Operation AL FAJR

While the combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) reasserted American supremacy in a classic combined arms campaign
on open terrain, success against the protracted insurgency in urban
areas is more elusive. As a recent analysis argued, “The very success
of American joint operations—and joint fires in particular—guarantee
that a clever opponent will move into cities for protection.”¹
While cautionary maxims oft-repeated since Sun Tzu’s time point
to avoiding cities, the U.S. military must be prepared to defeat the
urban adversary when war aims demand it. Military operations on urbanized
terrain (MOUT) are not new phenomena, but some pundits bemoaned coalition
readiness prior to Operation AL FAJR
(OAF) (also known as Operation PHANTOM FURY)
in Fallujah. Though neither sterile nor quick, OAF proved not to be
the feared bloody quagmire that other armies historically faced. In
the tradition of Hue City, coalition forces under the I Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF) successfully breached Fallujah’s defenses and seized
the city, eliminating a key insurgent stronghold. Several key factors
contributed to rapid tactical/operational victory—the virtual absence
of civilians; effective MOUT doctrine, tactics, and command and control
(C²); and adherence to the laws of
war, especially regarding joint fires.²
Extant joint and Service doctrine discusses MOUT characteristics and
caveats in detail;³ many apply to this
article but are not restated here. A pithy description of the urban
dilemma is that:

The enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure
American forces into terrain where Information Age knowledge, speed,
and precision give way to the more traditional advantages of mass,
will, patience, and the willingness to die.⁴

An examination of the OAF experience sheds light on enduring MOUT principles
and offers some preconditions for potential success.

Principles To Be Considered

First, a significant positive factor was simply the absence of the vast
majority of the population. Early in the precombat phase of operations,
I MEF made a concerted effort to persuade the insurgents to lay down
their weapons or face death. Many clearly chose to depart, attenuating
over time the enemy order of battle. So, too, did the majority of civilians.
The assault’s imminence became apparent as more and more forces
arrived at the outskirts of the city. Surely, recent I MEF operations
in Najaf also demonstrated that I MEF meant business, would risk casualties,
and would call in heavy fires when necessary to accomplish the mission.
By 8 November 2004, civilians had left the city in droves; as much as
80 percent of the 250,000 to 300,000 people departed.⁵
I MEF did not force the populace to depart but encouraged them via leaflets
and media to that effect. Some pundits alleged that the frequent airstrikes
from April to November were designed to terrorize the population and
drive them out.⁶ Regardless of intentions,
airstrikes likely did cause many to depart. The virtual absence of civilians
in MOUT is rare, making OAF somewhat unique. It simplified the tasks
of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants and employing heavier
fires.⁷ In fact, ground commanders
involved with the April 2004 Fallujah assault espoused the benefits
of removing civilians from the melee.⁸
Specifically, it expedites the doctrinal MOUT objective of isolating
the enemy without the negative consequences of a cordon and siege on
a tenant population. Further, resources typically needed to ascertain
the nature and extent of collateral concerns on the battlefield are
available instead for offensive priorities. In certain MOUT scenarios,
ground force commanders would do well to facilitate the departure of
civilians, perhaps with the preassault establishment of large internally
displaced persons centers. Although reports of OAF civilian casualties
surfaced, many proved exaggerated or baseless, and the Arab street outcry
was muted. Indeed, I MEF reported no known civilian deaths by D+11.⁹
Thus one reason the enemy did not win the OAF information war was the
minimal civilian casualties due to the evacuation.

Second, the weight of evidence indicates that Marine leaders, steeped
in MOUT lessons learned, applied this unique aspect of operational art
to OAF joint planning, strategy, and tactics. This was a daunting task,
considering the MOUT defender’s advantages as well as the local
support and sanctuary and the months the insurgents had to establish
weapons caches and C². For instance,
I MEF applied the MOUT dictum of overwhelming force and firepower, leading
a large force of seasoned Marine and Army battalions supported by a
mix of joint fires.¹⁰ As many as 15,000
coalition troops and 2,000 Iraqis¹¹
provided both physical wherewithal and psychological impact. Of course,
I MEF had sufficient time and resources to plan and mass forces—not
always the case in MOUT. I MEF also exploited existing MOUT doctrine,
most of which was either Marine Corps produced or filled with examples
from Marine operations. Even the use of a 64-year-old Marine Corps urban
warfare primer, disparaged by the press at the time, contributed to
success. Additionally, Marine Corps institutional appreciation for military
history and post-Cold War MOUT trends shaped predeployment Marine training.
For example, several courses of instruction, large-scale Marine exercises,
and deployment workups focus on MOUT.¹²
Navy and Marine air wings similarly train to strike targets on urban
mockup ranges. Allied MOUT experience, from exchange officer programs
to attendance at the British Army’s Copehill Downs MOUT training
center¹³ and the Israeli Defense Force’s
Adam Counterinsurgency Urban Warfare training facility,¹⁴
is also integral to Marine Corps MOUT instruction. MOUT tactics, long
part of the Marine toolbox, are increasingly a high priority for Army
personnel as well.¹⁵ Air Force MOUT
training emphasis is more limited, but they lead the development of
air-to-ground munitions optimal for MOUT. I MEF leaders clearly utilized
the Corps’ MOUT expertise, with units rehearsing MOUT tactics outside
Fallujah prior to the offensive, incorporating fighting techniques used
in Vietnam, Israeli territories, Chechnya, Somalia and, most recently,
Najaf and Karbala.¹⁶ Still, Marines
stress that the Corps must do more to “develop and advance an urban-warfare
ethos and mind-set.”¹⁷ Services
are still compiling OAF lessons learned,¹⁸
promising ample fodder for future professional articles; Quantico is
leading the way in this ongoing analysis.

One uniquely Marine modus operandi was also critical to OAF success—keeping
the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) intact under one commander.
Marines inherently train to fight as such and applied MAGTF MOUT strengths¹⁹
in OAF, while incorporating Army ground units and joint fires. Integral
Marine aircraft delivered the majority of bombs during OAF, but I MEF
did maintain the link back to the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander’s
(CFACC’s) joint airpower, with Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft
contributing to the many close air support (CAS) missions. The press
also highlighted the hundreds of rounds of daily Marine and Army artillery
supporting ground units clearing the city.²⁰
(Notably, indirect fires do not seem to have resulted in significant
civilian casualties.) Other successful MAGTF MOUT tactics included infantry-supported
armor, heavy reliance on snipers, and typical Marine Corps ingenuity,
such as heavy bulldozers to destroy or bury insurgent defenses. I MEF
also exploited non-lethal fires when appropriate. I MEF’s huge
“MAGTF-plus” dwarfed other coalition division-sized elements
but effectively incorporated joint and MAGTF MOUT strengths under a
single Marine commander.

Fourth, I MEF’s methodical approach to OAF demonstrated sound
MOUT C^2. For example, I MEF prudently
directed sector-by-sector (vice wholesale) urban clearing—disciplined
building-to-building movement—often at the consternation of Washington
leaders seeking a quick win. Indeed, the pace of MOUT (I MEF leaders
asserted the combat phase of operations was over in 11 days²¹)
can determine the operation’s outcome, though each MOUT scenario
is different. Accelerating an operation for political expediency can
spell disaster, while not exploiting fleeting battlefield opportunities
can extend the duration of fighting. Clausewitzian theory suggests either
a deliberate cordon to await conditions favorable for the attacker or
simply bypassing urban areas not critical to war aims.²²
OAF execution seems to reflect elements of both, with a gradually tightening
cordon and limited indirect attacks²³
and then an eventual siege but only at one decisive city. Coalition
resources limit the number and scope of MOUT campaigns, of course. The
indirect approach alone, however, would likely not work in all MOUT
scenarios. One cannot discount the significant resources and time to
effect a cordon or the requirement to “go downtown” in some
circumstances. I MEF C² apparently
orchestrated the intensity, simultaneity, and pace of maneuver and fires
to good effect in OAF. Conversely, poor MOUT C²
or ineffective joint coordination increases the chances of fratricide,
excessive collateral damage (CD), and even operational failure. Russian
pilots acting independently of ground troops in Grozny and unity of
command problems in Mogadishu are good cases in point.²⁴

Due diligence to the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) was another key
to OAF success. In fact, it did not compromise “military effectiveness”
as some suggest—if strategic victory is the gauge of success. OAF
execution demonstrated CD consideration at all echelons; commensurate
rules of engagement (ROE) followed. Marine leaders showed awareness
of protected sites, even in areas devoid of civilians, carefully controlling
fires in measured, proportional responses. Fallujah insurgents, however,
clearly disregarded LOAC; insurgents used 60 of the 100-plus mosques
for military purposes,²⁵ technically
making them legitimate military targets.²⁶
Knowing Americans are loath to attack protected sites, this insurgent
violation mirrors the larger combatant use of the urban area itself
(normally protected) for military purposes. CD concerns also influenced
joint fires decisions, including the use of delayed fusing and smaller
weapons selection for MAGTF and CFACC fixed-wing aircraft²⁷—mainly
smaller precision weapons like the GBU–38 (500-pound joint direct
attack munition (JDAM)) and AGM–65 Maverick. While not technological
panaceas, JDAM accuracy and smaller warheads reduce the potential for
CD. Additionally, supporting the civilian departure was clearly in line
with LOAC principles. Finally, while LOAC due diligence can be a factor
in strategic success, political pressure to avoid friendly and civilian
casualties will likely always put joint warfighters on the horns of
a dilemma. Efforts to protect noncombatants typically mean increased
risk to coalition forces, while tactics to reduce risks to friendlies
put civilians in harm’s way.²⁸
Thankfully, meaningful LOAC training and enlightened senior leadership
seem to be the Marine Corps norm.

CAS in MOUT

The prudent use of heavier fires as a critical MOUT procedure deserves
further discussion. MOUT doctrine explicitly calls for selective and
precise joint fires, especially regarding air-to-ground ordnance.²⁹
Doctrine focuses on the difficulty of identifying targets themselves,
while avoiding fratricide and CD, but more importantly, taking the potential
operational/strategic impact of joint fires into account. Sensible OAF
weapons choice and fires planning arguably saved coalition lives, prevented
fratricide, and shortened the operation. Though the vast majority of
the fires were apparently reactive—mortars, artillery, helicopter
gunships, and fixed-wing CAS for troops in contact—joint procedures,
such as gridded reference graphics and mensurated aim points for on-call
CAS targets,³⁰ helped expedite, simplify,
and control the effects of heavy urban fires. I MEF’s CAS emphasis
(roughly 50 missions daily in the combat phase) demonstrated an appreciation
for doctrine, history, and LOAC/ROE, even as some pundits criticized
the dearth of deliberate airstrikes in the first few days.³¹
Moreover, the all-weather GBU–38 (laser-guided bombs require clear
line of sight and continuous illumination³²)
proved decisive, providing greater precision and lethality against defended
buildings than MAGTF artillery or helicopter fires. Add to that its
high-impact angle, low circular error probable, and comparatively small
blast and fragmentation outside targeted buildings and the warfighter
has a significant new “low CD” MOUT weapon.³³
Notably, the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) air wing was the first
to deploy the Navy GBU–38 in urban combat.³⁴
Other near-term developments optimal for MOUT include global positioning
system (GPS)-guided 155mm artillery rounds, Navy 5-inch extended range
guided munitions, the small-diameter bomb, and tactical Tomahawk.³⁵
Notwithstanding recent advances, many traditional U.S. military firepower
strengths remain marginalized in MOUT.³⁶
OAF truly demonstrated, however, that lighter, precise joint fires enhance
the chances for successful MOUT when wielded by enlightened practitioners
of the art of war.

Mitigating CD

Local and international expectation and perception management before
OAF seems to have improved the chances for success as well. While media
predictions of a protracted imbroglio proved inaccurate, early U.S.
estimates of heavy fighting helped shape public opinion. Whether OAF
coalition casualties were “heavy” or not is debatable, but
they were markedly lower than other historical examples. The press cited
as few as 51 U.S. troops killed and 425 wounded; in comparison, 2,800
Russian troops died in the 1995 Grozny assault.³⁷
In all fairness, OAF operations continued into May, with occasional
U.S. casualties, but OAF friendly—and civilian—casualties
were “light enough” to avoid strategic failure. While MOUT
experts and doctrine caveat the potential strategic repercussions of
friendly casualties, OAF’s unique circumstances and U.S. military
supremacy were mitigating factors. The next MOUT scenario may not be
so propitious. Further, after Najaf and Karbala, any expectations of
minimal OAF CD were pure naiveté. Of course, civilian casualties
are only part of the CD equation. Damage to infrastructure, residences,
and other protected sites is going to occur. Although physical damage
can be repaired, significant reconstruction costs should be expected
in MOUT (authorities estimate $500 million to repair Fallujah infrastructure
and the 32,000 destroyed homes).³⁸
Before the first shot is fired, careful efforts to inform global decisionmakers
and public opinion are advisable. The Hue Marine tactical victory is
an example where careful information management might have prevented
a strategic failure, when the costly, high-profile battle eroded the
U.S. will to fight. Without expectation management, bloody media coverage
and MOUT’s heavy resource toll can make battlefield successes moot.

Phase IV Operations

Finally, I MEF OAF planning and execution demonstrated keen understanding
that Phase IV urban operations will make or break the larger campaign.
Although inglorious, the complexities associated with Phase IV eclipse
those of the combat phase:

The urban warrior must deal with refugees, media,
curfews, crowd control, municipal government, street gangs, schools,
armed citizens, disease, mass casualties, police, cultural sites,
billions of dollars of private property, infrastructure and religion,
to name but a few factors.³⁹

Marines’ successes stem partially from training that molds a force
ready for both combat and the often more strategically important follow-on
operations. A recent analysis contended that heavyhanded U.S. Army OIF
postcombat urban operations contributed to the entrenched insurgency,
while Marine “small wars” experience permitted greater Phase
IV successes in their areas of responsibility.⁴⁰ Marine Corps institutional emphasis on cultural, language, and peacekeeping/reconstruction
training via the focus on military operations other than war paid off
in Fallujah. Long before OAF D-day, elaborate Phase IV planning and
resource marshaling was underway at Camp Fallujah, the I MEF headquarters.
Civil-military operations teams later followed closely behind combat
elements to begin the difficult work of humanitarian aid, reconstruction,
and establishing law and order. Further, Quantico continues to develop
skills for the “three block war,” using the Fallujah experience
in ongoing seminars and major U.S. Joint Forces Command wargames designed
to explore innovative interagency approaches to complex joint and combined
MOUT.⁴¹ Even with all of the Phase
IV doctrine, training, planning, and joint military wherewithal, OAF
illustrated this vital requirement for interagency coordination to bring
resources from outside the Department of Defense (DoD) to bear, especially
funds for postcombat normalization.⁴² Notably, significant OAF Phase IV operations continue. At the writing
of this article, 5 months after decisive combat operations ceased—OAF
strategic victory is not yet fully assured.⁴³

To maintain military supremacy, the United States must seek to master
the urban conundrum and fully incorporate this capability into the American
way of war. Political and military leaders would do well to embrace
the likelihood of future MOUT and support continued refinement of doctrine,
training, and specialized capabilities. OAF mission accomplishment demonstrated
that the question of urban warfare is not if it can be done, but whether
it is advisable in each case, and if the U.S. public and decisionmakers
are willing to pay the costs in blood and treasure. OAF serves as a
unique MOUT historical example—nothing like Stalingrad, for instance,
where the population fought alongside Russian troops defending the homeland
against an invading army. Similarly, Fallujah’s sprawl is nowhere
near as vast an urban terrain as Sarajevo or Beirut (though the terrain
and construction presented myriad unique challenges). At a minimum,
the high-visibility fight for Fallujah likely convinced insurgents that
coalition forces will bring the fight to them in any terrain. At best,
the OAF operational victory provides a case study reinforcing the current
DoD “cognitive transformation” initiative.⁴⁴
If history is an accurate measure, other more potentially potent aggressors
outside Iraq also took away some lessons—Americans will fight in
the city, they will fight knowing casualties will occur, and they will
unleash overwhelming force to achieve legitimate war aims.

Marines train to fight and kill on the urban battlefields of tomorrow.
We need warriors with these skills—warriors instilled with the
Corps ethos of honor and valor even in the bloodiest fights. As demonstrated
in OAF, MOUT will always exacerbate the fog and friction of war; however,
sound tactics and planning, produced by artful leadership, can mitigate
its most deleterious effects. Time will tell whether OAF proved a decisive
blow against the insurgent network, but urban warfare is here to stay.
Since Marines embraced this truism earlier than other Services, they
remain the best hope of success in the next urban fight. As such, they
should lead the effort to consolidate the plethora of MOUT doctrine,
evaluate new technologies, and develop and teach MOUT tactics, perhaps
from a national MOUT analysis center in Quantico. Similarly, decisionmakers
should consolidate the Service training facilities into a single, large
urban live fire range for joint exercises, as Marines, like their Army
brethren, will never move into cities alone. History will show that
Marines led a force of “magnificent bastards” into Fallujah,
truly living up to the credo of “no better friend, no worse enemy.”

1. Leonhard, LTC Robert R., USA(Ret), “Sun Tzu’s
Bad Advice: Urban Warfare in the Information Age,” Army Magazine,
available at http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/
AA1C74DA9302525585256CDF005EED3D?OpenDocument,
April 2005 archives.

2. This article deals only with OAF. Assessments may
or may not apply to previous Fallujah operations. See Mackubin T. Owens,
“Two, Three, Many Fallujahs,” The Weekly Standard,
December 2004, available at http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/owens/04/fallujah.html,
accessed 10 April 2005, and Jim Krane, “Fallujah Declared Success:
General Credits Lessons Learned in Failed April Assault on City,”
San Diego Tribune, 15 November 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041115/news_1n15iraq.html,
accessed 5 March 2005.

3. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication
3–06 (JP 3–06), Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, Washington,
DC, 16 September 2002. JP 3–06 references serve as a good
baseline for the plethora of MOUT doctrine.

4. Scales, MG Robert, USA(Ret), “Urban Warfare:
A Soldier’s View,” Military Review, January-February
2005, p. 9.

5. Al-Badrani, Fadil, “Falluja Retrunees Angry,
‘City Unfit for Animals’,” Reuters, 23 December 2004,
available at
http://www.ccmep.org/2004_articles/iraq/122404_fallujah.htm.

6. Stannard, Matthew B., “U.S., Iraqi Troops Mass
for Assault on Fallujah,” San Francisco Chronicle, 6 November
2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/041106-fallujah-assault.htm,
accessed 1 March 2005.

7. Keiler, Jonathan, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?,”
Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, January 2005,
p. 59.

8. Naylor, Sean D., “‘Paying the Price’
for Pulling Out: Commanders See a Tough Fight to Retake Fallujah,”
Army Times, 4 October 2004, available at http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-ARMYPAPER-369620.php,
accessed 10 March 2005.

9. Sattler, LtGen John A., Defense Department Operational
Update Briefing, 18 November 2004, available at http://www. defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041118-1606.html, accessed
15 April 2005 via http://www.GlobalSecurity.org.

10. Keiler, p. 59.

11. Ibid. In comparison, some 50,000 Russian troops
were needed to effectively cordon the smaller Grozny in 2000. See Timothy
Thomas, “Russian Lessons Learned From the Battle of Grozny,”
Marine Corps Gazette, April 2000, p. 45.

12. Kennedy, Harold, “Marines Seek Better Training,
Gear for Urban Combat, “ National Defense Magazine, July
2005 accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Jul/Marines_Seek.htm,
accessed 16 August 2006.

13. Glenn, Russell W., Marching Under Darkening Skies:
The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat,
Chapter Four: “MOUT Training,” Rand Corporation, 1998, p.
13.

14. Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA),
“Israel Assists U.S. Forces, Shares Lessons-Learned Fighting Terrorists:
Fallujah Success Capitalized on IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] Know-How,”
27 December 2004, available at http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/1701/documentid/2774/history/
3,2360,655,1701,2774,
accessed 4 March 2005.

15. Sample, SFC Doug, USA, “Soldiers Explain Army
Urban Warfare Doctrine,” Armed Forces Press Service, DoD, 27 November
2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2002/n11272002_200211272.html,
accessed 20 March 2005. The Army recently began MOUT training at its
state-of-the-art facility at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort
Polk, LA.

16. “Warplanes Continue To Hit Targets in Falluja:
Allawi Issues Warning as Offensive Looms on Anti-U.S. Stronghold,”
15 November 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/05/iraq.main/,
8 March 2005. Also Tom Shanker, “Past Battles Won and Lost Helped
in Falluja Assault,” The New York Times, 22 November 2004,
available at http://www.nytimes.com,
accessed 10 April 2005.

17. Houlgate, Maj Kelly P., “Urban Warfare Transforms
the Corps,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis,
MD, November 2004, available at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1104_Urban-P1,00.html,
accessed 6 March 2005. Maj Houlgate criticizes the lack of Marine combined
arms live fire training.

18. Sherman, Jason, “Pentagon Panel To Boost Urban
Defenses,” Defense News, 6 December 2004, available at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20041206/atpc15834960.sgml,
accessed 2 March 2005. OAF’s many lessons learned mirror those
of previous analyses found in sources cited throughout. For a good summary,
see Glenn, Chapter 7: “Recommendations” and LTC Robert F.
Hahn II, USA, “Urban Warfare and the Urban Fighters of 2025,”
Parameters, Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS,
Summer 1999, pp. 74–86.

19. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–53.3,
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, Headquarters Marine Corps,
Washington, DC, 26 April 1998 p. 1–13.

20. Spinner, Jackie, “Artillerymen Clear Path for
the Infantry,” The Washington Post, 11 November 2004, p.
A33.

21. Sattler.

22. Field Manual 3–06.11, Combined Arms Operations
in Urban Terrain, Headquarters U.S. Army, Appendix H, 9 November
2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/toc.htm,
accessed 10 March 2005. Also see Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On
War, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1984, p. 412.

23. Scales, “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military Forces Can
Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal
International, 136, October 1998, pp. 71–72.

24. Vick, Alan, et al., Aerospace Operations in Urban
Environments: Exploring New Concepts, Appendix D: “Lessons
Learned From Past Urban Air Operations,” Rand Corporation, 2000,
p. 12. Also see Field Manual 3–06, Urban Operations, Appendix
C, June 2003, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/index.html,
accessed 15 April 2005.

25. JINSA.

26. Waxman, Matthew C., International Law and the
Politics of Urban Air Operations, Chapter 2: “The Law of Armed
Conflict and Urban Air Operations,” Rand Corporation, 2000, p.10,
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1175/index.html.

27. Irwin, Sandra, “Urban Fighting in Iraq Spurs
New Thinking in Strike Aviation,” National Defense, November
2004, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Nov/UrbanFighting.htm,
accessed 2 March 2005.

28. Waxman, Chapter 3: “Political Constraints on
Urban Operations,” p. 1.

29. JP 3–06, Appendix B, “Joint Fires
for Urban Operations.”

30. JP 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Close Air Support, Washington, DC, 3 September 2003,
pp. III–18, V–51. See also Headquarters U.S. Air Force (XOL),
“Operation ANACONDA: An Air Power Perspective,”
Washington, DC, 7 February 2005, p. 56.

31. Keiler, p. 9; Sattler.

32. Air Land Sea Application Center, Aviation Urban
Operations, 15 April 2001, pp. IV–9 and C–1.

33. Jensen, Ron, “Latest Bombing Technology Helps
Reduce Risk to Iraqi Civilias,” Stars and Stripes, http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=26319&archive=true.

34. Department of the Navy, Navy Newsstand, 9
November 2004, available at http://www.news.navy.mil/list_single.asp?id=18714,
accessed 9 March 2005.

35. Scully, Megan, “Smart Artillery: U.S. Wants
to Adapt Weapon for Street Fighting,” Defense News, 29 November
2004, available at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20041129/atpc15798345.sgml.
Also see Chris Gaudet, “GPS Receiver Guides Artillery Shell in
Firing Test,” Defense News, 21 October 2002, available at
http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20021021/atpc3487872.sgml,
both accessed on 10 March 2005. Artillery warhead size often limits
its effectiveness in MOUT.

36. Keeter, Hunter, “Urban Operations Challenge
Shows Limits of U.S., Allied ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]
Capability,” Sea Power, U.S. Navy League, May 2004,
available at http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/may_04_14.php,
accessed 15 March 2005.

37. Field Manual 3–06.11, Combined Arms Operations
in Urban Terrain, Headquarters U.S. Army, Appendix H, available
at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/apph.htm,
accessed 1 April 2005.

38. Michaels, Jim, “Fallujah Sees Limited Progress
Toward Rebuilding,” USA Today, 10 April 2005, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-04-10-fallujah-rebuilding_x.htm,
accessed 10 April 2005.

39. Leonhard.

40. Gentile, LTC Gian P., USA, “The Army Can Fight
Small Wars Too,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis,
MD, March 2005, p. 92. See also Joint Publication 3–06,
p. II–4.

41. Headquarters Marine Corps, Public Affairs Press
Release 1004–04–1121, “Wargaming Exercise Highlights
Lessons Learned From Iraq,” 1 October 2004, available at http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/0/58C1EA4027E14C2085256FEA0055CF38?opendocument,
accessed 8 March 2005.

42. Krane. The I MEF plan for Fallujah called for an
immediate push of contractors to begin reconstruction.

43 Michaels. Marine leaders warn that the slow reparation
fund disbursement could turn the tide of Fallujah—and the Sunni
Triangle—sentiment against the coalition. LtGen Mattis frequently
espouses the critical need for “patient, persistent presence”
in a counterinsurgency environment.

44. Scales, “Army Transformation: Implications
for the Future,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,
15 July 2004, available at
http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-15Scales.pdf,
accessed 9 April 2005. April 2005 press cites new DoD requirements stressing
language, foreign area officer, and joint professional military education
training, indicating the cognitive transformation seed has found fertile
soil.