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Support to RXR
by Mr. Ben Closs

>Mr. Closs is a retired Marine Intelligence Officer. He works for FGS, LLC supporting doctrine, strategy, and policy development for the Deputy Commandant for Information’s Intelligence Division.

Purpose
Russia’s failure to secure an early victory against Ukraine—despite its much larger force and greater resources—suggests strongly that numerical superiority and 20th-century operational art are no longer enough to assure military success in the Information Age. The Ukrainians have fought bravely and well, but they have managed to resist, in no small part, because they have made far better use of their intelligence and information resources than Russia has. In the Information Age, even a relatively small force—Ukraine—supported by the right messaging and a steady stream of timely targeting data can offset some fairly significant disadvantages in numbers and supply. If this conflict is any indication of those yet to come, future battlefields promise to be heavily slanted in favor of the nation with the best relationships and the best situational awareness. These lessons, presaged by recent publications like MCDP 1-4, Competing, and A Concept for Stand-In Forces make it clear that our Corps can no longer afford to organize, train, and equip itself as a break glass in case of war forcible-entry force to be used only once diplomacy has failed.

Today’s Marines recognize that, even during peacetime, each engagement, operation, and exercise they conduct must achieve two essential tasks: sending the right messages to America’s allies and would-be adversaries and satisfying our national leadership’s intelligence requirements. Both efforts promise to become significantly more difficult once the shooting starts, however. Future, informationized fights between technology-enabled peer competitors threaten to escalate and culminate much more rapidly than past conflicts, offering the Joint Force no time to build, let alone move, the industrial-age mountains of iron and steel upon which America’s previous victories relied.

Data has become our new iron mountain. The vast quantities of information that nations and governments can collect and generate during competition will direct, and become, the ordnance with which the next conflict must be won. To enable friendly success in combat or deterrence, Marines must tailor all their operations, activities, and investments with an eye toward reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance (RXR) efforts that fulfill the Joint Force’s information requirements and messaging objectives. The Marine Corps does not yet have the capability or capacity to perform these feats quickly or efficiently enough to meet the Joint Force’s future requirements, but it does have an organizational construct tailor-made to enable the aggregation, organization, and delivery of intelligence data, products, and capabilities. The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE) is that construct. Though its current posture is focused on Title 10 support to force development and headquarters decision making, the MCISRE can, and perhaps must, evolve to become the unified, Service-level base of intelligence support our Nation’s maritime RXR forces need to turn peacetime operations into continued deterrence or eventual wartime advantage. As we strive to implement the transformative changes of Force Design 2030, the entire Marine Corps must challenge itself to reconsider what it means to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and the MCISRE must modernize and expand to integrate itself into the Service-wide RXR effort.

This concept is a broad, initial look at how the Marine Corps can approach intelligence support to RXR operations against a peer competitor. It aims to highlight key ideas related to future requirements and recommend the examination of capabilities that can support them. It may also stimulate and facilitate some of the conversations our Service must have while plotting the course. To win the “hider-finder” competition on tomorrow’s battlefield, Marines must organize, train, and equip the entire Service with an eye toward enabling it as a reconnaissance capability. This maritime RXR force must continue to evolve while remaining focused on the Joint Force’s problem set and integration with the Navy. Finally, the Marine Corps must design enough mass and flexibility into the unit’s housing and employ its ISR assets to effect time-sensitive, operationally driven shifts in the way it tasks and supports its low-density technical and analytic capabilities.

Background
The past century’s events—and especially the last 25 years—make clear that any effort to tailor the U.S. military for a changing environment or mission set must begin with a detailed examination of those capabilities and functions, which have changed most since the last benchmark in its evolution. The compact disc and the first-generation Macintosh were the pinnacles of information technology in 1986 when the Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the DOD’s structure. In a time of crisis, our country can choose to enter a conflict very quickly, but the DOD can only move so fast in its efforts to prepare itself for the next fight. The Marine Corps, recognizing an unfulfilled need for joint scouting and battlespace awareness capabilities tailored toward great-power competition, is now tailoring its own structure and capabilities toward winning the RXR battle for America’s maritime and Joint Forces. To succeed in this venture, our Corps must build and learn to employ all Marine units, not just the Marine Littoral Regiments, as all-domain, 21st-century reconnaissance forces.

A Concept for Stand-In Forces (SIF) calls on the entire Marine Corps to focus its capacity and capabilities on a relatively small, forward-deployed force that will operate continuously, throughout all forms of competition and conflict, inside the threat envelope of our competitors’ standoff weapons systems. These forces will stand in against potential threats, learning everything they can about their nature and operations from up close. They will also show our country’s friends and competitors alike that the United States cares enough about its allies to stand by them—no matter what the threat may be. These forces’ messaging and maneuvers will stimulate adversary military and political systems and either influence them to adopt a less aggressive posture or force them to reveal crucial information about their intentions and capabilities through their responses to our operations, activities, and investments.

Context/Future Operating Environment
Should a competitor seek to threaten or coerce our allies, the initial U.S. response would likely include the SIF already in theatre, at least part of which would become the inside force, if open hostilities were ever to break out. We must assume that our adversaries can hold U.S. assets throughout the space and information domains at risk throughout the continuum between competition and conflict and that they can threaten surface and landbased forces and facilities of almost any sort with very little warning. Although the threat forces’ access to, and awareness of, the maritime and air domains may exceed our own within their sphere of influence, their degree of control will, like ours, remain incomplete, iterative, and potentially vulnerable to certain forms of disruption.

The electromagnetic spectrum will remain a contested space likely to see shifts in adversary activity long before any hostile act occurs in the physical domains. Given the trajectory of ongoing improvements in threat capabilities, we must assume that most of the communications technologies we currently use will be perceptible and, to some degree, locatable by our adversaries at key points within the battlespace. Any capability which generates a recognizable cyber or electromagnetic signature will be subject to detection, disruption, destruction, or some other form of vulnerability at unpredictable intervals throughout the conflict, and both threat and friendly forces will be able to locate and target adversary units that generate a prominent enough signature throughout their areas of influence— even while they are on the move. The task of sensing and processing adversary signals and signatures, and differentiating them from the local baseline, is sure to challenge the threat’s ISR apparatus in certain parts of the area of operations, just as it will our own. Commanders will nevertheless have to weigh the potential cost of expanding their units’ signatures at critical times and locations and choose in a very conscious and deliberate manner how or whether to alter the timing, method, volume, or subject of their units’ operations and communications.

Operational Challenge
SIF must remain keenly aware of both adversary and third-party dispositions and intentions, as well as the characteristics of a complex, uncertain, and potentially hostile littoral operating environment. The MCSIRE’s challenge will be to enable secure, effective RXR operations by providing deep battlespace awareness and enduring target intelligence support for a widely distributed naval and Joint Force across the spectrum of competition and conflict. To achieve this goal, the enterprise will have to leverage all available sources of intelligence as well as other forms of friendly, neutral, and adversary-related information generated throughout the theatre and across the globe. Meeting this challenge will require the enterprise and the Service to consider epochal shifts in their design and operational patterns. All Marine units now own some type of reconnaissance role—in addition to their other warfighting responsibilities—and must be able to plan and direct reconnaissance, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations at speed without disrupting the tempo and harmony of their other essential tasks. Whatever else Marines do, all their key missions in the coming years will include:

• Identifying, validating, and prioritizing intelligence requirements.
• Planning and integrating reconnaissance, intelligence production, and dissemination efforts.
• Issuing requests and tasking reconnaissance and analytical resources.
• Maintaining continuous supervision over a vast enterprise of joint, national, and coalition intelligence capabilities to ensure its responsive and effective support to their own, and their higher’s, operations and requirements.

Central Idea
The MCISRE, though without a formal chain of command or hierarchical structure, has remained an essential and enduring Service community by virtue of its purpose. It is composed of everything and everyone who performs, supports, or directs intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance functions for Marine units across the globe. This enterprise relies on the contributions of a multitude of individuals, networks, and communities, all of whom must combine and coordinate their efforts to deliver fused, integrated intelligence products and capabilities to Marines and, by extension, the Joint Force.

Theory of Success
The MCISRE must develop the capability to receive and process all the data and reporting of intelligence value that Marines, and other SIF, collect and generate during competition. The MCISRE must then be prepared to store this information, make sense of it, and push all the relevant analysis and targeting data to theatre and national decision makers before, during, and after any potential crisis or contingency. This enterprise of Service, joint, national, and combined resources and manpower must be able to do for the Joint Force what numerous individuals are doing in and for Ukraine but on a longer-term basis and, potentially, under even more challenging circumstances. Recent and ongoing operations suggest that information and intelligence overmatches—while they cannot guarantee success by themselves—are key factors to both national and military resilience and serve as force multipliers that can offset many of the more traditional advantages America’s competitors are working to build within their respective spheres of influence.

In the era of great-power competition, every Marine must become much more than just a collector. Today’s Marines must all rise to the challenge of operating as fully engaged members of our Nation’s maritime RXR force. On tomorrow’s interconnected, digital battlefield, the entire force must focus on sensing the environment, understanding the threat, and frustrating the adversary’s targeting effort.

Supporting Ideas and Planning Considerations
1. Focus on the Joint Force’s Problem Set and Integration with the Navy
     Maritime Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance. In today’s competition, as in tomorrow’s conflict, all Marine operations must contribute meaningfully to the Joint Force’s battlespace awareness. MCISRE personnel and systems must be able to network and cooperate with combined, joint, and naval intelligence capabilities, both embarked and ashore, even in disrupted, disconnected, intermittent, and low-bandwidth signals environments. To provide the kind of insight and deterrence potential theatre campaign plans will require, the enterprise will have to support maritime reconnaissance and sea control efforts, along with a host of other missions the COCOMs may allocate to their naval and Joint Forces.

Distributed Analysis. To utilize a modern, networked approach to ISR, SIF must be able to coordinate and integrate intelligence requirements and operations seamlessly between all their subordinate elements, the Joint and combined force, their Service component, and the COCOM headquarters. Their MCISRE components must also be able to share data, plans, and products with reach-back elements at their home station(s), as well as with any other MEF, component, Service, or joint organizations upon whom they rely for distributed analytical support. To provide that support, Marines must appreciate the operational context surrounding each requirement they hope to answer, and they must be able to do so across the great distances that will likely separate deployed units from those forces trying to support them from garrison. Managing the effort to fulfill its decision makers’ information requirements is a complex but vital job for any staff: doing so at a distance, in a denied, degraded, intermittent, or low-bandwidth communications environment raises that challenge to another level. This capability will be critical to enable distributed operations in the 21st century, however, as SIF may not be able to afford the luxury of concentrating their forces or analytical resources while they operate in theatre.

Support to, and from, units in garrison. In response to a significantly expanded version of the requirement for which the MCISRE was once conceived, each MEF must enhance its ability to provide intelligence support to deployed units while simultaneously fulfilling all the planning and training-related requirements for whatever portion of its force remains in garrison. This support must continue without interruption while those units in the rear continue to perform the many steady-state Title 10 functions necessary to ready the force for its next mission. Given the significant strain this tension between competing Title 10 and Title 50 requirements can place on the MEF, the Service or Marine Forces headquarters may need to become more than simple administrative entities. They may need to support deployed forces as well, either by receiving or developing organic analytical capabilities of their own, or by coordinating long-term MAGTF, Service-wide, or multi-Service liaison with, and augmentation to, the theatre joint intelligence operation centers along with other theater and national support organizations.

2. Organize, Train, and Equip the Entire Service as a Reconnaissance Capability
Every Marine a Reconnaissance Operator. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are much more than a particular set of personnel, units, staff sections, or occupational fields. They are essential functions that all military organizations and personnel perform every day. In a far-flung fight or during everyday competition, Marine units will distribute their various components and resources, both to enhance their survivability and expand their spheres of influence while simultaneously reducing the signatures they project into the operating environment. Infantry Marines, logisticians, and other personnel operating as members of small, isolated detachments or aboard expeditionary advance bases will perform ISR functions right alongside, and often in the place of, their intelligence and signals intelligence brethren to enable their unit’s contribution to the COCOM’s intelligence and targeting efforts. Every Marine may have been a collector in the past, but going forward, each Marine, as well as much of his gear, will have to become proactive and fully engaged reconnaissance assets. Whether their mission focus is on the air or ground domains, at sea, in space, or in cyberspace, every Marine’s central task will be to help the Joint Force sense, understand, and influence events within their area of operations.

Every Marine a Counter-Reconnaissance Asset. Marines’ responsibilities to the Joint Force’s counter-reconnaissance mission are no less vital than their reconnaissance efforts. Our adversaries and competitors are working to better integrate their all-domain, multi-INT ISR efforts. Though they may have to refrain from physical violence until authorized or forced to apply it, Marine units operating as SIF must be able to go kinetic at a moment’s notice to disrupt or dismantle our competitors’ ISR networks before they can complete their kill chain. The effort to build and maintain the kind of granular situational awareness and long-term target custody that enable this wartime capability will require SIF to engage in constant target development throughout competition. Marines will acquire, update, and hand off targeting data for the full range of adversary military capabilities, especially ISR capabilities, on an ongoing basis long before any physical conflict begins. Constant, intensive, peacetime ISR activity will be necessary to deter or blunt aggression, break adversary comm links and kill chains, and blind or deceive their decision makers to prevent their forces from seizing the initiative. Not only must all Marines enable the success of friendly counter-reconnaissance targeting efforts, but each Marine must uphold his responsibility to the entire force’s effort to manage its signature and further frustrate or deceive adversary ISR. The war in Ukraine has already provided innumerable examples of why Marines must discipline themselves and their peers to maintain an unshakeable commitment to all-domain operational security. There will be no off-duty from this duty.

3. Using ISR to Weight and Shift the Main Effort
There are more than 7,000 intelligence billets within our Marine Corps, with more to come in the years ahead, but they are of little use to the Joint Force right now because so many of them remain scattered across smaller, tactical-level units. We can both optimize the value of Marine ISR support to the current joint requirement and facilitate the flexibility necessary to reallocate or reapportion it when necessary by building, training, and fielding cohesive, multi-intelligence support teams and detachments for key unit deployments, (e.g. the MEU S-2 [intelligence] and Marine Special Operations Command distributed support team models) drawn from regionally, functionally, or theatre-aligned pools of intelligence manpower and resources, (e.g. Air Force intelligence squadrons and the Army’s theatre military intelligence brigades) with facilities that enable them to deliver reach-back support, even while in garrison. By providing the MCISRE’s constituent units with the critical mass and authority to task-organize all the high-demand/low-density ISR skills and resources within the Marine Forces, MAGTF Command Element, or major subordinate command and then push tailored, integrated units, products, and capabilities down to supported units, Marines can maximize the synergistic value of team training, and get the most value out of their best analysts and operators. This flexibility will also contribute to the MAGTF, Marine Forces, and Joint Force commanders’ ability to weigh the main effort with additional battlespace awareness resources when appropriate or necessary. This ability to rapidly and dynamically task-organize ISR capabilities, including manpower and equipment, as well as all other necessary forms of physical, cyber/electronic, and cognitive support, will enable SIF to respond to swiftly changing battlespace conditions and requirements in both the physical and information domains.

Conclusion
The foregoing thoughts outline an initial set of considerations to stimulate and facilitate conversation as the Marine Corps continues to plan, develop, support, and leverage the MCSIRE and other RXR capabilities. Each of the ideas in this concept will require the description and refinement of numerous specialized sub-functions to plan and direct ISR operations, to collect, process, and exploit information, to produce fully integrated intelligence and decision-support products, and to transmit them all to the Joint Force in a manner that supports security, signature management, and tempo. All our efforts to build the future MCSIRE can achieve greater efficiencies and better effects if they adhere to these principles: a focus on the Joint Force’s problem set and integration with the maritime force; viewing, training, and equipping the entire force as a reconnaissance capability; and building enough ISR concentration and organizational agility into the force to redirect our least-engaged collection and analytical resources toward the main effort. Many of you may disagree with one or more of the statements within this concept, and even more of you probably have ideas you think are missing from it. Bring them on! Please join in the conversation and the subsequent analysis that will be necessary to make the MCISRE and the Marine Corps everything they must become. We are still at the beginning of a very long road toward having the force we want and may need for 2030, but with a common set of goals and a cooperative mindset, we can cover this great distance and answer the challenge our Nation has set before us. Now let’s get to work.

How the MAGTF Training Command continues to evolve Service-level training to meet requirements for expeditionary operations

>MajGen Renforth is the Commanding General, MAGTF Training Command and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center

The MAGTF Training Command (MAGTFTC) recently completed Service-Level Training Exercise (SLTE) 2-23, centered around 3D Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and 7th Mar. SLTE 2-23 provided another opportunity for the 3rd MLR to progress while also providing an opportunity for 7th  Mar to be better prepared to meet the future. As the institution continues to implement, develop, and debate core concepts to Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) and Training & Education 2030 (T&E 2030), the validity of training amphibious operations at Twentynine Palms has come into question by leaders at multiple levels. For decades the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) served as the foundation for training the Service in collective combined-arms exercises, though planners and leaders alike are examining the relevancy of MCAGCC in the era of FD 2030 and the re-emergence of the naval campaign. Questions surrounding the ability to train in sea denial, counter-landing, and naval-integrated kill-web operations in the desert lead planners in the FMF to seek alternate training locations that better replicate the conditions and environments of the Indo-Pacific.

Though the allure of creating a perceived irreconcilable chasm between MCAGCC and the realities of combat operations against the pacing threat may invigorate heated debate surrounding FD 2030, it is a surface-deep criticism. Service-level training is much more than an exercise on a piece of terrain. It is a comprehensive approach to training and readiness that supports the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Title 10 responsibilities to train and equip combat-credible forces to all geographic combatant commanders. Readiness generation is the product of training and readiness repetition of mission essential tasks (MET), regardless of venue. MAGTFTC supports FMF units to achieve readiness through the Integrated Training Exercise, Adversary Force Exercise, and synthetic training events through live, virtual and constructive training environments. The subordinate elements to MAGTFTC are unique capabilities nested within the training and education continuum. Though the live-fire combined-arms training at MCAGCC are exercises that are the options closest to combat, the readiness generation from MAGTFTC-sponsored events is not confined to the Mojave Desert.

MAGTFTC Trained the FMF Before 9/11
The publication of FD 2030 redirected the Marine Corps’ mission from countering violent extremists in the Middle East to peer-level competition, emphasizing the Indo-Pacific. It called on the Service to transform from traditional models of organization and training to meet a new desired state partnered with the Navy. FD 2030’s vision created a Service-wide debate that associated institutional components associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as adverse relics, much like the association with attrition warfare during the maneuverist transformation decades ago. This perception partly fuels contemporary criticism of MCAGCC’s role in training the force of the future, believing that training in Twentynine Palms is primarily relegated to exercises centered on the Global War on Terrorism, forgetting that the Mojave Viper series and mission readiness exercises focused on METs required for existing and emerging deployment requirements. It is important to have a perspective on the history of SLTE and its progression over time.

Before the attacks of 11 September 2001, MCAGCC sponsored the Combined-Arms Exercise through the Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). From the early 1980s, the Combined-Arms Exercise provided FMF units with live-fire maneuver training in core METs against a Soviet-threat template. Exercise events focused on the fundamentals of technical and tactical integration between elements of the MAGTF to prepare units to deploy to Europe, Africa, Asia, and as part of MEU. The terrain at MCAGCC did not necessarily match the deployable theater, though the training environment created combat conditions that the FMF could not replicate at home stations or in theater. Roles and responsibilities between TTECG and the FMF (though a unit-level training program) existed to ensure that the supporting establishment provided opportunities that the FMF could not. Theater/MEU-specific training continued at the home station so that unit-level and Service-level training complemented each other. Those expectations and opportunities still exist today.

As the Marine Corps transitioned into the 21st century, MCAGCC evolved to meet the needs of the Service and the Commandant’s Title 10 responsibilities in the new global operating environment. Training and Education Command stood up MAGTFTC in October 2000 to dedicate a command and staff focused on training the FMF apart from core competencies. MAGTFTC rapidly changed exercises and events over the next two decades to meet the emerging needs from lessons learned through Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, ensuring the best level of readiness for deployable units to fight and win in combat. As operations in US Central Command dissipated after the surge in Afghanistan, MAGTFTC again evolved to meet the renewed emphasis on amphibious operations by creating the Integrated Training Exercise and Large-Scale Exercise. TTECG continued to provide training to FMF units in core METs while including the Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group and Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group focused on training advanced individual and collective tasks within the ground and logistics communities. As the Service continued its transformation into 2020, MAGTFTC continued to meet institutional requirements by leveraging unique training opportunities at MCAGCC with centers of excellence to develop the flagship force-on-force training event—the MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX). Recounting the rich history of MCAGCC and MAGTFTC as a learning organization is essential to establish the credibility of its Marines to meet rapidly emerging requirements over time, which made the recent SLTE designed for the naval-centric employment of 3D MLR.

SLTE 2-23: Preparing for the pacing threat and to fight tonight
SLTE 2-23 demonstrated MAGTFTC’s ability to develop a niche exercise at the forefront of FD 2030 while also providing legacy formations the opportunity to improve operational readiness for existing global force management requirements. One-half of the exercise-trained 3D MLR in expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) under 3D MarDiv as a Naval task group supporting sea-denial operations. The other half of SLTE 2-23 provided 7th Mar the opportunity to execute offensive and defensive operations with adjacent and non-organic subordinate elements, replicating realistic composite formations likely used in current expeditionary operations. The exercise introduced two new MAGTFTC-sponsored events based on guidance and requirements outlined in FD 2030, the Tentative Manual for EABO, and the Concept for Stand in Forces (SIF).

SLTE is one component of MAGTFTC’s training portfolio. It is an integral learning tool for evolving formal schools, doctrine development, a tailored Fleet Support Program, and the mentorship of the future battalion, regimental, squadron, and group commanders. The instructors at MAGTFTC’s centers of excellence and expeditionary warfare training groups support SLTE as observers and exercise controllers. The wealth of experience from the Marines and civilians supporting exercises at MCAGCC pays dividends to a campaign of learning that reaches every corner of the Service. Observations and lessons learned to inform the courses producing the tactics and operations instructors serving across the FMF. Final exercise reports collected from high-end events at the Marine Corps’ most permissive training area update and create new doctrine to prepare for future conflict. Assessments of core METs in finely tuned live-fire events refine a fleet support program that reinforces home station training and unit-level training programs. The comprehensive career experience of commanders and staff of MAGTFTC subordinate elements from all corners of the FMF and supporting establishment produces a first-class Facilitated After-Action Report that focuses on individual warfighting functions to prepare the exercise force for their upcoming deployment at every echelon.

The Taiwan crisis of 2027

>MajGen Maxwell currently serves as the Commander, Marine Corps Installations Command, Commanding General, Marine Corps National Capital Region Command, and Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Facilities). He most recently served as the Vice Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff. He previously served as the Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Plans, Policies, and Strategic Mobility), Commanding General, 2nd MLG, and Combined Joint Director of Logistics for the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

Force Design 2030 and Installations and Logistics 2030 describe evolving missions and new capability requirements driven by a changing operating environment. Installations and Logistics 2030 is explicit about challenges associated with installations in contested environments and makes the following key points:

• To posture ourselves against the threat of peer and near-peer competitors, we need to rethink our view of Marine Corps installations.
• Our installations must be able to provide the full range of infrastructure and trained personnel required by the future force.
• Our installations must enable training, force readiness, experimentation, mobilization, and deployment while also improving quality of life for Marines, their families, and the civilian workforce.
• Smart, resilient, networked installations will provide stand-in forces with enhanced capabilities to recover quickly from attack, persist in contested spaces, and sustain distributed formations.
• We must ensure force protection efforts enable continuity of operations, protection, and safety of our families, and our forces to meet operational requirements.

The following vignette explores the contours of the changing operating environment and the associated implications for our installation through a fictional account of a security crisis occurring in 2027. While longer than most articles, a vignette is the most efficient way to animate the guidance in Force Design 2030 and Installations and Logistics 2030 while also illuminating the many challenges and opportunities associated with making our installations ready.

The Taiwan Crisis of 2027 System Attack–Systemic Defeat
Cloudy, with late afternoon rain was the forecast as Col Kay Smith headed up the gentle rise skirting the Okinawa Expressway toward Taiyo Golf Course for an early morning tee time with Col John Harmon and Col Steve White. As on most Saturday mornings in Okinawa, the plan for Kay was to get her mind focused on having a good round of golf after a week of non-stop mini-crises in her job as the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Installations Pacific, but today there was something else on her mind: the rising tensions between China and Taiwan had serious implications for the operations and safety of the bases and stations under her command. Eighteen holes with Harmon, the III MEF G-3, and White, the Commanding Officer of 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, offered an opportunity to discuss her concerns with respected friends and colleagues. She seldom saw White, but she looked forward to catching up since they had known each other since The Basic School.

Driving into the parking lot afforded a glimpse of the verdant dark green course, having benefited from the above-average rainfall of the past few months. Unsurprisingly, John and Steve were running a little late, so Kay signed in and started some warm-up swings. After some additional stretches and a brief chat with a friendly groundskeeper, John came hustling over with Steve in trail.

“Hey, sorry we’re late. Let’s get going or we’ll miss our tee time,” said John.

“Right,” Kay said with a wry smile as she glanced at her watch. “Let’s get to it.”

By the 9th hole, the trio had settled into the flow of the game, and Kay ventured some shop talk.

“So, guys, the Chinese seem to be stepping up their Taiwan torment; more aircraft intrusions and more saber rattling. The G-6 says cyber intrusions are way above average. I think we should be stepping up preparations. I know we’re reviewing our base and station readiness.” John and Steve cocked their heads and looked at each other.

“There she goes again, always the professional,” Steve quipped, having known Kay for 23 years.

Niceties dispensed with, John took on a serious tone and said, “Yes Kay, you’re right to be concerned. Indications and Warnings are tipping into the red; we could be in for some unpleasantness in the coming months.”

“We’re ready,” Steve added. “The regiment is in good shape, and we’ve got several elements doing reconnaissance/counter reconnaissance in the lower Ryukyus and northern Luzon. We’ve actually detected some atypical PLAN submarine activity well east of Taiwan. But I’m not sure I get it Kay, what’re you worried about; our bases and stations aren’t going anywhere.”

“That’s precisely why I’m so concerned,” Kay responded. “It’s much easier to target a fixed installation than a low-signature distributed force. Would the PLA be more inclined to use expensive missiles on large, fixed bases or a small, hard-to-target, mobile unit? We’re sitting ducks.”

Somehow that game flow had evaporated. “OK,” John offered, “let’s call it at nine and talk about this over some yakisoba and a Sakura.”

At the table, John picked up where they left off. “OK, let’s remember where we are, so keep it unclass, but let’s think this through a bit. Kay, you started this, so what’s bothering you most?”

“Well, starting at the top, strategically, it just doesn’t make sense to me that we’re treating our bases and stations like we did when we UDP’d here as lieutenants. The threat’s very different now. We’re in the same arc of fires as our deployed operational units. That’s a big difference, right?”

“An attack here would be really escalatory, and might bring Japan in as an active combatant,” Steve opined.

“Remember Putin?” John interjected. “That insanity was just five years ago. It’s hard to predict an autocrat’s decision calculus,” he continued, looking ever more serious. “Kay, tell me what has been done to improve the posture of our installations as of late.”

Looking askance, Steve muttered, “But look where that got Putin: six feet under. Maybe Xi learned something.”

Kay had hoped the discussion would get to this point. “We’ve done a lot, but so much still needs to be done. We’ve barely moved the needle with Headquarters Marine Corps on resources. I think it’s important that we’re now tied into the theater missile defense early warning system and we can send warnings out to all smartphones if the threat dictates. That’s critical for Marines, civilians, and their families. Unfortunately, we’ve still not gotten the mobile cell towers we requested, in part because we’re still working on spectrum access with the Japanese. We need to keep pushing this. Steve, your folks might find them of use tactically, if we go Corregidor.”

Range and capability analysis of People’s Liberation Army Air and Rocket Forces. (Photo provided by author.)Steve chuckled while John’s arched eyebrows conveyed some skepticism over the World War II analogy, but his demeanor was now quite serious.

“And to be fair,” she continued, “there have been some other notable improvements over the last five years, and not just in IT upgrades. After pushing the issue for a couple of years, all our Installation Marines have a T/O [table of organization] weapon assigned and do annual FAM [familiarization] fire at a minimum. We have also developed healthy habitual relationships with elements of MARFORRES. Using reservists to fill holes created by our reduced reliance on FAP [Fleet Assistance Program] billets, and we now have the ability to fill vacancies with individual augments for the remaining FAP personnel when they get pulled during a crisis. Also, while there are IT and sensor elements associated with Global Logistics Awareness, hopefully, you’re seeing a difference in the responsiveness of logistics to operational requirements. The biggest deal has been the change in mindset. Logisticians are no longer waiting to be told the requirement, they are anticipating and planning for future requirements by integrating logistics into operational planning. The old way just won’t cut it given how distributed we are nowadays—and it also helps Installations by improving our situational awareness on LOGCOM [Logistics Command] and FMF logistics support requirements.

“OK,” John said, “balanced argument noted Kay, but give us the wavetops of today’s challenges,” the golf game already a distant memory. “What else?”

“Let me do it in terms you guys might best understand: the seven warfighting functions—it’s still seven right? We haven’t added yet another one recently, have we?” Kay jested, trying to lighten the mood she had precipitated, if only just a tad.

Kay opened a firehose of pent-up frustration. “Let’s start with command and control. John, whether you’re in Guam or here in Okinawa, you obviously understand the importance of your operations center. It needs to work 24/7 regardless of weather or enemy action. You know that, but did you know the communications grid that underpins it is brittle and lacks adequate capacity? You know our computers are old and slow; you see them every day, and you might guess that routers and servers need to be upgraded, but you might not think about the cables running down the streets and in the walls of our facilities. They are from a different era.”

“I’ve been told you might need to actually fight the MEF from your garrison facilities given the ranges of our latest missiles—and the PLA’s. The bandwidth required to support the surveillance, tracking, and targeting of enemy assets is growing constantly. Our IT pipes are strained passing PowerPoint slide decks. So much for full-motion video and passing target data back to CONUS! And it gets better; the power grid that runs the communications grid is even less resilient. Much of our communications grid is buried, but most of our power grid is overhead. We lose power with every hurricane or typhoon. What will it be like if the PLA comes knocking? Steve, you’ve at least got your tactical communications. That’ll work locally, but what if space is denied? A redundant underwater fiber line might be essential for off-island comms.”

“Every Marine loves to shoot stuff—fires is a perennial investment favorite—so you’d think we’d be good to go, right? Well, not exactly. First, Steve, you understand the limitations we have with ranges. Individual and crew-served weapons aren’t too bad, although we probably don’t shoot enough, the big challenges are the limited areas we have to do live fire and maneuver and where we can shoot artillery and missiles. We’re still waiting on funding to build virtual training ranges. Admittedly, a big part of the problem is a posture that mal-positions one-third of our operating forces for training, but we’ll save that one for another day.”

“We need to be able to simulate the entire kill chain for our anti-ship missiles, and we’re just not there yet. The sim center is still just a POM30 unfunded deficiency,” Steve chimed in. “Kay, don’t forget ranges for our loitering munitions. We can do some training at Fuji and Tinian, but that’s it, and since the smaller loitering munitions are integral to squad, platoon, and company operations, we need more reps and sets.”

“Force protection—wow, where to begin?” Kay said. “Of all the priorities in my job jar, this one worries me the most. Talk about multi-domain; we’ve got threats coming from every direction: cyber, drones, SCADA attacks, ubiquitous sensing, insider threats, CBRNE—heck we even have space-based and sub-orbital challenges, plus the usual concerns for hypersonic cruise missile and ballistic missile attack. We just haven’t adapted fast enough to have answers to these threats. From my time in P&R [Programs and Resources], I know there hasn’t been the trade space given our constrained budget topline and we had to get the basic new warfighting capabilities fielded.”

“Damn right,” Steve interjected. “We wouldn’t have been able to provide the sensing and fires to the Joint Force that we can now.”

“I’m with you,” Kay continued, “but now we need to think like the Chinese. This is a warfighting system we’re talking about, a system that doesn’t work without protection, sustainment, and installations that can operate in a contested environment. The PLA doesn’t think in terms of our stovepipes, they see a system and look for the weak link in the chain, and yours truly is holding the weakest link. I feel a disturbance in the Force.”

John had to say something at this point.

“Kay, come on. You SAW [School of Advanced Warfighting] Jedi always love those Star Wars references, but maybe you’re being just a bit too dramatic. We can’t afford to do everything.”

“Maybe … maybe,” Kay replied, “but when a lone Chinese SOF operator drops his backpack and releases ten loitering munitions that put holes in six JSF on the flightline, we’ll see how dramatic things can really get. Anyway, that’s a good segue to information and intelligence challenges. Both of these functions have increased steady-state requirements far beyond what they were when we were lieutenants. In competition, especially here in the Pacific, we’re in the fight every day. We need to have 24/7 intel on below-the-threshold threats, and we all read the CHINFO [Chief of Information] media summary every morning. There’s a constant back and forth as we, and our allies and partners, try to expose Chinese bad behavior and counter their disinformation campaign.”

“From my standpoint, we’ve had to band-aid our communications grid, which wasn’t built for the bandwidth and security requirements associated with these new demands. I mean, even battalions and regiments need PED [processing, exploitation, dissemination] facilities and these things often run 24/7, which means 24/7 chow hall hours and IT support. Security of these facilities is an issue as well.”

“You’re not being overdramatic in the least about this point, Kay,” Steve said nodding. “We were running an MQ-9 mission last week and we had some comm problems. We had to call the Enterprise Help Desk, the same service an action officer gets sitting at a desk building slides. I couldn’t believe it. We had to scrub the mission.”

“OK, well my soliloquy is almost over; just two more functions,” Kay said, picking up where she left off. John rolled his eyes.

“Maybe more of a diatribe than a soliloquy Kay,” he said, “but I like your passion. I get where you’re coming from. We need to have a conversation with the CG.”

“So, logistics is still logistics, always key, but Steve you mentioned loitering munitions. We need some additional funding to get the ammo storage facilities up to speed to allow us to store the munitions and their batteries in adjacent facilities, and our NMESIS missile systems would benefit from humidity-controlled storage. But the bigger picture, I’m concerned we could actually be like Corregidor in World War II. We’re at the end of a tenuous line of communications. The PLAN might decide to interfere with them with actions that drive up shipping insurance costs, and they could even get more aggressive and actively interdict shipping to Okinawa. We can’t prepare for everything of course, but we should at least have some extra stores on hand to ensure we have enough fuel, food, and ammo to sustain us should the Chinese decide to cut us off. John, do you agree?”

“I do, as long as we don’t get too crazy. I think I’m going to name the MEF CP Malinta,” he said with a little less sarcasm than his previous quip about World War II analogies.

Kay continued, “There’s also the potential for huge expenditure rates of munitions and the possibility for substantial combat attrition. We need to have a distributed and resilient stockpile of munitions that our operating forces can access, both at home base and when deployed with allies and partners in their territory. Unfortunately, our PGMs [precision-guided munitions] are located in known Navy ammo supply points. We’ve just not been able to get the resources to do distributed prepositioning, which, ironically, is substantially less costly than the old maritime prepositioning approach. I guess ships are just more interesting than warehouses, which is unfortunate because the relevant combat power of our new missiles is on a par with previous configurations and doesn’t require ships, connectors, escorts, and vehicles—all without the delay of RSO&I [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration]. Old paradigms die hard, I get it, but we’ve got to get folks to understand the increased power density of new weapons systems and their amazingly low cost per strike mile … but I digress.”

“Back to the need for reconstitution. We haven’t had to worry about this for decades; it’s just not in our psyche to increase planning factors to account for the kind of expenditure rates and attrition we’re likely to face. We need to have more robust facilities to accommodate repair and refit. This will need to be a long-haul effort to change our cultural proclivities. Finally, I promise, we come to maneuver.”

“Yup, got it,” said Steve.

“Yea, me too, got it, maneuver is key,” John reiterated.

“OK, sure but what about installations?” Kay replied.

“Good grief,” said John. “You’re not going to try and sell us on mobile installations are you?”

“Of course not,” said Kay, “but have you considered that installations, at the very least, provide a base for maneuver? If we were not postured across the first and second island chains and you moved your regiment tactically to the same geography currently occupied by our bases and stations, would you say we have conducted operational maneuver in relation to our adversary? I would say yes!”

“Hmm, hadn’t really thought about it in those terms,” said Steve.

“As we increase our inventories of PGMs at all echelons and their ranges increase, we will increasingly maneuver not to assault, but to gain positional advantage for indirect and long-range precision fires. Our bases and stations occupy terrain in the mutual weapons engagement zone of our forces and those of our adversaries. So, it’s not inconceivable we could be firebases for these weapon systems. It might not be our primary COA [course of action], but if we’re cut off, it might be our only option to take the fight to the PLA. Of course, that moves us up the PLA’s list of target priorities, which gets me to resilience.”

“Obviously, we can’t afford to harden everything, but we need to think deliberately about how to maintain continuity of operations for all of our critical infrastructure. Our critical infrastructure must be resilient and some assets may even need to be hardened for weapons effects vice just resilience.”

“Like in a tunnel or underground,” John winked. He was ready for this one. “The CG has been talking about this issue at nearly every weekly staff meeting. He understands it’s an issue that needs attention. He gets it.”

“Awesome,” Kay said, “That’s what we get for having a loggie as MEF commander. Only the second time, if I recall correctly!” She continued. “Resilience is a term of art in the installations community, but I like to keep things simple. The Air Force has a succinct definition: the capability of an installation to sustain the projection of combat power by protecting against, responding to, and recovering from deliberate, accidental, or naturally occurring events. I think that about covers it.”

“The CG is really worried about fuel,” John said.

“That makes sense; it’s a critical vulnerability. Of course, it’s the vulnerability of the storage tanks, but perhaps the most problematic is the fuel handling infrastructure, especially for aviation. It’s a tough nut,” Kay affirmed.

Two Months Later
Two months after their golf outing, and five years to the day since Xi Jinping was proclaimed “ruler for life,” the onslaught began, not with a bang, but with an incremental, yet unmistakable escalation across multiple fronts.

It appears the Chinese paid as much attention to our doctrine, concepts, and force posture as we had. For over a month, they gathered an amphibious armada that tripped indications and warning systems, so we knew something was coming. We assumed it was a massive amphibious assault on Taiwan, a Chinese version of D-Day, but to our surprise, that did not happen. Instead, they began a graduated, slowly expanding interdiction of Taiwan’s connections to the outside world. Undersea fiber optic cables stopped working, then space-based communications became unreliable, maritime militia significantly ramped up interference in commercial fishing operations throughout the South China Sea, and a northbound container ship sank suspiciously in moderately foul weather.

One month into China’s campaign of intimidation, their playbook of malign activities appeared limitless. It was at this point that one of Kay’s worst fears was realized. Through an intense information campaign, China made clear that any interference in their Taiwan campaign by the United States would result in devastating attacks upon U.S. bases and stations. They explicitly called out Camp Humphries in South Korea, Kadena AFB, Marine Corps installations on Okinawa, and Anderson AFB and Camp Blaz on Guam. The warnings were very precise and stated that any damage to property or personnel other than those named U.S. installations would be unintended collateral damage. China emphasized the attacks would be precision strikes, focused solely on U.S. property and personnel.

The Chinese thus presented our President with a dilemma—support Taiwan’s defense or risk attacks on tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel and their dependents. The President was in a difficult place. If he took overt military action against the Chinese anaconda plan to constrict Taiwan’s line of communications, the United States would be the first party to initiate combat, and at the same time, potentially thousands of U.S. citizens would lose their lives. Xi apparently was taking notes in 2022 when Putin catalyzed Western resolve with a massive, violent military assault on Ukraine. It was a black-and-white situation, whereas China’s actions were all shades of gray.

Early on, when Chinese preparations were accelerating, Marine Stand-in Forces had been deployed from Okinawa and Guam to northern Luzon and Miyakojima, Kumejima, and Tokashiki Islands to the west and south of Okinawa. These distributed Stand-in Forces provided surveillance and sea denial fires options for the Luzon and Miyako Straits while providing enhanced situational awareness to the Joint Force. Given the gradualist approach adopted by China, having a thicker and more diverse range of sensors proved to be especially important to national command authorities given the large uncertainties associated with China’s chosen approach—a massive all-out attack with missiles and an amphibious assault would have provided a more simplified, black and white decision calculus for U.S. response. The options for ISR, cyber ops, information ops, targeting, and strike that Stand-in Forces add to the Joint Force’s expanded decision-maker options to allow for a measured and agile response, able to scale commensurate with China’s incrementalism.

One Month Later
“BREAKING NEWS—CHINA REPEATS THREATS TO U.S. PACIFIC BASES,” read the TV banner in Marine Corps Installations Pacific’s crisis action center adjacent to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Forward/III MEF COC.

It did not help Kay’s mood that she had been warning about such an eventuality. Told you so was not a helpful attitude, and she knew it. Now was the time to do the best with what was at hand.

“OpsO, I need to see our most recent SITREP,” she requested.

Kay ran through a mental checklist of installation functions to ensure all necessary measures had been taken given China’s demonstrated propensity to avoid surfaces and look for gaps that could be exploited. It looked like installations were truly a gap in PLA eyes.

Law enforcement personnel were working extra shifts and perimeter security was stepped up. Fortunately, the recently fielded AI-enabled drones substantially reduced the manpower required for conducting patrols, but there were still concerns over operatives able to deploy electronic warfare in support of cyber operations, as well as jamming and physical damage to communications infrastructure. The 2024 decision to issue installation Marines weapons was proving to be a wise move, enabling them to provide additional support to perimeter security. Hard to believe we had become so assured in our security we had forward-stationed Marines without weapons or weapons training.

Thankfully, the reservist rotational augments were fully incorporated into bases and stations—yet another manpower improvement over the last few years. Kay made a note to request a surge to get the next rotation in early and to encourage as many currently assigned personnel as possible to extend.

Tenant commands were operating around the clock, so there was an increased demand for chow halls, IT support, and maintenance. Kay made a mental note to talk to John to see what MEF might be able to do to help with surveillance and security operations to allow Marines with specialized installation skills to support base surge ops.

Cpl Sanchez interrupted, “Ma’am, the MEF G-2 is on the phone.”

“OK, I’ll take it,” said Kay with some apprehension, as she had a good idea what Joe wanted. “Joe, how can I help you?” she asked.

“Kay, we’re getting crushed, we’ve got the majority of our tactical sensors deployed and we’re getting fire hosed with data, but the network is clobbered, our PED’sters can’t get their jobs done, and they say it’s not processing capacity, it’s a bandwidth problem.”

As Kay suspected, installations communications grid upgrades had been an unfunded deficiency for four years running. Base comm grids were largely still copper and simply lacked the capacity. Back in Virginia, she recalled having fiber run to her house by a commercial vendor years ago, providing one gigabyte per second upload and download speeds. Her house had more bandwidth than the MEF-sensitive compartmented information facility, which is crazy but true and not to mention electromagnetic pulse attack was not a big consideration when she decided to shift to fiber for her home—so there was that vulnerability to think about as well.

“Joe, sorry, we understand the problem. Tell you what, I’ll talk to our comms folks. Perhaps we can have them team with Comm Battalion to run some fiber to a tactical SATCOM link,” Kay offered. “I’ve already asked engineers to disperse their generators to ensure we have backup tactical power generation if needed.”

“Kay, OK I appreciate that, but you know space is going to be unreliable. Perhaps they could tie into a commercial fiber point of presence,” said Joe.

“Right, we’ll look into that as well,” Kay agreed. “I’ll let you know tomorrow where we are with the band-aid.”

Kay looked up to see Sanchez back at the hatch looking serious.

“Ma’am, we just got a message saying the next UDP battalion won’t deploy on time—some sketchy stuff going on in Pendleton, Twentynine Palms, and Lejeune.”

“Need some specifics Sanchez, like what?” asked Kay.

“Well, in addition to the interruptions in the Global Logistics Awareness systems you’re already aware of—like sensors dropping off and recurring network outages—there’s been a number of intrusions into our range control systems stateside, and it’s been affecting the training cycle. That ankle-biter stuff set the battalion back a few weeks, but now there’s been major disruptions in contract air operations—but that’s not the worst of it. Third Battalion 2d Marines was at Cherry Point forming up in the parking lot after the buses dropped them off and a quadcopter flew over; they’re thinking it might have dispensed anthrax. They’ve got to all be tested, and it’ll be a day or two before they can confirm what it was. I got a text from Sgt Mulvaney who’s a grunt in 3/2 Mar. He was looking forward to escaping the Lejeune heat since his barracks A/C was broken again, but now they’re back in barracks waiting on test results. Just lots extra friction regardless of whether it was an actual bio-attack or not.”

Kay turned back to the situation report and the logistics support section. Two dry store ships had been delayed due to maritime militia activities in the South China Sea and Naha Port authorities were reporting other delays as well. The commissaries would be out of fresh produce in a week, and there was only a two-week supply of baby formula. Fortunately, the base had gained funding for an additional two-month supply of MREs that could feed all tenants and dependents, but good luck feeding MREs to infants. Maybe we can frag a C-130 to make a run to the mainland for formula, putting a whole new meaning to the old term milk run, thought Kay in disbelief. How did we get to such a place?

At least the training ranges were in pretty good shape, but ammo levels were not what they should be. The arms room concept placed an increased requirement for ammo to qualify a wider number of Marines, whereas before only specialized MOSs qualified on crew-served and shoulder-fired rockets. It was unquestionably critical to have more Marines trained in more weapons platforms, but ammo allowances had still not increased to levels necessary to get everyone trained to standard.

Virtual and constructive training helped with training on artillery and missile systems, but the facility envisioned by Project Tripoli just had its groundbreaking last month. Despite MCICOM’s efforts, it was still taking five years to get new facility construction started and then there were the inevitable construction delays. At any rate, no reason to dwell on this now; it is what it is, she thought. There were more immediate concerns.

Two Weeks Later
There was now no question that China was all in on gaining control of Taiwan. Essential supplies were still arriving in Guam and Okinawa, but merchant ships were now organized into escorted convoys after the investigation of the lost container ship EVER GENTLE revealed ambiguous but highly suspicious indications that there had been a PLAN submarine in the area of the sinking.

Evacuation of dependents proceeded apace with charter flights leaving at regular intervals from Naha International Airport and Kadena Air Force Base. Once these flights were completed, the concerns over food and medical care for tenants would be substantially reduced, but it remained to be seen whether the departure of dependents would make the bases and stations more or less likely to be targeted. On the receiving end, Marine Corps Installations–West was busy with the influx of new families. It would have been good to have rehearsed this non-combatant evacuation operation beforehand to develop a playbook for how to secure quarters, guidelines for what could be taken, and more information to give the displaced about what to expect on the other end. Still unresolved was who would care for all the pets remaining behind.

Currently
To date, the Chinese have still not taken overt military operations and the United States has decided to work with the international community to impose economic sanctions on China while also increasing naval and air forces in between the first and second island chains.

Kay could only hope that sanctions worked. The evacuation of dependents from Japanese locations reduced the burden substantially, but that did not increase ammo levels or ensure that theater air and missile defenses would make much difference if China decided to go kinetic.

Maybe the installations would weather the storm. Kay could only hope because there was nothing else to be done; it would depend on the Chinese.

Epilogue
Can a fait accompli be slow and progressive? Does it have to be so sudden the opponent is unable to offer a timely response in hours or days?

With the benefit of hindsight, what appeared at the time to be a progressive ratcheting up of intimidating actions by the Chinese looks today more like a fait accompli given China’s studied exploitation of our vulnerabilities and the recognition that they had tailored a long-term campaign to gain control of Taiwan and then executed it to near perfection. America and its allies and partners did respond to Chinese provocations quickly but in a measured series of economic, information, diplomatic, and military actions, with varying levels of effectiveness. Yet today, China controls Taiwan’s apparatus of government and is working to consolidate total control over the island.

As an adversary with a mature Long-Range Precision Strike complex, the Chinese changed the battlespace in novel and unanticipated ways. The ability to create effects, without changing location, meant the Chinese could threaten to attack or conduct an attack at very low cost. By manipulating our Indications and Warnings, they were able to force us to react, executing flush plans, conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation, and focusing on internal housekeeping matters while they had none of the traditional logistical or temporal costs associated with moving into battle position.

Attack or threat of attack was fast and cheap for the Chinese, whereas we had to move large forces great distances, evacuate families, and implement ad hoc defensive measures to cover installation vulnerabilities. Also, their attack options had the benefit of being precise, thus allowing them to modulate collateral damage. Importantly, they could attack any target set within range of their munitions while we had perhaps overfocused on protecting tactical formations to the detriment of fixed installations.

The DOD rightly recognized the need to improve its abilities to target and attack PLA forces back in 2018, but this focus evolved into tunnel vision given resource constraints across the Department that forced budgets to focus only on the “top” priorities vice the Joint Force’s system priorities. Underinvestment in system enablers opened a seam the Chinese drove their missiles through. The Chinese viewed all U.S. assets within their weapons engagement zone as valid targets, and without the baggage of our cultural propensities, they were clear-eyed as to where the U.S. was most vulnerable and what targets would best achieve their political objectives.

The Chinese knew our democracy demanded the President pay close attention to public sentiment, and Taiwan did not resonate with the American polity as had Putin’s attack on Ukraine. This was not because Americans had a greater affinity for a European war. Rather, it was because of the way the Chinese had learned from Putin’s mistakes and adopted a gradualist approach that avoided bloodshed until the very end of their campaign. By then, it was too late to walk back the chain of events they had orchestrated.

China’s strategy leveraged American ambivalence by threatening to attack U.S. citizens and military personnel at U.S. bases and stations located within their desired sphere of influence, and the President decided to avoid escalation until U.S. non-combatants could be evacuated. Perhaps savvily, China chose not to interfere with the evacuation. They understood they were losing some of their leverage, but the vulnerability of U.S. installations left plenty of targets possessing both military and iconic value for them to threaten. In return, they gained more of their most valuable commodity: time.

It is clear now that posture matters greatly. Vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities, whether operating force or supporting establishment, especially in the eyes of an adversary who may understand political vulnerabilities better than the U.S. military, given they have the benefit of not being burdened by the U.S. military’s inclination to focus primarily on military outcomes.

The Joint Force and the Nation’s infrastructure and industrial base comprise a system that was perhaps better understood by previous generations. In World War I and World War II, key cities, bases, fortresses, and industries were early military objectives of both sides, but during the long interregnum of our military hegemony since then, we forgot. The Chinese had not.

How multi-disciplinary Marines provide maximum flexibility to a distributed force

>Capt Sanderfield is currently serving as the Operations Officer for 1/2 Mar. He was the Company Commander for Alpha Company, the experimental Force Design 2030 company from July 2021 to April 2023.

 

The character of war is changing, and the Commandant has taken ambitious steps to redesign the force to confront a capable adversary in the Pacific. One of the most contentious aspects of the Commandant’s Force Design initiative is the Arms Room Concept. Under this concept, the Marine Corps infantry would transition away from some specifically defined MOSs to a force that leverages a multi-disciplinary Marine capable of employing a variety of different weapons systems on the battlefield. Responding to a question about the Arms Room Concept, BGen Watson, Commanding Gen Marine Corps Warfighting Lab said, “So the arms room means that you would have a sort of an armory of many different systems, and your Marines would be trained in all of them, and then you pick the weapons suited to the mission … as opposed to having single-threat Marines who are only experts at one system.”(1) As a company commander of Alpha Company 1/2 Mar, an experimental Force Design 2030 rifle company, my team and I have been on the forefront of creating multi-disciplinary Marines utilizing the Arms Room Concept over the last eighteen months. This period has resulted in many lessons learned and recommendations on how infantry battalions can overcome systematic shortfalls and effectively implement the Arms Room Concept going forward. With additional investments of time, resources, and an adjusted approach to enlisted infantry schooling, infantry battalions can employ multi-disciplinary Marines to provide maximum flexibility on a chaotic and distributed battlefield.

The push towards the development of the multi-disciplinary Marine is not one of desire, but one of necessity. Static positions and massed formations are terribly easy to find and target, especially against an adversary like Russia and China who possess a robust suite of sensors and persistent ISR capabilities. However, as this technology continues to develop and spread, it is no longer just the major power players who possess the ability to leverage space-based ISR platforms and unmanned-aerial systems to hunt their adversaries. These systems, coupled with precision-guided missiles, long-range rockets, and cheap loitering over-the-horizon suicide drones will force military formations to become smaller and more dispersed to survive. Operating within this type of environment makes it no longer tenable to train Marines to become experts at one singular weapons system. As formations operate further away from their higher headquarters, small units will be required to possess a multitude of assets, weaponry, and capability sets.

The common question that comes up when discussing the creation of multi-disciplinary Marines is which weapons systems should encompass the arms room and which capabilities will require a Marine with a specific MOS. While training every Marine to become proficient and qualified in every weapons system is desirable, it is unrealistic in application. Within Alpha Company’s Force Design structure, specialty-trained Marines and weapons traditionally held at the battalion level, such as Javelin missiles, heavy machineguns, mortars, and loitering munitions, have been transferred from what was previously weapons company to the company’s hunter killer platoon. These complex weapons systems require Marines with advanced-level training and were not included in our training to create multi-disciplinary Marines.

What Does the Arms Room Concept Provide the Service?
Flexible/adaptive force
A leading benefit of the Arms Room Concept has been the flexibility it has provided the company. As the 2nd MarDiv Experimental Force Design rifle company within 1/2 Mar, the company had the privilege of executing a series of difficult experimental training exercises across the United States. These exercises were designed to push the limits of an infantry company, employing advanced sensors and weaponry within exercise scenarios for the company to distances exceeding 50 kilometers from the rest of the battalion. In each of these instances, the company’s platoons and squads were distributed another five-ten kilometers to accomplish independent tasks assigned by the company commander. Upon insertion of the company into the exercise operational area frequently dominated by adversary sensors and anti-air missile systems, there was virtually no ability to adjust or reallocate key assets or crew-served weapons across formations. Doing so would require the use of already limited transportation platforms and would expose the force to the risk of detection and subsequent targeting.

Alpha Company’s employment of multi-disciplinary Marines and access to previously held battalion-level assets at the company level were key components that enabled success in a distributed operating environment. By having medium machineguns, rockets, long-range precision rifles, and recoilless rifles within each platoon, platoon commanders and squad leaders have the unique ability to custom tailor their table of equipment to provide a mission-ready force to accomplish the task assigned. For the platoons and squads within Alpha Company, this has at times resulted in one squad carrying multiple medium machineguns and rocket systems while another is operating with a much lighter footprint carrying only their primary service rifle into the fight. Only by training Marines on every weapons system could these custom-tailored units have the flexibility required to be successful in a distributed fight against a capable adversary while simultaneously possessing the firepower required to mass when necessary.

Redundancy
Redundancy is another beneficial aspect of the Arms Room Concept. If the Marine who is typically responsible for employing the medium machinegun or Carl Gustav recoilless rifle is incapacitated, there is a squad’s worth of Marines who can pick it up and employ it effectively in the fight. This occurred during several of our exercises and will undoubtedly happen in the next big conflict. While the most common example included a simulated casualty for the Marine carrying a specific weapons system, there were other instances where a Marine became ill or was simply needed to execute some other task. By having this redundancy, the unit never lost the capability that the weapons system provided because there was a ready bench of capable Marines who could pick up and employ that weapons system in the fight effectively.

Redundant capabilities have additional benefits beyond providing a company with a strong bench of utility players. It provides the option to weigh units in a way that was not previously possible. By having thirteen Marines who are trained to employ the medium machinegun or recoilless rifle within a squad, a company commander has the option to weigh that unit with additional weapons to allow for the accomplishment of a task such as an attack by fire or support by fire. The availability of these options has undoubtedly made the unit a more capable, flexible, and deadly force.

It is important to note that although redundancy means that a squad could theoretically hand a medium machinegun, grenade launcher, or recoilless rifle to any Marine within the squad to effectively employ, naturally the proficiency levels amongst the Marines will vary. We have addressed this by striving to train all Marines to be incidental operators with each of the weapons within the Arms Room. This means mandatory, across-the-board cross-training built into the training schedule to ensure every Marine can at least pick up a weapon, load it properly, conduct appropriate misfire procedures, and manipulate a machinegun’s traversing and elevation mechanism or a recoilless rifle’s sight system to engage various targets on the battlefield.

Enhances Integration
A point often used to argue against the Arms Room Concept is that there is no requirement to have these weapons capabilities organic to the rifle platoons and squads, for they can be attached by the company if required. While this argument is true on the surface, it overlooks the significant benefit of having Marines with those capabilities organic to each small unit. By platoons having access to the weapons and Marines during training, they will be best postured to accurately understand their capabilities, limitations, and how to best employ them on the battlefield. The valuable trust built through time and repetitions cannot be replicated with an attachment that may or may not have worked with the unit before. Instead of receiving an attachment whose true physical capability and overall proficiency are unknown and largely assumed, the Marines are already an organic part of that small unit. Under the new construct that employs multi-disciplinary Marines, a single rifle platoon can serve as a heavy support-by-fire element complete with a full complement of machineguns while also providing organic internal security. Previously, this same task would require several attachments from outside the platoon to accomplish. Now, each platoon commander and squad leader have the capabilities required within their units with their multi-disciplinary Marines.

Recommendations
The implementation of the Arms Room Concept provides the Marine Corps infantry with a much more capable, lethal, and flexible force, but it does come at a significant cost. To create highly proficient multi-disciplinary Marines, the Marine Corps will have to adjust the way we man, train, and equip future infantry formations. Below are some recommendations for how infantry company commanders can approach this issue to support its implementation and future use across every infantry battalion.

Building Capabilities Incrementally
Training all Marines within an infantry rifle squad to effectively employ every weapons system available does take an extraordinary amount of time and energy. That said, it is achievable if you take an incremental approach to building capabilities over time. Those who typically push back on the concept will point out that it is impossible for every Marine to have the same level of proficiency as a current machine gunner who has years of fleet experience and advanced-level training. However, the goal of the Arms Room Concept is not to blindly hand weapons to any Marine in your formation and expect the same results. Instead, the goal is to create highly lethal teams made up of multi-disciplinary Marines who can perform a laundry list of tasks and employ a variety of weapons systems. With a future operating environment characterized by contested airspace and severe distribution of maneuvering forces, Marine Corps units cannot afford to fill a critical seat on any insert helicopter with someone who can only carry out one singular task or employ one specific weapon.

Critics of the Arms Room Concept express concern about losing a level of technical proficiency by moving away from designated Marines who employ some of these weapons in the previous, legacy construct. Although a valid concern, the argument tends to exaggerate the complexity of certain weapons while also ignoring that the Marine Corps has long trained Marines to employ multiple weapons systems. Combat engineers and artillerymen each cross-train Marines to employ machineguns for localized security. Even within the infantry, squads for decades trained traditional riflemen to employ the M249 squad automatic weapon, a light machinegun organic within each fire team. Marines carrying this machinegun achieved much success in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan before the Corps transitioned to the current service rifle.

To accomplish our goal of incrementally creating multi-functional Marines who can employ each weapons system in the Arms Room Concept, Alpha Company started by selecting the most common weapons systems the squad would likely use on the battlefield. These included the Infantry Automatic Rifle, the M320 grenade launcher, Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, and the M240 medium machinegun. With the agreed-upon understanding that it would take a large amount of time and ammunition for all Marines to become experts on each of these weapons, we started by qualifying every Marine on the basics, such as the ability to load, unload, and conduct misfire procedures for each weapon. As each Marine effectively demonstrated the ability to conduct these incidental-operator-level tasks, they were classified as qualified Marines capable of employing this weapons system if required. As each Marine trained to become qualified, small-unit leaders identified top performers who were evaluated in employing that weapon on a live-fire range. Those who were successful in this evaluation were designated as certified on that weapon and could now fire that weapon system in support of a maneuvering friendly element. Over the course of the pre-deployment workup, the company was able to qualify nearly every Marine in the rifle platoons on each weapon system while also building an impressive number of certified Marines who were the first ones within that unit to employ the weapon if the requirement was identified during planning.

Use of Simulators to Build Proficiency
Certifying every Marine on each weapon within the Arms Room Concept would require a massive increase in the amount of ammunition typically available to each infantry battalion. To continue to train multi-disciplinary Marines under this resource constraint, infantry companies will need to maximize the use of technology and simulators. The Marine Corps has made great strides over the years to ensure Marines have access to realistic simulators to train and build proficiency, and these systems will only get better as technology improves and becomes cheaper to replicate. Currently, every base installation has an Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT) available for units to schedule and use for training. Although Alpha Company did leverage these systems to a limited degree, this is admittedly a resource we should have used more. Company commanders should embrace the use of available simulators and incorporate them into their weekly training schedules to build individual weapons capabilities without expending the limited ammunition available.

Although the ISMT is a valuable resource for training Marines, there are currently several limitations associated with these systems. First, the limited number of simulators available on each installation will be insufficient to support every infantry battalion as they each transition to the Arms Room Concept. Either the current ISMTs will need to expand, or additional facilities will need to be constructed to meet the increasing demand. There will also need to be an expansion of weapon systems available within the current ISMTs to ensure they encompass the M320 and Carl Gustav, critical weapons within the arms room. Another option could be the investment in an ISMT type similar within each infantry battalion’s office space. While this would require significant initial investment and continued attention to keep them working and operational, the benefits would be well worth the cost. 1/2 Mar has seen the benefit of having an in-house simulator first-hand. Within a battalion command post, there is a dedicated training room with multiple Javelin and TOW missile simulators. Utilizing these training aids does not require an extensive request process or deconflicting with dozens of other units across the base. As a result, the company and battalion have been able to sustain proficiency with these weapons systems while building an impressive number of incidental operators despite not receiving the necessary number of missiles to train effectively. With additional investment in the access and quality of simulators, infantry units can overcome the limited availability of live ammunition and develop a capable unit of multi-disciplinary Marines.

Leverage/Create Subject-Matter Experts
The Arms Room Concept and the creation of multi-disciplinary Marines within infantry battalions are only possible through the possession of unit internal instructors and subject-matter experts to train Marines on the technical proficiency necessary to employ various weapon systems. Alpha Company, 1/2 Mar has been fortunate in this area. To achieve the task organization in the company that included an increased rank requirement, the rifle squads were built from Marines from every infantry MOS. This was particularly important at the small-unit leader level. Each squad was comprised of staff sergeant squad leaders, sergeant team leaders, and several junior NCOs who were school-trained machine gunners, mortarmen, and anti-armor Marines. The presence of this diverse set of skill sets allowed the company to leverage these warriors to develop a team of multi-disciplinary Marines within each rifle platoon.

As infantry battalions adopt the Arms Room Concept and explore ways to replace the different specialty MOSs into a consolidated all-encompassing 03XX MOS, the Marine Corps must ensure units have access to a bullpen of school-trained instructors to fill this critical role. Until the Advanced School of Infantry redesigns its infantry school pipeline to meet this new challenge, infantry battalions must continue to leverage courses such as Advanced Machine Gunners Course, Advanced Anti-Tank Missile Gunner Course, and Infantry Unit Leaders Course. Marines returning from these courses will have the technical proficiency necessary to help develop and train the other Marines in their platoons. In addition to maximizing the use of these current advanced schools to train Marines and build a cadre of capable instructors, each infantry division needs to play a part by crafting division schools that help units achieve the goal of creating multi-disciplinary Marines across their formations.

Warfare is experiencing a technological revolution where precision-guided munitions and unmanned systems will continue to proliferate and dominate the future battlefield. To meet the challenge of a future fight against a smart and capable near-peer or peer adversary, the Marine Corps infantry will need to transition away from a force of single-threat Marines to a more capable and flexible team of multi-disciplinary Marines capable of employing a variety of different weapons available within the unit’s armory. While Alpha Company 1/2 Mar has made a tremendous number of mistakes along the way and certainly does not have all the answers, our experience on the cutting edge of Force Design 2030 experimentation for the past eighteen months has informed us of the benefits of Arms Room Concept and the necessity of multi-disciplinary Marines within the infantry. With additional investments of time, resources, and an adjusted approach to enlisted infantry schooling, infantry battalions can employ multi-disciplinary Marines to provide maximum flexibility on a chaotic and distributed battlefield.

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Notes

1. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Update Force Design 2030 After a Year of Experimentation in the Field,” United States Naval Institute News, April 26, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/26/marines-update-force-design-2030-after-a-year-of-experimentation-in-the-field.

Using time wisely for professional development

>Col Tiger is an F/A-18 Pilot and the Commanding Officer of Marine Aviation Training Support Group 22 in Corpus Christi, TX.

>>1stLt Grier is a Villanova University graduate and is awaiting jet training in Kingsville, TX.

>>>2ndLt Appel is a Naval Academy graduate and a prior-service Nuclear Electricians Mate. She is awaiting primary flight training in Corpus Christi, TX.

Marines Awaiting Training
In naval aviation, there is a fictional character named Grandpa Pettibone. Borne out of desperation in World War II, this grumpy old codger would impart aviation knowledge to his readers with cartoon drawings and sarcastic humor in a desperate attempt to reduce flying accidents.1 Every naval aviator since 1942 has learned some vital lesson from the cantankerous, pithy, and humorous old Grandpa Pettibone.2

If Gramps saddled up with his cane and book o’ knowledge to tour our training bases, he would probably say, “Jumpin’ Jehoshaphat Devildogs! Why aren’t your Marines awaiting training using this time wisely to further their professional development?”3

Commandant Berger would agree with Gramps. The Commandant’s five priority focus areas include force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. Our Marines awaiting training focus on all five priority areas, with particular attention directed toward education and training.

From commissioning to winging as a fleet aviator, Marine student pilots can spend two years or more in a Marines Awaiting Training status. As Grandpa Pettibone says and the Commandant directs, this time must be used wisely. Marine Aviation Training Support Group 21 (MATSG-21) in Pensacola and MATSG-22 in Corpus Christi are developing unique, low-cost, low-overhead training events that intellectually develop Marines. Some of these events may also be useful to other commands with large student populations awaiting training.

Intellectual Development
The Marine Corps is a learning organization.4 Marine Corps Order 1553.4B states individual Marines are responsible for their own learning, and it is incumbent upon commanders to foster a culture of lifelong learning. This intellectual ability is cultivated through “active engagement with the brightest minds and the most challenging material, which forces Marines to contend with their assumptions, perceptions and concepts.”5

To foster a culture of lifelong learning, MATSG-22 executes a syllabus that teaches lieutenants to read critically, write articulate essays on their subject matter, and brief peers on the lessons derived from various works. Distilled from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps War College syllabi, the MATSG syllabus focuses on both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The final module focuses on military aviation history. Each module begins with a war college-produced lecture, available online and taught by resident experts that describe each war in detail. Students then read, write and think critically about lessons from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.
The background students receive in reading, writing, and speaking critically about military history will support them throughout their careers. Confidence when briefing aviation operations as a captain, credibility with overseas partners as a major, historically based planning as a lieutenant colonel, and strategic-level depth and insight as a colonel are only some of the positive outcomes our students will achieve with their focus on critical reading, writing, and speaking.

To complement this intensive reading program, MATSG has experimented with critical thought workshops. Instructors and students recently participated in a two-week workshop in a live classroom setting with the Ground Truth Design Company, a private-industry program designed to equip leaders with tools, doctrine, and techniques to think critically and better solve complex problems. The initial results are promising.
Instructors and students were broken into five teams, each with a different problem to address. Using the techniques provided by the instructors, our teams set to work and contacted industry experts, general officers, and even one Congressional Staff who agreed to take our student’s proposal and incorporate their solutions into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The success our students achieved exceeded all expectations in many cases. These lessons will serve our students well throughout their careers as they address complex problems in the Indo-Pacific region, Force Design implementation, naval integration, and more.

Tactical Training
To complement the intellectual development program, MATSG has implemented a three-tiered system that trains students in the tactical application of their profession.

Our primary tactical training period is called MATSG-22 University, focused strictly on flight training. This week-long course is taught by recent flight school graduates to those awaiting flight training. This course prepares students for the rigors of flight school using books, lectures, chalk-talk, and simulator events. The desired end state of MATSG-22 University is to reduce time-to-train while producing higher quality aviators outside the official period of instruction. As with the intellectual development program, this is a low-cost, low-overhead, repeatable event taught by peers under the supervision of fleet instructors. The course delivery method also demonstrates a transition from the industrial-aged model of learning towards a student-centered, 21st-century learning style supported by Training and Education Command.

Battlefield staff rides, museum visits, and case studies provide the second tier of tactical training evolutions. The Marine Corps Association produces excellent military case studies, ranging from Mogadishu to Guadalcanal to the Chosin Reservoir. Students are selected to lead various case studies, leveraging the Marine Corps Association’s pre-built case studies that describe the historical significance, tactical importance, and strategic implications of each battle. Each package includes detailed maps with the scheme of maneuver and terrain depicted with recommended articles, podcasts, videos, and books that complement the case study. Similar to the critical reading, writing, and speaking from the intellectual development module, students gain experience briefing and leading events among their peers, with guidance and structure provided by the instructor cadre.

The third tier of the tactical training module is Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). Recently implemented and with direct assistance from the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and Commanding Generals of Training and Education Command and Training Command, this program will aid students in completing their professional military education requirements while awaiting flight training. This program has enormous potential for newly winged aviators entering the fleet as senior first lieutenants and junior captains who must focus on the tactical employment of their aircraft while expeditiously completing their PME requirements prior to the promotion board. To compensate for each student’s lack of real-world experience in the course, the Expeditionary Warfare School instructor selected senior Marines to augment the class so that students can leverage their experience. This “hybrid” approach to Expeditionary Warfare School will serve aviators and the Marine Corps well.

Real-World Training
“We must elevate our standards and deliver a more capable Marine to the FMF, while also incentivizing and expanding MOS-specific development opportunities afforded throughout the Marine’s career.”6 MATSG-22 turned commander’s intent into action and sent students around the country and the world to support individual professional development while simultaneously supporting fleet commanders in accomplishing their mission.

One of the most anticipated events in MATSG’s arsenal to expand career developmental opportunities is the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, held semi-annually at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, in Arizona. Here, students gain an appreciation for graduate-level aviation employment as they observe flight line operations, live ordnance procedures, classified briefs and debriefs, realtime execution from secure facilities, and more. With great support from the MAWTS-1 Commander and his staff, and with proper risk-mitigation measures in place, this evolution is the most sought opportunity among all flight students awaiting training.

Other opportunities for temporary duty exist on a case-by-case basis. For example, a Japanese-speaking Marine flight student recently served as an interpreter for Marine Forces Japan, enhancing joint interoperability between U.S. and Japanese naval forces. MATSG routinely pairs flight students with fleet units who can effectively leverage and employ their unique skills. Fleet units in need of temporary and specific skills are encouraged to contact MATSG-21 and MATSG-22 who can properly vet its 450 students awaiting training to support your mission.

Lastly, MATSG-22 began a monthly program where flight students interact with the Joint Staff J-3 via the Secret video teleconference network. These classified briefings from some of the Pentagon’s resident experts provide valuable insight for young officers interested in European, Middle Eastern, and Asian operations. This interaction sparks students’ intellectual curiosity and provides a frame of reference for the world they are about to enter once they graduate from flight training.
It is important to note the tremendous support MATSG receives from senior leaders, MAWTS-1, the Joint Staff, Marine Aircraft Groups, the Marine Corps Association, and others that assist in mentoring, instructing, employing, empowering, motivating, coaching, and teaching young flight students awaiting training. Their efforts help develop a student’s intellectual curiosity and support critical thinking and builds the bench of future leaders needed to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

Conclusion
The Marine Corps requires leaders at all levels who can achieve intellectual overmatch against our adversaries.7 Names such as Alfred T. Mahan, U.S. Grant, John J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, John A. Lejeune, Matthew Ridgeway, O.P. Smith, and Colin Powell are noted for their ability to devise, implement and execute military operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Today’s Marines must learn to do the same. MATSG-22 supports this endeavor with intellectual development exercises, tactical training evolutions, and real-world exposure events within a 21st-century learning construct. Grandpa Pettibone would be proud to know our young leaders are dedicated, disciplined, and focused on professional and intellectual development while awaiting flight training.

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Notes

1. CAPT Rosario Rausa, “Jumpin’ Josephat! 50 Years of Gramps” Naval Aviation News (Jan–Feb 1993).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Gen David H. Berger, Training & Education 2030 (Washington, DC: January 2023).

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.