of the Pacific. Quickly gearing up for my new gig I spent a majority of my time driving up and down the H-3 from Marine Corps Base, Hawaii to Camp Smith-the home of Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. The drive was scenic and about thirty minutes start to finish-what better time to start crushing audio books? One of the first ones I finished was Ghost Fleet.

I won’t spend a lot time summarizing the book, but it was eerily familiar driving the roads and seeing first-hand the ships at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickham, the hill leading up to Camp Smith, and living near the air station at Marine Corps Base, Hawaii–all the while having Ghost Fleet narrated through the speakers of my car. There was no better way to digest the thought provoking work than seeing the geographic locations to which it occurs firsthand. For those who have yet to read it, I would highly recommend it make it onto your bookshelf in the near future.

Fast-forward a few months and throughout the hustle and bustle of the first six month on island my wife and I were enjoying coffee one Saturday morning watching the news when a strange audible tone echoed throughout the house. Initially thinking it was an amber alert I grabbed my phone to see this:

Screen shot from Apple iPhone with Hawaii Missile Alert

Many in the aftermath, of what we now know to be a false alarm, spoke of North Korea and their ability to range the Hawaiian Island chain. During my initial reaction I only thought about China. There is some background to my thought process.

Six months prior I was in the middle of completing a graduate degree in international relations and my capstone was how the U.S. was poorly postured to combat a threat from China and their influence. Perhaps another Pearl Harbor, perhaps a Ghost Fleet moment, perhaps a ballistic missile inbound over Saturday morning coffee.

Biggest takeaway, we never know when another Pearl Harbor or September 11th is on its way, and you never know how and when it will occur. It could happen on a sunny Saturday morning having coffee with your wife and two dogs in Hawaii.

Do yourself a favor, if you haven’t read Ghost Fleet, go grab a copy. You’ll find with the current global landscape shifting, those Ghost Fleet moments August Cole tweet’s about aren’t all that uncommon and seem to become more prevalent as time goes on and the Marine Corps must be ready to meet those moments–enter the Commandant’s Planning Guidance.

PART II : CMC’s CPG

The good news is the 38th CMC’s CPG answers this uncertainty operating within a shifting global landscape. The USMC is pushing toward Force Design (#1 priority by our Commandant) which has to be threat based. For too long we held on to sacred principles with a willingness to allow the degradation of our warfighting abilities by adhering to historical designs and structures that no longer suited the future fight. With force design being the #1 priority, the CMC postures the Marine Corps to answer any call, at any time, in any place, leaving our elected officials with a singular resounding thought, “Send in the Marines.”

The next two priorities, within the CPG, bolster our prowess as the warrior elite, and also as a thinking and mental agile force for the future. Marines of all ranks and experience will be interoperable working in large fleets and components in the Joint Force down to autonomous small teams implementing AI, additive manufacturing, and other technologies requiring the mental agility to shift between both. Education will remain at the forefront and is the third priority of the CPG, and the Department of the Navy echoes the importance of this with a recent article by our newest Navy Chief Learning Officer, Mr. John Kroger.

In this new situation, America has to learn a new strategic trick: how to maintain military supremacy as economic and technological advantages erode and perhaps even disappear. How can the United States pull this off? For our armed forces, the answer is brainpower. If America is going to maintain its ability to deter and outfight potential opponents in a world defined by great power competition, American military professionals are going to have to out-think them.-John Kroger https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/charting-the-future-of-education-for-the-navy-marine-corps-team/

The greatest part of the CMC’s CPG is it isn’t a USMC only document, it fits into the DoN, DoD, and realizes wherever we go, we will go with our brothers and sisters in arms supported by our civilian counterparts across the U.S. Government alongside our partners and allies. This is important as the Ghost Fleet moments mentioned above will not be met by a singular force or service, but a global coalition that has trained, learned, and fought alongside of each other long before the first rounds go downrange. The CPG lays the framework for the force of the future to which future generations, my peers, will build upon for warfighting success.

Was Ghost Fleet a wake-up call for me? Absolutely. When will it happen? I don’t think anyone has a crystal ball, but one thing I think is certain, the USMC and DoN have postured themselves to develop the greatest possible force for the future.

Call to Action: Ghost Fleet

Ghost Fleet by P.W. Singer and August Cole tells the story of future war against China in the Pacific, around the world and in space and cyberspace.  It may be a cautionary tale about the Marine Corps’ and the entire US Joint Force’s dependency on technology and our fundamental belief that we will always dominate the air, sea, and information domains.  The story highlights the American will to fight and the disruptive power of small insurgent teams while uncovering both the brightest and the darkest aspects of human nature under enemy occupation.

If we stipulate that Ghost Fleet describes an accurate vision of future war with Communist China, what should the Marine Corps be doing now to prepare to fight and win in that future world?  Does the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance put us on an azimuth to arrive at this level of preparation?

Professional Event Series: Ep 10 Gen James N. Mattis at the Combat Development Dinner

From the Marine Corps Association & Foundations 2019 Combat Development Dinner, General James N. Mattis, USMC (Ret) former Secretary of Defense, spoke on a range of topics from getting his Marines surrounded in the desert to the Commandant’s Planning Guidance of General Berger. He shared stories of his time in Washington and answered questions about China and Russia.

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Call Sign Chaos reviewed by Col. Eric L. Chase, USMCR (Ret)

For the years spanning the late 20th and early 21st centuries, former Secretary of Defense and retired Marine General James N. Mattis stands as a preeminent exemplar of the Corps’ warfighting ethos: “He has commanded Marines at all levels, from a rifle platoon to a [Marine Expeditionary Force].”1 Capping a 40-year military career, he retired with four stars, notwithstanding his willingness to speak his mind, frequently challenging conventional wisdom and spurning political correctness. Marines loved his plain-spoken manner, his affection for them and, above all, his noteworthy combat leadership. The general public admired the authenticity of this no-nonsense American warrior and treasured the quotable quips that made occasional headlines.

Both in battle and the highest command and joint duty assignments, he honed natural leadership traits. He enriched his tactical and strategic insight and skills with intellectual curiosity about everything military: a passion reflected in his personal library of over 6,000 volumes and his claim, “[T]here’s no substitute for constant study to master one’s craft.” Upon retirement from the Corps in 2013, he became a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He achieved a remarkable scholar-warrior reputation, neither exceeded nor even matched by anyone else of any rank or Service. In Call Sign Chaos, Mattis amplifies that stature. 

When President Donald J. Trump selected Mattis as his first Secretary of Defense in January 2017, it came as no surprise that Congress overwhelmingly voted to waive a Federal law that would have otherwise disqualified him from that post for seven years after his military retirement. The only other such congressional waiver enabled five-star General of the Army George C. Marshall to become Defense Secretary in 1950. The Senate quickly confirmed Mattis by a vote of 98-1 (with only Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand voting no, and Sen. Jeff Sessions not voting while his appointment as Attorney General was pending). 

Mattis served just two years as Secretary. On 20 December 2018, he submitted his resignation, which he attaches verbatim at the end of Call Sign Chaos. Mattis offers not a word to assess President Trump’s policies, character, or leadership. Instead, he promises that he is “old fashioned [and does not] write about sitting Presidents.” Almost exclusively, he draws upon his four decades as a Marine. 

In this immediate runaway best-seller (briefly number one on the New York Times non-fiction list), Mattis promises “to convey the lessons [he] learned for those who might benefit, whether in the military or in civilian life.” The book’s three sections, “Direct Leadership,” “Executive Leadership,” and “Strategic Leadership,” connect his military career to the leadership theme. The story’s sole protagonist, Mattis links his professional autobiography to his own growth in leadership as his rank and responsibility rose.

He delivers “lessons” far beyond the prologue’s modest promise and outside the parameters of his legendary career and reputation as a Marine. He translates his military acumen and record into myriad memorable, fact-rich, teachable paragraphs that can resonate with current and aspiring military and civilian leaders. His exceptional combat instincts materialize in the direst of combat circumstances, portrayed in gripping accounts, capturing the urgency of those moments, and translating them into practical ways to think, lead, and prevail.

Although he shares jacket cover credit for authorship with Bing West, a formidable military author in his own right with a stellar background as a combat Marine and Assistant Secretary of Defense, this is Mattis’ first-person story from beginning to end. His voice carries the narrative, and his life history in the Corps and beyond personifies the “lessons … learned.” No doubt, West influences the riveting flow and readability of the narrative, but he remains behind the curtain; the only visible narrator is Mattis.

Call Sign Chaos will become a standard volume in curricula of America’s war colleges and career military schools at all levels. Despite the necessary military terminology and acronyms, his book will also strike chords for civilian university programs in politics, business, and leadership. For at least the present and near future, Call Sign Chaos should be America’s most authoritative and accessible primer on leadership in both military and civilian spheres.

During the three leadership phases described in Call Sign Chaos, he usually sees clearly through the fog of war, both in small, close engagements and in theater-wide strategic decisions and planning. He pleads to his share of mistakes, though, and forgives errors of others when done in a good faith effort to aggressively show initiative and accomplish the mission. He was ever ready to spar about decision making with superiors and subordinate commanders, yet always open to ideas from good thinkers of all ranks. As a Commanding General during the crucible of combat, he lauds recommendations to him by corporals or lieutenants that made decisive differences.

In crisis after crisis, he draws from a vast, self-made intellect—nurtured constantly by an insatiable desire to read and learn from others. With perhaps some unnecessary repetition, he admonishes his audience to do the same. His advice to read arises from experience, practice, and application:

Reading sheds light on the dark path ahead. By traveling into the past, I enhance my grasp of the present. I’m partial to studying Roman leaders and historians, from Marcus Aurelius and Scipio Africanus to Tacitus, whose grace under pressure and reflections on life can guide leaders today. I followed Caesar across Gaul. I marveled at how the plain prose of Grant and Sherman revealed the value of steely determination. E.B. Sledge, in With the Old Breed, wrote for generations of grunts when he described the fierce fighting on Okinawa and the bonds that bind men together in battle. Biographies of Roman generals and Native American leaders, of wartime political leaders and sergeants, and of strategic thinkers from Sun Tzu to Colin Gray have guided me through tough challenges. Eventually I collected several thousand books for my personal library. I read broadly and selected a few battles and areas where I was weak to study deeply.2

 Mattis describes his early life only cursorily. His was a hardscrabble youth, marked by boredom in classrooms, reading at home, and regular hitchhiking starting at age thirteen. In college he “was a mediocre student with a partying attitude.” After underage drinking, a judge sentenced him to spend some weekends in jail. This setback awakened him to healthier pursuits. Following college, he earned his commission in 1972 as a second lieutenant. Mattis proves that a rise to the Marine Corps’ top echelon and beyond requires no privileged upbringing or unearned advantage.

Leadership is Mattis’ constant focus and touchstone. He eschews generalities, platitudes, or banalities—the banes of many textbooks. Instead, he demonstrates mastery of the art of war with dozens of riveting vignettes that include: planning for combat, arguing for or against specific tactics, and leading in combat. As a commander, his greatest affection is for his troops.  Achingly, he laments the regular promotions that further removed him from direct supervision of, and camaraderie with, Marines engaged with the enemy: “I stayed in the Corps to be with the troops.”3 He lavishes praise, often by name, on fellow warfighters of all ranks who excelled on his watch. 

He can be critical of commanders who, for him, did not measure up. He issues harsh, yet valid, assessments of U.S. Army GEN Tommy Franks who initially rejected deployment of Marines in Afghanistan because “[w]e don’t have access from the sea.” For Mattis, “[t]his was a classic example of being trapped by an outdated way of thinking. The Marines don’t need to be anywhere near a beach to land from ships.” According to Mattis, Franks inexplicably deprived the Marines of a clear opportunity to take out Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora Mountains in December 2001, nearly ten years before Navy SEALs killed him in May 2011. 

Mattis entertains as he teaches, demonstrates, and instructs. Intensity and pace leap from page to page and assignment to assignment. In his telling, large and small controversies among military and civilian leaders abound, and he was a principal actor in most of his examples. He weaves his mastery of warfare’s history, from antiquity to the present, into decision making at all ranks, from squad and platoon leaders, to combatant commanders, and the Commander-in-Chief. 

Some critics contend that Mattis could be ruthless in the conduct of his leadership or complain that he is out-of-step with modern sensibilities, but history justifies his difficult personnel and operational decisions. He confronts head-on criticism for his colorful language and, far from apologetic, tackles critics with the same rhetorical gusto that he embraces with his actions on the ground.

As CG, 1st MarDiv, his relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy as commander of Regimental Combat Team 1 in 2003 was an unusual step. It was an abrupt removal of a distinguished and respected senior officer during combat operations in Iraq. Mattis’ explanation, however, makes sense. Without ever identifying Dowdy by name (even though the event and Dowdy’s name were publicized at the time), he depicts the colonel as overly fatigued and reluctant to carry out Mattis’ aggressive intent in the attack. During a face-to-face session with Mattis, Dowdy “expressed his heartfelt reluctance to lose any of his men by pushing at what might seem to be a reckless pace.” Because Dowdy’s honest admission contradicted the aggressive combat plan, Mattis fired him “on the spot,” even while acknowledging Dowdy as “a noble and capable officer who in past posts had performed superbly.” 

In another example, he was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation in Norfolk and oversaw a staff of officers from many nations. He fired an unnamed foreign admiral working with him at because the admiral’s mistreatment of staff continued, even after Mattis’ counseling. 

His frank assessment of political interference with military missions is persuasive. Mattis praises the positive and successful leadership of President George H. W. Bush, acknowledging how “he avoided sophomoric decisions like imposing a ceiling on the number of troops or setting a date when we would have to stop fighting and leave.” Moreover:

He approved of deploying overwhelming forces to compel the enemy’s withdrawal or swiftly end the war … He systematically gathered public support, congressional approval and UN agreement. He set a clear, limited end state and used diplomacy to pull together a military coalition that included allies we’d never fought alongside. He listened to opposing points of view and guided the preparations, without offending or excluding any stakeholder, while also holding firm to his strategic goal. Under his wise leadership, there was no mission creep.

He is critical of some aspects of President George W. Bush’s leadership in Iraq who held back the Marines in Fallujah, even though Mattis contended that they held an advantage that needed to be timely exploited. Bush overruled him, and Mattis “believed the President’s goal [to share combat responsibility with other nations] was idealistic and tragically misplaced.” 

But he saves his harshest critiques for unwise military decisions by President Barack Obama, especially in the unwarranted and vacuum-creating withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq in 2011. He recites frustrating meetings with officials, including then-Vice President Joe Biden, and was perplexed at the level of ignorance about the likely consequences of a pullout—as foreseen by Mattis and many others in uniform.

His active duty career abruptly ended when he was fired as CG, U.S. Central Command. He recalls the circumstances and sets forth dissatisfaction with the poor quality of civilian military oversight at the end of 2012:

In December 2012, I received an unauthorized phone call telling me that in an hour, the Pentagon would be announcing my relief. I was leaving a region aflame and in disarray. The lack of an integrated regional strategy had left us adrift, and our friends confused. We were offering no leadership or direction. I left my post deeply disturbed that we had shaken our friends’ confidence and created vacuums that our adversaries would exploit.

I was disappointed and frustrated that policymakers all too often failed to deliver clear direction. And lacking a defined mission statement, I frequently didn’t know what I was expected to accomplish. As American naval strategist Alfred Mahan wrote, ‘If the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect.’

Unfortunately, the predicted unraveling of Iraq occurred quickly as ISIS gained strength and geography, and U.S. troops had to return to the fight. Mattis makes a cogent case that self-inflicted strategic errors cost American lives and treasure and did grave injury to U.S. standing with other countries.

In addition, Obama’s failure to live up to his “red line” warning to the Assad regime in August 2012, wherein the former president stated that “a red line for us we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized,” profoundly diminished American credibility. A year later, when the Assad regime in Syria repeated its use of chemical weapons in defiance of Obama’s warning, the President authorized no retaliatory action. “This was a shot not heard around the world,” says Mattis, “Old friends in NATO and in the Pacific registered dismay and incredulity that America’s reputation had been seriously weakened as a credible security partner.”

At the same time, Mattis tempers a warrior’s credo with compassion for innocent victims of war, especially women and children caught up in or near the maelstrom of the battlefield. He rails, for instance, at “the egregious behavior of rogue guards at Abu Ghraib [which] had cost us the moral high ground.” Mattis’ leadership package emphasizes adherence to the law of war as a basic tenet. Even as he speaks often and straightforwardly about his quest to lawfully kill those enemy combatants who stand in the way of his Marines’ mission, and who fail to surrender, he never permits crossing professional or ethical lines. He cites two core principles that may appear to be paradoxical or contradictory to some. For Mattis, they are the essence of leadership in projecting deadly force in areas where civilians reside.

First, don’t stop. Don’t slow down, don’t create a traffic jam. Jab, feint, hit, and move, move, move.

Second, keep your honor clean. Thousands of homes, stores, stalls, and mud and concrete houses lined the roads. Terrified civilians would be in the line of fire. I made it clear that our division would do more than any unit in history to avoid civilian casualties.

The phrase, “no better friend, no worse enemy,” attributed to Roman General Lucius Cornelius Sulla over 2,000 years ago, embraces a fundamental truth for the ethical combatant, and it became Mattis’ calling card.

Mattis challenges innumerable conventional wisdoms. He displays ingenuity and creativity in combat and invites those qualities in his subordinates; dispels rigid adherence to “doctrine” which he conceives as a startup point; and sees “commander’s intent” as a conceptual primer, not a constraint, for commanders who should understand what that intent is and be able to “seize fleeting opportunities under stress.”

Mattis often injects his famous wry sense of humor into a substantive message. He takes apart a mainstay of modern military (and civilian) classrooms and briefings—the PowerPoint:

PowerPoint is the scourge of critical thinking.  It encourages fragmented logic by the briefer and passivity in the listener.  Only a verbal narrative that logically connects a succinct problem statement using rational thinking can develop sound solutions.  PowerPoint is excellent when displaying data; but it makes us stupid when applied to critical thinking. 

Effective leadership must combine discerning, sometimes elusive, qualities for anyone in a position of high authority and responsibility. The ability to inspire others and to cause them to follow with trust and confidence requires a combination of talent, high character, integrity, perseverance, and hard work. A leader of troops in combat must also demonstrate personal courage and presence of mind in the most daunting circumstances. In Call Sign Chaos, Mattis powerfully demonstrates the qualities and actions that define leadership, but, perhaps most important for a work like his and West’s, he shows others what they, too, need to be leaders themselves. 

Notes

1. Col Chris Woodbridge, “Authentic Leadership:  An Interview with General James N. Mattis, USMC (Ret) and Francis J. (Bing) West,” Marine Corps Gazette (Quantico, VA: October 2019).

2. See Call Sign Chaos, Appendix B, which is Gen Mattis’ letter during the Iraq War elaborating on the importance of professional reading. He also lists 58 of his “favorite books.”

3. In a post-publication interview, Gen Mattis said, “Well there’s no doubt in my mind the most enjoyable job is to be an Infantry Platoon Commander where the physical toughness and the mental abilities are on full display to your troops.See “Authentic Leadership.” 

Call Sign Chaos

reviewed by Maj Skip Crawley, USMCR(Ret)

“Why is this guy in the Marine Corps?”

Then-LtCol Mattis to CO, Alpha Co, 1/7

When then-Lieutenant Colonel Mattis took command of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7), I was down at Camp Pendleton participating in the regimental and divisional machinegun and mortar competitions. One afternoon shortly after the competitions wrapped up, I was in the Alpha Company Platoon Commanders’ office and our new battalion commander came into the office carrying my Officer Qualification Record. Obviously, I was the last officer the new battalion commander had yet to meet. We went up to his office. I do not know how we got on the subject, but I told my new CO, “We [the Marine Corps] have too many colonels and lieutenant colonels; we have 600 colonels and 1,600 lieutenant colonels.”1 I also opined that there were officer billets with higher rank than necessary. He asked for an example and my response was, “I read in the Gazette that the division electronic warfare officer is a colonel’s billet.” LtCol Mattis heatedly responded, “I just came from Division G-3, and the Electronic Warfare Officer is a Major’s billet filled by a Captain.” Our conversation went downhill from there, prompting the aforementioned question to my Company Commander.

Spring 1990: Embarked Aboard the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) in Transit to Hawaii for KERNEL BLITZ 90

“This is the worst PME book I’ve ever read.”

Then-1stLt Skip Crawley comment about Forgotten Soldier during Officer’s PME

LtCol Mattis was conducting an Officer PME discussing the Forgotten Soldier by Guy Sajer. When he asked for opinions about the book, I stated the view above. Somewhat taken back, Mattis responded how the book illustrated what the German army could do with the manpower available to it.

Present Day

I served under Gen Mattis the entire time he commanded 1/7, including our DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM combat deployment. From the previous anecdotes, a person might conclude that I dislike Gen Mattis and are probably assuming this is going to be a relatively negative review of Call Sign Chaos:  Learning to Lead. In reality, while Gen Mattis and I got off on the wrong foot, I came to admire him because he is a man of tremendous character and intellect whose profession is the art of war.

A book review should always answer the reader’s question, “Why is it worth my time to read this particular book?” I argue Gen Mattis articulates the answer best:

 Reading is an honor and a gift from a warrior or historian who—a decade or a thousand decades ago—set aside time to write. He distilled a lifetime of campaigning in order to have ‘a conservation’ with you. We have been fighting on this planet for ten thousand years; it would be idiotic and unethical to not take advantage of such accumulated experiences.

You may admire Gen Mattis or you may despise him; I have met plenty of Marines in both camps. But regardless of any personal feelings concerning Gen Mattis, Call Sign Chaos should be read by anyone who desires to be a better practitioner of the art of war by taking “advantage of [General Mattis’] accumulated experiences”.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: 1st Battalion, 7th Marines 

On 31 July 1990, 1/7 was conducting the summer package at Bridgeport. Fifteen days later, we were getting off airplanes in the middle of the night in Saudi Arabia where the temperature was still over 100 degrees. A couple of weeks later, 1/5 and 1/7 took up defensive positions on either side of the main highway leading from the port of Al Jubail to the Kuwait-Saudi border with 3d Light Armored Infantry screening to the north.2  1/5 and 1/7 were glorified “speed bumps.” As a student of military history, I wondered if I was going to be in one of those epic Marine Corps battles such as Iwo Jima or Chosin Reservoir.

 After more forces arrived into theater and it became obvious that we were not fighting Saddam Hussein anytime soon, I noticed that some of my fellow lieutenants were no longer thinking of this as a combat deployment—as illustrated by comments such as, “This is like a UDP deployment except we don’t know when it will end.” One morning, I attended the daily battalion meeting. Alpha Company had just returned to the battalion from our four days back in the oil workers compound.3 No one told me that the morning before Gen Mattis had asked the question: “How many of you think we’ll be fighting the Iraqi Army in 30 days?” Apparently, very few (if any) hands went up; Gen Mattis’ response was both incredibly strong and negative.

When Gen Mattis asked the same question again the next morning, my hand was one of three that went up. I do not recall Gen Mattis’ response word for word, but it was something to the effect that anyone who did not think we were going to be fighting the Iraqi Army in the next 30 days had better get serious about our purpose in Saudi Arabia and get a certain part of their anatomy in gear.

As the day went by, I thought about this incident and it bothered me. I truly believed that we would not engage the Iraqi Army in the next 30 days. Would we someday? More than likely. Did we have to be ready to fight at a moment’s notice? Yes. Was this a combat deployment, not a UDP? Absolutely. That afternoon, I went to Gen Mattis’ hooch and explained how I just did not really think we would fight the Iraqi Army in the next 30 days. “Skip, you’re one of the few people here that I don’t worry about their platoon being combat ready,” he replied.

I realized at that instant that Gen Mattis was concerned about the complacency I had seen and was taking steps to negate it. While I wholeheartedly approved of his action, I would have preferred not to have been a “friendly-fire casualty” of my battalion commander’s necessary action.

If a Marine bought Call Sign Chaos to read only Gen Mattis’ description of how he prepared us for combat, it would be money well spent. The many things he did to get us ready for combat, such as “imaging,” matching “personalities to anticipated tasks,” and “rehearsing” for combat vice generic “training,” serves as a tutorial in how to make a unit extremely combat effective. 

I want to expound on one point Gen Mattis brings up. It may seem counterintuitive, but I have always felt that Bridgeport was the best training—except for CAX live fire—our battalion could have received prior to deploying to the desert. During the Bridgeport summer package, my platoon fielded twenty-plus Marines: about half the strength I had in the desert. But my eventual platoon sergeant and all three section leaders in DESERT STORM were at Bridgeport in lower ranking billets then they held when 1/7 rolled across the line of departure. The core of the platoon I lead into Kuwait was formed in the mountains of the Sierra Nevada. As Gen Mattis highlights, learning “the personalities” of the Marines you serve with and developing “tighter bonds” with them in one environment will carry over to combat, even if the actual combat is in a completely different climatic environment. 

What Gen Mattis did as our battalion commander to make 1/7 as combat effective as possible is entirely consistent with his actions later in more senior combat commands. Since I only have personal knowledge of Gen Mattis during his time in command of 1/7, I will leave to others who have served with or under Gen Mattis to express their views of him as a combat commander at higher echelons. However, I intend to discuss two paramount attributes that made Gen Mattis the combat leader he was: character and intellect.  

Character

A few years after DESERT STORM, I went up to Twentynine Palms to see my former battalion commander, who was now the CO, 7th Marines. Gen Mattis told me that following DESERT STORM he spoke with another colonel about getting the awards for his 1/7 Marines approved. When the colonel expressed indignation in response to his effort to ensure that his Marines were given the awards they earned, Mattis then “suggested they take off their blouses and have it out.” This was the action of a commander who was concerned about his Marines getting the recognition they deserved vice being concerned about the potential negative effect it might have on his future career.4

Throughout Call Sign Chaos, Gen Mattis states numerous times he was “ready to go home” and how this mindset “freed me to not worry about my next command and focus instead on doing the best job I could in the one I had.” I can personally attest to this. During KERNEL BLITZ 90, part of Alpha Company conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) at Schofield Barracks. The NEO scenario was poorly conducted by the exercise coordinators. For some reason, the senior exercise coordinator would not allow me to utilize the busses (standing in for CH-53s) to evacuate the “civilians” to the beach the day after we arrived. We were forced to wait until the next morning to evacuate the civilians. In an actual NEO, I could have chosen to disobey the order and conduct the evacuation immediately—if I was willing to accept the responsibility for my decision. As we sat on the beach discussing this, Gen Mattis stated that if he was faced with a similar situation, he would have disobeyed the order and accepted the consequences. He continued to say that if his superiors disagreed with his decision and relieved of command, “I’ll just go home and be an onion farmer in Washington.” 

Intellect

I want to highlight three aspects concerning Gen Mattis’ view of studying history. First, no matter how much combat experience an individual has, they cannot have personal experience of every possible tactical situation: “During planning and before going into battle, I could cite specific examples of how others had solved similar challenges.”5 Second, the nature of war does not change because neither does human nature. This is why reading and studying history is so important; no historical situation is a perfect analog for a present day challenge. However, “History teaches that we face nothing new under the sun.” Lastly, knowing history in and of itself does not directly accomplish anything; however, “Reading sheds light on the dark path ahead. By traveling into the past, I enhance my grasp of the present.”

Recently, I was talking to someone else who served under Gen Mattis as a lieutenant in 1/7 during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. He agreed with me that Gen Mattis had an affinity for those officers who viewed the Marine Corps as a profession, not a vocation, and endeavored to “study (vice just read) history.” But he made the sage observation that Gen Mattis looked for those officers who have that intellect while being able to “take a punch” in combat and keep moving. All the intellect in the world is useless if you are unable to apply it in combat. Without question, character is more important than intellect.

Conclusion

I do have one problem with Call Sign Chaos. At times, Gen Mattis examines things with an idealized view. In one instance he notes,

We [company commanders] worked out our command kinks without wasting the time of our subordinates, who were relentlessly rehearsing.

I personally observed some lieutenants who were not serious about preparing their platoons for combat until December when DESERT SHIELD forces were being doubled to provide President George H.W. Bush the option of invading Kuwait. The difference between an officer “relentlessly rehearsing” his unit in order to prepare it for combat and an officer who tries to convince himself a combat deployment is a UDP deployment is the same as someone who views being a Marine officer as a profession rather than a vocation.

It’s well known among Marines that our greatest honor is fighting alongside our fellow sailors and Marines. I know that our soldiers, airmen, and Coast Guardsmen feel the same.

Overlooking the reality that many “soldiers, airmen, and Coast Guardsmen” join the military for reasons that have utterly nothing to do with combat—in fact, that is the last thing they want—not all Marines feel “that our greatest honor” is combat. We want all Marines to join our Corps for the right reasons and manifest the attitude Gen Mattis states above; unfortunately, reality is often different.6

Call Sign Chaos is a book all Marine officers and anyone else who desires to become more proficient at the art of war should read and study. Gen Mattis has “distilled a lifetime of campaigning” in Call Sign Chaos:  Learning to Lead. Allow Gen Mattis to converse with you to make you more lethal on your next battlefield. I enthusiastically recommended this for inclusion on the Commandant’s Professional Reading List.

Notes

1. I had recently read books such as “Fighting Power” by Martin Van Creveld and “A Genius for War” by Trevor DuPuy that discussed officer-to-enlisted ratios and other issues and how they affected combat effectiveness.

2. Following Desert Storm, Light Armored Infantry Battalions were re-designated as Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions

3. 1/7 established a 16-day routine: One rifle company (plus 1/3 of Weapons Company and H&S Company) would go back to a compound built for oil workers for 4 days to live in air conditioning and eat some real food. The last 4 days the entire battalion maneuvered as a unit to the new laager site.

4. General Mattis discusses the entire issue of awards and the letter he “wrote to the MEF Commander, Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, with my concerns” on pages 37-38 of Call Sign Chaos.

5. Not surprisingly, Call Sign Chaos is replete with historical examples General Mattis used to guide his decisions and actions.

6. In my weapons platoon, my platoon sergeant suddenly developed “back pain” in late November when it was apparent we were preparing to invade Kuwait and was allowed to go home. Shortly after we arrived in Saudi Arabia, a sergeant in my platoon claimed he had AIDS and had to go home. Shortly before Desert Storm started, HQMC inexplicably allowed some Marines to leave if they had an end of active service within a certain date window. I had one Lance Corporal fall in that category. I tried to talk him into staying, but he took his “out”. I cannot call him a coward like the other two because the Marine Corps gave him that out. Furthermore, in my career, I have worked with SNCOs who have retired from the Marine Corps with 20-30 years of service—and not one day in combat.