Enemy Strongpoint or Friendly Gap?

The Situation

You are the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (three rifle companies) reinforced with two platoons of tanks and a combat engineer platoon. You have been in reserve during the initial stages of a deliberate attack by 5th Marines. After overcoming several enemy elements in hasty defensive positions, the regiment encountered a well-developed fortified area, the commanding officer of the 5th Marines gives your battalion the mission of attacking this strongpoint and securing it (creating a gap) so that follow-on mechanized forces can continue the attack against lucrative targets in the enemy rear. In addition to your organic and attached units, you have close air support and artillery fires available to you.

Working through intelligence channels up to the MEF level, your S-2 obtained the attached sketch of the enemy position and determined that the area is held by a unit organized along the lines of a Soviet motorized rifle company but estimated to be at about 75 percent strength. Some of the positions shown on the sketch have not been completed, and some are dummy and alternate positions. In general the enemy bunkers and vehicles are well camouflaged. Observation/listening posts, minefields, and antiarmor ambushes have been detected forward of the position.

The Requirement

Your unit is presently located several hundred meters south of the area shown on the sketch. Develop the plan you will use to carry out your orders and attack the strongpoint area. Describe how you intend to organize your assets and the sequencing of your attack. Send your solution without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, care of Tactical Decision Game #90-8, P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette’s TDG Board will select several solutions for publication in the December issue.

Enemy Over The Bridge: A Thwarted Plan

Readers will recognize this scenario as the continuation of TDG #90-1, “The Enemy Over the Bridge.” The actions described here are based on a solution submitted by Maj Claes Henrikson, an instructor at the Company Commander’s Course, Armored Troop Combat School, Swedish Army.

The Situation

You are the executive officer of 2d Battalion, Sixth Marines consisting of a rifle company on trucks, two rifle companies on foot, a tank company, and a TOW section. As the lead element in a major division offensive, your battalion was moving to an assembly area in preparation for an attack north across the river at 0400 tomorrow morning. Although the assembly area, bridge, and riverbank were supposed to be in friendly hands, at 2000 your battalion discovered this was not the case. An enemy force of at least company size has seized the bridge and occupied your assembly area.

Recognizing the importance of the bridge and the need to move at once if the division attack is to proceed as scheduled, the battalion commander directed the mobile force of Company E (in trucks), supported by Company A (tanks), and the TOW section to attack the bridge by East Farm Road within one hour. As this was the main effort, he accompanied the force with his mobile command group. Companies F and G were directed to attack immediately to the northwest across East Hill toward Hamlet, the original assembly area, and West Farm. The intent of this attack was to gain control of the main roads leading south, protect the deployment and advance of the main force, and divert the enemy’s attention from the bridge.

As executive officer, you moved behind Company F and were coordinating the attack of the two companies in the south. Briefing and preparation for the attack by both mobile and ground elements took longer than expected as troops were tired and had been looking forward to resupply and rest in the assembly area. At 2110 Company G reported that elements on East Hill heard loud explosions and an intense firefight to the northeast. It seemed clear that the mobile force had contacted the enemy, but neither you nor Company G on East Hill were able to raise anyone with the mobile force on any radio net. Periodic small arms could be heard for several minutes, then enemy artillery began impacting in the vicinity of East Farm. At approximately the same time, Company F reported contact with the enemy south of the original assembly area. At about 2120, you received a garbled, panicky report from a radio operator on the conduct of fire net. The mobile force had been ambushed with heavy casualties. It is stopped on the road, disorganized, and now under artillery fire.

As the battalion executive officer, what would you do?

Requirement

Within a 10-minute time limit respond to the above question by describing the actions you would take, the frag orders you would issue, and the reports you would make. Explain the rationale supporting these decisions and provide a sketch map showing the positions to be assumed by battalion elements.

Gap at the bridge

Knowing your enemy means, understanding his capabilities and general intentions. But it also means seeing things the way he sees them, thinking the way he thinks, with the aim of anticipating his actions and thereby gaining the upper hand.

This tactical decision game may look familiar to some readers. It is, in fact, TDG 90-1, “The Enemy Over the Bridge,” with one very significant difference: This time you are the enemy. How will knowing how you reacted to “The Enemy Over the Bridge” influence your actions now that the shoe is on the other foot?

The Situation

You are the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The division is halted temporarily, but the division commander plans to resume the offensive toward the south as soon as logistics can be brought forward. You have been operating north of the river against enemy reconnaissance and security elements. The enemy holds the riverline and the bridge in strength. (You believe the river to be unfordable.) Intelligence indicates that the enemy is planning an imminent offensive north across the river-sooner than your division can be ready to attack in strength. Your mission, which gives you broad latitude in the manner of execution, is to take whatever actions you can to disrupt the enemy attack in your sector.

A reconnaissance patrol by one of your companies discovers that the enemy forces that were holding the bridge have withdrawn. The company commander has already begun to infiltrate his company across the bridge. You decide to exploit the situation by getting your entire battalion south of the river with an eye toward mounting a spoiling attack. In the process, one of your companies has an engagement near the bridge with an enemy scout car, which flees west on the river road. You contact regiment and explain the actions you have set in motion. The colonel tells you he will reinforce with all the forces he can muster-infantry and tanks will begin to arrive in two to three hours. You have the priority of fires for all supporting arms, he tells you.

The time is about 2000; darkness is descending. Elements of your surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon report that Hamlet shows no signs of enemy activity. As your leading companies move into the triangular wood west of Hamlet, another STA team located on the high ground south of the wood reports an enemy column approaching from the south headed toward your position. The STA team sends the following report:

Enemy force, estimate at least battalion strength, moving north on Hamlet road, at the intersection south of the pass; covered tracks, jeeps, infantry on foot; I can hear tanks in the distance but do not have a visual.

Simultaneously, a short firelight breaks out with what appears to be an enemy patrol moving into the triangular wood from the south. You suspect it may be the advance guard of the enemy column. What do you do?

The Requirement

Within a five-minute time limit, give your solution in the form of the fragmentary order you would issue to your subordinates and support it with an overlay sketch. Then give a brief explanation of your actions-the key considerations and assumptions that shaped your decision. Send your solution without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, care of Tactical Decision Games (90-4), P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The editor will select several solutions to be published in two month’s time.

The Enemy Over the Bridge

by Capt John F. Schmitt

The following is an example of a tactical decision game like those in use at the Marine Corps University as a tool for developing military judgment and decisionmaking ability. The basic idea behind these deceptively simple games is to create a hypothetical battlefield dilemma of some sort and require the players to develop a solution under pressure of a time limit. The games work best in groups up to about a dozen, where Marines can argue the merits of various plans. The games are designed to teach students how to think rather than what to think, the rationale being that since each battlefield situation is unique it is futile to try to provide the right answer in advance for every conceivable situation. In fact, as in war, there are no absolute right or wrong answers. As long as a solution reflects the tenets of maneuver warfare, it is the “right” answer.

The Situation

You are the commanding officer, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion consists of two rifle companies on foot, one rifle company in trucks, a tank company (minus), and a TOW section on HMMWVs.

Friendly forces hold the bridge and the riverline. (You believe the river to be unfordable.) Reconnaissance elements are operating north of the river. Tomorrow morning the division begins a major offensive north across the river, with the division’s main effort in 6th Marines’ zone. Your battalion will spearhead the regiment’s attack.

You are to occupy the assembly area shown on the map west of Hamlet in preparation for the morning attack across the river commencing at 0400. You are moving north toward the assembly area as shown. At 2000, your surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon, which is forward reconnoitering the route, reports enemy infantry occupying your assembly area in strength and continuing to reinforce. The size of these enemy units is unknown but estimated to be at least a company. Further, the STA platoon commander reports he has just met a reconnaissance team that was operating north of the river but has been forced south across the river under fire. The reconnaissance team leader reports there is no sign of friendly forces holding the riverline or the bridge and that enemy infantry with some light vehicles has been moving across the bridge for at least 30 minutes. This is all the information the STA and reconnaissance Marines can tell you.

As the battalion commander, what will you do?

Requirement

Within a five-minute time limit, give your solution in the form of the fragmentary order you would issue to your subordinates-to include the intent behind your plan-and support it with an overlay sketch. Then give a brief (200 words or less) explanation of the reasons behind your decision, the key considerations that led you to choose your course of action. Since there is no school solution to a problem like this, the emphasis is not so much on the course you take as in the reasons behind that course. Send your solution without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, care of Tactical Decision Games, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico. VA 22134. My solution and one or two others chosen by the editor will be published in the June issue.

“Belleau Wood Challenge”

by Team 1, H&S Bn

Situation

You are the CO, 1st Bn, 6th Marines, 4th Marine Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, American Expeditionary Forces. Your battalion is currently located to the southeast of Lucy-de-Bocage. During the Battle of Château-Thierry on 6 June 1918, the 4th Marine Brigade seized Hill 142 and the town of Bouresches and established a foothold in the southern portion of Belleau Wood. The clearing of Belleau Wood is now essential in preventing harassing fire and in ensuring the overall security of the Paris-Metz highway—the main Allied line of communication. With outcropping boulders, dense foliage, and steep, rolling terrain, Belleau Wood offers the perfect defensive position and is currently occupied by the German Army with elements of the 461st Infantry Regiment, 237th Division in the north and the 40th Fusiliers Regiment, 28th Division in the south. Operations conducted by Marines from 6 through 9 June have shown that the Germans are armed with heavy and light machine guns and are well supported with artillery fires. German artillery units have been known to utilize chemical munitions. The enemy has regimental-sized elements to the north and east of Belleau Wood that can make a movement to reinforce during the night.

On 9 June at 1830, you receive Field Order 3 from BG James Harbord, CG, 4th Marine Brigade. Your battalion has been tasked with clearing the southern portion of Belleau Wood to the limit of advance. Upon taking the objective, you are to link up with 2d Bn, 5th Marines to the west in Bois de Champillon and 3d Bn, 5th Marines to the east, in Bouresches. You have the 1st Bn, 15th Field Artillery Regiment in general support of your maneuver that can range all objectives within Belleau Wood.

Requirement

It is H-10; prepare a course of action graphic and narrative; identify and task your main effort and supporting efforts. Additionally, include a reconnaissance and fires plan.

Issues for Consideration

  • 1. What is the enemy’s composition, disposition, and strength within the southern portion of Belleau Wood?
  • 2. How can an integrated fires plan shape the battlespace?
  • 3. How can you utilize maneuver or deception to avoid attacking the enemy’s main strength?

Instructions

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solution to [email protected] or Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 07-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

 

>Members of Team 1 are found on p. 18.

Dull Garrison Chronicles Part IV: Take the Airfield R

By Carl F. Kusch

Situation

As the commanding officer BLT 2/8 (part of 26th MEU), you and your command are feeling pretty good about yourselves after Company G was able to rescue the American Ambassador. The general situation, however, has deteriorated further. The forces of BAD invaded Dull Island and are threatening to overrun the Marine garrison, which has suffered heavy casualties and is now fighting for survival on the outskirts of Al Habib. Furthermore, it would appear that BAD is already reinforcing and fortifying its defense of Dull Garrison Island even while it is attempting to eliminate the Marine stronghold.

The loss of Dull Garrison Island would be devastating to the American effort since access to other possible staging areas has eroded through the neglect of reciprocal defense treaties. Therefore, the National Command Authority has no choice but to order the immediate seizure of that vital island staging area.

It has been decided that the initial attack on Dull Garrison Island will occur at the island’s Airfield #2 in order to (a) relieve pressure on the beleaguered Marine garrison; (b) cut off the airfield through which BAD is bringing in supplies and reinforcements; and (c) provide an entry point for the U.S. forces that will continue the attack and secure the entire island.

In defense of Dull Garrison Island, the enemy has mustered a full division spearheaded by elite Guards and filled out with regular infantry spread throughout the entire island. Fortunately, other than a few antiaircraft batteries, the division’s heavy equipment has not yet caught up with it. Airfield #2 is thought to be defended by a small battalion (400 men) of regular infantry along with three antiaircraft emplacements. (See map.)

Available to provide close air support (CAS) are the MEU’s eight Harriers and eight Cobras. A carrier battle group (CBG) will support the landing from a distance but will be engaged primarily in air superiority and CBG and amphibious task force (ATF) defensive missions. Once the airfield secured, elements of the 82d Airborne Division will be airlifted directly into it (by parachute if necessary). The initial elements are to assist the MEU in strengthening and expanding its foothold. The division will eventually assume the mission of securing the rest of the island. Finally, you are ordered to minimize collateral civilian damage. In support of this effort, the BLT’s specific missions are to:

• Secure Dull Garrison Island Airfield #2 (ATF Obj I) ensuring that the three antiaircraft emplacements are destroyed. The airlift of stateside forces is scheduled to begin a mere six hours after the commencement of the assault.

• Secure the village of Al Joblin (LF OBJ 1) in order to destroy the enemy headquarters and combat units located there as well as to prevent any reinforcement of the airfield.

• Seize the bridge over North River (LF Obj 2) in order to block any reaction the enemy may attempt as well as to facilitate future operations ashore.

Because of unfavorable beach conditions, the only suitable landing site for an amphibious assault is located at the mouth of North River, which is dry at this time of year. It is felt that the LCACs and AAVs will have no difficulty in overcoming any sandbars that may be located in this area. Beachmasters, however, will have to determine if an alternate landing point will have to be offset slightly for the LCUs, LCM-8s, and general offload. There are two LCACs and two LCUs aboard the LHA and one LCAC and one LCU aboard the LPD. Company E retains possession of the combat rigid raiding craft. Furthermore, there are only enough helicopters available to lift either one reinforced rifle company or the 105mm platoon of the battery at a time. The BLT is tasked organized aboard ship as follows:

  • LHA BLT 2/8 Headquarters (-) (rein)
  • Company G
  • Artillery Battery (4xl05mm+4xl55mm)
  • Engineer Platoon (-)
  • TOW section
  • 3d Squad, Dragon Platoon
  • LPD
  • Company E
  • Weapons Company (-)
  • 2d Squad, Engineer Platoon
  • Platoon LAI
  • (4xLAV+2xLAV-AT+lxLAV-M)
  • IST
  • Company F
  • AAV Platoon
  • 1 Javelin Squad, Anti-Armor Platoon
  • 1st Squad, Engineer Platoon

Requirement

As the BLT commander, briefly discuss your plans for accomplishing your mission to include your task organization for the assault, your sequencing of units ashore, and the broad missions you assign your subordinates. Include an overlay, which indicates the landing zones you intend to use, additional BLT objectives that you may designate, and your general scheme of maneuver. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game #92-6, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.