Author: Ambershay Cooper

The Force Design 2030 report was recently released by our 38th Commandant largely answering the “Why” many of the decisions were made and the thought process behind the decisions allowing what many are calling the most drastic force design the Marine Corps has ever seen. History reveals very few times such a comprehensive review of the Marine Corps has been completed. My mind circles back to the Hogaboom report many moons ago.

Many readers of this post may be absent from the world of social media. If that is the case, it is important to know a large discussion has been, and will continue to occur on this subject matter in that forum, mainly occurring on Twitter. A discussion recently occurred on an article published by 30 year Marine Corps veteran Mark Cancian from the Center for Strategic and International Studies who brought up legitimate concerns of the recent force design stating (https://www.csis.org/analysis/marine-corps-radical-shift-toward-china):

“Radical change brings risks, and this effort is no different. Risks arise from the lack of hedging, the movement away from current operations, and the uncertain viability of the new war-fighting concepts. If the Marine Corps has misjudged the future, it will fight the next conflict at a great disadvantage or, perhaps, be irrelevant.“

Although I don’t agree with some of the statements made in the article, I know Mr. Cancian is no slouch in the intellect department from his previous works, and his concerns are valid to many onlookers.

This is a natural discourse for anyone observing the decisions being made, especially what many would call radical or revolutionary. However, I do not believe this Force Design was a shot from the hip aimed at some far off target, but instead a work of precision resulting from many great minds and data driven war-games.

If one circles back to the on-going discussions in the social media realm (Twitter mostly) many can speculate, but very few individuals actually know the calculus the FD 2030 discusses. Rightfully so. The ability to keep war-gaming results to those who have a need to know in terms of classification leave many, myself included, to arm chair quarterback the results. Self-study can help bridge the gap, but will never bring any of us who are not in the room when those decisions are made to fully understand how and why each decision was made. FD 2030 is a great place to start for many to begin to appreciate the process.

General Berger discusses his experience and history with war-gaming. Reviewing his biography it seems his career path has naturally complimented his ability to appreciate and understand force design when it comes to the Marine Corps. His roles have encompassed MAGTF-TC, I MEF, MARFORPAC, MCCDC/CD&I, and now Commandant. From his time in Twentynine Palms (which encompasses Bridgeport, MAWTS-1–very important when you think of MAGTF integration, training, and the role aviation plays in USMC) to his role at MCCDC, who is now the singular touch point for the Marine Corps driving the force design. The social media discussions are entertaining, and many can war-game and predict shortfalls with the current plan using their own experiences, but a large majority are not privy to the data that helped drive these decisions and are left making assumptions without data to support them. This should not keep any Marine from providing critical and data driven feedback to try and improve upon FD 2030. In fact, I think many discussions had on social media yield tremendous value and look for holes in the current plan to improve the future force.

So, what does this mean? It means the CPG is on glide slope reaching CMC’s priority #1, and the Marine Corps is changing as delineated by the requirements set forth by the NDS, NMS, and DPG. It also means the USMC is going back to its naval heritage and from open-source reporting it seems with the full support and integration of the Chief of Naval Operations and the US Navy.

This is a great first step, but my concern is as the Marine Corps develops the force of the future our manpower systems, promotion and command boards, remain largely unchanged. The Marine Corps may be left with the correct force structure for the future without the right people to lead it.

I have watched the US Army revolutionize the orders issuing process and revamp their command screening boards. A recent MARADMIN discussed M&RA meeting with the Army for lessons learned on these programs. Until funding is provided to increase the technology the USMC uses to recruit, retain, and promote the Force of 2030, the full potential of this force will be left untapped. The USMC must provide the funding required to improve a largely antiquated system. If budgeting, which can take considerable time to include the POM cycle, prevents implementation of certain aspects for improving the manpower model, many options, provided by Tim Kane author of “Bleeding Talent”, can be implemented without legislation or money (https://www.hoover.org/news/hoover-fellow-contributes-military-personnel-system-reforms).

The CPG states, “Everything starts and ends with the individual Marine” to which I wholeheartedly agree. It also states that the Marine Corps is not tied to any piece of equipment or acquisition program. If we have shaped the force of the future, are on a path to divest ourselves of antiquated systems and unwarranted capabilities, it is now time to retain, promote, and place each Marine within that force in the right place at the right time to maximize the full potential of Force of 2030.

by Major R. W. Pallas

“Body and spirit, I surrendered whole, to harsh instructors, and received a soul.”

-Rudyard Kipling

War memoirs, or reflections, fictional or otherwise, are hard to compete with–especially in the Marine Corps. You can start chronologically with the fictional work by Anton Myrer, a US Marine, who penned “Once an Eagle”. It continues with works such as “With the Old Breed” by Eugene Sledge, and “Goodbye, Darkness” by William Manchester. James Webb brings us front and center to the Vietnam conflict with “Fields of Fire” only to be complimented by “Matterhorn” written by Karl Marlantes. You’ll quickly realize Marlantes provides a work of “fiction” leaving the reader to question where the blurred line of reality starts and ends as you thumb through the pages of his other work “What it is Like to Go to War”. Fictional or not, these Marines left an indelible mark capturing specific time periods of conflict.

I fall into the category of the new war, the next generation. My generation was led through the infant stages of our careers reading Nathaniel Fick’s “One Bullet Away” desperately searching to fulfill the same calling he sought:

“In Athens or Sparta, my decision would have been easy. I felt as if I had been born too late. There was no longer a place in the world for a young man who wanted to wear armor and slay dragons…I wanted something more transformative. Something that might kill me…” (Fick, N. “One Bullet Away” Kindle page 4)

That book opened the door to the new war, the HBO “Generation Kill” crowd. The war was quickly summarized over time by other services and authors hallmarked by the tragic events of Patrick Tillman captured by Jon Krakauer in “Where Men Win Glory” and the widely televised Abu Ghraib incident. Colonel Andy Milburn provides a work that seems to bring a sense of pride to what many call the “Long Wars”, some even the “Lost Wars.” Colonel Milburn dictates the story I feel many veterans, myself included, of those wars wished to be conveyed. In a world of conflicting views and ethical dilemmas, Colonel Milburn provides a simple answer to why many of us were there, or continue to serve in that theater:

“Although I am the one telling the story, it is intended to be as much about those with whom I served as it is about me. Because I am a Marine-and without, I hope, appearing parochial-much of this story is about Marines, who in a sense belong to a world of their own. With its emphasis on ritual, tradition, obedience and hierarchy, the Marine Corps is a culture far removed from the society that it protects…

The Marines who landed with me in Mogadishu were much the same as those who marched on Baghdad, captured Fallujah, and subsequently took the fight to ISIS in Northern Iraq…” (A.Milburn page xi).

The fabric of the uniforms change from generation to generation, but the fabric to which each and every Marine is cut remains constant. Andy Milburn gives the new generation a voice through telling his own story. A story gripped with inconsolable loss (both personal and professional), fear, and gut-wrenching hardship through painstakingly clearing a city overcome by terrorists. One, single, door, at a time–fully knowing there is nothing but the possibility of pure, unyielding death on the other side of each and every door. Only to find himself, years later, trying to gain back the bloodied territory Marines so valiantly won years before.

His story is not a heroic take, in fact, many lessons he bestows as what not to do should something similar arise in your own career. He also conveys the great burden of command, time away from family as a husband and father, empty phone calls and e-mails in an attempt to generate any semblance of normalcy, and the weight of decision-making in combat that comes with the enhanced responsibilities as he progresses from enlisted to officer spanning a 31 year career.

In one of my favorite lines from the book he encapsulates the gravity to which accompanies increased rank:

“His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to follow orders.” -elder Von Moltke (A. Milburn pg. 117)

This tale is one any service member can find solace in, and one to which I believe Andy searches for himself documenting not just the glory of success on the battlefields, but the broken relationships, lives, and his own personal journey as he tries to find the meaning of it all, and answer the question, “Was it all really worth it?”

“I do believe that we are a force for good here, Andy”…He climbed onto his rack and stared at the ceiling. “But some of the shit that happens here is going to stay with me for a long time,” he said, and closed his eyes.

Despite Rocco’s words, I was mired in guilt. Guilt for our callous entry into that family’s lives, leaving them forever changed while ours went on as before. (A. Milburn, pg. 178)

As the story unfolds Colonel Milburn provides a level of transparency that almost enables many others to do the same. The loss for both personal and professional events leaves Colonel Milburn with a challenge left to face on his own–like so many of us. His candid account of physical and mental exhaustion far from the battlefield reveals the toll many service members battle long after the kinetic events unfolded.

“a profession that commits them to being instruments, not architects, of national policy. That is the lot that they have chosen. “Theirs is not to reason why; theirs is but to do and die,” in the words of Victorian poet, Lord Alfred Tennyson.” (A. Milburn pg. 313)

I am a Marine Aviator by trade and have never cleared a door, gone through the funnel of death entering a building, or shot a round toward the enemy, but strangely enough relate to every page penned by Colonel Milburn as a fellow wearer of the cloth. In fact, two short months ago, holding my six month old daughter, my own past came back to me as my wife and I sat in our Hawaii home on a cool Sunday afternoon.

Watching a documentary about an Army Apache unit on the initial push into Iraq, faulty intelligence put their flight path over the largest Iraqi unit in the country, them never knowing. In the monochromatic hue of green that filled the screen, mimicking the image of night vision goggles, I heard and saw the tracer fire riddle the sky intermingled with rockets. I was transported back to almost a decade earlier on my first deployment, never realizing I had never dealt with the events that occurred on January 11, 2012. By the time I actually heard the voice of my wife asking me, “Do you need a moment?” I sat in embarrassment as she picked up my daughter and walked quietly downstairs. I never realized I sat soaked in sweat with tears running down my eyes sitting on the couch reliving the events from almost a decade before. In the words of Colonel Milburn, “Only then did I realize what a strain it had been trying to tamp down the chaos inside, while pretending that nothing was wrong.” (A. Milburn, pg. 314).

I share that story because Colonel Milburn took the time to share his own. We are a storied culture, with a historic past captured by the men and women who take the time to painfully pen down their own personal accounts opening themselves to the world about the events of their own lives–in one way extremely cathartic, another way, extremely delicate as the world is now aware of something so very personal. But this is how we heal, this is why we write.

Colonel Milburn’s work is the perfect 10/10 in my opinion. It will be added to the list of quintessential memoirs for the men and women who have served during that time period.

Personally, I owe him a debt of gratitude as his story has enabled me to confront my own past. He has also opened the door for the next brave soul to take pen to paper and write the next memoir for those who continue to fight.

The Corps is in the midst of a historic effort to redesign the force to meet the challenges of this new age of great power competition.  To gain an understanding of the progress to date, the force design methodology and the institutional changes required going forward read and comment on the Commandant’s Force Design 2030 report here.

Ryan Evans of War on the Rocks spoke with Berger about the recently released Force Design 2030 report to “get the inside story of these reforms, which he describes as being in their earliest phase.” According to Gen Berger  “This is not the end of the journey, but rather the beginning.” The Commandant “calls upon more voices to chime in with criticism to ensure the Marine Corps is ready for the future of war.” You can find the podcast here:

A Chat with the Commandant: Gen. David H. Berger on the Marine Corps’ New Direction

Reviewed by Maj Skip Crawley

ADOPTING MISSION COMMAND:  DEVELOPING LEADERS FOR A SUPERIOR COMMAND CULTURE.  By  Donald E. Vandergriff.  Annapolis, Maryland:  Naval Institute Press, 2019.    ISBN: 9781682471043. 309 pp.  Hardcover $41.33.

      The thesis of Adopting Mission Command:  Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture by Maj Donald E. Vandergriff, former Marine and Major, U.S. Army (Ret.) is that   today’s complex operating environment requires leaders who are adaptable, professionally well-grounded and capable of executing mission command (more familiarly known to Marines as “mission orders”).  Vandergriff does an excellent job of providing a historical perspective on mission command; explaining the importance of institutionalizing mission command within the Army and offers some specific ideas as to how to achieve that objective.  But about halfway through Adopting Mission Command, I feel Vandergriff loses his way, discussing topics that are only tangentially related to his purpose.  This might be because a substantial portion of Adopting Mission Command is a “reprinting of parts or whole of previous articles into chapters or sections in this book”.  Vandergriff then finishes strong discussing how the current Army Reconnaissance Course “builds and evolves the traits of adaptability and independence demanded under a culture of Auftragstaktik” and discusses MG John S. “Tiger” Wood, the Commanding General of the 4^th Armored Division under General George S. Patton in World War II, who utilized mission orders to great effect.  

Mission Command — Auftragstaktik

     Adopting Mission Command starts out with a short discussion of John Boyd and his well-known OODA Loop[1] which provides a launch pad for Vandergriff’s thesis that the institutionalization of Auftragstaktik (“‘mission-type orders’ or ‘mission command’”) in the US Army is imperative given the rapidly changing tactical and operational environment combat leaders find themselves in today.  Vandergriff devotes a considerable amount of discussion on how the Prussian/German Army of the 19^th and 20^th Centuries utilized mission command principles; the education and training of their officers; their institutionalization of mission command and how this increased the German Army’s combat effectiveness in war.  Interestingly, the German Army placed considerable importance on the concept of Verantwortungsfreudigkeit, “the joy of taking responsibility”:

Why is it important for an officer to enjoy responsibility?  Independence was what equipped an officer to handle uncertainty and still make independent decisions.  But when faced with the horrors of the battlefield an officer needs more than just independence to keep him vigorous.  When everything is difficult and everyone around him seems to have given up that is when the feeling of responsibility kicks in.  It is the feeling that it is up to him to decide the outcome of the engagement when everyone else has given up…” (Italics added by reviewer.)

     This rings true.  Small unit leaders must be ready to go the last mile in order to will their units to accomplish the mission when all their subordinates are tired.  On a much larger scale, generals in command of armies require the strength of character to make decisions that have the potential to result in thousands of deaths.  There were many differences between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee.  Grant was “a man indistinguishable in a crowd even in uniform”; Lee was “patrician, scion of the First Families of Virginia”.[2]  The Union general was an excellent strategist; the Confederate general, an excellent tactician.  But both generals manifested an American version of Verantwortungsfreudigkeit.  Neither general hesitated to issues orders and take ultimate responsibility for the lives of tens of thousands of men. 

     Transitioning to the US Army, Vandergriff explores the historical background and institutional choices that have resulted in today’s personnel policies and other organizational attributes that are detrimental to mission command and offers suggestions to correct the problems.  Vandergriff makes the interesting observation that perhaps the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has outlived its usefulness.  TRADOC was established in 1973 during “the Army’s transformation from a conscript to a volunteer (but not yet a professional) Army”:

 “General DePuy’s personal leadership philosophy became the institutional culture for how to train… [his] personal experiences with draftees and volunteers reinforced his beliefs about how such forces would have to be prepared to fight that war and win.  He believed that there was insufficient time and capacity to develop civilians into professional soldiers.  Therefore, the institution would have to be top-down and in centralized hierarchies able to “tell them what to do, tell them how to do it, and check that they did it right.”

     The DePuy[3] construct was adopted for the needs of a different time and a different Army.  Unfortunately, to a large extent this construct is still in place.  Vandergriff says “To their great credit, senior Army leaders are fully aware of this… [but] there has long been a disconnect between the intentions of the Army’s senior leaders and the execution to achieve those intentions by the organization itself”.  The solution Vandergriff advocates is that the Army adopt Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBT&E); sometimes currently referred to as Adaptive Soldier Leader Training and Education (ASLT&E):

Simply put, OBT&E looks for results.  It puts a greater burden of professionalism (including accountability for prior knowledge and training) on the shoulder of the student, with guidance from the instructor.  OBT&E is best described as ‘developmental training,’ that is, development of the individual within the training of military tasks.

     Most of the balance of Adopting Mission Command is devoted to explaining how to implement OBT&E/ASLT&E.  Vandergriff’s recommendations about how to implement OBT&E/ASLT&E in Tactical Decision Games, force-on-force exercises and war gaming are excellent; but then he goes into detail as to how to conduct these evolutions.   However, Adopting Mission Command is not a training manual intended to provide a detailed explanation on how to conduct these evolutions, but to make “the case for advancing the Army culture toward Auftragstaktik”.  This detracts from an otherwise excellent book.         

Conclusion

     Adopting Mission Command finishes on a strong note.  Vandergriff discusses the Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC) at Fort Benning, GA, holding it up as an excellent example of OBT&E/ASLT&E training.  Lastly, Vandergriff holds up MG Wood, famed armored division commander, as an outstanding practitioner of maneuver warfare and Auftragstaktik.  Unlike most other US Army armored divisions in World War II, Wood constantly changed the mix of maneuver battalions under the combat commands every few days.[4]  I often wondered how Wood was able to do this and still have the teamwork and cohesion within his combat commands necessary for effective combat units.  Vandergriff explains:

“Constant maneuver training, in all conditions, enabled the commanders of companies, battalions, and the combat commands of the division to know each other as officers seldom do.”

and

“… Wood’s battalion commanders and the division command learned to recognize each other by voice [over the radio] — authentication by familiarization.”    

     I found Adopting Mission Command interesting, insightful and informative.  Highly recommended for anyone who wants a deeper understanding about mission command; aka, Auftragstaktik or mission orders, and the importance of institutionalizing it.

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[1]Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action (OODA) Loop

[2] Jean Edward Smith, Grant, (New York:  Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2001)

[3] General William DePuy served in the 90^th Infantry Division during World War II as a battalion commander and division operations officer.  Observing and experiencing the poor training and combat effectiveness of draftees, DePuy spent the rest of his career as one of the Army’s leading “trainers”; culminating in command of TRADOC, where he was able to implement his philosophy Army-wide.   

[4] The so-called “light” armored divisions the US Army fielded during World War II — of which the 4^th Armored Division was one — had 3 combat commands (regimental-level organizations) and “nine [maneuver] battalions: three armor, three [armored] infantry, and three artillery” that most division commanders semi-permanently attached to the combat commands to facilitate teamwork and cohesion and minimize friction.  

Here is an excellent book about the imperative for forces engaged in land operations (the “close combat” elements of US Army and the Marine Corps) to adopt and institutionalize Mission Command.  The author, Donald E.  Vandergriff, provides detailed explanations of the Mission Command Philosophy, defined by the Army as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within commander’s intent to empower agile adaptive leaders…” 

Indeed, the Principles of Mission Command are wholly consistent with the Corps’ maneuver warfare warfighting philosophy:

Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.

Create shared understanding

Provide a clear commander’s intent

Exercise disciplined initiative.

Use mission orders.

Accept prudent risk.

Later, the book goes into great detail explaining techniques to incorporate Mission Command into training and education such as Tactical Decision Games, and force-on-force exercises.   Are these “excursions” into the application of Mission Command in unit training effective and useful? 

Gathered here is a collection of posts from the Gazette blogging community at large. Subjects vary from Strategy and Defense Policy to Professional Development and more. You are invited to read and comment, and if you have a subject you want to add, visit our Gazette Blog Resources page for more information on how to participate in the Gazette Blog!

by William Treuting

To a civilian, Andrew Milburn’s When the Tempest Gathers offers a unique insight into conflicts that which many Americans know little of. Milburn vividly narrates his experiences, allowing one to better comprehend how the United States, and the Marine Corps in particular, conducted itself throughout the many conflicts of the past few decades. While Milburn is the protagonist of his own story, the depth of his perspective and illuminate the personal costs, violent consequences, and unintended results of U.S. military action over the previous decades. Many Americans could not locate the places where Milburn and other American servicemembers fought on a map, let alone understand the nuances of fighting the Global War on Terror in one of the most tumultuous and confusing socio-political regions on Earth. However, having written this book in a colloquial tone, Milburn combines emotion with acute detail to synthesize how his personal experiences are part of a larger collective experience, which underlines his intent: “to provide some insight into what it’s like the fight America’s wars.” It is the personal experiences of individuals such as Milburn which puts a face to the thousands of individuals who serve their country—regardless of the circumstances.

To those serving in America’s armed forces, Milburn provides a litany of applicable lessons from which all servicemembers can learn from—especially on cooperating with the armed forces of partner nations.  Milburn’s experiences in working alongside foreign soldiers is indicative of the difficulties that our servicemembers face when cooperating with allies and partners. Milburn, who benefited from his global upbringing, demonstrated a significant amount of cultural understanding and patience when working with foreign forces. The issue of how to properly work with allied and partner nations is a frequently reoccurring problem addressed by authors in the Marine Corps Gazette. As the Marine Corps reorients itself to face current threats—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—there is an understanding that America will not face these threats alone, which will require cooperation with foreign soldiers. 

Below, I offer a small sample of histories and films of nations which with we may one day have to work with in a major military conflict.  For each country, I chose two books—a general overarching history and a military history—as well a popular military-related film produced by that country.  For the larger, overarching histories, I tried to find the most recent and reputable works which analyze the internal narrative of each country.  For military histories, I endeavored to find histories which either analyze conflicts these counties had with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, or were indicative of that country’s military experiences.  My reasoning for including films is to demonstrate how many of these nations self-perceive their military and to determine the cultural values, beliefs, and mores that exist within these nations’ military narratives. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, and although I researched each work to ensure its reputability by the scholarly community, they only offer one perspective.  Rather, my intent was to initiate a starting point for those who wish to better understand the nations and militaries with whom we might have to cooperate in future conflicts.  Analyzing the history and perspective of potential allies and partner nations may help give Marines an edge in creating a productive and cooperative relationship with foreign soldiers.

Ukraine:

The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine by Serhii Plokhy

The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know by Serhy Yekelchyk

Breaking Point: The War for Democracy in Ukraine directed by Mark Jonathan Harris and Oles Sanin

Finland:

A Concise History of Finland by David Kirby

Finland at War: The Winter War 1939–40 by Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen, and Chris Birks

The Unknown Soldier 1955 film directed by Edvin Lane or the 2017 version directed by Aku Louhimies

Republic of Korea:

Korea Old and New: A History by Carter J. Eckert, Ki-Baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner

Taegukgi directed by Kang Je-gyu

Vietnam:

Vietnam: A New History by Christopher Goscha

Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991 by Xiaoming Zhang

The Abandoned Field: Free Fire Zone directed by Nguyễn Hồng Sến

India:

India: A History by John Keay

China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World by Bertil Lintner

72 Hours: Martyr Who Never Died directed by Avinash Dhyani

Taiwan:

Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan by Jonathan Manthorpe

The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China by Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu Hui

Philippines:

History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos by Luis H. Francia

Frustrated Ambition: General Vicente Lim and the Philippine Military Experience, 1910–1944 by Richard Bruce Meixsel

Manila, Open City directed by Eddie Romero

Turkey:

Turkey: A Short History by Norman Stone

A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East by David Fromkin

Breath directed by Levent Semerci

Japan:

A History of Japan: Revised Edition by R. H. P. Mason

The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 edited by Mark Peattie

Battle of Okinawa directed by Kihachi Okamoto

Indonesia:

A Brief History of Indonesia: Sultans, Spices, and Tsunamis: The Incredible Story of Southeast Asia’s Largest Nation by Tim Hannigan

Confrontation the War with Indonesia, 1962–1966 by Nicholas van der Bijl

Merah Putih directed by Yadi Sugandi