Artificial Intelligence in the Marine Corps Logistics Enterprise: Part 2

Part 2: It’s not pretty: How ugly is AI progress in the Marine Corps logistics?
>See Part 1 for bios.

This is the second article in our three-part series. The first article discussed the topic of artificial intelligence and how it relates to Marine Corps logistics operations. This article describes how the advancement of our logistics enterprise toward artificial intelligence (AI) cannot rest on highly developed technologies alone.

LtCol Wolfe: I was a previous commander of the 3rd Supply Battalion, a large multifunctional logistics organization; I had a 75 percent and 25 percent rule. Success and effectiveness in running an organization extend beyond effectiveness and efficiency at the operations level. Seventy-five percent of my time was devoted to the tone, temper, and climate of the organization. In other words, things like vision, influence, morale, equality, leadership, mentorship, and decision making affect the entire organization. Beyond this, there were the daily requirements that consumed my time: substance abuse control, legal matters, personnel management, medical/dental readiness, training, inspections, safety, career planning, package routing, maintenance, facilities, budget, and the endless amount of paperwork that must be signed. Twenty-five percent of my time was left over for operations improvement and development. I focused on the conceptual aspects of command, not the technical ones. I relied on and trusted the technical acumen of those professionals embedded within the organization.

Maj Barnes: I was the operations officer for Combat Logistics Battalion 22, a small battalion with a broad set of capabilities (motor transportation, maintenance, medical readiness, supply, engineering, landing support, explosive ordnance disposal, and communications). The battalion had roughly 300 Marines and sailors who possessed around 80 occupational specialties. Due to the broad scope and narrow depth of the battalion, all personnel issues and considerations were unequivocally linked to battalion operations—Marines and sailors become the “one-of-one” capability. The cornerstone of the job was a balancing act to ensure capabilities are maintained and ready amidst incredibly dynamic personnel shifts (permanent change of station orders, promotions, disciplinary actions, end of service, injuries, etc.).

The Problem: Conceptually
The Marine Corps has a group of smart officers that adapt very well. The Marine Corps culture fosters adaptability and decision making with uncertainty extremely well. Unfortunately, the manpower system pays little attention to innate talents, college degrees, or commercial work history. It does not seem to be recruiting specific talent to handle our future data-driven challenges. Instead, it is purely a numbers game. For example, the offensive coordinator does not recruit specific quarterback talent from a pool of college baseball and minor league players. Likewise, Amazon is not recruiting supply chain managers or business analytics or distribution experts from the geology department at Penn State; they are looking for top-performing applicants from the business and statistics departments who have internship experience. The Basic School is often the luck of the draw, with Marines thrown into the logistics world with no formal understanding or passion for the field, and they then receive cursory training in our schoolhouses. There is no clear path to an advanced understanding of how logistics operate and the data that supports decisions and feeds new technology. Some military skills need to be developed within the Marine Corps because there is not a commercial industry talent pool: infantry, artillery, etc. However, this is not the case with logistics. Logistics and analytics are in every industry, every university, and every business model. But the Marine Corps training model for logistics and supply officers takes a wide range of individuals and begins their training from zero. This method does not allow for gaining efficiencies provided by university degrees or the latest industry applications. Progress, improvements, and innovation are systematically stunted by the current methods of assigning occupational specialties.

The battleground for AI progress is ugly and full of shortfalls that must be addressed. We will describe the people and skills shortfalls within the Marine Corps’ logistics enterprise, which we believe must be addressed prior to the exploitation of AI. We are not saying that we are bad at logistics; however, through the spectrum of business analytics, the Marine Corps logistics enterprise is not prepared to transition current practices toward AI for logistics command and control and decision making. Logisticians across the Marine Corps possess the conceptual understanding, but there is an exceptionally large gap in the technical abilities to transition raw data and information into useful AI systems.

We propose that our logistics business structure is off. Structurally, Marine Corps logistics is missing key business attributes within its skills progression. Do not be fooled—the Marine Corps logistics enterprise is a business, even though the business is not driven by profit. It is a business because it is driven by decisions about how to manage scarce resources. Business analytics is a significant technical skill required at supervisory and middle management levels, and we propose that it is an altogether missing element in the administration of our logistics structure. Advanced systems will not solve people problems. Back to the football example, a perfect system, designed by the greatest football offensive coordinator, will not reach its full potential without appropriately skilled players to execute it. So, who are the players?

Data Skills Requirement
The major players in implementing artificial intelligence must possess two critical attributes. First, they must have a deep understanding of Marine Corps logistics. Secondly, they must have a high aptitude for technical skills around data analytics.

In the previous article, we described that business analytics is the precursor to artificial intelligence. We also explained that business analytics encompasses data, information, and knowledge. To expand on that concept further, the science of analytics is generally divided into three fields of study: descriptive analytics, predictive analytics, and prescriptive analytics. The core competencies of descriptive analytics are rooted in statistical analysis. Predictive analytics builds on descriptive by creating models to predict outcomes based on information. And, finally, prescriptive analytics focuses on what should happen in the future. In other words, based on the predictions, what decision should be made to affect the predicted outcome?

Across the three fields of analytics, data visualization is a key component. Data visualization serves two very critical functions. First, the human brain has strong and natural abilities to observe patterns. Therefore, data visualization is a critical step for understanding data and relationships. Second, data visualization is a very powerful tool to convey relationships and communicate concepts to individuals with a wide range of skills and abilities. Data visualization makes concepts from analytics tangible and understandable to people, even when they do not fully understand the deepest technical aspects.

Business analytics software generally falls into two categories: business intelligence and business analytics applications. According to IBM, business intelligence is “an umbrella term for the technology that enables data preparation, data mining, data management, and data visualization.”1 The software company, Oracle Corporation, compares business intelligence and business analytics by stating the purpose of business analytics:  To make data-driven predictions about the likelihood of future outcomes, business analytics uses next-generation technology, such as machine learning, data visualization, and natural language query.2

The variety of available tools and resources to perform business analytics/intelligence are too numerous to cover in this article. However, it is worth mentioning a few entry-level software platforms that are well-known and highly used. First and foremost, Excel can run various basic analytics and Marine Corps logistics personnel do not typically scratch the surface of its inherent capabilities; for example, think solver. Going beyond Excel, other powerful data analytics programs include PowerBI, Tableau, R, and R-studio. These programs are more powerful than Excel and are specifically designed to perform business analytics/intelligence tasks. These programs are important because they are capable of handling data and transforming information into actionable insights to inform leaders as they make decisions.

Current, Disorganized Systems
Maj Barnes: While at Penn State, I chose to pursue a professional certification in business analytics in addition to a master’s degree in supply chain management. During the coursework, my eyes were opened to the expansive world of business analytics and its applications. Reflecting on what I learned in the classroom, I looked back on my recent operations officer billet. I had hands-on, daily interaction with a multitude of digital platforms to perform and track battalion operations. The best way to describe the experience is segregated and misaligned. It is a common occurrence that, when there is a data call for training, organizations will use Marine Corps Training Information System metrics, but the Marine Corps Training Information System does not match the morning report, and the morning report is different than 3270 because updates are pending. Then, once the final roster is identified, it is discovered that a lance corporal that checked in two days ago received the training at his previous unit, but it never got entered. Furthermore, there is a corporal that checked out of the unit on temporary-duty orders 25 days ago, but he is at a remote training location and cannot be reached, and he did not receive the training that is reflected in our Marine Corps Training Information System. The S-1, S-3, sergeants major, and the individual sections spend hours tracking this information down. All this is, of course, happening in the background as general update briefs, along with PowerPoint representations of maintenance readiness information, are being refreshed. Furthermore, there is other information that must be collected, analyzed, and reported for readiness reporting in DRRS-MC. Put simply, it is too much—too much information, too many systems, and too much redundant effort.

Excess in anything is not a good thing. There are seven deadly sins in supply chain management implementation that are routinely discussed, one of which is having too many options from which to choose.3 In our search among high-level organizations, it was discovered that the Marine Corps logistics enterprise has over one hundred information systems that are used, partially used, or available but ignored by the logistics community, and it is unclear who owns and controls the systems. There are too many managing systems functioning in fast-changing environments. Too many tools and data repositories lurk in the shadows. It is hard to keep pace and know where these systems hide. Most do not interact with one another; rather, they are silos that operate independently. The number of systems is so numerous that many officers do not know they exist, much less how to maneuver within them. Marine Corps logistics information and data are everywhere and nowhere. AI cannot save that business model.

Data collection is a good thing, but with unbounded collection comes risk; indeed, too much data can be worse than not enough. It is clear that there is a wide variety of elements within Marine Corps logistics production that must be monitored. Collecting everything just because it is easy to gather the data is not an appropriate monitoring system.4 Too much irrelevant data can hide the more valuable data and make an already complex and disjointed network of systems more complex, resulting in faulty control measures that keep repeating themselves. Silo monitoring policies from shadow logistics element “mafias” has added to the dilemma. In the end, if we want our systems to have better performance, we must simplify data collection, alter the processes, and have personnel on hand who fully understand analytics. AI will not fix these persistent process gaps. Therefore, AI should not be viewed as a savior for something that is deeply rooted within our core business practices:
Digital waste is especially detrimental to the supply chain. It refers to redundant or unnecessary data that is collected, managed, and stored for no tactical or strategic reason. The amount of digital waste within an organization is typically great. It increases exponentially when one considers the data flow among members in a supply chain.5

AI implementation requires special analytics talent and skills. Determining where to position the talent is a critical decision in an organization as large as the Marine Corps. The division of labor is not only broken down between officer and enlisted but goes much further into a large array of MOSs.

Within the managerial hierarchy, there are essentially three levels—top, middle, and supervisory. Top-level managers are responsible for controlling and overseeing the entire organization. Middle-level managers are responsible for executing organizational plans which comply with the company’s policies. They act as an intermediary between top-level and supervisory-level management. Supervisory-level managers focus on the execution of tasks and deliverables and serving as role models for the employees they supervise.6

Image
Figure 1. (Figure provided by authors.)

In any organization, there are certain skills associated with each management position. These skills are technical, human, and conceptual. The transition of technical, human, and conceptual skills corresponding with the supervisory, middle, and top management roles is a well-described framework in the business environment (Figure 1). Looking specifically at the business skills required for Marine Corps logistics operations at the battalion level, the top management are the battalion commander, majors, and sergeants major; middle management is captains, CWO3-CWO4, master sergeants, first sergeants, and gunnery sergeants; and supervisory management is first/second lieutenants, CWO/CWO2, and corporals through staff sergeants.

Not all levels of management need the same skills and points of view shift depending on an individual’s level. For example, a general officer does not view the skills framework from the same perspective as a battalion commander. At the level of general officer, it is very easy to imagine how battalion commanders can be considered middle management (possibly even supervisory management) when there are regiments, divisions/groups, and MEFs between the most senior generals and battalions. With respect to AI and supply and logistics operations, the supervisory management level requires understanding independent versus dependent variables, knowing how to make statistical predictions, and understanding the scope of the data needed (e.g., six weeks or ten years’ worth). I (Maj Barnes) did not learn these things until participating in my intermediate-level resident school at Penn State—too late when I am already at the top management level, where conceptual thinking prevails over technical.

LtCol Wolfe: In my previous organizations, (for example, Supply Battalion) we collected a lot of data. In my conceptual leadership role, I did not have the time, resources, or, unfortunately, the training in higher-level analytic skills to precisely develop, read, or formulate massive amounts of data and information into something actionable. Holistically speaking, I was already past the technical and was operating from a conceptual level. I relied on supervisory- and middle-level managers to oversee this task. All the while knowing that the business-level analytics needed was not taught in Marine Corps schools. This knowledge gap forced my personnel to learn on the go, and often on their own. My CWOs, who specialized in specific domains of logistics, had to take personal initiative to get up to speed with industry to stay above water. I was keenly aware that most of my staff were not trained for that type of technical understanding. Additionally, prior to my assignment with Supply Battalion, I had served as the Field Supply Maintenance Analysis Office–Western Pacific officer in charge. In this data-centric organization, I also saw that something was missing within all the Marine units my teams analyzed. Not until becoming a fellow at Penn State and participating in the supply chain management coursework did I realize the missing component was business analytics. Today, these functions are often the cornerstones for advances in operations at any level of commercial business operation. If any organization should have the training, specialized skills, and current industry supply chain management tools to assist with analytics, it should be the supply battalions and Field Supply Maintenance Analysis Office–Western Pacific, yet neither did! Unfortunately, the norm is to fall back to spreadsheets or ACCESS, regurgitate the data into it, and then attempt as well as possible to formulate conclusions. My experience highlights an area where the Marine Corps logistics enterprise is behind in advanced business analytics. With these skills being the cornerstone of AI, Marine Corps logistics is not positioned to establish AI systems and practices.

In conclusion, no matter your point of view, information wrangling requires the technical understanding of middle and supervisory managers. Logistics technology, information systems, and business analytics tools are not commonplace in our entry- or mid-level training models. We tend to be broad in scope and rarely, if at all, incorporate commercial industry practices or state-of-art tools to implement advanced analytics for logistics operations.

Current Skill Set Pipeline
It is unnecessary for the Marine Corps to create its own talent pool of software engineers that can develop from scratch these complex systems. That is a bridge too far. However, Marine Corps logistics does not have a group of professionals with the technical skills to manage data on an advanced level. Rather, there is a pool of Marines looking at white noise, trying to understand what it means and where it may fit into complex AI systems or even basic decision making.

Brooks McKinney, in his Northrop Grumman article, “Defense AI Technology: Worlds Apart from Commercial AI,” says:

AI is not simply a “bolt-on” capability that will make everything more capable than before. It doesn’t instantly make things smarter. AI must be integrated into a system from the ground up. According to Jackson Bursch, an AI software engineer for Northrop Grumman, defense AI requires a diverse skill set, including more disciplines than the domain of software engineering. “We’re not just developing software, we’re developing complex systems that work in every domain,” he explained, So, we need people who specialize in specific sensors for data collection, others who can build AI software and still others who can handle the network engineering that connects those sensors to our software.

Image
Figure 2. (Figure provided by authors.)

Talent Management 2030 states, “Every Marine treated like a round peg, every billet like a round hole.” The tangible aspect of this concept in the logistics community is that there are approximately 1,540 second lieutenants through captains with a supply or logistics MOS. The 1,540 Marine officers in that category have approximately 170 degrees among them (Figure 2). The degrees range from ocean engineering and forestry to advertising, art studies, and biblical studies.

Therefore, these individuals were processed as if through a meat grinder. In other words, they were assigned a supply or logistics MOS, sent to three months of supply and logistics school, and then assigned as maintenance management officers, platoon commanders, supply account holders, etc. Logistics problems have always been calculus problems—constantly changing in space, time, and scope. The future of logistics problems will be driven by data, restricted communications, and deep understanding. As an example, consider the following situation.

A logistics unit will be on the move from Objective D to Objective E. They know Objective E is seven days away. The maintenance team is thinking about where they will be seven days from now. Due to communications restrictions and security considerations, it is unsafe to transmit from the locations. So, the team programs a quadcopter to take off from Objective D in three days. Therefore, they will be four days from Objective E with new requirements. Applying an eighty percent accuracy to the timeline, what are the high and low estimates of the team’s actual arrival? What are the risk factors of early or late delivery? What will the future requirement be?

To think about data and information in this manner, both the person transmitting and receiving the information must understand probabilities, error rates, sensitivity analysis, rates of change, and so forth. LtGen Wissler (Ret), in his article, “Logistics: The Life Blood of Military Power,” says that logistics is the most complex capability provided by the military. The depth, breadth, and scope of logistics are immense and intricate. Alan Estevez, former principal deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics says, “Logistics isn’t rocket science … it’s much harder!”7

The skills gap does not go away by redefining roles. One could argue that all officers must be conceptual thinkers, or that filling unrestricted officer seats by targeting specific business analytics skills would be too restricted. These arguments make sense because leaders that are required to make decisions and influence outcomes are needed and are a major part of the management hierarchy. However, recruiting talent in this specific way results in an enlisted skills gap. From either point of view, the skills gap remains; it simply shifts from a shortfall in the officer population to the enlisted population. In contrast, industry is specifically targeting these skills in their recruitment. If they need a supply chain manager or business analytics skill set, they are not recruiting forestry majors from college or the workforce; rather, they are targeting the skills they need. This goes back to Figure 1 and identifying where the organization needs the technical skills.

System Security and Bureaucracy
Another strategic business consideration is that, if we had the talent pool today, the bureaucracies and security measures in place would prevent these individuals from accessing the tools required to perform AI precursors of analytics. Delving into the systems and information security risks that are naturally inherent to the subject is beyond the scope of these articles, and indeed, free-flowing information and unhindered access to data is a risk. Furthermore, open-source programs are an integral part of developing AI systems. In the article, “Why Is Open-Source So Important? Part One: Principles and Parity,” the authors discuss the importance of open-source programs.

‘For every single branch of IoT and AI there’s an army of companies competing to have their technology become the ‘new standard,’ says Ontañon, ‘those companies developing their technology the open-source way are in a much better position to get ahead of the rest.’ Quite simply, this is because open-source technology has thousands of skilled workers building, checking, and testing code in real-time and in any number of different applications, and thousands of heads are better than one.8

It would be a monumental hurdle for a lieutenant to get permission to have a lot of leading-edge tools such as PowerBI and Microsoft Project, which are basic business tools. Access to open-source tools like R-Studio and Tableau is even harder and more restrictive, with limited licenses. With systematic Marine Corps restrictions on commercial industry logistics tools, the transition to artificial intelligence cannot be realized at a rapid pace.

Conclusion
From our perspective, data overload, skills and talent shortfalls, thousands of people with hundreds of degrees and multitudes of occupational specialties, hundreds of systems, untethered information collection, and restricted software access in the logistics and supply community makes the landscape for AI implementation very ugly. This is a system in disarray. Moreover, artificial intelligence and data analysis are rapidly developing fields, and staying at the cutting edge requires serious strategic decisions aligned with future visions.

In our next article, we will present and discuss solutions that would chip away at the ugly, making it prettier for AI and other advanced technology to flourish.

Notes

1. IBM Corporation, “IBM Docs,” IBM, March 8, 2021, https://prod.ibmdocs-production-dal-6099123ce774e592a519d7c33db8265e-0000.us-south.containers.appdomain.cloud/docs/en/spss-modeler/18.2.0?topic=dm-crisp-help-overview.

2. Oracle, “What Is Business Analytics?” Business Analytics, n.d., https://www.oracle.com/business-analytics/what-is-business-analytics.

3. Inbound Logistics, “Seven Deadly Supply Chain Sins,” Inbound Logistics, January 1, 2004, https://www.inboundlogistics.com/articles/seven-deadly-supply-chain-sins.

4. Jack Meredith and Scott Shaffer, Operations and Supply Chain Management for MBAs (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2020).

5. Ibid.

6. Emily Barr, “The 3 Different Levels of Management,” SpriggHR, July 15, 2022, https://sprigghr.com/blog/hr-professionals/3-different-levels-of-management.

7. John Wissler, “Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power,” The Heritage Foundation, October 4, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power.

8. Charles Towers-Clark, “Why Is Open-Source So Important? Part One: Principles and Parity,” Forbes, September 24, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestowersclark/2019/09/24/why-is-open-source-so-important-part-one-principles-and-parity.

Quote to Ponder

“What makes the general’s task so difficult is the necessity of feeding so many men and animals. If he allows himself to be guided by the supply officers he will never move and his expedition will fail.”
—Napoleon, Maxims of War, 1831

Artificial Intelligence in the Marine Corps Logistics Enterprise: Part 1

Part 1: It’s not pretty: What is artificial intelligence and its components?
 >LtCol Wolfe was a Marine Corps Logistics Fellow at Smeal Business College, Pennsylvania State University, and previously served as Battalion Commander for 3rd Supply Battalion. He is currently assigned to the Joint Staff J4.
>>Maj Barnes was a Marine Corps Logistics Fellow at Smeal Business College, Pennsylvania State University, and previously served as Operations Officer for Combat Logistics Battalion 22. He is currently assigned to HQMC Installations and Logistics.

Marine Corps logistics is moving toward artificial intelligence (AI) as an element of our logistics systems. We will address the challenges for the Marine Corps and provide solutions through a three-article series. Article one, “It’s Not Pretty: What is artificial intelligence and its components?” sets up the discussion and addresses what AI is and the building blocks associated with it. The article addresses misinformation or misunderstanding of AI that results from its extremely broad application and the varying degrees with which it is developed and implemented. Article two, “It’s Not Pretty: How ugly is AI progress in Marine Corps logistics?” will discuss why the Marine Corps logistics enterprise is unable to take advantage of industry technology in timely, relevant, or meaningful ways. The article brings together the magnitude of challenges in implementation for logistics applications. Finally, article three, “It’s Not Pretty: How can we start making AI progress ‘prettier’?” will discuss an enduring business solution for getting AI implementation right and preventing mistakes early on. It provides tangible and achievable goals to build the capability for execution.

Level-Set Discussion about AI
What is AI? Definitions and capabilities of AI for Marine Corps logistics applications are not uniformly understood, much less agreed upon; furthermore, AI represents broad, dynamic, and evolving technology. There is not a clear understanding among Marine Corps logistics professionals of where the lines between data, information, business analytics, automation, and deep/machine learning are—much less how to formulate and perform these functions. Adding in AI creates another layer of complication. We will attempt to unify the collective understanding of technology and the path to AI.

Definitions and Building Blocks
In this section, we will provide critical definitions for the essential building blocks of AI. There are several precursors to AI, and it is important to understand how the precursors are linked. AI begins and ends with data. However, the bridge between data and AI is pillared on information, knowledge, analytics, automation, deep learning, and machine learning. Put simply, AI is to data what astrophysics is to arithmetic. There are steps in between that must be refined or, dare say, mastered before diving into a new arena. Ultimately, AI performs human-like analytical tasks based on pattern recognition. Pattern recognition is best accomplished through data manipulation and visualization known as business analytics. Within business analytics, there are critical components of data, information, and knowledge. Below, we provide detail for each of these components and the relationship of business analytics with data, information, and knowledge is depicted in Figure 1.

Data is “the basic individual items of numeric or other information, garnered through observation; but in themselves, without context, they are devoid of information.”1

Business analytics is the process of analyzing raw data to draw out meaningful, actionable insights. Effective analytics is the key driver behind data, information, and knowledge. It is embedded within each domain (Figure 1). Without it, we cannot make sense of material to understand the meaning, recognize trends, or arrive at a decision. When looking at a random set of numbers, we can determine it is a phone number. Further analysis can reveal what country it might be from, the state where it was issued, and even to whom it may belong.

Example: Think about random numbers 5553467864, which have no meaning.

Image
Figure 1. (Figure provided by authors.)

Information is “that which is conveyed, and possibly amenable to analysis and interpretation, through data and the context in which the data [is] assembled.”2

Example: Give meaning through rational connection. 555-346-7864 is a phone number.

Knowledge is “awareness, understanding, or information that has been obtained by experience or study, and that is either in a person’s mind or possessed by people generally.”3

Example: Apply useful meaning to the phone number. 555-346-7864 is Jim’s number; he is the owner of a manufacturing business.

Automation is “the ability of software systems and equipment to perform repetitive, monotonous tasks.”4

Examples: text notifications on your smart device, assembly lines, and out-of-office replies.

Deep Learning/Machine Learning is “a type of artificial intelligence that uses algorithms (sets of mathematical instructions or rules) based on the way the human brain operates” and “the process of computers changing the way they carry out tasks by learning from new data, without a human being needing to give instructions in the form of a program.”5

Example: speech and image recognition.

Artificial Intelligence is “the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, acting, and more—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems.”6 “AI makes it possible for machines to learn from experience, adjust to new inputs and perform human-like tasks.”7

Examples: autonomous vehicles, smart assistants like Siri, and grammar predictions.

Like anything else, AI is a building process that requires multiple predecessors to execute correctly (Figure 2). It is a sequencing of steps from a repertoire of operations, each building from its predecessor so that the goal is better achieved. In business, certain elements must first be refined or created before reaching the desired end state. For example, stakeholders must be identified, roles and responsibilities defined, project scope created, budget formulated, timeline built, milestones established, goals prioritized, and deliverables defined. The Marine Corps is no different. The Marine Corps Planning Process has taught us that there are precursors to the final execution of a well-developed plan. Before we reach the transition step, we must sufficiently tease out a problem-framing course of action (COA) development, COA wargame, COA comparison and decision, and orders development. Moving from problem framing straight to transition does not work—neither does jumping Marine Corps logistics from its current state to AI without enhancing the predecessors.

Image
Figure 2. (Figure provided by authors.)

Business analytics (data, information, and knowledge) can be accomplished without the use of computers, non-digitally. Even though the use of computers and digital systems can enhance analytics, they can still be accomplished (albeit slower and less efficiently) by non-digital systems and processes. Replicating a non-digital process in digital form should not be confused with automation.

Findings From Relevant Literature
Reading the Commandant’s Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century and Talent Management 2030, Marine Corps Gazette articles, and “Stanford University Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2021” provides a great perspective on the direction logistics is headed and the precursors that are necessary before AI exploitation. Military-specific publications establish the status of AI internal to Marine Corps organizations, while academic publications convey a broader perspective and describe the industry overall. Below is a synopsis of those materials to provide readers with a collective understanding and establish common knowledge.

During his time as Commandant, Gen Berger has published several documents that outline his visions for developing a Marine Corps that is relevant and prepared for future conflict environments. A common thread of urgency to address talent and technology shortfalls can be seen throughout the documents:

Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century: Gen Berger states the logistics community must identify the improvements necessary to elevate the MAGTF beyond its current state. He goes on to allude that we must always review, discuss, and debate the capabilities we hope to develop. Finally, he talks about data-driven processes for conversion into actual task-related information.

Talent Management 2030: Gen Berger primarily discusses the retooling of our personnel system to better recruit and retain especially skilled individuals. The former Commandant says, “unless we find a means to quickly infuse expertise into the force—at the right ranks—I am concerned that advances in artificial intelligence and robotics, among other fields where the speed of technological change is exponential, will force us into a reactive posture. We should have an open door for exceptionally talented Americans who wish to join the Marine Corps, allowing them to laterally enter at a rank appropriate to their education, experience, and ability.”8

Gen Berger is referring to the building blocks that are necessary to advance our logistics operations. He is not expressing a specific direction here but is leading the logistics community to identify vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies that will enable advanced technologies like AI in support of the MAGTF. Likewise, following the Commandant’s guidance, our recommendations will enhance our current capabilities to better transition into more technological domains.

A review of Marine Corps Gazette articles from the last five years highlights that we have an exceptionally large gap to close from our current logistics practices to what is required in future operating concepts as outlined in key documents like the National Defense Strategy (2018), the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (2019), and Force Design 2030 (2020). Technology, innovation, and rapid flexibility will be essential for logistics support, yet progress is being slowed by legacy systems and practices:

 “21st Century Logistics, Designing and Developing Capabilities”: LtGen Dana’s (Ret) focuses on hybrid logistics, which optimizes old technologies and blends them with the new, discussing how data will drive our future. He indicates that the Marine Corps must realize the full potential of a user-friendly Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps while anchoring in data-driven predictive analytics. Harnessing a data-based approach will elevate logistics operations to the next level. He then mentions training and education as critical for logistician success. He talks of greater operational understanding among the joint, interagency, international, commercial, and host-nation environments to expose logisticians to new ideas. In article two, we will pick up on this topic and address the analytical skills shortfall that is becoming an ever more abundantly clear impediment to advancements and growth in the technology sphere.

“Future Logistics Challenges”: BGen Stewart (Ret) points to logistics information technology shortcomings and our struggles to maintain material readiness for the future we want. He states that we need a user-friendly command and control foundation to advance any future capability or innovative technology. He questions whether the logistics community is invested and taking the right steps to properly educate and train the force for big data and advanced technology execution.

 “Data Driven Logistics”: LtCol Spangenberg et al proposed a year-long experiment that would equip the MLGs with specialized cells focused on data-driven logistics. The cells would consist of six to fifteen Marines with expertise in data engineering, systems engineering, software design, and data analysis. These teams would “experiment with data (collection, analysis, visualizations, decision support) to tangibly demonstrate capabilities, limitations, and requirements of D2L [data-driven logistics] … collect, access, and analyze data; produce actionable insights with clear visualizations; and answer questions or solve problems to enable decisions of their host MLG.”9 At its core, the article proposes a solution to conduct formalized business analytics with core competencies in a manner that mimics leading logistics companies and organizations in the private sector.

The key documents discussed above highlight two crucial points. First, we are unquestionably headed into a data-centric world. Second, we do not have the core competencies, skills, or training to maneuver properly within the inescapable advancements in technology and AI development. We argue we are not even close to commercial industry progress.

The “Stanford University Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2021” highlights the trajectory of AI research and publications and accurately tracks the current state of the art for AI. The report compares the trajectory and effort of various industries, economic sectors, superpowers, Fortune 500 companies, etc. The key takeaways are listed below:

Private investment in AI soared: The private investment in AI in 2021 totaled around $93.5 billion—more than double the total private investment from 2020.

AI capabilities and technology shifts: The AI algorithms are more capable than ever and continue to make drastic improvements (language and image recognition). Robotics are less expensive and more accessible than ever before (42 percent price decreases).

The United States and China dominate cross-country collaborations on AI: Despite rising geopolitical tensions, the United States and China had the greatest number of cross-country collaborations in AI publications from 2010 to 2021, increasing five times since 2010. The collaboration between the two countries produced 2.7 times more publications than that between the United Kingdom and China—the second-highest collaboration on the list.

Increased investment: Data management, processing, and cloud received the greatest amount of private AI investment in 2021—2.6 times the investment from 2020—followed by medical and healthcare.

Technical experts flocking to industry—not government: In 2020, one in every five computer science students who graduated with PhD degrees specialized in AI/machine learning, the most popular specialty in the past decade. From 2010 to 2020, most of the AI PhDs in the United States headed to industry while a small fraction took government jobs.

Image
Figure 3. (Figure provided by authors.)

The chart above (Figure 3), which depict the number of publications written on AI, correlate with the sense of urgency for AI progress in the Marine Corps and industry. The chart on the left depicts the number of articles written in the Marine Corps Gazette, and the chart on the right shows the number of articles written in the industry. Publication and research efforts are driving the private sector’s development of AI. At first look, the rapid increase in the number of Marine Corps Gazette articles and journal publications around the 2018 timeframe are parallel—this is a positive. However, it is important to note that these are publications that only mention AI and are not necessarily related to logistics.

A closer look at the Marine Corps Gazette articles reveals that of the 47 articles written since 2017, three of them were related to logistics, but they only make cursory mention of AI and address little about what is needed to get to an AI end state. Is three a high or low number of articles? The answer depends on whether the information in the articles was acted upon. Were the results of their implementation assessed, refined, and redeveloped? The sparsity of articles should make the corresponding suggestions easy to track, and if they are not being implemented, then they are the wrong ideas, and not enough ideas are being presented. Since, as a logistics community, we are not collectively discussing how to implement AI, what the requirements are, and what structural problems might exist, the three articles written in the Gazette have not served as benchmarks for traction and implementation across the Marine Corps logistics enterprise

Understanding AI
A better understanding of what it can do, some examples of its use, and how it works may increase the priority it is given within the Marine Corps logistics enterprise.

The PBS special, In the Age of AI, provides several real-world examples of recent advances in AI. One of the most powerful lines in the video is: “China is the best place for AI implementation today, because the vast amount of data that is available in China. China has a lot more users than any other country—three to four times more than the U.S.” The host goes on to further explain, “We’re talking about ten times more data than the U.S., and AI is operating on data and fueled by data. The more data, the better the AI works—more importantly than how brilliant the researcher is working on the problem. So, in the age of AI, where data is the new oil, China is the new Saudi Arabia.”10

In his TED Talk, “The Incredible Inventions of Intuitive AI,” Maurice Conti walks through the progression of human ages and argues that we are at the dawn of a new age. Human society has progressed through hunter-gatherer, agricultural, and industrial societies and is currently in the Information Age. Conti argues that the next age is the Augmented Age, in which natural human abilities will be enhanced by computers, robotics, and digital nervous systems. While the previous ages have been defined by passive tools, the augmented age will be defined by generative and intuitive tools based on the abilities of humans, robots, and AI systems to work in harmony and solve complex problems. Conti makes a clear argument that within a human lifetime (64 years), computers started off playing tic-tac-toe (1952), then advanced to beating the best humans at chess (1997), then beating humans at Jeopardy (2011), and finally beating humans at Go (2016). Computers started off playing kids’ games and are now able to outperform human thought in our most complex games of strategy.

The video “But What is a Neural Network” contains a clear explanation and demonstration of how a neural network is fundamentally built. The demonstration is based on illustrating how the human ability to recognize a set of handwritten numbers from zero to ten is a very simple task. For example, the number three is extremely easy to recognize even when written sloppily and in several different ways. However, writing a program to recognize digitally written numbers becomes extraordinarily complex. Though the video focuses on neural networks, the host explains that neural networks are the foundation of machine learning. Understanding the mechanics and a specific and narrow application of a neural network and understanding where a neural network is in the progression from data to AI are valuable insights.

The Problem
AI is extremely technical, heavily reliant on technology and extensive/free-flowing data, and requires technical experts that can manage complex systems. The Marine Corps logistics apparatus is deep. Not only does the logistics domain include the six functions of logistics but embedded within each of them is a consortium of diverse functions including ship loading, transportation distribution, cargo throughput, mortuary affairs, acquisition, arming and refueling, and warehousing, to name only a few. AI is extremely specific in its algorithm application. Data and information are vast and predictive analytics is brought to life by specifically designed algorithms. Data manipulation has a human element; without understanding the data at a fundamental level, we are guessing about what to tell computers to do.

Conclusion
In our minds, understanding the building blocks for any innovation is critical. The breadth and scope of AI are a significant challenge for any industry, and the Marine Corps is not exempt from this challenge. The three primary concerns are: we have fallen behind industry standards; we have significant challenges adopting state of art for logistics applications; and our pacing-threat competitors are leaning in heavily to develop and apply AI. To win in this domain, Marine Corps logistics must have the goals, talent, and infrastructure to smartly advance it further. In our next article, we will identify the ugly, inconvenient details that currently exist within Marine Corps logistics and must be addressed prior to any deep movement into the AI landscape.

Notes

1. Max Boisot and Agustí Canals, “Data, Information, and Knowledge: Have We Got It Right?” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 14 (2004).

2. Ibid.

3. Cambridge Dictionary, “Knowledge,” Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d., https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/knowledge.

4. Harry Dreany, “LP Studies Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research Proposal,” November 23, 2021.

5. Cambridge Dictionary, “Machine Learning,” Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/machine-learning; and Cambridge Dictionary, “Machine Learning,” Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d.. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/machine-learning.

6. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, (Washington DC: 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.

7. “LP Studies Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research Proposal.”

8. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021).

9. Kirk M. Spangenberg, Gregory Lucas, Stan Bednar, Jason Fincher, Leo Spaeder, and Miguel Beltre, “Data-Driven Logistics,” Marine Corps Gazette 103, No. 3 (2019).

10. FRONTLINE PBS, Official, “In the Age of AI (Full Documentary),” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dZ_lvDgevk.

First to Fight

Lessons from the Battle of Belleau Wood
>Maj King is an Infantry Officer and currently serves as Commanding Officer, Recruiting Station Salt Lake City.

“And, waking or sleeping, I can still see before me the dark threat of Belleau Wood, as full of menace as a tiger’s foot, dangerous as a live wire, poisonous with gas, bristling with machine guns, alive with snipers, scornfully beckoning us to come on and be slain, waiting for us like a dragon in its den. Our brains told us to fear it, but our wills heard but one command, to clean it out, and I can still see before my very eyes those waves in the poppy-spattered wheat-field as the steady lines of our Marines went in.” (1)

—Albertus Catlin,
With the Help of God and a Few Marines

Col Albertus Catlin, commander of 6th Mar at Belleau Wood, recorded these words a year after the Marine Corps’ performance in that small crop of woods east of Paris in the summer of 1918. Catlin’s first line poetically describes the overwhelming odds Marines faced in the battle: mustard gas from German artillery shells, Maxim machineguns dug in ready to fire, and enemy snipers scanning the battlefield for targets. It is his second line that reveals those intangible traits Marines exhibited during the almost month-long battle—virtues that have set the Corps apart since its inception: discipline, gallantry, grit, sacrifice, esprit de corps, and mission accomplishment among others. Outgunned and outmanned, a brigade of Marines fought for nearly 26 days against multiple divisions of battle-hardened German infantry and ultimately won.

Although the battle has long passed, we Marines have an obligation to look back at this storied engagement and extract from it applicable lessons for today. This article is just that, a simple recap and analysis of the Battle of Belleau Wood and the leadership fundamentals and virtues exhibited that remain timeless in war. Under the severest of conditions, Marines overcame their tactical and operational missteps, equipment shortfalls, and an overwhelming enemy force. These are the reasons every new generation of Marines must know the story of Belleau Wood.

America Goes to War
To fully appreciate the battle, we need to go back further to 1917, the year the United States entered World War I. The war had been raging in Europe since 1914 with President Woodrow Wilson pledging to keep America out. When Great Britain intercepted the Zimmerman Note (Germany’s request for an alliance with Mexico) in January 1917 and turned it over to the United States, it was enough for President Wilson to petition Congress for war.

Beleaguered French and British allies needed the Americans immediately. The United States responded by assembling roughly 14,000 troops and sent them to France in June 1917. Named the American Expeditionary Force and commanded by Army GEN John J. Pershing, the force included 5th Mar. In February of 1918, the 6th Mar arrived in France and joined with the 5th Mar to form the Fourth Marine Brigade, attached to the Army’s U.S. Second Infantry Division. (2)

American action in the war was minor throughout the winter of 1918 until the Germans launched a series of offenses with fresh troops freed from the now-silent Eastern Front. British and French forces repulsed the first two German offensives, but the third, known as the Aisne Offensive, struck at French forces in the Chateau-Thierry region of France, only 39 miles east of Paris. The force and momentum of this German offensive smashed the French army and dashed most Frenchmen’s hopes of keeping the Germans out of Paris. The Allies suddenly threw American forces into the line to blunt the invasion. The U.S. Second Infantry Division was ordered to Chateau-Thierry, and the Marine Brigade’s mission was to take back Belleau Wood, an ancient hunting ground half the size of New York’s Central Park.(3)

Baptism by Fire
Departing their camp near Paris and traveling by foot and truck for over 36 hours, the Marines arrived filthy and exhausted, falling in along the front near the villages of Champillon and Lucy-le-Bocage only a few kilometers north of the Metz-Paris Highway and the city of Chateau-Thierry. By the morning of 2 June 1918, despite poorly designed French maps issued in minimal quantities, most of the Marine Brigade reorganized along a northwest-running defensive line.(4) French troops were tied in on the brigade’s western flank and the Army’s 9th Infantry Regiment was tied in to their east. When oncoming Germans repulsed a French counter-offensive forward of Marine lines, retreating Frenchmen demanded the Marines withdraw with them. Capt Lloyd Williams, a company commander with 2/5 Mar, replied to a dispirited French major, “Retreat, Hell! We just got here.” The brigade, although untested in battle, was ready for action.(5)

On the afternoon of 3 June, the woods across from the Marines’ line finally came alive. Waves of German soldiers emerged from the tree lines and advanced through waist-high wheat fields toward the Marines. Some reports list 500 yards away, others say 300 yards away, but at some distance the Germans were not expecting, the Marines of 1/5 Mar and 2/5 Mar, lying prone with their 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles, began pouring precision rifle fire into the advancing enemy. While watching the onslaught, Col Catlin recalled, “The Boches fell by the score there among the wheat and the poppies … they didn’t break, they were broken.”(6) Marines and their rifles alone won the day in their first encounter with the enemy. Even nearby French units praised the Marines for their unmatched marksmanship. After three failed attacks on 3 June, the Germans limped back into Belleau Wood and began fortifying their front. The Marines rested and re-organized their lines over the next two days, preparing to clear out the woods when orders came.

At 2225 on 5 June, brigade headquarters issued orders for an assault, with zero hour set for 0345 on 6 June. Commanders now had only five hours to deliver the order to their men dispersed along the line, coordinate supporting arms, and ready their men. Despite the impossibility of the task word passed through the darkness, troops checked their equipment and readied their weapons, and platoons moved to their rendezvous points. The first objective would be Hill 142, a prominent terrain feature that commanded high ground a few hundred meters west of Belleau Wood. 1/5 Mar would spearhead the attack.

At 0345 only the 49th and 67th Companies were in position to begin the assault, and at 0350 whistle blasts signaled the weary yet eager Marines to begin the attack. Many veterans remember the initial waves moving toward Hill 142 as a textbook performance of an attack formation. The platoons attacked in lines of four, maintaining proper intervals, with French-made Chauchat light machineguns interspersed for suppressive fire. The parade-like formations, however, fell apart when German machineguns sprang to life. Withering fire from German Maxims and Mausers raked the approaching Marines, killing scores. Platoon formations quickly morphed into individual struggles for survival. Momentum stalled. Then small-unit leaders took charge. Only meters from machinegun emplacements, junior officers and noncommissioned officers rushed forward, inspiring their men to keep moving. One Marine lost a hand grabbing an enemy machinegun barrel. The enemy gun crew, however, suffered a worse fate at the hands of Marines with bayonets.

By noon on 6 June, 1/5 Mar had secured Hill 142 but at a cost of 16 officers and 544 Marines killed or wounded.(7) The Germans suffered far greater with an estimated 2,000 casualties. With the high ground overlooking Belleau Wood in American hands, the assault on the woods could begin.(8)

From just the first few days of the battle, we can take away several lessons:

  1. Forced Marches: When not enough vehicles were available for transportation, 1/5 Mar, and the 5th Machine Gun Battalion were forced to march with weapons and equipment to the front line.9 Rigorous training both stateside and in France prior to the battle prepared Marines to undergo these strenuous conditions and perform superbly. Although vehicles and aircraft are the norms for transportation today, commanders must still ensure that their units can move themselves and their equipment to distant objectives without those luxuries and still complete the mission.
  2. Marksmanship: During the initial encounter with the enemy on 3 June, marksmanship displayed by the Marines engaging targets out to 500 meters was far superior to French and German marksmanship during the war. Although mission sets change, the Marine Corps must continue to imbue marksmanship fundamentals to all Marines in both recruit training and the FMF, and commanders must make every effort to increase the accuracy and lethality of Marines under their charge. Get your Marines trigger time, that is always a good investment.
  3. Aggressive Execution: Poorly planned orders to secure Hill 142 gave subordinate commanders minimal time to plan and execute. Regardless, at zero hour, NCOs and junior officers were moving amongst the troops, getting them in order and inspiring them with their command presence and leadership. When chaos ensued, well-trained small-unit leaders made the difference in securing the objective. That legacy of sacrifice, determination, and leading from the front must continue to be instilled in all junior leaders throughout the Corps through rigorous training, effective promotion screening, and character development by their commanders and senior enlisted leaders.

Into the Woods
Brigade headquarters issued orders to clear out the entirety of Belleau Wood while the engagement on Hill 142 raged back and forth. Setting zero hour for 1700 that same day, 6 June, Gen Harbord, commander of the Marine Brigade and a career Army officer, issued Field Order Number Two, calling for a multi-pronged attack on the woods. 3/5 Mar would execute the main attack by striking the woods on its western front while 3/6 Mar would penetrate the woods at its southwest tip and clear the woods northward. Rotating on 3/6 Mar’s right flank, 2/6 Mar would protect 3/6 Mar’s flank and secure the village of Bouresches east of the woods.

Intelligence on enemy activity in Belleau Wood during the days leading up to the attack was limited. Various French air scouts reported observing enemy activity inside the woods, and division intelligence believed that the Germans were consolidating positions in the woods. Gen Harbord, however, believed the woods were either empty or occupied by only a small force to be easily captured. As a result, the brigade scheduled minimal artillery support for the attack, a decision that would prove disastrous.(10)

At 1700 on 6 June 1918, the attack on Belleau Wood commenced. Leaving the safety of their lines, the attacking battalions proceeded through waist-high wheat fields toward their objectives in the dark, looming tree line. 3/5 Mar, the northernmost unit, had the most exposed approach to the woods.(11) 3/6 Mar, to the south, fared somewhat better with trees and terrain shielding their approach.

Spread out on-line in four different waves, 3/5 Mar’s Marines were several hundred yards from the woods when German machineguns ripped into their front and flanks. Marines fell by the dozens. Casualties mounted. Lieutenants abruptly found themselves in command of rifle companies, sergeants suddenly commanded platoons, and privates now led squads. Col Catlin, commander of 6th Mar, was observing his regiment’s progress when a German bullet smashed into his chest, rendering him unable to continue command. Maj Benjamin Berry, 3/5 Mar’s battalion commander, lost most of his right arm in the attack but remained with the battalion until forced to evacuate. 3/6 Mar, fighting to the south, gained a foothold on the southern edge of the woods but not before sustaining heavy casualties from devastating enemy machinegun and rifle fire.

Around 2100 on 6 June, Berry’s battered Marines of 3/5 Mar, having failed to gain a foothold in the woods, withdrew back to their lines. 3/6 Mar, also decimated by machinegun fire and low on ammunition, held only a sliver of Belleau Wood’s southwestern leg. 2/6 Mar, east of the woods, fared the best. Having gained a foothold in the village of Bouresches, 2/6 Mar would hold the village to the battle’s end.

The fighting on 6 June proved to be one of the costliest days for the Marine Corps in all its history. That day alone, the Marine Brigade lost 31 officers and 1,056 enlisted men.(12) Although the fighting spirit among the Marines was strong, valor and aggressiveness could go only so far against machineguns and artillery. The Marines would need the next few days to filter in replacements, resupply ammunition and equipment, and better coordinate their supporting arms.

The Brigade’s actions on 6 June reveal countless lessons worthy of review:

  1. Reconnaissance/Intelligence: Division intelligence reports suggested that the Germans were fortifying the woods. Any legitimate reconnaissance mission into the woods would have revealed significant enemy troop activity and the numerous machinegun emplacements. With these obstacles identified, the brigade could have ordered attacks at weaker points or utilized greater supporting arms to suppress enemy strong points. Commanders have a responsibility to get eyes on the objective whenever possible.
  2. Synchronization and the Use of Supporting Arms: Gen Harbord’s belief that the woods were lightly occupied caused him to forgo the extensive use of integrated artillery fire to soften enemy strong points. Further, the use and positioning of machineguns by the 5th and 6th Machine Gun Battalions failed to effectively suppress enemy machineguns and strong points in support of maneuver elements. Although speed and tempo are always factors in an operation, commanders must make every effort to fight the enemy using combined arms.
  3. Commander’s Intent and Mission Accomplishment: The capture of the village Bouresches east of Belleau Wood is a superb example of small-unit leaders understanding the commander’s intent and utilizing their own initiative, ingenuity, and resourcefulness to seize the objective. The first unit to enter the village was a platoon of Marines led by 2ndLt Clifton Cates, the future Commandant, whose report to higher, “I have no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold,” reflected the grit of those junior leaders committed to accomplishing the mission. Commander’s intent means something; it gives subordinates clarity in chaos and decision-making ease in situations of strained communication.

Hard Fought Victory
On 8 June, only two days after the bloody lessons of the 6th, Maj Berton Sibley’s 3/6 Mar continued its assault into the southern leg of the woods until casualties and overwhelming enemy fire checked their advance. Gen Harbord, realizing the full strength of the German presence in the woods, finally made complete use of his artillery. Throughout the night of 9 June and into the morning of 10 June, allied batteries fired over 34,000 shells into the square-mile patch of woods.(13)

Attacking northward behind the rolling artillery barrage, 1/6 Mar relieved 3/6 Mar and finally captured the southern edge of the woods. On 11 June, 2/5 Mar braved devastating machinegun fire and crossed the same wheat field where 3/5 Mar was bloodied and repulsed four days earlier. Harbord’s artillery preparation had reduced German strong points, allowing 2/5 Mar to penetrate the woods on its western front. After four grueling days fighting inside the woods, LtCol Frederick Wise and the Marines of 2/5 Mar had captured over 300 German prisoners, dozens of machineguns, and the southern half of the Belleau Wood.(14)

German resistance was far from over, however. As the Marine Brigade consolidated its gains in the southern half of the woods, the Germans responded with precise artillery fire, wreaking havoc with high explosive and mustard gas shells. Yet, in the chaos heroes emerged. GySgt Fred Stockham, of 2/6 Mar’s 96th Company, seeing a wounded Marine in need of a gas mask, removed his own and gave it to the man. Saving the Marine’s life, GySgt Stockham eventually succumbed to exposure and died several days later. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions.

After 10 days of intense combat, near constant artillery barrages, machinegun fire/and poison gas, Gen Harbord pulled the crippled Marine Brigade off the line. On 18 June, the Army’s 7th Infantry Regiment replaced the beleaguered Marines and spent a week trying to take the northern sector of Belleau Wood. Poorly trained and untried, the Doughboys fared terribly, and by 23 June the Marine Brigade was sent back in to finish the job. On 26 June elements of 3/5 Mar cleared the northern edge of the woods of all German resistance. Maj Maurice Shearer, 3/5 Mar’s battalion commander, passed up to brigade the famous message “Woods now United States Marine Corps entirely.”(15) The Battle for Belleau Wood was over, but the legend had just begun.

Final lessons drawn from the Battle of Belleau Wood:

  1. Quality over Quantity: The quality of officers and enlistees in the Marine Corps during World War I was far above average for the Services with 60 percent of enlisted men having completed some college.16 While the Army’s standards were lowered, the Marine Corps accepted only 60,000 out of almost 240,000 applicants, looking for candidates with high moral character, athletic abilities, and patriotism. Despite today’s recruiting challenges, the Marine Corps must keep the standard high. As 21st-century missions become more complex only the best and the brightest will allow our units to adapt, improvise and overcome, like our forefathers at Belleau Wood.
  2. Combat Arms: In 1918, the Marine Corps consisted predominantly of infantrymen, engineers, artillerymen, and machinegunners. Mission requirements today have changed those ratios, but the Corps should be careful in trimming its combat-arms element. Future conflicts have highlighted the need for increased numbers of cyber specialists, intelligence analysts, and other enablers, but near-peer threats will require troops on the ground using direct and indirect fire weapons to secure physical objectives. That will never change. Should we be worried about having enough Marines to staff the finance center or enough of the right Marines to hold the line when the enemy presses an attack? The Corps cannot lose its fighting edge.
  3. Recruit Training: Col Catlin claimed tactics employed by Marines were no different from the Army’s during World War I. What made the Marine Corps stand apart, he said, was the esprit and pride imbued in all Marines during recruit training.17 From that pride flowed discipline, gallantry, grit, self-sacrifice, esprit de corps, and determination to accomplish the mission, all of which were poured out in that small patch of woods. Leaders have an obligation to sustain in their Marines those same ideals instilled at Parris Island, San Diego, or Quantico by use of challenging and purposeful training, exemplary leadership, professional education, and historical study and emphasis. Leaders often fail to challenge their Marines after their completion of entry-level training or formal schools. They joined for a challenge; it is our job to deliver it.
  4. Service Above Self: Army GEN Matthew Ridgeway later cited Belleau Wood as a “prize example of men’s lives being thrown away against objectives not worth the cost.”18 We now know that the battle had a significant effect on halting the German’s advance, yet poor tactics and misuse of combined arms did cost excess lives. What carried much of the battle was individual and unit discipline, the ability of each Marine to subjugate their own personal interests and desires for the good of the unit and the mission. Ever present at Belleau Wood, the concept of service above oneself has almost all but escaped our society and is inching its way out of our Corps. Our Nation’s trending obsession over personal liberties and social movements in place of service to a greater good is eroding the patriotism and selfless service that have long been hallmarks of the American experience. Leaders at every level must curb this overt narcissism by fostering cohesion and esprit in their units. We are Marines first. The Marine Brigade was ordered to attack and, drawing on the discipline and selflessness of Marines at every level, unhesitatingly carried out the mission and captured Belleau Wood.

Notes

1. Albertus W. Catlin, With the Help of God and a Few Marines (Nashville: The Battery Press, 2004).

2. George B. Clark, The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I: Battalion Histories Based on Official Documents (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 2015).

3. Robert Coram, Brute (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2010).

4. Alan Axelrod, Miracle at Belleau Wood (Guilford, CT: Lyon Press, 2007).

5. The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I.

6. Miracle at Belleau Wood.

7. With the Help of God and a Few Marines.

8. The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I.

9. Miracle at Belleau Wood.

10. With the Help of God and a Few Marines.

11. Miracle at Belleau Wood.

12. The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I.

13. Michael A. Eggleston, The 5th Marine Regiment Devil Dogs in World War I: A History and Roster (Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 2016).

14. Miracle at Belleau Wood.

15. The 5th Marine Regiment Devil Dogs in World War I.

16. The Fourth Marine Brigade in World War I.

17. With the Help of God and a Few Marines.

18. Ibid.

Talent Management Tangibles

Current initiatives

Since the release of Talent Management 2030, we have better aligned departments and organizations involved in talent management, assessed, and mapped out interdependencies of total force personnel policies, and begun to generate momentum with a sense of urgency. Leveraging authorities previously enabled by Congress, we enacted nine initiatives in 2022, which we will expand and accelerate in 2023:

Commandant’s Retention Program (CRP): During FY23, the CRP offered pre-approved reenlistments to top-performing Marines by streamlining the process and giving priority access to primary military occupational specialty monitors for duty station and assignment options. The CRP resulted in a 72 percent increase of first-term reenlistment submissions by top-performing Marines with the average reenlistment approval accomplished in 24–48 hours, much quicker than the previous norm. Going forward, we will expand the program to more first-term Marines as well as our career force.

Staff NonCommissioned Officer (SNCO) Promotion Board Realignment: Beginning in FY24, we are realigning SNCO promotion boards to sequence more effectively with the assignments and reenlistment processes. This initiative will reduce SNCO billet gaps in the FMF and decrease the processing time of reenlistment packages. The realignment will provide greater predictability for SNCOs and their families while dramatically reducing the number of permanent change of station moves across the force.

Recruiting Station Commanding Officer Selection Board: We implemented two initiatives for the FY23 Recruiting Station Commanding Officer selection board. First, officers now have the opportunity to volunteer for command, including officers otherwise not scheduled for consideration. Second, officers may also request removal from Recruiting Station commanding officer consideration for one year, without penalty, should they prefer to complete a deployment or other professional obligation, or due to a personal life circumstance.

Special Duty Assignment (SDA) Volunteer Program: Prior to 2022, we screened and selected Marines for SDAs en masse. But last year, we launched a pilot SDA volunteer program, expanding incentives to provide duty station preference for volunteer recruiters, drill instructors, and combat instructors. As a result, volunteers increased by 62 percent, reducing the number of involuntarily screened Marines by 38 percent. This minimized disruption to Marines, their families, and FMF units while also reducing SDA school attrition. We will improve and expand this program in 2023.

MarineView 360-Degree Leadership Review: MarineView360 is a development tool for leaders that helps Marines identify their strengths, blind spots, and areas for focused improvement through the polling of their supervisors, peers, and subordinates. Leaders receive feedback and advice through a dedicated mentor and coach. The MarineView360 pilot began with a group of 150 sitting commanders and is now leveraging the experience of 200 additional selected commanders and senior-enlisted advisors. The final phase of the pilot will expand to 1,000 Marines of varying rank from gunnery sergeant to colonel.

Officer Promotion Opt-Out: Starting in 2022, both the active and reserve components offered certain officer populations the ability to opt-out of consideration for promotion once without penalty. This allowed officers increased flexibility in their career paths to pursue unconventional career experiences or formal education that would otherwise take them off track for key developmental assignments. We are currently exploring the expansion of this initiative to enlisted Marines to afford them the same flexibility in their careers.

Digital Boardroom 2.0 (DBR 2.0): DBR 2.0 increases the functionality and accuracy of information presented to board members, enhances the conduct of virtual boards, safeguards data, and improves this critical talent management process. The enlisted career retention and reserve aviation boards successfully used DBR 2.0 in 2022. With the availability of cloud-based data, we will expand use of DBR 2.0 while simultaneously assessing the outcomes, cost and time savings, and professional depth and breadth of board members to benchmark with our legacy process.

Separate Competitive Promotion Categories: To meet the demands of the future, the Marine Corps must retain the highest quality officers with the necessary skill sets at all ranks. To that end, we are exploring options to reorganize the unrestricted officer population into separate competitive categories to better meet the Marine Corps’ needs for diverse expertise and experience at all ranks by competing for promotion with peers having similar skill sets, training, and education. We will conduct a pilot program to evaluate the merits of this reorganization during the 2025 field-grade officer promotion boards.

Career Intermission Program: Many Marines desire to pursue specialized education or to focus on family for a significant life event. The Career Intermission Program is an initial step toward allowing Marines an option to temporarily pause their active-duty service and later resume their careers without penalty. This program enables career flexibility, and in doing so, also encourages retention of experienced, talented Marines.

Talent Management Way-Ahead Manpower Information Technology System Modernization (MITSM): In February 2022, Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs created a business capability requirements document that outlines the capabilities required to begin the MITSM acquisition process. MITSM will aggregate legacy systems and capabilities into a device-agnostic, data-driven, and dynamic human resources information technology solution that meets the evolving needs of the Marine Corps’ talent-based work force. One aspect of the MITSM will be a web-based talent marketplace, which will enable a collaborative and transparent assignment process and increase the role of both commanders and individual Marines. This capability will help us better align the talent of individuals with the needs of the Service to maximize the performance of both. The talent marketplace is here and is currently being tested by five monitors and about fifty Marines.

Implementation of Indefinite End of Active Service Policy for Enlisted Personnel: As we seek to mature the force, we also seek to eliminate processes and policies that induce both friction within the personnel system as well as personal and familial stress. There is little reason why those who have served honorably for eighteen-plus years need to worry about re-enlistment before completing twenty-years of service. This year, we are exploring the feasibility of senior SNCO career designation to establish an indefinite expiration of active service. This shift will align senior SNCO retention practices, increase flexibility in assignments, reduce administrative burden and needless paperwork, and minimize uncertainty for SNCOs and their families.

Small-Unit Leader Initiative: Under the current policy, first-term Marines are ineligible for promotion to sergeant. While the spirit of that policy is reasonable, it created a disincentive to the highest performing Marines across the force by establishing an administrative obstacle they cannot overcome regardless of individual talent. Going forward, if one of our talented Marines with at least 36-months of service wishes to re-enlist, then that Marine will become eligible for promotion to sergeant upon their re-enlistment. This program will incentivize the most talented who desire to stay for another enlistment and should help mitigate the persistent need for sergeants across the FMF.

The Case for Revising Warfighting

Modernize doctrine for the future force

>Col Greene is an Infantry Officer and currently the Commanding Officer of Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group.
>>Maj Malcolm is an Infantry Officer currently serving as the Operations Officer for 2/8 Mar. He previously served as Officer in Charge of the Advanced Maneuver Warfare Course at Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group.

 

“As the character of warfare continues to evolve, as it always has, under the pressure of technological, social, and geopolitical change, we may find ourselves compelled to reexamine assumptions we were able to take for granted when we formed our warfighting philosophy, and to communicate those ideas clearly and comprehensively across the Corps so that our ‘common language’ remain in keeping with the times.” 1

—Gen David Berger,
38th Commandant of the Marine Corps

In 2022, the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group recorded several interviews on the subject of maneuver warfare for its official podcast. The guests for these interviews included both proponents and skeptics of maneuver warfare in general and Warfighting specifically.

Among the criticisms leveled at Warfighting in these interviews, a few are worth noting for the purpose of this article. One issue of concern is the language describing maneuver warfare versus attrition warfare. Warfighting can too easily be interpreted as advocating maneuver warfare as a moral imperative (and by extension, attrition warfare as morally deficient) in all circumstances. While Warfighting does, in fact, state that “pure attrition warfare does not exist in practice” and “firepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver,” it also introduces the terms maneuverist and attritionist; the latter is very clearly presented as inferior to the former.2 The connotation thus attached to maneuver warfare and attrition warfare is one of the most obvious, enduring legacies of Warfighting.

Another concern is that Warfighting makes no distinction when and at what level we should “seek to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.”3 Collapsing the enemy system cannot be accomplished everywhere all the time. Moreover, collapsing the enemy system at a certain echelon, location, or time may not actually be accomplishing our higher headquarters’ intent. In fact, there are examples from history in which doing so at one level was actually detrimental to larger operational aims or even strategic goals.4

It must be said that John Schmitt, the author of Warfighting, agreed with some of these criticisms. In fact, the most surprising thing to come out of our conversation was that he flatly does not believe something many of his critics think he does, which is that systemic collapse can easily be achieved if one simply figures out the correct critical vulnerability and pokes it. Quite the contrary, Schmitt does not believe it is possible to get the center of gravity or critical vulnerability “correct.” The value of the center of gravity analysis is in the shared understanding of the enemy as a system derived from the discussion, not in getting the exact right answers. Schmitt has stated that the defeat mechanism of systemic disruption (the label he prefers to systemic collapse) is an aspirational goal that likely cannot be achieved most of the time.5 He has also stated in the past that he believes Warfighting can be improved upon by the inclusion of a discussion on the concept of defeat mechanisms.6

Interestingly, one thing that both critics and proponents agreed upon was that the Marine Corps should tread carefully in revising Warfighting. Despite their criticisms, all our guests were quick to point out how impactful the book has been to their lives and careers and counseled caution against tinkering with what by most assessments has been a successful formulation. As Schmitt put it, “FMFM 1 caught lightning in a bottle. It’s unrealistic to expect to do that again.”

Nevertheless, we feel that, for several reasons, the time is right to update our capstone doctrinal publication. To state the obvious, a lot has happened in the last 25 years since the last revision. While we believe that the type of doctrine represented by Warfighting should change with the climate, not the weather, it does seem to us that the era of the Global War on Terror, followed by the return of great-power competition, and the changes envisioned in Force Design 2030 constitute a considerable climate change. The current strategic context is significantly different from that of 1989 or 1997. Whereas the terms naval and joint are noticeably absent from Warfighting, today’s context has engendered a growing recognition across the Service that to be relevant, we must integrate with and provide value to the Joint Force. Doctrine has evolved, too. Since 1997, two domains—space and cyberspace—have been added to joint doctrine; a third, information, has been added to Marine Corps doctrine. Finally, though our warfighting philosophy is not beholden to technology, we cannot ignore the advances in military technology of the last three decades. To give just one example, in 1997 the majority of priority intelligence requirements were addressed by ground reconnaissance and surveillance units. Today, the majority of priority intelligence requirements are accounted for by airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.

Perhaps the best reason for a revision, however, has nothing to do with what has happened but with who makes up the Marine Corps. The percentage of the current active-duty Marine Corps that was serving when MCDP 1—let alone FMFM 1—was published is minuscule. Therefore, the vast majority of Marines lack the context of the debates of the 1980s and 90s that led to the adoption of maneuver warfare and publication of Warfighting, and they may have trouble relating to it as a result.

Though a revision to Warfighting is necessary, we take the concerns of Schmitt and others seriously. Therefore, we think it important to state and adhere to a few principles when revising and updating our foundational doctrine. First and foremost, there should be no change merely for change’s sake. Any part of Warfighting that does not absolutely need to be changed should be left alone, even if the authors tasked with the revision think they could improve upon the wording of the original. Second, additions to Warfighting should be kept short. The goal is to add content of value without a significant increase in the size of the publication. Third, as we will describe below, a revision should seek to add nuance but increase clarity. The language must be kept accessible to entry-level Marines without being condescending. Part of Warfighting’s magic is that its language is direct enough to be understood by all Marines while also being sophisticated enough to spur thought. Finally, a revision must not become an exercise in satisficing various interest groups. The salient reason why Warfighting is so coherent, readable, and compelling is that Gen Al Gray entrusted its authorship to one individual to craft within his guidance. A previous attempt at writing a capstone doctrinal publication was rejected largely because, as Col Michael Wyly wrote in his scathing critique, it bore all the hallmarks of having been “done by committee.”7

So, under those principles, what should be the focus areas for change in a new edition of Warfighting? First, we must seek to curb the virtue-vice characterization of the attrition and maneuver discussion. Understanding the post-Vietnam context in which Schmitt wrote the first edition of Warfighting, we can see why he framed the argument as two opposing styles of warfare. What he was arguing against was not seeking to destroy the enemy with firepower, per se, but an approach to fighting in which the enemy is merely a number, the body count is all that matters, and all bodies are treated equally. We argue that what should be cast in negative terms is not attrition warfare but unintentional attrition warfare in which no thought is given to the enemy as a system and efforts are not deliberately focused on critical parts of that system. An intentional attrition approach, on the other hand, is one in which a force assesses its combat power relative to its adversary and concludes that it has an advantage in firepower and a greater capacity to absorb casualties. This was exactly the calculus that underpinned Ulysses Grant’s vision for the Overland Campaign, one of the most brilliant in U.S. history. The reason a firepower-attrition approach to warfare is not suitable for the Marine Corps is not that it is objectively inferior to a maneuver approach, but because the Marine Corps will rarely, if ever, have an advantage in numbers or firepower relative to the U.S.’ peer adversaries. Therefore, the Marine Corps must adopt “a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves.”8

Second, the revised Warfighting needs to make clear that systemic collapse is aspirational and not to be pursued at all times and locations at every echelon. The desire to shatter the enemy’s cohesion must be balanced against an appreciation for the single battle. If we do not keep in mind our role within our higher headquarters’ battlespace framework, we may encounter a situation in which collapsing the enemy system in one zone of action prevents our higher headquarters from inflicting defeat on the larger enemy system. Similarly, there will be times when a total collapse of the enemy system at a certain echelon runs counter to the accomplishment of strategic objectives. For example, in a war with limited objectives, it would not be beneficial to collapse the enemy system at its national command authority level because there would be no one left with whom to negotiate a peace settlement. The important point is not that we achieve this aspirational goal (we rarely will), / but that by aspiring to it, we prevent ourselves from falling back upon the attritional approach without intentionality.

Third, we need to ensure that readers of Warfighting understand that the Marine Corps is an integral part of the Joint Force. Since long before the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed into law, the Marine Corps has had a culture of self-reliance. It has served us well in many respects, but it must be moderated with the understanding that against a peer competitor, the Marine Corps relies on the rest of the Joint Force for critical capabilities. On the other side of the coin, the Marine Corps must offer something that the rest of the Joint Force wants if it is to stay relevant. Our unique offering has changed over time and will continue to do so. Historical examples include the seizure of advanced naval bases, small wars, and crisis response. Warfighting should not go into the specifics; it merely needs to convey that the Marine Corps does not go it alone and has a responsibility to bring something unique to the table.

Finally, the verbiage used in describing the spectrum of conflict needs to be revised to align it with MCDP 1-4, Competing. The spectrum of conflict should be replaced by the competition continuum described in the latter publication and in the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, and the labels military operations other than war and small wars should be eliminated. U.S. military thinking has moved away from a black-and-white dichotomy of war and peace toward a theory of competition both above and below the threshold of armed conflict. Furthermore, Force Design envisions a Marine Corps whose value to the Joint Force is manifested just as much in competition as in conflict. Our foundational doctrinal publication should reflect these developments.

We attach no importance to a specific number of years; just because 25 have passed does not mean we are due for a revision to Warfighting. Rather, the changes in the character of war and the changes they have necessitated within the Marine Corps have brought us to a point in which a revision is warranted to make us stronger, more agile, and more valuable to the Joint Force. However, care must be taken to make these necessary updates without losing the goodness of the original. Edits and additions must be deliberate, focused, and concise. The author must be given a clear mandate and protected from interference. They must be answerable, as John Schmitt was, to the Commandant alone. Only under these conditions can we deliver an updated doctrinal foundation worthy of the title Warfighting.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2022).

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

3. Ibid.

4. Thaddeus Drake, “The Fantasy of MCDP 1,” Marine Corps Gazette 104, No. 10 (2020).

5. Marinus, “On Defeat Mechanisms,” Marine Corps Gazette 105, No. 7 (2021).

6. Damien O’Connell, “John Schmitt,” Controversy and Clarity (podcast), April 15, 2021, https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/episodes/10–John-Schmitt-euoegn/a-a57jmmo.

7. Michael Wyly, “Review: Operational Handbook 6-1 Ground Combat Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 72, No. 7 (1988).

8. MCDP 1.

>Authors’ Note: Tactics and Operations is the official podcast of the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group. If you would like to hear the discussions that informed this article, check out the following episodes:

  • “Criticizing Maneuver Warfare with LtCol John Meixner.”
  • “The Fantasy of MCDP 1 with LtCol Tad Drake.”
  • “Defeat Mechanisms and Maneuver Warfare with John Schmitt.”
  • Tactics and Operations can be found here: https://open.spotify.com/show/65qyMOctQ78NOXr7Y7fi1s.

The Death of the Marine Corps

The war in 2039

>GySgt Knight is an Infantry Unit Leader (0369) currently serving as an Operations Chief. He has served as every billet from Rifleman through Platoon Sergeant in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. He has also served as Heavy Machinegun Platoon Sergeant, Scout Sniper Platoon Sergeant, and Weapons Company Operations Chief in support of Unit Deployment Program Okinawa.

 

The Marine Corps was rendered combat ineffective during the opening weeks of the U.S.-China War in December of 2039. First, Second, and Third MarDivs were systematically engaged by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy, air, and ground forces, which resulted in the reduction of these divisions by a combined 75 percent. China had used a specific and effective strategy to cripple the U.S. military. This process was the development of a worldwide trade route controlled by them, ceasing all trade with the United States and forcing military funding cuts.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the development of the Belt and Road Initiative. Seventy-one countries pledged to join in the endeavor.1 China quickly began making deals with these countries to build rail lines, improve roads, and build seaports in strategic locations. They would loan the money to the host country to build each project with only one stipulation, Chinese contracted companies would be hired to assist in the construction. China knew these countries would not be able to repay the accrued debts which allowed China to employ debt-trap diplomacy to gain strategic advantages in some of these areas.2 By 2017, the countries along the Belt received 35 percent of global foreign direct investments and accounted for 40 percent of global merchandise exports.3 This had all been part of China’s bigger concept of Tian Xia or world domination.4 The ground and maritime trade routes expanded their reach throughout the entire globe. This opened the trade routes and allowed China to influence a dominating portion of the trade deals made in the world. China began slowly arranging for resources to be acquisitioned from the countries along the Belt to reduce the number of materials they would need from U.S. suppliers.

During a press release in 2036, President Xi Jinping announced China would no longer receive any imports from the United States effectively gouging the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) by fourteen percent. China again used debt-trap diplomacy to convince many of its partner countries to do the same. In total, the U.S. GDP was reduced by 24 percent over the next two years. This drastically affected the markets in the United States and caused an unexpected recession for which the American people were not prepared. Many companies that relied on exports went bankrupt and millions of Americans were laid off. The unemployment rate rose to eleven percent and the government was forced to start cutting its spending. By 2038, the defense budget was reduced by fifteen percent forcing the different branches to begin tightening their belts.

Due to these budget cuts much of the equipment the military used, including ships, could not be maintained. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to reduce the number of personnel in each of the branches to free up some funds to maintain its gear. The Marine Corps was reduced to 165,000. This forced the Marine Corps to disband all three battalions of the Fourth Marine Regiment and both battalions of the Eighth Marine Regiment as well as numerous support battalions. The Navy was also required to put 30 ships in long-term storage. The Third and Seventh Fleets took the brunt of the reduction as their ships had seen more use and required the most maintenance. This left a crucial gap in the maritime defenses in the Pacific, which Chinese military leaders exploited when they attacked the West Coast of the United States.

On 7 December 2039, U.S. Navy ships from the Third and Seventh Fleets came under fire from Chinese DF21D anti-ship ballistic missiles. These missiles were simultaneously launched from PLA Navy ships, cargo ships, and ground bases. The missiles were controlled by the Yaogan family of defense satellites they had launched between 2009 and 2012. The PLA Navy was able to target U.S. ships by monitoring their electronic emissions from the 8G personal electronic devices used by sailors aboard the ships. This attack successfully rendered both fleets’ combat ineffective. The PLA Navy then moved eight group armies (approximately 650,000 troops) from the PLA Ground Force to the West Coast of the United States unimpeded by utilizing ships that had been pre-staged and trade routes they had already established. Simultaneous with the attack on the U.S. Navy, the PLA Air Force conducted a massive aerial bombardment of Marine Corps Base Hawaii and Camp Butler Okinawa Japan. This raid was conducted by Xian H-6 long-range bombers launched from the Chinese Xi Jinping Air Station on the man-made Mischief Reef Island in the South China Sea. The raid effectively targeted the infrastructure and equipment of 3rd MarDiv resulting in a reduction of 90 percent. The PLA Ground Force invasion was contested by the 1st MarDiv as well as the U.S. Army’s 40th Infantry Division and the California National Guard. This joint task force, named Task Force Bear, was able to hold the PLA Ground Force in California until they could be reinforced by the 2nd MarDiv and the rest of the U.S. Army but not before being reduced by 85 percent. The 2nd MarDiv took 50 percent casualties during the intense fighting that followed. The loss of two of the three divisions was a fatal blow to the Marine Corps as a fighting force.

In the aftermath of the bloody U.S.-China war, Congress established a policy to prevent the country from becoming reliant on exports for such a large percentage of the GDP. This would prevent an adversary country from being able to reduce our GDP and defense budget just by monopolizing trade. When it came to the Marine Corps, Congress was also left with a choice. Re-constitute the divisions or amend Title X thereby dissolving and abolishing the Marine Corps. Ultimately, they chose the latter. On 10 November 2040, the Marine Corps Colors were retired for the final time. The remaining personnel and equipment were absorbed into the other branches.

Notes

1. Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, “What Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?” The Guardian, July 30, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer.

2. Ibid.

3. Caroline Freund and Michele Ruta, “Belt and Road Initiative,” The World Bank, March 29, 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative.

4. Howard W. French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape Chinas Push for Global Power (New York: Vintage Books, 2018).

Machine Learning to Enhance Force Preservation

AI supporting leadership

>Capt Borinstein is an Intelligence Officer currently assigned to Company B, Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion at Fort Meade, MD. He holds a Master of Science in Data Analytics from the Georgia Institute of Technology.

 

Although generally not top of mind when considering the Marine Corps’ most pressing future warfighting challenges, mental fitness, and suicide prevention unquestionably remain a chief priority across the DOD. Today, suicide rates among service members are among the highest levels in their recorded history.1

In response to increasing suicide rates, the Marine Corps has resorted to requiring commanders to become more involved in Marines’ lives and applying the risk management process to those subjectively deemed at-risk through the Force Preservation Council (FPC) program. The FPC order directs commanders to “use engaged leadership and risk management guidance … to recognize and intervene early when stressors and potentially risky behaviors first develop in Service members in order to interrupt the chain of events that can lead to an adverse outcome.”2 Unfortunately, the Defense Suicide Prevention Office’s 2020 Annual Suicide Report shows that the Marine Corps’ suicide rate has increased on average since at least 2014, with suicide rates in 2020 being the highest ever recorded in the wake of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic.3 This trend suggests that the Marine Corps will continue to battle with and for the mental health of its Marines well into the future, which poses significant challenges to the future force’s ability to remain ready to respond to our Nation’s calling.

Despite the Marine Corps’ good intentions, the FPC program in its initial form was riddled with flaws. One of its primary problems occurred when losing and gaining commands often failed to exchange information on Marines’ past and potential struggles. When they did exchange this information, it was often through informal, non-secure means. Although the Marine Corps FPC Order (MCO 1500.60) required losing commands to “ensure the gaining command is provided the necessary and relevant force preservation information,” there were no mechanisms by which to hold units accountable for failing to comply with policy.4 Such a lack of standardization and security meant that commanders rarely received all the information needed to contextualize Marines’ behaviors and issues and that Marines’ personal data was often put at risk through the unnecessary use of PowerPoints and other informal dissemination mechanisms.

In August 2020, the Marine Corps sought to resolve these issues by adopting the Command Individual Risk and Resiliency Assessment System (CIRRAS), which is essentially a standardized database for FPC data.5 Although certainly an improvement upon the legacy FPC process, CIRRAS will sell the Marine Corps short if it remains only a tool for data storage. Indeed, CIRRAS presents a unique opportunity for the Marine Corps to experiment with using artificial intelligence—and more specifically machine learning—to combat the threat of suicide within its ranks. The Marine Corps should examine the efficacy of using the CIRRAS database in conjunction with supervised classification machine-learning algorithms to help commanders better identify Marines who are most at risk for self-harm.

What is CIRRAS?
CIRRAS is a secure application developed by Marine Corps Systems Command that standardizes the FPC program across the Marine Corps, giving commanders the ability to monitor their Marines’ holistic health and combat readiness.6 It allows commanders and their representatives to input and track the various stressors that Marines regularly experience, including information regarding mental health, relationship disputes, alcohol- and drug-related offenses, and other significant issues that could impact operational readiness.7 Though it offers a new, more secure way of storing and transferring sensitive data about Marines, CIRRAS does not make any fundamental changes to the FPC program.

Although CIRRAS offers the means to standardize and secure Marines’ holistic health information, it does not seem to offer any additional analytical advantage to commanders. In other words, CIRRAS improves commanders’ abilities to securely communicate raw data, but it does not use that data to provide valuable insights to make better decisions.

The primary purpose of collecting standardized data in any capacity is to detect trends and patterns to better inform decision making. Human minds are very good at detecting simple, linear trends in two or three dimensions, but are very limited in their capacity to detect complex, non-linear trends, which can be common in multidimensional datasets such as those involving personal health information.

Machine Learning
Machine-learning algorithms happen to be especially adept at identifying complex, non-linear trends in vast amounts of data. They can take datasets on the scale of thousands of dimensions, identify their most important factors, and detect patterns that no human brain could hope to understand or recognize. These algorithms are regularly used in the private sector to determine which Netflix shows would best suit you, which songs you will most likely enjoy on Spotify, and which products you should next consider purchasing on Amazon.

At its most basic level, machine learning is using past data and consequent outcomes to identify complex patterns, generate models from those patterns, and then combine those models with future input data to quickly deliver predictions of future outputs. The machine-learning algorithms used by tech companies take the data you and others give them, such as browsing activity and personal information, to detect patterns and build statistical models that can quickly calculate high-probability outcomes.

By centralizing and standardizing FPC data in a single database, the Marine Corps has created a venue through which it could use machine-learning algorithms to identify under-the-surface trends common among Marines who have expressed suicidal or other life-threatening tendencies. If provided with the right types of data, these algorithms could prove useful in providing commanders indications of Marines who are more likely to engage in self-threatening behavior.

Among the many different types of machine-learning algorithms, the most useful for the purposes of predicting future behavior are classification prediction algorithms. These types of algorithms are trained to predict specific categorical outcomes (green/yellow/red), and not numerical ones (1, 2, 3). Among the most popular types of classification prediction algorithms are decision trees, random forests, k-nearest neighbor classifiers, logistic regression, and support vector machines. The Marine Corps should experiment with these types of algorithms to determine whether any of them can effectively predict Marine behavior.

Issues and Requirements
Using machine learning to make impactful decisions in Marines’ lives obviously presents several potential problems. The data science and tech worlds are alight with debate over the moral and ethical use of machine-learning algorithms with others’ personal information. Moreover, no model or algorithm is perfect and, if not properly understood, can result in unfounded dependence on “the numbers” and remove commanders’ responsibility to use their judgment.

First, one should note that no model is infallible. Models are abstract representations of reality and are optimized to represent historical data. They are susceptible to developing a narrow focus and will always produce some measure of error. No model or algorithm can perfectly describe previous forms of reality nor perfectly predict future ones.

Because of this, commanders using mathematical models to make decisions must remember that such models are tools designed to supplement decision making and should never replace well-informed human leadership and judgment. It seems too often that we settle for reducing complicated situations into PowerPoint slides with boxes colored green, yellow, or red. No Marine’s personal situation can be adequately captured by a simple color, and we should be wary of similar behavior when using other models to predict which Marines are most susceptible to suicidal behavior. Instead, commanders should use such tools to identify who they should be spending more time observing.

All prediction algorithms produce false positives and false negatives. The Marine Corps must avoid a zero-tolerance approach when it comes to using machine learning and artificial intelligence of all types. Tools that use such technologies are designed to inform better and faster decisions but are never intended to generate decisions in lieu of humans.

Garbage in, garbage out is a common saying among data scientists. Because machine-learning algorithms live on the data that they are given, poor data quality can easily result in models which fail to adequately reflect reality. Leaders responsible for inputting data into CIRRAS must do so properly. The notion of no data in is also worthy of consideration. Given that prediction of at-risk Marines is the ultimate goal, a lack of data on risk factors means some Marines could slip through the cracks.

Data used in machine learning must also be computable, meaning that it should be standard throughout the dataset (think multiple choice responses or numerical data with common formatting). Supervised classification learning algorithms work by identifying which characteristics were most prevalent among Marines who expressed self-harming inclinations, generating a model by appropriately weighing each of those characteristics based on their correlation with the outcome, and then applying that model to other Marines as needed. To make this work, however, these algorithms require standard data values, especially for the metric in question, which in this instance is whether a Marine has demonstrated a predisposition for self-harm. Machine-learning algorithms cannot easily interpret free-response data without additional processing, which often involves manual interaction. CIRRAS must provide standard datasets to generate effective models.

Not all models work well and there is no guarantee that these models will provide any value at all. It is very possible that none of the models listed would be able to accurately predict which Marines are most susceptible to self-harm, and in doing so could add unnecessary noise to an already-complicated FPC system. If, however, these models can generate correct predictions even as low as 50 percent of the time, they could prove very valuable to commanders.

Conclusion
In recent years, Marine Corps dialogue has become consumed with some of the Nation’s favorite tech buzzwords: artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data, and the like. Nevertheless, we have yet to find ways to implement these at scale in the same way multi-billion-dollar corporations have been doing for years. There is little question that we should be researching and experimenting with means to harness the power of these technological advancements. In reality, however, reluctance to adapt quickly and try new things at middle and lower echelons demonstrates that research in these fields may not truly be a top priority.

Exploring the use of machine learning in conjunction with CIRRAS’ database offers an easy opportunity for the Marine Corps to showcase its long-held reputation as the Nation’s most innovative force. Further research on this topic may prompt widespread use of this technology and could prove valuable to commanders by quickly providing automated actionable data in one of the Pentagon’s top challenges: service member mental health. If our people are truly our greatest strength, then we should leverage every advantage, technological or otherwise, to their benefit and that of the Naval Service.

Notes

1. U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs, 2020 Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report (Washington, DC: 2020).

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 1500.60 Force Preservation Council (Washington, DC: August 2016).

3. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense, Calendar Year 2020 Annual Suicide Report (Washington, DC: 2020).

4. Stephen Losey, “Military Deaths by Suicide Jumped 25% at End of 2020,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/05/military-deaths-suicide-jumped-25-end-of-2020.html; and MCO 1500.60 Force Preservation Council.

5. Headquarters Marine Corps, “Announcement and Implementation of the Command Individual Risk and Resiliency Assessment System (CIRRAS),” Marines, August 12, 2020, https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/2310545/announcement-and-implementation-of-the-command-individual-risk-and-resiliency-a.

6. Marine Corps Systems Command, “Marine Corps Develops Secure App to Monitor Holistic Health and Combat Readiness of Marines,” Marines, February 11, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2500948/marine-corps-develops-secure-app-to-monitor-holistic-health-and-combat-readiness.

7. Ibid.

Dissent

A lecture to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Image
Dr. Kohn is the co-editor with Peter D. Feaver of Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (BCSIA Studies in International Security) 2d Edition, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. ISBN 978-0262561426.
>Dr. Kohn is a Professor Emeritus of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He was Chief of Air Force History for the Air Force at the Pentagon, 1981–199l. This article is a revised and updated version of a lecture to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in May 2022.

Thanks, LtCol Anthony, for that kind introduction. It’s a pleasure and an honor to speak to the College class, and my thanks for this opportunity. I must note special appreciation to your Dean, Dr. Jonathan Phillips, whom I have known and appreciated for nearly 30 years, from his time in the UNC PhD program in history: one of the finest teachers and most honest, careful, and insightful scholars in my experience. And a personal friend whose advice, on professional issues as well as on what sailboat and bicycles to buy—two items of his special expertise.

In discussing dissent, we are not talking about simply disagreeing; we all disagree about many things, and frequently.1 After all, we are Americans, at least most of you in this audience. Nor is dissent insubordination or disobeying orders, although dissent can lead to such. Dissent is not about defying or disobeying lawful orders.

Where dissent differs from simple disagreement is that dissent implies disagreement with the majority opinion or judgment, with a consensus, or with established authority, or with traditional and commonly accepted institutional norms, or even orders. Fundamentally, dissent is simply thought. Sometimes, with certain people, it can be an attitude. But in your readings and in the common parlance today in civilian society and within the military, both in general and in the Marine Corps in particular, where it has something of a long tradition all the way back to Smedley Butler and Evans Carlson in the 1920s and 1930s, and after, it is accompanied by the voicing of disagreement in private or even publicly—in other words, expressing a contrary opinion. Not remaining silent. And another part of the definition is that dissent implies acting at the risk of self-interest, personal or professional, or both, and thus that it requires some courage. Risking the personal self-interest of a relationship with a boss, or peers or simply professional self-interest in promotion or reputation. As officers, you know and possess physical courage; dissent is something different, something we might call moral courage. We all know, and are educated to, or to be capable of understanding, right from wrong, and have the training, experience, education, or ability in any given situation to figure out what is a proper course of action, or ought to be, even if one is not aware of all the facts, have all the necessary information, the wider perspectives, and necessities that people at higher levels might have.

Every profession or trade expects dissent. Lawyers, doctors, professors, clergy, business executives, supervisors in factories, carpenters, electricians, social workers, nurses, and the like face, on a regular basis, problems that involve discussion with peers, supervisors, subordinates as to how to accomplish a task or solve a problem. We are a practical, pragmatic, problem-solving people and our culture thrives on differing perspectives and ideas. It is built into our culture. Our politics is infused with dissent. One of our norms—respect for alternative viewpoints—is indispensable, although it seems, unfortunately, to have declined. The country was founded on dissent from British policy, laws, and institutions; our religious traditions from earliest times involved dissenting—splits in established churches and even migration, from Roger Williams leaving Puritan Massachusetts to the Mormons leaving upstate New York and Illinois and settling in the Mountain West—and many of you know that earliest Mormon settlements had their own dissenters and breakaway groups.

Think of countries that do not permit, or do not value, dissent that arises from freedom of thought and expression. Their governments are autocracies, arbitrary, capable of terrible mistakes—such as Russia has committed in invading Ukraine—and the militaries of such governments are less flexible, more corrupt. Businesses across the world, in all societies, that are top-down and do not encourage independent thinking and open discussion often waste money, choose wrongly, misjudge the market or the popularity or appropriateness of their products, and flounder.

In the armed forces, where lives can be on the line and the country’s security or even existence can be at stake, dissent seems to me as important as in any walk of life, simply because of the stakes in military service. It seems to me that dissent is not only a moral and ethical imperative, but an obligation. Think of it at the personal level. If you witness a mistake about to be made, a decision that will lead in your judgment to unnecessary death and destruction, to counterproductive results, to self-defeating consequences, do you not have the obligation to raise questions? To stand by without asking for explanation or clarification, or further discussion, can be something of a dereliction … not serving the mission, your superior, or the people for whom you are responsible, very well or even perhaps adequately.

On the other side, in command of others, would you not want your people to express their views, give you the benefit of their experience, knowledge, and judgment in the process of deciding a course of action—if not whether to act, how to act, what are the alternatives and the risks. It seems to me that every supervisor needs to encourage subordinates to make their views known in some way or in some venue, to know that they are heard and considered, that the boss is open to ideas and thoughts that might be out of the box or unpopular. That there will be no penalty for disagreeing with the boss. You must be careful not to intimidate your people into silence. At the beginning of his tenure, as the legendary Army Chief of Staff during World War II, George C. Marshall, reputably told his immediate staff that they were not doing their job. The staff was surprised, some even shocked, and they asked for an explanation. Marshall told them that they had been working with him for a week and not one of them had disagreed with him.2

At least this is the theory of dissent and leadership. I have made it sound simple, cut and dried, no problem. But we all know that the devil is in the details. The realities, as many of you know and probably have experienced, is that dissent is always situational. That is, it depends on a number of factors, and on the circumstances.

First, the situation, the context. Is it at the tactical level, as a junior officer, or higher, at the operational level, or even higher in a geographic combatant command or in Washington or the strategic level? Is it in the field, in combat, in a unit engaged, or at a command post or headquarters, or on a staff, at home or abroad? Is there time to dissent, to discuss? Does it involve allied forces or is it all Americans? If the latter, are other Services involved, or civilians, or local populations and civilians, local leaders or institutions or partners? Is it about a policy or its implementation, say the rules of engagement, established recently or further in the past, by your command, at a close level above you or in Washington far away? Does the dilemma involve a decision or its execution? Is there time to discuss or debate the policy, decision, order, or action? Are lives at stake? Is accomplishing the mission at stake?

In other words, how important is the issue? How consequential, and is the officer in a position, because of experience, knowledge, information, and the like, to make that determination accurately? All of this requires judgment and sensitivity, acute observation, and considerable thought.

Additionally, the people involved in a situation are a crucial consideration. One has to gauge the situation, and how often to dissent. With your peers, it seems easier to dissent. To your superiors, more difficult.

And then there is the problem of how to express dissent. Speaking up, in private or within an organization or up the chain of command, but not out to the public or people who will make your views public seems to me more problematic. That is, you can speak privately one on one, or in a small group with people you know and where there has already, through personal knowledge or time together, a bond of respect and trust. Perhaps a contrary view is best offered in private, with carefully crafted language. One has to read not only the boss, but the context, and one has to make clear, always, that you are subordinate, not just in words but also in tone, body language, and understanding of the issue and the person in charge.

When I worked in the Pentagon in the 1980s, there was a saying, “that it is better to ask forgiveness than permission.” Think about that. Like all aphorisms, it can be untrue or even dangerous. My father, a canny Illinois lawyer with a likeness of Abraham Lincoln on his office wall, loved aphorisms. One he often expressed was in my judgment wrong: “You’re never sorry for what you don’t say.” Well, I disagree with that, particularly on the subject of dissent, as I will explain in a moment. On another aphorism, he was dead right: “Don’t be so open-minded that your brains fall out.” The points are these: what counts are the situation, the circumstances, the importance of the problem, the people one is trying to reach, to engage, to influence, and more.

But if dissent is a moral and a professional obligation, one with personal and professional risks, in a discussion with important consequences, and an officer who disagrees and remains silent: has he or she fulfilled the duty to his or her subordinates and the loyalty to superiors? It is a ticklish question, an important question, but also one that should not be paralyzing either in the abstract, as a matter of theory, or particularly troubling in the everyday carrying out of your duties. It is simply a part of your profession, as it is with all of the professions, with life in general. When to speak up, when to remain silent. Do not make a big deal of it, or think about it all the time, making it a defining element of your officer-ship and relationships with your contemporaries and superiors. It is just a natural part of officer-ship in a professional military service. As one retired four-star admiral said to me recently, “All of us carry out orders we disagree with, occasionally and sometimes often.”3

George C. Marshall was particularly candid about the necessity for choice. He established an independent and candid relationship with Franklin Roosevelt when, newly promoted and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army in the late 1930s, in a meeting the President made his own views clear and went around the room asking those present if they agreed. All did until Marshall, who told Roosevelt that he most definitely did not agree and why. People there told Marshall his career was over, but Roosevelt respected Marshall’s bravery and honesty, and in 1939 appointed him Chief of Staff over several other higher-ranking people. And for the next six years, when dealing with Roosevelt and with Congress, the general admitted after the war that he always saved voicing his dissents for the most meaningful, important, consequential problems or issues, and let the unimportant pass without offering contrary views, lest he forfeit his credibility or influence with these politicians on matters he considered crucial. “I never haggled with the President,” Marshall remembered. “I swallowed the little things so that I could go to bat on the big ones. I never handled a matter apologetically and I was never contentious.”4

A good example of the necessity for silence occurred at an Army Air Forces base in North Africa in 1943. Years ago in discussion with two retired generals, both four stars, the mission to take out the Axis oil refineries at Ploesti in Rumania came up. Then Col Jacob Smart, a member of the chief of Army Air Forces colonels group at Headquarters in the Pentagon, said he thought up the idea of a low-level bombing mission to avoid the fighters and flak. Hap Arnold, the Army Air Forces chief, accepted the risk and told Smart that since he came up with the idea, he should go over to North Africa and sell it to the crews that would have to fly it. Leon Johnson, the other general, then a colonel and group commander, told Smart and me that he knew the attackers would be shot to pieces and the mission likely would fail—and it did—and Johnson won the Medal of Honor for his bravery and leadership. I asked him why, if he thought it would fail, why did he not refuse to fly the mission or object to it? He was dumbfounded. In the middle of World War II, against a murderous enemy in an existential world war, it never occurred to him to refuse the mission. As far as I know, he did not dissent; to do so, in retrospect, might have unhinged his unit.

I would be particularly careful not to confuse dissent with disobedience and even insubordination, at the various levels of combat and command, as in the reading by Andrew Milburn. He cites personal instances when he disobeyed or violated orders. But every example is from the tactical or operational level, the example of the Prussian officer and king. Milburn avoids the strategic level and above, as when, in an essay over a decade ago, he cited Douglas MacArthur in Korea as an example to be followed.5 This was and is nonsense; MacArthur was guilty of insubordination and disobedience at the policy, strategy, and presidential levels. The necessity for civilian control of the military, so pervasive in the U.S. Constitution and so foundational to the American government, admits of no disobedience. Officers can dissent in discussions with civilian superiors, but in private, speaking up but not out (i.e. to the press or the public), and even in testimony to Congress, senior officers must be extraordinarily careful in discussing their advice to the most senior civilian officials.

As the field officer, and throughout the military in many and perhaps most situations at the tactical and operational level of war, there is the expectation that officers have the discretion to adjust their orders and their decisions, if necessary, to implement the commander’s intent. The Armed Services seem in the last generation to try to locate decisions at the lowest level where commanders on the ground are likely to have the best knowledge to judge what needs to be done to accomplish that intent. Officers must navigate uncertainty and risk, not just in battle, staff work, or in deciding when it is imperative to dissent, to speak up. When it comes down to it, moral courage and physical courage come out of the same wellspring of character and judgment.

One other example. There may be times when orders can be disobeyed and perhaps should be. On a trip to Vietnam some ten years ago, the group I was with visited tunnels used by the Viet Cong near a town northeast of Saigon. One member of our group told us that, as an Air Force major near the end of the war, he had been a forward air controller marking enemy targets on the ground. When an order came through to vector an attack on a certain village because a South Vietnamese brigade was taking fire from it, he refused—twice. He told his superiors that he had flown over it many times, never taking fire, that if the South Vietnamese brigade was being fired upon, it should assault and take the town, not level it and kill all its innocent civilians. The major was accused of insubordination, taken off flying duty, and hauled before the four-star commander of U.S. air forces in Vietnam. His superiors presented the situation to the four-star. Legal orders; clear situation; twice ordered, threatened, consequences made clear. At the hearing, the major explained why he refused the orders to mark the town for destruction. Gen John Vogt, the commander—a distinguished officer, a fighter ace from World War II—then cleared the room and asked the major again, what happened and why. Same story. Vogt pondered, then told the major to return to his unit, that he would be put back on flying duty, and the incident was closed.

Now another commander might have thrown the book at the major. The man had made a moral and professional decision not to kill in his mind innocent people because the South Vietnamese brigade commander did not want to risk his own casualties in a ground assault. You make up your own minds. Was this moral courage? The right choice?

Command at any level is not a popularity contest, even if officer evaluations are being done with 360-degree inputs. Situations are often unclear, information lacking, choices difficult. Just as command is filled with uncertainty, so too is the need and appropriateness for dissent. Officers are often forced to “lead from the middle,” that is to help their superiors get through ambivalent choices, advocate and argue for a course of action that runs against the thinking of a group. Or, as is more often the case, take a decision or order that is disagreeable or that even appears wrong to one’s subordinates, and make the best of it. As one former Marine officer said a few years ago, when at a conference on wars of choice, when asked how one leads people in battle when they think the war is wrong and they oppose it: he answered that he always did everything in his power to accomplish his mission with the least harm to the people under his command and to the Iraqis involved in the action.

There are times when one has to speak truth to power, but as Marshall understood, you cannot do it all the time or you become a nag and a problem. As you rise in rank and responsibility, you will learn the instinct to assess the audience and the situation. Do not take counsel of your fears any more than you do in combat situations. One Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had to deal with a most difficult, frequently abusive, dismissive, and yet indecisive Secretary of Defense, told me that he always wanted the Secretary to be glad when he, the chairman, came into the room, knowing that he needed to be listened to. That it was essential to tell the Secretary what he needed to know even if he did not want to hear it. Marshall said essentially the same, in dealing with FDR: pick spots, save dissent, or unpleasant truth for what really mattered.

Let me close with one more thought. The Marine Corps is going through a set of dramatic changes as we speak. The law of averages tells me that some of them, hopefully, a tiny, tiny few, may be wrong or need adjustment or modification or whatever. This means that Marines at every level must be even more willing to dissent than in “normal” times, lest a mistake from the top—or near it—cause difficulties, even inefficiencies or deaths, that otherwise could be avoided. You who are not Marines in this audience should also take notice, and be prepared to dissent equally. I know the other Services face great challenges brought on by technology—to name only a few, cyber and drones, artificial intelligence, uninhabited ships and planes and vehicles—and a rapidly changing, and threatening, international situation. Not to speak of funding limitations, of changes in our alliances, and in leadership, all of which reverberate downrange. Be prepared for such; be attuned to the contributions you can make not by going along to get along, but by contributing your experience and expertise, reading widely and thinking critically, and dissenting when it is called for, and it can be helpful. Your Service and the country will be the better for it.

Notes

1. As a verb, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “dissent” as “to differ in sentiment … To withhold assent or consent from a proposal, etc.; not to assent; to disagree with or object to an action … To think differently.” The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Dissent.”

2. Marshall and his staff at the beginning of his tenure.

3. Conversation in 2021, repeated in the fall of 2022 in Durham, NC. The Admiral had been a COCOM commander and after retirement, a senior civilian reporting directly to the President.

4. Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1965); and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963).

5. Andrew Milburn, “When Not to Obey Orders,” War on the Rocks, July 8, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/when-not-to-obey-orders; Thomas E. Ricks, “Richard Kohn Fires a Warning Flare about a Joint Forces Quarterly Article,” FP, September 29, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/29/richard-kohn-fires-a-warning-flare-about-a-joint-force-quarterly-article; Andrew R. Milburn, “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional,” Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4th Quarter 2010).

Contested Logistics in the EABO Environment

A present look and way ahead

>1stLt German is currently a student at the Army’s Logistics Captains Career Course. He is a Ground Supply Officer and previously was the Battalion Supply Officer for 3d Littoral Logistics Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment and has a Master’s of Economics from Purdue University.

As the Marine Corps works on applying the ideas of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) to sea denial and sensing across island chains in the Western Pacific, one critical component remains uncertain: logistics and sustainment. In a recent U.S. Naval Proceedings podcast, when asked what the Marine Corps still needs help on concerning Force Design 2030, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Eric Smith, remarked, “Where we always have to work is logistics, that remains the pacing challenge.”1

The current supply chain is not responsive enough to support disbursed forces in the Western Pacific, and these challenges will only be exacerbated by greater distance and less infrastructure. The Marine Corps needs to find a way to adapt its systems to do so or adjust its business practices to provide sustained support. Looking at data from the Marine Corps supply and maintenance system (Global Combat Service System-Marine Corps [GCSS-MC]) for units in the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) can provide framing for this assessment. Evaluating supply and maintenance chains is relevant to every Marine occupational specialty, especially to the individual rifleman. Sustaining that Marine will be more challenging than ever. While Gen Smith was serving as the commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, he commented that when considering logistics in a distributed environment everyone should be thinking, “need less.”2 With that being said, each asset is of even greater importance. The days are gone of fleets of HMMWVs and Seven-Tons at a commander’s disposal. Logistics assets within the Marine Littoral Regiment and in the WEZ will be few and far between. Neglecting the supply chain and maintaining these assets is a risk, and the data below highlights several processes that are vulnerable and worth consideration.

When items are ordered in GCSS-MC, the user assigns a priority code which tells the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) the urgency of need for that requirement. The priority codes are associated with a force/activity designator (FAD), which is determined by a unit’s geographic location and proximity to a threat or enemy. Almost all of III MEF is poised to respond to a crisis in the Western Pacific and therefore has a FAD of II as depicted in Figure 1. This means units can order an item with a priority of 02 (highest priority), 05, or 12 (lowest priority).

Image
Figure 1. Designators used in data. (Figure provided by author.)
What next determines how fast the part arrives is the source of supply (SOS) which fulfills the requisition. By looking at SOS and priority code, it is possible to analyze how well the Marine Corps supply systems perform and how impactful priority codes are in reducing wait time. The USTRANSCOM-approved time definitive delivery standards set a goal of delivering an 02 item to Marine units under U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in eleven days (not considering backorders or delays from the SOS).3 USTRANSCOM does not rely solely on the priority code, though, because what actually determines if the item goes by ship or air is the required delivery date (RDD) inputted in GCSS-MC. Even if a maintainer makes a part 02, if they leave the RDD spot blank in GCSS, it will appear to USTRANSCOM as a low priority.
Using an ordinary least squared regression (a data science practice often used by economists), it is possible to parse out not only the expected wait time from a source of supply but also how much the priority code reduces wait time. An advantage of using the ordinary least squared model versus simply averaging the wait time for each variable is the “ceteris paribus” feature or “all else being equal.” This serves to isolate the effects of each variable from the others. This gives a more accurate estimate and thus allows for an accurate evaluation of the efficiencies or inefficiencies of a supply system.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the regression and displays the wait time measured in days for each SOS that had more than 200 requisitions in III MEF over one year and the effect that assigning a priority 02 or 05 had on wait time. Overall, the data included 244,910 requisitions in III MEF over the last year from 6 different SOSs. There are two supply management units (SMUs) in III MEF, one on Okinawa and one on Oahu, these on-island warehouses are the first stop for units requisitioning parts and supplies based on enterprise business rules; they are grouped together as one SOS for analysis. The right-most column shows the percent of requisitions filled by each SOS.
Image
Table 2. (Table provided by author.)

The most important results come from the two SOSs that filled 99 percent of the requisitions, which were unsurprisingly the SMUs and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The SMUs are obviously performing the best, and even their priority twelve wait time is likely skewed by the rest of the SOSs and averages much lower (around four days). If the on-island SMUs do not have the item being requested, it is most often filled by Defense Logistics Agency. What is important to note though is that the wait times for Defense Logistics Agency are greater than two weeks even for 02 priority requisitions. Another interesting point is that 02 requisitions are only expected to come in around two days faster than a priority twelve item across all SOSs.

The results illustrate that there is little to no difference in 05 and 02 priority requirements in terms of wait time. Commanders often request weekly or daily updates on their 02 requirements; generally, they are almost identical to the 05 ones in terms of wait time. 02 priority requirements are defined as those without which “the requiring force is unable to perform assigned operational missions.”4 FAD II is also the FAD used by units “engaged or assigned to combat zones.”5 This implies that units in combat roles dislocated from the United States who need a part not stocked by a nearby SMU could expect to have the same wait time of over two weeks for their high priority requirements. Now, as mentioned earlier, some of these delays could be a result of not inputting the correct RDD correctly that then leads USTRANSCOM to assign a lower priority.

How does this apply to littoral logistics operations? For one, it is evident that the supply chain is a limiting factor. The tentative EABO manual specifically mentions how “distributing maintenance forces must be complemented by efficiency and responsiveness in the supply chain to ensure maintainers have timely access to repair parts, enabling them to restore equipment to a mission capable status.” Based on the data of requisitions in III MEF, distributing forces will have a hard time meeting this mission-capable status. Waiting over fourteen days in a contested environment is untenable; the deadlined asset will be a target well before the part can reach maintainers. Even if some of the results from above are truly from an improper RDD and priority combination, this still is a cause for concern given that the systems and pressure personnel will be under much greater pressure in the first island chain. In the status quo, units will have to anticipate lengthy wait times or construct highly comprehensive class IX resupply blocks in order to continue to operate effectively, both of which go against EABO principles.

There exists a plethora of solutions to these logistic problems. For one, automation of the correct combination of priority and RDD in GCSS would prevent one of the issues identified above. This is a simple coding switch in GCSS-MC that would prevent a Marine in the WEZ from accidentally getting his part sent via ship versus air. A more advanced and data-science-related solution is developing technology to determine supply needs in advance, this is currently being done with the Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) program. CBM+ involves placing sensors in military equipment like the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), these sensors can then track a vehicle over its lifetime and use data science to predict part failures or prevent catastrophic failures.6 After data is collected, it can be “transformed via machine learning applications to develop predictive insights, which are then pushed to software-driven dashboards that can be used by maintainers and operators to make decisions based on evidence of need.”7 The more time and data the system receives, the more accurate the predictions will become which goes to partially solving the current iron-mountain problem. It cannot be overstated how important this technology is to units like the Marine Littoral Regiment which will be more disaggregated and removed from sources of supply than ever before. Capturing this data will better inform not only the maintenance and supply requirements of current equipment but procurement for future programs of record. The Marine Corps must continue to invest in this program and similar initiatives. If done correctly, this could reduce the wait time to zero—where a maintainer has a part just before it even becomes an issue.

Another solution to this problem is looking at alternatives to established and expensive programs of record. There is a lot of discussion around 21st-century foraging as a way to get after this idea. The suggestion is to purchase local commercial equipment to use for logistical purposes. The upfront expenses might be high to purchase some used vehicles or assets, but the money and time saved in maintenance cycle costs could be tremendous. Vehicles like local pickup trucks, commercial construction, or engineering equipment offer several advantages within the WEZ. They are discreet, reasonably cheap, already exist there, and for the most part, the logistics networks to support them already exist. This strategy also allows leaders the option to abandon assets without the repercussions of losing millions of dollars in government equipment. This also goes along with the thinking mentioned in the tentative EABO manual, if you cannot fix it, get rid of it—which is much easier to do when you did not invest hundreds of thousands of dollars into each asset. One great counterargument to 21st-century foraging is that the local economies of the islands and countries will not be able to support these requirements for a large force (the total personnel within a single Marine Littoral Regiment is in the thousands). An offshoot of 21st-century foraging is to create equipment that is easier to throw away. Unarmored, cheap, simple equipment is one way to get Marines moving faster and support them easier. In an EABO environment, Marines are less worried about an improvised explosive device than they are about a ballistic missile. In World War II, over a quarter of a million jeeps were made, and there was not much intermediate maintenance done on them because it was not worth it. If the jeep broke down and was more complicated than a spark plug or a tire change, it could be disposed of wherever it lay. Last year the Marine Corps Commandant, Gen Berger, mentioned this same idea, asking, “what if it’s done its business in a year and we buy another one?”8 This is the mindset that Marine Corps Systems Command and procurement specialists need to start asking themselves. If parts are hard to get, then a valid solution is equipment that needs fewer parts.

The EABO manual also offers a cruder solution hinted at above, that is, “If equipment cannot be repaired forward in an expeditious manner, then it should be evacuated, cannibalized, or abandoned.”9 Again, evacuation is arguably the ideal scenario, but evacuating a principal end item like a JLTV requires more than just a simple tow (a single vehicle weighs up to 21,000 pounds). On an island within the WEZ, limited by narrow avenues of approach and poor maneuverability, it is far more likely the equipment would need to be destroyed and left. One JLTV has a price tag of around $305,000; a single part like a power-control module can make the vehicle unusable, leaving that rifleman and his squad on the island with a giant metal target parked next to them. Units like the Littoral Logistics Battalion within the Marine Littoral Regiment rate only 13 of the D00457K JLTV variant, meaning losing one would decrease their readiness immediately by 8 percent, three of them gone puts them below 80 percent readiness (if we assume the rest are all in perfect condition). On top of that, the current maintenance cycle demands a huge amount of time and money; there are routine preventative maintenance costs, modification instructions, and part replacements that the current system demands. These all might work reasonably well in garrison, but they are a huge investment of manpower and funding which is arguably too large to then be abandoned because a part breaks and there is no chance of timely resupply. On top of this, the Marine Corps is fighting for every penny in order to invest and procure technologically advanced gear like Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, a replacement for the aging assault amphibious vehicle fleet and littoral amphibious warships. All this equipment will be required to defeat an adversary like China but arguing for these funds in Congress will be much less convincing if the Marine Corps abandons the same equipment on an island a few years later. The Marine Corps needs to confront this issue and accept it as a likely reality. When U.S. forces left billions of dollars of equipment in Afghanistan last year, the public outrage was enormous and top military officers were called to testify about the losses. If the Marine Corps does not adapt quickly to sustaining equipment and procuring “throw-away” equipment as mentioned above, then leaders will need to be prepared to answer similar questions.

Overall, the supply chain system needs to adapt to find ways to deliver parts faster, or at least consistently apply priority codes to get urgent parts delivered more efficiently. This applies to the EABO but also the modern battlefield in general. The pace of battle against a near-pear threat will be much faster than it was in Iraq or Afghanistan. Supply choices might need to be reevaluated using data science as here to see which systems or vendors are working and which are not. Programs like CBM+ need to be prioritized and funded so we can start collecting data and predicting now. If the system is unable to adapt, then commanders and higher will need to understand that the support they expect; is not going to be there anytime soon. The Marine Corps is going to have to find a way to come up with smarter, more flexible ideas to keep equipment operating or start investing in equipment easier to replace. There will not be wrecker support or an intermediate maintenance bay available in EABO. If parts are not anywhere close for delivery, the logistics community is going to have to figure out how to prioritize what they need and find creative ways to get it to the forward-deployed Marine. That rifleman will be the one that we are letting down by not working through these problems and facing these realities now; if we do not plan, they will be the ones figuring it out for themselves.

Notes

1. Bill Hamlet, “Proceedings Podcast Ep. 266—Stand-in Forces: Adapt or Perish,” The Proceedings Podcast, podcast audio, May 4, 2022, https://www.usni.org/maga zines/proceedings/theproceedingspodcast/proceedings-podcast-ep-266-stand-forces-adapt-or.

2. Philip Athey, “Is Expeditionary Foraging in the Corps’ Future?” Defense News, August 9, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/08/06/is-expeditionary-foraging-in-the-corps-future.

3. Staff, “Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS),” Welcome to L&MR, n.d., https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/SCI/TDD_Standards.html.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 4400.16H, Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority Statement (Washington, DC: 2010).

5. Ibid.

6. Michael Whitaker, “USMC CBM+ Overview Brief,” presentation, Pentagon, Washington, DC, July 28, 2022.

7. Osman Sesay and Michael Whitaker, “Condition Based Maintenance Plus Minimum Viable Product (MVP) and Beyond,” (Washington, DC: December 2020).

8. Gina Harkins, “Top Marine General: We Need to Get Comfortable with ‘Throwaway’ Equipment,” Military.com, February 2, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/02/02/top-marine-general-we-need-get-comfortable-throwaway-equipment.html.

9. Headquarters Marine Corps, The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (TM EABO) (Washington, DC: March 2019).

>Author’s Note: A special thanks to the following individuals for their assistance in the research and drafting of this article, CWO3 Erick Bannar, Capt Joseph Shavel, 1stLt William Allred, CWO2 Wendell T. Horton, LtCol Osman Sesay, and Mrs. Anna German.

A Message From the Deputy Commandant for Information

The Marine Corps is in a constant “fight for information.” Winning this fight today and every day gives us a lethal advantage in the next battle, the next war. Information and combat power are inextricably linked. Whether it is to ensure trust in the firing solution data for the next fire mission, achieve decision advantage through all domain reconnaissance, or gain access to key maritime terrain through a partner that trusts our reputational narrative, the fight for information is real, consequential, and never ends. Winning this fight requires talented Marines with a bias for action and a willingness to execute their duties to the highest professional standard. This is exactly what I have seen since serving as the Deputy Commandant for Information.

I am extremely proud of the insight, imagination, and innovation of our Marines as they take full advantage of Force Design concepts. For example, Marines from the Gulf of Finland to the first island chain are engaging in the fight for information by conducting all domain reconnaissance. This concept of Force Design directly supports the combatant commander and realizes a key aspect of Joint All Domain Command and Control. I have personally seen these Marines in action. They are not waiting for “textbook” instruction or solutions. They are smart, empowered, and focused on solving problems and mitigating challenges through an innovative spirit. We can all learn from their unconstrained view of opportunity, their technical savvy, and deep understanding of the digital environment in which they grew up. These Marines understand how fast technology changes and how a good idea today may not be so next year. Unleashed, they can help us solve numerous information challenges ranging from battlefield command and control, to targeting, to laying out phase maintenance schedules for complex aircraft. Marines today understand the power of information and how to fuse and correlate it to generate outcomes.

The office of the Deputy Commandant for Information is focused on providing the capabilities and authorities needed to make Marines successful. The essence of our approach is readiness. Using the Commandant’s guidance, we need to be “ready for what, with what, when?” Should a theater security cooperation event unexpectedly turn into a crisis, the “kit” our Marines require must move seamlessly from one to the other. We must not rely on a “digital iron mountain” of server stack farms and equipment. Instead, we must engage with the minimum information required to accomplish the mission, while minimizing logistics requirements and signatures. In such an environment, Marines require the right information capabilities based on the conditions of placement and access. This includes capabilities and methods from edge computation and storage to a lean “apps” approach through a ubiquitous transport-enabled cloud environment.

I have had the distinct privilege to work across many different parts of our MAGTF—from aviation to C4 to intelligence to cyber. It has kept me humble trying to maintain pace with our aggressive and innovative Marines. What I have learned is they have a disdain for the status quo. They always want to move forward. Force Design provides the opportunity to be innovative and to fully support our National Defense Strategy through our warfighting ethos. Semper Fidelis!

Semper Fi,

Image

 

Matthew G. Glavy
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Information

Giving “Laser Focus” New Meaning

The Marine Corps is unprepared for the newest tactic of civil unrest events

>>Capt Deavenport is an Intelligence Officer currently serving as an Olmsted Scholar in Bangkok, Thailand.

When adversaries combine commercially available products with a little ingenuity, they can create new attack pathways that are difficult to counteract. Over the last decade, anti-government protestors around the world have done exactly that during large-scale civil unrest events. In Hong Kong, protestors used traffic cones and leaf blowers to counter the effects of tear-gas canisters. In Portland, OR, protestors used umbrellas to hide their collective faces from surveillance cameras. In Beirut, Lebanon, and Nantes, France, protestors used tennis rackets and hockey sticks to hit tear-gas canisters back at police. Perhaps the most concerning new tactic, however, is protestors using hundreds of laser pointers simultaneously to blind and disrupt law enforcement officers and government security personnel.

Given its effectiveness against law enforcement in places like Egypt, Chile, Hong Kong, Iraq, and the United States, the use of laser pointers as a form of non-violent resistance has been shared widely on the world’s social media platforms. A practical assessment indicates that the tactic will likely be a feature of future civil unrest events in countries around the world. As an expeditionary force-in-readiness that often operates in environments of civil unrest, the Marine Corps should be concerned about this emerging tactic for the risk it poses to our forces. As it stands, Marines are neither equipped nor trained to operate in this emerging threat environment. The Marine Corps has an obligation to address this problem at the Service level.

Understanding the Threat
Lasers were once considered to be little more than science-fiction, popularized by multimedia franchises like Star Wars and 007. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration narrowed the delta between fiction and reality when they considered using lasers as part of a broader ballistic missile defense platform, though researchers concluded that the technology was still decades away from military use. Today, great powers around the world are studying the potential applications of laser technology in modern directed energy weapons. Across the national security and defense community, the discourse on laser technology remains a subject of intrigue for its numerous potential applications.

For people outside of the defense establishment, however, laser technology is most commonly associated with a simple office presentation tool. The laser pointer is a seemingly innocuous device that became affordable, ubiquitous, and commercially available in the 1990s. Today, consumers can purchase a new, high-powered laser pointer online for less than $30. Aside from the warning in the fine print to “avoid direct eye exposure,” these devices are sold to the general public with very few legal restrictions. Not surprisingly, the disruptive use of laser pointers is a growing issue.

In the United States, the most common incidents of laser disruptions are reported by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In 2020 alone, the FAA reported 6,852 laser incidents targeting commercial aircraft in the United States, 20 of which resulted in unspecified injuries to pilots or aircrews.1 In 2021, the number of reported incidents swelled to 8,550 incidents, 46 of which resulted in injuries. While it is a federal crime to aim a laser at an aircraft in the United States, the FAA laser incident reports suggest that the law has done little to mitigate the practice. In many cases, individuals may not realize the damage that a $30 device can cause. The data points listed above represent cases in which laser pointers disrupted the operations of commercial airlines, but they represent only isolated incidents, absent any coordination or concentrated effects. What happens when laser pointers are used as objects of resistance on a larger scale?

Since 2013, civilian protestors around the world have embraced laser pointers as useful tools for non-violent resistance, particularly in the context of anti-government protests. In places like Egypt, Chile, Hong Kong, Iraq, and the United States, protestors used hundreds of laser pointers in a coordinated fashion to confuse police officers, scramble facial recognition cameras, and deter people from taking photos amid periods of anti-government unrest.2 In one viral video from 2019, a crowd of protestors in Santiago, Chile, appeared to “shoot down” a police quadcopter by concentrating their lasers against the remote aircraft. When used against people, like police officers or government security forces, laser pointers can cause both temporary and irreversible damage to the eyes. Such is the nature of truly devastating threats: they are non-threatening enough to not be taken seriously but dangerous enough to do real harm.

There is evidence to suggest that lasers could revolutionize protesting around the world because they offer several advantages for protestors in the modern era.3 First, laser pointers are affordable and widely available. When protesters gathered in Cairo, Egypt, in 2013 to celebrate the overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi, street vendors reportedly sold laser pointers to protestors “just for fun,” apparently not yet aware of the dangerous potential that exists when many laser pointers are used together.4 In Hong Kong, laser pointers were distributed en masse for protection against police amidst widespread anti-government protests. Second, laser pointers can disrupt (or seriously harm) law enforcement personnel with the blinding effects of concentrated light. However, protestors see lasers as a novel tool for non-violent resistance because they present a relatively low risk to physical objects, at least compared to rocks, broken glass, or firearms. Third, in the age of artificial intelligence and facial recognition cameras, lasers can also protect the identities of the protestors in the crowd. When a single laser hits a camera lens, it drastically shifts the exposure and effectively washes out the image, making identification of protestors in a crowd almost impossible. Ultimately, the mass use of laser pointers offers an accessible and effective tool for protestors around the world to resist government crackdowns in a way that is generally perceived as non-violent while also offering some protection against surveillance cameras and facial recognition technology.

The available data on the disruptive use of laser pointers highlights some useful patterns to better characterize the threat. First, among the various laser pointers that are commercially available, the 532-nanometer green laser is the most widely used device in recent protests around the world. The green laser, compared to colors like red, purple, or blue, is the most visible to the human eye and is therefore the most preferred type. Indeed, the FAA data cited earlier indicates that more than 88 percent of the reported laser incidents involved green lasers. Additionally, we know that the power output for commercially available lasers can range from a meager 5 milli-watts (mW) all the way up to 1,000 mW.5 Consider this excerpt from the American Academy of Opthalmology:

If a laser with less than five milliwatts of output power is directed at someone’s eye, that person can blink or turn away without suffering an eye injury. However, the natural protective mechanisms of the eye—such as the blink reflex—are ineffective against lasers with output power greater than five milliwatts, and severe retinal damage may occur, even after momentary exposure.6

Green laser pointers are inexpensive, prolific, and can be sold at power outputs that are empirically dangerous to the human eye.

Second, the advent of digital mobilization suggests that protestors in future civil unrest events will integrate the tactics and technologies from other protestors around the world. A 2020 article in the New York Times entitled, “Why Protest Tactics Spread Like Memes,” offers several examples to reinforce this point.7 In Hong Kong during 2019, video showed protestors racing to place orange traffic cones over tear gas canisters to keep the smoke from spreading; in Minneapolis, MN, nine months later, protestors did the same thing. In Hong Kong during 2019, protestors used leafblowers to disperse tear gas; in Portland, OR, a year later, protestors did the same thing. There are several more examples, but they all lead to the same conclusion. The widespread use of social media, coupled with digital mobilization, means that successful civil unrest tactics will spread and increase in scale.

Taken together, we know three fundamental things about this emerging threat: protestors are most likely to use 520-nm green lasers, the power output of a single laser can range anywhere from 5-1,000 mW, and protestors are likely to use this technology in civil unrest zones around the world because of digital mobilization. This data alone is sufficient to mount a response to this threat. A single laser can cause blurry vision or permanent blindness, but the mobilization of hundreds, or even thousands, of lasers could effectively neutralize a ground force, particularly one without the appropriate personal protective equipment and training. Surely then, the Marine Corps is well-prepared to meet this threat—right?

Herein lies the problem: the Marine Corps’ standard-issue, authorized eyewear offers no laser eye protection. None. The current standard-issue glasses feature 2.4-millimeter polycarbonate lenses for ballistic protection, 100 percent ultraviolet protection, and fog-prevention treatment for those steamy Camp Lejeune field exercises. However, they offer zero protection against laser devices in any wavelength. In fact, the Marine Corps’ governing document on laser safety programs, Marine Corps Order 5104.1C, fails to even mention laser protective equipment or training for forward-deployed forces.8 The current eyewear arguably met the minimum eye protection requirements of battlefields a decade ago, but the threat landscape has meaningfully changed.

Bear in mind that the Marine Corps, compared to its adjacent services, is perhaps the most likely to operate during civil unrest events on foreign soil. Consider, for example, the missions assigned to the MEU. Among other things, the MEU is assigned the mission essential tasks of performing non-combatant evacuation operations, airfield seizure operations, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations. All these missions virtually ensure close contact with host-nation civilians amid varying degrees of civil unrest. The evacuation of Kabul in August of 2021 is just one example. It is a matter of when, not if, Marines will operate against protestors armed with laser pointers.

The other services acknowledged this threat years ago. In 2018, the Air Force signed a nearly $200 million contract to provide laser eye protection for their pilots and air crews. The Army issued a pre-solicitation for next-generation eye protection and the Coast Guard subsequently initiated a joint research project for low-cost laser eye-protection glasses.

Recommendations
To mitigate this threat, the Marine Corps must first purchase enhanced eye protection for threat laser devices in both combat and training situations. This eyewear should provide sufficient protection to prevent permanent eye damage and temporary effects (glare, flash blindness, etc.) from laser devices while minimizing visual acuity degradation. It is worth mentioning that the Marine Corps’ current eyewear supplier already produces a laser protective lens that blocks 99 percent of 532-nanometer green lasers. This piece of gear, or a similar model, should be fielded to Marine forces across the air-ground task force at the soonest opportunity.

Second, the Marine Corps must develop and integrate training modules to prepare Marines for the new tactics used by modern protestors. The San Francisco Police Department recently surveyed their patrol officers and asked how they would respond to the hypothetical use of laser pointers during protests.9 Some officers said they considered laser pointers to be non-threatening distractions, while others said they viewed lasers as dangerous weapons and would respond with force. Without any standardization in terms of training and equipment, it is not at all surprising that the responses among San Francisco police officers were inconsistent.

If the same question were posed to our Marines, I expect that we would get the same results: inconsistency and subjectivity. If Marines were sent to reinforce an embassy in a given hotspot today and protestors gathered at the gates with 532-nanometer green laser pointers, would Marines simply dismiss it (not likely), react with non-lethal force, or react with lethal force? No Marine on the ground or in the air should have to make this decision absent any training or guidance, much less without the proper protective equipment. Wherever possible, the Marine Corps has an obligation to reduce uncertainty, subjectivity, and inconsistency through realistic and threat-informed training.

From my perspective, the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Operations Training Group structure is the best vector to provide this training for pre-deployment forces. The Expeditionary Operations Training Group already provides tailored, pre-deployment training packages to prepare units for the requirements of the respective geographic combatant commands. Once Marines are equipped appropriately, it would take only minor revisions to the Expeditionary Operations Training Group training framework to provide a basic introduction to modern laser pointer tactics, protective equipment, and mitigation techniques.

In the context of the world’s dynamic and ambitious threats, it is easy to dismiss the laser pointer as little more than an office presentation tool, but its emerging applications will almost certainly challenge future Marines. Now is a fitting time for the organization to make a clear-eyed assessment of its standard issue protective eyewear and associated training to meet the shifting threat landscape.

Notes

1. Federal Aviation Administration, “Laser Incidents,” Federal Aviation Administration, November 23, 2021, https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/lasers/laws.

2. Alan Taylor, “The Lasers of Discontent,” The Atlantic, November 23, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2019/11/photos-lasers-discontent/602263.

3. Jeremiah Kim, “Lasers: The Future of Protests,” Harvard Political Review, March 19, 2020, https://harvardpolitics.com/lasers.

4. “Egypt crisis: Why are Cairo Protesters Using Laser Pens?” BBC News, July 4, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-23178484.

5. Big Lasers, “Differences in Laser Pointer Output Powers,” Big Lasers, March 11, 2013, https://biglasers.com/blog/2013/03/11/differences-in-laser-pointer-output-powers.

6. Ari Soglin, “Is Your Laser Pointer Dangerous Enough to Cause Eye Injury?” American Academy of Opthalmology, June 22, 2018, https://www.aao.org/eye-health/news/laser-pointer-eye-injury.

7. Tracy Ma et al., “Why Protest Tactics Spread Like Memes,” New York Times, July 31, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/style/viral-protest-videos.html.

8. Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 5104.1C, “Navy Laser Hazards Control Program,” (Washington, DC: May 2008).

9. “Lasers: The Future of Protests.”