Gazette Article Topic: MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest

2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: Second Place

A satire of and recommendation for the Marine Corps Fitness Report

“A collection of talented individuals without personal discipline will ultimately and inevitably fail. Character triumphs over talent.” 1

—James Kerr, Legacy

“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.” 2

—Sir William F. Butler

Part 1: The Problem, in Satire
There is a pyramid of Eagle, Globe, and Anchor logos that comprise the Comparative Assessment Chart in Section K of the Marine Corps fitness report. The image is colloquially referred to as “the Christmas tree” for the diagram’s resemblance to the traditional holiday pine. In this portion of the report, a higher-ranking officer, who may not know the Marine very well, will compare the Marine’s value against that of other Marines who the higher-ranking officer also may not know very well. 

At the bottom of the chart is a single logo, mimicking the stump of the tree, where the Corps’ invalids are lumped under the solitary, shameful tag of Unsatisfactory. Those who happen to blunder and slip through the cracks of bare proficiency to rank so lowly against their peers should be separated by a bold double black line to annotate inadequacy and disgrace. 

Above the doomed are the Qualified, who represent the lowest trim of branches that merit holding ornaments. They are the foundational layer of bottom-third talent upon whom those of higher standing rely to buffer against shame. To be qualified is to be relegated to an inference of sub-standard functioning that, while technically satisfactory, must be categorically subjugated and cataloged as a group that has failed. They only did what they were told to do. 

Then, atop the regular folk but just below la crème, sit the masses of the Many Highly Qualified Professionals Who Form the Majority of this Grade. It is quite the epithet, especially considering the phrase portends where most Marines shall be assessed. They have done much more than is to be expected and should think highly of their accomplishments. However, that they have done more that what is expected of Marines. They will find a modicum of success within the organization. 

Next, one finds the proverbial pick of the litter, also known as One of the Few Exceptionally Qualified Marines. These must be the men and women who are charged with keeping bright the shining light atop the Corps’ hill because, without their influence, how will those wide-eyed followers beneath them know the morally right from the objectively wrong? When young boys and girls say out loud to their friends at recess that they want to grow up to be a Marine, this is what they intend.

Still, there is a rank above these do-no-wrongers. At the top of the Christmas tree is another single Eagle, Globe, and Anchor logo. This one is labeled: The Eminently Qualified Marine. It is commonly understood that no Marine truly ranks in this category. It exists to humble us and to let us know that only because the very best of our ancestors were so exceedingly proficient at winning wars was this classification even created.

However, this is not the system that describes human interaction. The pursuit of principled achievement cannot be summed through an exaggerated appellation that has no real definable metric. Who has not woken up on days and felt barely Qualified? Yet, there is no box to tick for One of the Many Who Succeeds in the Daily Conquering of an Inner Demon. Nor is there a category for Unassuming, Yet Expertly Competent. Who is not eminently qualified, sometimes, though having made unsatisfactory errors in judgment and execution, on occasion? 

Nonetheless, the slow, steep climb out of despair starts with one trudging step in darkness. Arguably, this is the hardest step. Marines might better be judged by how far and determined their trek than if they were able to plant a flag on the summit of eminence. The latter is an evaluation of talent; the former is an assessment of character.

As leaders commonly convey, Marines are promoted on future potential rather than past performance. Yet, the current version of the Marine Corps fitness report does little to characterize the potential of individuals. In fact, its sole function is to quantify past performance. The report and its accompanying master brief sheet codify every blemish, categorize every remark, and collate every meritorious phrase, reducing the sum of evaluations into a single comparative number known as a relative value. These values form the proverbial hourglass figure (or lack thereof): the graphical depiction of a career’s worth of reports.

The obvious discrepancy when attempting to shape-ify performance over the length of a career is the lack of nuance regarding the individual. Fitness reports capture performance for instance, and master brief sheets average those instances across a decade or more. Neither provides an evaluation of potential, which, at least colloquially, is the fundamental attribute for promotion (and by implication, denotes character). To avoid propagating the Peter Principle, where Marines rise to their level of incompetence, we must select for potential, within which is an assessment of character, and prepare prospective promotables for future successes.3

Part 2: Selecting for Potential (and by Implication, Character)
The first part of this recommendation, and an easy proposal to make, is an update to the evaluation form. The problem, however, is defining potential. Then, once defined, quantifying it for comparative review. For the former issue, Harvard Business Review identified three general markers of high potential: ability, social skills, and drive.4

At its core, the current fitness report is an appraisal of ability. Essentially, the report is a drawn-out work sample test, where Marines are evaluated based on observations of the tasks that make up their job. That this evaluation is divided into five sections and fourteen sub-sections simply demonstrates the extent to which the individual’s ability (in his current position) is scrutinized. However, when evaluating a candidate for a higher, more complicated position, the capacity to learn “where the single best predictor is […] cognitive ability”5 supersedes the propensity to perform. In this sense, a premium should be placed on education, the ability to acquire new skills quickly, and flexibility in new roles or when making mistakes. Still, beyond a measure of raw cognitive ability, promotion to each successive rank or position requires examination of intangible items related to intelligence. As an example, promotion to a rank of organizational influence or selection for leadership positions should include an assessment for creativity and a knack for systems thinking.6 These advancements should also involve a sense of vision and imagination, items not usually captured in a standard annual report. Moreover, if the Corps is serious about promoting smart Marines, then the organization should test for aptitude as a required element of promotion, command, or school selection. Evaluation of ability, as it relates to potential, requires a rigorous assessment of intelligence. 

Social skills are the core elements of emotional intelligence, another item not explicitly measured when concerning retention, promotion, and selection for advanced programs or leadership opportunities. The core competencies of emotional intelligence, depicted with their relationships in Figure 3, are self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management. The primary attribute, self-awareness, describes the ability to understand your own strengths and weaknesses and recognize how they impact the team’s performance.7 Related, and perhaps the one item mentioned within the current Marine Corps fitness report, addressed as effectiveness under stress, is self-management. Beyond basic recognition, self-management refers to the ability to manage emotions, especially under stressful conditions. Social awareness closely relates to empathy and can best be described as knowing how to read a room. Lastly, relationship management “refers to your ability to influence, coach, and mentor others, and resolve conflict effectively.”8 The evaluation of these social skills, progressing generally in order of merit as they are listed above, is necessary to qualify emotional intelligence, an important factor in determining potential and assessing character.

An individual’s drive, best expressed in the current fitness report as initiative, is probably the most measurable and the most easily shaped by the environment. To the latter point, and in the parlance of the expectancy-value theory, drive is “motivated by a combination of people’s expectations for success and subjective task value in particular domains.”9 To this end, a Marine’s drive partially belongs to the individual yet is also indicative of a leader’s ability to create expectations of success and valency of the tasks to lead to it. 

Part 3: Evaluating through Education
If cognitive ability is the single best predictor for higher-level success within the organization, then a Service-level investment in an individual’s intellect is the best groundwork for collectively preparing cohorts of Marines for selection and promotion. Furthermore, the results of that educational assessment (e.g., class ranking) should inform competitiveness for future opportunities. Within the officer corps, career-level, intermediate-level, and top-level schools require professional military education (PME) for promotion to the respective ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. Whether accomplished through resident PME (an allegedly selective process for attendance) or through non-resident education, and irrespective of the Marine’s relative success at the school, accomplishing PME is briefed at non-statutory boards as either complete or incomplete.

While the Marine Corps PME system excels in providing a baseline education to the masses, at least for the officer ranks, it lacks a tool for educational assessment that could advise promotion and selection panels on the potential of a Marine for advancement or command. If resident PME is truly selective, then attending an in-person school program is the first aimpoint for an individual’s efforts to increase his or her value to the organization. It then follows that Marines are incentivized to perform well if they understand that the educational assessment affects career potential.

Beyond baseline educational schools, such as Expeditionary Warfighting School for captains or Command and Staff College for majors, specialty schools aligned to billet or general job descriptions are few and far between. If an infantry captain attends the Army’s Maneuver Captain Career Course (MCCC), then he is well-prepared to be an infantry company commander. Conversely, if the same captain attends Expeditionary Warfighting School, he or she is well prepared to be a staff officer in a MEU. Why is a curriculum like MCCC not mandated for the preparation of incoming company commanders? Why does the student’s evaluation from a school like MCCC not influence whether he or she should be a company commander? These schools, and many like them, become proverbial checks in boxes without any measurable bearing on a Marine’s career.

Part 4: A Recommendation
Character and intelligence ebb and flow over the course of a career, ideally upward, yet the fitness report and the master brief sheet do little to distinguish progress. Evaluations must be adjusted to provide the best picture of the current Marine’s value. Only the last five observed reports should be included in the master brief sheet.

If a fitness report is a tool used to screen promotion and selection opportunities, then its sections must evaluate potential. These sections should include ability (identified as talent and intelligence), social skills (identified as self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management), and initiative (i.e., drive).

If cognitive ability is the single best predictor for higher-level success, then resident education should be valued higher than non-resident, and the individual’s evaluation at a PME school should affect master brief sheet percentages. Additionally, skill-enhancing schools should become a requirement for advancement within military occupation specialty fields.

Figure 4 is imperfect and requires a process for normalization within a reporting senior’s profile. Additionally, it does not address the reviewing officer’s markings—but it does provide a better framework for how those markings should be applied. In any case, the current Marine Corps fitness report format is multiple decades old; it is time to accept a challenge to improve.

“The challenge is to always improve, to always get better, even when you are the best. Especially when you are the best.” 10

—James Kerr, Legacy

>Maj Halpern is an Infantry Officer whose previous experience includes deployments with the 22d MEU, FAST Deployment Programs, and SPMAGTF–Crisis Response Africa. Additionally, he spent two years working within the Australian Defence Force as part of the Marine Corps Personnel Exchange Program–Australia. Following, he served as the Assistant Operations Officer for 7th Mar. He is currently the Future Operations Officer for 4th Mar.

Notes

1. James Kerr, Legacy: What the All Blacks Can Teach Us About the Business of Life (London: Little, Brown Book Group Limited, 2013).

2. Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (London & New York: Macmillan & Co, 1893). Charles George Gordon served in the British Army from 1852–1885, retiring as a major general. He served in the Crimean War, the Second Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Mahdist War.

3. “Peter Principle is prevalent in situations where people downplay the aptitude for management when making promotion decisions in organizations. In most cases, promotion decisions are made largely dependent on current performance. Therefore, those who excel in their current roles are promoted to managers despite not having the necessary management skills.” Human Capital Hub, “Peter Principle: What You Need to Know,” Human Capital Hub, May 29, 2023, https://www.thehumancapitalhub.com/articles/peter-principle-what-you-need-to-know.

4. Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Seymour Adler, and Robert B. Kaiser, “What Science Says about Identifying High-Potential Employees,” Harvard Business Review, October 3, 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/10/what-science-says-about-identifying-high-potential-employees.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Lauren Landry, “Emotional Intelligence in Leadership: Why It’s Important,” Business Insights Blog, April 3, 2019, https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/emotional-intelligence-in-leadership.

8. Ibid.

9. Robert V. Kail and Campbell Leaper, “Chapter 9-More Similarities than Differences in Contemporary Theories of Social Development: A plea for theory bridging,” in Advances in Child Development and Behavior 40 (Burlington: Elsevier Science, 2011).

10. James Kerr, Legacy: What the All Blacks Can Teach Us About the Business of Life (London: Little, Brown Book Group Limited, 2013).

2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: Honorable Mention

Reevaluating a supposedly foundational text

I hate Sun Tzu. There, I said it. Go on, make your judgments, roll your eyes, and think: Here we go, this is the same guy who dismissed Plato in Philosophy 101 just to be a shocking contrarian. That is, admittedly, a perfectly reasonable reaction—but let me add some context now that I have your attention.

The Art of War does not offer bad advice, quite the opposite. It has had a profound effect on the 20th century through men like Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap; that is unquestioned. The Art of War is the definitive work on war in some parts of the world—but not here. The problem with Sun Tzu is two-fold. First, the influence of Sun Tzu is wildly overemphasized in Western military education since The Art of War is a relatively recent addition to the Western strategic canon. Second, his Confucian philosophy is antithetical to the philosophies that shaped the American way of war. Ultimately, Sun Tzu is an outsider whose work has limited applicability to the Marine Corps.

New Kid on the Block
Sun Tzu is typically covered first when studying the theory of war. This makes sense, as he is chronologically the earliest great theorist. Yet, when the historicity is considered, Sun Tzu is a relatively recent addition. French Jesuits brought the first translations of The Art of War to Europe in the late 18th century, but when The Art of War entered into the Western zeitgeist is up for debate. Just because translations were available did not mean they were utilized. B.H. Liddell-Hart, whose indirect approach bears some similarities to The Art of War, was already working on his ideas when he was introduced to Sun Tzu in 1927.1 It was Marine Gen Samuel B. Griffith’s translation and commentary alongside Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare in 1963 that finally brought the text to wider attention in the West. Griffith even observes in his translation’s appendix that, despite European theorists having access to the text, they either had little knowledge or regard for it.2 Sun Tzu did not even make the cut for the definitive Makers of Modern Strategy, first released in 1986, though he did make the cut in the 2023 edition.3

Mediocre translations were certainly a factor in the relative sluggishness of Sun Tzu’s acceptance in Europe; however, likely the most significant factor was the lack of foundational texts whose understanding was a requisite for comprehension. Even today, much of the nuance of The Art of War is lost on Westerners who are not familiar with Confucian philosophy and Chinese history.

Most Westerners are not familiar with their own foundational texts, much less the Chinese ones. However, this was not always the case. For centuries, education in Europe was based on the medieval model’s trivium and quadrivium—collectively referred to as the liberal arts.4 This model drew heavily from the Greco-Roman texts that formalized education and served as a means of leveling the upper class.5 Classical works were pervasive in the development of modern military theory, practitioner Wellington and theorist Clausewitz would have equally dreaded the sentence: Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.6

Intellectually, the Greco-Roman and Medieval worlds were far more influential than Sun Tzu could ever hope to be. The overwhelming majority of theorists and practitioners who shaped our world had no idea who Sun Tzu was. If studying the evolution of Western strategic theory as it developed chronologically, Sun Tzu appears very late—certainly after Clausewitz and Jomini. The ancient classics with their medieval linkages are so vast that scholars frequently forget they are standing on them.

Why Sun Tzu Does Not Belong
The Art of War was a subversive text at the time of its collection. War in ancient China had become increasingly theatrical with battles serving as opportunities for the nobility to display their manliness. Sun Tzu brought pragmatism to war in China. That is precisely the problem, Sun Tzu is the ultimate pragmatist; winning without fighting is a pragmatic goal, not a moral ideal. Restraint and magnanimity in victory are only necessary when the benefits outweigh the cost. People are disposable if it means winning; he lets others do the fighting and suffering provided it leads to victory. Everything is available to Sun Tzu—how you win is of no importance so long as you do. Mao and Giap won their wars in no small part because they were willing to inflict truly staggering degrees of suffering not just on their soldiers but on their own people; safe in the knowledge, it was for their own good. Effectively employing The Art of War requires the kind of hubris that Icarus would briefly appreciate.

This is where Sun Tzu fails to meaningfully contribute to the American way of war or Marine Corps warfighting. His commonsense advice is just that—common. Sun Tzu is certainly not unique, Homer compares conflict to flowing water as well.7 Readers can already learn the value of deception from wily Odysseus, sound campaign preparations from Julius Caesar, and strategic foolishness from Thucydides. Sun Tzu just reads better on a PowerPoint.

What is distinct to Sun Tzu is his cynical philosophical underpinnings that are best suited to equally cynical autocrats seeking to create a world more advantageous for themselves. The difference becomes more apparent when it is compared directly to the Western intellectual tradition that would create the concepts of chivalry and just war. The Art of War stresses the importance of the general as the “bulwark of the state” and “arbiter of fate” which has been an antithetical concept in American history since George Washington.8

Like Liddle-Harts’s indirect approach, Sun Tzu requires a healthy degree of sophistry to intellectually sustain. If you properly observe the techniques, then success is all but guaranteed; failure is the result of not following the proscribed techniques. By this logic, one could argue that Alexander applied the indirect approach when he slashed open the Gordian knot. Just consider the translation convention of terms like Moral Law and virtue, Sun Tzu and Thomas Aquinas are talking about very different things.9 Where Sun Tzu advocates morally relative pragmatism, Thomas Aquinas acknowledges moral paradox. War can be both awful and just. Violent men are expected to control themselves with courtly manners. This is not hypocrisy but the inability to live up to transcendent ideals, much like Clausewitz’s acknowledgment that theoretical total war is impossible. This is why Europe has King Arthur and China has Confucius.

Know Your Self, Know Your Adversary
Science is the handmaiden of philosophy. Therefore, cynical pragmatic philosophy will produce cynical pragmatic means of making war. Sun Tzu would be baffled by Western readers’ negative perception of the Melian Dialogue as an increasingly imperious Athens threatens the small neutral island of Melos into submission; obviously, the weak endure what they must, that is the entire point of being strong! For the most hardened student of realpolitik, it is hard to make a case that Americans are particularly talented at the strategy advocated by Sun Tzu. It has been attempted but rarely with lasting success and never with moral justification. When Americans are at peace, Sun Tzu has minimal applicability to U.S. foreign policy because pragmatism does not win friends.

Two states that actively espouse Sun Tzu will never truly be at peace. Sun Tzu emphasizes attacking an opponent’s strategy. In peacetime, this means undermining the enemy society since the best way to win without fighting is to endlessly prepare for war while undermining your adversary. A state that ascribes to this sort of mentality can have a public policy of no preemptive strikes yet still launch a surprise attack in the name of defense.

Sun Tzu emphasizes a mental model of war versus a physical one; this becomes truly terrifying when it hybridizes with postmodern materialistic philosophy. The pursuit of gaining and maintaining political power becomes its principal goal and is endlessly pursued. Sun Tzu is far more applicable to the challenges of international order, unsurprisingly, the People’s Republic of China. China has recognized that attacking an opponent’s strategy means corrupting their society, which they do through disinformation campaigns on social media, complicity in illicit synthetic opioid exports, and eroding trust in global institutions, such as the World Health Organization. A state that emphasizes undermining its perceived adversary’s societal fabric through deception will have to pay a moral cost as words will cease to mean things and trust corrodes.

What Should the Marine Corps Do About It?
Thucydides should be acknowledged as the intellectual godfather of the Marine Corps; the History of the Peloponnesian War puts tragic the human cost of war on full display. When war is perceived as easy and convenient, reality quickly dispels this notion at a terrible cost. Society breaks down when pragmatism is ahead of ideals. The fact humans are unable to achieve permanent peace does not make the ideal less worthwhile. Wars should be fought with the intent to create a better state of peace, wars of pragmatism rarely accomplish this. Thucydides paints an imperfect world that is worth living and fighting for, the world of Sun Tzu knows no leisure.

Sun Tzu should be studied and comprehended in the same way that Mao’s Little Red Book should be kept handy. No reasonable person could argue about Mao’s effectiveness as a leader; he achieved his political objectives and was one of the most consequential leaders of the 20th century. Yet, this came at the cost of ruthless purges, grinding campaigns, and mass starvation but on a scale that most Americans can barely comprehend. The current generation of the Chinese Communist Party helming China are the heirs of that tradition. Whether they appreciate it or not, Americans are crusaders. Brilliant crusaders. Whether crushing insurrections to end slavery or ending the terror of an authoritarian dictator; when Americans go to war with ideals and strategic alignment—they get the job done regardless of the cost and blood.

Sun Tzu is commonly referenced because it is easily referenced, pithy quotes that apply to everything. The Western classical tradition is more difficult to digest but offers a much richer understanding of humans in conflict. Thucydides is a grind, both textually and spiritually, and it should be—comprehending war should not be easy or convenient. The works of Homer and Thucydides are ostensibly sad, life is hard, and war is tragic but that is only because deep down they understand that it should not have to be this way. Understanding the rage of Achilles, the despair of Odysseus, or the whole tragedy of the Peloponnesian War offers a far more realistic view of humanity in conflict because of its longing for a better world that is denied to them. They can only see the silhouettes that are created by a luminous perfect form. They are focused on the light; Sun Tzu is focused on the shadows.

Sun Tzu’s current place in the Western strategic canon is poetic, his introduction is far more recent, yet he is the most recognizable and more often quoted. The West Point Civil War generals fought because of Jomini, the Prussian generals fought because of Clausewitz, and both of whom are footnotes when compared to the influence of Thucydides. Sun Tzu has truly won without fighting.

>Maj Stephens is the Course Chief for the Logistics Intelligence Planners Course at the Marine Corps Operational Logistics Group in Twentynine Palms, CA.

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, Art of War, translated by Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

2. Ibid.

3. Gordon Gecko cites the text in 1987’s Wall Street if that is any indication of public awareness.

4. For a concise description of the medieval liberal arts, see the Dorthy L. Sayers essay “The Lost Tools of Learning.”

5. Thomas Ricks, First Principles (New York: Harper, 2020). 

6. “All of Gaul is divided into three parts,” The (in)famous opening line of Julius Caesar’s campaign in Gaul.

7. Homer, The Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

2024 Chase Prize Essay Contest Winner: First Place

Eleven challenges to Talent Management 2030

As stated in Talent Management 2030 (TM2030), “Our modern operational concepts and organizations cannot reach their full warfighting potential without a talent management system that recruits, develops, and retains the right Marines.”1 While this statement is extremely valid, there is one significant problem with this sentence, and furthermore, one significant problem with TM2030—specifically the word talent. Simply put, the Marine Corps does not need talent. 

Talent Management 2030’s mandate is to “achieve a full transition from the current manpower system to a talent management system no later than 2025.”2 However, there are challenges that need to be addressed immediately to facilitate this intent to the fullest—increasing our combat lethality, operational effectiveness, and survivability to win our Nation’s battles. Therefore, this article poses eleven challenges to TM2030 and describes how the Marine Corps does not need talent. The ultimate thesis is that we do not need a talent management system but a Marine management system. 

Challenge 1: Talent is Overvalued
In his book, Talent is Overrated, Geoff Colvin defines talent as: “A natural ability to do something better than most people can do it.”3 This is similar to how TM2030 defines talent (i.e., “an individual’s innate potential to do something well.)”4 Regarding talent being overvalued, throughout the book, Colvin’s research showcases that we exceedingly credit innate gifts (i.e., talents) to top performance. The reality is that top performance comes from extreme purposeful effort (i.e., deliberate practice).5 Colvin describes how we overinflate talent with musicians, intelligence, and individuals such as Tiger Woods and Mozart.6 In fact, Colvin’s book demonstrates that top-performing musicians practiced 800 percent more than lower-performing musicians and that both Tiger Woods and Mozart’s fathers started their training while they were infants and toddlers. Therefore, they could hardly be described as child prodigies.7

As seen in Case Study 1, Johnny Manziel shows that talent will only get a person so far in one’s career. Colvin credits high consistent performance with deliberate practice, not talent.8 “Deliberate practice is also not what most of us do when we think we’re practicing … Deliberate practice is hard. It hurts. But it works. More of it equals better performance. Tons of it equals great performance.”9 Deliberate practice can be summarized as practice that is purposefully designed to elicit performance by pushing a person just beyond their current limits, with high quality, frequent and recurrent repetitions, with immediate feedback, and is mentally taxing. 

“… but of course we can take any credit for our talents, it is how we use them that counts.”

—A Wrinkle in Time

Challenge 2: Experience is Overinflated
When you read Malcolm Gladwell’s book, Outliers: The Story of Success, the reader will clearly see that talent, experience, or rank did not enable the outliers (top performers) to achieve greatness, rather it was the opportunity combined with hard, diligent work.10 Mike Eruzione, captain of the 1980 U.S. Miracle hockey team, credits two fortunate chances (i.e., opportunities) in his life that provided him the opportunity to score the winning goal on 22 February 1980 against the Soviets; however, it was Eruzione’s blue-collar work ethic that allowed him to exploit those chances.11 Regarding experience being overrated, as stated by Colvin, “extensive research in a wide range of fields shows that many people not only fail to become outstandingly good at what they do, no matter how many years they spend doing it, they frequently don’t even get any better than they were when they started.”12

Furthermore, Colvin states: “More experienced doctors reliably score lower on tests of medical knowledge than do less experienced doctors; general physicians also become less skilled over time at diagnosing heart sounds and X-rays. Auditors become less skilled at certain types of evaluations.”13 The way we should view experience is as whether or not one’s experience is that of a low performer, average performer, or a high performer. For too many in our Corps, our experience is that of being average; yet, we overinflate having experience of being average to that of credibility. 

Let us never confuse a driven, hardworking, and problem-solving individual who possesses little experience to be less than an individual with more experience of being average. What we should acknowledge and reward is not experience but rather learning, innovation, effort, and the ability to fail and grow. Of note, “sub-elite skaters spent lots of time working on the jumps they could already do, while skaters at the highest levels spent more time on the jumps they couldn’t do.”14

Challenge 3: Rank is Overrated
As stated in TM2030, “We should have an open door for exceptionally talented Americans who wish to join the Marine Corps, allowing them to laterally enter at a rank appropriate to their education, experience, and ability.”15 However, anyone who has been in the Marine Corps long enough knows that rank is overrated. We have all seen the lance corporal who outperforms the sergeant; the sergeant who outperforms the gunnery sergeant; or the captain who outperforms the major. Similar to talent and experience, rank is overrated. 

As stated by Evans Carlson when he was the 2d Marine Raider Battalion commanding officer in World War II, “Are you willing to starve and suffer and go without food and sleep? I promise you nothing but hardships and anger. When we go into battle, we ask no mercy, we give none.” We should ask a similar question for those qualified (not talented) individuals we are trying to recruit into our Corps, specifically are you willing to start at the bottom, earn the title U.S. Marine, give up the comforts of your life that you are accustomed to, so that you may serve alongside the finest men and women of the United States? 

Gen Krulak stated on 6 May 1946 to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in his infamous bended knee speech:

Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past, but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go.16

Then we must ask our Marine leaders of 2024, why do we have a bent knee to civilians with credentials we value? Figure 1 is a simple flow chart that displays if we as Marines should accept a 35-year-old with PhD in Cyber Security with ten years of cyber experience to try out for our Corps and earn the title of Marine. It has been stated that humility needs to be incorporated into our Marine culture, and if a civilian is not willing to humble himself, start at the bottom, and earn our title, then we do not need that individual.17 Of note, in the book Good to Great, Collins notes that “ten of eleven good-to-great CEOs came from inside the company, whereas the comparison companies tried outside CEOs six times more often.”18

Challenge 4: We Already Recruit a Different Person
As stated in TM230, “the core objectives of all modern personnel management systems are to recruit individuals with the right talents, match those talents to organizational needs, and incentivize the most talented and highly performing individuals to remain with the organization.”19 However, as emphasized, talent is overvalued. Furthermore, are we certain that TM2030 is truly appreciating what we should be recruiting? Case Study 2 showcases what happens when you recruit for the wrong variables, such as perceived talents. 

Our history, culture, character, and standards should draw the correct Americans toward us. Coach John Wooden coached the University of California Los Angeles for 29 years, where he won 10 national championships, had 4 perfect seasons, and 88 consecutive victories. Over Wooden’s 29 years as a coach, he only visited 10–12 players at their home but only after the athlete initiated first contact. Coach Wooden’s philosophy was that if these high-performing athletes did not want to play for the University of California Los Angeles, then perhaps they should play somewhere else.20

As stated by Coach Wooden:

I always felt that my nonrecruiting policy for players was the right thing to do—a productive part of the screening process. Before I talked to an individual about joining us, I first wanted to see evidence of his desire to be a part of the Bruins. The last thing you want is people in your organization who had to be talked into being there, who needed convincing that your team was worthy of them … Recruiting should be a two-way street.21

Furthermore, as stated by Dave Nassef, “I used to be in the Marines, and the Marines get a lot of credit for building people’s values. But that is not the way it really works. The Marine Corps recruits people who share the corps values, then provides them with training required to accomplish the organizations mission.”22

While we need to improve our recruiting process, we need to recognize we are already recruiting a different American. What we do with that American, from their initial training until they get out of our Marine Corps, rests on our shoulders as leaders and commanders. Specifically, we must truly sustain the transformation; make our Marines more lethal, resilient, and proficient; and retain the right Marines. Lastly, our legacy and current culture should continue to drive the right (not talented) civilians to want to earn the title of Marine. 

Challenge 5: Entry Training Needs to be a Selection Process
We do need to improve our recruiting process. However, we must also increase the standard of our entry-level schools (basic training [BT] and Officer Candidate Course [OCC]). As stated in TM2030, “approximately 20% of those recruited do not complete their first enlistment, a strong indicator that the service can do better to screen potential recruits.”23 While TM2030 states that we need to recruit to a higher standard, TM2030 completely negates the fact that the twenty percent who do not complete their first enlistment earned the title Marine. We failed our ancestors by allowing such a high number of individuals with the inability to serve four years in our Corps to earn the title of Marine.  

Civilians wanting to earn the title of Marine are already volunteering to serve their country in the hardest Service. We should not forget this; we are already recruiting a different person. However, we need to take the earning of the title to a higher standard. We should treat BT and OCC the same way Marine Corps Special Operations Command treats assessment and selection. Specifically, BT and OCC should be a selection process. Based on the data, at least twenty percent of those who start BT should not earn the title of Marine. 

Challenge 6: Talent Management Neglects Leadership
As stated in TM 2030, “A Marine turns their talents into strengths, aptitudes, and skills through dedicated study, repetition, and hard work—a process accelerated by their curiosity, passion, and interests, and desire for excellence.”24 This is similar to the sentiment in Training and Education 2030 that states, “ultimately, every Marine is responsible for their own learning.”25 However, it has been posed that while each Marine is responsible for their own learning, “We as leaders in the Marine Corps must recognize it is imperative to educate our Marines by providing the optimal resources and direction.”26 

In a similar vein, while it is the Marine’s job to turn their talents into strengths, it is also a mandate of Marine leaders to get the most out of their Marines, to include improvements in their strengths and weaknesses, in their interests and non-interests. Leadership has been defined as, “The ability to inspire and influence those around you to perform at a higher level and become better versions of themselves.”27 A leader’s job is to push Marines. Grow them, push them outside their comfort zone, build interests, develop passion, create opportunities, make innovation occur, give feedback, create optimal experiences, and develop specific, detailed, and progressive training. The moment the Marine Corps ceases to make leaders, our Nation should divest of her. Therefore, we must make leadership a part TM2030. 

Challenge 7: Leaders and Commanders Cannot Retain the Right Marines
A significant reason we have issues retaining the right (not talented) Marines in our formation is the direct leadership and command experienced by our young Marines during their short tenure in our Corps. Simply put, the Marine Corps did not lie to us—all one has to do is to look at our recruiting posters which typically either display a Marine in their dress blues or a Marine suffering in training. The Marine Corps promises civilians the ability to earn the title Marine (i.e., dress blues) as well as tough and miserable times via realistic training, physical conditioning, deployments, etc. 

However, the Marine Corps also promises competent, moral, ethical, and beyond-reproach leaders. When we fail to deliver strong, competent, and confident leaders who possess humility, we lose the trust, passion, and motivation of our Marines we fail to sustain the transformation and retain the right (not talented) Marines. 

Challenge 8: Our Culture (Not Talent) is What Makes Us the Marine Corps
As stated in TM2030, “Marines make the Marine Corps. We have never defined ourselves by our equipment, organization constructs, or operational concepts.”28 Furthermore, as stated by Gen Berger, “Our historical and legislatively mandated role as the Nation’s force-in-readiness remains a central requirement in the design of our future force. The most important element of this requirement is the individual Marine.”29

The title of Marine should not be synonymous with talent. If Marines are to be synonymous with talent, then we should divest of BT, the Crucible, OCC, basic officer course, etc. Marines should be synonymous with riflemen, learners, leaders, problem solvers, resilient, passionate, dedicated, winners, driven, disciplined, professionals, accountable, and reliable—not talented. Case Study 3 displays that purposeful effort can achieve greatness while lacking the talents needed. 

In the book The Culture Code, Daniel Coyle states, “Our instincts have led us to focus on the wrong details. We focus on what we can see—individual skills. But individual skills are not what matters. What matters is the interaction.”30 As stated, the “Marine Corps culture is what makes us who we are. Our warfighting culture is what made us successful in battles past, and our culture will either enable or hinder our future battles. Remember, our culture is our DNA, and while we cannot see it, we see its manifestation, which for the Marines, is on the battlefield.”31

Challenge 9: Mandate a Culture of Pursuing Performance
Talent Management 2030 states, “Once an individual earns the title ‘Marine,’ they have made the grade. There are no additional obstacles or barriers to entry—‘Once a Marine, always a Marine,’” and that we must encourage a culture of inclusion.32 TM2030 additionally directs our leaders to “focus on building inclusive teams … based on performance.”33 There are two issues with this: the passivity of the word encourage, and the passivity and acceptance of simply earning the title of Marine is enough. 

Regarding culture, I have argued “that the single greatest contributor to a high-performing unit is the unit’s culture.”34 Furthermore, we as leaders “must define, emphasize, measure, acknowledge, and correct the culture we pursue.”35 However, leaders and commanders, who are the owners of the unit’s culture, should not encourage (passive) our culture, we should mandate (active) the culture we pursue.”36 We should have a culture of “hostility towards mediocrity.”37 

Second, we as Marines should be proud of the title Marine, but we should not be content with just the title. Our mothers can be proud that we once earned the title Marine; however, we must earn that title every day while in uniform. Having graduated from BT or OCC is not enough. Far too many Marines in our Corps peak at earning the title Marine, evident by the twenty percent unable to complete four years of service.38 While hazing, tribalism, and/or a culture of less than for being new to the Marine Corps is not warranted nor is it productive, there should be daily challenges and mini-goals. However, these daily challenges and mini-goals are completed by each Marine in the unit every day. These can be physical or cognitive events done individually or collectively. However, each Marine regardless of rank, billet, years of service, or MOS should earn the title every day. Being a Marine should be a holistic, deliberate lifestyle. Case Study 4 shows that even talent must pursue greatness. 

Challenge 10: Define Performance
Talent Management 2030 discusses performance, but we as an organization have failed to define what performance means for early 21st-century warfighting performance (CWP). The more clearly defined a trait is, the more easily we can measure it. The better we can measure it, the more easily we can acknowledge success and correct setbacks. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 describes the constants of war via Chapter 1, The Nature of War.39 The changing character of the modern-day battlefield can be seen in the rise of private military contractors, the execution and planning of war by non-humans (i.e., drones and artificial intelligence), the saturation and proliferation of information and disinformation, additive manufacturing, and the accelerating pace of change.40

Without clearly defining early 21st-CWP, we will have: an unnecessary variance in preparation for war, a greater inherent risk of creating myopic definitions which leads to suboptimal performance, and increased risk by misclassifying performance, leading to incorrect emphases. Thus, we must adequately define early 21st-CWP. The author states that early 21st-CWP is the transient and relative capacity to impose our will during times of cooperation, competition, crisis, and conflict; the transient and relative capacity to efficiently and effectively achieve mission success criteria on the three levels of war; relative to the enemy, environment, and political situation, and a pursuit, where we never fully culminate. This definition of early 21st-CWP applies from the individual to the platoon to the Joint Force.  

Challenge 11: Talent Management is the Incorrect Sentiment
While TM2030 has numerous valid points, the Marine Corps does not need talent. Those who do possess talents (i.e., innate abilities) can often achieve quick success in learning new skills. However, when these talented individuals do not combine their gifts with practice, passion, or by challenging themselves, they will be surpassed by those who are less talented but are driven. For our newest Marines to join our ranks, current performance does not directly reflect future performance. 

For example, a talented infantryman who recently graduated from Infantry Training Battalion may be more physically fit, have greater cognition, and display what we might perceive as being a leader, compared to a peer lacking in those domains due to their talents. However, if this Marine does not have the drive to be a better infantryman, Marine, or leader, and if a less-talented Marine were to consistently and deliberately practice his deficiencies, then over time, the less-talented Marine would become the better infantryman. In the book, The Sports Gene, Epstein states that regarding becoming a high performer, the 10,000-hour rule is what the average person takes to become an expert with intentional and designed practice.41 However, David Epstein states that due to people’s innate abilities (talents), it should really be called the 10,000 ± 5,000 hours because some can become experts in 5,000 hours, whereas others will take 15,000 hours to become experts. Thus, a talented, low-driven Marine may never make the 5,000 hours needed to become an expert, but the less talented, high-driven Marine may very well accumulate 15,000 hours. A talented Marine with low drive will be the first to fall asleep on watch, the last to volunteer for extra duties, and will not embody esprit de corps. Therefore, we can see that talented Marines are not innately preferable to hard-working, driven Marines.

Furthermore, talented individuals can be less resilient to failures and setbacks. In her book Mindset, Dr. Dweck’s research shows that individuals who are praised for their talents can develop fixed mindsets.42 While those with fixed mindsets can be highly successful, they are ultimately less resilient than those with growth mindsets. Figure 2 summarizes the research by Dr. Dweck regarding those with fixed mindsets to those with a growth mindset.43

Therefore, talent management is not the right sentiment; rather, it is Marine management. While there would be significant overlap to the principles laid out in TM2030, Marine management recognizes that we should not emphasize innate gifts, but whether or not the Marine is making improvements in their MOS and billet and is living by the ethos we pursue. As stated by Coach Herb Brooks, coach of the 1980 U.S. Miracle hockey team, “Gentlemen, you don’t have enough talent to win on talent alone.”44

Conclusion
While there are eleven challenges to TM2030, there are many facets I fully agree with, such as: “Marines are individuals, not inventory,” “Talents can be identified and evaluated,” and “Data drives decision-making.”45 Furthermore, transforming our recruitment system as identified in TM2030 is vital moving forward as well as increasing opportunities for Marines while in uniform.46

As stated in TM2030, “It begins and ends with preparedness for combat. Our ability to fight and win on future battlefields demands a personnel system that can recruit, develop, and retain a corps of Marines that is more intelligent, physically fit, cognitively mature, and experienced.”47 Were the Marines at Belleau Wood, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir able to impose their will on our enemies because of their talent (i.e., innate ability), or were our forefathers able to impose their will because they were Marines, forged in training, developed by small-unit leaders, led by morally-competent commanders, fighting for a purpose higher than themselves? We do not need talent.

>Maj Carter, before becoming a Special Operations Officer, was an Infantry Officer, serving as a Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer, and Company Commander, with deployment experience as both. Before commissioning in the Marine Corps, he was a strength and conditioning coach, a researcher in sports science, and a graduate teaching assistant. He is still currently active in the strength and conditioning community with his research centric to holistic training approaches for human performance. 

Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021).  

2. Ibid. 

3. Geoff Colvin, Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else (New York: Portfolio/ Penguin, 2018).

4. Talent Management 2030.

5. Talent is Overrated. 

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (New York: Back Bay Books, 2008). 

11. Mike Eruzione with Neal E. Boudette, The Making of a Miracle: The Untold Story of the Captain of the 1980 Gold Medal-Winning U.S. Olympic Hockey Team (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2020). 

12. Talent is Overrated.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Talent Management 2030. 

16. Alexander A. Vandegrift, “Bended Knee Speech,” Marine Corps University, March 30, 2024, https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Frequently-Requested-Topics/Historical-Documents-Orders-and-Speeches/Bended-Knee-Speech. 

17. Jeremy Carter, “A Critical and Devastating Gap in our Leadership Traits, Principles, Evaluations, Ethos, and Culture: The Problem with Solutions,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, No. 7 (2024). 

18. Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap and Others Don’t (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001).

19. Talent Management 2030. 

20. John Wooden and Steven Jamison, Wooden on Leadership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005). 

21. Ibid.

22. Good to Great.

23. Talent Management 2030. 

24. Ibid.

25. Gen David H. Berger, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2023). 

26. Jeremy Carter, “Strategic Competition and Stand-in Forces: A Novel View for Tactical Units,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, No. 8 (2024). 

27. Jeremy Carter and Thomas Ochoa, “The Relationship Between Enlisted and Officers- Part 1: The T-Shape Philosophy,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7 (2023). 

28. Talent Management 2030.

29. Ibid.

30. Daniel Coyle, The Culture Code: The Secrets of Highly Successful Groups (New York: Bantam Books, 2018).

31. Jeremy Carter, “Achieving the Culture We Pursue: The DEMAC Approach,” Marine Corps Gazette (Submitted).

32. Talent Management 2030.

33. Ibid. 

34. “Achieving the Culture We Pursue.”

35. “A Critical and Devastating Gap in our Leadership Traits, Principles, Evaluations, Ethos, and Culture.” 

36. “Achieving the Culture We Pursue.”  

37. Ibid.  

38. Talent Management 2030.

39. Douglas W. Hubbard, How to Measure Anything: Finding the Value of “Intangibles” in Business, 3d edition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2014);  “Achieving the Culture We Pursue;” and Headquarters Marine Corps: MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

40. Jeremy Carter, “United States Marine Corps Commandos: Enabling Joint Forcible Entry,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7. (2023). 

41. David Epstein, The Sports Gene: Inside the Science of Extraordinary Athletic Performance (New York: Penguin Random House LLC, 2014).

42. Carol S. Dweck, Mindset: The New Psychology of Success- How We Can Learn to Fulfill Our Potential (New York: Ballantine Books, 2016). 

43. Mindset.

44. The Making of a Miracle.

45. Talent Management 2030.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.