On That First Day on Guadalcanal

Why so little Japanese resistance?

During the months after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and other Asian targets, the United States was driven from the Philippines, the British surrendered Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, French Indochina fell, and the Dutch lost the East Indies.  

This dire threat led to the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, where Japanese and U.S. Navy carrier forces fought to a tactical draw, resulting in a strategic victory, albeit temporary, for the United States and its allies. The Battle of the Coral Sea was also important for the subsequent Battle of Midway, which occurred the following month, as it diminished Japanese carrier forces available for the attack on Midway.

The Japanese also landed on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in May 1942, and there they began to build an airfield. 

The location of this new Japanese airfield at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal was a serious threat to the security of Australia and New Zealand. So, the United States, as a matter of great urgency and despite not being fully prepared to go on the offensive in the Pacific theater, conducted its first amphibious landing of the war. The 1st MarDiv landed on Guadalcanal on the morning of 7 August 1942 and secured the Japanese airfield under construction without difficulty. 

However, holding this airfield—to become Henderson Field—over the next six months was one of the most contested campaigns in the entire Pacific war. The high stakes fight for control of Guadalcanal, along with the surrounding waters and airspace of the Solomon Sea, was an important turning point in the Pacific War. Ultimately, the U.S. victory at Guadalcanal completely halted further expansion of the Japanese defensive barrier and enabled the Allies to go on the offensive.1

Why did the 1stMarDiv face so little opposition during the first few days on Guadalcanal? It was not just luck, though there was some of that, too. A large part of the answer is provided by MG George C. Kenney in his book Air War in the Pacific.2 Here, Kenney, in a succinct, contemporaneous style, describes the U.S. Army Air Force’s (USAAF) actions against the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul, located on the island of New Britain, to coincide with amphibious landing operations on Guadalcanal: 

Twenty B-17s flew [from their Australian base] to Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea [on 6th August to refuel] and eighteen took off on the big strike on the morning of the 7th August. Twenty Jap fighters intercepted our bombers about twenty-five miles short of the target, but the kids closed up their formation and fought their way to Vunakanau [airfield at Rabaul] where they dropped their bombs in a group pattern that was a real bulls-eye. The Japs still had the same 150 planes lined up wing-tip to wing-tip on both sides of the runway. The [post-strike reconnaissance] pictures looked as though we got at least seventy-five of them, besides setting fire to a lot of gasoline and blowing up a big bomb dump on the edge of the field. In the air combat we shot down eleven of the twenty Jap fighters that participated.3

We lost one B-17 piloted by Captain Harl Pease …. During the combat coming into Rabaul, Pease was on the wing that bore the brunt of the [enemy fighter intercept] attack. By skillful handling of his airplane, in spite of the fact that the bad engine by this time had quit entirely, Pease held his place in the formation and his crew shot down at least three of the Jap fighters. Shortly after he had dropped his bombs on the target, another wave of enemy fighters concentrated their attack on his airplane which they evidently realized was crippled. The B-17 burst into flames and went down. No parachutes were seen to open.4

I recommended Pease for a Medal of Honor; General MacArthur approved and forwarded the recommendation to Washington. The next day, a wire came in from the War Department confirming the award. Carmichael [commanding officer, 19th Bombardment Group and the B-17 flight leader] was given a Distinguished Service Cross, while a number of lesser decorations were awarded to outstanding members of the group.5

The Marines landed at Guadalcanal with practically no opposition. Tulagi was also taken … There was no Jap air interference. Admiral Ghormley wired General MacArthur a congratulatory message on the success of our attack on Vunakanau and the fact that it had broken up the possibility of Jap air interference with his landing in the Solomons. General MacArthur added his congratulations and I sent both messages to the 19th Group with my own.6

During the day [of 7th August], we intercepted several Jap radios which were appeals by the Nips in the Solomons for help from Rabaul air units. The Jap commander at Rabaul replied that he couldn’t do anything for the boy[?] in the Solomons on account of our heavy air raid on his airdrome. The next day [8th August] we intercepted another message which showed that only thirty bombers were serviceable at Vunakanau [post attack]. Jap prisoners, taken at Guadalcanal airdrome (Lunga), confirmed our observation that the day before there were approximately 150 bombers at Vunakanau at the time of our attack.7

Following this highly successful early morning attack on Rabaul on 7 August by the USAAF’s 19th Group, the Japanese hurriedly reconstituted and managed to launch an attack of 27 G4M Betty horizontal bombers that arrived in the Guadalcanal area in the early afternoon. Fortunately, a heavy cloud cover in the target area disrupted these bombers’ aim, and all their bombs fell harmlessly into the waters off Guadalcanal. This flight of Betty bombers was met by eighteen U.S. Navy F4F Wildcat fighters attacking in two waves. A flight of eight Wildcats from the VF-5 squadron based on the aircraft carrier Saratoga attacked first. Then, a second flight of ten Wildcats from VF-6 squadron based on the carrier Enterprise joined the attack. Five Betty bombers fell to Wildcat guns. However, nine of the eighteen Wildcats fell to the seventeen superior-performing A6M Zeroes escorting the Bettys. Some of the downed Wildcat pilots were rescued from the waters off Guadalcanal.8 Later in the afternoon of 7 August, nine D3A Val dive bombers attacked. However, these aircraft managed only one bomb hit—on the aft deck of the destroyer USS Mugford. Again, F4F Wildcat fighters rose from the two USN carriers to shoot down five of the Vals, with the other four ditching during their return to Rabaul. Wildcats also bagged two of the escorting Zeroes.9

The next day, 8 August, the Japanese again sent a horizontal bomber force of 27 Bettys south to Guadalcanal escorted by 15 Zeroes. However, the U.S. Navy was ready. Wildcat fighters again launched from carriers Saratoga and Enterprise to meet this new attack, shooting down 22 of the Bettys while also downing two of the escorting Zeroes. The Bettys did severely damage a U.S. Navy destroyer and sink a transport ship; however, no American aircraft were lost, and no bombs fell on Guadalcanal.10 

Clearly, the USAAF’s perfectly timed, preemptive attack on the Japanese redoubt of Rabaul greatly spared the 1stMarDiv and U.S. Navy’s amphibious shipping off-shore Guadalcanal from far larger air attacks. Credit for this major accomplishment goes to MG George Kenney, who foresaw the need for a heavy, early morning surprise attack on Rabaul to coincide with Guadalcanal operations. 

Kenney, who had only arrived in Australia the month prior, vigorously assumed command of all Allied air operations in the Southwest Pacific Area theater under GEN Douglas MacArthur and insisted on quickly building up the combat capability of the 19th Bombardment Group. This foresight was crucial to staging a highly effective attack on Rabaul with its large concentration of heavy bombers based on the island of New Britain, located at the northern end of the Solomon Sea. 

Of course, the primary credit goes to the courageous 19th Bombardment Group. The eighteen aircrews flew their B-17s without fighter escort all the way to Rabaul and delivered a knockout blow to an enemy air threat. The 19th Group’s surprise attack destroyed or damaged roughly 80 percent of a Japanese bomber force that would have contested amphibious operations at Guadalcanal to a much greater extent.11

Subsequent Japanese air attacks on Guadalcanal were perforce significantly smaller. Indeed, the reduction in Japanese air power caused by this one USAAF attack enabled U.S. Navy fighters protecting Guadalcanal to counter the residual Japanese bomber aircraft that did attack Guadalcanal early on.

As a nod to the 1stMarDiv’s motto of “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy,” one can rightly say that in those first days on Guadalcanal, the 1stMarDiv had very good friends in both the USAAF and U.S. Naval aviation. On those fateful days, they went after the division’s worst enemy in a very big way. 

>Col Karch served from 1966 to 1992. A Naval Aviator, he flew the F-4 Phantom II operationally over three decades. He was also a Test Pilot, Advanced Flight Instructor, and a Ground Forward Air Controler with the South Korean Marines in Vietnam.

Notes

1. Wikipedia Editors, “Guadalcanal,” Wikipedia, n.d., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadalcanal.

2. George Kenney, Air War in the Pacific: The Journal of General George Kenney, Commander of the Fifth U.S. Air Force (N/A: P-47 Press, 2018). George Churchill Kenney (6 August 1889–9 August 1977) was a USAAF general during World War II; he is best known as the commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, a position he held between July 1942 and August 1945. He was the first commander of the Air Force Strategic Air Command.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. 

8. Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (New York: Random House, 1990).

9. Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 

11. Ibid. MajGen Kenney was soon promoted to the rank of lieutenant general upon the personal recommendation of MacArthur based on the excellence Kenney displayed in staging the Rabaul raid of 7 August and in subsequent SWPA air operations by the Fifth U.S. Air Force.

I Didn’t Sign Up for This

Civilian contractors in combat at Wake Island

To compete globally in the 21st century, the U.S. military must rely on civilian contractors to manage vital logistical systems. However, war does not discriminate between uniformed combatants and civilians. This tragic fact became all too real for the Marines and construction contractors on Wake Island in December 1941. The Battle of Wake Island offers valuable operational and legal lessons for civilian contractors in combat scenarios. 

At the outset of World War II, Wake Island was occupied by the understrength 1st Marine Defense Battalion, 46 Pan American (Pan Am) Airline employees operating the commercial runway, and 1,145 engineers contracted by the Navy to develop Wake into an advanced base.1 Hours after Pearl Harbor was attacked—2,000 miles to the East—the first Japanese bombs fell onto the tiny atoll of Wake.2 After two weeks of aerial and naval bombardment, the Japanese finally captured the island on their second amphibious assault.3 The defenders of Wake fought heroically, inflicting over 1,000 casualties, sinking two destroyers, damaging eight other ships, and downing 21 aircraft. The 1942 movie, Wake Island, memorialized the heroism of the Marines but downplayed the role of the civilians.4 However, dozens of civilian volunteers assisted the Marines in preparing defenses and directly engaged the Japanese in combat. Several Marine officers even recommended their attached civilian volunteers for decoration.5

This article examines how the civilians were incorporated into the defense of Wake Island. First, it will examine the command relationship between the Navy and contractors, then analyze how the Marines incorporated the civilians into the fighting, review legal considerations, and recommend lessons learned for contemporary military leaders. These lessons are: Account for combat situations in contracts, incorporate local contractors into combat contingency planning, and educate contractors on how the Law of Armed Conflict affects them. 

Military-Civilian Relationship on Wake
The Marines and civilians on Wake Island had functionally and legally unique, segregated roles. The first group to permanently occupy Wake was employees of the Pan American commercial airline, which used the atoll as a stop for its seaplane service ferrying passengers and mail to the Philippines. Although Pan Am had Navy approval to operate from Wake, the Navy exercised no control over its operations.6 After the initial assault from the Japanese on 8 December 1941, all but three of the Pan Am employees evacuated Wake on a civilian aircraft.7 The largest contingent on the island was the 1,145 civilian workers under the construction conglomerate, Contractors Pacific Naval Air Bases (PNAB), who started arriving on the island in January 1941.8 While PNAB was under contract to the Department of the Navy, the engineers were only legally allowed to perform the construction work according to Contract NOy-4173, which called for the construction of a naval air station.9 As shown in Figure 1 (on the following page), the PNAB workers directly answered to a naval responsible officer-in-charge of the 14th Naval District. However, much like a modern contracting officer representative, the responsible officer-in-charge could only ensure the workers were living up to the terms of the contract, not issue them orders.10 When the Marines of the 1st Defense Battalion, commanded by Maj Devereux, arrived on 19 August 1941, they were under strict orders to keep their activities separated from the civilian workers. In fact, the PNAB civilians were even prohibited from refueling military aircraft, taxing the understrength Marine Battalion even more.11 Navy CDR W.S. Cunningham was the Wake Island commander in charge of both civilians and military personnel, but his role was more like a modern-day garrison commander. CDR Cunningham had no authority to order the civilians into combat, and Maj Devereux was in charge of the defenses overall.12 Despite this strict segregation, a looming war against Japan forced the Marines to bridge this gap. 

Figure 1. Command structure on Wake Island, 1941. Full lines represent a direct operational control or tactical control relationship (by modern doctrinal terms), while the dashed line represents coordination for the contractors. (Source: LtCol R.D. Heinl, The Defense of Wake (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps), Appendix V.)
Figure 2. Defense installations on Wake Island. (Source: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division–U.S. National Park Service website A MAGNIFICENT FIGHT: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island.)

Civilians in the Defense
The Marines at Wake Island incorporated contractor volunteers into both non-combat and direct combat roles. Construction contractors fit more naturally into non-combat roles such as creating earthworks, aiding the wounded, and moving heavy equipment. Maj Devereux praised the efforts of the civilians in this regard, but it was too little, too late. The civilians only deviated from working on the construction stipulated in the contract after Wake was bombed.13 Aside from the more obvious engineering tasks, necessity demanded that the civilian volunteers directly engage in combat. The Marine 1st Defense Battalion only had about a third of its authorized manpower, which meant most of its heavy weapons and fighting positions did not have full crews.14 Figure 2 shows Wake’s defensive strong points and indicates unmanned weapon systems. All too aware of this shortfall, the Marines began training civilian volunteers on heavy weapons three months before the attack.15 Civilian volunteers helped to occupy some but not all of these vital strong points.16 Notably, Sgt Bowsher led an all-civilian crew of 16 volunteers on Battery D’s three-inch naval gun located on the island’s northeastern end.17 To coordinate the civilian volunteers, Maj Devereux coordinated directly with the contracting superintendent, Dan Teeters, a World War I veteran who organized requested civilian work parties.18 Often left out of posters and movies, the civilians on Wake Island who did volunteer to aid the Marines deserve just as much recognition. The Japanese certainly treated them the same.

Legal Considerations
Civilians engaging in combat alongside soldiers do so at their own legal risk. Although Japan did sign the 1929 Geneva Convention, the Japanese military became notorious for its mistreatment of prisoners.19 For a modern perspective, the currently in effect Geneva Convention III, ratified in 1949, is best for analyzing the legal status of the fighting contractors on Wake. Geneva Convention III stipulates that civilians accompanying combat forces, such as civil engineers, enjoy the same prisoner of war (POW) status as soldiers. This distinction is important because POWs are entitled to extra rights, such as limits on the type of labor they perform.20 However, if the civilians decide to fight, then only certain criteria grant them POW status. Article 4 states that militias must have a clear commander, have an insignia, must carry arms openly, and must respect the laws and customs of war.21 On Wake, one could argue that the contractor volunteers constituted a militia, but they lacked an official uniform or insignia distinct from the PNAB civilians who did not want to fight. The civilians did have a right to self-defense, but if they were captured after fighting instead of immediately surrendering, then under the Geneva Convention, they would not have to be treated as POWs. Furthermore, the civilian volunteers would not have combatant immunity, meaning they could be charged with murder by the government whose territory any killing took place in. Seeing how Wake Island was a U.S. territory, not surprisingly, no civilian ever saw their day in court. Although helpful for future cases, the Japanese did not weigh these considerations. The Japanese who captured Wake Island treated (and mistreated) all the civilians, even those not participating in the defense, the same as the Marine prisoners of war.22

Conclusion
The Marines and civilian defenders of Wake Island still have lessons to teach the force today. As contractors become increasingly enmeshed with soldiers in the modern operating environment, commanders should consider how to manage or even employ them in combat situations.23 First, unlike at Wake, military contracts should have some stipulation on when and how civilians report to commanders in a combat situation. Even if the contractors cannot fight, the commander should be able to keep their accountability. Second, military units should identify which civilians would be willing to assist in combat and provide necessary training. Contingency plans also should have provisions for how the contractors are either employed or protected. Then the commander should leverage the existing civilian chain of command as much as possible. Lastly, civilian contractors should be made fully aware of the legal repercussions if they choose to fight and be provided distinct insignia if they make that resolution. It is not a decision to be taken lightly, but as the experiences of Wake proved, the alternative could be worse. Out of the 1,145 contractors on Wake Island in December 1941, 34 were killed in battle, 98 were massacred on the island in 1943, and 114 died in Japanese POW camps.24 Contractors supporting the military cannot always choose if they are suddenly in a combat zone, but they can be more prepared by those who make preparing for war their profession.

>Maj Thomas is an Army Special Forces Officer with several combat deployments to the Middle East. He recently graduated from the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and is currently serving as a Plans Officer in I Corps. 

>>Maj Malapit is a Judge Advocate Officer who deployed to Latvia during her time as an Engineer Officer. She recently earned her LLM from the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School and is currently serving as the Chief of Justice for the 7th Infantry Division.

 

Notes

1. Bonita Gilbert, Building for War: The Epic Saga of the Civilian Contractors and Marines of Wake Island in World War 2 (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2012); and James Devereux, Report on the Defense of Wake Island (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Archives, 1945).

2. Report on the Defense of Wake Island.

3. Ibid. 

4. Devereux, The Story of Wake Island (New York: Charter, 1947).

5. Woodrow M Kessler, Battery B Report to LtCol Devereux (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Archives, 1945); and George Kinney, Report to Lt Col. Devereux (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Archives, 1945).

6. Building for War. See specifically, Chapter 2, “Opportunity Knocks.” 

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. 

9. National Archives, Federal Register Volume 6, Number 21 (Washington, DC: 1941).

10. R.D. Heinl, The Defense of Wake (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1947).

11. Report on the Defense of Wake Island.

12. The Defense of Wake.

13. The Story of Wake Island.

14. The Defense of Wake.

 

15. Building for War.

 

16. Report on the Defense of Wake Island.

17. Building for War.

18. The Story of Wake Island.

19. Utsumi Aiko, “Japan’s World War II POW Policy: Indifference and Irresponsibility,” The Asia-Pacific Journal May 2005, https://apjjf.org/-Utsumi-Aiko/1790/article.html. 

20. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. I, Federal Political Department, Bern, Section III, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949?activeTab=undefined.

21. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. I, Federal Political Department, Bern, Section I, Article 4; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949?activeTab=undefined. 

22. Building for War.

23. Mark F. Cancian, U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: SOF, Civilians, Contractors, and Nukes (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2019).

24. Building for War. See specifically Appendix II.

Someone to Light the Path

Morals, ethics, and self-assessment

Whom Shall I Send?
“All around our society, you see immoral behavior … lying, cheating, stealing, drug and alcohol abuse, prejudice, and a lack of respect for human dignity and the law. In the not-too distant future, each of you is going to be confronted with situations where you will have to deal straight-up with issues such as these. The question is, what will you do when you are? What action will you take? You will know what to do—the challenge is, will you do what you know is right? It takes moral courage to hold your ideals above yourself. It is the defining aspect. When the test of your character and moral courage comes, regardless of the noise and confusion around you, there will be a moment of inner silence in which you must decide what to do. Your character will be defined by your decision, and it is yours and yours alone to make. I am confident you will each make the right one.”

—Remarks for Pepperdine University Convocation Series, Gen Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 14 October 1998

There is No Superman
Imagine yourself as a unit leader locked in kinetic engagement with a peer enemy force. Your support is too far away and too heavily engaged to provide adequate assistance at this time. Enemy artillery is creeping closer and closer to your position as their troops close in behind it.  It seems that the entire world is beginning to crash down around you. The shockwaves and blast overpressure are rolling over you and taking your breath away. The small-arms fire and machineguns shooting at your position make loud snaps as the bullets pass by you and overhead (it sounds just like when you were pulling pits at the rifle range), and you can hear them ricocheting off metal objects, walls, and other things around you. The entire time, you are being pelted with pieces of dirt, debris, and bullet fragments. The day-to-day cares of normal life—paying bills, eating right, working out, getting to work on time, saving up for retirement—all of these things seem trivial and meaningless in the din of this moment. The thin veneer of civilization is stripped away, and your worries and cares have been reduced to a single primal instinct: to survive. The lives of you and your Marines are teetering on the precipice. You realize that existence beyond this moment is not guaranteed. It is time to make a decision and give your orders.

What kind of leader have you been up to this point, now that your own life and the lives of your Marines are at stake? Have you been a leader who has been hands off in the development of your unit, allowing the lower leadership to make all the decisions on training objectives and readiness, trusting that all will pan out well in the end? Have you been a leader who sought acceptance and popularity by catering to your Marines’ creature comforts, drinking alcohol with them during downtime and being cool, allowing training rosters to be pen-whipped, fitness tests to be inflated, and readiness requirements to be falsified—and now you and your Marines find yourselves significantly unprepared for the situation at hand? Rather, have you been a leader who has continuously led from the front with a strong work ethic, shared the common burden, and relentlessly enforced and adhered to our training standards? Have you held yourself and your Marines to the moral and ethical standards that we have sworn ourselves to, setting the example both on and off duty? Have you done your best to adhere to our code of Honor, Courage, and Commitment? Given the current situation, do you believe in yourself to make a recognition-primed, correct decision? Do you believe in your Marines’ ability to fight out of this situation? Do your Marines believe in you? What sort of leadership is more reliable and trustworthy when the time comes to put ourselves to the test in actual combat? Are you currently empowering those Marines who constantly strive to keep the standards of honor, courage, and commitment, or are you hindering them? Are the voices of reason being drowned out by those voices who prefer the easy road and do not take training seriously? What kind of leader should be calling the shots when everything is at stake? Is it someone like your current leader? More importantly, is it someone like you, or is this a job for Superman?

The central purpose of this article is to provoke the drive for self-assessment and recall the line of thinking that spurred us to join the Service. We should recall the frame of mind that originally put us on this path and, if we have found ourselves straying too far from that original line of thinking, that this piece will prod you to self-correct, readjust, or, if you need to, hit the reset button and start over. I would like us to contemplate the values that prompted us to join, the moral and ethical obligations that our country demands of us, and enforce those same obligations to which each of us has sworn a sacred oath to honor and uphold both within ourselves as well as within our ranks. My aim is to fortify our trust and confidence in each other and to empower and strengthen the dedication, resolve, and bias for action of those voices among us whose honor and character have withstood the furnace, the hammering, and the quenching of the forging process to become the true bearers of our battle standards and the uncompromising stalwarts of Semper Fidelis.

The Ovation from the Depths of Hell Itself
From the time when I was young, I have always felt like I was meant to do something great, like I had a higher purpose in life. I grew up extremely poor. My brother and I made do with a few worn-out toys and three sets of clothes each that we had to wear to school two days in a row every week. That was all we had. My family saw to it that we were educated and had a solid moral foundation, but I never felt as though I had the means to be something more. After high school, I went to college and worked a couple of jobs. I even owned a small construction business, but nothing seemed to satisfy my desire to do something that would truly make a difference in this world. Then 9/11 happened. At the time, I was working for the State of Alabama’s Department of Human Resources, going with our social workers as contracted security doing in-home investigations and mentoring ill-behaved state-custody kids who were attending public school. It was meaningful work, and we made huge differences in the lives of the children we helped—but it was also extremely disturbing at times because of what I found that parents were capable of subjecting their own children to. One day, while sitting in a high school with one of our state-custody kids, the teacher suddenly stopped the class and turned on the TV. We all saw the first tower burning as the second plane hit live on the air. The film crews on scene were shooting live footage of people jumping to their deaths. The high-pitched clapping sounds of average American citizens hitting the pavement at terminal velocity still haunt me to this day. When the President came on television and told us that our Nation had been attacked and that we were going to war, I knew deep down that I had to do something. That day, I quit my job at the Department of Human Resources and found a job at a local gym so I could get myself in shape for military service.

Through this Portal
I am, and have always been, what some would call a true believer. When I joined the Marines, I believed in everything that I read in the pamphlets and saw in the commercials on TV. I believed in everything that my drill instructors shouted at me about integrity, discipline, and the pride that is inherent in being the world’s most elite fighting force. I was grateful for the opportunity to endure the forge that would shape me into a Marine. Then, finally, one hot summer morning after an intense and grueling three months at Parris Island, an Eagle, Globe, and Anchor was placed in my hand. With tears rolling down my face, I was honored to be joining this battle-hardened organization that holds our rich and storied history in high regard and, above all else, holds in high regard the moral and ethical standards that, throughout my entire life, have been imprinted upon my soul. There was no work that I could put my hands to that could ever honor myself and my family more than serving as a Marine. I was hooked for life.

The Horns of a Dilemma
All of us, at one time or another, have been faced with some sort of moral or ethical dilemma while wearing the uniform. To level the playing field and be honest with ourselves, we must ALL acknowledge that none of us is beyond reproach in these matters. Nevertheless, in order to fight entropy, keep good order and discipline within our ranks, and to protect our most precious commodity—special trust and confidence—we must relentlessly strive to uphold and enforce the moral and ethical principles that sustain that trust and confidence. Both up and down the chain of command, mutual trust and confidence are the currency that enables us to execute our missions. Without mutual trust and confidence, we assume enormous amounts of risk and gamble the welfare of our Marines, the accomplishment of the mission, and—most importantly—the love for each other that holds it all together.

Omnia ergo quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis.

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

—The Golden Rule

This well-known adage has been restated in multiple ways, such as treating others the same as you would like to be treated, not treating others in a way that you would not want to be treated, or providing to others the same dignity, honor, and respect that you expect in return. No matter how you interpret it, all these variations have the same result: reciprocity in how we deal with each other. We all want to be surrounded by people that we can trust, but this trust and confidence is not, and should never be, a one-way transaction. That being said, I am not suggesting that we should ever lie, cheat, or steal from those who do these things to us (as can sometimes be misinterpreted from the Latin translation), but that we stay on the positive end of the spectrum with our morals and ethics and correct, as efficiently and effectively as possible those who treat us and others unjustly. This will preserve our honor and dignity both as individuals and as a force. We must relentlessly seek justice and ensure that the standards that we create and enforce among ourselves apply to everyone equally, regardless of rank or station, even when it means that those who are expected to enforce the standards are the very ones who require correction. There should be no double standards. Everyone should be held equally accountable to the same set of principles. By living by this maxim, we create and sustain an environment where mutual trust and confidence can thrive, we preserve the honor of our Service, and we have the opportunity to guide, mentor, and preserve those certain voices among us from destroying themselves as well as our organization.

Trust and Confidence
Mutual trust and confidence come at a very reasonable price—that you put forward your best effort and treat those around you with the same honor, fairness, and dignity that you expect in return. Lying, cheating, and stealing are all unjust actions that no one wants to have done to them; therefore, you should hold yourself to this basic standard: that you do not impose the injustices upon others that you would not want imposed upon yourself. As Marines, I would venture to say that we should not only use these axioms to guide ourselves individually but that we have all been bound in oath together to enforce these axioms amongst ourselves, and as expeditionary forces in readiness, that we are meant to enforce these axioms against any unjustified and tyrannical entity that has born itself into existence, in whatever clime and place that our attention has been directed.

“Trust is an essential trait among leaders—trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure. Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.”

—MCDP 1, Warfighting

“A great man doesn’t seek to lead. He’s called to it, and he answers.”

—Dune, Warner Bros. Entertainment, 2021

Trust, and the confidence that it brings in tow, is the invisible glue that holds all our relationships together. From our brotherhood and esprit de corps to our effectiveness as fighting units, trust in each other is what ties our spirits together, and hence makes us extremely effective as a team. In keeping with this, performance on demand is the standard that must be maintained. It is our intrinsic responsibility to each other to hold the line, enforce the standards, and keep each other sharp and ready for employment at a moment’s notice.

When missions come down, commanders look at what they have available, based on the Defense Readiness Reporting System and then decide which units get tasked to do the job. The Defense Readiness Reporting System report is published by each unit and requires that the leaders within each unit report correct numbers to accurately depict their unit’s readiness to meet our Nation’s requirements. If they fail to do this accurately, units may get tasked with missions that they have not been manned, trained, or equipped to accomplish. Doing so would create unbalanced tasking, which would lead directly to the reckless risking of Marines’ lives, potentially for nothing more than unit leaders selfishly wanting to look good in readiness briefs. It is not fair to the other units that are doing business honestly, nor is it fair to the Marines who are being held to a higher mission standard than what they have been trained to accomplish. Readiness is what commanders assess when war comes, so it must be done accurately and honestly for the sake of the mission and the Marines.

Mission Accomplishment and Troop Welfare
Mission accomplishment and troop welfare are the two principles that guide every unit in the Marine Corps. These two ideals of mutual expectations between leaders and led are built on the foundations of mutual trust and confidence. Without mutual trust and confidence between leaders and the led, neither mission accomplishment nor troop welfare can survive. Leaders must be able to trust that their Marines will pursue mission accomplishment in the most efficient, effective, and honorable way possible, while their Marines must in turn be able to unquestionably trust that their leaders have employed all options available to ensure their safety and troop welfare.

This trust is built over time by the repeated meeting of expectations by both leaders and led. If we want our leaders to trust us, we must prove to them that their priorities are our priorities and line up our objectives, whether in training or combat, to best address them. We must prove time and time again that we are highly capable and can be trusted both on mission and on liberty. We must be frank and honest and find out what concerns them. Then we take action to address and quell those concerns. The end state is a leader who has the utmost trust and confidence in their unit and the peace of mind necessary to employ their Marines with mission-type orders. This focus on the concerns of the leadership should be the ultimate goal of the led.

As leaders, if we want our Marines to trust us, it is simple—we love and care for them as we would our own children. We reward them when they do well, always reinforce their positive behavior, and provide fair and reasonable correction when necessary. We must train and mentor them as a teacher would their students. Above all else, we must share their burdens and never task them to do anything that we are not willing to do ourselves. We must prove to them that we are willing to sacrifice for them as they are for us—that we love them as we love ourselves. This can be proven via the sacrifice of your time, blood, and sweat to endure the same burdens alongside them. Make time to know them. Make time to suffer alongside them. This self-sacrifice shows that you genuinely care about them, proves that you have their troop welfare at heart, and builds unquestionable trust from your Marines. This relationship between leaders and led—mission accomplishment and troop welfare—is the unspoken trade-off that lives within every hierarchy in the Marine Corps. This relationship should be well-maintained and be the ultimate goal of the leaders on behalf of the led. When this relationship is properly cared for, trust flourishes, and the unit performs tremendously. When this relationship is not maintained with mutual trust, confidence, respect, and dignity, the seeds of destruction have been sown.

“Destroy the seed of evil, or it will grow up to your ruin.”

—Aesop

Seeds of Destruction
Every ordered system undergoes entropy. It is a natural part of existence. Things break down when left unmaintained, and, at times, maintenance may not be enough to restore their proper functioning. It may be necessary at times to rebuild the entire system to adequately address new requirements in line with what it was ultimately designed to do. For us as Marines, the functions of our Service and the relationships that control them are that system. For this article, I will avoid discussing big-picture Force Design and attack from the little end—the day-to-day functioning of small units and the individual Marines within them. The bottom line is this: if we do the small things right, the big things will take care of themselves. These small things are simply the basics that you were taught at boot camp and Officer Candidate School. Treat your fellow Marines with respect and dignity. Always be honest. Moral courage and integrity are virtues to be sought after and respected. Calibrate and follow your moral compass. Hone your honor. Muster your courage. Uphold your commitment to stand up for what you know is right.

The author (left), Naim Mohammad (right), and James “Jim” Cathey Jr. (center). Jim’s father was a mentor to the author and was killed by an IED during their 2005 combat deployment to Iraq. (Photo by author.)

So, what causes entropy within our Service? It starts small. It is the everyday things that we let slide when we know they should be done correctly. Maybe we slack on pushups when the squad leader is not looking. Maybe we let someone else do our annual training. Maybe we lie about why we showed up to work late. Maybe my team leader lies for me, so I do not get in trouble. Maybe I inflate my numbers on the crunches during the PFT. Maybe my team leader inflates everyone’s numbers. As entropy goes unchecked, we may begin submitting morning reports without accountability of the Marines, pen whipping training rosters, plagiarizing or stealing credit for someone else’s work, stealing gear and supplies, stealing issued gear from another Marine, stealing ammunition from the range, falsifying unit readiness reports, cheating on your spouse, committing adultery with someone else’s spouse, using your position to get sexual benefits, sexually harassing or assaulting another Marine—the list could go on. The bottom line is that we all have the responsibility to engage and destroy these seeds of destruction as soon as they present themselves, before they grow out of control. It is on each of us to be the sentries of good order and discipline. Never ignore your inner voice. Never accept that standing up for what is right is an obstacle that cannot be overcome.

The Obstacle Is the Way
Think back to when you graduated boot camp or got commissioned. Remember how proud you felt. Remember how proud your family, friends, and loved ones were of you. Imagine them seeing you now and knowing what you know about what kind of Marine you have become. Would they still be proud of you? Compare your mindset then to who you are now. After all this time, are you still proud of yourself? If not, it is time for self-assessment and self-correction. When you fail to do it yourself, it is on us as your fellow Marines to help you assess and correct. By wearing the uniform, you represent us all. You have sworn an oath to our ethical principles, and we have in turn sworn an oath to help keep you sharp and on the path.

You do not have to be a Marine of higher rank to be a moral and ethical leader. All of us are equally capable of guiding our fellow Marines, no matter what their rank or station. All it takes is moral courage. Hold honor and integrity higher than your comfort. Fight all these fights and do your best to win each one. These short-term victories will support long-term resilience and will be realized in the indomitable strength you will gain from overcoming countless obstacles and hardships. Strength is gained by opposing a force. Confidence is gained by overcoming these obstacles. Some might say that the obstacles in your life are exactly what you must seek out. The obstacles are where you find opportunity. That the obstacles are, in fact, the way.

Beyond Corruption
The ultimate point is that we all must first be loyal to the same common standard—something fair and just and beyond corruption. People are human and fallible. They are imperfect. They have lapses in judgment and make mistakes. Loyalty to people will always have the chance of failing or backfiring on you. However, loyalty to a common set of principles will always be incorruptible given that the members of the organization see to it that its commonly agreed upon principles are always kept. Some of us will be strong when others are not and vice versa. Some of us will see the path while others do not and vice versa. Some of us will have the moral courage to stand up for what is right when others do not—and vice versa. We hold each other accountable, and by doing so, we build trust and confidence among us and ensure both mission accomplishment and troop welfare.

Conclusion
My grandfather, having served as an infantry platoon commander and company commander during World War II, taught me that leadership is built on mutual respect and dignity. My father, echoing my grandfather’s teachings, taught me that hard work is good for the soul and that honesty is always the best way forward, even if it seems to be personally harmful in the moment. Above all else, the Golden Rule is the essence of an honorable way of life. Treat others how you want to be treated. Be honest. Work hard. Recognize and honor those who do the same while having the strength and moral courage to hold accountable those who do not. Never be too proud or arrogant to allow yourself to be corrected, sharpened, and guided back to the path. Take the improvement in stride and appreciate your chance to become a stronger Marine—and a better human being—than you were before. Be appreciative and allow the detrimental parts of yourself to be identified and cut away. We all need pruning from time to time.

It is my deep and sincere wish that this article helps us all to identify the areas in which we need to improve ourselves both morally and ethically as Marines. I hope that we can make ourselves better and more honorable human beings than before—to become guides to our leaders, peers, and subordinates. To be flares who light the path of honor, courage, and commitment. This path embodies the principles and promises of all our pamphlets, commercials, and publications. This path ensures that we maintain the tremendous reputation of those who have gone before us and puts us all on the best possible trajectory to being the greatest versions of ourselves and, therefore, the finest Marine Corps that we can possibly be. Instill trust. Radiate confidence. Be loyal to our common ethical principles. Enforce our core values. Hold the line. Do not allow the seeds of destruction to take root. Do not contribute to the darkness. Each and every one of us who holds our common values near and dear—and defends them—is a light to those Marines around us. Do not let them wander in the darkness. Correct them, sharpen them, and most importantly, love them. Be someone to light the path.

>Maj Fountain enlisted in the Marine Corps in 2003 and served three combat tours to Iraq, a MEU to CENTCOM, and two deployments to the Black Sea Rotational Force. At the time that this article was written, he was deployed and serving as the Combined Task Force 61/2 Space and Special Access Programs Operations Officer in support of U.S. Sixth Fleet objectives in EUCOM. He is currently at II EOTG and retiring from the Marine Corps.

First to the Fight in Acquisition Reform

Equipping Marines better and faster: a proactive approach

The new administration’s call for a revitalized military demands a fresh look at defense acquisition reform. The DOD has wrestled with the complexities of acquiring and fielding advanced military capabilities for decades, generating a mountain of studies, reports, and recommendations in the process. Yet, a crucial question remains: how can we navigate this complex landscape to best equip Marines for the 21st-century battlefield? This question takes on even greater urgency as the character of warfare continues to evolve at an unprecedented pace, driven by technological breakthroughs, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, and the emergence of new domains of conflict, such as cyberspace and space. Our role as the stand-in force within the acquisition weapons engagement zone provides us with a unique perspective on balancing reform needs with crisis response. Every decision we make hinges on one essential question: will it result in sustainable, superior capabilities delivered to Marines faster?

This question drives acquisition professionals at the Program Executive Office, Land Systems (PEO-LS). Tasked with equipping the Marine Corps with the groundbased weapons systems and equipment necessary for success in modern warfare, PEO-LS occupies a critical position within the defense acquisition ecosystem. As the stand-in force in the acquisition world, PEO-LS must constantly balance the need for modernization and innovation with the urgency of delivering capabilities to Marines rapidly and efficiently.

3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d MarDiv, fire a Stinger missile from a Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. The MADIS Mk1, pictured, and Mk2 form a complementary pair and will be a force multiplier for the low altitude air defense battalions’ ground-based air defense capability. (Photo by Jim Van Meer.)

The PEO-LS recognizes that success in this challenging arena requires strong partnerships across the Marine Corps and the broader DOD. The organization collaborates closely with entities like the Deputy Commandants for Capabilities Development and Integration and Programs and Resources, Marine Corps Systems Command, and fellow program executive offices to ensure aligned efforts and a cohesive approach to acquisition reform. These partnerships are essential for breaking down bureaucratic silos, fostering shared understanding, and promoting unity of effort across the acquisition enterprise.

Evolutionary Versus Revolutionary Reform: Forging the Optimal Path
The debate surrounding defense acquisition reform often hinges on the appropriate balance between evolutionary and revolutionary change. Proposals for reforming the Defense Acquisition System span a broad spectrum, from evolutionary tweaks within existing frameworks to revolutionary overhauls aimed at redefining processes and structures. This debate is not merely academic; it has real-world implications for the ability of the U.S. military to maintain its technological edge and prevail in future conflicts.

Evolutionary reforms target incremental improvements to existing processes and structures within the traditional pillars of requirements, resources, procurement, and sustainment. The 2020 Adaptive Acquisition Framework, with its emphasis on tailored pathways for different types of acquisition programs, exemplifies this approach. However, as highlighted by a recent Government Accountability Office assessment, these efforts have yet to significantly reduce the average delivery time for weapon systems.1 While such reforms can generate positive results, they often fail to keep pace with the rapid technological advancements and evolving character of warfare. Critics argue that evolutionary reforms, while well-intentioned, often amount to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic: they may improve efficiency at the margins, but they fail to address the systemic issues that plague defense acquisition.

Revolutionary reforms demand a fundamental reimagining of the Defense Acquisition System. These proposals advocate for disruptive changes to processes, organizational structures, authorities, and even the underlying culture of defense acquisition. Proponents of revolutionary reform argue that the current system, rooted in a bygone era of industrial-age warfare, is simply not equipped to deal with the complexities and challenges of 21st-century defense acquisition. They call for a fundamental shift in mindset from a culture of risk aversion and bureaucratic inertia to one that embraces innovation, experimentation, and rapid iteration.

Marines with 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, II MEF, discuss the events of ISLAND MARAUDER as part of BOLD QUEST ‘24 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC, 30 October 2024. BOLD QUEST ‘24 is a joint staff sponsored, multinational venue designed to enhance and develop interoperability. (Photo by LCpl Weston Q. Lindstrom.)

Three recent efforts are notable. First, the Atlantic Commission report on the Commission on Defense Innovation offered many proposals that adopt the private sector’s rapid innovation best practices.2 The Commission also proposed modernizing acquisition and budgeting processes to foster increased collaboration with nontraditional companies to get advanced technology to warfighters sooner. Second, the NDAA FY 2022 Sec. 1004 Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform final report recommended that the DOD should adopt a new resourcing system.3 The proposed Defense Resourcing System, in the commission’s view, would preserve the strengths of the current PPBE process while also better aligning strategy with resource allocation and allowing the DOD to respond more effectively to emerging threats and technological advances. Finally, a recent Bloomberg Strategic Edge study, chaired by the former Commandant, Gen Berger, highlighted the urgency of rebuilding the industrial base, using non-traditional innovators, and unlocking private capital to accelerate the fielding of emerging technologies.4 Differing from the other studies, this report recommended the DOD carry out these acceleration efforts by divesting fifteen percent of its budget for some of its aging legacy systems to fund a new parallel track for fielding high-technology capability quickly and at scale. 

These diverse yet interconnected proposals share common threads: a focus on accelerating innovation, streamlining resource allocation, embracing organizational agility, and fostering closer collaboration with the private sector. The challenge lies in determining which specific reforms, and to what degree, will deliver the greatest benefit for the Marine Corps and the broader defense enterprise. This requires careful analysis, a willingness to experiment, and a commitment to continuous learning and improvement.

PEO-LS: A Dual Approach to Driving Transformation
The PEO-LS recognizes that successful reform requires both strategic vision and tactical execution. The organization actively implements strategic revolutionary changes while simultaneously driving tactical innovations within the existing framework. This dual approach enables PEO-LS to pursue both incremental improvements and more transformative changes, maximizing its impact on the defense acquisition process.

Strategic Reorganization and Process Optimization
The PEO-LS has undertaken a series of organizational realignments designed to enhance efficiency and better align its internal structure with the evolving needs of the Marine Corps. For example, we have reorganized program offices to enhance alignment and efficiency, merging key capability areas to better support Force Design aims. Notable examples include:

  • MAGTF Command and Control (C2): By combining ground and aviation command and control programs, we are developing an integrated, scalable MAGTF Command and Control solution. This initiative ensures interoperability across naval, joint, and coalition forces.
  • Intelligence and Cyber Operations: We have merged intelligence and cyber programs to use their unique network warfare capabilities, enhancing our ability to address emerging threats.

These integrated capability areas streamline decision-making processes, reduce redundancies, and foster greater synergy between related programs. This approach recognizes that the nature of warfare is increasingly interconnected, requiring a more integrated and holistic approach to capability development.

These examples show how we are continuously implementing acquisition reform while working within the bounds of the current process. We are stretching those bounds by adapting strategic-level changes, such as assigning several of our program managers to also act as capability acquisition managers, looking beyond their specific programs to see how they can improve key capability areas supporting Force Design outcomes, including integrated C2, counter unmanned systems, and integrated air and missile defense.

Recognizing that overly bureaucratic processes can stifle innovation and slow down acquisition timelines, PEO-LS has implemented a range of process improvements aimed at reducing administrative burdens and streamlining procurement activities. These efforts include eliminating redundant tasks, automating workflows, and delegating responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level. The PEO-LS has placed a particular focus on reducing procurement administrative lead time, particularly within the contracting process, where delays can significantly impact program schedules. This focus on streamlining processes is essential for enabling the rapid acquisition of emerging technologies, which often have shorter lifecycles and require a more agile approach.

Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, II MEF, test out the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) Driver Training System (ACV DTS) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The ACV DTS replicates the ACV’s driver’s station, complete with more than 50 unique functions, to include a driver’s display panel with realistic and accurate vehicle and engine performance displays. The simulation also creates a first-in-the-field complex and realistic surf zone with multiple wave types, variable wave heights, littoral currents, randomized wave periods, and directions all controlled by a physics-based simulation engine. (Photo by David Jordan.)
Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, II MEF, test out the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) Driver Training System (ACV DTS) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The ACV DTS replicates the ACV’s driver’s station, complete with more than 50 unique functions, to include a driver’s display panel with realistic and accurate vehicle and engine performance displays. The simulation also creates a first-in-the-field complex and realistic surf zone with multiple wave types, variable wave heights, littoral currents, randomized wave periods, and directions all controlled by a physics-based simulation engine. (Photo by David Jordan.)

Tactical Success: Rapidly Fielding Advanced Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS) Capabilities
Blending strategic-level revolutionary changes (such as the FoRGED Act or Gen Berger’s “Blueprint for Defense Innovation”) to the tactical changes, the Marine Corps acquisition professionals have and will continue to spearhead improved capability delivery. The results are impressive across several portfolios, but none more so than CUAS. Just five years ago, the only CUAS capability any Marine formation had was a Stinger missile and a Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball for detection. This year, PEO-LS’s Ground-Based Air Defense Program will complete the development or fielding of five programs of record and one urgent capability acquisition: MADIS, L-MADIS (replacing a Joint Universal Needs capability), installation defense of small CUAS (replacing a Joint Urgent Operational Need system), Medium Range Intercept Capability, and organic CUAS for dismounted formations.5 

These successes highlight the importance of close collaboration between PEO-LS and key partners such as the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Deputy Commandant for Capabilities Development and Integration. By working together, these organizations have successfully begun to better bridge the valley of death that often hinders the transition of promising technologies and capabilities from development to deployment, ensuring that Marines receive the tools they need without delay. This collaborative approach is essential for overcoming the stovepipe nature of traditional defense acquisition and fostering a more integrated and responsive approach to capability development.

The Road Ahead: Embracing Continuous Improvement and Empowering the Workforce
While PEO-LS has made significant strides in advancing acquisition reform, the journey continues. The organization recognizes that reform is not a destination, but rather a continuous process of adaptation, innovation, and improvement. In a rapidly changing security environment, the defense acquisition system must be able to adapt and evolve to meet new challenges and seize new opportunities.

To guide its ongoing efforts, PEO-LS must continuously ask critical questions and challenge the status quo:

  • How can we better integrate emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and directed energy, into existing and future acquisition programs? The PEO-LS must be proactive in identifying and evaluating emerging technologies, and in developing innovative acquisition strategies that enable the rapid fielding of these game-changing capabilities.
  • How can we foster deeper and more impactful collaboration with the private sector, particularly with non-traditional defense companies that bring new ideas and innovative solutions to the table? The PEO-LS must be proactive in engaging with these nontraditional players, leveraging their expertise and innovation to deliver cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter.
  • How can we strike the right balance between the need for speed in acquisition, particularly in response to rapidly evolving threats, with the imperative for accountability and responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars?

The PEO-LS must continue to refine its processes and procedures to ensure that it can acquire capabilities rapidly while maintaining the highest standards of fiscal responsibility and accountability to the American taxpayer.

By continuously asking these questions and engaging in a robust dialogue with stakeholders across the defense acquisition community, PEO-LS ensures that its reform efforts remain relevant, effective, and responsive to the evolving needs of the Marine Corps. This requires a commitment to continuous learning, a willingness to experiment, and a relentless focus on delivering results for the warfighter. 

Conclusion: An Unwavering Commitment to Delivering Capabilities and Equipping Marines for the Future Fight
While the journey toward acquisition reform is fraught with challenges, it also presents significant opportunities. Recent workforce reductions will align to process improvements reducing non-value-added tasks. Our optimized workforce remains our greatest asset The PEO-LS acquisition professionals bring unparalleled ability and dedication to the mission, making them well-equipped to implement both strategic and tactical reforms.

At PEO-LS, acquisition reform is not simply an abstract concept or a box to be checked. It represents a fundamental commitment to delivering the best possible capabilities to Marines as quickly and efficiently as possible. As the stand-in force within the acquisition weapons engagement zone, Marine Corps acquisition professionals are best positioned to lead the way in evolutionary and revolutionary acquisition reform efforts. Ultimately, the true measure of success will be our ability to deliver sustainable, superior capabilities to Marines faster. By keeping a steadfast focus on this goal, we can lead the charge in acquisition reform, ensuring the Marine Corps stays at the forefront of innovation and readiness. By staying true to our mission and embracing a culture of continuous improvement, we can ensure that the Marine Corps stays ready and capable in an ever-changing world.

>SES Bowdren is the Program Executive Officer Land Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Notes

1. Government Accountability Office, DOD Acquisition Reform (Washington, DC: December 2024). 

2. Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren, “Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption,” Atlantic Council, January 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-defense-innovation-adoption. 

3. Commission on Planning, Budgeting, and Executive Reform, Defense Resourcing for the Future (Washington, DC: March 2024). 

4. David H. Berger, Kirsten Bartok, Yisroel Brumer, Nathan Diller, Matt George, and Clint Hinote, Strategic Edge (Washington, DC: January 2025). 

5. Morgan Blackstock, “PEO Land Systems Fields Advanced Air Defense System to 3D LAAAB,” Marines.mil, December 13, 2024, https://www.peols.marines.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4000903/peo-land-systems-fields-advanced-air-defense-system-to-3d-laab; and David Jordan, “MRIC Complete Quick Reaction Assessment,” Marines.mil, October 24, 2024, https://www.peols.marines.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3947926/mric-completes-quick-reaction-assessment.

Closing the Gap for Integrated Casualty Evacuation

Logistical operations in a contested environment

Operational forces in future wars must be small, agile, and have a low signature to survive the Miniaturized Sensor and Precision Weapons Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This will have transformational effects on both peer and asymmetric conflicts.1 When combined with the scale and ferocity of peer conflicts, the RMA will generate casualty volumes not seen since World War II and Korea.2 This especially holds true in a maritime conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, where the tyranny of distance and timeframes of protracted conflict impose significant challenges on health service support (HSS) operations. Successful casualty evacuation is a particular vulnerability because a crucial gap exists between ongoing innovation efforts at the tactical level and well-established treatment facilities at the strategic level.

For operations inside the first island chain of the South China Sea, and the INDOPACOM area of operations more broadly, our naval forces have developed a doctrinal architecture for a future fight against China. These concepts include Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) by our fleets and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) by our FMF.3 The two concepts converge with Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE), where Navy and FMF medical operations will have to be integrated and synchronized with theater-wide logistical operations to maximize the survivability of the critically wounded. 

The challenge of medically supporting the Marine Corps during contested EABO and LOCE is formidable. The Navy and Marine Corps are redesigning their medical force packages to increase their survivability within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ).4 However, the medical concept of operations and requirements for the littorals are underdeveloped and present a particular friction point between the HSS capabilities supporting the naval force with DMO and those supporting the Marine Littoral Regiments executing EABO.5 

Medical forces will need to care for larger casualty volumes during sustained operations while minimizing the targeting risk that HSS operations pose to maneuvering forces. Bridging EABO and DMO requires new medical enablers within the contested littorals who can perform patient staging, and patient holding and coordinate numerous disparate evacuation elements spread over large distances.

EABO HSS Adaptations Lack Operational-Level Integration Component for LOCE
Navy Medicine is adapting to China’s steadily increasing ability to contest the sea domain by investing in smaller, faster next-generation afloat medical capabilities, and smaller ashore expeditionary medical capabilities to support the mass casualties likely to occur at sea and on land.6Within the FMF, it is now widely accepted that traditional Role 1 battalion aid stations lack the holding capability, and traditional Role 2 shock trauma platoons lack the agility and scalability to meet the needs of the modern battlefield such as EABO.7 Marine Corps Combat Development Command has identified these gaps and is developing prolonged casualty care (PCC), damage control resuscitation (DCR), damage control surgery (DCS), and en route care capabilities that can maneuver and support the ground elements during contested EABO.8

Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment describes the “integrated application of Navy and Marine Corps capabilities to overcome emerging threats within littoral areas that are rapidly expanding in operational depth, complexity, and lethality.” The new medical capabilities that will support the Marine Littoral Regiments during contested EABO and the new, smaller afloat surgical capabilities supporting the maritime force all share the same limitations: they cannot hold mass casualties, regulate patient movement, and exercise the medical command and control (C2) necessary to coordinate and stage patients for rapid evacuation through the Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System (TAES)—particularly at logistical nodes used as aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs).9

The LOCE medical force—blue naval, and green FMF medical personnel—must collaborate to resolve these limitations and create a unified survival chain that offloads casualties from the maneuvering elements, stabilizes them for transport, integrates them into the TAES, and moves them outside the WEZ and ultimately to military treatment facilities (MTFs). 

Optimal Casualty Care Requires Greater Control over Casualty Flows
Medical operations must be entwined with logistical operations for the contested environment in a future maritime fight, especially for EABO and LOCE. The Navy and Marine Corps have no dedicated fixed or rotary MEDEVAC capabilities and have previously relied upon Army, Air Force, and allied assets for short-range evacuation during an era when air supremacy and overflight clearance were assured.10 The Air Force also provides the long-distance aeromedical evacuation (AE) capabilities which will be necessary in a war in the East and South China Seas, given the time and distance challenges there. 

There is also no indication that the Navy and Marine Corps’ reliance on combined and joint theatre-level evacuation capabilities can be significantly reduced or that an abundance of organic short-range MEDEVAC options can be created in a reasonable timeframe. Military Sealift Command and flattop vessels do offer additional options beyond Air Force AE to evacuate casualties out of theatre; however, their mobility and survivability constraints are significant, and getting casualties aboard them still requires separate short-range MEDEVAC or CASEVAC assets. Therefore, the most likely outcome is the frequent re-tasking of platforms (particularly rotary ones) primarily designed for sustainment operations as lifts of opportunity.

The challenges to ad-hoc CASEVAC include the limited total number of airframes, vehicles, and small boats—all with competing tasking priorities—as well as evasion of an advanced enemy’s kill chain. Whenever CASEVAC can be tasked to patients, the next challenge will be to find a destination. Higher levels of care will likely be out of range, necessitating intermediate holding and staging locations. Intermediate medical units within the WEZ will also be distributed over larger areas and will have to become smaller to maintain mobility and survivability, in turn reducing their patient capacities and placing greater demand on casualty holding at other locations. 

In other words, casualty evacuation at the scale of future conflict will be an extraordinarily complex undertaking with many failure points. We risk thousands of preventable deaths due to casualties not being efficiently stabilized and evacuated outside the WEZ. If bogged down by these casualties, combat arms units will become combat-ineffective.

Historically, the failure to create robust medical C2 frameworks for casualty evacuation has been a consistent feature of post-Vietnam conventional conflicts.11 These failures significantly worsened medical outcomes in conflicts that were very one-sided in the United States’ favor.12 In a true peer conflict, poor medical C2 implementation could cause catastrophic levels of preventable deaths and widespread breakdown of combat effectiveness due to the inability to extract large volumes of casualties engaged in kinetic operations. This would ultimately lead to a cascade of failures from the tactical, to the operational and then strategic levels.13 Our concern must therefore not just be that inefficient casualty management will cause preventable deaths, but that it can cause us to lose the war. 

The silver lining is that there are low-cost, low-footprint opportunities for the Navy and Marine Corps to connect the dots and create a comprehensive operational medical system. These new medical C2 and staging capabilities will mitigate the current casualty evacuation constraints and gaps associated with a contested maritime environment.

A Crucial Air Force Template for Medical C2 and Logistical Integration
To complete the survival chain and decompress maneuvering forces engaged in DMO and EABO while maintaining tight accountability over injured personnel, the Navy and Marine Corps will greatly benefit from adapting Air Force aeromedical evacuation liaison teams (AELTs) to their own purposes.14

Aeromedical evacuation liaison teams are designed to provide on-the-ground AE coordination in the combined, joint environment to steer casualties into the TAES. An AELT is composed of a flight nurse, a Medical Service Corps officer, and a communications expert trained and equipped for critical decisions necessary to
coordinate patient movement requests and build requirements for lifts of opportunity. Operating for up to 30 days without resupply, AELTs do not provide direct patient care. Instead, they embed with tactical units, command centers, or logistical nodes to coordinate patient flows to move patients out of theater. The AELTs decide on the optimal allocation of evacuation assets, balancing clinical conditions versus lift requirements. 

One of their key liaison functions is to enter casualties into the Transportation Command Regulating Command and Control Evacuation System for accountability and tracking of personnel until arrival to military treatment facilities in the United States.15 This complex liaison function also necessitates equipping AELTs with redundant secure and unsecure communications systems through a standardized communications package.16

At present, no Navy or Marine Corps HSS elements possess the necessary structure, training, skillsets, and organic communications equipment of the AELTs. Without a counterpart to AELTs, the medical C2 aspect, initiating and coordinating patient movement on ad-hoc and dedicated medical lifts, will fall on tactical commanders. A Navy and Marine Corps version of AELTs would also need to coordinate afloat and long-range ground evacuation (e.g. via allied nation rolling stock).17 Such a complex regulation and evacuation function cannot be foisted upon combat leaders who are already cognitively saturated by the demands of kinetic operations. Navy and Marine Corps capability modeled on the Air Force AELTs is therefore not a nice-to-have but an absolute requirement to ensure patient accountability and prevent mission failure 

Air Force Model for Patient Holding and Staging Would Enable Rapid Integration with Logistical Operations
Another crucial gap capability for bridging EABO with DMO and medical with sustainment operations in the contested environment is a patient holding and staging system to hold patients behind the forward line of troops for rapid embarkation of wounded service members on lifts of opportunity. Traditional Role 2 enhanced and Role 3 units have the capacity to treat and hold many patients but are too large and static to survive inside the WEZ. The Air Force En Route Patient Staging System (ERPSS) is a model capability to fill this gap. 

The ERPSS can provide modular configurations for staging patients at SPODs and APODs. Teams have a holding capacity between 10 and 250 beds, and a holding time between 6 and 72 hours.18 Each ERPSS “provides patient reception, complex medical/surgical nursing, limited emergent intervention” and, crucially, ensures patients are medically and administratively prepared for extended travel on AE platforms.19 In addition to performing this vital medical regulation function, they create an efficient patient loading environment that minimizes the time that aerial platforms are vulnerable to detection and targeting on the ground.20 

The ERPSS is a modular concept that can be scaled up or down based on operational conditions or lift requirements, both afloat and ashore. The smallest block is the ERPSS-10, so-named because it organically comprises ten patient beds. Its thirteen personnel care for a maximum of 40 patients per 24-hour period, with supplies for a minimum of 72 hours of continuous operations (the associated logistical package provides 7 days of supplies).21 There are no credentialed providers (i.e. physicians/physicians assistants) in the ERPSS-10 configuration. Patients are instead expected to be triaged, resuscitated, and stabilized by DCR and DCS capabilities with the goal of force preservation to keep forces in the fight. 

A Navy and Marine Corps version of the ERPSS-10 could be the foundation piece to address the current patient staging and holding gap. As with the broader responsibilities of Navy and Marine Corps-adapted AELTs, an adapted ERPSS model will also have to package and hand off patients for maritime and ground-based evacuation platforms, which significantly increases mission complexity compared to the Air Force ERPSS. For instance, packaging a patient for high-altitude transport requires different steps than packaging a patient for heavy seas. 

Carrying over the modular ERPSS design would enable setups from 10, 50, to over 100 beds with predictable logistics and favorable conditions. Equivalent modules prepositioned at key APOD/SPOD locations with efficient, compact packaging sets will avoid the need for the Navy and Marine Corps version of ERPSS to co-locate with MTFs and make them self-sufficient. Switching from the fixed capabilities of traditional Role 2 and Role 3 units that previously supported ground operations to a scalable patient staging model based on ERPSS provides the means to rapidly prepare and package injured warfighters for egress based on theater conditions including adversary anti-access/area-denial capabilities, casualty volumes, and specific threat level at SPOD and APOD locations. 

New LOCE Medical Capabilities Will Maximize Warfighting and Patient Care Outcomes
The 37th Commandant, Gen Robert Neller, stated that “[Marines’ and Sailors’] ability to think critically, innovate smartly, and adapt to complex environments and adaptive enemies has always been the key factor we rely on to win in any clime and place.”22 As the Marine Corps makes major organizational changes to enable our combat arms brethren to maximize the use of that ability on the modern battlefield, Navy Medicine must adapt its organization and mindset to give our sailors the ability to maximize casualty survival.

We are already taking steps to enhance the ability of tactical-level providers to provide point-of-injury Tactical Combat Casualty Care and Prolonged Casualty Care in tandem with pushing DCR and DCS capabilities forward. The missing link in the survival chain are operational-level/LOCE adaptations that bridge casualty movement from the tactical EABO/DMO level to definitive care and recovery outside the enemy’s WEZ. By adapting the proven Air Force AELT and ERPSS concepts, the Navy and Marine Corps will empower our sailors to be agile and proactive, creating key nodes in the survival chain that decompress the tactical level, maximize the use of numerous long-distance evacuation modalities, and ultimately maximize our ability to keep casualties alive and maintain combat effectiveness.

The Air Force AELT and ERPSS templates will still have to be tailored to optimally support contested EABO and LOCE. The expectation of PCC within the tactical constraints of DMO and EABO is mirrored at the LOCE level by scarcity of Class VIII supplies and evacuation assets as well as the constant need to lessen vulnerability to enemy sensors and precision fire. We must recognize, though, that even as the enemy’s detection range and WEZ has expanded greatly because of the RMA, the requirements of operational-level medical teams such as Navy and Marine Corps AELT and ERPSS adaptations are distinct and separate from tactical-level medical assets such as DCR/DCS and strategic assets like MTFs. 

Creation of the proposed medical C2 and staging and holding teams to enable LOCE integration can easily occur within the existing force structure. These small new teams will require relatively modest dedicated budgets for training and communications equipment. Experimentation with the initial teams could then lead to a wider rollout of LOCE integration solutions to yield maximal combat effectiveness and casualty survival outcomes that will greatly benefit the Navy and Marine Corps as a whole.

>LCDR Keeney-Bonthrone is a General Medical Officer and the Lead Instructor of 4th MarDiv’s experimental Prolonged Casualty Care team. 

>>CDR Jaiswal is an Intensivist with 4th Medical Battalion. 

>>>CDR Ibikunle is a General Surgeon with 4th Medical Battalion. 

>>>>CAPT Delk is an Emergency Medicine Physician and the current the Commanding Officer of 4th Medical Battalion.

Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020); Kristen D. Thompson, “How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict; and Caitlin Lee, “Countering China’s Military Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region,” RAND Corporation, March 2024, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA3200/CTA3273-1/RAND_CTA3273-1.pdf.

2. Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2023).

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd Edition (Washington, DC: 2023).

4. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Surgeon General Campaign Plan 2028, (Washington, DC: 2023).

5. Headquarters Marine Corps, Littoral Operations in the Contested Environment, (Washington, DC: 2017).

6. Navy Surgeon General Campaign Plan 2028.

7. LCDR Benjamin Chi and ENS Duncan Carlton, “The Role 2 Light Maneuver Element” in Marine Corps Gazette 105, No. 3 (2021).

8. Johannes Schmidt, “Expeditionary Medical Systems: Increasing Warfighter Survivability in Littoral Combat,” MCSC Office of Public Affairs and Communication, Marine Corps Systems Command, December 28, 2023, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3627576/expeditionary-medical-systems-increasing-warfighter-survivability-in-littoral-c. 

9. Littoral Operations in the Contested Environment.

10. Dion Moten, Bryan Teff, Michael Pyle et al., “Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea,” Joint Force Quarterly, July 24, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1913091/joint-integrative-solutions-for-combat-casualty-care-in-a-pacific-war-at-sea.

11. Arthur M. Smith and CAPT Harold R. Bohman, “Medical Command and Control in Sea-Based Operations” in Naval War College Review 59, No. 3 (2006), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1931&context=nwc-review.

12. Ibid. 

13. Andrew S. Harvey, “The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis,” Military Review, November 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2021/Harvey-Levels-of-War.

14. Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.54: Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team, (Washington, DC: 2020); and Rachel S. Cohen, “46 Hours: How Airmen Fought to Save Lives After the Abbey Gate Bombing,” Air Force Times, August 30, 2022, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/08/30/46-hours-how-airmen-fought-to-save-lives-after-the-abbey-gate-bombing.

15. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.54.

16. Ibid. 

17. Stig Walravens, Albina Zharkova, Anja De Weggheleire et al., “Characteristics of Medical Evacuation by Train in Ukraine, 2022” in JAMA Network Open, June 23, 2023, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2806503.

18. Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 4-02: Health Services, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2019). 

19. Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.57: En Route Patient Staging System, (Washington, DC: 2016).

20. Ibid. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Headquarters Marine Corps, The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: 2016).

PPBE Reform

Legislative action to speed innovation

Under constraints in current programming and budgeting processes, the Marine Corps cannot match adversaries’ speed of innovation in today’s rapidly changing, technologically advancing environment. Many complain that the biggest problem with the Corps’ budget is it is too small. A bigger problem is that legislative requirements prevent us from properly allocating funding to new, emerging technology that advances capabilities. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process is how the Marine Corps plans for, requests, allocates, and spends the funding received from Congress. The Marine Corps must seek legislative reform in the programming and budgeting process to facilitate more timely acquisition of emerging technologies to remain competitive with adversaries. Many service members and civilians in the DOD recognize problems in this process. After a recent commission on PPBE reform, some in Congress now recognize the problem, too. It is a long, drawn-out process full of inefficiencies and restraints that create waste. Our Nation’s adversaries do not face these same bureaucratic hurdles in resource allocation and subsequent acquisition of goods. They have governments that try to facilitate the building of more lethal forces with modern technology. Because they have governments who try to streamline these processes instead of inadvertently hampering them, their military forces will be technologically superior to ours if we do not move to effect change now.

There are steps the Marine Corps can take with Congress to enact changes that facilitate innovation and allow the Corps to allocate resources more appropriately. Change like this requires transparency with Congress and continued good stewardship of taxpayer dollars, but the payoff will provide flexibility in resource allocation and a dramatic reduction in wasted funding.

The Marine Corps and DOD allocate resources against requirements through the PPBE process. The Marine Corps uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Assessment (PPBEA) Process. Because this article draws heavily from DOD policy and discussions at the congressional level, it will refer to the process as the PPBE Process. 

The full PPBE Process is typically a three-year cycle that begins with the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) conducting strategic and capabilities planning based on authoritative strategies at the national, departmental, and Service levels as well as the Commandant’s guidance. This is followed by the programming and budgeting phases, where funds are more specifically tied to requirements that support necessary capabilities. The process, for this article, ends in the execution phase when we spend congressionally appropriated funds against the requirements we began planning for years ago.1

The current process allows for civilian oversight of DOD spending through congressional control over the defense budget. It has permitted Congress to look at DOD needs as a whole and align resources to best support national security. At least, it has best supported national security in this manner up until the technological revolution we’re experiencing. A significant problem in this process is that to conform to this process the Marine Corps must begin identifying requirements three years before the year of execution. By the time the year of execution arrives, the technology looks completely different than it did during the planning process, and we have insufficient flexibility in realigning funds toward emergent requirements that did not exist during the planning phase. Thankfully, many of the shortfalls in the current process have already been identified.

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2022 called for the creation of a commission to evaluate the PPBE Process. The commission identified many issues with the current process that prevent it from supporting the DOD and national security in the current, ever-changing environment. Some of the issues identified are that it takes too long to distribute funds, it is challenging to make modifications or upgrades to current assets, the process makes Services slow to react to new threats, new starts are prohibited under a continuing resolution (CR), and the speed of innovation is slowed.2 During the planning portion of PPBE, DC CD&I aligns strategies and guidance to capabilities that will support this guidance.3 However, “the budgets presented to Congress and what is appropriated cannot be tied easily to the overall defense strategy since the budgets are presented to Congress in terms of appropriation title and agency … rather than by capability areas.”4 There is a misalignment between how the Marine Corps plans and how Congress resources those plans. This misalignment, and many other issues identified in the commission’s final report, cannot be remedied without widespread legislative and procedural change. However, there are more minor modifications to the current process that the Corps can work with Congress to change while we wait for more far-reaching action. Before looking at these less sweeping changes, it is worthwhile to look at how our adversaries approach resourcing their military forces to get the full picture of the problems we face. 

Our adversaries do not face the same bureaucratic hurdles as our own. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intentionally creates competition for the benefit of the People’s Liberation Army and increases its bargaining power with corporations in the defense industry.5 The CCP has split and merged defense industry corporations several times in the past to better foster innovation in technology and try to overcome its very different set of hurdles regarding military procurement.6 Based on U.S. values, the CCP’s example does not provide a model worth emulating. China’s government does not have the checks and balances in place that the United States does to prevent this kind of abuse of power. 

It is also worth mentioning that the system the CCP is implementing has not yet been effective in producing the desired results. None of the widespread reforms the CCP implemented have yet to get to the root of the procurement problems faced by their military, and the more current military-civil fusion it is implementing is focused more on research and development and less on procurement.7 For that reason, this brief comparison is not intended to be alarmist in nature. It is intended to show the sharp contrast to that of the U.S. Government, whose multi-year budgeting process and strict restrictions on funds availability drastically slow down military innovation. 

On 20 March 2024, the Commission on PPBE Reform presented its findings and recommendations to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Service. While some committee members viewed the findings favorably and realized the need for reformation in the PPBE process, there was also strong pushback and harsh criticism. The DOD was criticized for overspending, failing to track where its money went, and never having passed an audit. However, it was noted in the hearing that the Marine Corps is the only branch of the DOD to receive an unmodified audit opinion.8 Due to the size of the DOD’s budget and other governmental departments that also feel like they desperately need additional funding, it is no surprise that the DOD’s inability to account for taxpayer dollars is preventing Congress from giving its military more flexibility to seek innovative solutions to modern problems in preparation for a peer-to-peer conflict. 

Based on the feedback received from the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Marine Corps should seek legislative change allowing branches within the DOD that have passed the audit to receive benefit from some of the recommendations in the committee’s final report. This allowance requires transparency and open communication between the Marine Corps and Congress. The Marine Corps’ clean audit opinion goes a long way toward displaying transparency and building trust with Congress. We have proven that we can account for taxpayer dollars while adhering to applicable laws and regulations. 

The committee’s final report contained 28 recommendations to Congress, many of which would streamline acquisition, reduce waste, and permit innovation. Many of these recommendations need to be implemented in the entire DOD or they are simply not feasible. These changes will likely take years to come to fruition, assuming they do at all. The Marine Corps may already find itself engaged in the next conflict by this time and will have missed out on years’ worth of opportunities waiting for Congress to effect change to the PPBE Process. However, some recommendations could realistically be applied to only portions of the DOD and could be contingent upon a clean audit opinion. Congress can grant branches that receive an unmodified audit opinion greater flexibility in managing financial resources provided they can maintain their unmodified opinion. 

The Marine Corps receives funding through appropriations, which provides funds for a specified time based on the length of appropriation. Military Personnel (MILPERS) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds are single-year appropriations, which means they must be completely used by the end of the current fiscal year and are no longer available for use after 30 September of each fiscal year. Many Marines are likely familiar with the end-of-year funds dump, in which all the funding that was set aside at various levels for emergent requirements or additional budget cuts during the year of execution is hastily spent on whatever requirements can still be executed at the end of the year, regardless of the priority or capability provided. While it is necessary to ensure funds are available for emergent requirements, it goes without saying that this is an inefficient use of funding and a waste of taxpayer dollars. The commission recommended that the DOD should be allowed to carry over five percent of its Military Personnel and O&M funding each year. This would enable branches to maintain a reserve for unexpected end-of-year bills, short-notice permanent change of station orders, and overseas medical evacuation needs without potentially wasting that money at the end of each fiscal year.9 Instead, those funds could be carried over and applied to needs that more directly contributed to supporting warfighters and enhancing capabilities. This is the first recommendation from the commission that Marine Corps leadership should ask for Congress to implement immediately based on a clean audit opinion. Because the Corps has proven it is a good steward of taxpayer dollars, let us further stretch those dollars by carrying over five percent of these single-year appropriations. 

Below-threshold reprogramming (BTR) allows the Marine Corps “to realign, within prescribed limits, congressionally approved funding” without congressional approval.10 The BTRs are important since the year of execution in the PPBE cycle happens years after planning for that year began. Undoubtedly, unexpected requirements will arise that were not resourced by Congress. The committee’s final report made several recommendations regarding BTRs, one of which is to increase BTR thresholds.11 This is a relatively minor adjustment for Congress to implement, but when coupled with other recommendations in the committee’s final report, it will probably take years to implement. The Marine Corps should ask Congress to immediately permit BTRs up to the threshold recommended in the commission’s report. 

Continuing resolutions have become a painful and standard part of every fiscal year. Annual appropriations bills, which provide our funding for the new fiscal year, are supposed to be signed into law by 1 October of that year. The CRs were created as a safeguard to provide temporary funding until the new year’s budget can be signed, but they have turned into an expected norm for every year. Unfortunately, expecting them does not do anything to mitigate the consequences of them. “Standard CR prohibitions on new starts and increased production quantities delay the start of innovative new programs and the acquisition of essential capabilities.”12 Based on some of the comments in the hearing on the commission’s final report, it is unlikely Congress will be quick to remove all the restrictions in CRs, but some allowances can be made. Congress should allow new starts and increased production quantities during a CR for military branches that have and maintain an unmodified audit opinion. 

These changes would not only help the Marine Corps foster innovation but also allow us the flexibility to more properly align taxpayer dollars to higher priority requirements. They would also incentivize a clean audit opinion in other branches of the military and the DOD, which benefits Congress and all taxpayers. These changes will not solve all the Marine Corps’ problems in the PPBE Process as it relates to acquisition and proper resource allocation, but they will help. They are also realistic. Congress has acknowledged these problems exist. Because the Marine Corps has set itself apart from the rest of the DOD by proving it can pass an audit, it should seek Congressional relief from these known, documented problems.

The current PPBE process is too slow-moving to support the war‑
fighter in today’s rapidly evolving environment. Current policy is allowing technological advances to outpace the DOD while our adversaries are actively trying to capitalize on these advances. The DOD has not received a clean audit opinion and that is hurting us. This is understandable because the DOD, as the largest piece of the government’s budget pie, owes it to the people we serve to be good stewards of their dollars. The Marine Corps must lily pad off our unmodified audit opinion and work with Congress to seek relief from bureaucratic constraints in the PPBE process, or we will be outpaced by technology and our adversaries.

>The author’s bio was not available at the time of publication.

Notes

1. Commandant of the Marine Corps, MCO 7000.1, Marine Corps Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Assessment Process, (Washington, DC: August 2022).

2. Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform, Defense Resourcing for the Future (Arlington, VA: 2024).

3. Marine Corps PPBEA Process.

4. Defense Resourcing for the Future.

5. Yoram Evron, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion and Military Procurement,” Asia Policy 16, No. 1 (2022).

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Final Report of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform Commission: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 111th Congress, (2009), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-final-report-of-the-planning-programming-budgeting-and-execution-reform-commission.

9. Defense Resourcing for the Future.

10. Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 3: Budget Execution–Availability and Use of Budgetary Resources, Chapter 6: Reprogramming of DoD Appropriated Funds (Washington, DC: 2000).

11. Defense Resourcing for the Future.

12. Ibid.

2025 Aviation Plan Executive Summary

Balancing crisis response and modernization

The Deputy Commandant for Aviation’s (DC A) 2025 Aviation Plan (AVPLAN) was signed and released this past January. The AVPLAN intends to communicate to the FMFs, our industry partners, and Congress, the DC A’s priorities and direction over the next five years, guided by the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance and his priorities. Notably, the Commandant’s priority of “Balancing Crisis Response and Modernization” lies at the forefront of this AVPLAN and has guided Marine Aviation’s strategy to maintain a ready and lethal force.

Project EAGLE outlines DC A’s strategy to modernize Marine Aviation across multiple future year defense programs. The Project EAGLE initiative focuses on expanding interoperability with the Joint Force and allies, evolving the Marine Air Command and Control Systems, and incorporating new functional concepts such as Distributed Aviation Operations and Decision-Centric Aviation Operations. We will transform Marine Aviation to meet future operational needs by focusing on unmanned platforms, logistics, digital interoperability, and manned-unmanned teaming, ensuring a competitive advantage in future conflicts and supporting both the naval and Joint Forces across all domains.

To accomplish this, Marine Aviation must be ready. Therefore, operational readiness is the DC A’s number one priority. The challenge is to maintain a high level of readiness and remain lethal to respond to crises while also modernizing aviation capabilities. As we maintain this balance between crisis response and modernization, the DC A will ensure Marine Aviation remains lethal, naval at its core, and ready to respond to crises with the warfighting edge necessary to support our Marines, sailors, and the Joint Force.

Marine Aviation will also pursue a demand-based sustainment strategy, improving fleet readiness through better collaboration and efficient resource delivery. Efforts are being made to reduce variability in aircraft readiness through optimized maintenance, tooling, and logistics. Sustainment solutions will focus on three lines of effort: improving fleet readiness, enhancing sustainment for distributed aviation operations, and reducing equipment variability. This includes modernizing aviation supply packages, enhancing logistics information systems, and developing a replacement for aging aviation logistics vessels. This comprehensive approach ensures Marine Aviation can effectively support the MAGTF throughout the full range of military operations.

Qualified Marines also remain the key to our ability to meet operational requirements. While each type, model, and series of aircraft is in a different phase of lifecycle and inventory management, Marine Aviation will remain focused on managing aircrew and maintainer inventories by building properly-sized populations in grade, qualifications, and experience levels. To realize these goals, Marine Aviation will first reestablish a manpower management branch within Marine Aviation.

Marine Aviation Capabilities and Commodities
Marine Aviation aims to maintain a powerful and responsive air combat element for the MAGTF. This includes transitioning to an all-5th generation tactical air (TACAIR) fleet and modernizing the air combat element to be ready for combat today and tomorrow. The DC A’s intent is to maintain the current F-35 and CH-53K transition plans while also ensuring each community employs the most ready, safe, and lethal aircraft. 

First, the F-35 B/C provides advanced sensors, air-to-air missiles, and air-to-surface strike weapons, which are crucial for the MAGTF and Joint Force mission globally. By 2025, the Marine Corps will have received 183 F-35B and 52 F-35C aircraft. The F-35 program aims to support 12 F-35B squadrons and 8 F-35C squadrons, with a total of 420 F-35 aircraft. Fleet squadrons will be increased to 12 primary aircraft authorization by fiscal year (FY) 2030. The F-35B/C modernization includes Technical Refresh-3 upgrades, APG-85 radar upgrades, advanced countermeasures, and electronic warfare improvements. The program is focused on Block 4 capabilities, weapons integration, and site activations.

The F/A-18 Hornet provides vital maritime strike and air interdiction capabilities, with ongoing modernization ensuring its effectiveness in the Marine Corps’ TACAIR Transition Plan and global operations. The Marine Corps operates 161 F/A-18 aircraft, transitioning squadrons annually until FY29, with aircrew training now conducted by the Fleet Replacement Detachment at VMFA-323. The Hornet’s increased lethality with the AN/APG-79(v)4 radar and AESA technology, alongside upgrades in electronic warfare, extended-range weapons, and communications. Funding priorities focus on integrating advanced weapons, improving beyond-line-of-sight capabilities, enhancing electronic warfare systems, and supporting precision approach capabilities.

The AV-8B Harrier provides critical Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing capabilities for the MAGTF, offering precision strike, escort, and rapid deployment for MEUs with advanced targeting and missile systems. The Marine Corps operates 39 AV-8B aircraft across two VMAs, with plans for VMA-231 and VMA-223 to transition to F-35B. The AV-8B will continue supporting training and combat operations for forward air controllers and joint tactical air controllers, providing flexible deterrence and combat capabilities to combatant commanders. Funding will focus on T402 engine readiness, full LINK-16 integration, fleet replacement squadron support, and weapons upgrades.

The KC-130J is a vital enabler for MAGTF success, providing global mobility, logistical support, and aerial refueling across multiple regions with increased capacity in the Indo-Pacific. Four Marine aerial refueler transport squadrons operate 75 KC-130J aircraft with the full transition expected by 2027, which includes a program of record of 95 aircraft. The aerial refueler transport team is working to integrate more effectively with the MAGTF and joint forces by enhancing capabilities like realtime data transmission and adjusting training devices to support expanded training needs. Funding will focus on hardware and software upgrades, integrating MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link, procuring infrared countermeasure kits, and expanding backup aircraft inventory to maintain operational capacity.

The MV-22 Osprey provides critical medium-lift assault support with unmatched speed, range, and payload, ensuring rapid response for global crisis and humanitarian missions. The Marine Corps has a program of record for 360 MV-22Bs, organized across 16 active squadrons, 2 reserve squadrons, and several test and executive transport detachments, with VMM-264 reactivating in FY26. Ongoing efforts focus on improving configuration management, increasing fleet sustainability, modernizing flight control systems for degraded visual environments, and enhancing interoperability with the MAGTF Agile Network. Funding focuses on safety instrumentation for predictive maintenance, technology replacements to mitigate obsolescence, improved nacelle reliability, and new flight control systems to increase aircraft capability and safety.

The CH-53K King Stallion offers three times the range and payload capacity of the CH-53E Super Stallion. It can transport heavy equipment, troops, and supplies over long distances, ensuring forces remain agile and supported. Operating from both land and sea bases, including austere sites and amphibious shipping, it provides essential flexibility to the MAGTF. The Marine Corps plans to procure 200 CH-53Ks, equipping six active squadrons, one reserve squadron, and various test and fleet replacement detachments, with the full transition expected to be completed by FY32. Key efforts for the CH-53K include focusing on aircraft inventory, sustainment, and capability, with the first MEU detachment expected to deploy by FY27. Funding priorities for the CH-53E include sustainment, safety, and interoperability upgrades, while the CH-53K focuses on supply chain capacity, testing, sustainment, and warfighting capability expansion.

The H-1s are essential to the MAGTF, providing multi-role attack and utility capabilities that enhance lethal and non-lethal options, bridging gaps in low-altitude attack and strike operations. The H-1 Program consists of 349 aircraft, with a total active inventory of 301 aircraft across five squadrons and a planned increase to 314 by FY31. The H-1 modernization plan focuses on improving digital interoperability, survivability, lethality, and electrical power capacity, ensuring the fleet remains versatile and capable of future conflicts. The program’s key funding priorities include digital interoperability, power upgrades, survivability, sensor optimization, and aircrew systems enhancements.

The Marine Unmanned Expeditionary Medium Altitude Long Endurance unmanned aerial systems provide critical capabilities such as airborne early warning, maritime domain awareness, and electronic warfare support. The Marine Corps currently operates 10 MQ-9A Block 5-20 aircraft and plans to field a total of 20 Block 5-25 aircraft with ongoing efforts to establish additional unmanned aircraft squadrons. The MQ-9A program focuses on sustaining operations through contract logistics support and the activation of Unmanned Aerial System Maintenance Squadron 1 (UASMS-1) by FY26 to manage maintenance and sustainment for MQ-9A Reapers. Key funding priorities include Marine Unmanned Expeditionary Medium Altitude Long Endurance unmanned aerial systems procurement, capability spirals, UASMS-1 establishment, and improvements in lethality, survivability, and expeditionary deployability.

The F-5 N/F provides essential adversary training for TACAIR, assault support, groundbased air defenses, and Marine air control squadrons, enhancing combat readiness for Marine aviation and ground units. The Marine Corps currently operates F-5s assigned to Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron 401 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma and Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron 402 at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, with plans to acquire eleven more aircraft over the next four years to meet growing adversary training requirements. The F-5 fleet is undergoing upgrades, including glass cockpits and Red Net integration, while exploring new solutions like LVC capability and commercial air services to address adversary training gaps.

Marine Corps Operations Support Airwing provides critical air transport for high-priority passengers and cargo, ensuring timely logistical support for forward-deployed MAGTFs. The Marine Corps Reserve Operations Support Airwing squadrons, including Marine Transport Squadron 1, Marine Transport Squadron Belle Chasse, and Marine Transport Squadron Andrews, support active-duty Operations Support Airwing operations and lead the management of UC-12W, UC-35D, and C-40A aircraft. The top priority is the recapitalization of non-deployable UC-12F/M and UC-35D aircraft, with plans to procure additional UC-12W aircraft to meet the program of record. The funding priorities include procuring nine UC-12W aircraft and modernizing UC-12W with digital interoperability capabilities.

The HMX-1’s mission includes worldwide transportation for the President and key officials, supporting high-level travel and operational test evaluations for presidential lift aircraft. The HMX-1 began transitioning to the VH-92A in 2022, with the Marine Corps declaring its initial operational capability in December 2021 and having since integrated the aircraft into operational missions. With a total of 23 aircraft in the program of record, the VH-92A is set to fully replace the VH-3D and the VH-60N, with ongoing improvements in performance for high/hot environments and expanded communication capabilities.

Marine Aviation is advancing new weapon systems to address evolving threats, integrating capabilities that enhance fighter and attack aircraft for global operations. The focus is on munitions with greater range, speed, and lethality to dominate both air and surface domains. Recent efforts have concentrated on integrating net-enabled weapons into the F-35B/C and improving long-range maritime strike capabilities. Key developments include the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range entry into low-rate production, safe separation testing for the GBU-53 SDB II, and the addition of the Long-Range and Maritime Strike to the F-35B/C roadmap.

The AGM-158C Long-Range and Maritime Strike is a long-range, precision-guided anti-ship missile designed for semi-autonomous engagement of maritime targets. Its integration with the F-35B/C enhances Marine Aviation’s strategic maritime capabilities.

The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile program is undergoing operational testing on the AH-1Z. Its dual-mode seeker and multi-purpose warhead provide enhanced strike precision while its countermeasure resistance and fire-and-forget capability improve survivability in diverse conditions.

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II, integrated across platforms carrying 2.75” rockets, offers significant improvements over unguided rockets, particularly in precision targeting. The Single Software Variant, fielded in FY22, provides increased range and accuracy, enabling common use across fixed and rotary-wing platforms.

The AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder introduces lock-on-after-launch with data-link for 360-degree engagements, and its Block II+ variant will support F-35B/C in FY19. The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, with its ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously, is further enhanced by the AIM-120D variant, featuring GPS, improved data link, software, range, and speed.

The evolving electromagnetic environment necessitates advanced electromagnetic spectrum operations capabilities to ensure the MAGTF maintains superiority and can effectively deny the enemy’s electromagnetic spectrum use while protecting its own. Marine Aviation is integrating the electronic warfare family of systems with a focus on platforms like the UH-1Y, MV-22, and KC-130 while developing capabilities for unmanned systems through collaboration with the Marine Corps Spectrum Integration Lab.

The goal of MAGTF Digital Interoperability/MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link (DI/MANGL) is to deliver timely, efficient, and secure information across diverse systems to enhance situational awareness, accelerate the kill chain, and improve survivability. The DI/MANGL program is modernizing to align with Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control standards, advanced tactical data links, and zero-trust architecture, with funding efforts planned for FY26. The DI/MANGL integrates sensors, processors, interfaces, and radios to improve interoperability and situational awareness across the MAGTF, joint, and coalition forces while ongoing efforts expand tactical relevance and mobility.

The goal of aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) is to equip all aircraft with advanced systems that enhance survivability and situational awareness to detect, identify, and defeat anti-aircraft threats while integrating into the MAGTF C2 ecosystem. Current ASE systems include various missile warning systems, radar warning receivers, and countermeasure systems, all aimed at improving threat detection, situational awareness, and survivability across multiple aircraft platforms. Future efforts will focus on integrating multi-spectral sensors and evolving. 

The ASE systems, such as the Next Generation Pointer/Tracker, meet emerging threats and enable interoperability with future platforms. Continued science and technology investments will drive the development of ASE capabilities, ensuring seamless integration into digitally connected networks like the MANGL.

Marine Aviation Enablers
The Marine Air Command and Control System is undergoing significant modernization with new equipment like TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar, Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), and Marine Air Defense Integrated System to enhance air battle management, integrated air and missile defense, and multi-domain C2 capabilities. The CAC2S processes and integrates data from sensors and aircraft to support Marine, Naval, and joint aviation operations, while the CAC2S Small Form Factor variant and the Theater Battle Management Core System provide scalable, modern capabilities for distributed command and control.

The Marine Corps is expanding its groundbased air defense capabilities through systems like MADIS, Light-MADIS, and the Medium Range Intercept Capability to defend against a range of aerial threats, supported by the growth of the low altitude air defense community and future participation in the Army’s interceptor development efforts.

Aviation ground support ensures Marine Aviation’s expeditionary capability, providing essential services like airfield construction, aircraft recovery, and refueling at austere locations, supporting advanced base operations and distributed aviation.

The AC2GS funding priorities focus on improving air traffic control and aircraft launch and recovery capabilities, including precision landing systems, inter-facility communications, and airfield lighting. Additionally, funding is directed toward sustaining and enhancing green-dollar air C2, air defense programs, and aircraft rescue and firefighting equipment to ensure readiness and interoperability across joint and naval operations.

4th Marine Aircraft Wing
The 4th MAW plays a vital role in enhancing the MAGTF’s global readiness and flexibility by providing a reserve aviation force capable of responding to emerging threats. This force ensures that the Marine Corps maintains operational depth, which is critical for addressing the evolving demands of modern warfare.

The 4th MAW works closely with active components, strengthening aviation readiness through ongoing support and collaboration with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd MAW units. By transitioning to advanced platforms like the F-35C, KC-130J and tiltrotor aircraft, and integrating rotary, unmanned, and expeditionary aviation enablers, the wing ensures a unified and adaptable force structure ready for global missions.

Expeditionary & Maritime Aviation-Advanced Development Team (XMA-ADT)
The XMA-ADT, established in August 2023, accelerates the acquisition of technologies for Force Design by coordinating with stakeholders and employing operational prototypes to address critical capability gaps in Marine Aviation. In 2024, XMA-ADT focused on enhancing capabilities for Marine Aviation, including MUX TACAIR, Airborne Logistics Connector, Precision Attack Strike Missile, and H-1 Next, with key milestones such as UAS Manned-Unmanned Teaming and successful flight demonstrations for each project. In 2025, XMA-ADT will refine capabilities for MUX TACAIR, continue Airborne Logistics Connector demonstrations with plans for Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course 1-26, and further develop the Long-Range Attack Missile toward achieving a maximum range live-fire shot by the end of the year.

In summary, Marine Aviation continues to be forward deployed and operate from expeditionary sites, joint locations, Navy ships, and strategic main operating bases. As we actively campaign, our focus on balancing today’s readiness with tomorrow’s modernization is critical as we continue to compete, assure our allies and partners, and deter our adversaries. This balance cannot be achieved without direct investment in our Marines, sailors, and aircrew. Their training must be relevant, realistic, and accomplished in the best aircraft and equipment available. Marine Aviation stands ready to fight and win today and into the future.

Approachability: Overlooked but not Unseen

2025 Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest: First Place

Approachability is a bridge that connects you to your Marines. You are either paving the way, building barriers, or cutting off access. In the Marine Corps, trust and communication are paramount in candid conversations that can save lives and resources, making the difference between mission success or failure. The Marine Corps is a maneuver warfare organization that relies on trust built up and down the chain of command.1 Commanders owe their Marines clear intent and the resources to accomplish the mission. Followers owe their leaders accurate feedback, clarifying questions, and the trust to operate within the confines of the arena.

However, a culture of silence stifles creativity and hinders mission readiness. When senior leaders lack approachability, they struggle to gain a clear insight into what occurs at the lowest levels of their organizations. As leaders ascend through the ranks, their responsibilities expand, and their influence increases, yet their familiarity with the junior leaders and their troops decreases. An unintended consequence inflicted by overly busy schedules and competing priorities is a mounting difficulty for junior Marines to relate to their senior leaders. There is a direct correlation between increased rank and perceived harshness and limited interactions between senior and junior leaders often lead to the misperception that senior leaders are unrelatable and unapproachable.2 As leaders, assessing one’s level of approachability helps bridge the gap between senior leaders and junior Marines, leading to increased trust and effectiveness in the Marine Corps. 

The Challenge of Relatability
The mask of command, like body armor on a deployment, does not have to be worn at all times and in all situations.3 At its core, the perception of approachability is amplified by military traditions of customs and courtesies and by increasingly busy schedules that leave minimal time for senior leaders to troop the lines. Senior leaders’ intent on maintaining their war face—a stoic and authoritative demeanor—may unintentionally reinforce the divide between leader and led.4 While maintaining this demeanor has a time and place, such as formal ceremonies or leading troops in combat operations, it can be counterproductive in day-to-day interactions. Knowing when, where, and with what level of formality shows a mature leader willing to adapt to their position and circumstances. Striking a balance when visiting Marines sends one of two messages: either you are never there and do not care, or you are there too much and do not trust them to operate without strict supervision. 

Figure 1. Being unapproachable guarantees defeat. (Figure provided by author.)

Marines build trust through the process of “Forming, Storming, Norming, and Performing,” especially while operating at the company level or below.5 Unfortunately, due to competing commitments, senior leaders do not have the freedom or time to be as involved with junior leaders during the trust-building process. Oftentimes, the context of decisions is lost while troops on the ground focus on the down and in of the tactical level, while senior leaders focus on the up and out at the operational and strategic levels. However, there must be a common ground in which information is shared from the bottom up and the top down to create a shared consciousness and culture. All levels of leadership should have ownership in this process; however, it is up to senior leaders to build a climate of approachability and trust that drives this process. It is the responsibility of leaders to link the purpose of tactical actions with strategic context while fostering unit morale and working to achieve common goals. 

The Power of Approachability
Being an approachable leader is not a sign of weakness; it is a powerful tool that enables senior leaders to gain the trust of their subordinates and access to the unvarnished truth. Approachable leaders foster an environment where junior Marines feel valued and empowered to speak openly, which helps to identify and address problems before they escalate. There are several ways a senior leader can display approachability and build two-way communication. Senior leaders can increase their approachability by being conscious of their demeanor and communication style, prioritizing face-to-face interactions, attending training, visiting deployed forces, and holding regularly scheduled town halls. 

Leadership Tools for Approachability
Effective communication promotes a sense of purpose, trust, and collaboration that is essential for senior leaders when engaging with junior leaders. Senior leaders must ensure their messages resonate and inspire action by self-reflecting on, “Who is my audience? What’s the best method to reach them? How long do I have? What methods are available to me?”6 For junior Marines, effective communication must be clear, concise, and relatable to compete with their limited attention span, which is often divided among various work responsibilities and entertainment distractions. Communication must be tailored to reach your intended audiences while fostering trust and rapport. Additionally, feedback from trusted advisors and previous “gray beards” provides leaders with both wisdom and wasta.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps demonstrates effective communication by using social media platforms to communicate short, impactful video clips that deliver key messages such as reminders to complete the annual Combat Fitness Test.7 These videos, tailored to the Marine ethos, use straightforward language and relatable scenarios to connect with Marines at all levels, fostering trust, unity, and approachability. By leveraging modern technology and brevity, leaders ensure that critical guidance and values are shared effectively, empowering junior Marines to act decisively and confidently. 

Figure 2. Ask questions, listen, and succeed. (Figure provided by author.)

Demeanor plays a crucial role in shaping how others perceive us and directly influences our ability to build relationships. While it may seem minor, demeanor has significant leadership implications. A large portion of communication is non-verbal, meaning even small adjustments in bearing can greatly enhance approachability and effectiveness in leadership.8 Leaders who smile, engage in casual conversations, and show genuine interest in their Marines’ lives create a sense of camaraderie. A leader who smiles more appears relatable and less intimidating. This does not mean that leaders should forgo professionalism or adopt a perpetual grin, but rather, they should be mindful of how their expressions and body language impact their Marines’ perspectives. A sideways glance of displeasure during a brief can leave some Marines questioning their abilities and willingness to speak their minds. 

In-person communication should be prioritized to ensure non-verbal body language is used to convey your meaning, especially when controversial or complex ideas need communicating. Senior leaders can cultivate approachability by prioritizing face-to-face interactions. Whenever possible, communication should be delivered in the most personable way possible, especially if it is sensitive or personal, such as the loss of a loved one or corrective action. Communication priority should start with face-to-face, followed by video, then voice calls, and lastly, written messages.9 

Visible presence could include visiting the companies, walking the lines, eating meals with your Marines, casual meetings, planned mentorship sessions, and unit social events. During these interactions, leaders should practice active listening, demonstrate empathy, and refrain from passing immediate judgment. Senior leaders should leverage informal settings to foster candid conversations. These small actions signal that the senior leader is not just an authority figure but also a mentor and an ally.10 When Marines see their leaders as approachable, they are more likely to share their honest perspectives. 

To learn what is happening on the ground requires being on the ground. By visiting in person, listening, and then sharing context for Marines wondering about policy or strategic changes that impact them, an approachable connection is much more likely. Often, a unit’s dynamics might go unnoticed without taking the time to visit the troops. Battlefield circulations can seem like an excuse to get out of the office or rack up frequent flyer miles, but the message it sends to the troops and the insights gained by observing and listening to Marines cannot be replicated by storyboards or situation reports. Battlefield circulations can provide an opportunity for a senior leader to be approachable, and they must be willing and able to provide context to things their Marines care about. All decisions are made in context. If someone does not understand the decision, they likely do not understand the context. Leaders who share context find their formations less resistant to change, and therefore, approachability is invaluable during times of innovation and change. 

Senior leaders’ participation in mess nights, warrior nights, and the Marine Corps Ball might seem like trivial matters, but they provide Marines of all ranks and specialties an opportunity to commune and share in a setting that fosters relationship-building and transparent communication. By breaking down the barriers of rank and formality in these settings, leaders create an environment where ground truth can flourish as everyone takes part as a family of warriors. As trust increases, the speed of actions and decisions will also increase, creating a tempo Marines strive for in maneuver warfare.11 

The last method is the inclusion of town hall meetings. A good method to assess the trust built between senior and junior leaders is the presence of challenging questions and two-way dialogue in public forums. If senior leaders are practicing the aforementioned approachability skills, town halls should provide insightful feedback. While approachability fosters open communication and trust, it also necessitates guiding interactions to remain productive and respectful, especially in public forums where poorly framed questions can undermine credibility, distract from the discussions, and hinder unit morale. By setting the tone for what constitutes thoughtful inquiry, leaders can encourage dialogue while maintaining professionalism. 

Dumb Questions Exist, a Litmus Test: Arrogance, Ignorance, or Agenda
While senior leaders should take the mantle when developing approachability, junior leaders also hold responsibility for their demeanor and actions. For example, a senior leader should encourage open and candid dialogue, but that does not mean all questions are appropriate. Most Marines have heard questions that were not well thought out, in which the audience rolls their eyes and the chain of command grumbles under their breath. There is a three-part self-diagnosis everyone should ask before asking a question in a public forum: 

One: Am I demonstrating arrogance? Everyone has met over-eager people who know the answer to the question but wish to grandstand while citing their litany of achievements and knowledge. 

Two: Does this question show ignorance? Ignorance is measured within the context of the experience, rank, and length of service of the person asking the question. A junior Marine with limited experience has more room to ask foundational questions as opposed to someone who clearly should know the answer to what they are asking yet is demonstrating holes in their professional education out of laziness, immaturity, or low IQ.

Three: Does this question display an agenda? For example, when the Marine Corps controversially decided to divest of tanks, many tankers stood up in public settings with questions to senior leaders designed to point out their agenda to retrieve the steel beasts from the scrap heap of history.12 

Junior Leader Responsibility—Moral Courage
Approachability for senior leaders has utility, however, that does not negate junior leaders from displaying moral courage in the case of unapproachable leaders. George C. Marshall offers a case study on courage in the face of unapproachability. As a junior officer, George C. Marshall demonstrated significant moral courage in the face of adversity. Marshall served on the staff of a historically unapproachable leader, GEN John “Blackjack” Pershing. Equivalent to a six-star general, Pershing was known for his blistering tirades and blunt demeanor.13 However, long before Marshall became the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State responsible for the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. He first stood up to his unapproachable leader with honesty and humility while deployed to France in World War I.14 Although initially taken aback, Pershing respected Marshall as a man he could trust to give the painful truth instead of the pleasing lie.  

Figure 3. Facing senior leaders with courage. (Figure provided by author.)

Conclusion
Approachability is a cornerstone of effective leadership, yet it is often overlooked as leaders climb the ranks. By smiling, engaging with Marines on a personal level, and fostering open communication, senior leaders can bridge the gap that separates them from their subordinates. This connection not only builds trust and morale but also provides access to the ground truth needed to make informed decisions. In a profession where lives depend on effective leadership, the importance of approachability cannot be overstated. Senior leaders must embrace this trait, recognizing that genuine connection with their Marines is the foundation of mission success.

>LtCol Mitchell is the Marine Raider Regiment Operations Officer. He began his Marine Corps career as an Infantry Officer before becoming a Marine Raider. He holds a master’s degree from Air Force University, specializing in Russian proxy warfare, and another from the Naval Postgraduate School, focusing on the Stand-In Force concept in Indo-Pacific conflict. Throughout his career, he has been deployed globally on a range of assignments.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

2. Eric Wendt, “DA3900 Command & Leadership: Perceived Harshness and Positivity Model,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 10, 2023).

3. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988).

4. Full Metal Jacket, directed by Stanley Kubrick (Warner Bros, 1987). 

5. Admin, “What Is Forming, Storming, Norming and Performing?” Six Sigma Daily, August 17, 2020, https://www.sixsigmadaily.com/what-is-forming-storming-norming-performing.

6. David Grossman, “6 Steps for Effectively Connecting with Your Audience,” Your Thought Partner, July 18, 2022. https://www.yourthoughtpartner.com/blog/6-steps-for-effectively-connecting-with-your-audiences.

7. GEN Eric Smith, “Commandant of the @USMC (@CMC_MarineCorps)/X,” X, November 27, 2024, https://x.com/CMC_MarineCorps?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1861876810738483360%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftaskandpurpose.com%2Fculture%2Fmarine-cft-commandant-eric-smith%2F.

8. Chris Voss, “How to Use the 7-38-55 Rule to Negotiate Effectively,” MasterClass, June 7, 2021, https://www.masterclass.com/articles/how-to-use-the-7-38-55-rule-to-negotiate-effectively.

9. Eric Wendt, “DA3900 Command & Leadership: Communication Hierarchy Model,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 10, 2023).

10. Director, Marine Corps Staff and Administration and Resource Management Division, HQMC Mentoring Guide, (Washington, DC: n.d.).

11. Stephen M.R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: Free Press, 2008).

12. Matt Gonzalez, “Force Design 2030: Divesting to Meet the Future Threat,” Marines.mil, December 1, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2857680/force-design-2030-divesting-to-meet-the-future-threat.

13. Public Broadcasting Service, “Black Jack Pershing: Love and War,” PBS Learning Media. n.d., https://www.pbslearningmedia.org/collection/black-jack-pershing-love-and-war.

14. GEN George C. Marshall, “I’m Sorry, Mr. President, But I Don’t Agree With That At All,” The George C. Marshall Foundation, February 4, 2021, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/articles-and-features/im-sorry-mr-president-but-i-dont-agree-with-that-at-all. 

Force Design: Making the First Thing First – Logically

Design precedes development as the architect precedes the engineer

Force design is a critically important process for any military to ensure it is ready and able to preserve deterrence and meet the test of the next conflict should it occur. The Joint Staff defines force design as “a process of innovation through concept development, experimentation, prototyping, research, analysis, wargaming, and other applications of technology and methods to envision a future joint force.”1 Importantly, this definition describes force design as a continuing process of innovation; it is an infinite game.2

Currently, there is a great deal of attention on force design and modernization across the DOD given the rise of multiple peer adversaries.3 It has been especially prominent in the Marine Corps since 2019 when the 38th Commandant made it a centerpiece of his commandancy in his Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Given this Marine Corps focus on Force Design, and the author’s familiarity with these efforts, this article will use the Marine Corps as an exemplar to discuss force design processes and recommend force design best practices applicable to all components of the Joint Force. Thus, the subject addressed herein is the process of Force Design, rather than any specific instantiation of force design. The central idea is that Force Design is the logical first step of a larger force modernization process whose functions (force design, force development, force employment) must be performed concurrently and not sequentially as the current joint doctrine implies.4

Joint Force Development and Design and Historical Analogs
The CJCS Instruction 3030.01A, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design, outlines the processes and responsibilities for Joint Force Development and Design (JFDD) and describes three lines of effort: Build the force, educate the force, and train the force. 

The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) document describes future challenges, providing a shared appreciation of the threat across the department. Developing this shared vision is foundational to all subsequent steps to build, educate, and train the force. For this reason, JFDD would be better described as threat-based and concept-informed vice the CJCSI 3030.01A formulation describing the JOE as setting the conditions “for effective concept-driven, threat-informed capability development for DoD.”5 Calling out distinctions between concept-informed/concept-driven and threat-based/threat-informed may seem overly pedantic, but the distinctions have significance beyond semantic nitpicks as will be discussed later. This is especially so in the case of the Marine Corps, whose force development process describes a “concept-based” approach that places even more emphasis on concepts than the CJCSI-prescribed “concept-driven” joint process.6 

Whether the JFDD process is threat-based and concept-informed vice concepts-driven/-based and threat-informed is, in important ways, analogous to the early 2000s shift away from threat-based planning when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld replaced this Cold War-era process with Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP).7 While it is true that JFDD-related concepts are developed using specific scenarios against specific adversaries, the subsequent reduction of these concepts to lists of concept-required capabilities as the next step in the JFDD process encourages these disaggregated data to be viewed and resourced as individual capabilities rather than a system of systems that has many interdependencies. The Joint Force is a system of systems, not a simple aggregation of collected parts, and thus requires a holistic system view when defining force designs and associated capability resourcing. A line-item view created by reductive textual analysis of concepts of varying quality and relevance yields lists of capabilities and gaps functionally equivalent to the now-discredited CBP.

An insightful 2015 article in U.S. Naval Institute News provided a
retrospective assessment of the shift to CBP fifteen years after its inception. The author explains the importance of the shift to CBP by contrasting it to the Army’s 1981 threat-based AirLand Battle doctrinal reset that was developed to counter the Soviet Union. The author explains how in CBP, the by-then moribund USSR was replaced by a generic near-peer threat that “has no connections to any geography, culture, alliance structure, or fighting methodology. That adversary has no objectives, no systemic vulnerabilities, and no preferred way of fighting. Instead, the enemy is a collection of weapons systems that we will fight with (presumably) a more advanced set of similar systems, in a symmetrical widget-on-widget battlefield on a flat, featureless Earth.”8 The article then describes how problematic such an approach is because it divorces force modernization from all the particulars necessary to develop the ways and means of a coherent system to defeat an adversary. 

Geography always matters, as does weather, allies and partners, access, specific technical parameters of competing weapons systems, force posture, mobility, sustainment, and network resilience. The impact of the loss of these critical design considerations in the force development process was then amplified by two decades of focus on countering terrorism. This shift caused the department to lose focus on emerging peer threat ecosystems, even while entities such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Net Assessment were warning about the challenges of a revanchist China.9

Additionally, CBP encouraged military planning to shift focus inward vice on the enemy, thus allowing institutional preferences to prevail over war-winning imperatives. In theory, CBP could result in a Joint Force that is so dominant that it overmatches any adversary with its superior technology and operational acumen, but in practice, this is not the case. Throughout this era, science and technology investments provided a patina of innovation, and while it did yield improvements in force protection against improvised explosive devices, the real focus of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services, and more importantly, the real money, was on developing the next better version of existing marque capabilities such as 5th-generation tactical aircraft vice uncrewed systems (drones, collaborative combat aircraft); better-towed tube artillery vice a healthy mix of self-propelled tube artillery, rocket artillery, and loitering munitions; geostationary military satellites vice large constellations of low earth orbit micro-sats, and large surface combatants vice a hybrid fleet incorporating uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels.

The most important contribution of the 2018 National Defense Strategy was the unequivocal shift back to threat-based planning. Subsequent joint doctrine such as CJCSI 3100.01 Series, Joint Strategic Planning System, CJCSI 5123.01 Series, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, and the previously quoted CJCS 3030.01A all made improvements to how the Department approaches planning, requirements development, and solutions development. But, as with any complex process highly dependent for success on external factors, adjustments, and improvements must be continuous given the changing nature of threats, technologies, budgets, and strategies. 

From Time-Sequenced to Logically Sequential, Temporally Concurrent
CJCSI 303.01A describes three timeframes from the present: Force Employment (0–3 years), Force Development (2–7 years), and Force Design (5–15 years). While it is obvious that any process takes time, and therefore emerging capabilities will manifest further in the future than employing today’s forces, the three epochs described in the CJCSI are unhelpful and potentially detrimental. 

First, the Russo-Ukraine war has demonstrated that such a time-specific process cannot work. Forces must be designed and redesigned in important ways in the near future, and the inability of a force to do so means defeat. 

Second, at the most fundamental level, this sequenced construct fails. Logically, Force Design comes first (architectural design), then the force is developed to fit the design (like a house is built to an architect’s blueprint), and then it is employed (like a house is lived in). The underlying logic of the Joint Staff’s tripartite timeframes is that the acquisition process takes time and therefore Force Design manifests in the most distant epoch. But if we care about what we need to do to win tomorrow, we must focus on Force Design first just as someone building a house hires the architect before hiring the home builder. 

The forces being employed today were subject to force design in the past, but in most cases, the too-distant past, and this is why there is so much consensus in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress on the need for acquisition reform.10 It is also inordinately focused on traditional long-term program acquisition when, increasingly, opportunities exist for software upgrades to existing systems and the purchase of more advanced non-developmental capabilities (e.g. FPV drones) is possible. 

It is critical that designers, developers, and operators maintain a continuous dialog to ensure healthy feedback loops for rapid adjustment to processes and plans. The current time-dependent characterization serves as an implicit segmentation that discourages interactions among designers, developers, and operators and thus compromises essential feedback. Too often, combatant commanders (CCDR) and operating force emergent requirements are diminished by force designers and developers because these components are “just focused on today.” In the past, there was some justification for this argument, given the glacial evolutionary trajectory taken by all Services, but it is simply not true today. The CCDRs and forward-postured operating forces are increasingly conversant in both current and future adversary capabilities. In the past, when adversaries were decades behind us in fielding capabilities, a CCDR asking for contemporary countering capabilities was to ask for incremental changes; this is not the current circumstance. Now, when forward-postured forces ask for capabilities to counter existing and near-term adversary capabilities, they are asking for capabilities that are often far in advance of currently planned capabilities in the acquisition pipeline. This makes all the difference and is a key reason why the joint doctrine on timing and sequencing needs to be re-examined.

Concept-Driven or Concept-Informed
In describing the execution and implementation of JFDD, CJCSI 3003.01A states, “Concept-driven, threat-informed, capability development begins with a vision of the future operating environment that guides the DOD through a campaign of learning to identify the capabilities required to achieve the objectives established in national strategic guidance.”11

Concepts are extremely important elements of Force Design, but they are not the first thing, nor are they the most important. Vision comes first, and since force development processes and the systems they produce are sensitive to initial inputs, flaws in vision can have cascading negative effects on final outcomes. It is important to get the first thing, the main thing, right first. As Einstein said, “If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I would spend the first 55 minutes determining the proper question to ask, for once I know the proper question, I could solve the problem in less than five minutes.” 

Force Design is more deductive than inductive (as a recursive intellectual exercise, it will inevitably have elements of both). Experience and professional judgment allow us to have a vision and then a hypothesis. This tentative vision, which describes the desired attributes of the future force (objective force) needed to solve a specific military problem, is the vital spark of creation: the first thing. 

Concepts are useful because they pull together desired attributes into a coherent whole that describes important elements of the larger warfighting system and aids the progression from an impressionistic vision to the refined blueprint. 

Current concepts are of varying quality and utility. They are certainly useful but also quite imperfect. Given this reality, basing Force Design on these concepts cannot help but lead to a flawed force design if we use textual analysis of these concepts to determine requirements per the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems. Deconstructing concepts to transliterate them from conceptual think pieces to mechanistic lists, and then by rote, converting these lists to gaps and then requirements, is bound to lead to confusion amongst force developers and solution developers as the logical warp and woof of force design are shorn from the process, just as CBP did in the early 2000s. Additionally, flawed concepts do not get better through abstraction. 

Of course, lists can be quite useful, but we do not need a concept to generate a list. It would be surprising if the authors of concepts did not start with a list in their minds first and there is nothing wrong with this. Concepts are useful for their consilience of information into a narrative that can deliver shared wisdom while also stimulating further creative thought. 

The problem with lists is what bureaucracies do with them. They are often an excuse to reduce a complex cognitive task into manageable parts, which can be useful, but this is not a way to build a fit-for-purpose war‑
fighting system—it is simply a way to understand an already formed system. An architect does not take a pile of materials and build a house from what is in the pile. An architect uses education, experience, and knowledge of materials to build a plan. Mechanical engineers add greater detail to the blueprint to describe its internal systems and piece parts. If force designers are the architects, then force developers are the mechanical engineers, and both should be informed by concepts, not an abstracted list of those concepts’ key points.

Figure 1 offers a notional process flow for Force Design while emphasizing the centrality of the force designer and his cognitive processes.

Figure 1. (Figure provided by author.)

In sum, Force Design should be concept-informed and not concept-driven. Force designers produce conceptual frameworks for force developers to define system particulars—not simple lists. 

The most valuable conceptual work is derived by focusing a concept on a very specific scenario believed to be likely. This requires concept developers to understand more than good storytelling and understand applied warfighting. If we were to develop a range of concepts/concepts of operation for all supported combatant commands across the spectrum of competition and conflict, we would possess a robust playbook for likely challenges at the level of detail necessary to describe and build a system. Critically, this approach would require articulation of not just material requirements but also non-material requirements such as training, organization, facilities, logistics, tactics, techniques, and procedures, etc. 

A concept supports thought and creativity and loses its purpose when subjected to Derridean deconstruction. Force designers are architects, while force developers are mechanical engineers, and both use concepts to maintain the purpose of and vision for the objective force. 

Those involved in Force Design should be informed by the complete range of concepts relevant to their military problem and focus on using this knowledge to develop the concept of operations in narrative form and graphically in an operational view.12 This ensures a systems view that maintains priority for a functional warfighting system versus the current process’s proclivity for devolution into a “one-to-N” list of preferred capabilities with no guarantee they will cohere into a functional warfighting capability that can be fielded. Such lists are also susceptible to manipulation at various levels of the chain of command by those advocating for their special interests whether part of the system architecture or not. 

Case in Point: Marine Corps Force Design
A system comprises three fundamental elements: a purpose or function, system elements, and interconnections. In current process parlance, this is analogous to mission, capabilities, and interdependencies. This means Force Design is about system development—a combat system.

While biological evolution demonstrates that chance combinations of chemicals and energy can lead to complex lifeforms, we should not expect a warfighting system to emerge from the muck and mire of lists, technology, and capabilities, given that acquisition processes are, thankfully, somewhat shorter than biological evolutionary time horizons. 

To achieve speed of relevance, we must rapidly create a system, test it, modify it, and test it again. Fortunately, military professionals have the benefit of specialized knowledge, which, when combined with past and ongoing Force Design efforts, enables them to jump ahead evolutionarily to an imperfect but fully formed vision for a future war‑
fighting system through deductive reasoning. Conversely, over relevant time horizons, gaps and capability lists will not coalesce into an objective force (system of systems) inductively—an overarching vision is required because we are looking for something new, unencumbered by traditional approaches and existing capabilities. A creative step of system definition, through Force Design, is required to guide force development. 

Because the Marine Corps has evolved incrementally since World War II, there has been little attention paid to Force Design as the focus of the combat development process of this era was on buying a newer version of existing platforms. Force structure changes during this period were the subject of a parade of force structure working groups, force organizational review groups, and integrated process teams, with many of their recommendations not being implemented due either to lack of resources or to subsequent redirection from leadership. 

This historical experience demanded little in the way of force design and mostly required finding ways to improve existing capabilities, such as a better truck, HMMWV, AAV, etc. For decades, the Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration Command (CD&I) focused predominately on the ground combat tactical vehicle strategy because that is where Service-defining capabilities were thought to lie, and except for aircraft, it was where the most expensive platforms resided. 

Unfortunately, this was to the exclusion of upgrading our artillery systems to move beyond towed artillery to self-propelled. There was also inadequate investment allocated to Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and installations. There was substantial discussion about this, but funding was subordinate to the vehicle strategy. These decisions placed the Marine Corps in a situation where organic sensing and fires were inadequate for peer conflict. The 37th Commandant, Gen Neller, recognized the problem in his 2017 Posture Testimony, which stated unambiguously that “the Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment.”13 

Force design must be a core competency for any organization charged with force modernization and development, or we will find ourselves in a circumstance, yet again, where Gen Neller’s testimony will ring true. Currently, the Marine Corps’ combat development organization (CD&I) lacks dedicated force designers and instead relies upon ad hoc process teams, study groups, and organizational reviews to produce the vision and the attributes for an objective force. This lack of dedicated force designers all but guarantees that the nuances of the proposed design developed by an ephemeral ad hoc group will be inadequately translated and implemented by force developers, having been lost in the translation from vision to concept to list.

Recommendations
Amend Joint and Service Process Documents

Both the order and the temporal descriptions in the CJCSI should be reconsidered to reflect the logical progression of force development: Force Design, Force Development, and Force Employment. In addition to changing the order of activities, the arbitrary timeframes should be eliminated as they are not accurate and simply reinforce the flawed conception that Force Design only manifests in the distant future. As discussed, this is no longer the case in an environment where software-defined capabilities and commercial, non-developmental solutions are an ever-increasing portion of the warfighting system. 

Joint doctrine should make explicit that force design is threat-based and concept-informed vice concept-driven and threat-informed, and reemphasize the centrality of the JOE and related threat assessments. Threat documents should be unambiguously defined as the starting point for Force Design. 

Force designs must be consistent with the Analytic Working Group principles and standards wherein they must be detailed enough to be tested through wargames and experimentation. Thus, force designs can be thought of as testable hypotheses. Importantly, the joint doctrine is explicit that wargaming, experimentation, and analysis are crucial to shaping Force Design. These activities do not validate a design; rather, they contribute to an iterative process of improvement. For the Joint Force, the Joint Warfighting Concept guides organization, training, and equipping, and Service designs should clearly reflect how they fit within the Joint Warfighting-informed Joint Force.14

Best Practices

Concept required capabilities derived from concepts are insufficient for force development purposes. As CJCSI 3030.01A states, “CONEMPs are the most specific of all military concepts and contain a level of detail sufficient to inform the establishment of programmatic requirements.”15 Thus, even with the existing joint doctrine, Force Design derived from operating and functional concept required capabilities is inadequate. If lists are made to aid in understanding and communicating, they must be placed in context and not allowed to become the main thing. 

The Army has a force management occupational specialty (FA 50) that encompasses force development, force integration, and force generation. Officers are selected for FA 50 around their eighth year of service to attend a fourteen-week qualification course, and are expected to pursue subsequent education throughout their career.16 The Army also has a Futures Command headed by a four-star general in Austin, TX. The Marine Corps has made no investments in focusing and professionalizing its future force to the extent the Army has, and the results speak for themselves. The Army is implementing the fundamental aspects of Marine Corps Force Design (formerly Force Design 2030) at speed and scale and, one might argue, beating the Marine Corps at its own game.17 Of course, from a non-parochial perspective, the Army’s successes should be celebrated as they are making the Army more capable and relevant for the future fight. Go Army! All Services should learn from the Army and consider professionalizing the force design and force development workforce. 

Force Design Professionals
Force Design is not a product, it is a process—a creative process, and it is the first step in force development once threats and challenges have been identified. At the outset of the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, this first step was performed by an ad hoc group because there was nobody dedicated to force design. Given this lack of force design professionals, when the Provident Stare (the name given to the initial Force Design 2030 planning group) organization was handed off to the Deputy Commandant CD&I, CD&I had to proceed over subsequent years with a continuing string of ad hoc integrated product team efforts focused on pieces of the overarching design developed during Provident Stare. This structurally exposes the process to discontinuities and confusion given the lack of continuity in those doing the design and development. If Force Design is a continuous process and not a one-off effort, then Services should all have dedicated force designers educated, trained, and experienced in the art and science of designing a force. Gen Berger and other senior leaders recognized that existing capability portfolio management processes were suboptimal for a design effort requiring discontinuous change given they are the product of the historical, incremental approach to force development. 

Figure 2. (Figure provided by author.)

Given Force Design’s centrality to force development, and the inherent need for continuous adjustment, force design should be an organic core competency. 

In the Marine Corps, this could be accomplished by converting existing capability portfolio managers (CPMs) (active-duty colonels) to force designers. Force Design focus areas might include sense/influence, communicate, command, move, shoot, protect/defend, sustain, and support, each overseen by a force design colonel (Figure 2). As an option, these elements could be grouped into design groups should a different rank/command structure be desired. These design groups would be configured as follows:

  • Knowledge (K-DG): Sense/Influence; Communicate; Command.
  • Fight (F-DG): Move; Shoot; Protect/ Defend.
  • Enable (E-DG): Sustain; Support. 

Alternatively, rather than form separate design groups, the aforementioned groupings could simply be viewed as “caucuses” amongst the force designers, which in practical terms could be used to plan travel and briefings when all force designers cannot attend or should other reasons so dictate. Such an informal grouping could enhance synergy between force designers that have especially strong interdependencies. 

All relevant domains would be addressed in each of the design groups with the biggest difference being that Aviation would be fully integrated, versus the special relationship that now exists between CD&I and Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DCA) where the Aviation CPM is effectively a liaison for DCA vice an integral part of the requirements process. Currently, DCA determines requirements and provides solutions to the Aviation CPM. If deemed necessary, an aviation-focused design group could be added, but other CPMs would still approach their design activities in all domains, including air. The multidomain battlefield requires force design that is conceived in all domains. 

For the Marine Corps, the criticality of naval integration suggests that adding a Navy captain as a ninth force designer would be beneficial. This individual would provide connectivity to OPNAV staff and Numbered Fleet Headquarters. Given the current direction of the Army, an Army force designer would also be a logical addition, and a SOCOM force designer would be helpful as well. 

Force designers would work together daily as an integrated team like the civilian concept of scrum where a multi-disciplinary team works together to produce a new product. Battle rhythm and daily routine would be very similar to the Marine Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting with research, seminars, and supporting analysis culminating in the development of a blueprint for the Objective Force, a narrative description of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities attributes of the envisioned force. A supporting brief would be available to general officers and others to ensure consistent messaging on the desired Marine Corps of the future. 

On a yearly cycle, all operating and functional concepts would be briefed by the owner or author of each respective concept. This would reinforce concepts as a major component of Force Design’s intellectual foundation. Guest speakers from National Defense University, Marine Corps University, and local think tanks would be regular calendar events. 

Travel to exercises, experiments, wargames, other Service Futures Commands and force design entities, and industry partners would occur monthly. Force designers need to be imbued with a sense of the possible through extensive outreach to operating forces, other Services, industry, and academia. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab would provide regular updates on insights drawn from their wargaming and experimentation activities.

Force Developer Professionals
Force development follows force design and is guided by a Force Design blueprint. Marine Corps Deputy CPMs could be redesignated as force developers. The current senior/subordinate relationship between CPMs and deputy CPMs could continue with the new force designer/force developer construct since close coordination will be required to translate the force attributes described in the Force Design blueprint into formal requirements or problem statements (for problem-based acquisition). Force developers would run the Capabilities-Based Assessment process. 

Force developers would focus exclusively on requirements and problem statement development. Solutions would best be accomplished by solution developers under a single roof to benefit from multi-disciplinary expertise and enhanced situational awareness given the proximity and integrated processes within a separate solutions directorate. Force developers would work in close coordination with solution developers to continually refine requirements while force development and solution development benefit from creative tension caused by the clear separation of responsibilities. This increased specialization also allows more time for each to perform their respective tasks.

Notionally, force developer portfolios would map directly to the eight force designer portfolios and would address the following:

  • Sense & Influence: Intel, C-Intel, Cyber, all domain sensors, space, information.
  • Communicate: Space, terrestrial, military/commercial C4.
  • Command: Command Relations, Authorities, Componency, Joint/Combined integration.
  • Move: Ground, air, and sea mobility.
  • Shoot: Air, ground, lethal, non-lethal, kinetic/non-kinetic, cyber.
  • Protect/ Defend: Air, ground, cyber.
  • Sustain: Organic and theater logistics.
  • Support: Ground, Air, Sea installations, war reserves, supply, maintenance.

Solutions Development Professionals
For the Marine Corps, solution development is done within multiple organizations including the Combat Development Directorate, the Warfighting Laboratory, Systems Command, and Training and Education Command, among others. Solution refinement would be an iterative process involving structured interactions between requirements and solution developers. Over time, a separate solution-focused directorate, headed by a senior executive or brigadier general, would develop a cadre of solutions professionals who understand Joint Force, industry, and technology opportunities and will be equipped to steer solutions through the optimal acquisition pathway. 

Conclusion
As stated above, Force Design is first and foremost an act of creation. It involves the assimilation of historical and personal experience, missions, threats, technologies, concepts, concepts of operation, strategic guidance, Joint Force concepts and capabilities, and especially CCDR (customer) demand. The cognitive assimilation of multi-variate and complex knowledge to derive a coherent system capable of performing desired functions is where systems thinking and force design thinking coalesce into a vision of an objective force. 

As a continuous process, Force Design requires dedicated force designers to adapt designs in response to changing threats and opportunities. Each Service has an advanced career-level school for operational planning like the Marine Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting. A force design division within CD&Is Combat Development Directorate would provide an analogous environment to develop Service-level strategic planners and prepare colonels for increased responsibilities as general officers serving as deputy commandants and in commands such as the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and Marine Corps Systems Command and various joint assignments. The traditional ad hoc approach to the assignment of senior leaders worked in an era of incremental change, but the increasing complexity of the modern battlefield and the associated technical aspects of capabilities development require a more professionalized approach to senior leader talent management. 

While not the focus of this article, force development processes beyond the CBA process should be explored to streamline and speed up the development of requirements and the crosswalk of requirements to a dedicated Solutions Directorate that maintains an initial bias toward joint solutions. 

While the foregoing recommendations, in their specifics, are focused on the Marine Corps, the fundamentals of force design and force development are applicable across the department:

  • Force development should be threat-based. The JOE and related threat assessments are the foundation upon which force development is conducted.
  • Force development should be concept-informed. Concepts are important narratives that describe pieces of the overarching warfighting system, but they are, by design, tentative and not comprehensive. 
  • Force design, force development, and force employment are concurrent, not sequential, processes.
  • Force design is a creative mental process accomplished heuristically—it is not a dissection of capabilities described in incomplete and evolving concepts. Concepts are just one input among many. 
  • Joint Capabilities Integration Development System needs to be benchmarked against a conflict like the Russo-Ukrainian War and its ability to deliver a hellscape-like set of capabilities as defined by COMINDOPACOM, ADM Paparo. If it cannot deliver against these tests at the speed of relevance, it should be replaced. 

Force Design is the locus of innovation and the architect of force development; we must evolve our processes and organization and professionalize the force design workforce to do it well. 

>LtCol Williams is a Fellow at Systems Planning and Analysis and provides strategy and policy support to the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, CJCSI 3030.01A, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design, (Washington, DC: October 2022).

2. James Carse, Finite and Infinite Games (New York: Free Press, 2013).

3. Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, (Washington, DC: December 2024).

4. CJCSI 3030.01A, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design.

5. Ibid. 

6. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Development System User Guide, (Washington, DC: April 2018).

7. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2002, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-05-01/transforming-military.

8. Col Michael W. Pietrucha, “Capability-Based Planning and the Death of Military Strategy,” USNI News, August 5, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/08/05/essay-capability-based-planning-and-the-death-of-military-strategy.

9. Thomas Mahnken, Net Assessment and Military Strategy (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2020). 

10. Government Accountability Office, DoD Acquisition Reform: Military Departments Should Take Step to Facilitate Speed and Innovation, (Washington, DC: December 2024). 

11. CJCSI 3030.01A, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design.

12. Department of Defense, DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.02, (Washington, DC: August 2010).

13. Senate Committee on Army Forces Posture of the Department of the Navy, “Statement by General Robert B. Neller before Senate Committee on Army Forces Posture of the Department of the Navy,” June 15, 2017, 115th Congress. 

14. CJCSI 3030.01A, Implementing Joint Force Development and Design.

15. Ibid.

16. Department of the Army, Dept of Army Pamphlet 600-3-25, Force Management Functional Area, (Washington, DC: April 2024).

17. Jen Judson, “US Army Deploys Midrange Missile for First Time in Philippines,” Defense News, April 16, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/04/16/us-army-deploys-midrange-missile-for-first-time-in-philippines

Xi Jinping Thought and Implications for the Indo-Pacific Information Domain

Understanding the pacing threat

The dawn of a new year is a most appropriate and auspicious time to take stock of oneself, one’s goals, and one’s path forward for the next twelve months—a veritable fulcrum of reflection. And what better subject matter to consider in rectifying one’s ways than the governing ideology (to loosely use the term) of Chairman Xi Jinping, the paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over which he governs? 

Often framed as the “pacing threat” for the Marine Corps and broader Joint Force, the CCP-PRC Party-State under Chairman Xi has recommitted itself to an ideological nationalism formally termed “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), more commonly known as “Xi Jinping Thought.”1 First announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, “Xi Jinping Thought”2 now resides in the CCP’s constitution3 and serves as a guiding4 doctrine5 for all levels of the Party-State6 to “rejuvenate the nation” and achieve the “China Dream.”7

A key enabler for China’s “national rejuvenation” is victory in the information domain at home and abroad. Beijing’s recent efforts to manipulate domestic and foreign perceptions through digitally enabled hearts-and-minds campaigns are well-documented. Effective prosecution of the same will allow the CCP and PLA to shape battlefields to their advantage without a shot being fired. As those efforts begin on the PRC’s home front, it behooves practitioners of information operations within the Marine Corps and broader defense enterprise to develop familiarity with the Fourteen Commitments, or guiding principles, that form the heart of “Xi Jinping Thought.”

1. “Ensure the Communist Party leads over all forms of work in China.” Since Chairman Xi’s accession in 2012, the CCP has reasserted its control over state,8 academic,9 and private-sector institutions.10 This comprehensive approach to governance integrates Party leadership at every level of society, ensuring that the Party’s directives and ideology influence all aspects of governance and daily operations.11 By embedding its presence deeply within these sectors, the CCP aims to maintain ideological consistency and reinforce its authoritative role, effectively centralizing power and establishing a uniform policy execution across the nation.

2. “Commit to a people-centered approach.” The Party-state’s reassertion of influence in all facets of Chinese life is balanced with a focus on the social needs of the people. Xi Jinping emphasizes “common prosperity”12 to address13 the growing wealth gap14 in China, reflecting his intent to ensure equitable economic development. This approach seeks to temper economic policies with social welfare initiatives, striving to uplift disadvantaged communities and foster a more inclusive society. By prioritizing the well-being of the people, the Party aims to strengthen social stability and reinforce its legitimacy among the populace.

3. “Comprehensively deepen reforms.” Xi Jinping’s assertion that “only socialism can save China, and only reform and opening-up can develop China” underscores his commitment to evolving socialism and Marxism. Since 2012, Xi has championed reforms15 to fortify Party-State control16 over China’s economy,17 society,18 and military.19 These reforms aim to enhance governance, boost economic efficiency, and ensure social stability. By integrating socialist principles with pragmatic reforms, Xi seeks to modernize China while maintaining the ideological foundation of the Communist Party, thereby reinforcing its authority and guiding the nation’s development trajectory. 

4. “Adhere to new development ideas.” Xi Jinping emphasizes “scientific development” as the cornerstone for addressing China’s comprehensive challenges. This approach—characterized by coordinated, innovative, open, and green development—is designed to foster sustainable growth. Chairman Xi frequently frames20 CCP initiatives as “scientific”21 and “pragmatic”22 solutions, aiming to modernize the economy, enhance technological innovation, and promote environmental sustainability. By advocating for these development ideas, Xi seeks to ensure that China’s progress is both resilient and inclusive, addressing immediate needs while safeguarding future generations.

5. “Follow socialism with Chinese characteristics,” wherein “people are the masters of the country.” Chairman Xi frequently emphasizes23 that the development of the state24 should not take precedence over the people’s livelihood.25 Under this guiding principle, the CCP aims to balance state-led development with the well-being of its citizens. By advocating for socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi stresses the importance of prioritizing social welfare, public services, and improving living standards. This approach seeks to ensure that the state’s economic and social policies are aligned with the needs and aspirations of the people, reinforcing the notion that the people are the true masters of the country.

6. “Govern through the Rule of Law.” Socialism with Chinese characteristics26 is safeguarded by laws that require deeper judicial27 reforms28 and the enhancement of national29 moral quality.30 Chairman Xi has emphasized the importance of judicial reform and national morality to ensure a just and orderly society. However, the CCP remains the ultimate31 authority32 in interpreting and enforcing laws. This governance approach aims to balance legal frameworks with the Party’s overarching control, striving to uphold legal standards while maintaining the Party’s central role in the administration of justice and societal governance.

7. “Practice socialist core values, including Marxism, Communism, and Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Chairman Xi has consistently emphasized that confidence in China’s political culture33 is a profound driving force34 for the nation’s development.35 By promoting the core values of Marxism, Communism, and Socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi aims to strengthen ideological commitment and national identity. This confidence in political culture serves as a foundation for social unity and resilience, supporting the Party’s vision of a prosperous, stable, and progressive society. Through these values, the CCP seeks to inspire and guide the nation’s development path.

8. “Improving people’s livelihood and well-being is the primary goal of development.” Drawing inspiration from Sun Yat-Sen,36 Xi Jinping emphasizes that public contentment is essential for domestic stability,37 peace, and order. By stressing “common prosperity,” Xi aims to reduce the wealth gap and ensure equitable economic growth.38 This focus on improving livelihoods highlights the Party’s commitment to social welfare, healthcare, education, and employment opportunities. By prioritizing the well-being of all citizens, the CCP seeks to foster a harmonious and stable society, reinforcing the legitimacy of its governance.

9. “Coexist with nature.” Xi Jinping emphasizes the importance of basic national policies for environmental protection39 and energy conservation,40 believing they contribute to global ecological safety and safeguard China’s priceless natural assets. This commitment is reflected in Xi’s efforts41 to position China as a leader42 in green technology.43 By promoting sustainable practices and investing in renewable
energy, the CCP aims to mitigate environmental degradation and support global efforts to combat climate change. This approach underscores China’s responsibility to both its own environment and the broader global ecosystem.

10. “Strengthen national security.” Under Chairman Xi’s administration, major principles for national safety include coordinating development and security, strengthening awareness, and preparing for crises in times of peace.44 This strategic approach is reflected in the PLA’s focus on combat readiness.45 Xi emphasizes the importance of integrating national security into all aspects of governance, ensuring that China is well-prepared to address both internal and external threats. By enhancing military capabilities and fostering a culture of vigilance, the Party aims to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty and maintain stability in an increasingly complex global environment.

11. “The Communist Party maintains absolute authority over the People’s Liberation Army.” Chairman Xi’s reforms have reinforced the Party’s control over the military through comprehensive political education,46 continuous reforms,47 and advancements in science and technology.48 By enhancing legal management49 within the PLA, these reforms ensure that Party authority50 remains unchallenged. The focus on ideological indoctrination and modernization of military capabilities aligns the PLA closely with the Party’s objectives, maintaining its loyalty and readiness to serve the state under the absolute command of the Communist Party.

12. “One Country – Two Systems for Hong Kong and Macau; One-China 1992 Consensus and Eventual Taiwan Reunification.” Xi Jinping maintains the Party’s flexible, patient,51 yet dogged determination52 to assert its governing authority over all of China.53 The “One Country, Two Systems” principle allows Hong Kong and Macau54 to retain distinct administrative and economic systems, while the One-China 1992 Consensus55 underscores the Party’s commitment to eventual reunification with Taiwan.56 Xi’s approach reflects a strategic balance of firmness and adaptability, aiming to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity while accommodating regional differences.

13. “The Chinese dream is inseparable from a peaceful international environment and a stable international order.” Chairman Xi has promoted China’s system57 as an alternative58 to Western liberalism,59 advocating for a model that emphasizes state sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual respect. This approach contributes to the concept of a global “shared destiny,”60 wherein countries cooperate to achieve common goals while respecting each other’s unique development paths. Xi’s vision seeks to position China as a leader in fostering international stability and cooperation, aligning with the broader goal of realizing the Chinese dream in a harmonious global context.

14. “Enforce Party Discipline.” Chairman Xi’s anti-corruption campaign61 is the most visible62 sign of his belief in the importance of the Party’s internal supervision, political purity, and close ties with the masses.63 Xi has emphasized that the Communist Party must uphold strict discipline to maintain its legitimacy and effectiveness. By targeting unhealthy tendencies64 and corruption,65 the campaign seeks to strengthen the Party’s internal culture and ensure that its members adhere to high moral and ethical standards. This focus on discipline and integrity is essential for reinforcing public trust and achieving the Party’s long-term goals.

Insights for the Marine Corps
The above Fourteen Commitments provide a valuable framework for scoping and understanding the often expansive and nebulous nature of “Xi Jinping Thought.” They provide insights into enduring priorities for Xi Jinping as he seeks to maintain the CCP’s monopoly on political power at home and avoid the always-possible spectre of a Soviet-style collapse in the future. Themes that come to the fore include the pervasiveness of Communist Party authority in broader Chinese society, the populist need to frame Party activities as “serving the needs of the masses,” and the importance of maintaining “ideological rigor” and “internal unity” within the party and military, the better to secure the loyalty of the latter for the former. “Xi Jinping Thought” likewise provides a template for the type of authoritarian governance model that Beijing would gladly export abroad, the better to nurture a group of like-minded nations to help “make the world safe” for CCP-style authoritarianism. The Marine Corps’ continued operations, activities, and investments in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific can be more effectively calibrated via an understanding, outlined by Xi Jinping Thought, of how Beijing seeks to incrementally undermine that same order in the hearts and minds of its neighbors’ citizens.

>Mr. Jensen is a recognized expert in Sino-Russian relations and information operations. He is the author of the “Shanghai Weekly” and related pacing threat-focused products widely distributed throughout the U.S. and Allied maritime forces. He currently consults as the Senior RED (Russo-Chinese) Subject-Matter Expert for the Marine Corps Vandegrift Team, a coordinating tiger cell under the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Information focused on optimizing the broader U.S. maritime force and key partners for Great-Power Competition in the Information Domain.

Notes

1. China Central TV-1, “His Own Words: The 14 Principles of ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’” BBC Monitoring, October 24, 2017, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dmwn4r.

2. Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ideology for a New Era,” The New York Times, February 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html.

3. Jarek Grzywacz, “How Xi Jinping Used the CCP Constitution to Cement His Power,” The  Diplomat, January 26, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/how-xi-jinping-used-the-ccp-constitution-to-cement-his-power.

4. Charlotte Poirier, “Xi Jinping Thought: Xi’s Struggle against Political Decline,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2021, https://www.isdp.se/publication/xi-jinping-thought-xis-struggle-against-political-decline.

5. Mercy A. Kuo, “The Political Aims of ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’” The Diplomat, November 21, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/the-political-aims-of-xi-jinping-thought.

6. Congressional Research Service, “China Primer: China’s Political System–CRS Reports,” Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2025, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12505.

7. Timothy R. Heath, “Xi’s Cautious Inching Towards the China Dream,” RAND, August 11, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP70200.html.

8. Michał Bogusz and Jakub Jakóbowski, “The Chinese Communist Party and Its State. Xi Jinping’s Conservative Turn,” OSW Report, April 2020, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/REPORT_The-Chinese-Communist-Party_net.pdf.

9. William Zheng, “China’s Top Universities Told to Stop Slacking off on Communist Party Ideology,” South China Morning Post, September 7, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3147779/chinas-top-universities-told-stop-slacking-communist-party.

10. Scott Livingston, “The Chinese Communist Party Targets the Private Sector,” CSIS, October 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-communist-party-targets-private-sector.

11. Nis Grünberg and Katja Drinhausen, “The Party Leads on Everything,” Merics, September 24, 2019, https://merics.org/en/report/party-leads-everything.

12. David Bulman, Cui Wei, Mark Frazier, Mike Mike Gow, Yujeong Yang, Guoguang Wu, and Mary Gallagher, “Xi Jinping Says He Wants to Spread China’s Wealth More Equitably. How Likely Is That to Actually Happen?” ChinaFile, March 3, 2023, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/common-prosperity-China-wealth-redistribution.

13. Thomas Hale and Leila Abboud, “Xi Jinping’s Call for Wealth Redistribution Threatens Luxury Groups’ China Boom,” Financial Times, August 27, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/4cf59a34-cd03-48a1-b5d0-0c71922ef9b3.

14. Josephine Ma, “My Take: Why China Needs to Mind the Earnings Gap,” South China Morning Post, January 30, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3250334/why-china-needs-mind-earnings-gap.

15. Yew Lun Tian, “Unleashing Reforms, Xi Returns to China’s Socialist Roots,” Reuters, September 9, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/unleashing-reforms-xi-returns-chinas-socialist-roots-2021-09-09.

16. Maya Wang, “China’s Techno-Authoritarianism Has Gone Global,” Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/chinas-techno-authoritarianism-has-gone-global.

17. Laura He, “China’s ‘unprecedented’ Crackdown Stunned Private Enterprise. One Year on, It May Have to Cut Business Some Slack,” CNN, November 3, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/02/tech/china-economy-crackdown-private-companies-intl-hnk/index.html.

18. The Associated Press, “China Bans Effeminate Men on TV,” NPR, September 2, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/02/
1033687586/china-ban-effeminate-men-tv-official-morality.

19. The Economist, “Xi Jinping Is Obsessed with Political Loyalty in the Pla,” The Economist, November 6, 2023, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla.

20. Yu Jie, “China’s New Scientists,” Chatham House, July 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/07/chinas-new-scientists.

21. Ben Murphy, Rogier Creemers, Elsa Kania, Paul Triolo, Kevin Neville, and Graham Webster, “Xi Jinping: ‘Strive to Become the World’s Primary Center for Science and High Ground for Innovation,’” DigiChina, March 18, 2021, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/xi-jinping-strive-to-become-the-worlds-primary-center-for-science-and-high-ground-for-innovation.

22. Marina Rudyak, “Cooperation/合作,” Decoding China, March 26, 2023, https://decodingchina.eu/cooperation.

23. William Langley, “Xi Jinping Framed as Man of the People and the Party in New Year’s Speech,” South China Morning Post, January 1, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3116129/xi-jinping-framed-man-people-and-party-new-years-speech.

24. Joe C.B. Leung, “Common Prosperity: A Conundrum for China,” AsiaGlobal Online Journal, October 21, 2021, https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/common-prosperity-conundrum-china.

25. Mimi Lau, “Xi Declares Extreme Poverty Has Been Wiped out in China,” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2021, https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/politics/article/3123174/xi-jinping-declares-extreme-poverty-has-been-wiped-out-china.

26. Ethan Paul and Lea Li, “What Is ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’?” South China Morning Post, June 26, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3138788/socialism-chinese-characteristics-explained. 

27. Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, “Xi Jinping Emphasized Strengthening the Development of the Legal System Related to Foreign Affairs and Creating Favorable External Environment and Rule of Law Conditions during the Tenth Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo,” CSIS Interpret: China, November 28, 2023, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/xi-jinping-emphasized-strengthening-the-development-of-the-legal-system-related-to-foreign-affairs-and-creating-favorable-external-environment-and-rule-of-law-conditions-during-the-tenth-collective-st.

28. The Economist, “Why China’s Government Is Hushing up Court Rulings,” The Economist, January 15, 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/01/15/why-chinas-government-is-hushing-up-court-rulings.

29. Michael Schuman, “Xi Jinping Is Fighting a Culture War at Home,” The Atlantic, December 20, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/12/xi-jinping-china-culture-war/676896.

30. Delia Lin, “Morality Politics under Xi Jinping,” East Asia Forum, August 1, 2019, https://eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/01/morality-politics-under-xi-jinping.

31. Chris Buckley, “‘Drive the Blade in’: Xi Shakes up China’s Law-and-Order Forces,” The New York Times, August 20, 2020, https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/08/20/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-communist-party.html.

32. Thomas Hale and Xueqiao Wang, “China’s Court Database Reform Stokes Fears for Transparency in Legal Sector,” Financial Times, January 7, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/665a48d5-2ce0-4661-91c9-6dbebe2e4b9b.

33. Zhuoran Li, “The Sixth Plenum and the Rise of Traditional Chinese Culture in Socialist Ideology,” The Diplomat, November 19, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/the-sixth-plenum-and-the-rise-of-traditional-chinese-culture-in-socialist-ideology.

34. News Desk, “Xi Jinping Calls on Writers, Artists to Contribute to National Rejuvenation,” The Global Herald, December 14, 2021, https://theglobalherald.com/news/xi-jinping-calls-on-writers-artists-to-contribute-to-national-rejuvenation.

35. Agence France-Presse, “‘Ode to the New Era’: Chinese Communist Party’s Historical Resolution Explained,” France 24, November 17, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/
20211117-ode-to-the-new-era-chinese-communist-party-s-historical-resolution-explained.

36. Benjamin Carlson, “Tug of War over China’s Founding Father Sun Yat-Sen,” Yahoo! News, November 9, 2016, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/
tug-war-over-chinas-founding-father-sun-yat-
045718797.html.

37. Ananth Krishnan, “Domestic Considerations Always Come First for China’s Communist Party: Rana Mitter on the CPC at 100,” The Hindu, July 1, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/domestic-considerations-always-come-first-for-chinas-communist-party-rana-mitter-on-the-cpc-at-100/article61448303.ece.

38. Mercy A. Kuo, “China’s ‘Common Prosperity’: The Maoism of Xi Jinping–Insights from Ming Xia,” The Diplomat, September 23, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/chinas-common-prosperity-the-maoism-of-xi-jinping.

39. AsiaNews, “Xi Jinping Now Wants Economic Growth to Respect the Environment,” AsiaNews, February 11, 2019, https://www.asianews.it/
news-en/Xi-Jinping-now-wants-economic-growth-to-respect-the-environment-46216.html.

40. Helen Adams, “President of China, Xi Jinping, Declares an End to Coal Use,” Sustainability Magazine, September 22, 2021, https://sustainabilitymag.com/renewable-energy/president-china-xi-jinping-declares-end-coal-use.

41. Dominic Chiu, “The East Is Green: China’s Global Leadership in Renewable Energy,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 13 (2017), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/171011_chiu_china_Solar.pdf?i70f0uep_pGOS3iWhvwUlBNigJMcYJvX.

42. Erin Black, “Why China Is so Far Ahead of the U.S. in Electric Vehicle Production,” CNBC, March 24, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/24/why-china-is-so-far-ahead-of-the-us-when-it-comes-to-ev-production-.html.

43. Gang Chen,“China’s Quest for Global Climate Leadership,” East Asia Forum, June 24, 2021, https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/24/chinas-quest-for-global-climate-leadership.

44. Aadil Brar, “‘Prepare to Fight,’ China Tells Citizens. Xi Jinping Has Big Plans for Party and Security,” ThePrint, November 22, 2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/prepare-to-fight-china-tells-citizens-xi-jinping-has-big-plans-for-party-and-security/769639.

45. Ananth Krishnan, “China President Xi Jinping Signs Mobilisation Order for PLA Training,” The Hindu, January 4, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-president-xi-jinping-signs-mobilisation-order-for-pla-training/article38118147.ece; and  Catherine Wong, “Xi Tells China’s Military ‘be Prepared to Respond’ in Unstable Times,” South China Morning Post, March 9, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military

/article/3124733/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-military-be-prepared-respond-unstable.

46. Derek Solen, “Right Thinking and Self-Criticisms: Military Modernization with Chinese Communist Characteristics,” The Diplomat, September 29, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/right-thinking-and-self-criticisms-military-modernization-with-chinese-communist-characteristics.

47. William Zheng, “PLA Targets Top Brass in Loyalty Education Campaign after High-Level Purges,” South China Morning Post, February 8, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3297783/chinas-pla-targets-top-brass-campaign-touting-political-loyalty-xi-jinping.

48. Elsa B. Kania, “In Military-Civil Fusion, China Is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to Innovate,” The Strategy Bridge, August 27, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil-fusion-china-is-learning-lessons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate..

49. James Mulvenon, “‘Comrade, Where’s My Military Car?’ Xi Jinping’s Throwback Mass-Line Campaign to Curb PLA Corruption,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 42 (2013), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM42JM.pdf.

50. Mathieu Duchâtel, ed, “The PLA Reforms: Tightening Control over the Military: Foundation for Strategic Research,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2016, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/others/pla-reforms-tightening-control-over-military-2016.

51. Xin Ge, “Why ‘one Country, Two Systems’ Is Successful in Hong Kong and Macao?” Modern Diplomacy, January 14, 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/01/14/why-one-country-two-systems-is-successful-in-hong-kong-and-macao; and Ezra Cheung, Lo Hoi-ying, and Willa Wu, “Hong Kong Governing Principle to Be Permanent Feature, Top Beijing Official Says,” South China Morning Post, February 26, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3253216/beijing-attaches-great-importance-hong-kong-countrys-global-finance-hub-xia-baolong-tells-local

52. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Xi Jinping Pledges Reunification with Taiwan in New Year’s Message,” USNI News, January 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/01/01/xi-jinping-pledges-reunification-with-taiwan-in-new-years-message; and William Zheng, “Xi Jinping’s Firm Hand on Hong Kong and Taiwan Backed by Communist Party,” South China Morning Post, November 12, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3155755/chinas-communist-party-backs-xi-jinpings-firm-hand-hong-kong.

53. Colin Clark, “New Chinese 10-Dash Map Sparks Furor across Indo-Pacific: Vietnam, India, Philippines, Malaysia,” Breaking Defense, September 4, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/09/new-chinese-10-dash-map-sparks-furor-across-indo-pacific-vietnam-india-philippines-malaysia.

54. William H. Overholt, “Hong Kong: The Rise and Fall of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’” Harvard Kennedy School, December 2019, https://ash.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/overholt_hong_kong_paper_final.pdf; and Sophie Williams, “Macau: China’s Other ‘one Country, Two Systems’ Region,” BBC News, December 19, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50832919.

55. Alyssa Resar, “The 1992 Consensus: Why It Worked and Why It Fell Apart,” The Diplomat, July 18, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart.

56. Helen Davidson, “China and Taiwan Are Destined for ‘Reunification’, Xi Tells Former President,” The Guardian, April 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/10/china-taiwan-destined-for-reunification-xi-jinping-tells-ma-ying-jeou.

57. Dylan Levi King, “Wang Huning: The Man behind Xi Jinping,” The Spectator, July 27, 2021, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-man-behind-xi-jinping.

58. Christopher Colley, “The Fallacy of a Chinese Alternative to the Western Order,” Wilson Center, January 18, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fallacy-chinese-alternative-western-order.

59. Scott Foster, “The Chinese Communist Party vs Western Liberalism,” Asia Times, December 25, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/the-chinese-communist-party-vs-western-liberalism.

60. Robert A. Manning, “China’s Developing World Promises Are Smoke and Mirrors,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/05/china-developing-world-bri-global-development-initiative-hegemony.

61. William Zheng, “‘No Mercy’ in Anti-Corruption Drive, Xi Warns Communist Party,” South China Morning Post, January 12, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3163016/xi-jinping-his-top-leadership-no-mercy-fight-against-corruption.

62. Fatoumata Diallo, “Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Struggle: Eight Years On,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, April 9, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20211216205930/https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2021/04/Xi-Jinpings-Anti-corruption-Struggle-IB-09.04.21.pdf.

63. Perry Link, “The CCP’s Culture of Fear,” ChinaFile, October 21, 2021, https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/ccps-culture-of-fear. Cheryl Teh, “China Punished More than 600,000 Officials in 2021 amid Xi Jinping’s Clampdown on Corruption and Misconduct,” Business Insider, January 23, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-punished-over-600000-officials-amid-xis-corruption-clampdown-2022-1. Eva Fu, “Chinese State Media Orders US Workers to Maintain ‘political Purity,’ Not Practice Falun Gong: Internal Document,” The Epoch Times, December 2, 2021, https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/chinese-state-media-orders-us-workers-to-maintain-political-purity-not-practice-falun-gong-internal-document-4135242; and James Griffiths, “Analysis: Xi Jinping’s Culture War Comes to China’s Campuses as Communist Party Prepares to Mark 100 Years,” CNN, April 20, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/china/xi-jinping-universities-intl-hnk/index.html; and Katsuji Nakazawa, “Analysis: XI Aims to Mobilize the Masses with Populist Crackdowns,” Nikkei Asia, August 12, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-aims-to-mobilize-the-masses-with-populist-crackdowns.

64. Reuters, “China Culture Crackdown a Sign of ‘profound’ Political Change,” Reuters, August 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-culture-crackdown-sign-profound-political-change-commentary-2021-08-31.

65. Jacob Fromer, “Xi’s Iron Grip on Power Brings New Form of Corruption, US Panel Is Told,” South China Morning Post, January 28, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3165022/xi-jinpings-iron-grip-power-brings-new-form-corruption-china-experts. 

So, You Want to Influence a Foreign Government?

Messaging for competition and crisis

It is no secret that the Marine Corps wants to influence Russia, China, and other foreign governments. Like the rest of the Joint Force, the Corps is working to optimize information capabilities for competition and crisis—as described in the 2022 National Defense Strategy—to deter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) aggression against the United States, Taiwan, the Philippines, and others. Washington is concerned with a host of other PRC behaviors—not least of which is its massive and continuous malicious cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure. But so far, the DOD has prioritized warning against the consequences of seizing Taiwan.

The clearest messaging has come from the top. More than once, President Biden publicly stated that the U.S. would intervene to defend Taiwan if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked.1 Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks made clear that the Replicator Initiative is intended to counter China in a Taiwan Strait contingency, and ADM Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has said he wants “to tum the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.”2

What effect, if any, do these messages have on Xi Jinping and his few trusted subordinates with any real power? Power matters here because the purpose of these messages is to change Beijing’s behavior, and thus, the intended message recipients must have the power to affect state-level behavior. Within the influence community, there is debate about how to answer that question and even whether it is answerable. The fact that there is an influence community suggests that most influence capabilities and operations are not so highly visible as declarations from combatant command (CCMD) commanders, deputy secretaries of defense, or presidents. Less visible and less potentially escalatory—but also less potentially effective—influence operations may produce smaller effects that are harder to identify.

Purported effects typically assume—rather than demonstrate—causal connections. The PLA is investing in countering unmanned aerial vehicle swarms; they must be responding to ADM Paparo and Secretary Hicks, obviously. However, the PLA has been researching and investing in creating and countering drone swarms for years. How do we know their latest research and development is not what they would have done anyway—or had even planned to do before those public comments were made?

The trouble with giving up on assessing the effects of influence operations is that without them, you cannot get better. You cannot learn anything, determine what works, what does not, what produces unintended consequences, or even whether your actions are undermining your own goals. The PRC’s wolf warrior diplomacy is a prime example. That overly aggressive, bullying style of international diplomacy almost entirely backfired. It was intended to force compliance with Beijing’s foreign policy, view of its borders, ownership of the South China Sea, and the reach of its economic leverage. Instead, it pushed South China Sea claimants, South Asian, Pacific, Central and South American, and African nations closer to the United States.

Given the time, tax dollars, personnel, and other resources invested in the Joint Force’s influence capabilities, failure to develop precision measures of those capabilities would be akin to fraud, waste, and abuse. So, it is worth asking some basic questions to understand what the influence endeavor is based on, how to determine if it works, and what kinds of outcomes one would expect it to produce.

The first question the Marine Corps must answer is whether it can, in fact, influence any adversarial actors who meet two criteria: the actor is engaged in some behavior the Corps wants to affect, and the actor has the power to change that behavior. Behaviors of interest, to be more specific, can refer to intentions to take certain undesirable actions in the future (e.g., to invade or blockade Taiwan)—behaviors the influence specialist wants to change—or desirable behaviors the influence specialist wants to reinforce and maintain. In either case, these are typically state behaviors that express a nation’s foreign policy. When adversarial nations have autocratic regimes, the actors in question are a small number of national state, party, and military decision makers and the cadre of trusted advisors who can influence them.

Like the rest of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps must identify these actors, which of them have the power to influence state behaviors of interest to the Corps and defense policies the Corps supports, and which of them—if any—care about and pay attention to the Marine Corps and its capabilities. The conclusion is not foregone. Beijing may be preoccupied with deep concern over Space Force, Air Force, and Navy capabilities. Of course, Beijing’s leaders could both discount the role and effectiveness of the Marine Corps in a Taiwan contingency and be mistaken in doing so. It could be the case that they discount the Marine Corps when in fact, given China’s goals and capabilities, Beijing should give due weight to the role of Marines in future combat. In this case, it would fall to the Marine Corps to reshape those judgments to garner greater influence.

Combatant commands, which have unique information capability authorities, face practical limitations that may prevent them from ever leveraging Marine Corps capabilities for information effects. Combatant command information staffs, J3Xs, and J39s have limited capacity. If they determine that adversarial leaders are most concerned with, and most responsive to, messages about air, space, and naval capabilities, they will prioritize those messages, perhaps justifiably excluding Marine Corps systems from influence messaging content.

Figure 1. Steps in the logical process of identifying an influence target who both has the power to influence state behavior (or influence another actor who does) and is susceptible to the Marine Corps’ influence. (Figure provided by author.)

Whether adversarial state actors care enough about the Marine Corps to change national policy and state behaviors is a straightforward intelligence question. If the intelligence community can answer it in the affirmative, the Corps then confronts whether, how, and who should carry out a campaign of influence.

Whether to take any specific national security action, or program of actions, is too big and important a question to address here. It requires fuller treatment. American history includes catalogs of actions taken because they could be—without due diligence of whether they should have been. Deterrence is the best justification for strategic information operations—influence with the goal of preventing warfare—so one might reasonably ask, “What is there to lose by trying to avoid war?” Executed in ignorance, though, deterrence efforts can make warfare more likely—as when demonstrations of advanced capabilities produce an arms race that makes accidents more likely. 

Figure 2. Steps in the CCMD’s decision-making process for prioritizing finite influence resources for greatest effect. (Figure provided by author.)

There is a logical, commonsense process for how to proceed with influence operations, and a scientific process for how to make the endeavor successful. The former is straightforward. National security organizations like the Marine Corps and its subordinate commands have missions and directives from higher echelons. Some of these organizations have guidance and orders to influence adversaries’ behavior. These are likely the first units in the chain of command to have the subject-matter experts capable of answering the questions above—whether there are potential influence targets who can affect state, party, or military behaviors and whether those actors care about Marine Corps capabilities enough to be influenced by them. These subject-matter experts are intelligence analysts; linguists and cultural experts; experts on the PLA, CCP, and PRC organizations, structures, decision making, and policymaking; red teams; psychologists; other social and behavioral scientists; strategic communication experts; influence planners; and sometimes technical subject-matter experts. 

The essential question above is whether there is a specific, individual human who both 1) has the power to change state behavior (or has influence on someone who has such power) and 2) can be influenced by a given U.S. command (given its specific capabilities and authorities). Every command, whether a Service headquarters or a CCMD, is limited by its authorities in who and how it can influence—and further limited by its influence capabilities. This latter limitation encompasses the
organization’s knowledge of the information environment, inclusive of its understanding of the specific individuals who could be influenced to some effect, together with its skill at wielding influence. Thus, there are more individuals who satisfy condition 1), who have the power to change state behavior (or influence someone who does), than there are who satisfy condition 2), who can be influenced by a given U.S. command. 

This question is too rarely asked and more rarely answered. It is more often replaced with questions like, how can we influence China? or the PLA? or Russia? or only slightly better, PRC and PLA leadership? Worst of all, it is often replaced by the question how can we leverage the exercises and other activities we are already doing to influence unidentified individuals in these groups? Imprecise questions like these undermine measurement and refinement. 

Of the skilled professionals listed above, then, two are key. Psychologists who know how to influence individuals and how to design and assess measurable influence operations, and intelligence professionals who gather and interpret the information on which psychologists rely. 

Complementing the logical process is the scientific process used to test influence operations—in scientific parlance—to detect effects and measure effect sizes—and in military parlance—conduct assessments using measures of effectiveness. In doing this, scientific methods should be (but typically are not) employed to establish whether association, correlation, and causation are present. Such methods are key to ruling out alternative explanations by controlling for the influence of other variables and the influence of chance. To uncover relationships between independent and dependent variables, experiments must be designed (i.e., operations must be planned) using proven experimental design methods that can detect such relationships.

This is done by constructing operations as experiments that can disconfirm specific hypotheses. To take an example from above, one might hypothesize that ADM Paparo’s hellscape comment had some effect on Beijing’s behavior—but such a hypothesis is too broad to be disconfirmed. What the influence effects specialist wants to know is not whether Beijing responded to Paparo, used the word “hellscape” in its own public messaging, or even changed its behavior and claimed that it was doing so in response to Paparo—but whether, in fact, Beijing made a specific, desired behavior change—the change the operation was designed to bring about—in response to Paparo’s message, and that had Paparo not communicated his message, the behavior change would not have occurred.

To answer this question, the influence professional must have and investigate more specific hypotheses. Typically, these are formed when an operation is initially designed. Disconfirmable hypotheses—hypotheses that can be disconfirmed through empirical experimentation—in this case take the form, “Influence act a will cause influence target t to take response action r.” In practice, such a hypothesis is built on other hypotheses about groups of adversary actors (e.g., PLA officers with the power to affect cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure). Specific influence acts typically include specific messages, messengers, and contexts. They are delivered to specific target audiences to achieve specific behavioral outcomes. Specificity makes measurement possible. Imprecision in target audience identification (e.g., operations to influence “PRC” or “PLA”) muddies measurement  and results in failure to demonstrate operational outcomes.

Through careful design, measurement, repeated experimentation, and data analysis, influence practitioners can—in theory—discover how to get foreign leaders to take desired paths, but those findings will usually be relative to the specific uses, leading to findings of the sort: Xi is movable on topics t1, t2, and t3, but not t4, t5, and t6. Xi is receptive to messages m1, m2, and m3 on topic t1, but not persuaded by those messages on topics t2 and t3. Message m1 is persuasive 20 percent of the time when delivered through messenger d1 and 31 percent when delivered by d2. Message m2 is only persuasive 22 percent of the time when delivered through d1, but d2 is effective 34 percent of the time with m2. Message m3 is a military action not delivered by a specific messenger, but it has proved 10 percent effective.

Neither the Marine Corps nor the DOD has such findings or the data on which to reach them—and that is not only because influencing foreign leaders is historically a State Department task. Currently, no one in the U.S. government has such data because no one has embarked on the whole-of-government research program necessary to produce it.

Whether the Marine Corps, DOD, and other government departments and agencies will develop the necessary data infrastructure and measure influence activities—rather than just doing things—remains to be seen, but neither current budgetary priorities, institutional inertia, nor the short tenure of American military and civilian leaders bode well for research-driven statecraft. On the plus side, advanced data capture and analytics for foreign influence may be tools too powerful for any government to wield responsibly.

>Dr. Bryant is a veteran Army Intelligence Officer, Psychologist, and Neuroscientist at Headquarters Marine Corps DC I where he works as an Information Operations Effects Specialist. He has written on institutional and policy challenges facing DOD’s information and influence efforts, and proposed solutions in Proceedings and the Journal of Information Warfare.

Notes

1. Frances Mao, “Biden Again Says US Would Defend Taiwan if China Attacks,” BBC, September 19, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62951347. 

2. Jim Garamone, “Hicks Discusses Replicator Initiative,” DOD News, September 7, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3518827/hicks-discusses-replicator-initiative; Joel Wuthnow, “Why Xi Jinping Doesn’t Trust His Own Military,” Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/why-xi-jinping-doesnt-trust-his-own-military.