Gazette Article Topic: Strategy & Policy

A novel view for tactical units

“The current T&E [Training & Education] system is not preparing the Marine Corps for the future operating environment.”

—Training and Education 2030

The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that we are exiting a time of strategic atrophy.1 The DOD, including the United States Special Operations Command, is shifting toward emphasizing near-peer adversaries, in which we are faced with new and unique strategic problems not present during the Global War on Terrorism. As such, the Marine Corps is also rapidly evolving and transforming—using such critical documents as the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations, Training and Education, Talent Management 2030, and Stand-in Forces (SIF) as guiding features to enable our transformation to meet the challenges posed by our strategic enemies.2

As stated in A Concept for Stand-in Forces, SIF: (1) “reassure the Nation and our allies and partners,” (2) “win the all-domain reconnaissance battle,” (3) “win the all-domain counter-reconnaissance battle, and (4) “intentionally disrupt adversary plans.”3 Specifically, for this article, SIF “disrupt an adversary’s plans at every point on the competition continuum.”4 While individual Marines, tactical units, or the Marine Corps are not tasked with creating strategy, the truth is that we do not expect mere tactical-level results with the SIF concept during times of competition, crisis, and conflict. Rather, we expect impacts on the operational and (preferably) the strategic level of war by our SIF units.

However, while we desire and hope for enduring strategic-level results of our SIF, we as an entity generally do not educate our tactical-level Marines on the strategic level of war or strategic competition. As stated in Training and Education 2030, “As we prepare for the future fight, we need Marines who possess the intellectual ability to out-think their adversaries,” and “the most important warfighting advantage we have is the mental and physical endurance of our Marines, and their ability to make better decisions under pressure than our adversaries.”5 Therefore, the purpose of this article is to describe and illustrate strategic competition in a novel manner for our SIF units. As stated in A Concept for Stand-in Forces (ref), “SIF also practice ‘integrated deterrence,’ which means they coordinate their activities with the joint force, interagency, and allied and partnered nations to achieve greater results than could be gained by acting alone.”6 Thus, by arming SIF with knowledge and a conceptual model on strategic competition in outside declared theaters of active armed conflicts (ODTAAC), tactical units have the potential to facilitate strategic objects to a greater extent in ODTAAC environments.

Strategic Environment
Former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, noted that gray-area conflicts are the most likely and most difficult challenges for democracies to face.7 In 2023—with the compression of the three levels of war, in which the tactical individual is closer to the strategic level of war—tactical warfighters must recognize that gray-zone conflicts must be understood as cohesive organized campaigns that typically apply non-military measures to achieve political goals over several years to decades while remaining below the threshold of war. These campaigns are suited for the educated and trained Marine(s) due to our history in small wars (i.e., Banana Wars, combined action platoons, etc). Additionally, history clearly demonstrates that foreign militaries who are seen as a liberation force and not an occupation force, such as a surge of conventional forces, have a higher likelihood of strategic success. Regarding gray-zone conflicts, Mazaar states that gray-zone conflicts are “a pattern of state rivalry that can substitute for traditional military aggression, and which can pose serious challenges to U.S. strategy.”8

As stated by Jeffrey Record, “the United States has become a victim of its conventional military success.”9 According to Colin Gray, the U.S. war machine can be defined as: (1) apolitical, (2) astrategic, (3) ahistorical, (4), problem-solving, optimistic, (5) culturally ignorant, (6) technologically dependent, (7), firepower focused, (8), large scale, (9), profoundly regular, (10) impatient, (11), logistically excellent, and (12) sensitive to casualties.10 The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America states, “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model … Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit.”11 Our strategic adversaries have studied our history and analyzed our strengths and weaknesses and are conducting active measures to domestically and internationally weaken the United States to achieve their national objectives.

According to Kilcullen, Chinese military strategists developed a simultaneous dual-pronged strategy; one of economic and political engagement.12 This dual-pronged strategy is in combination with their acceleration of their military competencies. This development appears to be in line with the concepts put forth in Unrestricted Warfare written by the Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare provides numerous examples of how non-conventional methods can be used against the United States to achieve political goals in a form of hybrid warfare.13 As stated by Hassett,

the U.S. military is insufficiently postured, trained, and resourced through doctrinal publication guidance to counter current and emerging hybrid threats in the future. Hybrid warfare will continue to serve as an effective operational concept for adversary state and non-state actors in the future.14

Thus, education and understanding are paramount for SIF during times of competition.

Strategic Competition
The principal reason for this article is to describe strategic competition in a novel way in hopes of facilitating strategic impacts in ODTAAC environments by tactical units, primarily SIF units. The terms great-power competition and strategic competition have come to be buzzwords in the U.S. military. While these words are thrown around constantly, few can define great-power competition and even fewer can define strategic competition, despite these words dominating military leaders’ meetings, plans, and actions. As stated by Miller et al., “Competition now permeates nearly every contemporary U.S. strategic document.”15 Miller et al. define competition as “the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, leverage, and advantage necessary to secure their respective interests.”16 Additionally, Miller et al. define influence, leverage, and advantage as being “the power to cause an effect in indirect or intangible ways,” “the application of influence gained or created to achieve an effect or exploit an opportunity,” and “the superiority of position or condition,” respectively.17 Using the framework by Miller et al., the author visually displays strategic competition using Figures 1, 2, and 3.

At the bottom of Figures 1–3, the reader can see that at the base are the competing interests of the United States (blue) and the competing interests of an adversary (red). Miller et al. define interests as “things or concepts that a nation values—those things which states seek to protect or achieve concerning each other.”18 No matter what the United States positively performs when contending in strategic competition, the adversary’s interest will likely not go away. While the number of resources put into the targeted competition in a specific region will vary with the level of interests, it is important to note that the adversary’s general interests will remain a constant over the years; thus, patience and the emphasis on playing the long game must occur in strategic competition.

We must be cautious not to default to competition as being negative or problematic, especially tactical SIF units. Rather, tactical SIF operators should look at competition as an opportunity: “Competition provides opportunities to achieve outcomes before war, ensure favorable conditions for escalation, and gain advantage in the event of conflict. By building influence with allies, partners, and other actors is critical to producing opportunities in competition.”19

In Figure 1 (strategic competition- balanced), influence for both nation-states is depicted as equal. Advantage (represented via a triangle) acts as a fulcrum in the diagram, and for Figure 1 on the previous page, the advantage is also equal between the competing nations. It is important to note that a fulcrum simply provides the pivot point for a lever. Based on where the fulcrum is placed, will directly determine the amount of leverage, (synonymous with force and power), that a device can create. Advantage in strategic competition “is comprised of physical or virtual aspects (e.g., technology, geographic access, resources, and arsenal inventories) as well as more nebulous, cognitive elements (e.g., initiative, momentum, and skill).”20 Like many fulcrums, the advantage for the United States or its competitors can vary with time due to several variables.

Lastly, Figure 1 displays leverage via a lever for the strategic competition diagram. In strategic competition, leverage is facilitated by a “deep understanding of other actors and the strategic environment to increase the likelihood and scope of success.”21 Using the proposed strategic competition model (Figures 1–3), leverage is directly affected by both the advantage and influence of a nation.

In Figure 2 (strategic competition- negative), the reader can see that the United States’ interests (blue arrow) are directly being confronted by a strategic adversary’s interests (red arrow). However, Figure 2 shows the United States losing in strategic competition below the threshold of war. In Figure 2, the adversary has greater influence and supreme advantage, thus increasing the possible leverage in the situation and beating the United States in competition. An example of Figure 2 could be China pressuring a government of an underdeveloped nation (i.e., influence) by using their economy to build infrastructure in said nation (i.e., advantage), to minimize the U.S. influence and access in a country (leverage). By minimizing the U.S. influence in a country, China increases its global reach, resource allocation, strategic depth, and strategic encirclement. Unfortunately, Figure 2 appears to be the norm in many countries in the world due to the loss of influence by the United States as well as a shift in the advantage and leverage. Simply put, Figure 2 shows the enemy imposing their will on our Nation during strategic competition.

“Stand-in forces disrupt an adversary’s plans at every point on the competition continuum.”

—A Concept for Stand-in Forces

In Figure 3 (strategic competition-neutral), the reader can once more see that the United States’ interests (blue arrow) are directly being confronted by a strategic adversary’s interests (red arrow). Again, it must be emphasized that competing interests are to be expected as the new normal for the foreseeable future for tactical SIF units being deployed to ODTAAC environments, (which is preferred to either crisis or conflict).

In Figure 3, the reader can see that the outcome of the strategic competition is neutral despite the advantage being held by the adversary and the influence being supreme for the United States. Regarding strategic competition, this is a recommended view of how a tactical SIF unit can be ideally employed in an ODTAAC deployment. An example of Figure 3 could be China having the advantage due to their building of infrastructure in an underdeveloped nation using their economic instrument of national power, while the United States has greater influence, perhaps through a shared history; a strong, mutually benefiting relationship; and military training exchange programs.

Application and Recommendations
“SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential adversary.”22 As stated by Hassett, “great power strategic competition does not inherently imply strictly conventional forms of warfare.”23 Regarding the application of tactical SIF units, it must be emphasized that military contribution should not be the bid for success, but rather the full coordinated implementation of the United States’ instrument of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, economy, financial, intelligence, legality/ law enforcement, and technology).

This article prescribed a simple concept for understanding strategic competition. It must be emphasized that over a six-month deployment or a two-to-three-year tour of duty as a SIF unit, it is significantly easier for a SIF unit to impede our Nation’s leverage, influence, and advantage through negative and exploitable actions and information via our adversaries. Thus, we must recognize that preserving and methodically improving (over long-term sustainment) our leverage, influence, and advantage is of the utmost importance.

During competition, a SIF unit has the unique ability to measure our Nation’s influence, leverage, and advantage as on-the-ground sensors by providing on-the-ground truth. What might be perceived by national and strategic leaders as an effective campaign, operation, or situation, in all reality could be missing the mark for the targeted population. Thus, SIF units must be educated and trained accordingly. I offer four simple recommendations that the Marine Corps can and should start implementing to empower and enhance SIF units, which has been similarly suggested for SOF operating in ODTAAC environments.24

“Not the fortress, but the army that we send into the field secures our position of power in the world.”

—Gen Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke

Although training must focus on and emphasize the most dangerous situation, education should span competition, crisis, and conflict; especially considering the preferred situation is competition. While Training and Education 2030states, “Ultimately, every Marine is responsible for their own learning,”25 (in which the author agrees) we as leaders in the Marine Corps must recognize it is imperative to educate our Marines by providing the optimal resources and direction. To facilitate the SIF concept, our tactical-level professional military education should incorporate the concepts of strategy.

However, more importantly, tactical SIF commanders and leaders must develop their unit professional military education specific to the region their SIF unit will deploy using the concept of the strategic lens. The strategic lens (which has been updated from its original concept by including language), which includes geography, culture, history, language, religion, governmental systems, education, and economics, is of the utmost importance for SIF units.26 As stated,

The ‘strategic lens,’ like most lens, can be viewed from different angles. Regarding the ‘strategic lens,’ tactical SOF units must view the lens through the host nation, the relevant population, the belligerents, the strategic competitors, the United States, etc. By only viewing the ‘strategic lens’ through the viewpoint of the United States, the tactical SOF unit promotes the negative stereotype of the United States as being culturally unaware, ahistorical, and arrogant.27

Miller et al state, “To make informed assessments about degrees of influence, one must develop a better understanding of populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and other strategic issues.”28

2. Integrate with SOF
SOF has unique authorities and permissions that our SIF units will not possess. Additionally, SOF usually has access and placement that conventional forces do not have. A gap for SOF will always be capacity since a SOF principle is that you cannot mass produce SOF. However, SIF embedding with SOF is mutually beneficial in several ways.

First, SIF provides added capacity for SOF units, especially regarding foreign internal defense (training of the host nation forces). The author truly believes that a highly proficient machinegunner or mortarman, for example, should out cycle the average SOF operator on said weapons systems because these Marines are tasked with being the true subject-matter experts, while the SOF operator is tasked with a high number of varying skills.29 Thus, through this integration, our combined forces can increase the total number of partnered forces trained. Second, via this collaboration, we can also increase dispersed operations across the area of operations because the mixture of SOF and SIF can cover more units. It must be noted that dispersed military operations are being called for by our current guiding documents.

3. Educate the Joint Force
As the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, and Stand-in Forces continue to be enacted, we need to ensure the Joint Force (JF) understands our capabilities, limitations, and the opportunities we bring to the JF.30 As Marines, we must recognize that self-promotion isolated within our community is flawed. Thus, education on our capabilities to the JF via engagements, exchanges, liaison, etc. to increase our presence inside the weapon engagement zone as SIF is necessary.

4. Increased Communication Among All Relevant Players
As stated in previous works on SOF in ODTAAC environments, there are many strategic factors that tactical SOF units cannot impact. However, tactical SOF units can promote positive communication between all the relevant players up, down, and laterally within the chain of command. Regarding communication, lateral or higher units in the chain of command may possess permissions, capabilities, and intelligence that is needed for a SOF unit. Similarly, a SOF unit may possess permissions, capabilities, and intelligence needed by others.31

While written about tactical SOF units, this is equally as true for Marine Corps SIF units of action. To elicit operational and strategic effects in strategic competition via SIF, we have to communicate to the relevant players (i.e., joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial) our missions, locations, capabilities, initiatives, opportunities, and the ground truth. Our SIF units doing great tactical actions that do not lead to operational or strategic effects is not what our Nation needs and is not in line with the SIF operating concept. Using Figures 1–3, our tactical SIF units-of-actions will not have the ability to directly utilize strategic leverage (i.e., exploit strategic opportunities) and must rely on the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial communities; however, our SIF can have greater effects on influence and advantage. Therefore, our SIF units must rely on others, such as politicians and strategic leaders to utilize and apply leverage. Thus, six questions our SIF units should ask are: Does this hurt our national influence? How do we increase our national influence? Does this hurt our national advantage? How do we increase our national advantage? Does this lessen opportunities for national leverage? How can we create opportunities for national leverage?

“Create purpose-built forces … Aggregating specialized units with base elements creates a tailored multi-domain force in order to provide maximum relevant combat power (RCP) on demand.”

—Force Design 2030

Conclusion
During the 2018 House Armed Services Committee, Gen Raymond stated that “SOF is uniquely capable of effectively competing below the level of traditional armed conflict and across the spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.”32 While Gen Raymond was referring to SOF, the author believes SIF can also contribute in this manner. While both SOF and conventional forces should prepare for absolute conflict, we must also train, educate, and equip our SIF units on and for strategic competition illustrated via Figures 1–3. Of the U.S. military conventional-tactical units, tactical SIF units must thrive in competition.

“Forces that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable.”

—Force Design 2030

Notes

1. Jim Mattis, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: 2017).

2. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019); Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020); Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations 2d Edition, (Washington, DC: 2023); Gen David H. Berger, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2023); Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021); and Gen David H. Berger, A Concept for Stand-in Forces, (Washington, DC: 2021).

3. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

4. Ibid.

5. Training and Education 2030.

6. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

7. Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007).

8. Michael Mazar, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, 2015).

9. Beating Goliath.

10. Colin S. Gray, The American War of War. Critique and Implications. Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

11. National Defense Strategy.

12. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

13. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Battleboro: Echo Point Books & Media, 1999).

14. Patrick S. Hasset, “The Hybrid Warfare Vulnerability,” Marine Corps Gazette 105, No. 5 (2021).

15. Joe Miller, Monte Erfourth, Jeremiah Monk, and Ryan Oliver, “Harnessing David and Goliath: Orthodoxy, Asymmetry, and Competition,” Small Wars Journal, February 7, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/harnessing-david-and-goliath-orthodoxy-asymmetry-and-competition.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

23. “The Hybrid Warfare Vulnerability.”

24. Jeremy Carter, “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts: Guiding Features for Enduring Strategic Effects,” (thesis, American Military University, 2021).

25. Training and Education 2030.

26. “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts.”

27. Ibid.

28. “Harnessing David and Goliath.”

29. Jeremy Carter and Thomas Ochoa, “The Relationship Between Enlisted and Officers- Part 1: The T-Shape Philosophy,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7, (2023).

30. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance; Force Design 2030; and A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

31. “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts.”

32. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 115th Congress, (2018) (statement of Raymond Thomas).

Observation from OIF and OEF

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, I served on what was then the Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Combat Assessment Team. There was a sense of urgency in gathering campaign lessons learned and the team members of the team were imbedded in staffs across the MEF. We contributed as part of the staff during the day and captured observations at night. When Baghdad fell and I MEF was re-deployed home, we spent a couple of months synthesizing what we had learned into something that would hopefully be helpful for future fights. 

Our observations were focused on tactical lessons learned. The Marine Corps, after all, fights at the tactical level. Although I spent a lot of time studying and thinking about the operational level of war, my perspective has shifted, and I now argue the operational level of war does not exist.  It is a construct (and not a useful one) for warfighting, justifying, in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, general officer positions and massive supporting staff. Every staff, from combatant commanders through joint task forces, and functional component commanders, to the MEF claims to fight at the operational level of war. 

These “operational-level staffs” create a massive demand for tactical information from those doing the actual fighting while diffusing authority, responsibility, and accountability. Accountability and responsibility are vital in war, and it is critical to know who is empowered to make decisions.  He who makes decisions in war is responsible for strategy, and I am not certain our current organizational constructs make it clear who is in charge.   

As a related aside, it should be troubling to recognize the United States won World War II with fewer than a dozen four-star admirals and generals leading sixteen million men and women in uniform. The nature of war has not changed even though its character has evolved with technology. We are creatures of our technology, however, and one could argue war’s complexity has not necessarily become more difficult to manage. Today, we have forty-three four-star admirals and generals, and our win-loss record is not great. I thought the Information Age was supposed to flatten organizations. 

A tactical observation made, but perhaps not captured, by the Iraqi Freedom Combat Assessment Team was the failure in Phase IV planning. Phase IV was the phase that would follow the conclusion of combat operations. To say the Phase IV plan for I MEF was opaque would be charitable. Honestly, though I MEF planners were not negligent, they received no direction from the combined forces land Component commander or from anyone else.   

Arguably, the reason there was no direction for Phase IV is there was no strategic goal for the U.S. war in Iraq for which Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the opening campaign. There were vague goals surrounding finding weapons of mass destruction. Also, suggestions of ties between the Iraqis and the events of 11 September and after the initial campaign the shift from finding weapons of mass destruction to regime change continued to add ambiguity to our strategic goals. What was to come after regime change? What was the overarching U.S. strategic goal in Iraq? We did not have one. 

We did not have a strategic goal or a strategy in Afghanistan either; if we did, it was a bad strategy. In hindsight, Afghanistan should have been a punitive expedition with the goal of punishing those responsible for the 11 September attacks and those who provided them refuge. The United States had a worldwide charter of approval for a punitive expedition, after which U.S. forces should have been withdrawn.   

On 18 August 2021, following the debacle that was the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Berger, wrote a letter to Marines who had served in Afghanistan. He said,  

You fought to defend your country, your family, your friends, and your neighbors. You fought to prevent terror from returning to our shores. You fought for the liberty of young Afghan girls, women, boys, and men who want the same individual freedoms we enjoy as Americans. You fought for the Marine to your left and the Marine to your right. You never let them down. 

All of this is true, all of it is noble, and all of it is truly laudable and reflects the values of Marines and the Marine Corps. But through it all, one must wonder, what was the U.S. strategic goal in Afghanistan? Were Marines fighting for the liberty of young Afghan girls, women, boys, and men? Is that the goal for which we invested more than twenty years’ worth of effort and national treasure? 

A popular saying in the wake of the U.S. loss in Vietnam was that we won all the battles and lost the war. We dominated tactically and lost strategically. After Vietnam and through the 1980s, the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Nation writ large went through a catharsis of sorts, working to understand the failure and how to avoid the same again. One of the products of this work was what became known as the Weinberger Doctrine, which amounted to a list of questions and pre-conditions to be met before committing U.S. forces to conflict. The Weinberger Doctrine to many appeared quaint and inapplicable in the “changed world” of 2002. I would argue the tenants of the Weinberger Doctrine were applicable then and are just as applicable now.   

From my vantage point, there has been no effort comparable to post-Vietnam in understanding the failures of Afghanistan and Iraq. The focus has shifted to China and for the Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, kind of like a “whew, I’m glad that’s over, we need to get ready for what’s next.” I hope, at minimum, work has been done, as was done in 2003 to capture tactical lessons learned for the Marine Corps. Those lessons have immediate value and importance.   

So, why is this important to the Marine Corps and readers of the Marine Corps Gazette to think about strategy? Because many of the Marines reading the Gazette today will soon find themselves in the position of shaping national strategy. But our national strategy for Afghanistan and Iraq was the responsibility of our Nation’s civil leadership, right? A cornerstone of our constitutional republic is civil control of the military, they define our national goals. The military supports the national strategy.   

All of this is true, but at the same time, nobody in the Nation understands conflict and security better than those in uniform. The Nation invests in cultivating this knowledge and should be able, when necessary, to harvest the fruit. Senior military leadership has spent decades in uniform, in operational roles, in supporting roles, and attending schools. By the time these leaders arrive at the pinnacle of their careers, none of the civilians they support and advise can hold a candle to their training, education, and experience in matters of national security. 

Moreover, throughout their careers Army and Marine leaders at least learned the importance of well-defined goals for tactical-level operations. They recognize tactical goals are the pinnacle of a pyramid resting on the foundational layer of strategy and strategic goals. As was seen by I MEF in 2003 during phase IV planning, tactical goals are impossible to divine absent strategic guidance.    

This begs the question, why were we conducting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan without defined strategic goals military forces were fighting to achieve? If we did have a strategy, why did we fail to attain our goal? Why, when former Commandant, Gen Berger penned his letter to the Marines, was he unable to point to or mention what had been achieved or not achieved in terms of worthy and defined strategic aims? Why is there an after-the-fact questioning by many Americans of why we were even in Afghanistan, countered by vague assertions, with foundations of support resting in the shifting sand of assumptions of it being better to fight potential terrorists abroad rather than at home?   

Developing strategic goals implies the need for political consensus and approval. This means Congressional approval. In both conflicts, the use of force was authorized by Congress for initial operations, but there was little to no Congressional oversight focused on validating or shifting strategic goals in subsequent years of these long wars. There are many reasons for this lack of oversight. 

Strategy is not stagnant nor is strategy limited to planning. Developing plans is merely the first step of strategy, the most important part being the identification of the strategic goal, followed by a reconciliation of that goal with means and ways. Strategy continues beyond planning, however, with an endless series of decisions, adjusting to the changing reality to attain the goal. With each decision comes another round of reconciling means and ways to ensure they remain sufficient and feasible.   

Perhaps, with so few members of Congress having prior military experience, there was a dearth of understanding of the requirement for continuous oversight. Perhaps Congress simply trusted the military and State Department with the mission. Perhaps there was Congressional consensus, spoken or unspoken, for the need to project unity in the face of conflict. Perhaps political discussions of strategic goals were intentionally avoided precisely because doing so would create unwelcome controversy. It certainly is easier to simply approve generous annual appropriations to continue tactical actions than it is to wrestle in strategic discussions.       

The various war colleges are the capstone educational experience for officers. Much time is devoted to the discussion and understanding of civil-military relations. These institutions are probably one of the best venues to at least begin discussions on what has gone wrong in recent conflicts with the goal of improvement. While these discussions would make interesting non-attributional fodder for lectures and seminars, something formal and attributional resulting in a product with recommendations would better serve the Nation’s needs. 

Two questions that should be explored are what was the relationship between senior military officers and civil leadership from 2001 to 2021 and was it sufficient? In the over twenty years of conflict, no senior military officer ever spoke publicly with real misgivings in either conflict. Was this because of misplaced confidence in the status of ongoing operations?   

If this is the case, our armed services have a training and educational shortfall that precludes leaders from accurately assessing conflict. In July and August 2021, most civilians with common sense recognized the looming disaster in Afghanistan. It is puzzling to hear assertions that military leadership saw no warnings and indicators of imminent collapse.     

There would be true value when those who participated in Iraq and Afghanistan were available to examine these questions and to determine why we keep failing to get our strategy right. It would be valuable to re-consider the roles of military leadership in determining strategy in conflict. It may be of value to re-consider our organizational constructs. Is the geographic combatant commander and associated joint task forces construct still appropriate and are they effective?   

We should ask strategic questions today about the fighting in Ukraine. While U.S. troops do not appear to be overtly committed, the United States is nonetheless supporting tactical actions, committing resources totaling more than three times the Marine Corps annual appropriation, without clearly articulated strategic goals. We hear platitudes of “defending democracy” or dubious assertions we need to stop Putin from his plans to conquer all of Europe—but no real strategic goals. 

As noted, military leadership has more experience and qualifications than anyone else in understanding how to best shape our Nation’s strategy during conflict. Understanding how our strategy became insufficient in Iraq and Afghanistan and how it remains insufficient in Ukraine is important. Understanding and either validating or modifying for better results the roles of military leadership in defining strategy should also be considered. It is time to repeat the post-Vietnam efforts to understand what has gone wrong and determine how can be precluded from happening again. 

>Col Vohr served as a Logistics Officer and MAGTF Planner.