Doctrine - Marine Corps Association

At the Forefront of Tactical Thought

A doctrine that does not grow-evolve in consonance with other changes-is a danger rather than a helpful device. Our FMFMs, all doctrinal publications, need revision from the very day they are issued. . . .

A doctrine that does not grow is a danger rather than a helpful device for armed forces. The need for FMFMs to be revised from the very day they are issued is discussed.

Doctrinal Change: The Move to Maneuver Theory

The roots of the maneuver warfare movement in the Corps reach back to Vietnam and the lessons learned there by many junior officers . . .

[William S. Lind]'s name became disproportionately prominent partly because a rigid Marine bureaucracy found him a convenient scapegoat for criticism in their effort to defend the status quo. Of him they could say "He's never been in combat so he can't be right." So a separate controversy having

New Doctrine or Slipping Into the Past?

If FMFM-2 embraces concepts of synchronization, battlefield geometry, top-down planning, and battlefield operating systems, the Corps is taking a step toward rejecting its own maneuver philosophy.

I suspect LtGen James C. Breckinridge is rolling in his grave at the prospect of Marine Corps doctrine so closely iesembling Army doctrine. Ms Kerry Strong, Archives Director, Marine Corps University, in a research paper quotes one of Gen Breckinridge's constant complaints in the 1930s, "Marine

Revise FMFM 1, Warfighting

As FMFM 1 was written prior to Joint Pub 1 and " . . . From the Sea," has it become outdated?

To fulfill a mission responsibly, evidence of military judgment must be made tangible. Estimates are the means a priori to show the results of judgments, and a number of techniques have been developed to prove and improve estimates and resulting plans. We all can agree that comparison of objective

Dysfunctional Doctrine: The Marine Corps and FMFM 1, Warfighting

This author also believes that Marine doctrine as outlined in FMFM 1 is inadequate and needs to be revised.

If it is to maintain its battlefield edge into the next century, the Corps needs something it currently does not have. It needs a pragmatic warfighting doctrine-a doctrine written by a group of Marines of diverse operational backgrounds in close consultation with the operating forces and

Misnamed Doctrine Misleading

It probably cannot be stated more simply than in Capt John E Schmitt's article "Understanding Maneuver as the Basis For a Doctrine" (MCG, Aug90) where he states, "Maneuver derives from a very simple concept: creating and exploiting advantage. . . ."

Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine

War is about fighting. War is by nature a bloody business. Many of the critics of Maneuver mistakenly believe that Maneuver advocates units "running amok" (as a critical article in the Gazette recently put it), running circles around, bypassing, enveloping the enemy, and in the words of one general