Acquisition Is Warfighting

Arming the acquirer to forge a decisive edge

The Core Problem: Forced Dependency and the High Cost of Waiting

It is a familiar and frustrating story: a multi-million-dollar weapon system that is key to a unit’s survival is rendered inert by a problem the unit has the skills to fix—but not the permission or knowledge to do so. Marines, trained to be self-sufficient, are reduced to customers waiting for a service call. On the battlespace, this waiting robs them of what makes them dangerous: their initiative, adaptability, and the ability to keep fighting when everything goes wrong.

The Mandate: Acquisition as a Warfighting Function

To eliminate this scenario of forced waiting and dependency, a new mandate from the Secretary of War gets directly to the point. This urgency is a direct response to a rapidly shifting global security landscape, where the resurgence of near-peer competition and the pacing threat of technologically advanced adversaries means victory will be decided by speed, resilience, and adaptability. The directive has fundamentally reshaped the landscape of military acquisition, redoubling focus on a single, uncompromising objective: delivering a decisive edge to the war-fighter at the speed of relevance. The directive, “Transforming the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System,” is more than a change in name; it is a seismic shift in philosophy. It declares that acquisition is not a support function, but a war-fighting function, critical to deterring our adversaries and winning the Nation’s battles. For the Marine Corps, this means treating an acquisition contract as a weapon. It requires arming the acquisition workforce, empowering the maintainer, and unifying our efforts for a decisive edge.

This transformation directly addresses the systemic challenges the Secretary of War identified that have historically hampered progress. For the Marine in the field, these challenges have manifested in tangible, mission-impacting ways: delays in fielding urgently needed capabilities, extended downtime for critical equipment, and a costly over-reliance on contractor support that cannot keep pace with operational tempo.

The core principles of the new War-fighting Acquisition System are simple and direct: instill a warrior ethos in the acquisition workforce, inject a relentless focus on speed and urgency, and empower those responsible for delivery to make and own their decisions. Every process, board, and review must now justify its existence by proving it directly supports accelerating capability to the FMF. We will no longer treat barriers in contracting and acquisitions as administrative hurdles but as a direct operational risk to mission success.

Marine Corps Systems Command’s Strategic Response: Equipping an Unrivaled Fleet

Answering this call to treat acquisition as a warfighting function, Marine Corps Systems Command unveiled its 2025–2032 strategic plan serving as the command’s roadmap. In the plan’s opening message, BGen Tamara L. Campbell, Commander of Marine Corps Systems Command, outlines a vision for “Equipping an unrivaled, future-focused Fleet Marine Force, powered by a dedicated acquisition workforce.” She further states, “The future threat is ever evolving, and we must be prepared to modernize our approach and processes to meet and defeat that threat.” This modernization enables the continuous adaptation of our warfighting capabilities to ensure Marines can forge an unfair fight and win. Marine Corps Systems Command is focusing on key areas of program management, process improvement, partnerships, and talent management to accelerate the delivery of lethal, agile, and ready capabilities. For Marine Corps Systems Command, the Secretary of War’s mandate is not just a new requirement to be met but a confirmation of the path it is already on—a path dedicated to ensuring that every acquisition decision directly contributes to combat power.

The Ownership Imperative: Forging Self-Sufficiency

Putting this warfighting mandate into action, Marine Corps Systems Command is focusing on its approach to contracting, intellectual property, and system maintenance. For a Marine in a contested environment, the legal jargon of a contract is a distant concept until the way the contract was written impacts mission success and survival. Marine Corps Systems Command’s new Product Support Strategy policy addresses this reality, which transforms acquisition strategy into a direct lever of combat power by ensuring the Marine Corps truly owns the systems it fields. Strengthening contractual rights in the acquisition of a system means a Marine can make necessary repairs or modifications to the system to sustain combat power instead of relying on a contractor to do so at additional cost and/or delay.

To make this a reality, the era of accepting unnecessary “vendor lock”—where the Marine Corps is denied the technical data and intellectual property rights to repair its own equipment—must end. While we respect our industry partners’ need to protect their commercial interests, dependency on a sole-source vendor creates a critical warfighting vulnerability that we can no longer accept. Doing so means navigating a complex legislative environment where established intellectual property laws, designed to protect innovation, can inadvertently hinder battlefield readiness. This necessary shift has, predictably, sparked debate, but the acquisition and sustainment communities will need to continue to drive for expanded data rights and technical data packages required to leverage advanced manufacturing, ensuring our systems remain lethal and sustainable in any environment.

… the Marine Corps is arming its acquisition workforce with the authority, tools, and analytical capabilities …

Marine Corps Systems Command’s Product Support Strategy order also makes it clear that failing to secure intellectual property and data rights is no longer an acceptable risk. The order is a direct response to the battlefield costs of ignoring this risk: degraded readiness, atrophy of organic maintenance skills, uncontrolled cost growth, and reduced lethality. The policy mandates that we must prioritize the “maximum integration of organic supply and maintenance capabilities while leveraging the Joint Logistics Enterprise’s capabilities, where appropriate,” shifting the focus from slow, outsourced repairs to swift, organic sustainment performed by uniformed Marines at the point of need. This reinforces the warfighting ethos of self-sufficiency and ensures that core maintenance competencies are honed, not lost.

For the acquisition community, these updates formally shift sustainment from a costly afterthought to a core design requirement. Program managers and the acquisition workforce now have the blueprint to integrate the product support analysis activities into the systems engineering process from the beginning, using analytical rigor to develop reliable designs and affordable support plans. This codifies an “own, not rent” philosophy, ensuring that systems fielded to the FMF are both highly capable and sustainable, which in turn builds a more resilient, self-sufficient force.

Arming the Acquisition Workforce: Empowering the Fleet

To turn policy into battlefield advantage, the Marine Corps is arming its acquisition workforce with the authority, tools, and analytical capabilities needed to execute the Secretary of War’s vision. This empowerment is being driven through three key lines of effort: restructuring leadership for integrated decision-making, providing tactical tools for smarter contracting, and embedding a data-driven mindset for sustainable systems. A cornerstone of this empowerment is how the Marine Corps is currently standing up a Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Marine Corps ground equipment. The Portfolio Acquisition Executive will be the single accountable commander for delivering warfighting lethality, moving beyond the simple management of program performance—breaking down the traditional, inefficient coordination between individual programs. This structure will empower the Portfolio Acquisition Executive to make rapid, integrated decisions that accelerate outcomes and provide a decisive edge, shifting the focus from managing programs to delivering a unified warfighting solution. For the FMF, this means receiving systems designed to work together from the start, creating a cohesive and far more lethal capability on the battlefield.

To complement this empowered leadership with practical tools for execution, Marine Corps Systems Command is also launching a dedicated site within its Logistics Knowledge Center. Previously, the workforce lacked streamlined access to the specific contractual language required to secure intellectual property and enforce sustainability goals. This new initiative solves that problem by providing a centralized repository of critical contracting language, data item descriptions, and additional toolkits and resources providing the tactical knowledge to write to write stronger contracts that secure data rights and break vendor lock where appropriate. The impact on the Marine in the field is direct: the technical data needed to repair their equipment will be available at the point of need, dramatically increasing self-sufficiency and reducing mission-crippling downtime.

The third piece of this empowerment strategy is embedding a data-driven mindset. To that end, Marine Corps Systems Command is further empowering the workforce with its updated Reliability-Centered Maintenance policy and handbook. The Marine Corps has traditionally relied on maintenance that is either reactive or based on fixed schedules, resulting in unnecessary work and unexpected equipment failures. Reliability-Centered Maintenance provides the data-driven analytical engine to create smarter product support strategies, determining the most efficient maintenance based on a system’s reliability and operating context. This policy is the catalyst for moving toward a predictive model using Condition-Based Maintenance Plus when the process determines the need for it on a particular system. For the acquisition workforce, Reliability-Centered Maintenance provides the analytical proof needed to build intelligent, affordable sustainment plans from day one. For the Marine, this translates to higher equipment availability and reliability, allowing maintainers to focus their efforts where they are most needed.

The Secretary of War’s mandate has set the clear, uncompromising direction: acquisition is warfighting.

This combination of empowered leadership, tactical tools, and analytical rigor is a force multiplier. The Portfolio Acquisition Executive provides the strategic why, the Logistics Knowledge Center delivers the contractual how, and the Reliability-Centered Maintenance policy provides the analytical proof. Together, these initiatives arm the workforce with the strategic authority, tactical precision, and data-driven justification needed to break down institutional barriers and deliver fully sustainable warfighting solutions. This ensures that the systems fielded to the fleet are not just collections of parts, but integrated, reliable capabilities designed to be owned and dominate in the battlespace, fulfilling the promise of a truly self-sufficient force.

Conclusion: Forging an Unfair Fight

It is this self-sufficiency that ultimately forges the unfair fight. The Secretary of War’s mandate has set the clear, uncompromising direction: acquisition is warfighting. Within the Marine Corps, this is an operational imperative. We must see our contracts as the first weapon sent downrange, engineered from the start to forge an unfair fight in our favor.

If the Marine Corps wants to win in austere conditions, we cannot merely field capabilities; we must be able to own it, repair it, sustain it, and fight with it indefinitely, even when the logistics tail is thin, contested, or cut entirely. That is how we preserve tempo, maintain lethality, and ensure the FMF remains truly expeditionary—not just in doctrine, but in execution.

Yet, for all the progress being made, we must recognize that the journey has just begun. The hard part starts now: the daily act of implementation, of changing a culture and holding ourselves accountable to these new standards. Success will not be measured by the documents we publish, but by the contracts we award, the data we secure, the deliverables we accept, and the speed, lethality, and self-sufficiency we deliver to the FMF.

The acquisition professionals of the Marine Corps are postured for this challenge, ready to prove—in the words of the Secretary of War—that in acquisition, just as in combat, “speed wins and speed dominates.”

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

>Mr. Bond is a prior Marine Corps Logistics and Intelligence Officer and the Product Support Director at Marine Corps Systems Command, where he has worked since 2010. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Computer Engineering from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.

The Industrial Battlespace: Manufacturing and Maneuver

During the brutal assault on Tarawa in World War II, Marines faced nearly insurmountable odds. The beach was heavily fortified, enemy fire poured down from all directions, and the Marines’ landing craft were slow, vulnerable, and difficult to maneuver. Casualties mounted as Marines scrambled to disembark. The lessons learned from this chaotic operation were pivotal in shaping future amphibious assaults, with one of the most significant being the urgent need for faster, more effective means of troop deployment. The experience of Tarawa reinforced the importance of rapid mobility and adaptability in ensuring the success of future operations.

Though not directly involved in the Tarawa landings, 1stLt Victor “Brute” Krulak recognized the need for change after witnessing the difficulties Marines faced during these early amphibious assaults. He advocated for modifications to the Higgins boat, a shallow-draft landing craft that revolutionized amphibious warfare by enabling Marines to quickly and safely reach the shore under heavy enemy fire, including the addition of a bow ramp. This adaptation, which allowed for quicker disembarkation and reduced exposure to enemy fire, became a key innovation in improving the efficiency and safety of amphibious landings. Krulak’s intellect and determination to adapt to battlefield realities are prime examples of how rapid innovation can drive success on the battlefield.1

This story of the Higgins boat, its evolution, and its impact on amphibious assaults ties directly to the principles of maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps’ approach to warfighting. Maneuver warfare is about achieving speed, flexibility, and decisive action through decentralized decision-making. It is the ability to make fast, effective decisions at the lowest tactical levels, allowing for rapid response and sustained operational tempo. The principles of maneuver warfare are not only ingrained in our doctrine but are woven deeply into Marine culture, from leadership development to battlefield execution. World War II demonstrated that victory depended on the ability to generate and sustain tempo through industrial strength. Today, that same contest has shifted from mass production to speed of adaptation, where the ability to rapidly develop, integrate, and field capability determines advantage for Marines in contact.

The industrial base is not just support; it is maneuver space. Every decision that shortens the path from concept to contact, whether in contracting, engineering, training, or sustainment, creates operational tempo for Marines at the point of friction. With the establishment of Portfolio Acquisition Executive Marine Corps (PAE Marine Corps), the Marine Corps is advancing how it integrates and delivers combat capability across the force. This shift reflects a deeper reality: acquisition is not a supporting function, it is a warfighting function that directly influences speed, tempo, and advantage in conflict. Within this construct, PAE Marine Corps serves as the focal point for delivering capability to the force, aligning resources, requirements, and execution to generate combat power. Supporting this effort, Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) is evolving into a critical force provider, responsible for developing and sustaining the acquisition workforce and enabling the broader enterprise. Together, they operate where strategy meets execution, where decisions about technology, talent, and resources directly shape tactical tempo and battlefield outcomes. Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr.’s reminder, “it doesn’t cost any money to think,”2 remains the moral compass for this enterprise. It underscores the critical importance of intellectual rigor, where every decision, from selecting new technologies to negotiating contracts, begins with thoughtful analysis. In a fast-paced acquisition environment, leveraging creativity and foresight ensures we stay ahead of adversaries, maintaining operational readiness and sustaining the edge that our warfighters need.

As Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Gray oversaw the establishment of Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command (now MARCORSYSCOM) in 1987. His vision to streamline the acquisition process, directly involve the operating forces in identifying deficiencies, and establish clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability laid the foundation for how the Marine Corps delivers combat capability. That same mindset continues to shape today’s evolution, as the Marine Corps refines its acquisition enterprise through the establishment of PAE Marine Corps, reinforcing a more responsive and integrated system aligned with its warfighting philosophy.3

China’s Strategic Vision: Long-Term Patience and Technological Superiority

It is essential to analyze the United States’ leading adversary and competitor to gauge our efforts in the acquisition realm. 

At the heart of China’s current strategy is a focus on long-term goals and patient ambition. The Chinese leadership, particularly under Xi Jinping, has articulated a clear vision for 2049, when China plans to assert itself as the dominant global superpower. This vision is underpinned by a military modernization program that spans multiple decades and draws heavily from Sun Tzu’s principles of warfare. Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of winning without direct confrontation, suggesting that the true art of war lies in outmaneuvering the enemy strategically before physical combat is necessary.4 In modern terms, this has manifested in China’s use of economic and geopolitical tools, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, to exert influence globally while simultaneously building up its military capabilities.

Sun Tzu’s strategy of deception, “When able to attack, one must seem unable; when active, seem to be inactive; when near, make the enemy think you are far away; when far away, seem to him to be near,” has guided Chinese military thinking and aligns closely with their incremental, often covert, approach to military modernization.5 China’s emphasis on stealth, long-range missiles, and cyber warfare reflects a strategy of attrition and gradual dominance, focused on eroding the United States’ power in a way that makes direct confrontation unnecessary until the time is right.

China benefits from its highly centralized control over both military and economic policy. This centralized approach allows for a unified vision across all domains of national power, military, economic, and political, making it easier for China to direct resources toward its goals and make steady progress on long-term projects like hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and cyber capabilities. The United States, by contrast, faces a fragmented decision-making process, with budgetary priorities driven by political infighting and local interests. This disjointed approach can undermine efforts to maintain a consistent, long-term strategy.

Furthermore, China’s strategic vision is reflected in its ambitious goals for technological independence and its reduced dependency on foreign technologies. Although challenges remain, particularly in advanced sectors like aerospace and AI, China’s investment in indigenous innovation continues to grow, fueled by both state-directed efforts and market incentives. This shift toward self-reliance has been a critical element of China’s defense modernization strategy, as it aims to avoid the vulnerabilities associated with foreign supply chains.6

As China progresses in its military modernization, it continues to leverage its unity of effort, translating strategic vision into action. The Chinese military, armed with both cutting-edge technology and a long-term strategic outlook, is preparing to challenge the United States’ position as the world’s leading superpower. The Chinese approach to warfare is holistic, incorporating not only traditional military capabilities but also cyber, space, and economic tools to shape the global order.

The Nature of the Industrial Battlespace

Today’s competition reaches beyond conventional military power, extending into global supply chains, data networks, and material science, all contested domains. China’s dominance in rare earth elements and permanent magnets, controlling the vast majority of global processing capacity, illustrates how economic leverage can become a strategic weapon. When export controls tighten on critical materials like advanced semiconductors and rare-earth metals, operations slow before first contact, delaying systems and halting production lines. From a maneuver perspective, this is an attack on tempo at the strategic level.7

History is instructive. Interwar Germany galvanized industry to align with a concept of fast, combined-arms operations; standardizing components and prioritizing production that sustained tempo. The United States did the same at scale in World War II through the War Production Board and the Office of War Mobilization. Those efforts fused doctrine, industry, and logistics so that operations could be maintained at speed. In contemporary terms, this is the difference between sustaining precision warfare and reverting to attrition when inventories and production lines cannot keep pace. As Col Michael Wyly, a leading expert in military strategy and doctrine and one of the original proponents of maneuver warfare, has observed, wars are expensive; when a nation exhausts its capacity to produce advanced munitions and smart weapons at scale, it risks being forced to fight in a communication-degraded environment with non-precision munitions.

Industry as Maneuver Partner

Industrial resilience should be seen as a key part of warfighting readiness. Programs that depend on single-source suppliers, foreign refiners, or limited materials should identify these risks early and plan for backup sources or co-production with allies. Using digital tools like supply-chain dashboards and predictive analytics can help spot potential problems before they become critical. The Service’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy highlights using data to improve sustainment and make smarter decisions to keep operations moving smoothly under pressure.8

Industry is therefore not a roadblock, but terrain to be maneuvered upon. Successful examples already exist. Rapid counter-unmanned aircraft systems kits delivered through partnerships with small manufacturers, using other transaction authorities-based competitions and fleet feedback, illustrated the model: concurrent engineering, quick learning cycles, and tranche deliveries. The acquisition enterprise must design for adaptation, leveraging modular open systems architecture (MOSA), common interfaces, and standardized approaches so upgrades can be fielded without complete redesign.9 Industry’s responsibility is to provide maneuverable solutions that allow this adaptability to occur and not locked-down proprietary solutions that require the programs to start over at the beginning of each new contract.

Message to the Fleet

To the Marines in the fleet: The role of the Marine Corps acquisition enterprise is not separate from yours; it is part of the same maneuver system. Through the integration of capabilities under PAE Marine Corps, everything we do is focused on ensuring you have the right tools to execute your mission. Your feedback, from training to deployment, shapes the systems delivered to the force. The faster you communicate your needs, the more quickly the enterprise can respond. The faster equipment is fielded, the faster you can fight, and that depends on your continued partnership. Your involvement in requirements definition and early feedback loops ensures that you receive what you need faster and more effectively. When you are on the front lines, your readiness is our mission. Together, we ensure that technology and innovation do not just stay ahead of the fight, they stay ahead of the enemy.

Conclusion

Every generation of Marines must rediscover maneuver warfare in its own domain. While the character of war continues to evolve, the nature of war remains constant, defined by friction, uncertainty, and the contest of wills. For today’s force, that domain extends beyond the battlefield to the factories, laboratories, and data streams that sustain the fight. Within the Marine Corps acquisition enterprise, and through the integration of capabilities under Portfolio Acquisition Executive Marine Corps, ideas born in the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and requirements validated by Combat Development and Integration are translated into realities in the hands of the fleet.

If maneuver warfare is about creating advantage through tempo, then our generation’s task is to restore industrial tempo, ensuring the nation never loses the ability to fight smart because it cannot produce at speed. The charge for the acquisition enterprise is clear: think boldly, act decisively, and deliver the capabilities Marines need to fight tonight and in the conflicts ahead.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

> SgtMaj Heider is the Marine Corps Systems Command Sergeant Major.

Notes:

1. David Vergun, “Junior Marine Played Vital Role in D-Day Success,” Department of War News, May 30, 2024, https://www.war.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3787398/junior-marine-played-vital-role-in-d-day-success. 

2. Alfred M. Gray, Grayisms: The Wisdom of General Alfred M. Gray, USMC (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1990). 

3. “The Brain of the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps History (Summer 2020), Marine Corps University Press, https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCH/Marine-Corps-History-Summer-2020/The-Brain-of-the-Marine-Corps_. 

4. James P. Micciche, “The Art of Non-War: Sun Tzu and Great Power Competition,” War Room, March 18, 2021, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/non-war. 

5. James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 

6. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries: Rare Earths (Reston, VA: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2024); see also U.S. Department of Defense, Industrial Base Assessments on Critical Materials. 

7. U.S. Marine Corps, USMC Artificial Intelligence Strategy (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2024). 

8. Ibid.

9. Defense Acquisition University, “Using Industry Best Practices to Improve Acquisition,” Defense AT&L, May–June 2018.

First to the Fight in Acquisition Reform

Equipping Marines better and faster: a proactive approach

The new administration’s call for a revitalized military demands a fresh look at defense acquisition reform. The DOD has wrestled with the complexities of acquiring and fielding advanced military capabilities for decades, generating a mountain of studies, reports, and recommendations in the process. Yet, a crucial question remains: how can we navigate this complex landscape to best equip Marines for the 21st-century battlefield? This question takes on even greater urgency as the character of warfare continues to evolve at an unprecedented pace, driven by technological breakthroughs, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, and the emergence of new domains of conflict, such as cyberspace and space. Our role as the stand-in force within the acquisition weapons engagement zone provides us with a unique perspective on balancing reform needs with crisis response. Every decision we make hinges on one essential question: will it result in sustainable, superior capabilities delivered to Marines faster?

This question drives acquisition professionals at the Program Executive Office, Land Systems (PEO-LS). Tasked with equipping the Marine Corps with the groundbased weapons systems and equipment necessary for success in modern warfare, PEO-LS occupies a critical position within the defense acquisition ecosystem. As the stand-in force in the acquisition world, PEO-LS must constantly balance the need for modernization and innovation with the urgency of delivering capabilities to Marines rapidly and efficiently.

3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d MarDiv, fire a Stinger missile from a Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. The MADIS Mk1, pictured, and Mk2 form a complementary pair and will be a force multiplier for the low altitude air defense battalions’ ground-based air defense capability. (Photo by Jim Van Meer.)

The PEO-LS recognizes that success in this challenging arena requires strong partnerships across the Marine Corps and the broader DOD. The organization collaborates closely with entities like the Deputy Commandants for Capabilities Development and Integration and Programs and Resources, Marine Corps Systems Command, and fellow program executive offices to ensure aligned efforts and a cohesive approach to acquisition reform. These partnerships are essential for breaking down bureaucratic silos, fostering shared understanding, and promoting unity of effort across the acquisition enterprise.

Evolutionary Versus Revolutionary Reform: Forging the Optimal Path
The debate surrounding defense acquisition reform often hinges on the appropriate balance between evolutionary and revolutionary change. Proposals for reforming the Defense Acquisition System span a broad spectrum, from evolutionary tweaks within existing frameworks to revolutionary overhauls aimed at redefining processes and structures. This debate is not merely academic; it has real-world implications for the ability of the U.S. military to maintain its technological edge and prevail in future conflicts.

Evolutionary reforms target incremental improvements to existing processes and structures within the traditional pillars of requirements, resources, procurement, and sustainment. The 2020 Adaptive Acquisition Framework, with its emphasis on tailored pathways for different types of acquisition programs, exemplifies this approach. However, as highlighted by a recent Government Accountability Office assessment, these efforts have yet to significantly reduce the average delivery time for weapon systems.1 While such reforms can generate positive results, they often fail to keep pace with the rapid technological advancements and evolving character of warfare. Critics argue that evolutionary reforms, while well-intentioned, often amount to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic: they may improve efficiency at the margins, but they fail to address the systemic issues that plague defense acquisition.

Revolutionary reforms demand a fundamental reimagining of the Defense Acquisition System. These proposals advocate for disruptive changes to processes, organizational structures, authorities, and even the underlying culture of defense acquisition. Proponents of revolutionary reform argue that the current system, rooted in a bygone era of industrial-age warfare, is simply not equipped to deal with the complexities and challenges of 21st-century defense acquisition. They call for a fundamental shift in mindset from a culture of risk aversion and bureaucratic inertia to one that embraces innovation, experimentation, and rapid iteration.

Marines with 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, II MEF, discuss the events of ISLAND MARAUDER as part of BOLD QUEST ‘24 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC, 30 October 2024. BOLD QUEST ‘24 is a joint staff sponsored, multinational venue designed to enhance and develop interoperability. (Photo by LCpl Weston Q. Lindstrom.)

Three recent efforts are notable. First, the Atlantic Commission report on the Commission on Defense Innovation offered many proposals that adopt the private sector’s rapid innovation best practices.2 The Commission also proposed modernizing acquisition and budgeting processes to foster increased collaboration with nontraditional companies to get advanced technology to warfighters sooner. Second, the NDAA FY 2022 Sec. 1004 Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform final report recommended that the DOD should adopt a new resourcing system.3 The proposed Defense Resourcing System, in the commission’s view, would preserve the strengths of the current PPBE process while also better aligning strategy with resource allocation and allowing the DOD to respond more effectively to emerging threats and technological advances. Finally, a recent Bloomberg Strategic Edge study, chaired by the former Commandant, Gen Berger, highlighted the urgency of rebuilding the industrial base, using non-traditional innovators, and unlocking private capital to accelerate the fielding of emerging technologies.4 Differing from the other studies, this report recommended the DOD carry out these acceleration efforts by divesting fifteen percent of its budget for some of its aging legacy systems to fund a new parallel track for fielding high-technology capability quickly and at scale. 

These diverse yet interconnected proposals share common threads: a focus on accelerating innovation, streamlining resource allocation, embracing organizational agility, and fostering closer collaboration with the private sector. The challenge lies in determining which specific reforms, and to what degree, will deliver the greatest benefit for the Marine Corps and the broader defense enterprise. This requires careful analysis, a willingness to experiment, and a commitment to continuous learning and improvement.

PEO-LS: A Dual Approach to Driving Transformation
The PEO-LS recognizes that successful reform requires both strategic vision and tactical execution. The organization actively implements strategic revolutionary changes while simultaneously driving tactical innovations within the existing framework. This dual approach enables PEO-LS to pursue both incremental improvements and more transformative changes, maximizing its impact on the defense acquisition process.

Strategic Reorganization and Process Optimization
The PEO-LS has undertaken a series of organizational realignments designed to enhance efficiency and better align its internal structure with the evolving needs of the Marine Corps. For example, we have reorganized program offices to enhance alignment and efficiency, merging key capability areas to better support Force Design aims. Notable examples include:

  • MAGTF Command and Control (C2): By combining ground and aviation command and control programs, we are developing an integrated, scalable MAGTF Command and Control solution. This initiative ensures interoperability across naval, joint, and coalition forces.
  • Intelligence and Cyber Operations: We have merged intelligence and cyber programs to use their unique network warfare capabilities, enhancing our ability to address emerging threats.

These integrated capability areas streamline decision-making processes, reduce redundancies, and foster greater synergy between related programs. This approach recognizes that the nature of warfare is increasingly interconnected, requiring a more integrated and holistic approach to capability development.

These examples show how we are continuously implementing acquisition reform while working within the bounds of the current process. We are stretching those bounds by adapting strategic-level changes, such as assigning several of our program managers to also act as capability acquisition managers, looking beyond their specific programs to see how they can improve key capability areas supporting Force Design outcomes, including integrated C2, counter unmanned systems, and integrated air and missile defense.

Recognizing that overly bureaucratic processes can stifle innovation and slow down acquisition timelines, PEO-LS has implemented a range of process improvements aimed at reducing administrative burdens and streamlining procurement activities. These efforts include eliminating redundant tasks, automating workflows, and delegating responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level. The PEO-LS has placed a particular focus on reducing procurement administrative lead time, particularly within the contracting process, where delays can significantly impact program schedules. This focus on streamlining processes is essential for enabling the rapid acquisition of emerging technologies, which often have shorter lifecycles and require a more agile approach.

Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, II MEF, test out the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) Driver Training System (ACV DTS) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The ACV DTS replicates the ACV’s driver’s station, complete with more than 50 unique functions, to include a driver’s display panel with realistic and accurate vehicle and engine performance displays. The simulation also creates a first-in-the-field complex and realistic surf zone with multiple wave types, variable wave heights, littoral currents, randomized wave periods, and directions all controlled by a physics-based simulation engine. (Photo by David Jordan.)
Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, II MEF, test out the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) Driver Training System (ACV DTS) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The ACV DTS replicates the ACV’s driver’s station, complete with more than 50 unique functions, to include a driver’s display panel with realistic and accurate vehicle and engine performance displays. The simulation also creates a first-in-the-field complex and realistic surf zone with multiple wave types, variable wave heights, littoral currents, randomized wave periods, and directions all controlled by a physics-based simulation engine. (Photo by David Jordan.)

Tactical Success: Rapidly Fielding Advanced Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS) Capabilities
Blending strategic-level revolutionary changes (such as the FoRGED Act or Gen Berger’s “Blueprint for Defense Innovation”) to the tactical changes, the Marine Corps acquisition professionals have and will continue to spearhead improved capability delivery. The results are impressive across several portfolios, but none more so than CUAS. Just five years ago, the only CUAS capability any Marine formation had was a Stinger missile and a Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball for detection. This year, PEO-LS’s Ground-Based Air Defense Program will complete the development or fielding of five programs of record and one urgent capability acquisition: MADIS, L-MADIS (replacing a Joint Universal Needs capability), installation defense of small CUAS (replacing a Joint Urgent Operational Need system), Medium Range Intercept Capability, and organic CUAS for dismounted formations.5 

These successes highlight the importance of close collaboration between PEO-LS and key partners such as the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Deputy Commandant for Capabilities Development and Integration. By working together, these organizations have successfully begun to better bridge the valley of death that often hinders the transition of promising technologies and capabilities from development to deployment, ensuring that Marines receive the tools they need without delay. This collaborative approach is essential for overcoming the stovepipe nature of traditional defense acquisition and fostering a more integrated and responsive approach to capability development.

The Road Ahead: Embracing Continuous Improvement and Empowering the Workforce
While PEO-LS has made significant strides in advancing acquisition reform, the journey continues. The organization recognizes that reform is not a destination, but rather a continuous process of adaptation, innovation, and improvement. In a rapidly changing security environment, the defense acquisition system must be able to adapt and evolve to meet new challenges and seize new opportunities.

To guide its ongoing efforts, PEO-LS must continuously ask critical questions and challenge the status quo:

  • How can we better integrate emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and directed energy, into existing and future acquisition programs? The PEO-LS must be proactive in identifying and evaluating emerging technologies, and in developing innovative acquisition strategies that enable the rapid fielding of these game-changing capabilities.
  • How can we foster deeper and more impactful collaboration with the private sector, particularly with non-traditional defense companies that bring new ideas and innovative solutions to the table? The PEO-LS must be proactive in engaging with these nontraditional players, leveraging their expertise and innovation to deliver cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter.
  • How can we strike the right balance between the need for speed in acquisition, particularly in response to rapidly evolving threats, with the imperative for accountability and responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars?

The PEO-LS must continue to refine its processes and procedures to ensure that it can acquire capabilities rapidly while maintaining the highest standards of fiscal responsibility and accountability to the American taxpayer.

By continuously asking these questions and engaging in a robust dialogue with stakeholders across the defense acquisition community, PEO-LS ensures that its reform efforts remain relevant, effective, and responsive to the evolving needs of the Marine Corps. This requires a commitment to continuous learning, a willingness to experiment, and a relentless focus on delivering results for the warfighter. 

Conclusion: An Unwavering Commitment to Delivering Capabilities and Equipping Marines for the Future Fight
While the journey toward acquisition reform is fraught with challenges, it also presents significant opportunities. Recent workforce reductions will align to process improvements reducing non-value-added tasks. Our optimized workforce remains our greatest asset The PEO-LS acquisition professionals bring unparalleled ability and dedication to the mission, making them well-equipped to implement both strategic and tactical reforms.

At PEO-LS, acquisition reform is not simply an abstract concept or a box to be checked. It represents a fundamental commitment to delivering the best possible capabilities to Marines as quickly and efficiently as possible. As the stand-in force within the acquisition weapons engagement zone, Marine Corps acquisition professionals are best positioned to lead the way in evolutionary and revolutionary acquisition reform efforts. Ultimately, the true measure of success will be our ability to deliver sustainable, superior capabilities to Marines faster. By keeping a steadfast focus on this goal, we can lead the charge in acquisition reform, ensuring the Marine Corps stays at the forefront of innovation and readiness. By staying true to our mission and embracing a culture of continuous improvement, we can ensure that the Marine Corps stays ready and capable in an ever-changing world.

>SES Bowdren is the Program Executive Officer Land Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Notes

1. Government Accountability Office, DOD Acquisition Reform (Washington, DC: December 2024). 

2. Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren, “Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption,” Atlantic Council, January 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-defense-innovation-adoption. 

3. Commission on Planning, Budgeting, and Executive Reform, Defense Resourcing for the Future (Washington, DC: March 2024). 

4. David H. Berger, Kirsten Bartok, Yisroel Brumer, Nathan Diller, Matt George, and Clint Hinote, Strategic Edge (Washington, DC: January 2025). 

5. Morgan Blackstock, “PEO Land Systems Fields Advanced Air Defense System to 3D LAAAB,” Marines.mil, December 13, 2024, https://www.peols.marines.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4000903/peo-land-systems-fields-advanced-air-defense-system-to-3d-laab; and David Jordan, “MRIC Complete Quick Reaction Assessment,” Marines.mil, October 24, 2024, https://www.peols.marines.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3947926/mric-completes-quick-reaction-assessment.

A Culture of Innovation Drives Acceleration!

Rapid response to Corps’ modernization efforts

Innovation—the discovery of new ideas, methods, or technologies—is a necessary but insufficient condition to achieve the dominant warfighting capability edge needed to address both near-peer adversaries and other threats. Military history is replete with accounts of battles won not because of an advantage in the number of soldiers or platforms but rather by the side that employed a new technology—or a new combination of existing technologies—against an unwitting opponent.

At its heart, the Marine Corps’ Force Design initiative an innovation strategy that directs the entire Marine Corps, in a phased and organized way, to conduct innovation activities (experiments, tests) across technology and concepts of operations against current and anticipated threats.1 The acquisition community, fully engaged in responding to the Corps’ modernization efforts, often misses opportunities to adopt innovation. As this round of Force Design is funded, technology and capability acquisition must innovate at scale to ensure our Marines dominate across their multi-domain mission sets.

Today, we are engulfed—and at times overwhelmed—by the dizzying pace of technological change, spanning across known areas and extending into soon-to-be-known domains. The list is long. But mere discovery is useless unless those technologies or concepts are adopted, integrated, tested, fielded, and improved at the right speed, scale, and cost to support our warfighters. And nowhere is innovation more important than in the acquisition domain where new technologies are delivered at scale as new programs or capability improvements to existing programs. We know what side we want to be on in any conflict: the side that maintains a dominant advantage that will deter—and if necessary defeat—an adversary. To achieve this dominance, the Marine Corps’ acquisition community must develop a stronger innovation culture that can increase the pace of innovation adoption.

Most of the proposed solutions to improving the DOD’s innovation adoption are focused on broad organizational or authorities changes to the Defense Acquisition System and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System. The recently issued report from the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption outlines many of these recommendations that the DOD is considering implementing.2 However, there is little attention on how we can improve innovation adoption at all echelons and formations within the Defense Acquisition System.

Oftentimes, the way we are organized, both the acquisition commands and military formations are byproducts of the way we won the last war and can frustrate the pace of implementing innovations. After all, traditional military organizational structures, and how they fight wars, are optimized for operational execution and not for innovation. Orders must be given and followed, and experimenting in combat is high risk. In fact, it is hard to find a requirement to innovate in any military doctrine, process, or procedure. One common approach to spurring innovation in organizations is to create a centralized innovation group or cell that interested organizations can leverage. While this approach has its advantages, a notable drawback is that it can lead the rest of the organization to rely exclusively on that one group for innovation, assuming that it is someone else’s mission.

The acquisition community has the mission focus and tools to be a full-fledged innovation partner in re-equipping the force for its 2030 (or sooner) posture. Acquisition professionals partnered closely with the requirements setters at the Deputy Commandant for Capability Development and Integration and funding managers at the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources are empowered to tailor acquisition strategies, plans, and schedules to deliver capabilities promptly. They are adept at finding new and creative ways to improve capability delivery within the resources they have. The attributes of an innovation culture are present to varying degrees across our acquisition community, but they often compete with a well-entrenched regulatory and compliance culture and a set of beliefs and behaviors wedded to traditions, habits, risk aversion, and a predisposition to assume that only marginal change is possible. In short, our latent innovation culture is often overshadowed by our compliance culture.

While the formal innovation ecosystem (e.g., Marine Innovation Unit, Office of Naval Research, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, NavalX, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Strategic Capabilities Office, Defense Innovation Unit, etc.) is an important source of ideas (and of increasing resources), the acquisition community has huge opportunities to demonstrate the innovation it can contribute through the prototypes, programs, and capability that it is fielding to the fleet. We need to become full members of the innovation ecosystem.

Former Under Secretary of the Navy James “Hondo” Guerts said as much, noting, “When organizations don’t build in the ability to pivot quickly, they become very brittle.” A recent Gallup report identified eight factors as the building blocks of agile workplace culture, summarized by Guerts in his “4 D’s” to increase the Navy’s organizational pivot speed and agility.3 In short, decentralize, differentiate the work, maximize the power of the digit, and most importantly, develop talent. He believed that to truly empower innovation, one must first address infrastructure. Building a culture that values how we address failure and create spaces for psychological safety—knowing that the team is there to support their ideas and challenges in a non-confrontational way.4 A truly innovative organization needs to understand that changing a culture is not only driven by factors within our systems and processes but also by the mindset we foster in our workforce.

However, it is important to recognize the tensions between a culture of innovation and one oriented toward compliance. What are some indicators of an “innovation culture?” Of a “compliance culture?” How can we reconcile the two, keeping the best of both cultures? How do we resolve these contradictions that frustrate innovation adoption? How do we unleash our innate innovation energy to ensure we are key enablers and implementers of innovation adoption? How often is the acquisition community crowdsourced to help solve capability gaps, rather than for the fleet or Headquarters Marine Corps to assume that we are only focused on the program of record baselines?

One way to gauge readiness to innovate is to assess whether your team or formation exhibits yes-if versus no-because behaviors.5 A yes-if organization rises above process and procedural allegiance to find new ways to solve complex procurement and operational challenges. Yes-if teams anticipate, adapt, and thrive in dynamic environments. They take new approaches and test boundaries without fear of failure. Are we taking measured and deliberate risks, not only in executing our cost, schedule, and performance responsibilities but, in responding to fleet feedback and the need to keep the capability at an unfair advantage level? There are of course many occasions when programs need to say no, but that message is often best delivered to the fleet or others as a conversation about how to achieve the yes outcome. Other organizations that must anticipate, adapt, and thrive in rapidly changing environments have achieved great success in adopting a yes-if culture.6

There are five other areas that acquisition organizations should explore to gauge and improve their innovation culture.7

First, they should be tolerant of failure but not of poor workmanship or incompetence. Failures rooted in incompetence cost too much time or money to tolerate. We need to focus on achieving success while learning and avoid unnecessary repeated failures. Treat a failure as a “first attempt at learning” with the expectation that a professional, well-trained, and certified team will achieve success in its next attempt.

Second, be willing to experiment and take measured risks but be ruthless in establishing objective criteria to evaluate the results and take the next step or move on to the next effort. Continuous experimentation without a shared understanding of when to stop must be avoided.

Third, create an environment that fosters everyone’s engagement and participation so that candid and data-centered views can be shared without fear of professional embarrassment or ridicule. Focusing on objective measures and data-centered discussions keeps the team focused on getting all ideas and solutions out in the open and avoids negative emotions.

Fourth, foster collaboration while continuing to acknowledge individual contributions. For better or worse, our performance management systems are focused on individuals, not teams, and government civilians are evaluated for their individual performance and achievements. Team performance is usually only evaluated by boards screening award nominations. Find ways to reward team achievement and collaboration by holding individuals accountable for promoting that behavior.

Fifth, keep organizational structures and decision making as flat as possible by using commander’s intent and mission orders to encourage team-focused initiatives across the acquisition formation.

These are not necessarily easy contradictions to resolve or manage. Balancing a rising innovation culture with a compliance culture requires ambidextrous leadership at all levels to achieve seemingly incompatible objectives.8 This is the acquisition innovator’s dilemma: to ensure timely operational execution to deliver capability and capacity with enterprise processes, practices, and procedures while continually seeking novel technologies to improve what is in development or already fielded. In many ways, it is a smaller example of the competition between modernization and readiness that the Marine Corps is working its way through today via Force Design. And we know the seeds of success are present. Some program-specific examples below show what an innovation culture can achieve to increase capability delivery velocity through innovation adoption:

  • Medium Range Intercept Capability: An innovative acquisition strategy to stitch together three existing Marine Corps programs of record together (Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar, Common Aviation Command and Control System, Composite Tracking Network), adapt a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launcher, and leverage an international partner (Israel) to provide the missile and other elements (Iron Dome). Open architecture, risk reduction, avoiding long development cycles and new production lines, and looking to leverage the Israeli’s tactical experience for test and evaluation purposes are all hallmarks of an innovative culture.
  • Amphibious Combat Vehicle mission role variants procurement strategy: Use an engineering change proposal approach vice individual full rate production contracts for each lot to avert delays during months-long continuing resolution “no new start” limitations.
  • Marine Air Defense Integrated System: Using existing commercial or military off-the-shelf systems (radars, effectors, vehicles) and a Navy warfare center to integrate greatly reduces risk by avoiding the development of new systems and all the work associated with a new procurement. Took risk in leveraging the warfare center as the lead system integrator and managing the technical baseline to ensure an open systems architecture approach for rapid tech insertions.
  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense Roadmap Synchronization: Innovation in partnering closely with the Missile Defense Agency and PEO-Integrated Weapons System to ensure integration of Marine Corps groundbased air defense assets and Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar with Navy and joint mission threads and kill chains. This effort has no dedicated program manager or large staff and is a great example of cross-enterprise collaboration, embracing experiments and an environment well aligned to specific, integration and interoperability objectives.

Improving the Marine Corps’ pace of innovation adoption will only be as successful as our innovation culture is strong. A weak culture will lapse into compliance and not creativity. Striving for a yes-if attitude towards our stakeholders sets the foundation for resolving the cultural contradictions we face in our day-to-day balance of leading execution with purposeful innovation to improve capability. Let us add some more stories to the few examples outlined here and become indispensable members of the innovation ecosystem.

Notes

1. Staff, “Force Design,” Marines.mil, n.d., https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design.

2. Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren, “Final Report of the Commission of Defense Innovation Adoption,” Atlantic Council, January 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-defense-innovation-adoption.

3. Marco Nink, “How to Weave Agility Throughout Your Corporate Culture,” Gallup, January 17, 2019, https://www.gallup.com/workplace/245999/weave-agility-throughout-corporate-culture.aspx.

4. Alison Escalante, “How the Navy Created a Culture of Innovation in Big Bureaucracy,” Forbes, May 4, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisonescalante/2021/05/04/how-the-navy-created-a-culture-of-innovation-in-big-bureaucracy/?sh=158e48f8766f.

5. Pankaj Srivastava, “The Power Of Yes: Why The Yes Mindset Leads To Innovation And Creates Great Leaders,” Forbes, May 17, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/05/17/the-power-of-yes-why-the-yes-mindset-leads-to-innovation-and-creates-great-leaders.

6. Information available at https://sma.nasaq.gov/sma-disciplines/safety-culture.

7. John Kamensky, “Five Paradoxes of an Innovation Culture,” Government Executive, January 30, 2019, https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/01/five-paradoxes-innovation-culture/154531.

8. Charles A. O’Reilly and Michael L. Tushman, Lead and Disrupt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).