Evolving the OODA Loop for Strategy

A new application of Boyd’s model

The work of the late Col John Boyd has significantly influenced the doctrine and concepts of the U.S. armed forces for the last 30 years. Boyd’s achievements during his Air Force career include substantial contributions to fighter tactics and aircraft design.1 Yet, he is better known for his ever-evolving and eclectic theoretical efforts to define conflict and for his simple decision-making model, the famous “OODA loop.”2

In this article, we introduce another construct for consideration. The authors are avowed maneuverists, who find value in Col Boyd’s wide-ranging theories, notwithstanding his contempt for battles of attrition, which are sometimes unavoidable. Boyd’s detractors criticize the underlying historical cases he drew upon and his lack of published substantive scholarship. But over the last two generations, he has arguably offered better frameworks for thinking about warfare (especially at the tactical level) than anyone else. A concept that addresses uncertainty, cognition, moral factors, feedback loops, continuous adaptation, and time-competitive decision making is quite powerful. His theory rightly stresses the value of relative tempo vice just acting faster, which Boyd clearly understood. 

Thus, we are not surprised that Boyd’s conception of war as a violent and time-competitive clash to disrupt an opponent’s mind and force cohesion has traction with many in the U.S. military and Marine warfighting doctrine.3 Boyd was respected and praised by numerous students of war.4 Additionally,  having numerous devoted acolytes, the late strategic theorist and prolific author Colin Gray, counted Boyd as an honorable mention on his list of favorite strategic theorists.5 “The OODA loop may appear too humble to merit categorization as a grand theory,” Gray observed, “but that is what it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of applicability, and contains a high quality of insight about strategic essentials.”6  Scholars at the Army War College support this assessment.7

Boyd’s thinking also influenced the development of the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and underpins the Army’s concept of mission command, which embraces the delegation of responsibility and decision making down the chain of command to ensure tempo is not ceded to the enemy.8 The Navy’s Next Generation Air Dominance program, involving unmanned loyal wingmen flying with sixth-generation manned fighters, continues to assess the implications new technology will have on cockpit decision-making.9

Moreover, Boyd’s OODA construct (see Figure 1) has been popularized in both military and management circles and has taken root in the military doctrine of many NATO countries. 

Figure 1. Boyd’s full OODA loop. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 1. Boyd’s full OODA loop. (Figure provided by authors.)

But as previously noted, Boyd’s work is not without controversy or criticisms.10 Some scholars found the leap from Boyd’s cockpit experiences difficult to scale up to the operational and strategic levels of war.11 One critic labeled him a “blind strategist” who was “in the dark” due to his fraudulent reading of history.12 According to this critic, maneuver warfare somehow “corrupted the art of war” and is responsible for the catastrophic decisions made in Iraq and Afghanistan. That critique is both facile and hyperbolic. The most balanced observers of Boyd’s research acknowledge that he was not a professional historian and that his selection of historical cases reflected some bias.13

These shortcomings tempted some Army officers years ago to wishfully give the OODA loop a sendoff into academic oblivion.14 These authors focused on the simple four-step OODA loop, which is a shorthand description. They would be justified based on that abbreviated understanding. But they overlooked Boyd’s richer and expanded version that better depicts his thinking.15 There have been other efforts to construct alternative concepts including the critique–explore–compare–adapt loop and, in Australia, a pair of analysts proposed an act-sense-decide-adapt (ASDA) cycle.16 The ASDA concept stressed the competitive learning and adaptation aspects of warfare, as did Boyd.17

An Alternative Approach
Changes in the global security environment since the 1980s and ineluctable demands confronting today’s strategic planners suggest Boyd’s OODA loop could use a modest update. Thus, we propose a 4-D Model of discovery, design, decide, and disseminate/monitor. This builds upon Boyd’s OODA cycle while expanding his concept to enhance its relevance to the strategic level of war. Underpinning the need for the 4-D model are the following drivers:

  • The deliberative nature of strategy is less about making fast decisions and more about identifying and deeply understanding the right problem and the rigorous generation of a sound solution.  
  • The collective character of strategy formulation, including group dynamics between commanders, allies, staffs, and specialists, and not just one individual’s cognitive cycle. The importance of discourse in building a shared understanding needs reinforcement.18
  • The opportunity to incorporate advances in the cognitive sciences and other sciences that have occurred since Boyd developed his framework.19
  • The thrust of the military design movement has steadily influenced strategic planning.20
  • The need for a more explicit recognition of the role of risk in strategy formulation and implementation.  There are new dimensions of strategic risk that transcend traditional concepts of risk to mission and forces that must now be accounted for: the risk that action or inaction poses to democratic governance, the global economy, and nation-states’ ability to marshal both manpower and materiel to meet the exigencies of protracted war.  

In Boyd’s time, few fighter pilots or infantry commanders had to worry much about these factors. Today, they may find themselves quickly assigned to a combatant command headquarters and tasked with writing war plans and operations orders in an era of strategic competition and gray zone challenges. Thus, Boyd’s focus on operational or tactical success using the OODA cycle requires some translation for staff officers who are required to think strategically in peacetime but not yet moving to the sound of the guns. 

The “4 D” Model (Discovery, Design, Decide, Disseminate/Monitor)
Our proposed model is presented in Figure 2. We came to recognize from Boyd that these are not isolated steps; instead, they are interconnected by information flows from continuous feedback loops.21 Our model blends Boyd’s interdisciplinary efforts with additional elements and attempts to help modern-day commanders and their staffs apply it to their critical command functions. To represent the nonlinear and continuous interaction that Boyd intended, we revised our version as depicted in Figure 3. This depiction came out of Boyd’s writing about the nonlinearity of warfare and seeks to better reflect the interactive nature of the various components. 

Figure 2. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 2. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 3. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 3. (Figure provided by authors.)

Discovery
In place of observe, we propose discovery, which connotes a more active effort to learn and understand. Obviously, the Observe step is drawn from Boyd’s experience as a fighter pilot. Observing is not irrelevant to fighter pilots nor strategists, but a more proactive search is needed to build a comprehensive understanding of the strategic environment and the particular strategic culture of the adversary. What is necessary is an active effort to learn and appreciate what GEN McMaster called strategic empathy, which he defined as “the skill of understanding what drives and constrains one’s adversary.”22

In the discovery component, we include the identification and attempted resolution of “known unknowns” and an effort to satisfy the commander’s information requirements. We also include a recognition of the perspectives and mental modes, heuristics, and biases of key leaders and strategists, as Boyd properly noted. 

An integral component of the discovery step involves identifying political constraints (actions that must be taken) and restraints (actions that are not authorized) that will shape the design step. In an era of great-power competition between nuclear-armed adversaries, escalation control and the political imperative to find acceptable off-ramps will impact the design of strategies involving the use of force between nuclear powers and their surrogates.

Design
In lieu of orientation, we have labeled the next step of the process as design. Whereas Boyd used orientation to capture the elements of sense-making, leading to analysis and synthesis, our model explicitly uses some of the simpler components of design as practiced in joint and Service planning methodologies. Design is not a single step; it is a developing awareness based on constantly changing circumstances and imperfect information. In Boyd’s briefing lectures, he stressed that orientation never ceases but rather constantly evolves as it takes in new data.23 “Orientation isn’t just a state you’re in,” he claimed, “it’s a process. You’re always orienting.”24 Likewise with design.  

Some aspects of design theory have been incorporated within the existing joint planning process.25 While this has not been the sweeping paradigm change design advocates would like, it has helped generate the desired outcomes of the design movement (more creativity, critical thinking, challenging outdated frames, etc.). We agree with proponents who embrace complexity and novel ways to make sense of dynamic and non-linear environments and who want to exploit divergent thinking and leverage deep reflection.26

Yet, the notion of design theory and military applications is in flux. Now, as was the case a decade ago, there is little agreement on exactly what design thinking is or how to best apply it in strategy or operational art.27 The field is split between purists and pragmatists.28 While recognizing that design theory is a valuable but rather philosophical approach, we are practitioners who appreciate pragmatic applications.29 Design theory is not inconsistent with Boyd’s work, given his emphasis on complexity and systems theory, as well as the cognitive sciences.  

Design is a useful intellectual approach that can assist planners who must grapple with wicked or ill-structured problems that are non-linear, interactively complex, and have no stopping rule or final end-state.30 But planners who ignore Boyd’s ideas and attempt to use design to overcome war’s inherent ambiguity and uncertainty will be gravely disappointed.31 At best, ill-structured problems can be managed or mitigated and not permanently solved. Instead of seeking some sort of utopian end state, planners must be content with achieving an acceptable sustainable state.32

Our conception of design includes problem framing, the first step in any serious strategy formulation process.33 That enables multiple diverse approaches (or courses of action) to be generated to resolve the gap between a perceived environment and a desired change. Design generates ideations in the form of potential solutions or mitigations, and these are fed into the analysis and synthesis process via the gaming of options or courses of action. All of this is interactively refined by discourse and collaboration among commanders and staffs. Critically, the insights gleaned from this process will almost always require the approaches or courses of action to be modified, necessitating yet another round of testing and experimentation before the Commander takes a decision.  

Although doctrine still encourages strategists to develop a Theory of Victory, such verbiage can lead to over-reach when identifying the ends for which military force is going to be used. States acquire nuclear weapons to immunize themselves against regime change and existential defeat. Victory implies an outcome that is much more favorable than returning to the status quo ante or a negotiated settlement involving major concessions from both belligerents. History informs that the former is difficult to achieve and so a Theory of Success may have greater utility during strategy formulation.

Decision
The next component of the framework is the actual decision. Boyd appropriately labeled decisions as a hypothesis. This hypothesis represents a causal relationship between actions and desired ends, which is the operative theory of success in the evolving strategy.34

The commander is responsible and accountable for this decision as well as the degree of freedom of action for independent judgment that he or she delegates to subordinates and coalition members.35

In our model, we included strategic risk as an element in the decision component. Risk is an enduring reality in both strategic and operational decision making. The rigorous assessment of risk is or should be a critical and explicit step in strategy development. There is always a risk to any strategy thanks to the unrelenting reality of uncertainty in human affairs and especially war.36 Yet, it is often a weak link in U.S. strategy formulation and decision making.  

Strategic risk is more than the risk to mission or force in joint risk analysis. It can come from many sources, both internal and external.  Most of the time we look for risk from vulnerabilities or external events. The joint doctrine note on strategy suggests that risk analysis is an implicit function and relegates it to the assessment phase. It states, “Implicit to the implementation of a strategy is the identification of its associated costs and risks.”37 This is limiting and slightly problematic. Risk considerations should be explicit and start with the development of a strategy as well as execution and refinement from assessments. However, retired GEN Stan McChrystal insists that the greatest risk to our organization is from ourselves.38 Our lack of empathy, curiosity, and critical thinking leave us open to surprise from foreseeable hazards.  

Risk assessment is a continuing process based on new information, or planning assumptions that reveal themselves to be inaccurate. A strategy and design team will look at risk in its gaming and synthesis. However, a conscious effort to accept risk or modify a strategy is the responsibility of the senior official approving the strategy. Risk is not well understood, and risk management is not applied consistently and explicitly at the policy and strategic decision-making levels. The U.S. strategy community needs to sharpen its appreciation for risk as a requisite step in testing strategic choices, making risk-informed decisions, and implementing strategy.  

The inclusion of risk within the strategy process is now well recognized in U.S. doctrine but not by Boyd. Hence our inclusion of it as an explicit item to improve our capacity to appreciate risks to and from our strategy.39

Dissemination and Monitoring
After a decision has been made, it must be disseminated to all subordinate actors in such a way that captures the commander’s intent and logic. We have not used “act” since higher-level headquarters themselves do not act as much as support implementation and assessment.40 They do direct action across their formations, which must be continually assessed and which may generate the need to adapt the strategy or how it is being implemented. We specifically include monitor as a part of a commander’s function (and his staff) as it supports both mission command and documents the vital assessment process. Monitoring vice control is a notion we have absorbed from Boyd himself.41 Boyd felt that control was too focused on limiting freedom of action, which is the opposite of what learning and rapid adaptation are supposed to achieve.

Monitoring includes adopting useful assessment metrics that can help senior commanders and the civilian leaders they serve to answer the most difficult wartime question of all: is our strategy working? Bogus metrics and failing to ask this question frequently enough during a campaign can undermine the virtuous cycle of learning inherent to Boyd’s overall concept.  

Regarding transitions and change, as the Russo-Ukraine war demonstrates, war is a competition in learning and adaptation.42 This is just as true at the strategy level as it is in the conduct of warfare.

Pitfalls
Strategists must be mindful of pitfalls that can lead to less-than-optimum outcomes or outright failure. We expect our adapted model will help ameliorate them. Richard Rumelt believes that “a good strategy recognizes the nature of the challenge and offers a way of surmounting it. Simply being ambitious is not a strategy.”43 Nor are big audacious goals and broad arrows on a map conducive to sound strategy. Some of the most dangerous pitfalls to remain aware of include:

Ignoring or Stifling Criticism
• The discovery step includes gathering as much relevant information about the problem as possible—the security environment, adversaries, friendly forces, allies, and partnered nations, and required resources to implement and sustain the strategy. A bias toward happy talk and good news can result in overly optimistic judgments that seep into the design step and lead to developing facile courses of action and the downplaying of associated risks. Prudent strategists are wary of too much sunshine intruding on the process and jealously guarding their objectivity and dispassionate analysis. 

Forgotten Assumptions
• Strategy making takes time. Edward Miller has noted that “strategists are not clairvoyants,” and the development of War Plan Orange for defeating Imperial Japan in World War II was “a plan nurtured over thirty-five years.”44 Admittedly, this is a long time. Nevertheless, regardless of duration, strategy development requires that planners keep track of the assumptions underpinning their thinking and constantly cross-check them against reality. Circumstances will dictate whether old assumptions should be refined or discarded, and new ones adopted. A seemingly simple assumption like “country X or Y will or will not provide U.S. forces basing access,” can have an outsized impact on strategic outcomes. It is the impact that discarded, or newly adopted assumptions, have on the overall strategy—and the imperative to understand their second and third-order effects—that matters most.  

Interagency Cooperation
•  A strategy that integrates all elements of national power will, by necessity, involve multiple Executive Branch departments and agencies—each with its own unique organizational cultures and resource limitations. Understanding the role civilian agencies have in the strategy, and their timelines for execution, which, in most cases, differs from when the positive effects of their actions will be realized (i.e., financial sanctions and tariffs imposed, mobilization of industrial base, etc.) is crucial. Involving the interagency at the outset of the 4-D process will help promote a realistic understanding of what these stakeholders are bringing to the table, or not. 

Rigid Adherence to the Plan
• Good strategies have some organic flexibility baked into their design so they can adapt to changing circumstances during implementation. Strategy refinements and modifications are almost always necessary to meet the moves and countermoves of a thinking adversary. The U.S. “Europe First” strategy during World War II allowed for operations in the Pacific and Mediterranean without causing decision makers to lose sight of the ultimate prize. Throughout the war, military objectives were expediently modified to exploit success and more effectively align resources with changing operational and strategic priorities. There is a reciprocal relationship between policy and strategy during war that should occur naturally.45 Identifying the shifts and the strategic trade-offs that should be made and for what reasons is strategic acumen of the highest order. 

Conclusion
Like Clausewitz, Boyd deserves his place in the pantheon of useful philosophers of war. Oddly, both never really finished their work, and we are left with some questions to resolve on our own. We are not surprised Boyd’s various concepts resonate with many theorists and practitioners exposed to warfare. Despite the critics, we believe that any conception of warfare remains on solid ground with Boyd’s ideas about relative tempo, uncertainty, decision making, and adaptation. The convergence between Boyd and the Marine Corps is tied to their common emphasis on adapting to new circumstances in conflict. Ian Brown stresses, “such adaptability required a mind-set that could recognize when circumstances changed,” and the ability to “process the new information, and make those decisions necessary to adapt and triumph.”46 As noted earlier, the Army and the Navy also see some virtue in many of Boyd’s ideas.

We do not contend we have discovered the Rosetta Stone, but we offer this alternative model to help further leverage Boyd’s construct, especially for higher staff levels. We argue that Boyd would be happy to debate about the modified loop we have developed. Boyd hated dogmas and expected his ideas to germinate and evolve. Locking into a single mental model was tantamount to failure, or as Boyd colorfully put it, “You’ll get your pants pulled down.”47 His key point was to not become predictable or locked into templates which he labelled as cognitive stagnation.  

While some of Boyd’s ideas can and should be challenged, his thinking “has shifted strategists, planners, and operators from mass-based to tempo- and disruption-based conceptions of war, conflict, and competition.”48 We should continue to build on that at all levels of war. The extensive use of the OODA loop model for decision making is a testament to the pervasive utility of this concept. Yet, Boyd’s contributions go well beyond the OODA framework and are worthy of serious study. However, they do not represent the final word.  In fact, it is quite likely that the late Col Boyd would be unhappy if his provocative insights did not engender more debate and evolution. 

>Col Greenwood (Ret) currently works as a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, VA.

>>LtCol Hoffman (Ret) was, until his retirement, a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Barry Watts and Mie Augier, “John Boyd

on Competition and Conflict,” Comparative Strategy 41, No. 3 (2022).

2. Which for those not familiar with the construct stands for observe, orient, decide, and act.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC, 1997).

4. For positive assessments of Boyd’s many contributions see Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2001); Chet Richards, Certain to Win, (Bloomington: Xlibris 2004); Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Little, Brown, 2005); Ian T. Brown, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2018).

5. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

6. Ibid.

7.  Clay Chun and Jacqueline Whitt, “John Boyd and the “OODA Loop,” War Room blog, Army War College, January 8, 2019, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/boyd-ooda-loop-great-strategists.

8. Jamie L. Holm, An Alternate Portrait of Ruin: The Impact of John Boyd on United States Army Doctrine, (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2021.)

9. John Robert Pellegrin, “Boyd in the Age of Loyal Wingmen,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/boyd-age-loyal-wingmen.

10. Robert Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory—Is It Relevant to the Army?” Defense Analysis 16, No. 3 (2000); and James Lane, “A Critique of John Boyd’s A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” Research Gate, February 2023, unpublished thesis, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368470051
_A_Critique_of_John_Boyd%27s_A_Discourse_on_Winning_and_Losing.

11. James Hasik, “Beyond the Briefing: Theoretical and Practical Problems in the Works and Legacy of John Boyd,” Contemporary Security Policy 34, No. 3 (2013).

12. Stephen Robinson, The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Way of War (Dunedin: Exile Publishing, 2021).

13. Frans Osinga, “Getting a Discourse on Winning and Losing” A Primer on Boyd’s ‘Theory of Intellectual Evolution,’ Contemporary Security Policy 34, No. 3 (2013). 

14. Kevin Benson and Steven Rotkoff, “Goodbye OODA Loop,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2011, http://armedforcesjournal.com/2011/10/6777464.

15. David Lyle, “Looped Back In,” Armed Forces Journal, December 2011, http://armedforcesjournal.com/perspectives-looped-back-in.

16. David J. Bryant, “Rethinking OODA: Toward a Modern Cognitive Framework of Command Decision Making,” Military Psychology 18, No. 3 (2009).

17. Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, “OODA Versus ASDA: Metaphors at War,” Australian Army Journal 6, No. 3 (2009).

18. T.C. Greenwood and T.X. Hammes, “War Planning for Wicked Problems,” Armed Forces Journal, December 1, 2009, http://armedforcesjournal.com/war-planning-for-wicked-problems. See also Ben Zweibelson, “Seven Design Theory Considerations, An Approach to Ill-Structured Problems,” Military Review (November–December 2012).

19. Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Thinking of John Boyd (New York: Routledge, 2006).

20. Ben Zweibeleson, Understanding the Military Design Movement: War, Change and Innovation (Abingdon: Routledge 2023).

21. Alistair Luft, “The OODA Loop and the Half-Beat,” Strategy Bridge, March 17, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/3/17/the-ooda-loop-and-the-half-beat.

22. H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper, 2020); H.R. McMaster, “Developing Strategic Empathy: History as the Foundation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy,” Journal of Military History 84 (2020); Allison Abbe, “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security,” Parameters 53, No. 2 (2023); and Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” Joint Force Quarterly 38, No. 3 (2005).

23. “The OODA Loop and the Half-Beat.” 

24. John Boyd, cited in Brett and Kate McKay, “The Tao of Boyd, How to Master the OODA Loop,” Unruh Turner Burke & Frees, September 15, 2014, https://www.paestateplanners.com/library/Tao-of-Boyd-article-2016.pdf. 

25. Daniel E. Rauch and Matthew Tackett, “Design Thinking,” Joint Force Quarterly 101, No. 2 (2021).  See also the Army Design Methodology and Marine Corps Planning Process.

26. Ben Zweibelson, “Fostering Deep Insight Through Substantive Play,” in Aaron P. Jackson ed., Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, Joint Studies Paper Series No. 3 (Canberra: Center for Strategic Research, 2019).

27. Aaron Jackson, “Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force,” in Aaron P.  Jackson, ed., Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2019).

28. Aaron P. Jackson “A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 17, No. 4 (2017).

29. Ben Zweibelson, “An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why it Currently Fails to Work,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 16, No. 1 (2015).

30. “War Planning for Wicked Problems.”  

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Andrew Carr, “Strategy as Problem Solving,” Parameters 54, No. 1 (2024).

34. On Theory of Success see Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends+Ways+Means=(Bad) Strategy,” Parameters 46, No. 4 (2016); Frank G. Hoffman, “The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy, Theory of Success,” Joint Force Quarterly 97, No. 4 (2020); and Brad Roberts, On Theories of Victory: Red and Blue (Lawrence Livermore Laboratory: Center for Global Security Research, 2020).

35. Lawrence Freedman, Command, The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2022).

36. Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

37. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 2-19, Strategy, (Washington, DC: December 2019). 

38. Stanley McChrystal and Anna Butrico, Risk: A User’s Guide (New York: Penguin, 2021).

39. A point stressed by a former Combatant Commander, see Kenneth F. McKenzie, Melting Point: High Command and War in the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2024). See also Frank G. Hoffman, “A Weak Element in U.S. Strategy Formulation: Strategic Risk,” Joint Force Quarterly 116, No. 1 (2025). 

40. Drawn from Jim Storr, Something Rotten, Land Command in the 21st Century (Havant: Howgate, 2022).

41. Boyd, slide 32 from “Organic Design for Command and Control,” May 1987.

42. Mick Ryan, “Russia’s Adaptation Advantage,” Foreign Affairs.com, February 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage. For a deep study of adaptation in Ukraine see Mick Ryan, The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2024).

43. Richard P. Rumelt, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters (New York: Crown Business, 2011).

44. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

45. Dan Marston, “Limited War in the Nuclear Age: American Strategy in Korea,” in Hal Brands, ed., The New Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2024).

46. A New Conception of War.

47. Boyd quoted in A New Conception of War.

48. Brian R. Price, “Decision Advantage and Initiative Completing Joint All-Domain Command and Control,” Air and Space Operations Review 3, No. 1 (2024).

Strategic Competition and Stand-in Forces

A novel view for tactical units

“The current T&E [Training & Education] system is not preparing the Marine Corps for the future operating environment.”

—Training and Education 2030

The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that we are exiting a time of strategic atrophy.1 The DOD, including the United States Special Operations Command, is shifting toward emphasizing near-peer adversaries, in which we are faced with new and unique strategic problems not present during the Global War on Terrorism. As such, the Marine Corps is also rapidly evolving and transforming—using such critical documents as the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations, Training and Education, Talent Management 2030, and Stand-in Forces (SIF) as guiding features to enable our transformation to meet the challenges posed by our strategic enemies.2

As stated in A Concept for Stand-in Forces, SIF: (1) “reassure the Nation and our allies and partners,” (2) “win the all-domain reconnaissance battle,” (3) “win the all-domain counter-reconnaissance battle, and (4) “intentionally disrupt adversary plans.”3 Specifically, for this article, SIF “disrupt an adversary’s plans at every point on the competition continuum.”4 While individual Marines, tactical units, or the Marine Corps are not tasked with creating strategy, the truth is that we do not expect mere tactical-level results with the SIF concept during times of competition, crisis, and conflict. Rather, we expect impacts on the operational and (preferably) the strategic level of war by our SIF units.

However, while we desire and hope for enduring strategic-level results of our SIF, we as an entity generally do not educate our tactical-level Marines on the strategic level of war or strategic competition. As stated in Training and Education 2030, “As we prepare for the future fight, we need Marines who possess the intellectual ability to out-think their adversaries,” and “the most important warfighting advantage we have is the mental and physical endurance of our Marines, and their ability to make better decisions under pressure than our adversaries.”5 Therefore, the purpose of this article is to describe and illustrate strategic competition in a novel manner for our SIF units. As stated in A Concept for Stand-in Forces (ref), “SIF also practice ‘integrated deterrence,’ which means they coordinate their activities with the joint force, interagency, and allied and partnered nations to achieve greater results than could be gained by acting alone.”6 Thus, by arming SIF with knowledge and a conceptual model on strategic competition in outside declared theaters of active armed conflicts (ODTAAC), tactical units have the potential to facilitate strategic objects to a greater extent in ODTAAC environments.

Strategic Environment
Former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, noted that gray-area conflicts are the most likely and most difficult challenges for democracies to face.7 In 2023—with the compression of the three levels of war, in which the tactical individual is closer to the strategic level of war—tactical warfighters must recognize that gray-zone conflicts must be understood as cohesive organized campaigns that typically apply non-military measures to achieve political goals over several years to decades while remaining below the threshold of war. These campaigns are suited for the educated and trained Marine(s) due to our history in small wars (i.e., Banana Wars, combined action platoons, etc). Additionally, history clearly demonstrates that foreign militaries who are seen as a liberation force and not an occupation force, such as a surge of conventional forces, have a higher likelihood of strategic success. Regarding gray-zone conflicts, Mazaar states that gray-zone conflicts are “a pattern of state rivalry that can substitute for traditional military aggression, and which can pose serious challenges to U.S. strategy.”8

As stated by Jeffrey Record, “the United States has become a victim of its conventional military success.”9 According to Colin Gray, the U.S. war machine can be defined as: (1) apolitical, (2) astrategic, (3) ahistorical, (4), problem-solving, optimistic, (5) culturally ignorant, (6) technologically dependent, (7), firepower focused, (8), large scale, (9), profoundly regular, (10) impatient, (11), logistically excellent, and (12) sensitive to casualties.10 The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America states, “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model … Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit.”11 Our strategic adversaries have studied our history and analyzed our strengths and weaknesses and are conducting active measures to domestically and internationally weaken the United States to achieve their national objectives.

According to Kilcullen, Chinese military strategists developed a simultaneous dual-pronged strategy; one of economic and political engagement.12 This dual-pronged strategy is in combination with their acceleration of their military competencies. This development appears to be in line with the concepts put forth in Unrestricted Warfare written by the Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare provides numerous examples of how non-conventional methods can be used against the United States to achieve political goals in a form of hybrid warfare.13 As stated by Hassett,

the U.S. military is insufficiently postured, trained, and resourced through doctrinal publication guidance to counter current and emerging hybrid threats in the future. Hybrid warfare will continue to serve as an effective operational concept for adversary state and non-state actors in the future.14

Thus, education and understanding are paramount for SIF during times of competition.

Strategic Competition
The principal reason for this article is to describe strategic competition in a novel way in hopes of facilitating strategic impacts in ODTAAC environments by tactical units, primarily SIF units. The terms great-power competition and strategic competition have come to be buzzwords in the U.S. military. While these words are thrown around constantly, few can define great-power competition and even fewer can define strategic competition, despite these words dominating military leaders’ meetings, plans, and actions. As stated by Miller et al., “Competition now permeates nearly every contemporary U.S. strategic document.”15 Miller et al. define competition as “the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, leverage, and advantage necessary to secure their respective interests.”16 Additionally, Miller et al. define influence, leverage, and advantage as being “the power to cause an effect in indirect or intangible ways,” “the application of influence gained or created to achieve an effect or exploit an opportunity,” and “the superiority of position or condition,” respectively.17 Using the framework by Miller et al., the author visually displays strategic competition using Figures 1, 2, and 3.

At the bottom of Figures 1–3, the reader can see that at the base are the competing interests of the United States (blue) and the competing interests of an adversary (red). Miller et al. define interests as “things or concepts that a nation values—those things which states seek to protect or achieve concerning each other.”18 No matter what the United States positively performs when contending in strategic competition, the adversary’s interest will likely not go away. While the number of resources put into the targeted competition in a specific region will vary with the level of interests, it is important to note that the adversary’s general interests will remain a constant over the years; thus, patience and the emphasis on playing the long game must occur in strategic competition.

We must be cautious not to default to competition as being negative or problematic, especially tactical SIF units. Rather, tactical SIF operators should look at competition as an opportunity: “Competition provides opportunities to achieve outcomes before war, ensure favorable conditions for escalation, and gain advantage in the event of conflict. By building influence with allies, partners, and other actors is critical to producing opportunities in competition.”19

Figure 1. Strategic competition-balanced. (Figure provided by author.)

In Figure 1 (strategic competition- balanced), influence for both nation-states is depicted as equal. Advantage (represented via a triangle) acts as a fulcrum in the diagram, and for Figure 1 on the previous page, the advantage is also equal between the competing nations. It is important to note that a fulcrum simply provides the pivot point for a lever. Based on where the fulcrum is placed, will directly determine the amount of leverage, (synonymous with force and power), that a device can create. Advantage in strategic competition “is comprised of physical or virtual aspects (e.g., technology, geographic access, resources, and arsenal inventories) as well as more nebulous, cognitive elements (e.g., initiative, momentum, and skill).”20 Like many fulcrums, the advantage for the United States or its competitors can vary with time due to several variables.

Lastly, Figure 1 displays leverage via a lever for the strategic competition diagram. In strategic competition, leverage is facilitated by a “deep understanding of other actors and the strategic environment to increase the likelihood and scope of success.”21 Using the proposed strategic competition model (Figures 1–3), leverage is directly affected by both the advantage and influence of a nation.

In Figure 2 (strategic competition- negative), the reader can see that the United States’ interests (blue arrow) are directly being confronted by a strategic adversary’s interests (red arrow). However, Figure 2 shows the United States losing in strategic competition below the threshold of war. In Figure 2, the adversary has greater influence and supreme advantage, thus increasing the possible leverage in the situation and beating the United States in competition. An example of Figure 2 could be China pressuring a government of an underdeveloped nation (i.e., influence) by using their economy to build infrastructure in said nation (i.e., advantage), to minimize the U.S. influence and access in a country (leverage). By minimizing the U.S. influence in a country, China increases its global reach, resource allocation, strategic depth, and strategic encirclement. Unfortunately, Figure 2 appears to be the norm in many countries in the world due to the loss of influence by the United States as well as a shift in the advantage and leverage. Simply put, Figure 2 shows the enemy imposing their will on our Nation during strategic competition.

“Stand-in forces disrupt an adversary’s plans at every point on the competition continuum.”

—A Concept for Stand-in Forces

Figure 2. Strategic competition-negative. (Figure provided by author.)

In Figure 3 (strategic competition-neutral), the reader can once more see that the United States’ interests (blue arrow) are directly being confronted by a strategic adversary’s interests (red arrow). Again, it must be emphasized that competing interests are to be expected as the new normal for the foreseeable future for tactical SIF units being deployed to ODTAAC environments, (which is preferred to either crisis or conflict).

In Figure 3, the reader can see that the outcome of the strategic competition is neutral despite the advantage being held by the adversary and the influence being supreme for the United States. Regarding strategic competition, this is a recommended view of how a tactical SIF unit can be ideally employed in an ODTAAC deployment. An example of Figure 3 could be China having the advantage due to their building of infrastructure in an underdeveloped nation using their economic instrument of national power, while the United States has greater influence, perhaps through a shared history; a strong, mutually benefiting relationship; and military training exchange programs.

Application and Recommendations
“SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential adversary.”22 As stated by Hassett, “great power strategic competition does not inherently imply strictly conventional forms of warfare.”23 Regarding the application of tactical SIF units, it must be emphasized that military contribution should not be the bid for success, but rather the full coordinated implementation of the United States’ instrument of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, economy, financial, intelligence, legality/ law enforcement, and technology).

This article prescribed a simple concept for understanding strategic competition. It must be emphasized that over a six-month deployment or a two-to-three-year tour of duty as a SIF unit, it is significantly easier for a SIF unit to impede our Nation’s leverage, influence, and advantage through negative and exploitable actions and information via our adversaries. Thus, we must recognize that preserving and methodically improving (over long-term sustainment) our leverage, influence, and advantage is of the utmost importance.

During competition, a SIF unit has the unique ability to measure our Nation’s influence, leverage, and advantage as on-the-ground sensors by providing on-the-ground truth. What might be perceived by national and strategic leaders as an effective campaign, operation, or situation, in all reality could be missing the mark for the targeted population. Thus, SIF units must be educated and trained accordingly. I offer four simple recommendations that the Marine Corps can and should start implementing to empower and enhance SIF units, which has been similarly suggested for SOF operating in ODTAAC environments.24

Figure 3. Strategic competition-neutral. (Figure provided by author.)

“Not the fortress, but the army that we send into the field secures our position of power in the world.”

—Gen Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke

Although training must focus on and emphasize the most dangerous situation, education should span competition, crisis, and conflict; especially considering the preferred situation is competition. While Training and Education 2030states, “Ultimately, every Marine is responsible for their own learning,”25 (in which the author agrees) we as leaders in the Marine Corps must recognize it is imperative to educate our Marines by providing the optimal resources and direction. To facilitate the SIF concept, our tactical-level professional military education should incorporate the concepts of strategy.

However, more importantly, tactical SIF commanders and leaders must develop their unit professional military education specific to the region their SIF unit will deploy using the concept of the strategic lens. The strategic lens (which has been updated from its original concept by including language), which includes geography, culture, history, language, religion, governmental systems, education, and economics, is of the utmost importance for SIF units.26 As stated,

The ‘strategic lens,’ like most lens, can be viewed from different angles. Regarding the ‘strategic lens,’ tactical SOF units must view the lens through the host nation, the relevant population, the belligerents, the strategic competitors, the United States, etc. By only viewing the ‘strategic lens’ through the viewpoint of the United States, the tactical SOF unit promotes the negative stereotype of the United States as being culturally unaware, ahistorical, and arrogant.27

Miller et al state, “To make informed assessments about degrees of influence, one must develop a better understanding of populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and other strategic issues.”28

2. Integrate with SOF
SOF has unique authorities and permissions that our SIF units will not possess. Additionally, SOF usually has access and placement that conventional forces do not have. A gap for SOF will always be capacity since a SOF principle is that you cannot mass produce SOF. However, SIF embedding with SOF is mutually beneficial in several ways.

First, SIF provides added capacity for SOF units, especially regarding foreign internal defense (training of the host nation forces). The author truly believes that a highly proficient machinegunner or mortarman, for example, should out cycle the average SOF operator on said weapons systems because these Marines are tasked with being the true subject-matter experts, while the SOF operator is tasked with a high number of varying skills.29 Thus, through this integration, our combined forces can increase the total number of partnered forces trained. Second, via this collaboration, we can also increase dispersed operations across the area of operations because the mixture of SOF and SIF can cover more units. It must be noted that dispersed military operations are being called for by our current guiding documents.

3. Educate the Joint Force
As the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, and Stand-in Forces continue to be enacted, we need to ensure the Joint Force (JF) understands our capabilities, limitations, and the opportunities we bring to the JF.30 As Marines, we must recognize that self-promotion isolated within our community is flawed. Thus, education on our capabilities to the JF via engagements, exchanges, liaison, etc. to increase our presence inside the weapon engagement zone as SIF is necessary.

4. Increased Communication Among All Relevant Players
As stated in previous works on SOF in ODTAAC environments, there are many strategic factors that tactical SOF units cannot impact. However, tactical SOF units can promote positive communication between all the relevant players up, down, and laterally within the chain of command. Regarding communication, lateral or higher units in the chain of command may possess permissions, capabilities, and intelligence that is needed for a SOF unit. Similarly, a SOF unit may possess permissions, capabilities, and intelligence needed by others.31

While written about tactical SOF units, this is equally as true for Marine Corps SIF units of action. To elicit operational and strategic effects in strategic competition via SIF, we have to communicate to the relevant players (i.e., joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial) our missions, locations, capabilities, initiatives, opportunities, and the ground truth. Our SIF units doing great tactical actions that do not lead to operational or strategic effects is not what our Nation needs and is not in line with the SIF operating concept. Using Figures 1–3, our tactical SIF units-of-actions will not have the ability to directly utilize strategic leverage (i.e., exploit strategic opportunities) and must rely on the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial communities; however, our SIF can have greater effects on influence and advantage. Therefore, our SIF units must rely on others, such as politicians and strategic leaders to utilize and apply leverage. Thus, six questions our SIF units should ask are: Does this hurt our national influence? How do we increase our national influence? Does this hurt our national advantage? How do we increase our national advantage? Does this lessen opportunities for national leverage? How can we create opportunities for national leverage?

“Create purpose-built forces … Aggregating specialized units with base elements creates a tailored multi-domain force in order to provide maximum relevant combat power (RCP) on demand.”

—Force Design 2030

Conclusion
During the 2018 House Armed Services Committee, Gen Raymond stated that “SOF is uniquely capable of effectively competing below the level of traditional armed conflict and across the spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.”32 While Gen Raymond was referring to SOF, the author believes SIF can also contribute in this manner. While both SOF and conventional forces should prepare for absolute conflict, we must also train, educate, and equip our SIF units on and for strategic competition illustrated via Figures 1–3. Of the U.S. military conventional-tactical units, tactical SIF units must thrive in competition.

“Forces that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable.”

—Force Design 2030

Notes

1. Jim Mattis, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: 2017).

2. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019); Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020); Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations 2d Edition, (Washington, DC: 2023); Gen David H. Berger, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2023); Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021); and Gen David H. Berger, A Concept for Stand-in Forces, (Washington, DC: 2021).

3. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

4. Ibid.

5. Training and Education 2030.

6. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

7. Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007).

8. Michael Mazar, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, 2015).

9. Beating Goliath.

10. Colin S. Gray, The American War of War. Critique and Implications. Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

11. National Defense Strategy.

12. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

13. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Battleboro: Echo Point Books & Media, 1999).

14. Patrick S. Hasset, “The Hybrid Warfare Vulnerability,” Marine Corps Gazette 105, No. 5 (2021).

15. Joe Miller, Monte Erfourth, Jeremiah Monk, and Ryan Oliver, “Harnessing David and Goliath: Orthodoxy, Asymmetry, and Competition,” Small Wars Journal, February 7, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/harnessing-david-and-goliath-orthodoxy-asymmetry-and-competition.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

23. “The Hybrid Warfare Vulnerability.”

24. Jeremy Carter, “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts: Guiding Features for Enduring Strategic Effects,” (thesis, American Military University, 2021).

25. Training and Education 2030.

26. “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts.”

27. Ibid.

28. “Harnessing David and Goliath.”

29. Jeremy Carter and Thomas Ochoa, “The Relationship Between Enlisted and Officers- Part 1: The T-Shape Philosophy,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7, (2023).

30. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance; Force Design 2030; and A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

31. “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts.”

32. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 115th Congress, (2018) (statement of Raymond Thomas).

The Operational Level of War Does Not Exist

Observation from OIF and OEF

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, I served on what was then the Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Combat Assessment Team. There was a sense of urgency in gathering campaign lessons learned and the team members of the team were imbedded in staffs across the MEF. We contributed as part of the staff during the day and captured observations at night. When Baghdad fell and I MEF was re-deployed home, we spent a couple of months synthesizing what we had learned into something that would hopefully be helpful for future fights. 

Our observations were focused on tactical lessons learned. The Marine Corps, after all, fights at the tactical level. Although I spent a lot of time studying and thinking about the operational level of war, my perspective has shifted, and I now argue the operational level of war does not exist.  It is a construct (and not a useful one) for warfighting, justifying, in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, general officer positions and massive supporting staff. Every staff, from combatant commanders through joint task forces, and functional component commanders, to the MEF claims to fight at the operational level of war. 

These “operational-level staffs” create a massive demand for tactical information from those doing the actual fighting while diffusing authority, responsibility, and accountability. Accountability and responsibility are vital in war, and it is critical to know who is empowered to make decisions.  He who makes decisions in war is responsible for strategy, and I am not certain our current organizational constructs make it clear who is in charge.   

As a related aside, it should be troubling to recognize the United States won World War II with fewer than a dozen four-star admirals and generals leading sixteen million men and women in uniform. The nature of war has not changed even though its character has evolved with technology. We are creatures of our technology, however, and one could argue war’s complexity has not necessarily become more difficult to manage. Today, we have forty-three four-star admirals and generals, and our win-loss record is not great. I thought the Information Age was supposed to flatten organizations. 

A tactical observation made, but perhaps not captured, by the Iraqi Freedom Combat Assessment Team was the failure in Phase IV planning. Phase IV was the phase that would follow the conclusion of combat operations. To say the Phase IV plan for I MEF was opaque would be charitable. Honestly, though I MEF planners were not negligent, they received no direction from the combined forces land Component commander or from anyone else.   

Arguably, the reason there was no direction for Phase IV is there was no strategic goal for the U.S. war in Iraq for which Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the opening campaign. There were vague goals surrounding finding weapons of mass destruction. Also, suggestions of ties between the Iraqis and the events of 11 September and after the initial campaign the shift from finding weapons of mass destruction to regime change continued to add ambiguity to our strategic goals. What was to come after regime change? What was the overarching U.S. strategic goal in Iraq? We did not have one. 

We did not have a strategic goal or a strategy in Afghanistan either; if we did, it was a bad strategy. In hindsight, Afghanistan should have been a punitive expedition with the goal of punishing those responsible for the 11 September attacks and those who provided them refuge. The United States had a worldwide charter of approval for a punitive expedition, after which U.S. forces should have been withdrawn.   

On 18 August 2021, following the debacle that was the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Berger, wrote a letter to Marines who had served in Afghanistan. He said,  

You fought to defend your country, your family, your friends, and your neighbors. You fought to prevent terror from returning to our shores. You fought for the liberty of young Afghan girls, women, boys, and men who want the same individual freedoms we enjoy as Americans. You fought for the Marine to your left and the Marine to your right. You never let them down. 

All of this is true, all of it is noble, and all of it is truly laudable and reflects the values of Marines and the Marine Corps. But through it all, one must wonder, what was the U.S. strategic goal in Afghanistan? Were Marines fighting for the liberty of young Afghan girls, women, boys, and men? Is that the goal for which we invested more than twenty years’ worth of effort and national treasure? 

A popular saying in the wake of the U.S. loss in Vietnam was that we won all the battles and lost the war. We dominated tactically and lost strategically. After Vietnam and through the 1980s, the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Nation writ large went through a catharsis of sorts, working to understand the failure and how to avoid the same again. One of the products of this work was what became known as the Weinberger Doctrine, which amounted to a list of questions and pre-conditions to be met before committing U.S. forces to conflict. The Weinberger Doctrine to many appeared quaint and inapplicable in the “changed world” of 2002. I would argue the tenants of the Weinberger Doctrine were applicable then and are just as applicable now.   

From my vantage point, there has been no effort comparable to post-Vietnam in understanding the failures of Afghanistan and Iraq. The focus has shifted to China and for the Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, kind of like a “whew, I’m glad that’s over, we need to get ready for what’s next.” I hope, at minimum, work has been done, as was done in 2003 to capture tactical lessons learned for the Marine Corps. Those lessons have immediate value and importance.   

So, why is this important to the Marine Corps and readers of the Marine Corps Gazette to think about strategy? Because many of the Marines reading the Gazette today will soon find themselves in the position of shaping national strategy. But our national strategy for Afghanistan and Iraq was the responsibility of our Nation’s civil leadership, right? A cornerstone of our constitutional republic is civil control of the military, they define our national goals. The military supports the national strategy.   

All of this is true, but at the same time, nobody in the Nation understands conflict and security better than those in uniform. The Nation invests in cultivating this knowledge and should be able, when necessary, to harvest the fruit. Senior military leadership has spent decades in uniform, in operational roles, in supporting roles, and attending schools. By the time these leaders arrive at the pinnacle of their careers, none of the civilians they support and advise can hold a candle to their training, education, and experience in matters of national security. 

Moreover, throughout their careers Army and Marine leaders at least learned the importance of well-defined goals for tactical-level operations. They recognize tactical goals are the pinnacle of a pyramid resting on the foundational layer of strategy and strategic goals. As was seen by I MEF in 2003 during phase IV planning, tactical goals are impossible to divine absent strategic guidance.    

This begs the question, why were we conducting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan without defined strategic goals military forces were fighting to achieve? If we did have a strategy, why did we fail to attain our goal? Why, when former Commandant, Gen Berger penned his letter to the Marines, was he unable to point to or mention what had been achieved or not achieved in terms of worthy and defined strategic aims? Why is there an after-the-fact questioning by many Americans of why we were even in Afghanistan, countered by vague assertions, with foundations of support resting in the shifting sand of assumptions of it being better to fight potential terrorists abroad rather than at home?   

Developing strategic goals implies the need for political consensus and approval. This means Congressional approval. In both conflicts, the use of force was authorized by Congress for initial operations, but there was little to no Congressional oversight focused on validating or shifting strategic goals in subsequent years of these long wars. There are many reasons for this lack of oversight. 

Strategy is not stagnant nor is strategy limited to planning. Developing plans is merely the first step of strategy, the most important part being the identification of the strategic goal, followed by a reconciliation of that goal with means and ways. Strategy continues beyond planning, however, with an endless series of decisions, adjusting to the changing reality to attain the goal. With each decision comes another round of reconciling means and ways to ensure they remain sufficient and feasible.   

Perhaps, with so few members of Congress having prior military experience, there was a dearth of understanding of the requirement for continuous oversight. Perhaps Congress simply trusted the military and State Department with the mission. Perhaps there was Congressional consensus, spoken or unspoken, for the need to project unity in the face of conflict. Perhaps political discussions of strategic goals were intentionally avoided precisely because doing so would create unwelcome controversy. It certainly is easier to simply approve generous annual appropriations to continue tactical actions than it is to wrestle in strategic discussions.       

The various war colleges are the capstone educational experience for officers. Much time is devoted to the discussion and understanding of civil-military relations. These institutions are probably one of the best venues to at least begin discussions on what has gone wrong in recent conflicts with the goal of improvement. While these discussions would make interesting non-attributional fodder for lectures and seminars, something formal and attributional resulting in a product with recommendations would better serve the Nation’s needs. 

Two questions that should be explored are what was the relationship between senior military officers and civil leadership from 2001 to 2021 and was it sufficient? In the over twenty years of conflict, no senior military officer ever spoke publicly with real misgivings in either conflict. Was this because of misplaced confidence in the status of ongoing operations?   

If this is the case, our armed services have a training and educational shortfall that precludes leaders from accurately assessing conflict. In July and August 2021, most civilians with common sense recognized the looming disaster in Afghanistan. It is puzzling to hear assertions that military leadership saw no warnings and indicators of imminent collapse.     

There would be true value when those who participated in Iraq and Afghanistan were available to examine these questions and to determine why we keep failing to get our strategy right. It would be valuable to re-consider the roles of military leadership in determining strategy in conflict. It may be of value to re-consider our organizational constructs. Is the geographic combatant commander and associated joint task forces construct still appropriate and are they effective?   

We should ask strategic questions today about the fighting in Ukraine. While U.S. troops do not appear to be overtly committed, the United States is nonetheless supporting tactical actions, committing resources totaling more than three times the Marine Corps annual appropriation, without clearly articulated strategic goals. We hear platitudes of “defending democracy” or dubious assertions we need to stop Putin from his plans to conquer all of Europe—but no real strategic goals. 

As noted, military leadership has more experience and qualifications than anyone else in understanding how to best shape our Nation’s strategy during conflict. Understanding how our strategy became insufficient in Iraq and Afghanistan and how it remains insufficient in Ukraine is important. Understanding and either validating or modifying for better results the roles of military leadership in defining strategy should also be considered. It is time to repeat the post-Vietnam efforts to understand what has gone wrong and determine how can be precluded from happening again. 

>Col Vohr served as a Logistics Officer and MAGTF Planner.