Beyond the Kill Chain
By: Col C. Faith Zimmerman & Maj Will ZimmerPosted on February 15,2026
Logistics Support to Maneuver Warfare
The Marine Corps has mastered the kill chain—finding, targeting, and engaging threats—through constant innovation in fires and maneuver. Yet, the logistics chain that sustains those operations remains underdeveloped. The Corps still lacks the doctrine, culture, and training mechanisms to command and control sustainment with the same rigor as combat functions.
Logistics too often becomes an afterthought. Resupply plans go unrehearsed, timelines drift, and the tempo collapses when sustainment fails. The absence of standardized logistics control measures and overlays on the Common Operational Picture (COP) prevents timely decisions about resupply, risk, and the protection of critical units. Meanwhile, the logistics combat element (LCE) generally operates without a clearly enforced training and readiness sustainment, leaving Marines underprepared for convoy operations involving live-fire and night maneuvers. This reflects a lingering bias that treats logistics as secondary to combat arms—an assumption incompatible with modern war.
As the 39th Commandant warned, contested logistics is now a top priority: the Corps must “close and sustain the force” in a communications-degraded, threat-heavy environment. We must move beyond merely supporting maneuver to making logistics a driving force that enables it. As Col Angell and Mark Schouten wrote, “Tactical prowess is irrelevant for a force that cannot get to the fight or lacks the material to endure.”1
This article proposes four lines of effort (LOEs) that will better enable logistics units and logisticians to catch up to other elements of the MAGTF we are supporting in all phases of an operation—from planning throughout execution. The purpose is to conduct business as deliberately, rehearsed, and agile as the kill chain itself:
• Rehearse sustainment as you rehearse fires.
• Make sustainment visible and controllable on the COP.
• Train the LCE like an aviation squadron.
• Institutionalize the logistics support playbook.
Together, these efforts will transform the sustainment of the MAGTF from a passive tail getting proverbially left in the dust into the proactive combat system as designed.
LOE 1: Rehearse Sustainment as You Rehearse Fires
In the Marine Corps, nothing is “ready” until it is rehearsed. Fire-support teams walk through calls-for-fire; maneuver units practice schemes of maneuver to friction-proof execution. Yet, logistics rehearsals remain rare. During MAGTF Warfighting Exercise 1-25, for example, the LCE operations officer was told to “hurry along” so more time could be given to the fires discussion. The result was brilliant maneuver plans that faltered when fuel, water, or medical evacuation failed to align. A concept of logistics support written in an order is meaningless unless commanders and logisticians walk through it together. Rehearsing sustainment at confirmation briefs and rehearsal of concept drills exposes critical gaps: Where are the resupply points? What are the unmasking criteria or decision authorities for redirecting support? How do logistics units conduct link-ups in a communications-degraded environment? Such questions belong at every rehearsal table.
Every field exercise should integrate sustainment rehearsals alongside tactical ones, using realistic injects such as casualty evacuation, link-up between supporting and supported units, and no-communications plans. Commanders should discuss the criteria to unmask logistics and make this known across the formation. Is it the supported company commanders’ authority to push forward a low-density, high-value logistics formation? Is
“The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off.”
–GEN Douglas
MacArthur
survivability more important than supporting the supported unit—how and who makes these risk-based decisions? These questions must be addressed with commanders across the MAGTF discussing decision-making criteria and authorities. Rehearsing sustainment with the same intensity as fires signals a cultural shift: logistics is part of the fight, not an administrative detail. The outcome is a MAGTF that fights with confidence, knowing the logistical links will hold fast and or support across is understood.
LOE 2: Make Sustainment Visible and Controllable on the COP
Today’s operations centers display impressive digital maps of maneuver units and fires. Yet, too often, logistics is invisible—convoys, refuel points, casualty collection sites are absent from the picture. Without that visibility, commanders are having difficulty with command and control of logistics formations as evidenced by the Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group during MAGTF warfighting exercise and other collective training events. Further, MAGTF headquarters often struggled to locate dispersed convoys or distribution sites. Leaders could not answer the simplest questions: How much water remains? When is the next resupply mission scheduled? This uncertainty paralyzed tempo. As MCDP 4 reminds us, “Logistics visibility provides insight on reach and endurance … shaping decisions to adjust tasks, priorities, and resources.”2 You cannot protect or maneuver what you cannot see or control—or it becomes unnecessarily difficult to communicate perceived air superiority to desperate units.
A logistics overlay—updated and layered onto the main COP—turns sustainment into a controllable system. Logistics-oriented tactical control measures, like rapid resupply points, ambulance exchange points, and other critical areas, should appear on every COP. When an infantry commander can plan around their next resupply, they can develop courses of action that are feasible and prevent culmination, as logistics is intended. In one MAGTF warfighting exercise instance, once LCE movements were plotted, the GCE coordinated fires to shield a convoy under threat—saving the sustainment flow from interdiction.
Technology can help. Emerging “LOGCOP” tools fuse data on convoy locations, stock levels, and maintenance status using real-time data. The goal is secure, near-real-time sustainment visibility without revealing positions to the enemy. However, the procedures matter more than the software: standardized logistics tactical control measures, clear update cycles, and mandatory log-status reporting must become habitual across the MAGTF. Commanders must enforce the importance of Logistics Status, akin to positional reports, to support the timely application of fires.
Once visible, sustainment becomes controllable. Commanders can dynamically redirect convoys, shift resupply priorities, or activate contingency routes. Logistics thus becomes a maneuver system—one that sets the fight’s tempo rather than merely trailing behind it.
LOE 3: Train the LCE Like an Aviation Squadron
While deployed as part of the 13th MEU embarked aboard the USS Makin Island on the WESTPAC 23.1 deployment, we observed the strict training and readiness standards, deck qualification landings, or night qualifications of the air combat element and asked why this does not exist in the LCE? This discipline ensures combat readiness. Yet, no equivalent culture exists for logistics formations. Too often, LCE units spend training time on administrative or garrison tasks rather than tactical proficiency.
Doctrinally, “effective logistics depends on continuous, challenging, integrated training.”3 However, many logisticians reach major exercises having never executed a live-fire convoy or having conducted night convoy operations. Yet, we can generally all agree that there is a need for logistics units to conduct force protection and conduct movement using the concealment of night. Why is it that we can track individual training like combat and physical fitness tests or cyber awareness, yet we do not know if our sustainment interval is maintained for operating crew-served weapons and driving vehicles at night? Both are critical individual tasks required to accomplish the collective tasks associated with the assigned mission of the LCE. The LCE formations must treat logistics as a warfighting formation, not a service provider, and begin tracking these intervals during weekly command meetings—like command and staff or review via existing systems such as the Marine Corps Training Information Management System. When logistics Marines train like aviators—constantly evaluated, continuously improving—the result is a force that can maneuver, survive, and sustain under pressure. In a peer fight, there will be no safe rear area.
LOE 4: The Logistics Support Playbook
Even with rehearsed plans and trained units, combat chaos will disrupt communications and command. To thrive amid that friction, logisticians need tools that enable rapid, decentralized execution. The logistics support playbookis one such tool: a menu of pre-planned, flexible sustainment “plays” that can be executed with minimal comms—analogous to a fire-support matrix for logistics.
MCDP 4 emphasizes that maneuver warfare demands “flexibility and agility in our logistics plans … ensuring logistics itself does not become a critical vulnerability.”4 The playbook builds that flexibility by pre-deciding how to act when the unexpected occurs. It also enables the discussion between the supported and supporting units to conduct quick and detailed planning to enable link-up during execution.
Each “play” is a predetermined package of support or contingency action, rehearsed and encoded for quick execution. Suppose a battalion burns through ammunition repelling an ambush. Instead of drafting a long request, it transmits a simple code: “7-Eleven Option 1 execute.” Everyone already knows what that means—perhaps a six-pallet resupply of 155 mm, water, and MREs.
The LCE immediately launches the designated convoy “Lucky” to the pre-set linkup grid. A single burst transmission accomplishes what would normally take multiple messages.
These plays compress decision cycles, sustain tempo, and enable initiative at the lowest level. They embody mission tactics—allowing subordinate leaders to act within the commander’s intent even when cut off. Developing the playbook requires deliberate staff work. MAGTF planners identify likely sustainment challenges—emergency casualty evacuation, mobile fuel runs, alternate routes—and craft shorthand solutions. Each play includes triggers, responsibilities, and code words. Plays are standardized, disseminated, and rehearsed across the force. Used in the same manner as we observe any given Sunday.
The Marine Corps can perfect its kill chain, but without an equally disciplined sustainment chain, combat power will grind to a halt.
Like immediate-action drills, playbook codes do not restrict flexibility—they empower it. Because decisions are front-loaded, Marines can act faster when friction strikes. Training cycles should validate these plays, including emission control and degraded-comms scenarios. RAND analysis supports this approach: distributed operations require sustainment forces to “operate effectively with inconsistent communications.”5 The playbook provides precisely that capability. It also aligns with Force Design 2030 and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concepts, emphasizing distributed, autonomous sustainment. Commanders, depending on the command relationships, must trust subordinates to execute playbook codes without seeking permission. That trust converts logistics from a centrally managed process into a responsive network. Like a well-drilled football team executing an audible, a MAGTF using its logistics playbook can adjust instantly—maintaining tempo given the anticipated fog and friction as part of the nature of war.
Logistics is commonly referred to as the linchpin of maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps can perfect its kill chain, but without an equally disciplined sustainment chain, combat power will grind to a halt. The four LOEs outlined here chart a path forward: rehearse sustainment like fires; make it visible and controllable on the COP; train logisticians to the same warfighting standard as aviators; and institutionalize the Logistics Support Playbook to thrive in degraded conditions.
These reforms rely upon and demand leadership emphasis, doctrinal updates, and cultural change. They require time, resources, and persistence. But their payoff is immense: a MAGTF capable of sustaining itself in any clime and place, with logistics functioning not as a vulnerability but as a decisive weapon system. To win tomorrow’s fight, the Marine Corps must go beyond the kill chain—and command and control logistics as deliberately as it commands and controls firepower.
Featured Photo (Top): An accurate logistics COP can ensure visibility of critical classes of supply including bulk fuel.(Photo provided by Cpl Eric Allen.)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Col Zimmerman is a Logistics Officer and is currently serving as the Commanding Officer of Combat Logistics Regiment 17, 1st Marine Logistics Group.
Maj Zimmer is a Logistics Officer currently serving as a Faculty Advisor at the Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group.
NOTES:
1. Col Aaron Angell and Jeff Schouten, “Leveraging Logistics above the MAGTF,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 3 (2024).
2. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 4, Logistics (Washington, DC: 2019).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. M. Priebe et al., Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
