Short End of the Stick, Part I

The Situation

Since we landed eight days ago, the operation has been going well. We quickly gained air superiority. Our mobile forces-mounted in light armored vehicles, well-equipped with a new generation of precision-guided weapons, and acting in close cooperation with our aircraft-are moving rapidly inland. Indeed, we would already have destroyed the enemy’s conventional forces were it not for the fact that so much of the country was heavily wooded.

You are the commander of a Marine infantry battalion (four companies, without attachments) serving as part of the follow-on forces that must “mop up” the pockets of resistance bypassed by the mobile forces. You have only your organic vehicles. As a result, you and your men must move and fight largely on foot. Worse yet, the density of the woods in which you operate-which remind you more than anything of the places in Quantico where you got lost trying to learn land navigation-makes the use of the new long-range precision-guided munitions almost impossible.

Thus, for the past week you have been marching and fighting the oldfashioned way. Fortunately, resistance has been light, so that you and the battalions on your flanks have been able to move about 25 kilometers a day. While there have been no wholesale surrenders, groups of enemy stragglers have been giving themselves up on a regular basis. Those enemy units that do wish to put up a fight have seldom tried to hold their ground. They have generally been satisified to drop a few trees and fire a few shots before fleeing.

Today, however, as you and your battalion, near the end of a 23-kilometer march, were entering the supposedly secure town of San Miguel, you were surprised by three enemy light armored vehicles that burst out of the woods and onto the road. One was quickly dispatched by a hail of fire from your grenade and rocket launchers. The crews of the other two vehicles surrendered in time to avoid the same fate. You were lucky this time. Although the vehicles had working machineguns and plenty of ammunition, the crews neglected to fire on the tempting target offered by your battalion on the road.

As night falls, you find your billets in San Miguel. At 2200, you receive your orders, and a home-made map. from regiment.

“We are continuing the work of securing these roads through the woods,” the order read. “Your job is to clear the stretch of woods between road number five and the Marquesa Creek, inclusive. I’m giving you no deadline; take whatever time you need to get the job done. Remember, however, we have to maintain the tempo of this operation. We don’t want to give the enemy time to reorganize itself.”

As you ponder your map, your staff gathers. The first to arrive is the supply officer, who tells you that your request for additional night vision goggles (to augment the 50 sets that you already have) has been denied.

The Requirement

Discuss your intent, the concept of operations, and the guidance you will give the staff concerning the order to be issued to the battalion. Include any plans for the use of supporting arms, an overlay of any schemes of maneuver, and any further communications you would make with battalion. Then give a brief explanation of your rationale. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game #91-10, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the author’s and other solutions in the December issue.

Gap at the bridge

Knowing your enemy means, understanding his capabilities and general intentions. But it also means seeing things the way he sees them, thinking the way he thinks, with the aim of anticipating his actions and thereby gaining the upper hand.

This tactical decision game may look familiar to some readers. It is, in fact, TDG 90-1, “The Enemy Over the Bridge,” with one very significant difference: This time you are the enemy. How will knowing how you reacted to “The Enemy Over the Bridge” influence your actions now that the shoe is on the other foot?

The Situation

You are the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The division is halted temporarily, but the division commander plans to resume the offensive toward the south as soon as logistics can be brought forward. You have been operating north of the river against enemy reconnaissance and security elements. The enemy holds the riverline and the bridge in strength. (You believe the river to be unfordable.) Intelligence indicates that the enemy is planning an imminent offensive north across the river-sooner than your division can be ready to attack in strength. Your mission, which gives you broad latitude in the manner of execution, is to take whatever actions you can to disrupt the enemy attack in your sector.

A reconnaissance patrol by one of your companies discovers that the enemy forces that were holding the bridge have withdrawn. The company commander has already begun to infiltrate his company across the bridge. You decide to exploit the situation by getting your entire battalion south of the river with an eye toward mounting a spoiling attack. In the process, one of your companies has an engagement near the bridge with an enemy scout car, which flees west on the river road. You contact regiment and explain the actions you have set in motion. The colonel tells you he will reinforce with all the forces he can muster-infantry and tanks will begin to arrive in two to three hours. You have the priority of fires for all supporting arms, he tells you.

The time is about 2000; darkness is descending. Elements of your surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon report that Hamlet shows no signs of enemy activity. As your leading companies move into the triangular wood west of Hamlet, another STA team located on the high ground south of the wood reports an enemy column approaching from the south headed toward your position. The STA team sends the following report:

Enemy force, estimate at least battalion strength, moving north on Hamlet road, at the intersection south of the pass; covered tracks, jeeps, infantry on foot; I can hear tanks in the distance but do not have a visual.

Simultaneously, a short firelight breaks out with what appears to be an enemy patrol moving into the triangular wood from the south. You suspect it may be the advance guard of the enemy column. What do you do?

The Requirement

Within a five-minute time limit, give your solution in the form of the fragmentary order you would issue to your subordinates and support it with an overlay sketch. Then give a brief explanation of your actions-the key considerations and assumptions that shaped your decision. Send your solution without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, care of Tactical Decision Games (90-4), P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The editor will select several solutions to be published in two month’s time.

The Battle of Mount Giddy

This tactical decision game is a little different from previous ones for a couple of reasons. First, it is of a broader scope than previous problems; one might even argue that it verges on being an operational decision game rather than a purely tactical one. Second, it is a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) problem-designed for a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) commander-in which the requirement is for the broad integration of ground, air, and logistics elements rather than just the tactical control of subordinate units on the ground.

The Situation

You are a MEB commander fighting in a coastal desert that offers excellent mobility and freedom for mechanized and motorized forces save for the ridgelines, which tend to channelize vehicle movement. The theater strategy calls for the Joint Task Force (JTF)-of which the MEB is part-to mount a major land offensive toward the north out of the Damoose region. The MEB’s mission is to protect the JTF’s southern flank, i.e., its rear, as the JTF attacks north. You are authorized to trade space for time as long as you deny the enemy the Damoose-Brut line, Brut being a key port and airfield and Damoose being a key logistics node.

Your MEB command element (CE) and brigade service support group (BSSG) are located at Damoose. Your aviation combat element (ACE) is located at Brut. The air situation is one of relative parity, the enemy being stronger in air defense assets while you are stronger in offensive air assets. Your ground combat element (GCE) consists of a motorized infantry battalion (minus) in the vicinity of Mount Giddy with a company detached at Huffy, a battalion of amphibious assault vehicles near Gooselub, another along the railroad west of Bed Lake, a light armored infantry company (reinforced) also guarding the right flank near Berra. and a tank battalion (minus) in reserve near Nevertheless. The enemy has a superiority of roughly two to one in ground forces

You plan to conduct a delaying action, trading space for time. You intend to fall back only under pressure, making the enemy pay for every inch of terrain but avoiding decisive engagement. Since yours is a subsidiary mission, you do not intend to force a decision but rather to forestall one. The JTF offensive has been underway nearly a week and to this point the enemy on your front has played into your hands by remaining relatively inactive, probing but not threatening your forward defensive positions. He has irregular forces equipped with light vehicles operating out of the barren desert to the west who periodically try to cut the Damoose railroad, an important line of communication. Intelligence has been reporting a buildup of enemy armored and mechanized forces and supplies south of Gooselub over the last 48 hours. The G-2 anticipates the enemy will mount an offensive in that sector within the next 72 hours.

As it turns out, however, the enemy buildup in the south is actually a wellexecuted deception. Instead of striking Gooselub, the enemy attacks in strength at Mount Giddy supported by massed offensive airpower. The GCE commander also reports that the light armored company and mechanized battalion on the right flank are under attack but holding their own, as is the battalion at Gooselub. But he reports that he cannot make contact with the motorized battalion at Mount Giddy, which apparently has been overrun. Within 12 hours scattered situation reports indicate that enemy mechanized and armored forces have reached Nevertheless, where they are being engaged by the reserve tank battalion, and are beginning to bypass Huffy headed north along the littoral plain.

By all accounts a major offensive has penetrated your left front and is pouring unchecked into your rear. As the MEB commander, what will you do?

The Requirement

Develop a MEB plan that includes a general concept operations (with intent) and broad missions for your GCE, ACE, and combat service support element as appropriate. (Leave it to your staff to work out the details.) Then provide a brief explanation of your plan. Send your solution without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, c/o Tactical Decision Games, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish several solutions in two months’ time.

The Infantry Company in the Desert

With nearly a third of the Marine Corps deployed in the desert, opposed by a large tank threat, every Marine ought to be thinking seriously about how to fight tanks. Such thinking raises questions at a number of levels. Confronting a tank-heavy enemy with one of our Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTF) organizations is one thing, a problem to be solved by generals and colonels alike. There is a different set of problems to be solved by companies, platoons, and squads of Marine infantry and for combat service support Marines, problems of close combat against tanks that loom as overriding for a lance corporal and drive into insignificance any theories of fighting the MAGTF. Make no mistake: colonels and generals also need to be vitally concerned about combat at this level.

Marines are infantrymen. The Marine expeditionary force, combined arms force that it is, remains fundamentally an infantry unit. Therefore, Marines ought to be able to answer the question: What does infantry do against tanks in the desert?

Focusing on the company level, this problem is designed to begin a dialog in answer to that question.

Background

You are commanding officer, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7). It is 0530, 12 December 1990. Mounted in amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), you have been moving south to north across the open Southwest Asian desert, following an intensive but indecisive battle against enemy mechanized forces. You, Company B, 1/7, and Company A, 1st Engineers, have been placed under the leadership of commanding officer, 1st Tank Battalion (-) (+), following the battle. He is operating as part of Task Force Mauler, a combined arms task force whose mission is to find and destroy an enemy armored brigade.

Your company includes detachments from the Dragon, TOW, and 81mm mortar platoons. In addition to your tables of organization (T/O) allocations of small arms, automatic weapons, and machineguns, your inventory of weapons includes:

2 TOWs (HMMWV-Mounted)

8 Dragons

6 SMAWs

8 AT4s

27 LAAWs

10 AT (antitank) mines

2 81mm mortars

1st Tank Battalion (-) (+) is the easternmost thrust of a number of multiple thrusts that comprise Task Force Mauler’s move north. As the leading element assigned to 1st Tank Battalion (-) (+), you have been performing reconnaissance and screening missions. The battalion commander, who habitually leads from the front, is moving with a small mobile command group some 1,000 meters to your north and west. Company B, 1/7, is moving slightly behind Company A, two to three kilometers to the west, The engineer company has been moving along with you. The tanks-approximately two companies of them-have been moving behind you.

Situation I: 0600, 12 December

Monitoring the battalion tactical net, you hear the battalion commander order the tank companies to halt. A logistic train is approaching, and it will rendezvous at their present position to refuel and perform maintenance. Though fueling and repair will be conducted as rapidly as possible, the battalion commander thinks it will be three hours before all his tanks are up and ready. All vehicles in the battalion are critically short of fuel, including your AAVs. Priority will go to fueling the tanks, but you must either accommodate the logistic train in your position or dismount and send your vehicles back to where the tanks are fueling, depending on the situation, as the fuel your vehicles have onboard will not last more than another hour. You discuss this over the radio with your battalion commander and halt your company in the position shown on the diagram. By the time you halt, the distance between you and the tank companies has widened to about three kilometers.

The battalion commander now calls you on the radio as follows:

The tanks are going to refuel and refit in their present position. The threat is still to the north. It’s possible that 50 to 100 tanks with infantry could be down here in less than an hour. I want the two rifle companies to protect us while we refuel. Alfa, You orient towards the north and east. You are the focus of effort. Bravo, you orient towards the north and west.

1st and 2d Battalions, 11th Marines are both in range to give us artillery support if we need it HMLA-369 is on the deck with 10 UH-1Ns and 10 Whiskey Cobras that can be in action here in less than five minutes. The wing has launched dawn patrols; if any enemy tanks materialize, you can expect EA6Bs and Harriers to attack immediately.

The terrain is fundamentally featureless desert, save the single ridge near Company A’s present position, shown on the diagram. This ridge rises to a maximum of 10 meters in height, is approximately 1,500 meters in length, east to west, and 200 to 300 meters in depth, north to south. Though otherwise featureless at the macro level, it does, of course, offer the normal indentations and depressions that individual infantrymen can use to hide and to afford themselves a modicum of protection. Although approximately level, there is a gentle slope, never more than 3 degrees, downward on either side of the dotted line shown on the diagram.

Requirement I

Who should determine at this point where and how you should position the forces that are at the disposal of Company A-the battalion commander or the company commander?

Assuming the role of either the company commander, the battalion commander, or both, submit your concept for employing Company A and its attachments. Where will they be positioned vis-a-vis the tanks?

Situation II: 0700, 12 December

In the morning twilight, dust plumes are visible on the horizon, following reports from aerial reconnaissance that at least 50 tanks are heading due south, directly towards your position. Aerial recon confirms that the tanks are T-62s. They are followed by as many BTRs, probably carrying infantry. Indications are that they are unaware of your location but are hopeful of locating you and surprising you. U.S. Marine attack air begins its attack 6-8 kilometers north of your position; however, enemy fighters are on the scene as quickly as the Marine planes arrive. You see two Marine Harriers go down, apparently from ZSU-23 fire.

Requirement II

Draw a separate, enlarged diagram of your company position, showing how you will emplace the additional weapons available to you. (See Background above.) Include enough detail in your diagram to show how these weapons are integrated with your T/O weapons and the infantry units of Company A, including, where appropriate, detail at the squad and/or fire team level. (Use of improvised symbols, numbers, or letters to identify weapons is permissible.)

Send your solutions without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #90-9, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Encounter at Bertie

The Situation

You are the commander of a Marine infantry battalion with the mission of destroying enemy forces that are attempting to move north through the Ardunes Forest (off the map to the west). Your battalion of four rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company are mounted in 5-ton trucks. The major exception to this is your heavy machineguns and Dragons, which are mounted in HMMWVs.

You are en route to intercept the enemy in Ardunes Forest. To protect the north flank of your move through Lucy Woods (southwest, along Route 26), you have posted Company A (reinforced with Dragons and heavy machineguns) in the village of Champs. The rest of your battalion-with Dragons, heavy machineguns, and 81 mm mortars attached to the rifle companies-is in column. Accompanied by an artillery liaison officer, your air liaison officer, and a forward observer from the mortar platoon, you are riding with Company B at the head of the column.

As you exit Lucy Woods, you see a single light armored vehicle entering the woods along the road that leads to Champs. You identify this vehicle as belonging to the enemy. A few seconds later, the road ahead of you is filled with explosions. As you dash back to the shelter of the woods, you see three or four helicopter gunships firing rockets. They seem to be aiming for you.

As you gather your wits about you and try to decide what to do next, you receive the following report from Company A: “Two enemy light armored vehicles emerging from north edge of Lucy Woods along road to Champs. We will engage.”

The Requirement

Within a time limit of five minutes, decide what actions you would take to cope with this situation and prepare the frag order you would issue to your subordinates. Include an overlay and a brief explanation of the rationale behind your plan. Both the frag order and the explanation must be short and to the point. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #91-1, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the author’s and other solutions in the March issue.

Rifle Company Defends in the Desert

You are a rifle company commander who, together with the rest of the regiment, landed in the country of Aridia a few days ago. The regiment is part of a Marine expeditionary force whose mission is to deter aggression by Aridia’s hostile neighbors, who covet her riches and have large mechanized armies. It is general knowledge that, in Aridia, mobility is excellent for armor but not always good for wheeled vehicles. While no one is at war yet, there are threatening concentrations of armor along Aridia’s borders, and border patrols from each side occasionally fire at each other, usually without much effect.

Yesterday morning, a platoon of assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs), enough to transport your entire company, joined you, as did a squad of engineers. Otherwise, you have a standard table of organization. According to battalion’s standing operating procedure, the battalion commander will retain control of his TOW assets but will readily entertain requests from his company commander for support by other antimech assets at his disposal.

Early this morning, the battalion moved northeast along Route 1, screened by Cobra helicopters, and halted approximately 15 miles from the hostile border. The battalion commander called you to his newly established command post for a meeting. You ordered your executive officer to disperse the AAVs, put out some security, and recon the area to the north and northeast of your stopping place.

When you arrive at the battalion command post, you find that the battalion commander has been called to regiment “for an urgent meeting.” leaving the S-3 to brief the company commanders. He tells you only that the battalion’s mission is to defend the area in order to deny the use of the coastal highway to the enemy and invites the company commanders to make overlays of the provisional boundaries on his map. Your frontage is small, about 1,000 meters, but it is astride Route 1, the coastal highway, about where the company is now. You notice that Route 1 is the only highspeed avenue of approach into the country in the area. You also notice that there are no discernable contour lines on the map. The S-3 promises more guidance when the battalion commander returns.

You drive back to the company, where your executive officer reports urgently that the recon patrol he sent down the road has just reported a large dust cloud “right front and left front, 8 to 10 miles” and “possible gunfire.” Looking around, you yourself notice a small dust cloud to the southwest, roughly where, you suppose, your neighbor could be setting in. The shape of that cloud suggests movement away from the front. You also notice that the dunes on either side of the highway form small linear ridges up to 10-feet high, much like gentle crested swells at sea. There is a moment of silence, broken only by a Marine 10 yards away muttering sometiling about “a speedbump.”

What are your orders?

Would your orders be different if you had more time to prepare your position?

Facing an End Run

You are the company commander of Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. Your company is mounted in assault amphibious vehicles.

The enemy has landed forces east of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and has been attacking west for the last three weeks. Far superior in numbers and equipment, the enemy’s advance has been delayed through deception and an almost constant rain that has turned the road system into a quagmire. Vegetation is relatively thick along the river, with cultivated areas farther inland.

Your regiment is fighting a withdrawal under pressure when you discover that an enemy force of battalion size mounted in armored personnel carriers has now gotten across the river at Eltham’s Landing and presents a threat to your withdrawal route.

Your battalion is providing screening forces to the regiment’s flanks. Prevention of enemy interference to the regiment’s movement for the next 24 hours is critical for its survival.

You are tasked with delaying the enemy force that landed at Eltham’s Landing until the regiment can reach its new defensive position. One artillery battery and a section of 81mm mortars are in direct support. What do you do now?

The Requirement

Within a time limit of five minutes decide what actions you would take to cope with this threat and prepare the frag order you would issue to your subordinates. Include an overlay and a brief explanation of the rationale behind your plan. Both the frag order and the rationale should be brief and to the point. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #91-4, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the authors’ and other solutions in the June issue.

Seizing the 70-Ton Bridge

You are an officer serving in a large Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The ground combat element (GCE), a “mech heavy” force that includes a battalion of M1A1 tanks and an infantry regiment mounted in assault amphibians, is advancing toward the east. Its present position is some 50 kilometers west of Highbank River. Your mission is to seize the 70-ton bridge over the Highbank River and hold it until the GCE can complete its advance and link up with you. The expected time of linkup is 1200 on H+6. (It is currently 1200 on H+5.)

For this mission you are given one rifle company reinforced by an attached Dragon section (eight teams) from the battalion’s antiarmor platoon, sufficient transport helicopters to lift this force, and four AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships.

The intelligence officer gives you the following information: “As far as we can tell, the enemy has yet to cross the Highbank River with major units. The bulk of his force consists of light armored vehicles that can cross the river at many places, so he doesn’t need the bridge for his own purposes.”

Your plan is simplicity itself. You intend to land at Landing Zone (LZ) Hawk and set up a perimeter defense around the bridge.

On the last leg of your flight toward LZ Hawk, your force flies south along the path of the Highbank River. Just north of the Eastbank woods, you see 10 enemy light armored vehicles travcling south along the road. What do you do?

Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #91-5, P.O. Box 1775. Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the authors’ and other solutions in the July issue.

Will We Snatch Defeat From the Jaws of Victory?

You are the commanding officer of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines (three rifle companies) reinforced with a tank company, a platoon of TOWs, and a platoon of combat engineers. Close air support and artillery fires are on call for you. Your battalion’s mission is to create a gap for friendly mechanized forces. Using a variant on Rommel’s tactics, you organize the battalion into assault, suppression, and exploitation elements and carefully rehearse the operation. Every man knows his job.

Your attack, preceded by carpet bombing and feints, is launched at night and is successful but costly. By the early morning hours, your battalion has seized one of the enemy’s second-line defensive strongpoints, threatening two other strongpoints from the rear and putting you well out in front of the rest of your friendly neighbors. You can easily place fires on forces entering or leaving the other strongpoints, but the reverse is not true. Since you have captured two enemy messengers bearing orders for the enemy battalion that had occupied your current position, you assume that the enemy is uncertain about your position and strength.

When you report your success to regiment, you are told that the follow-on force has been delayed and may not be able to move before daybreak, (when movement will be much riskier). Through your starlight scope you can see about 200 enemy soldiers leaving the strongpoint to the southeast.

(You are in strongpoint B on the sketch; the enemy soldiers are exiting strongpoint C.) The company outpost at the northern end of your position then reports noise and dust, possibly a column of enemy vehicles moving in column on a road or lanes through suspected minefields toward your position, very roughly estimated to be 10 kilometers away. Knowing enemy doctrine, you suspect a tank-heavy counterattack by local reserves. You report your suspicion to regiment. The operations officer says the regimental commander is considering shifting the focus of main effort away from your battalion, and asks if you can hold or withdraw. How do you respond? What orders do you give to your battalion?

Send your frag order and rationale to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #91-7, P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the author’s and other solutions in the September issue.

The Short End of the Stick, Part II

The Tactical Decision Game (TDG) is a follow-on to TDG #91-10 which was presented in detail in MCG Oct81 and discussed on the preceding pages.

The Situation

Nightfall found you and your battalion in the town of San Miguel. In accordance with your continuing mission of clearing the woods, you divided your battalion sector into three company sectors, ordered Companies A, B, and C to send out reconnaissance patrols (one per company), and let the rest of your battalion get as much rest as they could. (See Solution, A, p. 60 and Map below.)

During the night, you received the following reports:

2100: The patrol from Company B reports that it was shot at by three machineguns located north of Argentina Farm.

2115: The patrol from Company C reports that enemy mortar fire fell near Route 5 about 600 meters south of Checkpoint 256.

2125: The patrol from Company C reports that the crossroads at Checkpoint 256 are occupied by field fortifications, heavily manned. Further progress by the patrol near Route 5 is not possible.

2130: The patrol from Company C requests the attachment of a machinegun squad. The patrol also requests an 81mm mortar concentration on the crossroads at Checkpoint 256.

2140: The patrol from Company B reports that it saw two light armored vehicles on road east of Checkpoint 256.

2145: The patrol from Company B reports it has heard the distinctive noise of enemy light armored vehicles moving through the woods to its west.

At 2145 you order all your patrols to pull back well south of the east-west road miming through the crossroads at Checkpoint 256 so that the mortar concentration requested by Company C can be fired. As the patrols return, you get more information. Company A reports that it encountered no enemy in its sector. The lieutenant in charge of the patrol from Company C provides you with a detailed sketch of the area around Checkpoint 256.

A particularly valuable part of the sketch is the broad outline of the fields of fire of machineguns in the concrete bunkers. Thanks to the light of a full moon and the poor light discipline of the enemy, the lieutenant was able to locate the firing ports (embrasures) of the bunkers. This information allowed him to deduce the rough shape of the fields of fire. (See patrol sketch.)

At 2230 you order the mortar platoon commander to fire the mortar concentration. At 2315 you receive an order from the regiment. This order forbids all offensive action before 0900 the following morning. At that point, the regiment, with three battalions on line, will move forward to clear the woods as a unit.

What frag orders do you issue your company as a result of these developments?

Requirement

In a time limit of five minutes, describe the actions you would take and the instructions you would issue to your team leaders. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions to Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game #91-12, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the author’s and other solutions in the February 1992 issue.

Ambushed En Route

You are the commander of a Marine artillery battery of eight M198 howitzers. Your battalion is part of a brigade-sized task force exploiting past a defeated enemy defending force. The brigade’s mission is to seize a strategic enemy city, which is presently lightly defended. Additional elements of the Marine division are to follow within 24 hours. It is expected that any available enemy will converge on the objective and your route to prevent this, so time is of the essence. The route to the objective is a well-paved highway, which zigzags through a marshland. Much of this marsh is drained for fields and is crisscrossed by drainage ditches and dikes, and dotted with small villages and occasional patches of high ground. Secondary roads lead off the main route. You know from experience that these can either be useful alternate routes or dead ends. They are not accurately marked on the map. The terrain has confined the brigade to the main highway for this movement. The brigade is led by a tank-heavy mechanized element, followed by the remainder in a column. Your battery is several kilometers behind the lead element, sandwiched between miscellaneous support units. Although your battery is moving as a single unit, the liaison section is not present. Other artillery batteries are well behind you in the column or in firing positions to the rear.

Several hours after starting the move a nuclear weapon is detonated at high altitude and a considerable distance away in the direction of the division’s main body. This causes no casualties in your battery, and damages little radio equipment, but subsequent heavy static effectively jams the entire frequency range preventing any further radio communication.

Shortly after nightfall the column in front slows to a halt. Your map spot places you 9 kilometers from the objective. On the left an empty field extends into the darkness. On the right a substantial looking road intersects the main highway. You become aware of small arms fire about 2,000 meters ahead. Mounting the cab of the lead gun truck, you can see fires that appear to be several burning vehicles, occasional lines of tracer ammunition, and flares. Another check of the radio frequencies proves fruitless.

Confronted with this uncertain situation you give the order for personnel to dismount and take defensive positions along the road. The firing ahead fades twice, only to pick up again each time. After a few more minutes a HMMWV emerges from the darkness ahead, rapidly picking its way through the column of (rucks. It stops near you, and a major dismounts and identifies himself as the commander of the combat service support detachment unit ahead. He quickly explains that the truck-mounted infantry ahead of him came under enemy fire, and they are presently attempting to defend against repeated attacks. There is no sign of support from the mechanized group that was leading the brigade. The attacks, which he judges to be of at least battalion size, seem to be originating from the village, which he indicates on your map. He has moved back along his column ordering all but his drivers to dismount and move forward to support the infantry. Far ahead you notice a large quantity of mortar fire building up.

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes decide on the course of action you would take and prepare the frag order you would issue to your battery. Justify your decision and order on the basis of the mission assigned the task force and the present situation. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions to Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game #922, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish the author’s and other solutions in the April 1992 issue.