Gazette Article Topic: Marine Corps 250

>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, September 1921.

Great deeds were done by the American Marines in the World War, and of these every school child knows. Only the historian and the antiquarian know of the part played by the Continental Marines in the Revolution, yet in that desperate struggle in which our forefathers won freedom and the right to exist as a nation, the Marines of that day acted a role fully as important and spectacular as that of the immortal Fourth Brigade in the war with Germany, covering their Corps with undying honor in battles more fruitful in their effect on our history than Belleau Wood and more smashing and decisive in results than the Meuse-­Argonne.

Few Americans, aside from avowed historians and other searchers of Colonial and Continental documents, know that there were American Marines with Washington at the Battle ofTrenton, yet recent investigation of the records of that period disclose that fully a quarter of the entire strength of the heroic band of patriots with whom the First Commander-in-Chief crossed the Delaware on Christmas Eve, 1776, and smote the Hessians in the midst of their revels was made up of Soldiers of the Sea. The archives also show that on that occasion as well as at the equally decisive Battle of Princeton, the Marines conducted themselves in a manner worthy of the high traditions of their Corps and won the warmest praise from Washington himself by their valor, steadiness, discipline and efficiency.

On the roster of officers who led the Marines under Washington are names borne by families distinguished in Colonial annals and woven throughout the history of the United States. Some of these continued in the service of the Corps and won added glory on later occasions. Others transferred to different branches of Washington’s forces in need of their services, particularly to the artillery of the Army, where their experience with heavy cannon on shipboard rendered them particularly useful. Others made the supreme sacrifice in the cause of their country on the fields of Trenton and Princeton and were buried on the ground that their blood had hallowed.

In dealing with the Battles of the Revolution, writers of popular histories of the United States have paid little attention to the identity of corps or divisions of troops of the regular branches of the service. When the militia of the colonies appeared upon the field, their presence has been noted by writers of their respective states but with the regulars of Washington’s forces, little attempt has been made to preserve a record as to the troops which took part in the various battles and skirmishes, except as to the names of general officers and commanders of groups, with the result that the specific achievements of the Marines and of the regiments and other organizations of the Revolutionary Army have been to a great degree lost.

Recent search of the records reveals that of Washington’s force of about twenty-four hundred men with whom he crossed the Delaware on that momentous Christmas Eve, 1776, more than six hundred were Marines. These were made up of the “Famous Battalion” of Major Samuel Nicholas, the Marine Guards of the Andrea Doria, Hancock, Montgomery, and other vessels. Coming as they did, as a fresh, well-fed, well-equipped, well-trained reenforcement to Washington’s worn-out veterans, exhausted by the constant forced marches and desperate rear-guard actions of their retreat across the Jerseys, they may well have been the factor, which supplied the fresh strength and aggressive force, which made possible the decisive strategic successes of Trenton and Princeton.

With the coming of December, 1776, the position of Washington’s Army was indeed a precarious one, and the cause of the newly born United States trembled in the balance. Worsted in the battles of Long Island and forced to cross the Hudson to New Jersey, Washington was obliged to look on helplessly while the City of New York was occupied by a British Army and Fort Washington and Fort Lee captured. While this was going on a detachment of the main British force overran the surrounding territory, driving a wedge between New England and the more southern colonies, cutting vital avenues of communication.

Furiously pursued by an overwhelming force across the Jerseys, Washington reached the Delaware near Trenton, and rapidly assembled a fleet of boats and barges while the Continental Navy and Pennsylvania State Navy combed the banks of the river fifty miles above and below Trenton, sweeping up everything that would float. On December 8th, Washington’s Army completed the passage of the river, taking the most serviceable of the boats with it and destroying those not needed for its own transportation. So effective had been the work of the naval detachments, that when the British reached the river a few days later, not a boat was to be found, and Lord Howe and his commanders quickly decided that it would be impossible to cross until the river should freeze.Accordingly detachments of the British Army occupied Trenton while other details spread up and down the eastern bank of the Delaware pillaging and burning the homes of those colonists loyal to the new government and occupying towns and strongpositions.

Meanwhile consternation struck into the hearts of the leaders of the Revolution, and itseemed that nothing could save the Americans from complete subjugation.Disheartened by the defeats of their Army and the rapid advances of the British forces, the Continental Congress adjourned from Philadelphia to Baltimore, and adopted a resolution arming Washington with absolute dictatorial powers for a period of six months.

All the able-bodied citizens of Philadelphia were enrolled in the Militia, and the Council of Safety of Pennsylvania organized a Home Guard of all such persons who were not fit to march with the Militia. On December 12,1776, bounties were offered to all Volunteers enlisting  “who shall join General Washington” for six weeks’ service, “at this inclement season, to assist in defending their country, threatened with instant invasion.”

From New England to Virginia, disheartenment reigned and the affairs of the Thirteen States seemed without hope or promise of success. Among the British, confidence was supremely evident, and Lord Howe and his generals openly boasted that with the coming of colder weather they would cross the frozen Delaware without opposition and occupy Philadelphia, the capital city of the new nation, without striking a blow.

Under these discouraging conditions Washington rallied his shattered Army with desperate energy, sending a call to Philadelphia for all available reenforcements to join him in the most urgent haste. His appeal was immediately answered by the dispatch of approximately 1,500 men, nearly half of whom were Marines. These were made up of a battalion numbering about three hundred Marines under command of Major Samuel Nicholas, which had been raised and drilled in Philadelphia to furnish Marine Guards for a number of frigates being built for the Continental Navy.Added to this were other Marine detachments, hastily withdrawn from naval vessels in Philadelphia and operating on the Delaware River, bringing the total up to approximately six hundred Marines.

On account of the pride which Philadelphia, even at that early date, took in its connections with the Marine Corps, these Marines were well-equipped with clothing, arms and ammunition. Practically all of their officers had seen active service against the British on board the vessels of theContinental Navy and for several months they had been occupied in daily drill and frequent skirmishes with small British detachments. As a consequence they had reached an extremely high state of training and discipline and from the numerous successes which had attended their operations, their confidence and morale were excellent.

In addition to the Marines the forces sent to Washington from Philadelphia consisted of several hundred troops of that State, including the famous Philadelphia City Troops and detachments of Bluejackets, used to firing guns under command of Captain Thomas Read of the Navy. The arrival of these reenforcements greatly encouraged Washington and served to raise the morale of his small Army to a great degree. Seeing the scattered and overconfident state of the British forces opposing him, the American Commander-in-Chief resolved to profit by these conditions and strike a blow at the earliest possible moment. He selected the city of Trenton, at that time occupied by a body of about 1,200 Hessian mercenaries in the British service under the command of a German, Colonel Rahl, as the point at which his first stroke should be directed. Knowing that it was the custom of these troops to celebrate Christmas with feasting and unrestrained drunkenness, Washington selected Christmas Eve as the night for the blow. On the evening of December 24th, he gathered together a force of about 2,400 men with which he crossed the Delaware in open boats through drifting ice, landing at about three o’clock in the morning, several miles above Trenton.

He had originally planned to attack that city in the dark before daybreak Christmas morning, but owing to the difficulties in crossing it was found that he would be unable to reach the city until after daylight. Undaunted, however, he determined to persevere in his attempt, trusting to the overconfidence of the British and the demoralization of the Hessians following their Christmas feast, to make good his surprise. In this hope he was not disappointed. Although the American columns did not reach their positions for the attack until eight o’clock the surprise was complete. Not a shot was fired until the attack was well underway, and the American troops were in the heart of the city almost before the astonished Hessians were aware of their proximity. The success of the attack was assured before a blow was struck. Scarcely any casualties were sustained by the patriots while of the Hessians, Colonel Rahl and about a hundred of his men were killed and the rest surrendered. More than a thousand prisoners were taken by Washington, who retreated with them at once again to the west bank of the Delaware.

Encouraged by his success at Trenton, Washington determined upon a further stroke. Crossing the Delaware again on December 30th, here occupied Trenton as a feint. General Cornwallis, who commanded a large British force occupying the town of Princeton, at once responded by marching towards Trenton to give battle. After a skirmish at Assanpink Creek, on January 2, 1777, Washington retreated to the eastward, drawing the British force after him.

Nightfall found him hemmed in by Cornwallis, with the British Army in front and rough country with practically no roads or trails, in his rear. Full of confidence the British commander made his camp, believing that at last he had caught the elusive Colonial chief, and that with the dawn of day, he would be able to scatter or crush his patriot force. Washington had other ideas, however. When night had fallen he gathered his forces, leaving guards to keep his camp-fires burning through the night, and set out to force his way through the rough country to his rear, around to the Princeton road.

Accustomed to travel, through wild and unbroken country, the Colonials effected this manoeuvre without loss of time or attracting attention, and at daybreak on the following morning when Cornwallis was preparing to advance against their empty camp, Washington’s advance guard appeared on the outskirts of Princeton, more than ten miles distant. Here they found three British regiments, constituting the rear-guard of their army.

Completely surprised, these were beaten in battle in the early morning and retreated with a loss of more than 400 men, leaving quantities of military stores in the hands of the victors. The loss of the American force was extremely small, and after destroying the stores which fell into their hands, Washington continued the march with his Army, and before the British main body around his vacant camp at Assanpink could pursue, he had broken entirely through the British cordon and taken up a strong position at Morristown. Here he was joined by other units of the scattered American forces, and soon found himself at the head of a force sufficiently numerous to give battle to the British on equal terms.

The effect of the news of the successes of Trenton and Princeton on the cause of the Colonies was magical. Congress returned at once from Baltimore to Philadelphia and public rejoicing reigned from New England to Savannah. Through their defeat of the Red-Coats in superior numbers at Princeton the Continentals lost all their awe of the British regulars as fighting men and even the prestige of the dreaded Hessians was shaken. Patriots everywhere renewed their hopes and redoubled their activities, and everywhere militia companies were recruited with new zeal and sent off to join Washington’s forces in northern Jersey.

The British were correspondingly discouraged and dispirited. From overrunning southern Jersey and confidently preparing to march on Philadelphia, they were gradually driven back and forced to abandon town after town and concentrate on New Brunswick, where they were constantly harassed and hemmed in until it became a question as to whether they would be able to effect their retreat to the protection of the guns of their fleet at New York without further severe reverses and great loss.

Of the part played by the Marines in these decisive battles of the Revolution, much evidence is scattered through the Continental records, and through the historical archives ofPennsylvania and New Jersey.

Even before the retreat of Washington across New Jersey, the Marines commenced to wage a campaign in connection with the Navy on the Delaware which ended in the complete destruction of British influence in the Delaware valley. It was this campaign which rendered that river an impassible barrier to the British forces, and a safe defense behind which Washington was able to retire to rally his army.

The campaign on the Delaware began in the summer of 1776 following the return of Esek Hopkin’s Continental Fleet from its exploit in the Bahamas, where it captured New Providence, together with the British Governor and much military stores. Several vessels of the Continental Navy and the State Navy of Pennsylvania, based on Philadelphia, turned their attention to the work of weeding out, by means of naval expeditions, the British garrisons and groups of armed Tories along the shores of the river, and in parts of New Jersey which could be reached from that waterway and its branches.

Vessels which are named in the Continental records as sending their Marines ashore to take part in these actions are the Montgomery, Flagship of the Pennsylvania State Navy, the Virginia, Hancock and the Andrea Doria, of the Continental Navy, and it is very probable that several others participated from time to time.

In addition to the above named, the following vessels carried Marine Guards: Congress, Franklin, Effingham, Dickinson, Chatham, Burke, Camden, Bull Dog, Experiment and Convention.

A careful count from the muster rolls of the vessels of the Pennsylvania State Navy at this time shows that there were 529 Marines serving on board them. In addition Captain Thomas Forest, in command of 31 Marines, was serving with the Arnold Battery. Captain William Brown commanded the 64 Marines, and his Junior Officer, First Lieutenant James Morrison, on board the Montgomery.

The intimate relations between the Pennsylvania State Marines and the Continental Marines is shown by the fact that during this period two Marines of the Effingham were turned over to Captain Robert Mullan since that Continental Marine Officer claimed to have first enlisted them. In the course of the campaign, which was conducted for the control of the Delaware River, these Marines played a vital part.

By means of their ships’ boats, and galleys specially constructed for river warfare, they were able to commandthe river completely and drive the disloyal forces far inland, burning small forts and capturing garrisons and sweeping up all boats and means ofwater transportationthatmightbeusedagainstthe States.

One of the notable exploits by the Marines during this campaign was the landing at Burlington on December 12, 1776, from the galleys of the Continental Fleet, where they threatened to burn houses in which it was supposed Hessians were concealed. Similar landings were made at other places with similar success, and forces of Marines in boats were constantly at work sweeping the creeks and estuaries between Philadelphia and the rapids above Trenton, keeping detachments of the British forces on the move, and breaking up bands of Tories and pro-British colonists.

When the news came of  Washington’s defeat on Long Island and his forced retreat across the Jerseys came, the activities of the Marines was redoubled, as it seemed self-evident that it was his intention  to retreat beyond the Delaware and make a stand, using that river as a barrier between himself and the British Army. As a result, when Washington reached the Delaware an ample number of boats and barges were at hand for the transportation of  his Army, and so complete had been the work of the Marines and the Navy on the river, that his scouts reported that for fifty miles above Trenton and as far below, not a boat remained in disloyal hands.

The value of this work to Washington’s harrassed army it is not possible  to overestimate.  Reaching the Delaware in hot pursuit, the victorious British were compelled to come to an abrupt halt. Not a boat could be found for their transportation across the river, and Lord Howe was faced with the alternative of  building a bridge, or of waiting for the freezing of the river, either alternative necessitating a delay of weeks or months, affording Washington a vital interval for reorganizing his forces and allowing them to recuperate and repair their shakened morale.

In addition to the British lack of boats, the American Navy held command of the Delaware, rendering operations by the British near the banks of that stream hazardous in the extreme.American Marines still operated in New Jersey in connection with the vessels of the Navy, attacking small parties of the British, cutting off stragglers and dispersing bands of Tories, retiring to the ships when menaced by overwhelming numbers.In these, constant success seems to have attended the Marines, and these unvaried successes relatively unimportant though they were, proved a great factor in raising the morale and inspiring Washington’s main army.

It was in this period, between the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, that an exploit was planned with characteristic dash, which promised to rival the most daring feats of the war. Hearing that Elisha Laurence, Sheriff of Monmouth, New Jersey, who had been appointed Lieutenant Colonel by the British, was raising a force of Tories at Monmouth Court House and had imprisoned twenty Americans for refusing to bear arms under the Royal Standard, Major Nicholas of the Marines requested permission of General Cadwalader “of going after Laurence’s Party.” The incident was of such importance that on December31, 1776, General Cadwalader wrote to General Washington, asking authority to permit Major Nicholas to start out on his expedition, but the skirmish at Assanpink Creek and the Battle of Princeton intervened to prevent its accomplishment.

On account of their daring and success it was accordingly natural that when Washington appealed for all possible troops prior to his decisive strokes at Trenton and Princeton, the Marines who had proved that they could fight so well ashore should be sent. As a nucleus of these reenforcing Marines, the powerful new Marine battalion recently formed in Philadelphia was selected.

Major Samuel Nicholas commanded this battalion with Captain Isaac Craig as his adjutant. The first company was commanded by Captain Andrew Porter, the second by Captain Robert Mullan, and the third by Captain Robert Deane. Since Captain Craig had taken the Marine Guard of the Andrea Doria ashore, and also acted as Adjutant of Major Nicholas’ Battalion, it would appear that his Marines were also attached directly to this battalion.

A payroll of Captain Mullan’s company, serving in the battalion of Major Nicholas, signed by Major Nicholas and Lieutenant Montgomery, shows that First Lieutenant David Love, Second Lieutenant Hugh Montgomery, four Sergeants, four Corporals, one drummer, one fifer, and seventy-three other Marines, composed this company. This and other rolls appear in a book containing also minutes of a Masonic Lodge which met at the Tun Tavern on Water Street, Philadelphia, beginning with the year 1749. Robert Mullan, it seems, was a member of the Lodge, proprietor of the tavern and Captain of the Company of Marines, the rolls of which are written in the book. The book was found at “Mill Bank,” formerly the residence of Nathan Sellers, in Upper Darby, near Philadelphia, and now the property of his grandson, Coleman Sellers.

In addition to Major Nicholas’ Battalion many of the Marine Guards which had participated so successfully in the river campaign were assembled and sent as a part of the reenforcement. It is a matter of known record that the Marine Guards from the Flagship Montgomery, the Hancock, and the Continental warships Virginia and Andrea Doria, were sent, and since there were over five hundred Marines serving on board other naval vessels in the river, it is reasonable to conclude that a considerable number of them also participated in these battles.

There is no doubt but that the arrival of this veteran contingent, well-equipped and with the confidence arising from victories over the British, was a vital element in supplying the stamina and spirit necessary for the achievement of the victories of Trenton and Princeton.

In the Battle of Trenton there were very few casualties on the side of the Americans, and so far as is known, none of these were Marines.In the succeeding frays of Assanpink and Princeton, however, the Marines were not so fortunate.

After the Battles of Trenton and Princeton the Marines accompanied Washington to his winter quarters at Morristown, where, during the reorganization of the Army, a number of them were assigned to the artillery. Major Nicholas’ Battalion served as infantry up to February 1777, and later as artillery. Some acted as convoys for prisoners taken at Trenton and Princeton. For instance, a list dated February 27, 1777, shows that Captain Robert Mullan escorted twenty-five British prisoners of war to Philadelphia. The remainder returned to their ships on the Delaware or to their stations in Philadelphia, and resumed their duties in connection with the Navy.

* Much of the material included in this article was published in the magazine of the Daughters of the American Revolution, and is reprinted here by the courtesy of that magazine and its editor, Miss Natalie S. Lincoln.

The Marines’ first amphibious assault on New Providence

>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, November 2019. Editor’s Note: The authors biography is available in the original edition.

Within his logbook, Lt James Josiah wrote, “At 2 P.M. Cast off from ye Warf In Company with ye Commodore Ship Alfred, Columbus & Cabot, Light airs from ye Westward & much Ice in ye River.”1 The date was 4 January 1776. The wharf that Lt Josiah was writing about is located outside of Philadelphia, and he was on board the Continental Navy ship Andrew Doria. As Josiah looked over the rails of the Andrew Doria, he saw the newly formed Continental Marines board his ship and the surrounding Continental Navy vessels. Led by Capt Samuel Nicholas, over 200 Marines loaded aboard the ships. The Continental Marines were not even three months old, but they were embarking on what would be their first amphibious assault in a long and illustrious future that lay ahead.

At this time of the year, the water was frigid and many parts were frozen. This made movement difficult, delaying their departure date by a few days. Eight ships were in the fleet. The Alfred was the largest with multiple cannons. She had 20 nine-pounders and 10 six-pounders. On her bow, she had an elaborate figurehead of a man in armor drawing his sword as if riding into battle.2 Most of the ships were top of the line, newly built by the Continental Navy. They were commanded by Commodore Esek Hopkins, who made his flagship the Alfred. The other ships in the fleet were the Columbus, Cabot, Andrew Doria, Wasp, Hornet, Fly, and the Providence.3 Once on board, the Marines did not know where they were going or what their mission would be. This was all to be briefed on the way down to their target.

Commodore Hopkins was the only person who knew the destination and targets before he passed on the information to Capt Nicholas. Hopkins was ordered by the Naval Committee to sail down to Virginia. If he chose not to do so, the Naval Committee and the Continental Congress surely thought Hopkins would sail to Georgia or South Carolina as the possibility of a large campaign in the South was becoming more real. However, Hopkins had a better idea. He was going to sail to the Caribbean islands of the Bahamas. This proved to be a wise decision because the British had just sent two frigates and two sloops-of-war to Virginia, and Hopkins’ fleet could very well have been destroyed. The same may have occured in Georgia and the Carolinas as the British built up their military mass there for a southern campaign.4 The British Sailors hinted to their superiors the idea of an American attack in the Bahamas, but when Hopkins’ fleet eventually sailed, the British believed his destination to be New York City or Boston. In picking the Bahamas, Hopkins understood what others did not: the logistical needs of the army as well as the importance of surprise and strategy. 

Before the war, many American Sailors had traveled throughout the Caribbean for trading purposes when they were loyal to the British Crown. The Americans were familiar with the waters and knew the islands and their inhabitants quite well. In fact, the islanders cared for the Americans more than the British because they benefited more from their relationship; however, they generally cared for whichever deal benefited them the most.5 

The logistics of the Continental Army were poor. There was a serious lack of heavy artillery and black powder. Over the years, the British had established forts in the Bahamian capital city of Nassau. These forts consisted of cannon and huge armories full of gunpowder. The British assigned a company of the 14th Regiment of Foot to protect these supplies and weapons. However, the Americans found that this company of the 14th Regiment of Foot had been called to Boston to reinforce the British garrisons there. Additionally, the British sloop HMS Savage only visited the harbor occasionally.6 While Hopkins’ orders were to sail down to Virginia as reinforcements, his decision to attack the Bahamas was not totally against the Continental Congress’ will. On 29 November 1775, just nineteen days after the creation of the Marine Corps, the Continental Congress realized the Bahamas provided mass stores of gun powder and cannon, so they issued a resolution:

Information being given to Congress that there is a large quantity of powder in the Island of Providence, Ordered that the foregoing Committee take Measures for securing & bring[ing] away the said powder.7

Hopkins saw the opportunity for glory and was not going to let it slip away. 

The fleet finally set sail in February after being stuck for six weeks behind the thick ice of the Delaware Bay.8 While they waited in the ice, more reports came to Hopkins about how desperate GEN George Washington was for gun powder. Hopkins wanted to take action. Nicholas was in command of over 200 Marines with his two main lieutenants: Matthew Parke and John Fitzpatrick.9 As the fleet left the Delaware Bay, the Marines still believed they were heading to Virginia or further south. What the Marines did not know what Hopkins’ orders were after dealing with Virginia. His orders ended with the phrase, “You are then to follow such course as your best judgment shall suggest to you as most useful to the American cause.”10 

As Hopkins sailed into the Atlantic, the risk grew. This was the first fleet that the Continental Navy had put together, and its destruction would surely devastate the morale and future of the Continental Navy. The men were poorly trained for maritime warfare as they had only been merchants and knew only the basics of sailing and little of fighting on the open ocean. The threat of a growing number of British warships in the area loomed. The British had already deployed a 28-gun frigate, the HMS Liverpool, and there was a good chance it could cross paths with the American fleet.11

From the beginning, luck was not on the side of the Americans. Disease found its way onboard most of the ships. Smallpox was a huge concern; on 18 February 1776, it became a reality when the Alfred had to bury a man at sea who had succumbed to the disease. The next day, the Columbus did the same. Fear of the disease spreading grew among the men, lowering morale.12 In the days following the deaths of the two Sailors, storms appeared and the winds grew heavy. The fleet had lost visual contact of the Hornet and the Fly. In reality, the two ships had collided with each other; the Hornet was forced to return to port, the closest being Charleston, SC, to make repairs. However, the Fly made repairs and rendezvoused with the fleet on 1 March in the Caribbean.13 Two more weeks went by and nothing horrendous happened; the Sailors’ morale was lifting, and they were only about one day of sailing from their anchor point. Then tragedy struck again. On 1 March, the Columbus buried another sailor who died from smallpox. Hopkins reported in his logbook that four of his ships were infected with the disease.14

Later that same day, the fleet was sailing down the coast and spotted two sloops from New Providence belonging to the British Navy. The flagship quickly caught up to them and seized them as the first prizes of the Continental Navy.15 Later that afternoon, the fleet anchored on the southwest side of Grand Abaco in twelve fathoms of water.16

The assault on New Providence had two objective points: Fort Nassau and Fort Montagu. Both had guns and powder the Marines could take back to the colonies for use in Washington’s army only. Over the past few months, the British had moved some of the guns and troops from the fort to help reinforce Boston, but there were still enough guns and powder to make the mission a successful one. Fort Nassau was built in 1697 and overlooked the western entrance to the harbor. It was a fort of superior technology and heavy firepower. The fort was armed with cannon, including twelve-pounders, eighteen-pounders, eight-inch bronze mortars, five and one-half inch howitzers, and bronze Coehorn mortars. However, at the time of the attack, the fort was falling apart. The local loyalist militia thought the British infantry would kill themselves by simply firing the guns because of how old the guns were and because the walls were probably not sturdy enough to withstand artillery fire.

Fort Montagu was a different story. It was built between 1741 and 1742 and was located approximately one mile east of Fort Nassau. It was more simplistic than Fort Nassau, but larger, and it guarded the vulnerable rear entrance to Fort Nassau. Fort Montagu, at the time of the attack, maintained a strong defense, including eighteen-pounders, twelve-pounders, nine pounders, and six pounders. It also contained a large powder magazine, barracks, and a guardroom. Fort Montagu was not falling apart like Fort Nassau, but it did have one major flaw: its simple square shape made it extremely vulnerable to any type of assault.17

The assault was scheduled for 2 March. Hopkins knew the forts could be easily taken because the British failed to leave enough infantry to defend them, and the local loyalist militia was unprepared. The plan was to take the two sloops that had been captured the day before and hide the Marines below deck. The ships were known to the locals, so the Americans believed they could come into port, unload the Marines, and take their objectives. Once the sloops entered the sight of Fort Nassau, however, the plan fell apart. There were warning shots fired, and it was clear that the British knew the sloops had been captured and were not friendly. Hopkins’ fleet and the two sloops fled, hoping to attack the next day.18 That night, Hopkins called for a council of war to figure out the next move. He wanted to go to the western side of the island to have the Marines attack the town from the rear; however, there was no road for a march and no water deep enough to make anchor. Despite these issues, a decision was finally made.

As the American fleet sailed over the horizon and into the view of the British in the early morning of 3 March, the alarm guns were sounded and troops were called to arms. The British governor, Montfort Browne, decided it was necessary to defend the powder and put Fort Nassau’s commander, Maj Robert Sterling, in charge.19 The Marines made an amphibious landing at a point called “The Creek,” which was located a mile and a half south of Fort Montagu. This was the first amphibious assault in the history of the Marine Corps.

Over 200 Marines and 50 Sailors took the beach with the Wasp and Providence in support;20 they landed near a group of free slaves, and the Marines encountered no resistance. Capt Nicholas made a report in his journal about the first amphibious landing:

The inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance, and supposed us to be Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing.21

The Marines under Nicholas formed into two columns and marched toward Fort Montagu. Despite being under cannon fire from 110 local militia under the command of Browne, not a single American casualty was taken. Browne then took his militia to Fort Nassau, and the Marines easily captured Fort Montagu. The militia tried to “spike” its artillery but failed to do so properly.22 Nicholas and his Marines were tired. Nicholas later wrote,

I thought it necessary to stay all night, and refresh my men, who were fatigued, being on board the small vessels, not having a convenience to either sleep or cook in.23

Hopkins knew he could now take Fort Nassau, but to help save American lives and show the courtesy of eighteenth century warfare, he sent a message to the British:

If I am not Opposed in putting my design in Execution the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe, Neither shall they be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no Resistance.24

Browne understood this and knew he could not defend the city or the harbor from the outnumbering American force. Knowing the Americans wanted the powder he did what he knew best. The powder was the single most important item Browne possessed; thus, he loaded it all onto the HMS St. Johns. In total, there were over 100 barrels of powder, and Browne sent them to the British-occupied town of St. Augustine, FL. This was Hopkins’ major fault of the operation that later found him in trouble with the Naval Committee and in the likings of Congress. He failed to use the other ships of his fleet to block the few lanes out of the harbor. The powder escaped under the cover of darkness aboard the HMS St. Johns and made it to its destination safely.25

The following day, Nicholas was met with an invitation from Browne to take the city and Fort Nassau if he liked. Nicholas wrote in his journal,

On our march I met an express from the Governor … The messenger then told me I might march into the town, and if I thought proper, into the fort, without interruption.26

Not a single shot was fired, and the Marines took the city and the fort. Browne was arrested in chains and taken aboard the Alfred. 

The raid was a huge success. The Americans did manage to capture some barrels of powder. The fleet then spent two weeks loading all of its captured prizes onto its ships. The prizes consisted of a city, two forts, 88 guns, and over 16,500 shells of shot.27 On the Andrew Doria alone, 38,240 pounds of round shot were loaded into her storage areas. Hopkins had to hire a private sloop to carry some of the prizes back with him because there was not enough room on his own ships.28 However, sickness was still killing some of the men, and many took desertion on the island to get away from it.29 The fleet finally set sail on 16 March back toward Rhode Island, and along the way it captured four prize ships. The Marines performed these captures with outstanding musket fire. They finally returned on 8 April with seven dead and four wounded from the trip back. One of the dead included Lt Fitzpatrick, one of Nicholas’ personal friends.30 

Upon return, individuals were both praised and reprimanded. Capt Nicholas was promoted to major for his brave actions. Hopkins’ repution was tarnished for disobeying orders and attacking the Bahamas despite documentation stating he could. He was also reprimanded for failing to secure the lanes of escape from the harbor and allowing the most important asset, the powder, to escape.31

It was the first of many overseas attacks by the United States. It is astonishing that even though most of the Sailors and Marines were untrained, they performed as if they had been doing it for years. The seized cannon greatly helped the artillery-starved Continental Army. 

The raid at Providence did have one major impact that was more important than guns or powder. The British were now forever paranoid. They knew they had been vulnerable where they least expected it, and now they had to concentrate more naval powers in other areas that held guns and powder. It also hurt the British because the guns and shot seized in the raid would be used against the British five years later at Fort Griswold and other battles.32 Over the years, the Marines and the United States took what they learned on the Raid of Nassau and transformed it into an art form. 

Notes

1. Charles Smith, Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution 1775–1783, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1975).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Staff, “The New Providence Expedition,” American War at Sea, (Online: April 2012), available at http://www.awiatsea.com.

5. John McCusker, Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London, UK: Routledge, 1997). 

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Marines in the Revolution.

9. Ibid.

10. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

11. Marines in the Revolution.

12. “The New Providence Expedition.”

13. Marines in the Revolution.

14. “The New Providence Expedition.”

15. Ibid.

16. Marines in the Revolution.

17. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

18. “The New Providence Expedition.”

19. Ibid.

20. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. 

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. United States Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps University, (Online), available at https://www.usmcu.edu. 

28. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.

29. “The New Providence Expedition.”

30. Marine Corps University.

31. Ibid.

32. Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World.