The month-long battle for Belleau Wood in June 1918 during World War I rightly commands a prominent place in Marine Corps history. After all, the fighting there on the first day alone claimed more Marines than in all of America’s previous wars and conflicts involving Marines combined. Among its many accomplishments at Belleau Wood, the Marine Corps broke new ground, organizationally, when for the first time in its 143-year existence it fielded a brigade to fight alongside the U.S. Army in a protracted ground campaign. What makes this fact particularly significant is that the Marine Corps’ chief role two decades earlier was providing nothing more than small detachments to guard naval ships and stations.
In a message commemorating its 80th anniversary, the 31st Commandant General Charles C. Krulak anointed Belleau Wood the transitional event in the Marine Corps history, placing it above Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Inchon. He was not alone in assigning Belleau Wood the honor of being “the birthplace of the modern-day Marine Corps.” Military historian Agostino von Hassell called the battle “the foundation” of today’s Marine Corps, as did renown Marine Corps historian Joseph Alexander, who added, “the modern Marine Corps… may have been “born” in Philadelphia’s Tun Tavern in 1775, but it was bred in the wheat fields and underbrush of Belleau Wood in 1918.”
While Belleau Wood was indeed a benchmark event in every respect, does it best exemplify the modern Marine Corps? Or are there other battles in the service’s nearly 250-year history that might be more reflective of today’s Marines? Although this article neither questions Belleau Wood’s rightful place in Marine Corps history nor seeks to diminish the unparalleled heroism or the many lessons learned, it does, however, argue the Marines’ role in the 1898 naval campaign against Cuba during the Spanish-American War is arguably more representative of the modern Marine Corps.
Origins
The modern Marine Corps’ birth has its origins in America’s rise to western regional hegemony beginning in 1823, necessitating a more active U.S. Navy and, eventually, a renewed purpose for its Marines. The primary policy guiding U.S. national interests and security at that time was the Monroe Doctrine aimed at blocking European powers from interfering in the western hemisphere. Speaking before Congress, President James Monroe declared “any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portions of this Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”
Concurrent with America’s newfound regional dominance was its growing industrial might. Following decades of neglect and civil war, the Navy entered into an era of intellectual and operational reform. American sea power doctrine manifested itself in a ‘new’ Navy and a transition from wooden wind-driven ships to armored coal-fueled battleships and cruisers. Coal and steel gave way to ships capable of displacing greater distances at faster speeds. This challenge, however, was keeping large quantities of coal accessible to the fleet while at sea.

The Navy’s brightest junior- and mid-grade officers at the Naval War College, established in 1884 to study the service’s new mission and role in America’s expanding national interests, recommended acquiring and even seizing territory in the Caribbean, the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands and creating coaling stations for the squadrons escorting U.S. commerce ships. This advanced base concept coincided with Navy Commanders Theodorus B.M. Mason’s and Bowman H. McCalla’s earlier notion that the Navy’s future lay in landing tactics and operations. Long-time Marine Corps historian Jack S. Shulimson noted in “The Marine Corps Search for a Mission, 1880-1989” that the Navy’s core intellectuals at the college “explored avenues of naval strategy that would obviously require landing forces, in all probability Marine landing forces.” One such intellectual was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who offered that Marines serve as the “backbone of any force landing on the enemy’s coast.”
Dress Rehearsal
Simultaneous to ongoing naval reforms was a separatist uprising in Panama (then part of Columbia) in 1885, threatening the 40-mile long cross-isthmus railway connecting the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean and American efforts to construct the Panama Canal. The potential impact on the American economy and regional stability prompted U.S. President Grover Cleveland to order a naval expeditionary force from North Atlantic Squadron to proceed to the Caribbean and, if necessary, land Marines to secure the railway and restore order. Commander McCalla assumed command of the naval force assembling at the Navy Yard in Brooklyn, N.Y.
Upon his initial inspection, McCalla sent a request for additional Marines to Navy Secretary William Whitney. The request centered on his desire to avoid assigning sailors to shore tasks. Landing parties dating from the American Revolution were often a mix of sailors and Marines. During both the Mexican-American War and the American Civil War, however, the Marine Corps augmented its sea-going detachments with additional Marines from other naval stations to prevent this practice. In the case of Panama, McCalla, like the Marine Corps, wanted few, if any, Sailors ashore and to maintain naval readiness and each ship’s at-sea functions. Pulling from the Marine Barracks at Boston, Brooklyn and Philadelphia, Marine Corps Commandant Colonel Charles G. McCawley ordered Major Charles Heywood to organize a 549-man brigade.
On April 27, the Marine brigade landed in Panama. In addition to serving as a quick reaction force, the Marines patrolled the hills and small towns scattered along the railway and canal routes and performed various policing duties. Following the expedition, McCalla was critical of the Marines in his report to the Secretary Whitney titled “Report of Commander McCalla upon the Naval Expedition to the Isthmus of Panama, April 1885.” In his report, McCalla assessed the Marines lacked training in basic infantry tactics and handling of machine guns and artillery. To remedy these shortfalls, he recommended Colonel McCawley mandate training in both areas.
Most notable was his recommendation that the Marine Corps form, equip and train permanent expeditionary units for use “in future naval operations.” The Navy could then ferry these units in transports traveling alongside its battleships and use in naval expeditions. McCawley, however, declined McCalla’s advice for fear that refocusing the Marine Corps would leave it vulnerable to an Army obsessed with absorbing the smaller naval service. The idea nonetheless garnered attention within the Navy Department. Regardless, the Panama expedition was a clear indication that Marines would serve a vastly different role in future naval expeditions.

War with Spain
While the Panama expedition demonstrated America’s intent to carry out the Monroe Doctrine, it first real test came in 1895 after Spanish atrocities against Cuban revolutionaries pushed U.S. President William McKinley to contemplate an all-out invasion to liberate the island. He decided instead to anchor USS Maine in Havana Harbor as a show of force. On the evening of Feb. 15, 1898, an explosion sank Maine, killing 253 officers and enlisted men, including dozens of Marines. After the U.S. declared war on Spain, the Navy Department responded by recommending to McKinley a series of naval actions primarily to cripple the Spanish fleet, but also to buy the U.S. Army time to mobilize an invasion and occupation force. In the interim, the Navy would oversee the blockade of Cuban ports and bombard entrapped Spanish naval and ground forces.
“The greatest necessity” to prosecuting this plan was the availability of coal.
Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and Major General Charles Heywood, now the Commandant of the Marine Corps testified before the Committee on Naval Affairs on March 11 for an end-strength increase in anticipation of a war. Although the increase, at least originally, was for additional seagoing detachments, attention shifted to providing Marines for the advanced base concept under review by the Navy Department. On April 16, Long ordered Heywood to organize and equip a battalion for immediate duty with Admiral William T. Sampson’s North Atlantic Fleet and action against Spain. Like the Panama expedition, Heywood sourced 623 Marines from East Coast naval stations to form the First Marine Battalion’s five infantry companies and an artillery battery under Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington, the Marine Barracks Brooklyn’s commanding officer.
Huntington embarked the preponderance of his battalion on the transport ship USS Panther on April 22 pre-loaded with food, water, pioneering equipment, searchlights, medical supplies and ammunition. A second transport, USS Resolute arrived to take on the remaining Marines, but required structural modifications. While Resolute underwent modification, Panther joined Sampson’s fleet off Virginia before sailing to the naval station at Key West, Fla., where he offloaded the Marines and their provisions. The Marines underwent marksmanship training and a tactical field exercise until Resolute arrived.
On the morning of June 7, the Key West naval station commander received a telegram from Washington, D.C., ordering him to “Send the Marine Battalion at once to [Admiral] Sampson without waiting for the Army.” The battalion, at least initially, would be the American main effort in a war plan involving a blockade of the Spanish naval fleet anchored at Santiago de Cuba on the island’s southeastern coast. The purpose of the blockade was to prevent the Spanish fleet’s interference with the 5th Army Corps’ movement to Cuba and subsequent operations. Located 90 miles from Cuba, Key West housed the closet coaling station. To prevent providing too visible a naval target for the Spanish fleet arriving from Europe, planners suggested an advanced base on the island’s eastern-most tip roughly 50 miles east of Santiago at Guantanamo Bay. Planners assigned the 1st Marine Battalion the mission of establishing the advanced base. Assigned the mission to oversee the landing at Guantanamo Bay by Sampson was none other than Commander McCalla.

An Advanced Base Blueprint
The 1st Marine Battalion’s actions in Cuba are a matter of official record. Jerry Roberts’ “Marines in Battle: Guantanamo Bay, 10 June–9 August 1898” and Jack Shulimson and David E. Kelly’s “Marines in the Spanish-American War: 1895-1899: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography” are two invaluable sources recounting the Marine landing and subsequent operations in Cuba. Suffice to say, Sampson’s prosecution of the naval campaign against Spanish forces would not have been possible without Marines.
For two months, the Marines not only defended their advanced base, aptly named Camp McCalla, against successive Spanish ground attacks, but they expanded the base’s perimeter by seizing the high ground at Cuzco Well with the assistance of naval gunfire. The Marines’ presence along with nearly 1,000 Cuban fighters held a Spanish force of up to 7,000 soldiers in place in anticipation of continued counterattacks, possibly changing the outcome of the fighting at Santiago and the campaign.
During the blockade and a dozen other actions in and around Cuba, Sampson’s fleet of more than 100 ships participated in the naval campaign against the Spanish Navy, of which many used Guantanamo Bay to refuel, as an assembly area or for safe refuge. The advanced base played a major role in the subsequent land campaign to secure the island and other Spanish territories, as well. A week after the Spanish surrender of Santiago, more than 16,000 soldiers under U.S. Army General Nelson A. Miles used Guantanamo Bay as the staging area and jumping-off point for the invasion of Puerto Rico some 500 miles to the east of Cuba on July 21.
Before the fighting in Puerto Rico was over and the Spain-American War ended, the 1st Battalion were back in America less six Marines who paid the ultimate sacrifice. Another nine endured wounds from enemy fire. Sergeant John Quick would earn the Medal of Honor for his actions at Cuzco Well. Two officers, Captain George F. Elliott and First Lieutenant Wendell C. Neville, rose to become Commandant of the Marine Corps and were instrumental in keeping Marines on board ships and engaged in naval warfare. Their experiences at Guantanamo Bay certainly influenced them.
A mere two years later, in 1900, the Navy Department commissioned the General Board of the Navy to keep the Navy, and the Marine Corps, looking forward. One of its inaugural acts was assigning the Marine Corps the official responsibility of further developing the advanced base concept. In summary, the board directed the Marines to stand up a coastal and naval base defense force for the purposes of establishing both mobile and fixed bases in the event of major naval or landing operations. Relying only upon the Navy, the mission was the first recognized U.S. joint-service task force and gave the Marine Corps near-complete autonomy and operational independence.

Between 1903 and 1921, the Marine Corps introduced sweeping innovations to the concept. The advanced base force would evolve into the Fleet Marine Force, while the concept and mission itself would become the basis for the amphibious doctrine developed throughout the 1920s and 1930s and which the Marines executed throughout the Pacific theater of World War II from 1942 to 1945. Although there was a need for Marines in Europe during World War I and the 4th Marine Brigade’s performance brought about a positive change in how most viewed the service, it does not diminish the fact that Belleau Wood diverted the Marine Corps away from its primary mission. Worse yet was that employing Marines in a protracted land campaign gave the Army a stronger platform to argue for a smaller Marine Corps, a limited function and, in 1946, its outright abolishment.
Conclusion
The aforementioned argument is not a new one. Accomplished Marine Corps historian Robert D. Heinl reasoned in his 1962 “Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. Marine Corps, 1775-1962” that “by action and not by theory, Colonel Huntington’s fleet landing force had set a pattern for employment of U.S. Marines, which would still stand more than a half century and three wars later.” Similarly, historian Trevor K. Plante contends the Marines at Guantanamo Bay “… displayed something future [M]arines would take pride in—the ability to be called and respond at a moment’s notice.
That the Marines organized a battalion-size force and conducted an amphibious landing on a foreign shore with little-to-no notice is an exceptional accomplishment in and of itself. Doing this without an amphibious doctrine or having practiced the tactics and techniques further validates the significance of the Guantanamo Bay landing and seizure. What is more is the Marines accomplished this nearly 20 years to the day that their successors charged into German machine-gun fire traversing the wheatfields outside Belleau Wood. Yet, to some, the mission of seizing an advanced base is somehow less reflective of the modern Marine Corps and its mission, which unequivocally requires seizing expeditionary advanced bases for naval operations. Belleau Wood’s rightful prominence aside, perhaps it is time to put the Marines’ actions at Guantanamo Bay in the proper perspective and as the modern Marine Corps birth as a naval expeditionary force in readiness.
Author’s bio: Dr. Nevgloski is the former director of the Marine Corps History Division. Before becoming the Marine Corps’ history chief in 2019, he was the History Division’s Edwin N. McClellan Research Fellow from 2017 to 2019, and a U.S. Marine from 1989 to 2017.