In a contested environment, faced with a peer adversary, the Information Domain may prove decisive. Controlling the narrative, sharing information across disparate and distributed Marine, Special Operations, and Submarine forces and pushing national and theater intelligence and situational awareness to the tactical commanders of Stand-in Forces will require a different approach to Operations in the Information Environment.
Did anyone notice?… Did anyone notice but me that the Marine Corps, through some esoteric process involving smoke-filled, back room drug-deals (aka- Force Design), just created a new triumvirate fighting organization that has virtually NO AVIATION? NO AVIATORS? and NO ACE COMMANDER? Yes, the same USMC that for years has finagled, lobbied, and stonewalled JFACCs and JFMCCs alike that the MAGTF is inviolate, just dismantled it from the inside. By eliminating the ACE, they showed that Marine aviation really isn’t as integral as we always said it was and that our sorties are basically interchangeable with any other service sorties…
Or at least that’s how it felt…
Instead, let’s look at what really happened and what these changes portend for the future of Marine aviation and, perhaps, the Marine Corps.
This article will examine the following questions:
What threat or environmental changes necessitated the changes to (or, in the opinion of some pundits, the abandonment of) the MAGTF?
What did Force Design actually change?
What does the MPSR mean to the future of Marine aviation…of aviation in general?
What do these potential changes to aviation mean to the future of the Marine Corps as an institution with a niche within the National Defense Strategy?
This article does not presume to have all the answers, but rather seeks to pose a few questions that may spur discussion, lead to further experimentation, and result in innovations which might ensure our relevancy for the remainder of the 21st century.
Basic Tenets & Doctrine
From day one, Marines are taught that “Every Marine is a Rifleman.” It is stenciled on our foreheads even before we get our first haircut. Everything we are taught is focused on what the Marine on the ground is doing and what he needs to “close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver…”
So, it follows that for aviators and those Marines who grew up under the MAGTF banner, the corollary to this adage is– “Marines always fight as an Air-Ground Team.” For all normal circumstances, the MAGTF is virtually inviolate. No one supports our ground units like our own organic Marine aviation and logistics forces. Our training begins together and is focused on one thing- rapid response, expeditionary ops using combined arms (and logistics) to win battles. We are not a second ground Army; we are mandated to be the Nation’s 911 Force-in-Readiness and provide deterrence, buy decision space (time) and enable access for follow-on forces. We win battles because we are more tightly integrated than any other military force on this planet. Period. It is essential that our aviation assets be tightly interwoven to give us both the mobility and the firepower necessary to prevail. We are not a large force therefore we must maintain both our lethality as well as our agility. This method of operating has become so important that we even have joint doctrine that recognizes our differences from other services. Formerly known as the Omnibus Agreement and then codified into Joint doctrine (JP1), JFCs are enjoined to normally allow Marine aviation to fight as part of the MAGTF, rather than routinely be broken up into piecemeal sorties, and randomly tasked via the JFACC ATO process. While we do support the JFC (and its subordinate functional commanders), this has generally been as an integrated Task Force (MAGTF) vice a scattered collection of sorties or capability sets. Our synergy makes us more valuable as a whole than as individual pieces. Combined arms has been our bedrock…at least up until recently.
What has changed? MPSR & A2AD
Although it seemed as if it happened overnight, the last several years has seen the exponential rise of long-range weapon systems meant to dissuade U.S. (and other allied) power projection forces from intervention in regional affairs. Driven by increases in relatively affordable technologies, the accuracy and range of these new weapons (and sensors) has increased to the point of warranting a new moniker– “Mature Precision Strike Regimes (MPSR).” And, given these new capabilities, near-peer countries have leveraged the threat of these weapons into anti-access, area denial (A2AD) strategies. This has resulted in a significant change in the risk equation for projecting power and maintaining world order (supposedly, our bread and butter). With such substantial increases in the accuracy and ranges of land-based missiles (both ballistic and cruise), MPSR has created a virtual “No Go” zone for high-value, easily targetable forces such as carriers and naval amphibs brimming with MAGTF firepower. This perceived disparity is exacerbated when examined in comparison to U.S. missile ranges (Figure [1]). In short, MPSR has limited our power projection forces from influencing (or deterring) anyone (who possesses MPSR) because our forces can’t get close enough to the littorals without incurring (potentially) unacceptable levels of risk. Enabled by multitudes of sensors mounted on low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites (both military and commercial) and long-range manned and unmanned platforms (UxS), these MPSRs have effectively neutralized the relative value of our power projection forces. With new sensors mapping the earth every few hours, it is akin to trying to hide our fleets in the middle of a desert with no trees to hide under… Even the expanse of the world’s oceans can no longer disguise the approach of forces the size of our expeditionary strike groups.
Figure [1]. US & Chinese Long-Range Missile Comparisons
While technologies to “hide” or successfully “defend” against MPSRs are evolving as well, this “Hider-Finder” competition currently (and heavily) favors the “Finders” and the “Shooters” (over the “Hiders” and “Defenders”) (See Figure [2]). In the meantime, HVAs such as amphibs and carriers cannot risk being targeted when so few of these ships actually exist. The drastic improvements in range (especially for anti-ship missiles), have even outstripped the ranges of embarked aviation platforms meant to protect the very ships that carry them. Adding insult to injury, once you calculate the cost of a single long-range anti-ship missile versus the cost of the potential loss of a carrier or amphib (and their embarked crews and aircraft), the deterrence effect is magnified even more significantly.
This virtual “no go” zone has necessitated that the U.S. integrate and employ two types of forces- 1) Outside forces- those high value targets that can only enter these MPSR weapons engagement zones (WEZs) under specific conditions and for limited time frames, and, 2) Inside forces. Inside forces (also called Stand-in Forces or SIF) are those smaller, dispersed, more agile forces that aren’t easily targeted by large long-range anti-ship and land-attack missiles, but can serve as sensors and weapons operators deep inside these protected zones (WEZs) (Figure [3]). To adequately support operational constructs of this type, Force Design was unleashed to properly man, train and equip Marine “inside forces” to partially negate the effectiveness of MPSR and its resultant anti-intervention effects.
Figure [3]. A2AD and MPSR vs. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
Sanity Check: The MPSR threat (long-range missiles and their “Finder” assets, such as satellites and long-range radars) described herein, are currently limited to near-peer competitors. Additionally, these are not 100% Pk (probability of kill, or in this case, also detection) zones. Rather, they reflect the significantly increased risk for traditional power projection forces. Nevertheless, the future is clear: these technologies will continue to proliferate until lesser powers and non-state actors (such as terrorist organizations) have the ability to see and shoot at ranges that push U.S. power projection forces outside ranges from which they can adequately respond without incurring undue risk. Until “Hider” and “Defender” technologies improve, the “Finders” and (especially shore-based) “Shooters” have the advantage. Thus, we are presented with the conundrum of creating new warfighting organizations and concepts that will excel in this vision of the future (in addition to spending even more money buying requisite equipment that is somewhat unique to these environments). At the same time, we must continue to perform our primary missions in today’s operating environment. Therefore, what investments in new equipment and technology are essential for us to remain viable (LAW, Medium Altitude, Long Endurance UxS)? What sacrifices to fund them will prohibit us from performing our current mission sets (divestiture of tanks, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, infantry manning)?
How have we changed? Force Design
Instead of utilizing existing MAGTF structure, Force Design created the Marine Littoral Regiment, a slightly different, four-pronged organization with a Command Element, a Littoral Combat Team (LCT- with an infantry/rocket core), a Littoral Logistics Battalion (LLB- a logistics unit akin to a MEUs Combat Logistics Battalion), and a LAAB (a Littoral Anti-air Battalion) (See Figure [4]). The LAAB has elements of both Aviation Ground Support (airfield and aviation ground support such as fuel, ordnance, etc.) as well as aviation C2 support (modular MACCS agencies, ATC, Comms squadron support and a ground-based air defense capability [GBAD]). Notice that there are no aircraft or winged aviators in this list.
Figure [4]. Light Anti-Air Battalion (LAAB) as an element of the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) (Notional)
This was partially done because the MLR (and thus, the LAAB) must be able to operate under the threat of these long-range A2AD WEZs. This “inside” organization must be small enough so as to be difficult to acquire, agile enough to confuse adversary targeting solutions, and yet have sufficient capabilities to serve as the forward-most sensors for their originating strike groups. By employing sensors (active and passive) and select weapons, the MLR can influence the battlespace, deter adversary fait accompli actions, and shorten US response times for hostile activity that is observed. In essence, the MLR will serve to provide extended Sea Control (and potentially Sea Denial) for the JFMCC/Naval Task Force. Acting as an extension of the CWC construct, the LAAB will not actually command organic aircraft (other than possibly UxS), but will likely be under the tasking of warfare commanders such as the ADC (Air Defense Commander) and the SUWC (the Surface Warfare Commander) under the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC); all primarily naval officers. While they may support operations at expeditionary air bases and FARPs, participating aircraft will be commanded by Outside force warfare commanders. The MLR may be assigned battlespace, but so far, it does not appear there are plans to routinely assign Marine aircraft to the MLR.
The MLR in Context
To examine the MLR in a bit more context, it is envisioned that these Littoral Teams will deploy to islands, coastlines and observations posts along chokepoints where their networked sensors (G/ATOR) and weapons (NSM) can surveil the air and surface (and, potentially subsurface) waterways. The timing of their insertion is implied to be in the “competition” phase before hostilities start. The duration of their stay is less clear, and potentially challenging as resupply over long distances under existing WEZs will be challenging (Light Amphibious Warships [LAWs] or not). Host nation support (if it exists) will be critical as will prepositioned supplies and even “foraging.” The MLR purpose will be to observe and prevent any “grey zone” activities that lead to fait accompli actions. In some cases, it is presumed that they may be the “trigger” that shifts the status from competition to conflict if any premature hostile acts are directed towards their positions. While there are significant questions about their ability to influence any significant amount of battlespace (due to the limited range of their organic sensors and weapons), their true purpose is “deterrence by detection.” Once hostilities commence, some have postulated that these hard to target positions will help complicate the adversary’s targeting plans as well as potentially deplete their magazines of long range missiles that could be used against HVAs (Outside forces) on missions inside the WEZ. The multi-variate calculus problem is this: Are the sacrifices in structure, aviation and personnel worth the return on investment for new units that can be used in very specific locations for very specific timeframes across very focused battlespaces? Will our ability to perform Force in Readiness missions across the globe (where MSPR doesn’t yet exist and may not for many years) compromise our ability to conduct power projection, and the myriad of missions and tasks that we have performed through the last two centuries? There is no doubt that MPSR will one day require small, yet highly-networked teams of infiltrators to enable long-range IRST in support of power projection enabling missions, supported by mostly by long-range unmanned platforms (UAS) and missiles. But it seems those days are far off… Again, this is an optimization calculus problem with many variables, and no one has seen the homework. Perhaps this was by design, but I think we need a vision and a timeline of our modernization efforts to show how the Marine Corps will fill its niche in the NDS.
Given the digital interoperability challenges of operating disparate networks across enormous distances under DDIL (Degraded, Denied, Intermittent, and/or Limited) conditions, the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS- represented within the LAAB) is the perfect organization to manage the assets traversing its battlespace during distributed operations. They are the only organization with the C2 systems and training to orchestrate 3-D battlespace management as well the integration of joint and combined long-range sensors and fires and, with augmentation, information and cyber capabilities. However, given the probability that follow-on forces might build into a power projection leading element, it might make sense to have a more robust ACE presence, especially if Marine aviation units will be performing both CWC and MAGTF-enabling mission sets.
Seemingly always the last to be mentioned are those Marines upon whom we all depend- Logisticians. And, in this discussion, aviation ground support provided by MWSS assets (also within the LAAB) may have the most challenging mission- Supporting distributed aviation operations from extreme distances under existing WEZs and still remaining mobile and agile. Do we have the organic assets to move this amount of material and supplies (think- fuel, ordnance, spare parts, etc.) without being targeted by adversary MPSR assets? Will the LAW or any other naval surface asset be able to support this mission given the long distances and the MPSR threat (as well as the current “Hider” and “Defender” limitations)?
If MPSR continues, what happens to USMC aviation and the MAGTF?
As discussed earlier, MPSR is currently limited to near-peer competitors. However, given the exponential rate of technological advancement (removing cost as an inhibitor to their inevitable proliferation), it won’t be long before many third world countries will acquire these weapons, as will non-state actors and terrorist organizations. And, unless Hider and Defender technologies (such as stealth, on-board jamming systems, AI-enabled missile defenses, etc.) make a strong comeback (at a more affordable price), what becomes of Marine aviation? Even with stealth, range alone becomes a non-starter given the disparate abilities of land-based ballistic missiles compared to manned aircraft, even those based aboard carriers. Only long-range unmanned aircraft systems become a viable option. Finally, as AI-enabled air defense systems become activated, then manned aircraft may truly become obsolete.
What do these changes do to the MAGTF?
First, how will the MAGTF get to the fight? How will the Navy ever justify or mitigate the potential risks of littoral operations to disembark Marines as part of a power projection mission? Will this eliminate concentrated power projection platforms? Can power projection be done in a more “distributed” fashion? Can we rely on “Hider” or “Defender” technologies to save the day?
Additionally, the “Air”- Ground Team will by necessity, have a new look. While there will always be an air component, it will eventually be (mostly, if not completely) unmanned. OAS, air refueling, reconnaissance, and EW can all be done using unmanned platforms. Assault support (troop transport) will likely be the final hurdle for unmanned aviation. How long before small, highly-networked infantry teams man “Tesla-like” automated air transports for covert insertions supported by swarms of unmanned OAS and anti-air drones? The MAGTF of the future will be different but must maintain the same focus on mission accomplishment for our “boots on the ground.” The question is- who will re-architect the integration of unmanned aviation platforms into the “new” MAGTF construct ensuring that it is fully integrated with other long-range fires (rockets and missiles) as well as non-kinetic fires such as OIE, cyber and EW? While the MACCS is rapidly preparing to provide multi-domain C2 and fires integration of this new environment, does the Marine Corps have the maneuver, logistics, and fires/sensor assets to affect battlespace of this magnitude? Can we afford these capabilities and NOT affect our ability to conduct operations in today’s environment? How long before this new environment becomes the norm?
Lest we fear that our service is the only one subject to the fickle threats of change- Other than submarines, missiles, and satellites, what vessels or aircraft will the Navy and Air Force be able to operate? How long before even the carriers are obsolete due to their inherent signatures?
Change, it seems, will affect everyone.
Without organic aviation, what differentiates the Marine Corps?
Ironically, with the transformation of Marine Air, so also goes a part of our Marine Corps’ “identity.” Instead of the Air-Ground Team, what configurations and mission sets will differentiate the Marine Corps as a separate service? How does the USMC distinguish itself in terms of roles and missions? Previously, our hallmarks had been teamwork, esprit de corps, combined arms, deep integration of ground, logistics and aviation to project power more rapidly than any other force on the planet… Now what? What will our role be in a world of unmanned systems, hyper-sonic missiles and AI-enabled integrated air defenses (IADs)? What does the future of combined arms look like? Is there an AI-enabled, multi-domain C2 model that can successfully merge distributed kill webs of aviation, fires, and information and, still not be held hostage to the connectivity challenges of a DDIL environment? Can the Marine Corps rapidly deploy with such a C2 capability? Will we be able to count on space-based systems to survive long enough to deliver support to small, highly-networked combined-arms infantry teams that infiltrate and operate below the level of surveillance sensor granularity? If not, what then, will separate us from the Army? or Special Forces?
Summary
Much like the change that caused it, Force Design was necessary and inevitable. While you may not agree with how it has unfolded so far (especially given the impacts of its priorities, timing, and effects on current mission preparedness), advancements in technology have fundamentally changed our operating environment.
MPSR has increased the threat to traditional power projection forces and conveyances,
The range (and accuracy) of MPSR ballistic missiles has outstripped even embarked aviation,
Unmanned systems (both air and sea) will eventually outnumber and replace manned platforms,
The MAGTF Air-Ground Team will change but the relationship between “boots on the ground” and supporting arms (rockets, missiles, kinetic, cyber, OIE and multi-spectral) must be even more integrated, and allow for faster decisionmaking than our adversaries,
The roles and missions of the Marine Corps must always include rapid response, expeditionary operations that deter adversaries, buy decision space (time to decide and act), and enable follow-on forces.
The nature of combined arms and the close integration of aviation, fires, information and maneuver are evolving as rapidly as the increasing number of floating-point operations being performed on computer chips each year. It is exponential. As such, the slow-moving tectonic plates of funding sources, advocacy turf wars and traditional stovepipes must give way to innovation that mirrors the boldness of our amphibious doctrine of the pre-WWII years.
What hasn’t changed is the mission of the Marine Corps. Although we may not arrive to the fight in the same amphibs as we are familiar with, and although we probably won’t be organized like we have been for the last 50 years, our mandate is the same: Be the Nation’s 911 Force-in-Readiness, able to perform expeditionary mission sets to win battles, deter aggression, buy time and gain access. How that is done, is up to us. As the threat shifts, aviation evolves, and the nature of power projection changes, we too must change. Let’s agree on the fact that change is inevitable. Instead of criticizing, let’s work together to figure out what our Nation requires of us, then– FIND SOLUTIONS that enable us to accomplish our assigned missions- both in the reality of NOW as well as the rapidly approaching FUTURE. As Marines, we must continue to innovate and overcome or risk becoming irrelevant.
Pertinent Questions for Force Design Considerations
Are the divestitures in force structure sufficient to acquire the necessary ships, sensors, weapons, and C2 gear to enable EABO? Is the NSM/NMESIS the right weapon for MLR Sea Control? Range?
What if the Navy doesn’t build a LAW-like capability in time to deter China? How do we get to the fight? Will we be able to deter near-peer competitors? Was all of this for naught?
What demonstrated capabilities will DETER near-peer adversaries? Will the MLR have the resources to deter adversaries outside of the South China Sea? Other locations?
What risk does the Marine Corps take in anticipated conventional operations by not having the force structure already divested? Can we still be the 911 Force-in-Readiness or have the cuts been too deep? How long before this “new MPSR operating environment” becomes the norm?
How do we mitigate shortfalls in traditional firepower and structure, while waiting for MPSR to proliferate? More loitering munitions, more anti-armor capability? More UAS/UCAV?
Do events in Ukraine validate either perspective or are there mitigating circumstances?
How quickly will MPSR capabilities be acquired by less-than-peer states and organizations?
Will current USN ship defenses be able to defeat MPSR weapons such as- hypersonic weapons, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, etc.? …in what numbers?
If not, how will Power Projection forces be able to get close enough to deliver enough forces (mass) to project power (troops, equipment, sustainment)?
If not, what is the smallest ship/unit footprint (size, signature) that could enter an MPSR WEZ and be reasonably expected to survive/succeed?
Can power projection be done by infiltration with highly networked infantry with access to long range weapons and sensors?
Will LEO satellites be vulnerable to ASAT? Other Satellites? Laser dazzling? Space debris?
Will forward deployed bases/units/equipment be vulnerable? Even if hardened?
How deep must an adversary’s long-range weapon magazines be to overwhelm strike group defenses?
How long before MPSR weapons are accessible to non-state actors (terrorists) and less-than-peer state actors? What about UCAV and loitering munitions (already happened)?
At what point will USN ships judge the risk as acceptable to penetrate MPSR WEZs to off-load Power Projection forces?
Will manned (or even MUM-T) aviation have the range to penetrate land-based long range air defenses? If not, will UAS? Will sea-based ballistic missiles or loitering munitions (forms of UAS) overtake aviation as platform of choice in initial stages of Power Projection missions?
Are current UAS capabilities (range, sensors, comms, endurance) sufficient to screen, scout, and conduct Sea Control, Sea Denial missions apart from the CSG/ESG/MOC (range, connectivity, sensor packages, etc.)? How will EMS (EW/EA) operations affect UAS/UxS? C2?
How will we counter a significant integrated offensive air, missile, rocket, artillery and UAS threat?
Which technology will progress more rapidly (or dominate) for the near future? FINDER and SHOOTER? Will HIDER and DEFENDER catch up and return us to familiar scenarios or will technological advances (DEW, Hypersonic, UxS) keep SHOOTERS with the advantage?
With so much debate and argument over the Corps’ ongoing modernization efforts, the Gazette provides the following resources so readers and members of the MCA can quickly access the primary source documents and commentary published in multiple journals. Read, research, reflect, reach your own conclusions and join the discussion.
The source documents for your reference can be found below.
Major Rafiel Warfield, USMC, has practiced law in the U.S. military for over a decade and is currently the Deputy Chief of Operational Law for U.S. Forces-Korea. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and not endorsed by the Department of Defense.
Although uncomfortable to consider, the National Sexual Violence Resource Center estimates that between 2-10% of all sexual assaults reported nationally are determined to be false; the generally accepted average hovers around 7%.[1] Many legal advisors and DoD criminal investigation agents would argue that, given the close nature and unique environment of the military, the estimate is too low. Nevertheless, using that percentage and considering that in FY20 the DoD investigated 7,816 sexual assault allegations,[2] anywhere from 156 to 782 service members were falsely accused of sexual assault last year. Adding context to that number, last year there were 415 court-martial actions completed in sexual assault cases within the DoD; of those 415 cases, 90 were dismissed and another 99 resulted in acquittals.[3] There is a direct correlation between those statistics.
While the spotlight is on the department for its actions in Afghanistan, the DoD is also considering a policy which would as a consequence, increase the number of false sexual assault accusations. As part of the “Safe-to-Report” policy required by Congress, the proposed action would absolve a member, who files an allegation of sexual assault, from any collateral misconduct.[4]
Collateral misconduct is defined under federal regulation as “victim misconduct that might be in time, place, or circumstance associated with the victim’s sexual assault incident.”[5] Within the services minor infractions such as orders violations, underage drinking, fraternization, adultery, single time drug use, false official statements, drunken disorderly conduct, and others, are fairly common and often, the subject of collateral misconduct.[6] While seemingly insignificant, disciplinary action for any of the aforementioned infractions, regardless of officer or enlisted status, can effectively end a military career and result in the forfeit of thousands of dollars’ worth of bonuses, severance pay and retirement eligibility. Moreover, as the U.S. scales back its world-wide operational presence, retention, promotion and re-enlistment will become more competitive; the slightest disciplinary infraction could mean the difference between staying in or being told to leave. In short, avoiding disciplinary action for these minor crimes is in the best interest of any service member — an incentive to find a way to minimize or eliminate adjudication of misconduct.
In many instances, even when the misconduct of the complainant is not alleged to be directly associated with the sexual assault claim, the assault allegation is still cited as justification to not pursue further disciplinary action. For example, a Marine is charged with being drunk and disorderly last weekend but those charges are dropped due to the Marine alleging that they were sexually assaulted months prior – even though the assault is just now being reported in the aftermath of last weekend’s debauchery.
Whether it is retribution against another member (regardless of the outcome of the investigation, damaging administrative and procedural actions will be taken against the accused) or an attempt to avoid personal disciplinary action (regardless of the outcome of the investigation, my collateral misconduct will not be pursued), hundreds of false allegations of sexual assault in the military are made every year. While intended to address the perceived “chilling effect” on reporting, as this author can personally attest, mandating that collateral misconduct not be adjudicated within the DoD will create an incentive to fabricate a claim.
Due to the difference in reporting amongst the services, the total number of complainants in the DoD who are associated with collateral misconduct is unknown.[7] However, most judge advocates and legal advisors can attest that a significant number of sexual assault investigations involve some form of collateral misconduct on the part of the complainant. As it is nearly impossible to find a commander willing to pursue action against a member for making a false accusation (UCMJ violation of Article 92, False Official Statement), fictitious claims of sexual assault connected to collateral misconduct will continue to go unchecked.
However, that is not the only consequence of this policy. A change of this nature will subsequently ensure that the credibility and sincerity of a complainant, is further scrutinized during a criminal or administrative proceeding.
At trial, the quickest way for a defense counsel to create reasonable doubt is to establish a motive for the complainant to fabricate — “the witness is lying because of X.” Even in those instances where a legitimate allegation is being made, doubt can still be created when the complainant has been systematically absolved of misconduct. Using the previous example – the Marine is lying because they were accused of being drunk and disorderly but, now that they’ve made a claim of sexual assault, they no longer face punishment for that infraction. Subsequently, justice for legitimate cases of sexual assault will be eluded, due to a perceived motive to fabricate.
While it may sound like a good idea, the department must face the harsh realities of the second and third order effects of this proposed policy. Not allowing the adjudication of collateral misconduct creates a motive to falsify a claim of sexual assault and subsequently, breeds a new class of victims; those wrongfully accused who have to endure the grueling and seemingly interminable administrative effects of the military justice system. Investigatory agencies will continue to be backlogged with inflated caseloads created by an influx of false claims; increasing the investigation and adjudication timeline. Disciplinary proceedings will be impacted by complainants who are made to appear to have a motive to lie; creating an additional barrier to a finding of guilt.
Plainly stated, considering the unique environment of the U.S. military, a “get out of jail free” card for alleging a sexual assault is enough of a reason to falsify a claim or during an adjudication proceeding, find reasonable doubt in the complainant’s story. The department should continue to allow collateral misconduct to be adjudicated – removing the incentive to make a false claim. The misconduct should be handled prior to adjudication of the sexual assault allegation – removing the issue of motive to fabricate, on this basis, altogether.
Notes
[1] National Sexual Violence Resource Center. Statistics about Sexual Violence (2015). Found at https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_media-packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf. Accessed on 2 August 2021.
[2] Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (2020). Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 2020. Appendix C, metric 11.
[3] Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (2020). Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 2020. Appendix C, non-metrics 2.
[4] Section 539A of the NDAA for FY21. See also, Independent Review Commission. “Hard Truths and the Duty to Change: Recommendations from the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the military.” (2021)
[6] The Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces. “Letter to Secretary of Defense, Honorable Mark T. Esper dated 16 September 2019.
[7] The Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces. “Letter to Secretary of Defense, Honorable Mark T. Esper dated 16 September 2019.
Sexual Assault remains one of the most serious behavioral problems throughout the armed forces. In the Corps these offenses undermine good order and discipline and destroy the trust and cohesiveness that are crucial to building combat effectiveness. The severity of the problem has prompted the Corps to undertake significant actions in response and for the last decade authors from across the force have been contributing their observations and recommendations in the Gazette:
The problem remains and so in response to recent Congressional direction, the Department of Defense is considering implementation of a new policy known as the “Safe-to-Report” policy. While this policy may help solve one aspect of the problem it may also create new related problems. Read more detail and share your comments below.
I received an e-mail several months ago from a Marine, and I was both amused and appalled to find this notice appended to the bottom of the signature block:
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Of the many ridiculous directions the Marine Corps has taken over the last several decades, this latest obsession with infusing lawyers into every single one of our processes is almost certainly the worst. The upper reaches of the Marine Corps have taken to clinging to lawyers as if they were some kind of talisman or human flak jacket to protect them from all possible risk. Tbe military profession is by definition an immersion into risk. The whole existence of the Marine Corps is one of risking its members to warfare in support of their country. So how is it that our leaders in the Marine Corps and throughout the DoD have become so attached to their lawyers? We see it every day from the wordy statements at the bottom of emails to the overly detailed, restrictive, and unrealistic rules of engagement (ROE) to the hilariously inadequate reflective belts everyone has to wear while running. We have to attend endless sessions of motorcycle safety, equal opportunity, sexual harassment, suicide prevention, and alcohol and drug abuse prevention lectures, and years are added to the development of equipment until all of the vaguest possibilities of a mishap are developed out of them by various safety boards. You can’t schedule any kind of training event without first carefully composing comprehensive lists of all of the potential untoward events that could conceivably happen and then writing all of the remedies you can think of for all of them. We have armored our troops to the point that they can barely waddle around on patrol in che terrific heat because everyone in the chain of command is terrified that someone may get shot. We are the world’s premier fighting force that is afraid of doing anything that might get us into trouble!
Where and when did this insidious form of cowardice crop up? In my opinion it started when Marine leaders started to get more and more involved in the lucrative “careers after careers” – memberships on boards of directors, memberships with various think tanks, presidencies and vice presidencies for big companies, shilling for various products, and paid speaking engagements. These careers provide big money for those Marine leaders who make it to the top and don’t get in any trouble. It also became less likely that anyone would threaten to resign his career to avert some bad decision or ruinous policy. Everybody just learned instead to play it smart and keep quiet.
We also agreed to submit our officers to the command selection board process. That seemed innocent enough at first, but it has had major ramifications for the whole character of Marine Corps leadership. In the past, the division or wing commanding general chose who would be his regiment/ group and battalion/squadron commanders and if somebody wasn’t picked for a command, then it was just the “luck of the draw” and nobody’s career got hurt. Now we have the selected and the nonselected, the slated and the unslated, and the unspoken truth is that an officers career is at a dead end if he isn’t one of the chosen few. What kind of officer does that breed? The bold and innovative type or the kind that doesn’t make waves? Don’t think for a second that all of our young officers aren’t aware of the need for discretion and risk avoidance to make it past this large hurdle. How did we get the great leaders we had in the past without the help of the command selection board? Let’s put it this way. If you have an officer who isn’t fully capable of command, then he shouldn’t be wearing the rank insignia. We don’t need a command selection board; we need to weed out nonperformers.
Risk is the stock in trade of the Marine leader; we exist for risk. Everyone in command knows that they are responsible for everything that goes right and everything that goes wrong with their commands. We cannot sign away our responsibilities, we cannot lecture away our responsibilities, and we cannot have lawyers and boards accept our responsibilities for us. Marine leaders should know all by themselves what they need to do and then do it, without hoping that some lawyer will save them from it all with a well-composed legal statement. We have one the finest and most experienced generations of young combat Marines that we have ever had, and we need leaders who can lead them capably and fully without worrying whether a decision may risk their future portfolios.
We have a couple of generations of leaders who not only avoid risk, some are even dragging down the future effectiveness of the Marine Corps by always looking for “how things can’t be done” rather than looking for ways to make things happen. We have large parts of our Marine Corps staffs with the deserved reputation of blocking any new ideas because those ideas don’t follow their hardened patterns of preferences.
Get those silly legal statements out of your e-mails, break your shackles, and lead! Restore the innovation and risk-taking that has made the Marine Corps so disproportionately successful for more than two centuries. Get the lawyers out of your decisions and careerism out of the Corps before it’s too late.
Can the Marine Corps bridge the outlier and overachiever gap?
by Majs Steven Karsten & Robert Boudreau, USMCR, & Capt Joel Wellendorf, USMCR
“The only thing I ever learned from running cadence is that napalm sticks to kids.”1
Humor aside, running cadence has an important place İn Marine Corps training amongst many other treasured traditions. For example, every Marine, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS), takes pride İn mastering basic combat skills. The institutional values of honor, courage, and commitment are embodied by the Marine Corps and reflected İn both the individual Marine and the organization as a whole. Nevertheless, adherence to other elements of organizational culture, such as rigid adherence to prescriptive checklists, becomes the primary focus for personnel evaluations, to the detriment of both the individual career progression and the Corps’ ability to retain many of our best and brightest.
Collective experience suggests that selection for promotion, command, and assignment to coveted billets is generally reserved for the most proficient box checkers in the fleet: “Was he a company commander,” “What was his billet,” “How did he score on his PFT and CFT,” and “How well did he perform at resident school?” This check-the-box mentality has determined the careers of most Marines.2 The problem İs that this process leaves minimal room for the true innovators-call them intellects or insurrectionists-to push the boundaries of doctrine and to identify new areas for development, growth, and innovation to defeat and enemy that is constantly evolving and adapting.3 The purpose of innovation-that it is new, something outside the norm-immediately, although perhaps quite necessarily, places the Marine proponent at odds with the system. The Marine Corps, as an institution, İs not built to handle this type of individual, even though he may hold the greatest promise for the Corps’ future.
In August 2018, Congress passed the latest defense spending bill through which the Services will be afforded substantially greater latitude in effecting officer promotions.4 However, with its current move-up-or-move-out evaluation and promotion system, the Marine Corps’ outside-the-box thinkers are often relegated to only a few tours during which they have the limited capacity to put their visions into practice. In a quote attributed to a former Commandant during a Service Academy graduation speech, it was said that military officers’ careers fall into three categories: those who stick around because they love to serve; those who get out because they have have other career aspirations; and those who desperately hang onto their careers because they have no other options. These authors suggest a fourth category: those who resign, or reach the end of active service (EAS),5 because they are disappointed to find that their efforts to improve their profession through new thought processes, methods, and techniques are at odds with a bureaucracy that is unwilling to change or accept those who seek to effect change.
However, the field is ripe for change; our current leadership is no stranger to the concept of innovation as a cultural revolution within the Corps.6 There have been directives in recent promotion precepts where the respective promotion boards consider characteristics of creative thinking and prudent risk-taking in evaluating individual officers.7 The need for innovation İs not just a topic of interest for the Commandant;8 in fact, several Gazette issues include articles that focus on building an innovative and adaptive organization.9 For instance, Joshua Waddell’s article titled, “Innovation: And other things that brief so well,” espoused major structural reforms in force development.10 The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) staff recently published a reflective piece discussing the requirements for developing the Marine Corps’ future as an “exponential organization.”11 The first item addressed by the MCWL is innovation:
[T]he application of innovation must be incentivized. Evaluation criteria must be provided to identify innovative ideas among our Marines. Such efforts should be included as a future fitness report performance category.12
When examining innovators as individuals, research conducted by social scientists indicates that they do not fit the typical profile of Marines.13 In oft-cited research, mid- to senior-level military officers were found to fall predominantly (78 percent) into four personality categories14 under the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI).15 These types are ISTJ, ESTJ, ENTJ and INTJ. All share the “T” (thinking) and “J” (judgment) preferences and are well known for the individuals’ ability to accomplish tasks, follow the rules, provide purpose and direction, and motivate others.16 The same trend is found İn the business world, with mid- to executive-level management trending heavily toward T (95 percent) and] (87 percent) preferences.17 While all these qualities are needed for good leadership, they have some common pitfalls. With a strong T preference, the individual holds objective criteria in higher esteem than personal judgments; conversely, this type of individual may have less consideration for people, personal needs, and may often fail to consider extenuating circumstances. An individual with a strong J preference may tend to be more planned and rigid. For an organization to be innovative, these necessary personality strengths are to implement ideas and provide structure and guidance.
But, what about the thought leaders?18 The underlying issue İs that idea generation and creativity fundamentally rely on individuals-and not culture- to be fostered to maximum effect. Idea generation and creativity are found most profusely İn a whole other set or personality types, namely ENTP, INTP, INFP, and ENFP, which all share the “N” (intuition) and “P” (perception) preferences.19 Despite the fact that N/P individuals are brimming with ideas and creativity, some negative aspect are that they may lack the direction and staying power to follow through with their ideas. They may often lose momentum during the shift from creative conception to implementation. Additionally once their main ideas are birthed and their inspiration has waned, they may lack the motivation to return and fill in the gaps.20 These individuals also tend to forgo extensive planning beforehand (something the military holds in high esteem, especially in the officer ranks). The failure or lack of motivation amongst N/P personality type to implement new ideas through to completion may significantly hurt their careers as military officers under the current promotion/reward structure.
Where many Marines on the MBTI spectrum fit the “inspector” profile, heavy on order and discipline and light on the gray areas, innovators as “inventors” are more likely to disrupt the status quo. The MCWL’s proposal, to make innovativeness an evaluation criteria on fitness reports, may actually counteract its stated purpose by making it another checklist item. If the MCWL’s proposal İs to carry real weight, this fitness report category must be reserved specifically for those who do not fall into the other categories but are still extremely valuable to the Corps because of their fresh perspective.21 For an example of how the fitness report changes could be reduced to tangible criteria, the Corps need look no further than within: as part of its better buying power initiative updates, the DOD laid out specific guidelines for evaluating acquisition managers’ effectiveness at incentivizing innovation.22 The intention of this article is not to reiterate previously written themes of using personality assessments to change recruiting methods or to fit officers to particular MOSs; rather, it is to acknowledge that Marine officers fall along a spectrum of personality types. Thus, those who show themselves to be innovators should be given time and space to function as change agents within the Corps.
Besides fitness report changes, the MCWL proposed “the development of measures of competence beyond fitness reports” and potentially creating “a 360-degree evaluation rather than the current performance evaluation process,” as well as “[pushing] innovation authority, wherever possible, down to the unit: battalions, squadrons, and perhaps lower levels.”23 There are two proposals that will provide viable options to fulfill the MCWL’s objectives. One is to create a distinct career path for innovators. The other is to turn the Commandant’s individual-focused innovation initiatives into more robust, collaborative environments for innovators.
The Marine Corps needs to create a career path for innovators who want to hone their craft even though they may not particularly be interested in the traditional management-track promotion schedule. Currently, there are a couple possibilities for Marines to focus on developing their MOSs, at a tactical level, for a full career-but this is more by chance than design. A Marine could enlist, and after a few years, take the mustang/warrant officer route; if the timing works out, the Marine may retire as a captain or CW03 before the system forces him either to conform or to move on. Another way is to develop MOS expertise for around a decade, resist the pressure to fulfill a “B” billet, and then become a school instructor where new ideas may be instilled İn the next generations of Marines. For most new officers, however, the orders and promotion clock will not allow this sort of homesteading within their micro-profession of arms to develop as innovative warfighters.
Prior to the NDAA 2019 amendments, officers above the grade of 0-4 could continue on active duty past the statutory retirement dates, under certain conditions; the new law lowers the grade to officers above 0-2.24 Additionally, NDAA 2019 permits the military departments to designate alternative competitive categories for promotion, as well as to increase the number of opportunities for promotion consideration for those competitive categories.25 There is fear that the NDAA 2019 changes will encourage the Services to designate certain trendy MOSs as alternative competitive categories. For example, this means that all cyber warriors will now be cubbyholed into a separate promotion category; however, the grunts, communicators, and pilots will all have to remain in the traditional structure. Under our proposal, new competitive categories should be based on an individual officer’s innovation potential, rather than the particular specialty they hold. One means of creating this type of innovator category will be to create a single additional MOS (AMOS) for innovators (such as hackers, drone pilots or tank commanders), through which they could continue to promote for pay purposes (perhaps to a lower terminal rank or at a more tempered pace than their counterparts), but remain in company-or-below levels of command. In doing so, the Corps will leverage these officers’ technical expertise while permitting them to remain as thought leaders within the Corps. This will further allow innovators to focus from the ground up, rather than force them to become institutionalized and to feed into the top-down planning and development cycle.
Next, the Marine Corps needs to transform the current innovation initiatives, such as the Commandant’s Innovation Challenges, into a much more robust program. The Goldwater-Nİchols Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements, mandated by statute,26 are important for development of junior and senior officers; however, their usefulness is somewhat diminished at the tactical levels. For those innovative officers who are not focused on 40-year careers, one example will be for the Marine Corps to allow for a certain percentage to participate İn a functional think tank (whether “resident” or “distant”) for an equivalent period of time.27 A second way will be for the monitor community to identify those officers with a strong penchant for innovation then move those officers to units destined to be experimental forces in future phases of MCWL experimental exercises, such as Sea Dragon 2025.28 Such an action will allow highly technically proficient, likeminded leaders to collaborate İn a dynamic environment at the forefront of Marine Corps innovation. Over a 20-year career, these alternatives to traditional JPME could provide multiple opportunities for innovators to reconvene and consider approaches to old and new problems.
In sum, the MCWL is correct in identifying a need for rethinking the evaluation system for the individual Marine who holds unlimited potential precisely because he questions the belt-fed solutions. The Marine Corps will do well to help the innovators flourish by allowing them to work in a natural state for their creativity while leveraging the cultural shift toward innovation İn the Marine Corps, to see the creative output through to implementation. The two paths outlined above-opening alternative career paths based on individual potential or broadening opportunities for collaboration-may be a way of institutionalizing not just innovation as a concept, but innovators as the Marine Corps’ future.
Notes
Anonymous quote in reference to a popular cadence.
While much of this piece discusses room for improvement in the officer ranks, the same may be said of SNCOs-who may have to execute orders to the drill field or recruiting duty in order to progress.
A 2005 course offered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology discussed three theories of military innovation: (1) development from within; (2) development initiated by civilian leadership intervention; and (3) development spurred by inter-Service competition. See Posen, Barry and Harvey Sapolsky, 17-462 Innovation in Military Organizations, (Online: Fall 2005), Massachusetts Institute of Technology: MIT OpenCourseWare, available at https://ocw.mit.edu; License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA. As is discussed further below, current Marine Corps leadership has focused on generating innovation from within.
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 115-232, 115th Congress, (2018).
These authors focus exclusively on the active component; the “continuum of service” concept proposed by Retired LTG Dennis McCarthy, USA, could be a way of integrating Reservists into the Marine Corps’ innovation program. See LTG Dennis McCarthy, “A Continuum of Service,” Armed Forces Journal (Online: September 2008), available at http://armedforcesjournal.com.
Lance M. Bacon, “Commandant Looks to ‘Disruptive Thinkers’ to Fix Corps’ Problems,” Marine Corps Times, (Online: March 2016), available at https://www.marinecorpstimes. com.
For example, see SECNAV letter of4 August 16. Precept Concerning the Fiscal Year 2018 U.S. Marine Corps Major Promotion Selection Board, Captain Continuation Selection Board, Financial Management Major Promotion Selection Board and Financial Management Captain Continuation Selection Board, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, August 2016)
The Commandant’s Innovation Challenge, now in its third year, was first announced on 14 September 2016 in MARADM1N481/16.
See e.g., Christopher Wood, “Marine Corps Innovation: The Need for a Reawakening,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: November 2015); Kevin Huang, “Flipping the Board on Innovation: From top to bottom, technological to tactical,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: February 2017).
Joshua Waddell, “Innovation: And Other Things that Brief so Well,” Marine Corps Gazette (Quantico, VA; February 2017).
Staff, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, “Is the Marine Corps Ready to Become an Exponential Organization?,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: February 2018).
Staff, MCWL, note 10 supra p. 20.
Much of the research focuses on management-level leaders, and so is officer centered.
Jane M. Moraski, “Leadership: The Personality Factor,” (thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil.
The MBTI, a popular personality assessment tool, categorizes personalities into 16 possible types, organizing four individual attitudes or orientations (Extraversion, Introversion, Judging and Perceiving) across four mental functions (Sensing, Intuition, Thinking and Feeling). See The Myers and Briggs Foundation, “Type Dynamics” webpage, available at http://www. myersbriggs .org.
The Extrovert and Introvert preferences relate to the individual’s focus on the internal or external world; the Sensing and iNtuition categories relate to the individual’s information processing preferences. The Myers and Briggs Foundation, “MBTI Basics,” (Online), available at http://www.myers briggs.org.
Otto Kroeger and Janet M. Thuesen, Type Talk at Work, (New York: Dell Publishing, 2002).
As the venerated Warfighting publication reminds us, differences across the human element require a flexible approach: “No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.” MCDP1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997).
A.J. Drenth, “1 The Creative Life: Insights for INTP, INFP, ENTP, Sc ENFP Types,” Personality Junkie, (Online), available at https:// personalityjunkie.com.
See generally A.J. Drenth, note 17 supra, (Online), available at https://personalityjunkie. com.
A natural risk could be the human tendency to compassionately characterize those who are deficient in other areas as “innovators,” but that risk is inherent in every evaluation where ranking Marines amongst their peers is required.
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum of 9 April 2015, Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0-Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Excellence and Innovation, (Washington, DC: April 2015).
Staff, MCWL, note 10 supra p. 20-21.
NDAA 2019, note 4 supra, Sec. 506.
NDAA 2019, note 4 supra, Sec. 507.
See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2156.
One means would be to increase opportunities to participate in academic or professional fellowships.
