Author: Gazette

Civilian Control and Military Advice: Moral Courage or Insubordination?

The most recent chapters in the nation’s twenty year war in Afghanistan have been intensely frustrating and deeply personal for many Americans, especially veterans and those still wearing the uniform.  Some are pointing to a crisis of leadership at the highest levels of the military establishment—the DOD, the Services and the Geographic Combatant Commands.  Others look back at the experience of strategic defeat and moral failings of senior leadership in Vietnam as analyzed in “Dereliction of Duty” by then Lieutenant Colonel H.R. McMaster.  The coming weeks and months will inevitably be replete with recriminations, studies and analysis, investigation, and testimony all wrapped in today’s partisan politics. 

For today’s military professionals what are the most salient lessons about leadership, duty and the authorities of military command and control in our democracy?  What changes may be required to manage the effects of political expediency on strategic and operational plans?

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Also, be sure to check out these other articles on the topic listed below!

An article on the broader impact of current U.S. military culture on the conduct of irregular wars by Col (Ret) Andrew Milburn originally published in the Small Wars Journal: Losing Small Wars: Why US Military Culture Leads to Defeat

An article by LtCol Brian Kerg originally published in USNI Proceeding speaking directly to the issue of how “resigning in protest” may be treated in the Naval Service: How Active-Duty Officers Should Criticize Policy and Practice

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MCA members, as well as non-members, are welcome to post in their respective comments sections below!

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Non-MCA Member Comments

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MCA Member Comments

Copyright Marine Corps Association Aug 1997

by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret)

DERELICTION OF DUTY: Johnson, McNamara, the joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. By H.R. McMaster. Harper Collins, New York, 1997, 464 pp.,

H .R. McMaster, in his book Dereliction of Duty, has done what other historians might have done, but didn’t. He spent five years reviewing papers of key figures in the Vietnam War, archives of the Kennedy and Johnson Presidential libraries, and tapes of telephone conversations as well as conducting personal interviews with a wide array of participants. His research was thorough and organized.

McMaster’s conclusions are equally impressive. At the outset, he concludes that “The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, DC …”

The truth is the war was lost in all of those places. For sure, we did not fight it right, and the media and the campuses were defeatist almost from the start. But the principal malefactor, by many orders of magnitude, was in the Washington officialdom itself. McMasters is diligent in surfacing factual reality that the civilian leadership in Washington was severely limited by ignorance and blinded by arrogance. And then he proceeds to buttress his conclusions with an abundance of records of meetings, telephone conversations, and official documents.

As McMasters frames it, the out and away leader in the list of the guilty was Lyndon B. Johnson. Obsessed with being reelected, committed to the Great Society, deceitful, preoccupied with consensus, fearful of Russia and China, paranoid of the U.S. military, he could not have been a worse wartime leader.

Johnson’s deceptiveness was monumental. In early 1965, as we slipped slowly into the quagmire of actual combat, he saw, or thought he saw, in a New York Times article evidence of leaks in his own Government that came nearer to telling the truth than his official position. His responsive effort to suppress the truth caused breaks between Johnson, former President Eisenhower, Hubert Humphrey, and Deputy Secretary of State Ball to whom he said, in a climax of paranoia, that he would thenceforward make all decisions by himself and “get one man alone in a room and ban all others.”

Johnson never articulated a national policy regarding the Vietnam War. The nearest he ever came to being specific was frequent injunctions to the military to “kill more Viet Cong.” At the same time he sought to conceal offensive operations from the American public and the Congress. McMaster, in a simple summary, describes Johnson’s behavior as “dependent on lies and obfuscation.” Deceptive press releases and public statements by the President himself sought to conceal the steady increase in deployed U.S. troops, deceptions that came ultimately to be exposed by growing casualty lists.

To the end Johnson was motivated by two objectives, neither of which related to victory-politics (protection of his legislative program) and overpowering fear of China and the Soviets. There could not have been a less apt Commander-in-Chief.

Johnson’s substitution of deception for reality would not have been possible without continuing support of his position by the President’s subordinates. McMaster is uninhibited in his description of duplicity by Defense Secretary McNamara and his array of arrogant Ivy League assistants, who were obsessed with quantification and who considered communication rather than victory the purpose of our military action. McNamara did not trust or believe in the Joint Chiefs and, as McMaster puts it, “When the Chiefs’ advice was not consistent with his own, McNamara lied in meetings of the National Security Council about the Chiefs’ views.”

McMasters skewers McNamara with the precise indictment that the Secretary “viewed the war as another business management problem that would ultimately succumb to his reasoned judgment.” He was supported by a group of like-minded men in Defense and State-William and McGeorge Bundy, John McNaughton, Roger Hilsman, Michael Forrestal, Dean Rusk, and Averill Harriman-who all mistrusted the military and were quite willing to proceed, as McMasters says:

…on the basis that they had the prescience to predict with great precision what amount of force applied in Vietnam would achieve the results they desired, and that they could control the force with great precision from halfway around the world.

These were men of limited competence for the task at hand. In his first book on Vietnam David Halberstam characterized them as “the best and the brightest.” They turned out to be neither one.

The question may arise at this point “Was everyone involved stupid, arrogant, or both?” No. Not at all. However, with few exceptions, those who saw the war through a clearer lens were so far down the pecking order that their views had no resonance. An example of one individual whose stature was of sufficient weight to have an effect was John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence. He was determined that the very limited bombing of North Vietnam was fruitless, that to be effective it needed to be multiplied many fold and concentrated on the most productive targets. He addressed a strong memorandum to McNamara urging powerful action, air and ground, declaring that without a decisive expansion in the nature and scope of the war, the United States would incur “an ever increasing commitment of U.S. personnel without materially improving the chance of victory.” His proposal, sound in retrospect, got no consideration because the President was fearful that the action would alienate the constituencies on which his Great Society depended. McCone resigned in frustration.

One area where McMaster’s analysis is less than perfect has to do with the Joint Chiefs of Staff UCS). He appears to have been conditioned philosophically against the basic JCS concept and is critical of the dissonant individual views of the Chiefs on the war. Actually, that dissonance, properly managed, is an immense source of strength, but the President and his Defense Secretary were not able-or willing-to take on the task of managing it. They preferred to criticize the Chiefs for inaction and to cut them out of the information loop.

Never, from the very beginning, did Lyndon Johnson ever sit the JCS down and say, “Gentlemen, you have as much access to the facts as I have. My aim, plainly put, is to bring this war to an early and favorable end from the viewpoint of the United States. I give you one week to bring me a single comprehensive proposal representing your corporate view as to how to achieve that aim. Tell me what you need, and exactly how you propose to use it. And I do not want any splits or qualifications.”

It never happened because the President was fearful that such a straightforward approach might compromise his political aims. And the United States suffered mightily as a result.

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Copyright Marine Corps Association Nov 1997

by LtCol F.G. Hoffman, USMCR

I am writing to add some comments to LtGen Victor H. Krulak’s review of Maj McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty. While I feel the book’s author made a solid scholarly attempt at discerning the root problems that led to the debacle in Vietnam, both his effort and the review overshoot a few targets.

Gen Krulak’s review accurately captured the emphasis placed by McMaster on the lies and distortions of President Johnson and his irrepressibly arrogant, technophile Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara. Military literature, however, is replete with the opprobrium heaped on Mr. McNamara for his many sins. This scorn has only been reinforced by McNamara’s pathetic apologia, In Retrospect.

What is unique and courageous about McMaster’s effort is his indictment of the military leadership of this era as well. Ultimately, their performance or lack thereof contributed to the debacle as well. Thus, some share of the blame has to be appropriated to them as well. As McMaster argues-convincingly in my view-it was their inability to confront the civilian leadership to force a decision on a clear set of objectives, priorities, and military strategy that led to the long drawn out commitment with little real hope for success. In this they failed the President, they failed the Congress, and eventually they failed in their professional responsibility to the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen who served in Vietnam. This abdication of responsibility to the American people contributed to the long list of names on the black wall in Washington, DC, as well.

Only Marine Commandant Greene comes off well in this book. Gen Wheeler, serving as JCS Chairman, is depicted as a complete sycophant who willfully withheld information from his fellow members to support the President’s agenda. The author prefers to paint with a wide brush and indicts the whole sitting Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his final chapter, appropriately entitled “Five Silent Men,” he does not shy away from blaming Service rivalries and parochialism of the Service Chiefs for this failure of the Joint Chiefs:

Although differing perspectives were understandable given the Chiefs’ long experience in their own services and their need to protect the interests of their services, the president’s principal military advisers were obligated by law to render their best advice. The Chiefs failure to do so, and their willingness to present single-service remedies to a complex military problem, prevented them from developing a comprehensive estimate of the situation or from thinking effectively about strategy.

It is in this final indictment that the author oversteps his brief and his evidence. For as he previously covered in earlier sections, Gen Greene had argued strenuously, even with LBJ personally, against Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” tactics and attrition strategy. While he offered the Marine Corps’ preferred enclave strategy and pacification programs, he also argued for additional strategic bombing targets and the mining of Haiphong. None of these can be judiciously labeled as “single-service remedies.”

Gen Krulak’s review was superb, but it does not address the unique element of what has to be considered a major breakthrough in writing about the Vietnam war-namely, the U.S. military cannot continue to hide behind LBJ and his collection of intellectually dishonest aides.

In concluding his review Gen Krulak was properly critical of McMaster’s interpretation of the dissonant views held by the Chiefs. Such views, properly managed, should be considered a source of strength, had LBJ been able to see them as such. However, he was afraid that their opinions would clash with his own political programs and domestic policies, and he chose instead to isolate and ignore them. This mischaracterization, repeated by McMaster, has led to fundamental misunderstandings about how the Joint Chiefs of Staff should operate and contributed to the passing of Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Maj McMaster’s evidence strongly suggests that a sitting JCS chairman who supported the President blindly contributed greatly to the deficient decisionmaking about Vietnam, and that such action, now clearly facilitated by GoldwaterNichols, can produce greater sins than the sort engendered by Service rivalries. This strong evidence undercuts the rationale presented by defense reformers for Goldwater-Nichols.

However, Gen Krulak goes on to suggest that LBJ never sat the JCS down and told them to “bring me a single comprehensive proposal representing your corporate view” without splits or qualifications on how to achieve U.S. political aims in Vietnam. This appears to contradict the reviewer’s own well-substantiated requirement for a JCS that can offer diverse views and alternative strategies. Furthermore, one can argue as to whether the requirement to put together a single corporate view had to be levied explicitly by the President. Such a requirement would appear to have been a moral imperative since 1962, and only supports McMaster’s fundamental thesis that the dereliction of duty that occurred during the Johnson Administration went well beyond the White House itself.

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Copyright Marine Corps Association Jan 2010

A tough decision is pending

by LtCol Michael D. Grice

In the dynamic and free society that is the United States of America, change is constant. This is particularly true within the American military where, as a result of two protracted conflicts, warfighting doctrine has fundamentally shifted away from full-scale war predicated on fighting a peer competitor to the prosecution of counted insurgent campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia. In addition to transforming doctrine, this refocusing of combat operations away from the high end of the kinetic spectrum has given rise to many novel concepts and innovative ideas. Newly designed weapons beget refinements in tactics, techniques, and procedures, and innovative technologies evolve at a rate that the Marines who preceded us would have found unnerving, if not inconceivable. These types of changes are to be expected, however, as being parr and parcel to life in the fast-moving Marine Corps of the 21st century.

What about change that isn’t expected? Change, for example, that has nothing to do with the enemy that we currently fight or with our doctrine, weapons, and technology? Change that originates from the free society that all Marines are sworn to protect and defend? What about change that we, as leaders, may have to implemenr, regardless of our personal dispositions, backgrounds, or beliefs?

The change in question is one being discussed throughout American society. It addresses the right of persons to serve in the military without the fetters that currently exist in law and within the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and it may very soon directly affect the United States Marine Corps. It is being debated right now, at this very hour, on this very day. It is, of course, the proposed integration of openly gay men and women into the U.S. military.

Background

In 1993 President Bill Clinton signed into law the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding homosexual conduct in the Armed Services. At the time there was a tremendous hue and cry about how such a change would bring about the destruction of the Armed Forces. Similar claims were made in 1975 when President Gerald Ford signed the Defense Authorization Bill of 1976 and allowed women to enter West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy. That controversy was preceded by yet another immensely contentious and divisive Presidential act – Harry S. Truman’s Executive Order 9981, which in 1948 directed equal treatment and opportunity for Black servicemen and resulted in the racial integration of the Armed Forces. All three of these extraordinary events had tremendous effects on the military and were widely debated and decried by the very martial institutions that had to accept them.

Despite the often vociferous and obstinate determination within the military to block these changes, they were made. The Armed Forces were racially integrated, women entered the Service academies, and the don’t ask, don’t tell policy became law. These events, driven by society and enacted by the executive and legislative branches of government, placed the military in the position of implementing social policy. More importandy to those in uniform, however, was that the policy put leaders at all levels on the horns of a personal dilemma: how can one reconcile personal beliefs that are inconsistent with the laws and regulations that govern military service?

Before a decision is made, Marines are free to discuss the issue. Passionate debate within the Marine Corps over the issue of homosexuality is nor unprecedented. In the early 1990s, when the debate surrounding don’t ask, don’t tell was raging, Marines of all ranks and backgrounds voiced their opinions in a variety of forums. Letters and articles from officers and enlisted leaders inundated the Marine Corps Gazette in 1992 and 1993, one of which went so far as to call for the dissolution of the Marine Corps should the policy allowing homosexuals to serve be passed.¹ Other opinions were presented as well. Marines professed viewpoints that ranged from ambivalence on the subject of sexual orientation to their avowal that their love for the Marine Corps was more important to them than the issue at hand, and that should such a law be passed they would indeed follow it. Others, who found the prospect of serving with gays loathsome, resigned their commissions and left the Armed Forces.² How each Marine dealt with the policy was an intensely personal matter, and the debate today is heating up and will rise to levels that are just as intense as they were nearly two decades ago.

The Leader’s Dilemma

Every Marine, officer and enlisted, swears an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to obey the orders of the President and of the officers appointed over them. By the constitutional design of the American Federal Government, the U.S. military is subordinate to the elected civil authority that constitutes its executive and legislative branches. The rule of law and the organization of the government very clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the military, and they clearly articulate that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are duty bound to follow the laws, orders, and directives promulgated by duly elected civil authorities.

There isn’t any gray area that surrounds the duties and responsibilities of military leaders in this regard. If a directive is issued that repeals don’t ask, don’t tell, then it is the duty of every member of the military to comply with that directive. Compliance is not an area for subjective interpretation. So, what can a leader do? What is an ethical response that a leader can present in this situation?

Leaders can address and debate the issue until it becomes law, whereupon the opportunity for debate is closed. Debate must always be tempered with the professionalism expected of Marine leaders, commissioned or not. If leaders are not careful with their words and judicious with their opinions they may find themselves painted into a corner from which there may be no exit; for example, if a leader announces that “there won’t be any homosexuals in my unit,” then that leader has made a statement that may well be overruled should the law be repealed. What, then, can the leader do? He has let it be known that homosexuals are not going to be accepted, and such a declaration from a leader carries with it the same weight as any other statement that the leader has made. Unfortunately, it undercuts the credibility of the leader and places him in a position where he must recant; however, such a retrenchment will be greeted with skepticism. Skepticism in a Marine’s leaders is devastating to the concept of good order and discipline and can result in myriad negative consequences – all of which are unacceptable. In short, intelligent and honest debate is a critical part of being a professional leader of Marines; prejudicial and bombastic debate is not.

Should the decision to repeal don’t ask, don’t tell be made, then every Marine must focus inwardly to determine whether or not he can continue to lead and serve in light of what for many is a deeply moral dilemma. If a leader cannot subordinate his personal beliefs to such an extent that he can perform his duties, then it becomes necessary for that leader to resign.

Although resignation may seem drastic, the requirement is based on another part of the oath that we all have sworn, which requires that juniors render obethence to the officers appointed over them. This enormously important component of military service is the reason why leaders cannot place their personal feelings or morality above the rules, regulations, or laws that govern military service. Leaders do not have the luxury to deviate from the law because they disagree with it. Were that the case then each leader would be able to enforce his own private agenda on his subordinates. Such an idea shatters the foundation of good order and discipline on which the entire concept of military leadership is based. To empower each and every leader with the ability to choose which orders and directives he will follow and enforce removes the hard earned traditional mantle of professionalism and replaces it with a void filled with chaos.

The Contemporary Debate

With the ushering in of a new administration, the issue of homosexuals serving openly in the Armed Forces has again become preeminent. The possibility that the don’t ask, don’t tell legislation could be repealed is a real one, and with that possibility the debate about gays and the military has resurfaced with a vengeance. The discussion places Marine leaders on the horns of a personal dilemma: how would such a decision change their abilities to serve and lead their fellow Marines? Is it a moral conflict that could drive them from their military service, or is it a nonissue? Every Marine will have to determine what such a change means to him, because Marines, as with all military professionals, are duty bound to follow the orders of the President and the laws enacted by Congress. Every leader must decide how to reconcile his personal beliefs with the duty he is expected to perform. What will you do should the decision be made?

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Notes

1. Then-Maj Arthur J. Corbett’s article, “Disband the Marine Corps,” was published in the January 1993 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. The article was headed by the following aphorism: “It would be better to disband the Corps than see it dishonored and its virtues and values destroyed.”
2. Among the most notable Marines to resign was Maj Charles Johnson, who as a captain was lionized for stopping a platoon of Israeli tanks in Lebanon with only his .45 automatic.

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Copyright Marine Corps Association Aug 2011

What is its value?

by LtCoI J.P. Hesford, Jr., USMC(Ret)

As an organization that lives by the credo, “Always Faithful,” the inclusion of loyalty as 1 of the 14 Marine Corps leadership traits seems only natural. Faithfulness and loyalty, though modestly distinct from one another in a semantic sense, both represent a fundamental idea of what it means to be a Marine. Indeed, it is difficult to find a formal definition of either term that does not reference the other. Hence loyalty, as a leadership trait, is described in Marine Corps doctrine as “[t]he quality of faithfulness to country, the Corps, to one’s seniors, subordinates and peers.”¹ That both of these terms carry exclusively positive connotations is largely unquestioned.

Yet, there is room to examine the value the Marine Corps places on loyalty. In an era when the strategic corporal thrives, when Marines of every rank are admonished to be continuous students of the profession of arms, when intellectual and mental agility are prerequisites for conducting distributed operations, traditional interpretations of loyalty that center on rote obethence can be antithetical to the moral and professional development of Marine leaders.

A more contemporary interpretation holds that loyalty, in virtually any form, carries with it both promise and peril. In the case of the former, when a demonstrated sense of loyalty materially benefits the Marine or unit in question, there is little likelihood that the outcome depends on what has been “taught” about loyalty. Most often, loyalty emerges naturally, as a product of leadership, esprit de corps, and personal character, rendering the teaching unnecessary. Contrarily, when a commitment to loyalty on the part of a Marine ultimately proves detrimental to his mission or organization, the effort to instill it through intentional, structured means is ill-advised. A misguided sense of loyalty can thwart initiative, stifle valuable dissent, and lead otherwise stellar Marines into poor decisionmaking.

Loyalty should therefore be removed from the list of Marine Corps leadership traits. While it remains an eminently worthwhile subject for reflection and debate, as a leadership trait it has become an anachronism that no longer represents the qualities the Marine Corps seeks to instill in its commissioned officers and NCOs. Marine Corps professional military education curricula should likewise be adjusted to deemphasize the importance of loyalty and include discussions that warn of its potentially pernicious effects.

Healthy Loyalty

There is, of course, a truly healthy, beneficial form of loyalty that exists throughout the Corps today. For any Marine who has relied on “the guys on his left and right” to overcome hardship, and for any Marine who has been inspired by a senior or subordinate Marine to persevere under difficult conditions, the desire and willingness to do so are rooted in the collective. Loyalty reminds one that being a Marine is a shared experience; an individual is rarely a good deal better or worse off than the other Marines in his unit. Battalions and squadrons do not have great majors but lousy corporals. Battalions and squadrons function as a whole, elevated above the sum of their parts by a cohesion that depends on loyalty to the unit and the mission.

The Marine Corps, of all of the Services, most completely recognizes this. Marine Corps recruiting campaigns and television advertisements consistently eschew personal financial incentives, opting instead to attract potential recruits based on the vaunted reputation of the Corps as a whole. Established at first contact, this sense of loyalty germinates throughout officer candidate and recruit training, becoming an ingrained feature of those who wear the eagle, globe, and anchor.

This is never more true than in combat. Few Marines can think of the sacrifice and valor of CpI Jason L. Dunham and other renowned forebears without being awed by their utter selflessness. In the tradition of many other distinguished generals, MajGen James N. Mattis’ now-famous message to the 1st MarDiv on the eve of the 2003 Iraq invasion tapped into this powerful reservoir, encouraging his Marines to live up to the expectations of the unit, Corps, and country.² Certainly this was no gimmick. Sociologists, psychologists, and military historians have long understood the factors that motivate soldiers and Marines to fight to the point of self-sacrifice. Loyalty stands out among them as the single most compelling.³

Loyal to a Fault

There is, however, a distinct downside to the concept of loyalty. Leadership, especially under duress, is rarely an uncomplicated matter involving clear choices and obvious solutions. In both peacetime and under fire, leaders routinely face situations that are ridden with conflict. When intense external pressures are at variance with deeply held internal mores, a sense of loyalty can offer a convenient excuse for inaction, silence, or obstruction. Resolute, well-grounded officers and NCOs, when they are at their best, recognize this dilemma and choose to act, speak out, or intercede, despite the potential cost to reputation and career. That’s their job, after all. But it takes a rather uncritical eye to assume that this is the default condition under which most Marines operate. The reality is that most of us, lance corporals and lieutenant generals alike, do the best we can with what we have available at the time.

As an example, consider the case of retired Marine LtGen Gregory S. Newbold. In April 2006, the former Joint Staff J-5 Director penned an editorial in Time magazine titled, “Why Iraq Was a Mistake.”⁴ Though the personal conviction he displayed while serving on the Joint Staff and in writing the article is beyond reproach, by his own admission LtGen Newbold regrets that he did not do more, sooner, to make known his opposition to the war. He is unsparing in his criticism, labeling the architects of the war “zealots” and asserting that the rationale for the war “made no sense.”⁵ Despite this damning, black-and-white assessment, the tenor of his editorial and the conditions under which it was published (3 years into retirement) demonstrate a tremendous, ingrained reluctance to break with the status quo. Four months prior to the invasion, he resigned his commission and then stewed over the issue for the next 3 years. That is loyalty at work.

The loyal officer, it is perceived, may freely voice dissent up to a point but must eventually salute and carry out orders when directed. That is absolutely necessary and correct, but it is based on law, not loyalty. Per the Marine Corps definition, loyalty to the country enjoys precedence above all things, and it is easy to conclude that LtGen Newbold would have been acting in the interests of the country had he been more forceful in his dissent while in uniform (as he urges current military leaders to be). Yet reality intrudes. Courses of action that seem entirely plausible in a staid, academic environment are decidedly less attractive in real- wo rid settings.

The tendency toward misguided loyalty is not a new phenomenon. GEN Douglas MacArthur railed against it in 1951:

I find in existence a . . . dangerous concept that the members of the armed forces owe their primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of the Government, rather than to the country and its Constitution they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.⁶

While the average lance corporal or captain might rarely contemplate his fealty to the executive branch, he is no less susceptible to analogous pressures and conflicts. Whether it involves witnessing an unsafe maintenance practice in an MV- 22 squadron, a questionable act committed in a remote Afghan village, or an administrative violation during a routine workday, his response to the infringement should be guided by his own moral assessment oí justice, judgment, integrity, and any other germane leadership trait. Nagging questions about loyalty and the perceived fear of being branded disloyal only serve to obfuscate the picture and reduce the likelihood that he will act in the best interest of his unit, his leaders and peers, and the Corps.

Creative Destruction

Somewhat paradoxically, forceful decisionmaking that elevates integrity over loyalty often heightens respect for both the individual and institution involved, and serves to reestablish the bedrock principles on which the military depends. During his tenure as the head of the Defense Department, Secretary Robert M. Gates has dismissed the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and has fired (or caused to resign) extremely accomplished flag-level officers in high-visibility assignments from each Service. The lesson taken from these instances, whether in the media or among servicemembers, is normally depicted as a demonstration of accountability, but there is an equally compelling narrative regarding the appropriate limits of loyalty. Unceremonious dismissals at the secretary and four-star level are rare, as they should be, but were it not for a willingness to push loyalty aside, they might well be nonexistent.

It is on this side of the loyalty coin that far too little light shines. The current dialogue addresses the duality of loyalty by emphasizing that it extends both up and down the chain of command, but there is virtually no institutional discussion acknowledging that a sense of loyalty can be, and quite often is, adhered to in excess. Not so long ago corporals were far less strategic and battlefield operations weren’t nearly as distributed. It was sufficient to inculcate in our junior personnel a narrow understanding of loyalty that did little more than foster its growth. The national security landscape has changed, as have our junior personnel. There are myriad examples of both civilian and military leaders recognizing the exceptional intelligence of the officers and enlisted men and women who make up todays technology-centric Armed Forces, but there is no commensurate recognition of their readiness to navigate more complex moral and ethical waters. As we laud the agility of the young minds currently waging our three block wars, we would do well to recognize that its inadequate and potentially harmful to steep them in a one-dimensional understanding of loyalty.

Trimming the Fat

Enshrined as 1 of the 14 Marine Corps leadership traits, the concept of loyalty carries more heft than it otherwise would. Would a hard-as-nails gunnery sergeant care a whit about tact were it not on the list? As an officially sanctioned leadership trait, Marines are programmed to give pause when questions about loyalty arise. This should not be the case.

The healthy form of loyalty that cements the collective resolve of a fighting unit is borne of character and leadership. The commander whose Marines are described as fiercely loyal to him had no intention of making them so. Their loyalty emerged as an ancillary product of his ability to lead and his enthusiasm for command. Likewise, the commander who is fiercely loyal to his Marines needed no guidance to become so. Further, the Marine labeled disloyal is likely as not to have earned the descriptor by acting in the Corps’ best interest, perhaps at the expense of an individual or organization above him. For every legitimate whistleblower who corrects a wrong or exposes a fraud, there’s a corollary whisper campaign questioning his loyalty. Finally, the Marine who shuns being branded disloyal, electing instead to remain silent in the face of adversity, may do untold damage to the Corps.

The difference between loyalty and obsequiousness shouldn’t be shades of gray. When we ask our Marines for boldness, we are obliged to foster and reward it. By removing loyalty from the list of leadership traits and reframing the discussion of it in our professional military education venues, the Marine Corps will remove an impediment to candor, innovation, and clear-headed thinking. The associated risk is slight; Marines follow orders and always have.

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Notes

1. Marine Corps Reference Publication 6-1 IB, Marine Corps Values: A User’s Guide, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 20 October 1998, pp. 15-20.
2. Mattis, MajGen James N., Commanding General, 1st MarDiv, “Commanding General’s Message to All Hands,” March 2003.
3. Costa, Dora, and Matthew Kahn, “Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, Harvard University, MA, May 2003, p. 250.
4. Newbold, LtGen Gregory S., USMC(Ret), “Why Iraq Was a Mistake,” Time magazine, 9 April 2006, p. 36.
5. Ibid.
6. MacArthur, GEN Douglas A., quoted in Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika, Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Mount Pleasant, SC, 1992, p. 354.

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Copyright Marine Corps Association Oct 2018

A case for cultural regression

by Maj Stanley E. Bednar

“You can’t connect the dots looking forward; you can only connect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots will somehow connect in your future. You have to trust in something.”

-Steve Jobs¹

“The key to successful leadership is influence, not authority.”

-Ken Blanchard²

Leadership is a term often employed but seldom grasped. Like the game Othello, the concept of leadership İs fairly easy to define {and İs done so often) and understand but near impossible to master; this lack of mastery directly attributes to its notion of being an innately “human will” construct. From an educational point of view, no one definition of leadership rises to primacy above others, though there are commonalities across the spectrum that can be cobbled into a generally acceptable and workable definition: the ability to motivate a group of people to accomplish a common goal. That accepted, there was a time in which the Marine Corps proselytized leadership more correctly than not, its leaders once able to balance a storied culture with invigorated and cyclical manpower youth “seed corn”; and yes, my use of the past tense is absolutely purposeful. In its rush to remain current, the Marine Corps has bargained away its institutional character and, because of its nature, potentially sacrificed a large portion of its cultural relevancy.

The Marine Corps has always been unique among the Services, its cultural variance becoming its most stark during the mid to late 20th century (with the advent of maneuver warfare and the like). This distinction was never about better technology or equipment-it was not a material or resourcing difference. Rather, the Marine Corps distinguished itself with, plainly put, grit. The Corps prides itself on being anchored by traditions, willful, agile, resilient, audacious, and arrogant, with the mindset of “adapt and overcome,” more aligned to a brotherhood than a bureaucratic body. As such, it was able to punch above its weight class, and it could get to the fight sooner than others, sustain that fight for longer than it had any earthly right to, and fight İn places none thought possible. Combine those attributes, and you have a scrappy brawler that nobody had an appetite to contend with, foreign or domestic. As altruistic as that sounds, these wholly intangible personality traits are extremely and indelibly tied and slave to the human condition-we are the most “emotive” Service. If leadership ts about influencing human will, then logic would follow that the Corps is particularly sensitive to its application, or lack thereof.

“Leadership is hard to define and good leadership even harder. But if you can get people to follow you to the ends of the earth; you are a great leader”

-Indra Nooyi³

Before highlighting how the Corps may be “rushing to failure” with respect to cultural currency over relevancy, a deeper exploration of the commonly accepted traits of a well-led organization (and, by extension, how teams fail) İs prudent. Just as nebulous as a firm definition of leadership, there is no shortage of well-informed opinions regarding what it means to be well led. That said, like its definition, there are commonalities across that bank of opinions: collaboration and communication, a senior leader’s presence and guidance, a resulting vision and purpose, and satisfied employees. Similarly, negative indicators of a poorly led organization also trend: only management has offices, assigned leaders don’t talk about organizational culture, company values are posted like propaganda, employees are either bored or stressed, and slow decision making, unequal workloads, territorialism, long hours, and poor communication abound. Though these are just a sampling of indicators, generally, all of these traits can be bucketed into three categories: disengagement, a lack of organizational discipline, and little to no member buy-İn. The Corps İs inadvertently, but certainly, adopting these vectors, even if passively condoned.

“Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak and esteem to all. “

-George Washington⁴

“Desk defilade” is a very real element of office and cubicle tactics, even if not formally recognized or codified. Suggested in name, it is literally the act of being covered by one’s desk, as İn being so mired İn admınİstrivİa that a leader’s responsibilities cannot penetrate him. In today’s hyper-connected and immediate-communications world, which has only served to speed up (vice improve) decision making, desk defilade has transitioned from a humorous cautionary barb to a very real staff terror. As a young Marine officer, I was told to “drink other people’s coffee” and “if you can, task in person.” In other words, get up and out of your seat, away from your desk, and engage Marines. Not only does this invigorate spirit and refresh esprit de corps, it provides subordinates an engaged boss. Through that engagement, and to degrees of effectiveness exponentially greater than written transmission alone, discourse is born, a natural back and forth of thought and opinion that, from leader to led, translates into guidance and vision. In order to effectively lead, an individual must receive the appropriate inputs, process them, and, İn the vast majority of the day remaining, engage directly with his Marines to figure out what those inputs mean to the team and determine how they will address them. Anything short of this recipe robs troops of their guiding light, instead facilitating wellmeant, but ultimately chaotic, efforts and end states.

“A genuine leader is not a searcher for consensus but a molder of consensus.”

-Martin Luther King; Jr.⁵

Organizational discipline, not to be confused with the fíame of personal discipline largely kept by senior enlisted leadership, is the recognition, adherence, maintenance, and execution of defined work centers and efforts as well as their interaction with one another. It is not masking democratic-style asking and consensus-making under the false pretenses of recognition and adherence. Tight organizations and families demand structure regardless of the societal agenda-this is instinct and human nature. Authority and discipline enforce and facilitate recognition and adherence, which, in turn, convince the “body politic” that everybody is held accountable and to standard. After all, as the quip goes, the military defends democracy; it does not practice it. If a study were done on major successful corporations, likely, their members would know intimately who was in charge and exactly what was expected of them, regardless of how avant-garde the company’s culture was. Without an authoritative structure, there can be no personal buy-in, no investment; humans would continually wonder who was able to “ask” and would debate their way out of work, fundamentally eroding trust.

“Leadership contains certain elements of good management but it requires that you inspire, that you build durable trust. For an organization to be not just good, but to win, leadership means evoking participation larger than the job description, commitment deeper than any job contracts wording.”

-GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, USA(Ret)⁶

Organizational, or familial, trust is a byproduct of shared and appreciated roles and responsibilities-each member of the family is made to “carry their own water.” The confidence reaped from enduring a journey with your brother, of your own volition and motivation {vice either of you needing to be carried), fosters buy-in, an ingrained investment in and commitment to that family. The opposite is, unfortunately, equally stark; without the knowledge that your fellow Marines shoulder at least similar burdens, true buy-in and trust is simply unattainable. Trust is dubiously the easiest of the three vectors to understand, but it is the most interrelated and dependent on the other two vectors {leadership involvement and organizational discipline) and is most susceptible to human will. In other words, achieving true trust and buy-in necessarily means an organization has already conquered the other two vectors.

I implore you to give some real, honest thought to what you have observed of Marine Corps leadership of late. As I have been assigned to a relatively senior staff, I have obviously come to the conclusion that we may not be getting it institutionally right. We have diverged altruistically from the good commonalities of leadership along those three vectors. As an institution, a family, and a brotherhood, we have attempted to remain so societally current, following the trend of elevating the individual above the collective, that we have virtuously lost our way.

“The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, and equipped to meet the demands of a future operating environment.”

-Marine Corps Operating Concept⁷

“Amazing. Every word you just said was wrong.”

-Luke Skywalker⁸

Some may believe that relating the above quote, which topically speaks to the Corps’ physical ability to fight, to a largely humanistic intangible like leadership, the engagement between leader and led, is a reach. Every element of being able to galvanize and synergize organization, training, and equipping stems from the relationship between an organization’s “brain” {culture, owned by the senior leaders) and its “heart” {vitality and personality, owned by the juniors). When I first began exploring the potential leadership pitfalls plaguing our Corps, I started at the heart, assuming it was being weakened by lackadaisical youth. As I read and researched, the Institutionally obvious, but less overt, became clear: that the exact opposite of this sentiment was the case. As with the human body, the heart takes cues from the brain, just as young Marines are catalyzed by their senior leaders. And because senior leaders of any organization are the keepers of its culture, the challenge is not generational; it is more deeply rooted than that. The following examples of shortfalls along the previously identified vectors will establish this cultural position while also highlighting how subtly yet indelibly linked our shortfalls are, nefariously so.

1. Unfortunately, one does not have to look far to find very public examples of senior Marines once considered rising star leaders relieved of duty for significant leadership shortcomings. Commander relief is nothing new, but what does seem to be a relatively recent development is the trend in cause of such relief: the abuse of power. Blame social media and the hyper-connected age for making these types of relief more well known, but woe if we ignore the fire simply because more people are noticing the smoke-fire is still fire. That said, leadership relief for cause has taken a darker turn over the past seventeen years of my experience. Relief is bad, regardless, but when I was a junior officer, “cause” types of relief tended to center around unduly familiar “Trat boy” or “fast and loose” command environments. Again, bad, but the Marines at least felt loved by their frat-boy CO-there was a loyalty. Today, cause has morphed into senior leaders and commanders being relieved or called to task for taking advantage of their Marines, eroding all forms and levels of trust, from organizational down to familial. Not to mention that its really hard to provide organizational guidance when one is only looking out for his own skin. While I certainly don’t advocate for a frat-boy family construct, I will forever argue for a present commander who takes a vested interest in his unit and individual Marines and who is willing to engage them and provide the guidance we sometimes so sorely need. Doing so, however, means that he may have to turn attention from his seniors and invest it in his subordinates.

2. I can’t form any better argument against consensus-based leadership than what was recently codified by a specific colonel in a very senior leadership and planning billet within HQMC. During discussions and working groups that sought to develop support plans and policies for operation plans, he lamented that decisions made within HQMC are often watered down, belabored, and delayed for one predominant reason: consensus-based decisions. Counterintuitively, the same leaders who have based their significant military lives around the hierarchical nature of how the Marine Corps fundamentally works (state the problem, solicit input, decide on the course of action, make the plan, and execute), at the apex of their careers, now feel the “leader decides, we execute” construct is up for debate. The original statement by this well-respected colonel was “logistics by consensus.” At the operational and strategic level, guidance essentially equates to senior commanders being given resourcing direction and priorities, only to endlessly debate them, thereby stagnating action. This then morphed the discussion into “leadership by consensus” in general. When did a commander’s “Here are my priorities, and this is my decision,” (so long as those calls were neither illegal nor immoral), become a debatable item? And because the Marine Corps boasts of being a “leadership by example” team, what chance does firm and adhered-to decision making stand the farther down the chain you go if it is first and prominently questioned by senior leadership? If general officers can argue direction, why can’t colonels, lieutenant colonels, or captains? And for those who would argue that the farther up the chain you go, the more pontification and debate is accepted and understood, I counter with this. Not a month after hearing that senior colonel bemoan this decision-making trend, another equally respected colonel told me that a general had asked him to speak to his fellow colonel about “getting onboard with the general’s strategy” because the general was concerned the colonel wasn’t listening to his guidance. What?!

3. From an observational standpoint, buy-in shortfalls largely manifest themselves on opposite ends of the spectrum. On the “big” end, the aforementioned quote from the Marine Corps Operating Concept is an obvious indicator that institutional buy-in has largely eluded us, but the situation is actually a bit more dire. Classification sensitivity considered, let’s just say, for argument’s sake, that if the Corps is having a hard time plotting its own future course, the rest or the joint force is having an equally difficult go at figuring out how to employ us, if at all⁹ – to the tune of folks not really beating down the doors for Corps equities and capabilities. Marines have been wooden-hulled sharpshooters, island-hopping vanguards, jungle shock troops, embassy guards, counterinsurgency hold forces, embedded partners, and forward-presence military power emissaries. Ultimately, it does not matter what role we fill; that is determined by our civilian leadership. What does matter is how well we fill that role, and the Marine Corps can only excel if its Whole of being” understands what it is trying to be. Toward the “little” end, it stands to reason that the Corps can’t plot its course because its rowers are equally disenfranchised and confused. Owning to the first two sets of examples covering leader engagement and organizational discipline, the Corps is robbing its junior Marines of an aim point, a standard. This became blatantly and painfully obvious to me when I reviewed a handful of command climate surveys. One of the known “field Marines” (good in the field, troublesome in garrison-a term “no no’d” by policymakers because they didn’t want to believe the phenomenon existed), an EAS’ing corporal, “by named” his response. When I saw this, I immediately assumed his obvious gripe was going to be that the Corps had somehow wronged and harassed him, causing his premature departure from what I’m sure he believed was going to be an illustrious career. Unfortunately, my egregious assumption couldn’t have been farther from the truth. This otherwise motivated, albeit unorthodox, young leader was departing the Corps because we did not challenge him enough. He expected the pamphlet, the Corps gave him “summer camp,” and he felt jilted, robbed. In a day and age where individualism is given utmost primacy and value, we, the Corps’ leadership, must fight the urge to allow that internal retreat to take root and erode that uncommon esprit de corps that young men and women joined up for, that they couldn’t find anywhere else; that’s precisely what made us unique and afforded us grit, that pride in being hard. While there is no way of getting around the modern cultural trend of “cocooning” behind personal electronic devices, headphones, social media, you name it, we can prove to our young warriors that there is more to life than only those media, that there is a fiesh-and-blood brotherhood that wants their involvement. Once we convince them that such a construct exists, we must cultivate it by bringing back unit social functions outside “normal working hours” and away from the confines of unit spaces. It’s okay; the clubs could use the patronage. As Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos, recently put it, it isn’t a work-life balance you need but worklife “harmony.”¹⁰ Balance denotes give and take, while harmony espouses synchronization and satisfaction. In other words, leaders can ardently adhere to “9 to 5” schedules with their Marines, affording them maximum off/individual time, but if those Marines can’t get behind what the leaders are offering during the workday, those Marines won’t be any happier coming to work. And, as Bezos goes on to note, unhappy and/or unfulfilled work means the Marine, in this instance, takes the negative feelings home, degrading any benefits off-time would have offered. And this quid pro quo relationship quickly becomes a downward spiral, a career and opportunity death knell.

“Honesty is the fastest way to prevent a mistake from turning into a failure.”

-James Altucher¹¹

There is an April 2013 Forbes article titled “12 Signs of Cowardly Leadership.”¹² In it, Jeff Schmitt argues that while courageous leadership may be a well-used business cliché or buzzword, its adoption has highlighted the difference between talkers and doers, between the sycophants and phonies and the believers. Schmitt explodes those “simple” three vectors into more detail, but the message is clear and identical to my argument thus far. And, to round it out, there is a risk management article in the July edition of Inbound Logistics, “Protecting Your Supply Chain” by Tom Gresham,¹³ which argues that in order for an organization to implement initiative, it must have five elements in place: visible leadership, worker empowerment, knowledge of responsibilities, awareness of the pitfalls and boons of emerging technology, and oversight and intervention-in other words, engaged leadership, organizational discipline, and buy-in.

“Teamwork requires some sacrifice up front; people who work as a team have to put the collective needs of the group ahead of their individual interests.”

-Patrick Lencioni¹⁴

Reversing this noble but ultimately misguided “rush to currency” is actually quite easy in spirit, though its execution will likely prove complex and challenging. The ways and means to do so are the foundational blocks of “Leadership 101,” which we Marines are indoctrinated with on day one. The real challenge harkens back to the old adage that it is more difficult to start easy and then work harder than it is to come in hard and ease off. Regardless, the shift from this new consensus-based individualism to a more authoritative collectivism must take place.

1. Get away from the desk. So simple to say, seemingly near impossible to execute. However, regardless of the email deluge of belt-fed requests for information and questions and the unending tasks from a host of different management systems, if a leader isn’t spending a majority of his time with his led, even 51 percent of his time, then his Marines are being cheated. And, senior leaders, few things come off more disingenuous than forced troop time (like calendarinvited “walkabouts” or exclusive town halls). No, leaders, you need to engage your troops humanly, unannounced, unscripted, naturally, and purely. Only through this engagement will the mind of the leader be translated into guidance the troops can understand, get behind, enforce, and ultimately trust.

2. Once initial walkabouts are completed. and guidance starts to take root, follow-on face-to-face engagements should begin to address what the troops are actually doing. Leaders should eventually ask harder questions of their troops than “Hows your spouse?” or “How are the Patriots doing?,” like “What are you working on, and which of my priorities is this addressing?,” “Explain my task to you, in your own words,” “Why are you doing this when it is clear this task belongs to somebody else?,” or “What other section needs to know about what you are doing?” (Here, I am borrowing from “What do I know, who needs to know it, have I told them, and do they understand?”) Aside from the work of “lane maintenance” and “unity through shared pain,” trust will start to manifest through pointed discourse and potentially in a less obvious way. I recently overheard an orficemate quip that society expects a lot from youth by way of intellect but demands virtually nothing of responsibility. While less responsibility and a lack of accountability may be very palatable to these youth initially, distrust between senior and subordinate will eventually set in. After all, being treated like a child leads to acting like a child.

3- Once troops are engaged by their leadership, receiving and truly hearing their leader’s guidance, their trust that they are not alone in the fight catalyzed, they will begin to want to buy into the organization, to truly invest more of themselves than normal working hours. Unfortunately, a byproduct of institutional individualism is the concept that an individual’s time is his own, sacrosanct and not to be trifled with. Running a business that entices rotational young blood and that doesn’t necessarily depend on any one employee is fine and, in fact, generally accepted. Loyalty to a singular business is no longer in vogue in the civilian sector, oftentimes thought to equal a lack of cross-sectional experience and growth. In a family, that loyalty is a form of organizational lifeblood. At the very point some leaders and commanders may have begun to enjoy the trust of their subordinates, it has become commonplace not to cap that sentiment with time spent “as a family.” Officer and enlisted club membership is down or dead already. After-hours “staff calls” are allowed to be scoffed at and disregarded. In fact, it has gotten to the point where any after-hours function endorsed and mandated by a Marine Corps unit is seen as bothersome and harassing to families in nature. But the Corps is not a normal business, and this family needs time as well-well beyond the confines of normal working hours. Commanders, not only is it okay to flat mandate after-hours functions (if there is such a thing for a “Marine 24/7” family) but it is absolutely necessary, within moderation and understanding that spouses and kids demand a Marine’s time, too, if a commander wishes to harden that earned trust.

“A people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree without roots.”

-Marcus Garveý¹⁵

Progress for its own sake is futile at best. In the case of the Marine Corps, this rush to remain socially current has led to cultural ambiguity. The Corps must strive to regain the faith of its civilian leadership by rekindling that je ne sais quoi that once differentiated us from our bigger Army and Air Force brothers. To do this, it must relight the trust of its Marines, the kind of familial trust born of mutual respect, common goals, buy-in, and a sincere brotherhood mentality. That trust will stem from a reinstitutionalization of disciplined work and shared responsibility. And that “row well and live” mantra can only be inculcated by the overt presence of strong senior leadership and tempered, translated, and advanced by those youthful and vital junior leaders. The Marine Corps can revisit and reap, once again, this quirky, cult-like mentality and more, just as it has in the past, when this plucky, altruistic family found itself at similar cultural crossroads, and it will do so through grit.

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Notes

1. ‘”You’ve Got to Find What You Love/ Jobs SaysStanford News, (Online: 14 June 2005), available at http://news.stanford.edu. This article contains the video and script of Steve Jobs’ commencement address given at Stanford University on 12 June 2005
2. “Leadership,” Inspiration Arena, (Online: 2017), available at www.inspirationarena.com.
3. Ibid.
4. U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Washington Takes Command of Continental Army in 1775,” (Online: 5 June 2014), available at https://www.army.mil.
5. Martin Luther King, Jr., Domestic Impact of the War, (Chicago, IL: November 1967), found in “Martin Luther King, Jr.: Domestic Impact of the War; November 1967, National Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace,” African-American Involvement in the Vietnam War, available at www.aavw.org.
6. Dan Schawbel, “General Stanley McChrystal: Leadership Lessons from Afghanistan,” Forbes, (Online: 10 January 2013), available at https:// www.forbes.com.
7. Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the21st Century, (Washington, DC: September 2016).
8. “Star Wars: Episode VIII – The Last Jedi (2017) Movie Script,” Springfield!Springfield!, available at https://www.springfieldspringfield. co.uk.
9. Senate Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act, (Washington, DC: 2018).
10. Josh Constine, “Jeff Bezos’ Guide to Life,” TechCrunch, (Online: 5 November 2017), available at https://techcrunch.com.
11. James Altucher, “Failure: What Are 10 Ways That I Can Stop Feeling like a Failure?,” Observer, (Online: 7 October 2015), available at observer.com.
12. Jeff Schmidt, “12 Signs of Cowardly Leadership,” Forbes, (Online: 8 April 2013), available at https://www.forbes.com.
13. Tom Gresham, “Protecting Your Supply Chain,” Inbound Logistics, (Online: 16 July 2018), available at www.inboundlogistics.com.
14. Renee Houston Zemanski, “The Team Versus the Individual,” Personal Selling Power, Inc., (Online: 2 February 2010), available at https:// www.sellingpower.com.
15. “Remembering Old Marcus Garvey,” Afrobella, (Online: 17 August 2009), available at https://www.afrobella.com.

View or download the PDF here

by Col Christopher Woodbridge, USMC(Ret)

Recent highly publicized incidents of apparent and alleged police brutality against African Americans and the equally publicized and politicized global responses ranging from organized marches, peaceful protests, and civil disobedience to violent riots, looting and revenge-based lawlessness have once again laid bare a flaw lying beneath the veneer of American civil society. Actual and perceived racial injustice are a lingering weakness that touches the entire nation and can even touch the Corps as a reflection of that nation’s society. 

The difference is that as a military hierarchy, the Corps has the responsibility to be better than society-at-large through the action and authority of engaged leadership. Some leaders and Marines believe that there is no such problem in the Marine Corps. This disagreement should indicate the imperative to discuss these issues head-on in order to make the Corps a more cohesive warfighting organization. 

The purpose of the Call-to-Action is to provide a forum—under the aegis of the Professional Journal—to have that honest, frank discussion in a respectful, fact-based and above all constructive manner. Problems identified through facts must be paired with realistic solutions.

The following articles are the first offerings in this discussion. More will follow and readers may add their comments to the “thread.”

One Tribe Requires Inclusion by Col Christopher Shaw

The Petersen Chair at Marine Corps University by Col Kenneth D. Dunn

Corps Voices Podcasts: LtGen Frank E. Petersen, “It’s Just Not Going to be That Way”

Based on these first offerings, here are some initial questions for the discussion:

Is the current paucity of African American officers at the rank of Lieutenant General and above an indicator of institutional racism in the Corps, or the result of a combination of factors that lead to a shortage of qualified officers?  Could both be true, and is there something else leaders should consider?

Are incidents of “racial micro-aggressions” indicative of conscious and unconscious racial bias in the Corps or are they symptomatic of a general rudeness and degeneration of civil behavior in the nation as a whole? In either case, how could the environment or “command climate” perpetuate these unacceptable behaviors?

What is the role of Professional Military Education and the Marine Corps Culture of Learning in building understanding on all sides of this issue?

What can individual Marines do to “police their own” to shape a cohesive environment of trust and inclusion? 

Non-Member Comments:

Member Comments:

In an excellent “future history” essay, Capt Lakyra Pharms offers a chilling post mortem for the Marine Corps.  The author proposes that a Corps that does not reflect the diversity of a changing American population and that lacks relevance in the Joint Force may be disbanded by 2040.  As Capt Pharms asserts: “…the Marine Corps’ failure to embrace a culture of inclusion was making it a sore in the eyes of the American public.”

Does the future of the Corps depend in part on reflecting the diverse makeup of the Nation?  How do Marine Corps recruiting and officer accession standards limit the Corps ability to “look like America?” What role does diversity and cohesion play in the combat effectiveness that is the metric by which a military organization is judged?

Read the article by Capt Pharms here!

by Major Michael F. Masters Jr.

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Major Masters is a MAGTF Intelligence Officer with multiple combat tours to Iraq. He is currently a student at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Major Masters personally served under LtGen Bailey’s command while Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, as an Officer Selection Officer in Lexington, Kentucky from 2010-2013.

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Introduction

Before World War II, black Americans were not permitted to serve in the Marine Corps. The Service’s view was a binary outlook that only recognized white and black skin tones and ignored the content of one’s character or abilities to contribute to the organization. Upon the United States formally entering hostilities during World War II in 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, an opportunity presented itself for black Americans to support the war effort and take great strides towards racial equality within the U.S. military. Although, black Americans served in the defense of our Nation since the Revolutionary War and in segregated U.S. Army Units since the American Civil War, the Marine Corps insisted on maintaining a homogenous force under the guise of maintaining the highest standards of all the Service branches.¹ It was not until 1942, one year after the issuance of Executive Order 8802, in the face of mounting pressure from both the Executive Branch and Congress to allow black Americans to become Marines, that the Service begrudgingly made preparations to allow them to enter recruit training.² Between 1942 and 1949, approximately 22,000 black recruits were trained aboard Camp Lejeune, NC.³ The location was austere, a camp with no frills, named Montford Point. The facility was purposefully set away from the installation’s main side, so as not to co-mingle the black recruits and white Marines.⁴ During World War II, black Marine units continuously distinguishing themselves during combat operations and 85 percent of the men trained at Montford Point went on to serve in the Pacific theater.⁴ Despite their tactical prowess and dedicated service, the number of black Marines retained in the Marine Corps following World War II would sharply decline from 1947-1950 to approximately 2,000.⁵ Although the Service neglected to grasp the benefits of a diverse and inclusive force post-conflict, the seeds of progress were in many ways already sown by allowing these men the opportunity to prove themselves worthy bearers of the eagle, globe, and anchor.

            Many of the original Montford Point Marines would go on to lead successful careers within industry, the civil service, and a few were permitted to stay in the Corps—which aided in progressing the organization.⁶ The path blazed by these brave young men in the 1940s has played a pivotal role in the advancement of black Americans within the U.S. military today—specifically within the Marine Corps. Since the days of Camp Montford Point, many thousands of black Americans have earned the title of Marine. This piece profiles LtGen Ronald L. Bailey, (USMC, Retired) one of many successful black leaders of our Corps since 1942.

Early Life

            LtGen Bailey grew up in the West Augustine suburb of St. Augustine, FL, in the midst of the 1960’s Civil Rights Movement. Although urban areas just to the north such as Jacksonville, FL, had well established African American communities and leadership, such as A. Philip Randolph,⁷ leading the way for racial equality, the area West Augustine was considered by many at the time, as one local current Civil Rights Committee member puts it as “a third world country.”⁸ LtGen Bailey attributes much of his success to his tight-knit local community, his attendance at private Catholic schools, and the importance his father placed on his sons to be educated and patriotic.⁹ Regarding the prevalence of the ongoing racial discrimination of the time, LtGen Bailey distinctly recounts his white Catholic nun teachers “treating black students with dignity and respect” and his father actively explaining how the world around him was and how it could be improved.¹⁰ In the mid-1970s, with the Vietnam War coming to end, LtGen Bailey departed his native Florida on an athletic scholarship to attend Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, TN.¹¹ Although, he was originally a member of the U.S. Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps and had completed all the program’s commissioning requirements, because of “broken promises,” LtGen Bailey would eventually pursue the “challenge” of a commission in the Marine Corps via the Platoon Leaders Class Combined program.¹² The commissioning program required one ten-week summer training session before completion of his senior year of college; however, upon reflection on his initial training, LtGen Bailey began to have second thoughts about accepting his commission as he had other opportunities available to teach and coach football.¹³ He credits his decision to accept his Marine Corps commission to the sage counsel of his college football coach and the tremendous level of comradery he felt while at Officers Candidate School, akin only to his experiences on the gridiron.¹⁴ In 1977, thirty-five years after the first black recruit reported to Montford Point, NC and thirty-two years following the commissioning of the first black Marine Officer, Frederick C. Branch, Ronald L. Bailey was commissioned as a second lieutenant of Marines.¹⁵

            Of note, in the year of LtGen Bailey’s commissioning, there were only 145 minority officers accessed (accounting for 7.2 percent of the total officer accessions), making his accomplishment even more significant.¹⁶ While at The Basic School in Quantico, VA, for initial officer training, 2ndLt Bailey was steered toward applying for selection as an Infantry Officer by his Staff Platoon Commander (a coveted specialty of the Corps which still today is dominated by white males) because of his perceived leadership potential.¹⁷ He would heed his instructor’s advice and eventually submit the Infantry as his top MOS choice and be selected to attend the Marine Corps’ prestigious Infantry Officers Course.    

Marine Corps Career

            During LtGen Bailey’s forty-one-year career in the. Marine Corps, he commanded Marines at every rank, most notably including 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 3rd MEB, 1st MarDiv, and Marine Corps Recruiting Command.¹⁸ His postings would take him to traditional Marine bastions such as Quantico, VA, for military education (e.g., The Basic School, Infantry Officers Course, Basic Communication Officers Course, Amphibious Warfare School) and later for assignment as a Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower Management office as the ground Lieutenant Colonels Monitor, Okinawa, Japan, for his Lieutenant tour, Paris Island, South Carolina for his drill field tour, and Camp Lejeune, NC, for his Company Command time.¹⁹ He was also posted at the highly revered 8th and I Marine Barracks in Washington, D.C., as Department Chief, Professional Military Education and marched as the Parade Commander. While assigned to Kings Bay, GA, he activated the Security Forces Company and served as the Guard Company Commander.²⁰

            While in command of the 2nd Marine Regiment (referred to as Task Force Tarawa), during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, he and his subordinate battalions took part in the famed “Battle of Nasiriyah to secure a pair of key bridges across the Euphrates River.”²¹ There, “the fighting there was later dubbed “Ambush Alley” and was the most intense urban warfare seen by the Marine Corps since the Battle of Huế in 1968. Additionally, elements of the 2nd Mar also supported the rescue of Army prisoner of war Jessica Lynch.”²² This would prove a formative experience for LtGen Bailey as he recounts the losing of twenty-one Marines during Iraq combat operations.²³ He credits his success in combat primarily to his superb battalion commanders and staff but also underscores the importance of “knowing one’s self” and being an “adaptable leader” as no plan typically survives the first contact with the enemy.²⁴ As the fighting intensified and causality reports mounted, LtGen Bailey knew his own self-discipline was key to others remaining calm and forward mission-focused.²⁵ He had the utmost confidence that his regiment had the requisite expertise, training, and leadership in place to succeed; thus, he perceived his main role was to enable and motivate his team.²⁶

            LtGen Bailey admits that he had a unique situation upon reporting to the FMF, in that in his first three assignments, he would be commanded and evaluated by black Marine officers that would all go on to become general officers.²⁷ This did not alleviate the fact that he was very often the “only black Marine in the room”; however, it impressed the importance of “building relationships up, down, and across the chain of command” to be an effective leader.²⁸ Although LtGen Bailey made an impact wherever he was assigned through his larger-than-life personality and congeniality, perhaps LtGen Bailey’s most notable posting in the Corps is his historic appointment as the first African American Commanding General of the famed 1st MarDiv in 2011. Most fittingly, his chain of command ceremony aboard Camp Pendleton, California was attended by a contingent of original Montford Point Marines sixty-nine years after they took their oaths of enlistment as the first black men to support and defend the U.S. Constitution as Marines.²⁹

Leadership Philosophy 

            In Jim Collins book, Good to Great, he describes, “Level 5 leaders” as—personnel that is “fanatically driven, infected with an incurable need to produce sustained results.³¹ The future USAFRICOM Commander and former I MEF Commanding General, Gen Thomas Waldhauser, would agree that LtGen Bailey embodies this description, as he stated upon his LtGen Bailey’s assumption of command of the 1st MarDiv, “Ron Bailey is a tremendous leader who has been an infantry and regimental commander … He brings a lot of energy and superior knowledge to the job.”³²

            During his time in the Marine Corps, LtGen Bailey addressed many diverse groups along with inspiring his Marines. During a speech at Hillsdale College in early 2017, he clearly laid out to the faculty, staff, and students gathered the guiding principles on which successful organizations are set upon that include knowing one’s history, fostering a culture of hard work, remaining humble despite successes, having heart against all circumstances, maintaining and promoting the health of those around you, and the importance of habits of action and thought.³³ During this engagement, he further elaborated on his own three-pronged command philosophy: 1) Leadership (Influence and Relationships) 2) Attitude (Understand your team); 3) Warfighting Skills (Be the best in your profession).³⁴ Also, known as “Bailey’s Law” leaders are challenged to: know thy self—have strong relationships up, down, across the chain of command; stay connected their people—ensure they feel nurtured through providing opportunities for personal growth;  be the best at your skillset—increase your professional competence. Further, LtGen Bailey asserts, “If a leader has the right attitude, they have the ability to succeed. A consistent positive mental attitude is a force multiplier in any organization. I ask all leaders to be proactive, take the initiative and get rid of the word ‘can’t’.”³⁵

Impact & Legacy

            Marines and military historians, along with the people of St. Augustine, FL, will always remember their native son LtGen Bailey in much the same way as his historical marker planted at the intersection of North Holmes Boulevard and West King Street reads, “General Bailey was assigned to Camp Pendleton, California as the Commanding General (1st Marine Division)-becoming the first African American to command the oldest and most decorated division in the Marine Corps.”³⁶ However, along the way to this momentous distinction and thereafter, he served his country and Corps with relentless dedication and afforded those around him his fiercest loyalty and admiration. Marines that have served with him will all attest to his contagious levels of motivation, gregarious nature, and compassion. In fact, LtGen Bailey asserts that his most rewarding and defining accomplishment while in the Corps was mentoring and helping his Marines to be successful and the pride in knowing that everywhere he served he made those units more capable.³⁷

            There exist a multitude of tangible artifacts of his four decades of service to our Nation such as from his time at Marine Corps Recruiting Command when he facilitated closer partnerships with historically black colleges/ universities, black fraternities, and associations and made increased minority officer accessions goals a national priority of effort for the service’s recruiting force. Further, as the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations securing crucial funding from Congress to modernize the Marine Corps and maintain a “competitive advantage” by enhancing information-related capabilities, increasing crisis response capabilities, and reintroducing Marines to theaters such as Norway, Afghanistan, and USINDOPACOM after substantial lapses or force reductions.³⁸ Even in retirement, LtGen Bailey continues to impact America’s youth through his position as the Vice President for the Office of External Affairs, Austin Peay State University.³⁹ Additionally, his decision to serve on the Board of Directors for the Travis Manion Foundation, an organization that espouses to “empower veterans and families of the fallen, and then inspire them to pass on their values to the next generation and the community at large”⁴⁰ speaks volumes to his character and a deep sense of responsibility for the future.

Regarding the need to continue to increase diversity within the officer ranks of the Marine Corps, LtGen Bailey notes there is much work still to be accomplished. He views the problem of the homogenous make-up of today’s officer corps as three-fold.⁴¹ First, there is a propensity to be overly concerned with the number of black officer candidate accessions.⁴² While it is important to maintain a steady flow of minority candidates, it is equally important to retain diverse talent within the organization by demonstrating a culture of mentorship to value an individual’s commitment to remain in the service.⁴³ Lastly, there remains unspoken institutional impediments for minority advancement within the Corps that need to be addressed which filter out qualified black leaders from postings required for continued promotion.⁴⁴

Conclusion

            The success LtGen Ronald L. Bailey has enjoyed over the span of his more than four decades of military service is directly attributable to the original Montford Point Marines that volunteered to serve in the newly opened but highly segregated Marine Corps of the early 1940s. He is the first to say that he stood on the shoulders of giants such as SgtMaj Huff and Johnson, Capt Fredrick Branch, and the first African American Marine General, LtGen Frank Petersen. Without these pathbreakers, his accomplishments wouldn’t have been possible. Because they dared to serve and sought out the coveted eagle, globe, and anchor so many have benefited, including the organization itself. Although Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s espoused goal is to represent the nation in which we defend, the reality is minority applicants still today face impediments to join and be successful within the Marine Corps, particularly in the officer ranks. There is much more to be accomplished before the phrases “first” and “African American” stop preceding black Marines’ accomplishments.

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Notes

1. Melton A. McLaurin, The Marines of Montford Point: America’s First Black Marines, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

2. Ronald K. Culp, The First Black United States Marines: The Men of Montford Point, 1942 – 1949, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2007).

3. The Marines of Montford Point; and Jesse J. Johnson, Roots of Two Black Sergeants Major; Sergeants Major Edgar R. Huff and Gilbert H. “Hashmark” Johnson, Profiles in Courage, (Hubert, NC: Ebony Publishing, Inc., 1978).

4. Roots of Two Black Sergeants Major.

5. The Marines of Montford Point.

6. Ibid.

7. Staff, “Montford Point Marine Association,”Wikipedia, (n.d.), available at https://en.wikipedia.org.

8. Staff, “A. Philip Randolph,” Wikipedia, (n.d.), available at https://en.wikipedia.org.

9. Jeff Valin, “Local Marine Gets Historical Marker in West Augustine,” First Coast News (June 2020), available at https://www.firstcoastnews.com.

10. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021.

11. Ibid.

12. U.S. House of Representatives, “Official Biography of LtGen Ronald L. Bailey, USMC,” (Washington, DC: 2017).

13. Hillsdale College, “Lieutenant General Ronald Bailey (USMC) on Leadership at Hillsdale College,” YouTube video, February 23, 2017, 69:02, https://www.youtube.com.

14. Ibid.

15. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021.

16. “Montford Point Marine Association.”

17. Alphonse G. Davis, Pride, Progress, and Prospects: The Marine Corps’ Efforts to Increase the Presence of African-American Officers (1970-1995), (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 2000).

Of note, minority officer accession data from 1977 includes both Black and Hispanic officers, the USMC’s minority accessions goal that year was 185 officers, they fell short of that goal the year LtGen Bailey was commissioned by 40 officers.

18. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021.

19. “Official Biography of LtGen Ronald L. Bailey, USMC.’

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Staff, “2nd Marine Regiment,” Wikipedia, (n.d.) available at https://en.wikipedia.org.

23. Ibid.

24. “Lieutenant General Ronald Bailey (USMC) on Leadership at Hillsdale College.”

25. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Mark Walker, “MILITARY: Maj. Gen. Ronald Bailey takes command of 1st Marine Division,” San Diego Union-Tribune, (June 2011), available at https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com.

31. Jim Collins, Good to Great, (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001).

32. “MILITARY: Maj. Gen. Ronald Bailey takes command of 1st Marine Division.”

33. “Lieutenant General Ronald Bailey (USMC) on Leadership at Hillsdale College.”

34. Ibid.

35. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021.

36. Staff, “Our Native Son Lieutenant General Ronald L. Bailey,” The Historical Marker Database, (n.d.), available at https://www.hmdb.org.

37. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021

38. “Lieutenant General Ronald Bailey (USMC) on Leadership at Hillsdale College.”

39. Staff, “External Affairs,” Austin Peay State University, (n.d.), available at https://www.apsu.edu.

40. Staff, “About Us,” The Travis Manion Foundation, (n.d.), available at https://www.travismanion.org.

41. Personal telephone conversation between the author and LtGen Ronald L. Bailey (USMC, Retired) on 22 January 2021.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

by Chaplain, Major Meoshia A. Wilson

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Maj Wilson is a chaplain in the United States Air Force who has deployed to an undisclosed location. She is a student at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College. She was previously assigned to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains at Headquarters Air Force.

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A great leader is one who blazes a trail with integrity, despite adversity, and influences and empowers others to do the same. Col Gilda A. Jackson is a great leader who directly served in the Marine Corps for nearly thirty years and indirectly served the Marine Corps as the president and general manager of Lockheed Martin Aero Parts for fourteen years. She joined the Marine Corps as an active-duty enlisted supply clerk in 1968 during the Vietnam War. After her initial enlistment, she transitioned to the reserves while completing her bachelor’s degree in economics. In 1975, she commissioned as a logistics officer, and her military career soared from there. Two of her historic accomplishments include being the first black woman selected to the rank of colonel and becoming the first woman to command the Naval Aviation Depot in Cherry Point, NC. In her own words, Col Jackson believes that one success leads to other successes.¹ Col Jackson was successful because she exercised her faith in God, incorporated her mentors’ advice, seized the opportunities presented to her, and applied leadership lessons along the way.

Faith in God

            Faith in God was, and still is, a lifeline for Col Jackson. She was raised in Columbus, OH, in a Catholic home and continued to attend Mass throughout her time in the Marine Corps. She usually worshiped off base and would also participate in Mass on base whenever she served as a commander. During an interview, Col Jackson expressed how important it was for her subordinates to see her worship at the base chapel. She wanted personnel to know that she lived out her faith convictions.² When in command, leaders’ speech and actions communicate their values and beliefs. Thus, those who saw Col Jackson in Mass saw that she valued assembling with parishioners, praying, receiving holy communion, and being encouraged through the homily. Her faith was the foundation of her resilience. Black officers were few in the 1970s, so their ability to gain renewed strength for challenging times was critical. Col Jackson was repeatedly the only, or one of the few, black officers in her units. Dating back to the entrance of black Marines at Montford Point in 1942, black enlisted men had to prove themselves worthy of being called a Marine. It was not until the end of World War II that black service members proved themselves to be Marines.³ Women would travel a similar journey in striving to be called a Marine rather than a female Marine. Fast-forward to 1975, then Lt Jackson testified that she still felt the pressure to perform and even prove herself. She was a double minority, a black woman, who navigated leading the majority amid Marine culture. To persevere while leading through difficult times, her faith in God kept her prayerful and grounded.

Advice from Mentors

            Seeking and heeding the advice of mentors was another component of Col Jackson’s success. Some of her mentors include retired LtGen Willie Williams, retired MajGen Joe Anderson, and Harry Black. Mr. Black’s rank upon retirement is unknown to the interviewer; however, he was consistent in telling Col Jackson what to do and avoid. She trusted each of her mentors to steer her in the right direction and expected them to be brutally honest with her. She was open to correction because she knew her mentors would speak the truth. It is priceless to have truthtellers in one’s life, especially as a commander, because people who say what they think the commander wants to hear outweigh those who will say what needs to be said. Therefore, Col Jackson kept her mentors close. The guidance she received from mentors contributed to her performance, which positioned her for selection to in-residence professional military education (PME) at every level. She completed Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Air War College (AWC), all by correspondence before attending in-residence. It is no small feat to be selected for school and even more of a privilege to attend PME at a sister Service school. Col Jackson’s experience in AWC gave her more in-depth aviation knowledge, which bolstered her expertise in preparation for commanding at the Naval Aviation Depot.

           Before AWC, while commanding the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 in Yuma, Arizona, a mentor taught her a professional tactic that would become a personal hobby—golf. Each month, the wing commander held a wing review of aircraft, unit manning, and staff personnel. After the review, some of the squadron commanders played golf with the wing commander. Col Jackson was not interested in golf and did not know how to play, so she did not attend. She noticed that the squadron commanders who did attend received whatever they asked for in meetings. The squadron commander’s trend was to make a request during the meeting, and if the wing commander looked puzzled, the squadron commander would reference what she/he had discussed with the wing commander on the golf course. After discussing this observation with her mentor, Col Jackson took five golf lessons, and to this day, she spends at least three days each week on the golf course. Her mentor told her that golfing with the wing commander would allow her to discuss some of her squadron’s priorities, explain what was needed (e.g., money or manpower), and establish a bond with all of the commanders in attendance because it may come in handy later. From that point forward, Col Jackson followed her mentor’s advice and reaped the benefits when she too would remind the wing commander of what they discussed on the golf course. Mentors can help open doors, and what they suggest can be favorable in public and private life; it certainly was for Col Jackson.

Seize Opportunities

            Seizing opportunities was a habit before Col Jackson ever entered the Marine Corps, which worked to her advantage. She graduated from high school at age seventeen, a year after her father passed away, and looked for direction. The first opportunity she seized was joining the military. She intended to join the Air Force, but the recruiter was out of the office when she arrived at the recruiting station. The Marine recruiter was there and offered to assist her. He answered her questions and asked her to fill out a form with her contact information. He promised to leave it with the Air Force recruiter. Soon after that, the Marine recruiter called and asked if she wanted to come in and take the entrance exam, to which she agreed. As she was preparing to depart for basic training, the Air Force recruiter called to see if she was still interested. The Air Force’s loss was the Marine Corps’ gain. Then Sgt Jackson seized the opportunity to close the gap between her and the white women officers. She asked someone this question as she pointed to a woman officer, “What’s the difference between her and me?”³ The response she was received was “a college degree,” and she said, “I can do that.”⁴ Col Jackson completed her bachelor’s in 1975, and she commissioned the same year and completed her master’s degree in Human Resources Management in 1977.

            Beyond completing civilian education and PME, mentioned above, Col Jackson began her officer career serving Marines, yet she spent a significant part of her career with the Navy. Lisa Tendrich Frank summarizes Col Jackson’s officer career below:

She began a career in marine aviation that included stints as supply officer for the Stations Operation and Engineering Squadron in El Toro, California, as a Group Aviation Supply Support Center officer for the Marine Aircraft 12 in Iwakuni, Japan, and as a fiscal officer for the Marine Aircraft Group 16 for the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing in Tustin, California … she served in the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron of the Marine Aircraft Group 13 … once again, in the Marine Helicopter Training Squadron 301…she was stationed at the Navy Aviation Supply Office in Philadelphia, where she served as weapons system manager…she became commander of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 in Yuma, Arizona, and then the Marine support requirements officer at the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program Office … she reported to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing and shortly after earned a promotion to colonel and received the command of the Naval Aviation Depot … in her final assignment in the military, Jackson commanded the largest industrial employer east of I-95 and one with a billion-dollar annual budget.⁵

            Col Jackson’s assignments were challenging, but she loved serving others and accomplishing the mission. When she was selected to command the Naval Aviation Depot, she was honored and nervous simultaneously. The concerns she shared with her mentor revolved around what she thought maybe limitations. She told him, “but I’m a woman and they are men, I’m not an aviator and they are, I haven’t pinned on colonel yet.”⁶ Her mentor calmed her down by telling her not to worry about any of that. He assured her that she had been preparing for years to excel in the depot. Her mentor’s encouragement fueled her work ethic, which was to dazzle people by doing her homework and showing them that she knows what she is doing.⁷ Thus, commanding at the depot was another opportunity for Col Jackson to shine.

            Col Jackson did so well at the depot that Lockheed Martin asked her to consider working for it upon retiring from the Marine Corps. She initially dismissed the offer; however, they insisted she propose a salary range that would make her reconsider. After giving the Lockheed Martin representative a ridiculous dollar figure, the representative agreed and sealed the deal. Col Jackson’s expertise, experience, and leadership ability were priceless, and Lockheed Martin was relentless in adding her to its team. Although money attracted Col Jackson to the company, what made the job special was the opportunity it would give her to continue contributing to the Marine Corps C-130 mission. Upon retiring from the Marine Corps in 2001, she became the president and general manager of Lockheed Martin AeroParts. She was responsible for developing “training systems and curriculum for future pilots and aviation mechanics.”⁸ After fourteen years with Lockheed Martin, Col Jackson retired again in 2018. She undoubtedly experienced one success after another in the Marine Corps and at Lockheed Martin, all of which began with her willingness to seize the opportunities presented.

Six Leadership Lessons

            Leadership lessons are plenteous and can only make a difference when applied. Col Jackson learned countless lessons over her fifty-year career between the two organizations. What follows are six lessons extracted from stories Col Jackson shared while being interviewed. Lesson one: one can garner respect if people see the ribbons one has earned. She was prior enlisted but neglected to wear her ribbons on her uniform. She noticed that the senior enlisted personnel did not show her respect as a second lieutenant. A mentor told her to start wearing her ribbons and see if anything changed. Perhaps the ribbons communicated experience, knowledge, and wisdom to the enlisted personnel because they showed Col Jackson respect from that point forward. Lesson two: junior officers focus on leadership, and senior officers focus on managing while still leading. Senior officers can no longer be in the weeds; instead, they should have a big picture view of the organization’s direction while empowering lower echelon leaders to handle the details. Col Jackson’s distinction is a great way to establish boundaries, avoid micromanaging, and give junior officers an opportunity to lead with minimal interference.

            Lesson three: failure can teach one to pay closer attention to the details and know where the mission’s breaking point is. As a logistician, running out of supplies such as an aircraft tailhook was forbidden. After committing what was forbidden, Col Jackson learned to create a never out list and ensure those supplies were always in stock. Lesson four: leaders should read books and articles on how other people commanded and apply what is most pertinent to their situation. Reading other people’s experiences can be helpful because it reminds the reader that they are not alone, poses different scenarios to consider, provides varied perspectives, and sparks new ideas to implement. Lesson five: commanders should solicit their sergeant major’s advice and know when they are just sharing information versus wanting the commander to take action. The sergeant major needs to know that he/she is a valued member of the command team and will be taken seriously as an advisor to the commander.

            Lesson six: the decision-making process should be taken seriously since it is complex. For Col Jackson, her process included prayer and assessing whether her decision would facilitate a discharge action for someone and how it could affect their pay and livelihood. She would then gather all possible options and enlist a mentor’s help to identify the most likely and executable course of action. She would attempt to predict the outcome of that course of action and stand by her decision. There is wisdom in Col Jackson’s approach to making decisions because it demonstrates her compassion for people while maintaining good order and discipline and shows that she did not make significant decisions in a vacuum. The leader who makes intentional decisions and applies the lessons that she/he has learned is one who spends time reflecting.

Conclusion

            In reflection of the interview with Col Jackson, she is an inspiration. To have been a minority throughout her career yet break barriers despite having to prove herself is a testament to her character. She was a woman of faith who carried God with her while leading and managing people. The mentorship she received was an extension of God’s guidance, so Col Jackson relied on mentors to keep her out of trouble and propel her past her peers. Once pushed, she seized the opportunity to lead and be challenged because she knew it would facilitate learning and growth. As a lifetime learner, she gleaned leadership lessons that she applied throughout her career. One win led to many victories. Although she is retired two times over, she continues to mentor youth and young adults because she wants to contribute to their one success, leading to other wins. Her legacy is that she made it easier for her successors, and she showed people what was possible. The interviewer is a first-hand witness of what is possible for her and considers Col Jackson to be one who has provided shoulders upon which the interviewer can stand.

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Notes

1. Staff, “Once a Marine, Always a Marine: The Story of Gilda A. Jackson,” Marines TV Video, (September 2017, available at https://www.marines.mil.

2. Zoom interview between Gilda A. Jackson and Meoshia Wilson on 22 January 2021.

3. Ronald Culp, The First Black United States Marines: The Men of Montford Point, 1942-1946 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007).

4. Zoom interview between Gilda A. Jackson and Meoshia Wilson on 22 January 2021.

5. Ibid.

6. Lisa Tendrich Frank, An Encyclopedia of American Women at War: From the Home Front to the Battlefields, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2013).

7. Zoom interview between Gilda A. Jackson and Meoshia Wilson on 22 January 2021.

8. Ibid.

9. An Encyclopedia of American Women at War.

by MAJ Timothy G. Russell, U.S. Army

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MAJ Russell is an Armor Officer in the United States Army with multiple combat tours to both Iraq and Afghanistan. He is currently a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and following graduation, he will attend the AY22 School of Advanced Warfighting. His previous assignments include service in both Mechanized and Stryker Brigade Combat Team formations in addition to an assignment to the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, CA. 

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Throughout American history, stories of heroism, bravery and courage are documented and passed down from generation to generation to preserve the legacy of those who laid the foundation of excellence before them. Heroic actions of those who stood bravely to push the British from levying taxes on the Colonies to celebrated treasonous Confederate officers who sought to continue the systematic oppression of slavery in the southern states, the United States military has institutionalized professional military education programs to focus on the actions of white flag officers. These stories remain a part of the fabric of American history, but the deliberate exclusion of the efforts of African American military leaders who risked and those who gave their lives in every single military conflict since the inception of this Nation must be recorded and introduced into the military education programs across all levels and branches of Service. The Marine Corps retained a legacy of exclusion about the service of African Americans within their ranks for nearly 144 years from 1798 to 1942. This deliberate and public condemnation of the service of minorities in this branch did not suddenly change naturally or without significant push back from senior leaders and was only accomplished through the use of executive action from the President of the United States. The initial black Marines who enlisted and were trained in the Marine Corps are commonly known as the Montford Point Marines who not only risked their lives during American conflicts in Korea and Vietnam but also risked their lives domestically daily under the strict thumb of Jim Crow laws and American segregation. Placing the love of country above all else and motivated by a sense of service, these men laid the foundation for future black Marines to follow and provided their successors with the tools to break glass ceilings once thought to be impenetrable. One notable figure, LTG Frank Petersen stood vicariously upon the shoulders of these great leaders to create a path for future generations of black officers to follow while serving in the Marine Corps.

            Born into a family of four in the segregated city of Topeka, KS, on March 2, 1932, LTG Petersen was raised by working-class parents who praised education and hard work as a means to overcome the systematic inequalities that black Americans faced during the 1930s and 1940s. His father, a radio repairman, and his mother, an educator, always pushed their children to ensure that they could meet the challenges of the American way of life by studying hard and excelling in everything that you do as a means to compete within the intensely divided American society. As a result, LTG Petersen would be recognized by selection to gifted education programs in middle school and achieving above-average grades throughout his high school years. He and his family had become accustomed to the daily inequalities of segregated America, sitting in the back of public transportation and eating in separate facilities from whites.

            One significant day in history would change the culture of Topeka, KS, and shape the focus of American society in what seemed to be a swift moment in time. In 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred and, for what seemed like the blink of an eye, adjusted the mindset of all Americans, black or white, from coast to coast. The sense of American patriotism and American resolve flowed through the veins of white Americans and a sense of duty and service was instilled in many black Americans during this time. In a unique and unexplainable way, black Americans felt an obligation to serve in a war against an enemy who sought to cause harm to the country that for many years subjected them to racism, bigotry, and unprovoked violence. Topeka turned into a logistics and air support hub for units and equipment headed to participate in the war effort against Japan. Observing the rush of bombers and other aerial assets in the area, LTG Petersen became fascinated with the concept of flying and the complexity of the inner workings of military aircraft. He studied how they worked, how they were built, and found pleasure in building model planes for fun. His love of planes and fighter jets bled into a newfound desire to explore electronics and naturally became an understudy of his father who taught him the basics of electronics with the goal of his son one day making a living following his footsteps. LTG Petersen watched as his father continued to progress in his field, garnering recognition from Army leaders for his skill and knowledge of electronics, providing him with a position training military members about the radio in the Signal Corps who were headed to support the war effort. Feeling a sense of pride and admiration for the accomplishments of his father, young LTG Petersen was not naive to the treatment his father received being a black man in America. Racist whites who hired him and with whom he worked looked at him differently compared to other blacks in society but understood that outside of his contributions he would still be treated the same. This revelation turned into motivation for the young LTG Petersen as he knew he would have to work harder than his peers to gain their acceptance and hopefully prove his worth to be treated equally regardless of his ethnicity. His parents focused their parenting efforts on professional appearance, manners, and grammatically correct speech. The idea was that if they raised respectful, intelligent, and professional-looking children, they could one day assimilate into white society with reduced friction.

            As he grew into his formative years, LTG Petersen admired pioneer sports figures such as Jackie Robinson and Joe Louis. These groundbreaking symbols of black excellence motivated LTG Petersen to dream of a day when the issue of race would not be the primary focus for opportunities in America and that public acts of racism and discrimination would become illegal and change the minds of white American attitudes toward blacks. After graduating from high school, LTG Petersen sought to escape his hometown and enlist in the Navy. Because of age restrictions, he required support and signature authority from his parents to legally sign his enlistment contract. Initially, his decision to forego his college education for service in the Navy was supported by his father, his mother on the other hand was in direct opposition. She witnessed the massive war efforts that had occurred and were ongoing and could not stand the thought of her son risking his life on foreign land. As a result, LTG Petersen decided against enlisting into the Navy and enrolled into Washburn University, remaining at home with his parents. He attended school with other notable black students who would contribute to breaking systematic barriers in American society, but after his freshman year, he had a very short and minimally worded conversation with his father. In essence, his father granted him the approval and familial support to proceed with his enlistment into the Navy. Acknowledging that restricting his son to remaining in Topeka was causing harm emotionally and spiritually, LTG Petersen’s father knew he needed to allow him to grow his wings and follow his dreams and aspirations.

            So, in 1950, LTG Petersen rushed to the recruitment office to enlist into the Navy. Upon the completion of his entrance examination, the officials there requested that he retake the examination to verify his tremendously high scores. Reluctantly, LTG Petersen abided by the request and submitted to take the examination a second time, with the proctor in the room watching his every move. To the surprise of the recruitment official, LTG Petersen had obtained the highest scores ever recorded out of the Topeka recruiting station, and on his second attempt, he surpassed his initial examination results. During this time in American history, blacks were not viewed as being capable of serving in skilled or technical fields. Even with his high scores, the recruitment official offered LTG Petersen a job as a steward in the Navy. Offended and feeling insulted, LTG Petersen rushed out of the office and contemplated establishing his adult life in Topeka after all. He informed his father of the events and his interaction with the Navy recruiting official. A little time later, LTG Petersen was invited back to the recruitment office and was offered a position as a high-level electronics technician. Somehow, the recruiter was able to identify and find a position more suitable for the talents of the extremely talented and intelligent young LTG Petersen.

            He entered Navy training for electronics technician in June of 1950 with high hopes of not only serving his country but contributing to the slow-growing change in American society. While in training, he heard about a Navy pilot by the name of Jesse Brown. Jesse Brown was killed in the war in Korea in December of 1950 when his plane was shot down by the enemy fire. Although this was an extremely unfortunate and tragic event, his death motivated LTG Petersen and continued to drive his resolve to work hard and follow his dreams, and most notably Jesse Brown was black. This was significant because black service members were not afforded opportunities to serve in positions such as pilots and other traditional combat roles. Using this motivation as fuel, LTG Petersen applied and was accepted into the highly competitive Naval Aviation Cadet Program in 1951.

            Although a member of the armed services, LTG Petersen could not escape the racial injustices of life outside of military installations in America, and especially in Florida where he would receive his initial flight training. Upon his arrival at Pensacola Naval Air Station Basic Training Command, he learned that only three other black cadets had completed the course. One of those three being Jesse Brown whose untimely death had motivated him to apply for the course. Throughout his time in Pensacola, he knew that he represented something more than just himself and that although becoming a pilot was a personal goal, his successful completion would serve as a catalyst for future black pilots across the armed forces. LTG Petersen completed flight training and accepted a commission into the Marine Corps in 1952. His commission would become one of many firsts for the junior officer, he would forever be recognized as the first black aviator in Marine Corps history.

            Following his training, LTG Petersen would be deployed to support the war effort in Korea as an F4U pilot. He is recorded to have flown 64 combat missions out of the K-6 airfield. Because of high casualties along the Korean peninsula, many of his peers were pilots who were recalled by the military out of civilian life to fly combat missions in support of the war effort. LTG Petersen learned a great deal from these experienced pilots, many of them having the previous service in World War II who provided him with advice on how to face the complexities of flying in a war zone. During his service in Korea, LTG Petersen was recognized for his superior flying ability and his role in the war by earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and an additional six air medals. After returning home from his deployment to the Korean peninsula, LTG Petersen would serve in a variety of assignments in California and other schools to expand his knowledge base and keep him competitive amongst his peers in the aviation field.

            In 1968 LTG Petersen would assume command of a tactical air squadron, becoming the first black officer to accomplish this once unobtainable position. He deployed his unit to Vietnam later that year and flew over 290 combat missions against an extremely formidable enemy. During operations there his would log over 4,000 flight hours and also received a purple heart after being shot down by enemy fire over Vietnam. His squadron would earn recognition as the most outstanding fighter squadron for their overall actions during the war in Vietnam.

            Recognizing that flying was his true passion but maintaining a burning desire to continue to blaze a trail for others to follow, LTG Petersen knew he needed to take an assignment that would set him on a trajectory to be promoted into the general officer ranks. After facing this realization, LTG Petersen took an assignment as a Special Assistant to the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps. In this capacity, he would be directly involved in the development of actions to break down systematic barriers limiting the advancement of African American in the Marine Corps. This position provided him an opportunity to serve alongside the decision-makers within the Marine Corps and provide his testimony as a precedent to the potential that black Marines have not only in the Marine Corps but the armed forces as a whole.

            LTG Petersen would then move on to serve as the Marine Corps’ first black officer to serve as the commander of Marine Air Group 32 in Cherry Point, NC, and another command of a Marine Amphibious Brigade. He followed this assignment as once again, the first black officer to serve as the commander of a major Marine Corps base, Marine Corps Base Quantico. He would retire as the highest-ranking black officer in Marine Corps history in 1988.

            The story of LTG Petersen is not only a story of firsts for black officers in the United States armed forces, yet it is a historical depiction of what can be earned through hard work and determination. Growing up in an environment being treated as less than human and being viewed by society as inferior did not prohibit the aspirations of this motivating leader. Through the racial discrimination he faced, and the unequal treatment by forces within the military and outside of uniform, LTG Petersen always knew that fighting for what is right and representing himself with prestige and professionalism would one day pay off. The lessons taught to him by his parents growing up in Topeka, KS, provided the foundation for the life lessons that he took forward with him throughout his career in the Marine Corps. His legacy will undoubtedly live on in not only Marine Corps history but serves as a model of what is possible by all those who serve and all those who seek to eradicate systematic barriers for advancement in career fields that once restricted blacks from having an opportunity to prove their abilities.