Keeping the Heritage Alive: Museum Docent Shares His Experience With New Sergeants

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) perform one of the most critical functions of the Marine Corps. They serve as the first line of leadership in every small unit and can make or break the officers over them. In combat, the significance of their role expands greatly as they make decisions with immediate impact on the lives of their Marines.

Active-duty personnel and civilians on Marine bases around the world ded­icate their full-time efforts to the pro­fessional military education (PME) of up-and-coming NCOs. In Quantico, Va., the Col­lege of Enlisted Military Edu­cation enjoys the benefits of their prox­imity to the National Museum of the Marine Corps and all the resources it can offer.

One of the most important resources comes from the experience of docents who volunteer their time to help preserve the history on display and educate the public. Ronald Echols has served as a docent since 2008. He left the Marine Corps as a second lieutenant in 1968 after four years of service. At first glance, his lowly rank and time in service may seem unremarkable, but for those who know him, Ron’s time on active duty proved an action-packed whirlwind of combat, leadership challenges and, ultimately, a battlefield commission. As a result, today he helps lead a portion of the PME for new sergeants during their four-week primary course.

“I try to explain to them that caring for the Marines under them is the most important thing they’ve got to do,” Ron said. “It’s like being a parent. All of them are now in charge of somebody and they’ve got to take care of them. I have the students for about 45 minutes, and it always makes me feel good to feel like I’m giving something to these young Marines.”

Baptism by Fire
Ron joined the Marines in 1964 at the age of 18. He received selection for sea duty and spent two years aboard ship before joining the 2nd Marine Division rifle team at Camp Lejeune, N.C. He made sergeant in less than three years, and in June of 1967, deployed to Vietnam. Assigned to “Mike” Company, 3rd Bat­tal­ion, 26th Marines, Ron endured his baptism through fire in short order. The battalion operated in the northern part of South Vietnam along the Demilitarized Zone. Through the summer, several Ma­rine units were bloodied and nearly wiped out by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) near Con Thien. 3/26 arrived in Septem­ber for their turn in the melee.

The battle opened on Sept. 7. Ron’s company witnessed their heaviest action three days later.

“We had four tanks, two Ontos, and a battalion of Marines,” Ron remembered. “Who is gonna mess with a battalion of Marines and all that armor? Well, the 324th NVA Division attacked us. Within 15 minutes, we had one Ontos left, and the tanks were blown all to crap. It was raining artillery on us. For seven and a half hours, it was on, with hand-to-hand and everything.”

At one point during the battle, Ron pushed forward with his Marines. A punch to his face temporarily stunned him before he surged ahead again.

“He’s hit!” screamed one of Ron’s Marines.

“Who’s hit?” Ron yelled.

“You’re hit!”

Ron discovered a splash of blood across his flak jacket increasing in size. He put his hand to his face and lowered it covered in red.

“Well, give me a bandage then!”

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This immersive exhibit at the National Museum of the Marine Corps allows visitors a glimpse into the world that SSgt Ron Echols and other 3/26 Marines faced during the siege at Khe Sanh. Kyle Watts.
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SSgt Ron Echols, left, and one of the Mike Co Navy corpsmen on Hill 881S during the siege at Khe Sanh. (Photo courtesy of Charles McCarty) He continued fighting until the next day when he could be evacuated to the hospital ship. Doctors discovered a bullet entered his cheek near the mouth and exited the other side of his face in front of his ear. Miraculously, no bones or nerves were hit. A plastic surgeon went to work, and less than a month later, Ron returned to the front lines. He counted as one of 434 Marines from the battalion wounded in the fight around Con Thien where 55 had been killed. Due to the attrition his company suffered, Ron was appointed the platoon sergeant. He would hold the responsibility for his platoon for the rest of his time in Vietnam.

The remainder of 1967 proved merci­fully less eventful for Company M as a whole. October and November held sev­eral significant events for Ron, however. He received a second Purple Heart during one patrol when an ambush caught them with mortar rounds. Shrapnel peppered his leg, but Ron completed the mission without evacuation from the field. Later, on another patrol around a U.S. Navy Seabees gravel operation called “the rock crusher,” Ron further increased his reputation as a bold and decisive leader.

Ron volunteered one morning to take out a recon patrol of eight Marines, in place of a squad leader who typically led the daily tours around the perimeter. As they moved down a dirt road, friendly mortars suddenly exploded nearby over the crest of a distant hill. Ron grabbed the radio as the patrol found cover.

“What the hell is going on?”

“We’ve got a large group of Viet Cong in the open!” Replied a voice on the other end.

“Well, you’re almost on top of us!”

Sprinting figures appeared over the top of the nearby hill, holding AK-47s and heading directly toward Ron’s patrol. More followed behind the lead group. Even more sprinted up and over the crest behind them. Ron moved the radio back to his face.

“I see them! They’re coming over the hill right in front of me!”

“Act as a blocking force!”

Ron laid eyes on the seven other Ma­rines of his patrol. At least five times their number of VC were already over the hill and coming on fast.

“Do you know who you’re talking to?” Ron asked, presuming the voice believed Ron was at the head of a company, or even a full platoon.

“Yes! Now act as a blocking force!”

Ron dropped the radio and ordered the Marines into a ditch alongside the road.

“Stay down! Nobody shoots until I do!”

The first group of enemy stopped alongside the road less than 20 yards away. They waited in the open as more VC poured over the hill. Within minutes, a group nearly 50 strong gathered by the road catching their breath.

“I swear to God, I do not know what made me do this,” Ron remembered re­cently. “I jumped up and shouted, ‘Stop!’ in Vietnamese and every one of them threw their hands straight up in the air. The only thing I can figure is that they had just gotten through being mortared like crazy and they thought they had run into some big unit, so they surrendered.”

The Marines led the group of prisoners to an open spot in the road and surrounded them as they lay on the ground. Ron radioed for immediate help. The closest available unit was a group of Australians.

“I don’t care who they are,” Ron ad­vised. “We need help now!”

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As seen in a view from Hill 881S, this ridgeline several hundred meters away from the Marine positions proved a source of continuous enemy fire. Accordingly, it became the target of friendly airstrikes and artillery fire. The initial plume of an explosion can be seen bursting up in the center of the photo.

A dust cloud soon formed in the dis­tance as a convoy of Australian ve­hicles approached. The Aussies tucked prisoners into every nook and cranny of their trucks to transport their haul away. The Marines moved aside as the convoy sped off. As the engines faded into the distance, Ron turned to his stunned men.

“This patrol is OVER!”

They returned to base safely and found the platoon commander and company com­mander waiting for them inside the wire.

“Sergeant Echols,” said the captain, “You come with me.”

The officer immediately filed paper­work for Ron’s meritorious promotion to staff sergeant. Less than three weeks later, with just over three years total in the Marine Corps, Ron received his pro­motion to staff sergeant. After Ron’s elevation to platoon sergeant, several new lieutenants cycled through. Some were wounded, some were fired, but either way, the end result left Ron ultimately re­sponsible. He excelled in his role as act­ing platoon commander to such an extent that existing and incoming officers de­ferred to him, and left Ron in charge of his platoon.

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Mike Company veteran Charles Martin carried an 8 mm video camera during his tour in Vietnam, capturing incredible footage from Hill 881S, the Khe Sanh airstrip and various other locations. This screenshot from the video depicts a machine-gunner returning fire at NVA soldiers.

By the end of December 1967, 3/26 re­ceived orders to support the looming conflict at Khe Sanh. Ron and the Ma­rines of Company M occupied a front-and-center role in the siege, positioned west of Khe Sanh Combat Base on Hill 881 South.

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In another screenshot from the video taken by Charles Martin, SSgt Ron Echols is shown carrying his favored pump-action shotgun. This portion of the video was shot immediately after Ron saved Martin’s life by cutting down several NVA with his signature firearm. Courtesy of Charles Martin.

 “That wasn’t some training evolution, that was a real firefight,” SSgt Ron Echols said recently. “If I would have known at that time he was taking a video, I’d have grabbed that camera and stuck it where the sun don’t shine!” Courtesy of Charles Martin.

Marine defenses on 881S spread across two distinct hill tops, separated by a low saddle in between. Company I, 3/26, occupied the higher hilltop. Two platoons from Mike took over the lower side. Ron arrived with his Marines and found basic defensive positions carved out of the hill by its previous occupiers. He immediately ordered his Marines to dig deeper. They placed multiple layers of concertina wire outside the trench line, designed to funnel any oncoming enemy into the Marines’ machine guns. Ron directed his platoon to complete their defensive barriers with a tall, barbed wire fence immediately out­side of their trench line, preventing any approaching enemy from jumping into the trenches. The Marines spaced mines and claymores around the entire perimeter. When they ran out of clay­mores, Ron found an abundance of det­onators remaining. He improvised by filling empty ammo cans with spent rifle brass and explosives lining one side, then connected a detonator as a homemade anti-personnel device. Ron directed his men to save their empty C-ration tins and place several small rocks inside. The lid was then bent over a strand of the perimeter wire, creating a noise-making early warning device.

“I don’t even remember who our pla­toon commander was, but I remember Ron” said Charles McCarty, Ron’s radio­man for the duration of the siege at Khe Sanh. “He was doing everything a pla­toon commander would do. There was this old comic book character called, ‘Sgt Rock,’ and that’s what we used to call Ron, because he was hard as a rock.”

As days turned into weeks on the hill, the trench line surrounding Mike Company evolved from a shallow ditch to a six-foot-deep channel, lined with sandbags and bunkers dug underground. Ron insisted on underground shelters, as their position proved a favorite target of NVA artillery and rockets.

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Air Force B-52 bombers routinely conducted “Arc Light” strikes around Hill 881S during the siege at Khe Sanh. The power and devastation of these attacks left the Marines on the ground in awe. DOD.

Incoming of some sort hit 881S every day. Snipers kept the hill continually under fire and observation. Another hill less than a mile away, designated 881 North, acted as a NVA stronghold and observation post. Nobody knew exactly what enemy strength 881N housed. Ma­rines patrolling that direction suffered numerous casualties without successfully reconnoitering the hill, included a com­pany-size movement by Company I on Jan. 20, 1968. The Marines on 881S be­came increasingly exhausted under the constant threat of attack.

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Bombs from a friendly airstrike throw up dirt in a valley between Hill 881S and a nearby ridgeline. Bomb craters can be seen across the ridge as well, from which NVA soldiers harassed the Marines on a daily basis. Joe Darrell.

U.S. air power afforded the garrison its best chance of survival. The Marines called in air strikes on any suspected enemy position. On one occasion, a sniper harassed Mike Co for several days. Finally, Ron had enough. He grabbed a pair of binoculars and kept watch over the area where the rounds originated until, finally, incoming shots gave away the sniper’s position. He found the sniper perched high in the fork of a tree branch.

“Ron saw him and he says, ‘well, I can take care of that,’ ” remembered Charles Martin, a squad leader in Ron’s platoon. “Ron called in jet. That thing circled the tree one time and came in from the back side. The sniper was climbing down when a bomb hit the base of the tree and blew it in a million pieces.”

A ridgeline several hundred meters away from 881S proved a continual source of incoming NVA artillery and rifle fire. The ridge was close enough that individual enemy soldiers were easily seen moving around. Despite its close proximity, B-52 “Arc Light” strikes rained down con­tinuously across the ridge.

“Have you ever seen video of an arc light?” asked Charles McCarty. “To this day, when I say the word, ‘arc light,’ I get chills.”

Marines who knew what to look for might spot contrails high in the sky, sig­naling the coming devastation. For those unaware, the bombs fell out of nowhere. A line of explosions suddenly plumed up at one end of the ridge and worked their way across. As the explosions continued, the sound of the falling bombs, followed by their explosions, reached the Marines in a deafening roar. Shockwaves tossed the hill beneath the Marines like an earth­quake. Finally, after three B-52s emptied their bomb bays of nearly 30 tons of ordnance per aircraft, nothing but a barren landscape remained.

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A CH-46 touches down at Hill 881S, delivering critical supplies and extracting wounded. The “Purple Foxes” of HMM-364 provided much of the support for Ma­rines on the hill. Joe Darrell.

“B-52s hit that ridgeline every day,” remembered Ron. “They told me on the radio to have the men get in the bunkers, put their fingers in the air, and hold their mouths open. They hadn’t dropped one that close to friendly troops before. I cannot begin to describe the noise. The whole hill was shaking like we were on a ride at the fair or something. There were big rocks falling out of the sky and I thought someone would be killed. It was just unreal.”

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USMC History Division.

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In this screenshot from Charles Martin’s video, a stream of Marines can be seen rush­ing into the back of an aircraft still running on Khe Sanh airstrip. In the video, imme­diately after the plane is loaded and takes off, an artillery round strikes the runway. Courtesy of Charles Martin.

Despite the impressive show of air power, the NVA dominated the hills and jungle surrounding Khe Sanh. Hill 881S was inaccessible by land and could only be resupplied by helicopter. The NVA shot down several choppers attempting to resupply the Marines on 881S. Even so, the brave helicopter pilots, primarily from the “Purple Foxes” of Marine Me­dium Helicopter Squadron 364, continued coming. Eventually, a “super gaggle” of jets and attack helicopters proved neces­sary to strafe and bomb the sur­rounding jungle to cover the resupply choppers. The enemy threat, com­bined with daily fog and inclement weather, often prevented the Marines from obtaining the critical supplies they needed.

Harry W. Jenkins arrived at 881S as the new captain in charge of Company M, in March 1968. Jenkins, who later retired as a major general, was shocked by the conditions on the hill yet im­pressed by the level of morale and preparedness maintained. Dirty and bearded Marines in tattered clothing filled the trenches. He found several Marines with visibly decayed teeth.
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“I asked the Marines where their toothbrushes were,” MajGen Jenkins said. “They told me they were using them to clean their rifles. Under the cir­cumstances, I couldn’t argue. That’s just one minor example, but things like that led to emergency resupply orders for any number of things. I just couldn’t believe it. We had astronauts in space going around the moon, but we couldn’t get toothbrushes to 881 South.”

Ron rationed food and water among his platoon as critical supplies ran short. At one point, the Marines ran out of C-rations and went for nine days without food before a resupply finally made it into the hill. They spread tarps out over the ground each night, capturing the morn­ing dew to save as drinking water. A mountain stream north of the hill tantalized the Marines. The flowing sounds carried up the slope, but an un­known number of enemy in a parallel trench line stood between Mike Company and the water.

One day, while walking the perimeter, Ron heard movement outside the line, coming up the south slope. He shouldered his shotgun and prepared to fire. At the last second, three Ma­rines ap­peared through the brush carrying full can­teens. After Ron scolded them for being outside the wire and almost getting themselves killed, the Marines explained that they discovered a spring in a gully down the hill, where they had filled their personal canteens. Ron informed them the fol­low­ing day, they would be going back down to the spring with the rest of the platoon’s canteens to draw water for everyone else.

By April, Marines on the hill grew exhausted. Lack of sleep, lack of sup­plies, and isolation pushed them to the brink. Continual bombardment by the NVA, without real opportunity to retaliate, created a high level of ag­gression. On April 14, 1968, Easter Sunday, the Ma­rines of 3/26 got their chance to let their aggression out. The order arrived to finally oust the NVA from 881N. Ron’s platoon advanced alongside Marines from Company K, down 881S to the base of 881N. A furious bombardment preceded their attack. Direct fire from 106 mm recoilless rifles on 881S soared overhead as the Marines advanced up the hill. Ron prayed none would fall short into the advancing Marines. The fight ended quickly. Six Marines died in the effort to take the hill. More than 100 NVA bodies littered the abandoned enemy emplacements. An American flag flew over 881N long enough to signal the victory to those observing from 881S, before the Marines backed down the hill once more and choppered out to Khe Sanh Combat Base. This Easter assault marked the end of the siege for Mike Co.

The battalion received a short respite following Khe Sanh. All too quickly, though, they returned to the front lines, attacking into a place ironically called, “Happy Valley,” deep into the mountains Southwest of Da Nang during Operation Mameluke Thrust. The enemy remained determined to send Ron home in a body bag.

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Cpl Charles McCarty arrived in Vietnam just days after the battle at Con Thien in September 1967. He became SSgt Ron Echols’ radioman at Khe Sanh and remained by Ron’s side in that capacity for the duration of the siege. Courtesy of Charles McCarty.

During one patrol in their new area of operation, Ron’s platoon walked through chest high elephant grass. They spotted movement in the grass and Ron called the Marines to a halt. As everyone took cover, Charles Martin moved slowly around to a hill on the other side of the suspicious area and began working his way back. Ron gave hand signals directing Martin down the hill toward the area as he crept up from the opposite direction.

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Charles Martin displays his flak jacket, punctured by an enemy round, following the incident where SSgt Ron Echols saved him from three NVA soldiers. Courtesy of Charles Martin.

Throughout his time in Vietnam, Ron’s weapon of choice was a pump-action shotgun. He shouldered it now once again as he approached Martin. Three Vietnamese soldiers suddenly popped up out of the elephant grass between Ron and Martin. One took off sprinting away from the Marines. Another opened fire at Martin. Martin unloaded a few rounds before a bullet knocked him off his feet. He fell to the ground gasping for breath.

Ron squeezed hard on the shotgun’s trigger and pumped the forestock as fast as he could, instantly emptying seven shells into the grass. He rotated the gun on his shoulder and loaded more shells into the magazine tube. As he slid in a third shell, an enemy soldier appeared out of the grass with rifle raised. Ron shot him down, then continued up the hill.

“I could hear Ron running up the hill after he shot two or three more times saying, ‘Marty, don’t die on me, damn you! Don’t you die on me!’ ” Martin re­membered today. “He came up there and rolled me over and slapped me and said, ‘Are you OK?’”

A quick evaluation revealed the bullet tore a hole through Martin’s flak jacket but missed his abdomen. One enemy soldier escaped, and one lay badly wounded in the leg. The Marines found the third soldier dead in the grass, ripped apart by Ron’s initial volley of shotgun blasts.

On May 29, Company M choppered into a newly cleared landing zone (LZ) in the mountains. Ron boarded one of the last CH-46s to depart with 11 Marines from his platoon.

“Once we land, ya’ll need to get the hell off here!” the crew chief screamed to Ron over the noise of the engines. “We’ve been taking heavy fire up there all day!”

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The mural in the 881S exhibit at the National Museum of the Marine Corps recreates the view from the hill with stunning accuracy. From the India Co positions on the higher side of the hill, visitors can look down to Mike Company’s side of the hill, where Ron can still point out his old bunker’s location. Kyle Watts.

As the helicopter approached the LZ, enemy bullets punched holes through the aluminum skin. Hydraulic cables across the entire roof of the interior caught fire and the bird plummeted to­wards the ground. Tons of small arms and mortar ammo brought in by previous flights remained staged in the LZ. The doomed chopper crashed directly into it and rolled on its side. Ammo began cooking off around the burning wreck. One Marine on the ground near the LZ was killed by flying pieces of the helicopter. Shrapnel stung across Ron’s back, but miraculously, he and all seven of his Marines survived the crash and exited the chopper before it exploded.

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Active-duty Marines attend sev­eral professional military education events (PME) throughout the year at the Na­tional Museum of the Marine Corps. The museum tour and PME that Ron and other docents conduct for the Sergeants Course at Quantico has ex­panded to in­clude other groups of active duty or re­serve Marines, and even other branches of service. Rebecca Jackson.

Well-Deserved Commission
Official recognition of Ron’s role as a platoon commander finally came through in the last month of his deployment to Vietnam. In the weeks following Khe Sanh, Capt Jenkins submitted the paper­work for Ron to receive a battlefield com­mission. This distinguished achieve­ment proved exceedingly rare during the Viet­nam War. Numerous outstanding NCOs were plucked from combat and sent home to attend Officer Candidates School and The Basic School as part of the Mer­itorious NCO Program. Others received a temporary commission that reverted at the conclusion of their deploy­ment. An incredibly select few, however, skipped these training steps of the com­missioning process, remained in combat, and re­tained their commission as a per­manent rank. Some famous names, such as the legendary Force Recon Marine Major James Capers Jr., are included in this tally. The rest are Marines such as Ron Echols, whose names, reputations, and combat exploits are known only to the Marines with whom they served.

In June 1968, Ron was called out of the field to receive a physical. Wondering why a physical was so important to call him away from his platoon, Ron was informed a physical was necessary for his promotion. In short order, the officers over Ron removed his staff sergeant chevrons and replaced them with the gold bars of a second lieutenant. The fact that Ron’s date to leave Vietnam drew near mattered little. The promotion formally recognized the position he had held all along, through all the trying times his Marines endured.

Ron arrived back in the States the fol­lowing month. Just four years earlier, he stood on the yellow footprints at Parris Island as a recruit. Now, he faced the end of his enlistment as a battlefield-commis­sioned officer with a combat distinguished Bronze Star and two Purple Hearts. A third Purple Heart for injuries received in the helicopter crash never came through. With a lifetime of experience far greater than his age of 22 might let on, Ron elected to leave the Marine Corps. Mentally, he had had enough.

Like many Vietnam veterans, Ron dove into civilian life after leaving the military and it was years before he reconnected with the Marines he fought beside. In the early 1990s, Ron began attending 3/26 reunions, and continues to this day. As he reflected back to his time in Vietnam, Ron realized his biggest regret; through all the combat and harrowing situations he and his Marines faced, he had never found the time to recommend any of his brave men for the awards they deserved for their heroism.

In 2007, the reunion group met at the National Museum of the Marine Corps shortly after it opened the previous Nov­ember. The veterans of Khe Sanh found themselves transported back in time and airlifted to their old positions in the immersive exhibit dedicated to 881S. The mural surrounding the CH-46 ramp recreated the hill with stunning accuracy, and Ron could immediately look down to Mike Company’s side of the hill and point out where his bunker had been, and where some of his comrades had died.

“There is no question that there are Marines alive today thanks the superb leadership and attention to duty displayed by Ron Echols under the most trying conditions,” said MajGen Jenkins today, who also attended the 2007 reunion. “He clearly is one of the best combat leaders I ever served with. Some of that experience is passed on today, as he is often called upon to speak to classes of NCOs and enlisted Marines in various courses at Quantico.”

A Lesson in Leadership
Ron began volunteering at the museum in 2008. He and other docents began their work with the Sergeants Course at Quantico several years ago.

“Going to the museum is not technically a part of our curriculum, but by proximity, we take advantage of the museum and take the students over there,” said Master Sergeant Christian Tetzlaff, the staff noncommissioned officer in charge of the sergeant’s course in Quantico. “The docents are always energetic to help, and they take the opportunity to tell the students about events from their exper­ience and background. Students are pretty impacted by them. It’s real stories from real people who are from their heritage.”

The museum tour comes during the “heritage” portion of the four-week long course. The curriculum covers battlefield case studies on places like Inchon and the Pusan Perimeter from the Korean War. The trip to the museum provides students with a more tangible under­stand­ing of the events covered in the classroom. Anywhere between 30 to 70 new sergeants reap the benefits offered through museum and the docents’ class. They begin with Ron in the theater, where Ron walks them through his time on 881S, and what it looks like to work “tire­lessly to ensure the safety and well-being of his men,” as is stated in his Bronze Star citation read aloud to the class. The students then proceed to other docents stationed around the museum to learn more from their experiences.

“For sergeants, this course is really about reinvigorating their core values,” said MSgt Tetzlaff. “They are still sponges, trying to figure out what the Marine Corps is really all about and if they’re staying for the long haul. They see representatives like the docents who have no real reason to keep coming to the museum and volunteering their time, other than the fact that they are proud of what they are a part of. Demonstrating that to these young Marines, they’re going to look at these guys and think, ‘they are so passionate, and so thankful for all their experiences,’ knowing that they have experienced tough times,” Tetzlaff said.

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Veterans of 3/26 reunited at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in 2007. From left to right: Capt John J. Gilece, CO of Mike Co, 3/26, at Khe Sanh until he was shot by a sniper; 1stLt John T. “Tom” Esslinger, Executive Officer, then-CO of Mike Co following Gilece’s wound­ing; SSgt Ron Echols; MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC (Ret). Courtesy of Ron Echols.

“These interactions at the museum are not little things. They are profound mo­ments that embody our culture of, ‘once a Marine, always a Marine.’ A lot of young Marines might look at that and think it’s just a cliché, but then they see it in action and see these docents volunteering their life to serve the betterment of the Marine Corps and keep our heritage alive. There is a lot of opportunity for reflection.”

The All Saints’ Day Massacre

A sharp fight for a nameless ridge and a ravine led to a bloody sacrifice for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

October 1942 was a bleak and ter­rifying month for the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal. Nearly three months of combat—exhausting patrols punctuated by ferocious pitched battles—left men weakened, wounded and riddled with tropical disease. They were short of food, short of ammunition, short of everything to the point where they dubbed the campaign “Operation Shoestring” and themselves the “First Maroon Division.” Yet, despite these hardships, they managed to hold their perimeter around an airfield whose ex­istence was their sole reason for invading the Solomon Islands. And when they took the tallies at the end of the month, the Marines appeared to come out ahead of their Japanese adversaries.

“On the Matanikau [the Japanese gar­rison] appears to have lost about 500 killed by artillery fire in addition to a total of 13 tanks,” noted the D-2 (Intelli­gence) report. “Total enemy losses along the Matanikau during this period can be conservatively estimated at 1,200 killed. Most of these were from the 4th Infantry and the Oka Unit. On the other front, 1,200 bodies were buried after the battle. A partial count of additional bodies lying in the woods indicates total losses of 2,200 killed … . The 29th and 16th In­fantry Regiments and the Kawaguchi Detachment had been annihilated.” Reconnaissance patrols led by Lieu­tenants William “Holly” Whyte and Harold “Ramrod” Taylor revealed dis­organized and demoralized defenses west of the Matanikau. While these positions could still fight—Lt Taylor gave his life to obtain this information—evidence suggested that a concerted push might break the Japanese lines.

Augmenting this pleasantly bloody news was the anticipated arrival of the 8th Marines, fresh from garrison duty in Samoa, plus additional Navy firepower. These “riches beyond the dreams of avarice” led the Division commander, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, to green-light a new offensive across the Matanikau River. The ultimate goal was to annihilate any remnants of the beaten Japanese regiments, capture the base at Kokumbona, and “give them a sense of futility” preventing further reinforcement of the Guadalcanal garrison. Furthermore, Vandegrift hoped to capture or destroy the artillery pieces dropping shells on Henderson Field. For this mission, he tapped the relatively rested 5th Marines; the 2nd Marines and a battalion of the Army’s 164th Infantry would follow in reserve.

Crossing the Matanikau was a daunting endeavor. Marines made repeated forays to the western bank, starting with the ill-fated Goettge Patrol in August 1942 and the aptly named “First Battle of the Matanikau.” Subsequent efforts resulted in temporary control or outright repulse. In the 1st Marine Division, it was said that a man was only a man after crossing the Matanikau three times. By this stand­ard, the 5th Marines was one of the most mature regiments on the island.

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This footbridge built across the Matanikau River was installed by Marine engineers under the cover of darkness. USMC.

Private Leonard Anthony Baumann, a 25-year-old from Queens, N.Y., was an as­­sistant machine-gunner in Company D, 5th Marines. He knew enough about what lay beyond the river to take note of the preparations. “One heavy cruiser and four destroyers came in and sailed up beach to Kokumbona and shelled [Japa­nese],” he noted in a makeshift diary. “Ships went up and down six times con­tinuously throwing shells.” The following morning, Baumann’s squad moved out of their defensive positions and down to a coconut grove “to start the push.” Lieu­tenant Herbert Merrillat, a Marine public relations officer, watched the flow of military might moving into position. “Long lines of men in green and trucks full of ammunition and food crowded the road west of Kukum in a steady stream,” he wrote. The assault troops learned their objectives, duties, and the designated sig­nals for success or support. Through the pattering rain, they could hear the whump of Japanese artillery rounds falling else­where in the regimental area.

Rain and artillery dampened the al­ready muffled sounds of activity along the Matanikau. Under cover of darkness, Co L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines crossed the sandbar at the river’s mouth and set up a defensive perimeter on the western bank. A thousand yards upstream, a pla­toon from E/2/5 slithered to the water’s edge and boarded small boats, rowing across to establish a foothold in the jungle. Three companies of the 1st Engineer Battalion went to work deploying sections of pontoon bridges across a slow, lagoon-like stretch of the river. Previous cross­ings relied on the sand bar and “One Log Bridge”—sites well-known to both sides and “inadequate, in any case, for the number of men involved” in the coming operation. The engineers withdrew be­fore dawn, having secured three foot­bridges across the Matanikau. A fourth, strong enough for vehicles, would be deployed if the attack went well.

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U.S. Navy South Pacific Photography Interpretation Unit, with modifications by author

For 1/5, Nov. 1—All Saints’ Day, be­gan with a 4:30 a.m. reveille and an uninspired breakfast of coffee, jam, and “slum”—C-ration hash, eaten cold from the can on the front lines. As they wrapped up their repast and shouldered their weapons, an artillery barrage—nine batteries of the 11th Marines—ripped through the air overhead. Wildcats and Warhawks winged by, strafing the ground ahead with ma­chine guns and cannon fire. A flight of 19 B-17s droned westward to drop bombs on Kokumbona. As the last shells rumbled overhead at 6:30 a.m., the first 1/5 Ma­rines stepped onto the sturdy pontoon bridge, tramped across, and disappeared into the foliage on the other side. Within an hour, the entire regiment, from lead scouts to command post, was west of the Matanikau with all hands heading for their assigned sectors. The Japanese, shocked or strategically silent, did not contest the crossing.

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Japanese dugouts were almost undetect­able for the Marines of Co A due to the brush and debris from the surrounding jungle. Cpl Ernest A. Matthews, USMC.
Major William K. Enright, two weeks into his tenure as skipper of 1/5, had a 1,500-yard front to cover en route to Kokumbona, wide enough for two com­panies to advance abreast. He sent Cap­tain William Kaempfer’s Co A to the right flank along the beach—making them the rightmost Marine unit of the operation—and assigned Capt Robert Shine’s Co C to cover his left flank. Co B, under Capt Walter S. McIlhenny, constituted the bat­talion reserve. In keeping with stand­ard operating procedure, each of Enright’s rifle companies had a platoon of heavy machine guns—personnel from Co D—attached for the operation. These Marines sweated and struggled under the weight of water-cooled M1917 Browning ma­chine guns and their requisite parts: weap­on, tripod, water can, and as much ammu­nition as they could carry. Private Vincent Tortorici recalled how, on the morning of the assault, his section leader “added about eight new men from Co C to our squad to help carry the ammunition boxes.” With close contact anticipated, combat efficiency outweighed company loyalty.
Tortorici’s section leader, Corporal Anthony Casamento, was known for solid thinking under fire. The native New Yorker, still two weeks shy of 22, had two years of service under his belt; with this experience, he could lead multiple machine guns in a billet technically above his grade. Today, Casamento had two squads led by Corporals Lewis R. Robarts and Michael E. Shaner under his command. He did not concern himself with the larger tactical picture. “The Japanese had a big gun up on a hill. We called it ‘Whistling Pete,’ and it was giving us hell,” he related. “We had a job to do.”
Although focused on the task at hand, a premonition weighed on Casamento’s mind. “Somehow, just as we cross over the bridge, something comes into my mind. It’s the funniest feeling. My time’s up, I think. Right now, today.” He con­fided in Shaner. “Nuts,” declared Shaner, “you wait and see. You’re too lucky.” Casamento’s section fell in with Co C and began scaling the slope of a long ridge designated Hill 78.
To the right, Co A passed the burned-out hulks of Japanese tanks and moved through what little remained of Horahi, commonly called “Matanikau Village” by Marines. It was a familiar sight to the veteran outfit. “We called it a village, but Matanikau wasn’t more than eight or a dozen native huts, each with a thatched roof and walls of palm fronds and branches woven together,” commented Ore Marion of L/3/5. “This cluster of huts sat on the landward side of a little dirt road no wider than a good-size kitchen table.”
This path, known grandly as “Govern­ment Track” or “Beach Road,” passed for a main thoroughfare on Guadalcanal’s northern coast and was heavily used by both sides during the campaign. By Nov­ember, “between the trucks, the tanks, and the artillery fire that had crunched over the area, there was no longer a vil­lage of Matanikau, and there never would be again. It had been pulverized.” The way ahead looked no better, torn as it was by weeks of fighting and freshly cratered by the morning’s bombardment. Still, it was “slow going,” according to Pvt Baumann, whose squad accompanied Co A. “Seen plenty of dead Japanese on the way.”

For the time, fortune seemed to smile on the 5th Marines. The 2nd Battalion maneuvered through some complicated terrain but managed to reach their as­signed section of the first objective (O-1) line right on schedule. Farther to their left, the Whaling Group—a conglomerate of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, and Col­onel William J. Whaling’s hand-picked scout snipers—covered hundreds of yards of thick foliage without notable incident, positioning themselves to pro­tect the assault and advance on the Japa­nese flank if needed. A handful of de­fenders broke cover to snipe at Co A, but the preparatory bombardment effec­tively neutered op­position along the beach. Private Baumann deployed his machine gun “about 1,000 yards” from the Matani­kau, secured after a brief exchange of fire, then continued westward for another thousand yards. Here, the Japa­nese had better positions. “We were in jungle along river [probably a stream just west of Point Cruz], came across Japanese emplace­ments made of coral rock,” he wrote. “Natural camouflage couldn’t see them until about 5 feet from them. Little firing here, not much. Moved over across road and artillery opened fire on us. Some of the fellows were wounded here.” Never­theless, Co A secured its position on O-1 by 10 a.m.

The Massacre
Co C was making good time along the open ground atop Hill 78 when every­thing fell apart. Second Lieutenant David Harold Crosby Jr., had command of the point platoon of C/1/5. The 24-year-old Pennsylvanian was one of the best-edu­cated men in the regiment, if not the Marine Corps: in addition to a bachelor’s degree from Juniata College, Crosby had earned a master’s in sociology from USC. He had a reputation as a calm, intelligent, and considerate leader who could “dream­ily contemplate upon man and woman, the sea, the sky, or on the soft fragrant night air” in one moment and accompany his platoon scouts on patrol the next. Crosby was the only son of a widowed mother and had been married for just over a year; his thoughts naturally trended toward “home and peace,” according to fellow officer Gerald Armitage. Yet Crosby was not content to send his scouts anywhere he would not go himself.

Armitage recounted the scene:
“The position of the line assigned to [Co C] extended across a stretch of grassy hills, thick matted ravines, and jungle … . Dave was—as usual—at the head of his platoon with his scouts and runners. They came down the nose of a grassy hill and started to work their way through the deep undergrowth of the flatlands below [where] a man camouflaged cannot be seen a half dozen yards away. The … Japanese, masters at concealment, had organized a defensive line in the wild, tangled undergrowth, expecting a solid line of men to advance against it into an ambush without even realizing the pres­ence of the line. But Dave, wise to their deceits, was carefully feeling his way, with his capable scouts, to prevent such an ambush to his own men and the hun­dreds of men behind him.”

A Japanese sniper fired too soon; one of Crosby’s Marines returned fire and scored a killing hit. As if on signal, the Japanese line opened up with “a withering barrage of fire.” Although outnumbered and outgunned, Crosby “began to coolly direct” his scouts into a position where they could fight back but was killed as he rushed a camouflaged antitank gun. “David’s men, berserk with sorrow at the loss of the leader whom they idolized, managed in the face of that hell to drive past the spot where he was slain so that they could recover him,” wrote Lieutenant Armitage. “They immediately attacked the enemy position but could not get close enough to assault it. These boys were also killed; the only man who safely returned was the runner Dave had sent back.”

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Marine mortarmen drag a “Cole cart” along a narrow trail near the Matanikau River. During the attack on Nov. 1, 1942, the Marines of Co A bombarded Japa­nese emplacements with mortar fire. 1stSgt Abraham Felber, USMC.
As Crosby’s men fought to extract their fallen leader, 2ndLt David Claude Cox hurried to report to Captain Shine. The operations order for the assault pro­vided—unusually, according to historian John Zimmerman—for officers to direct artillery and mortar fire on ravines or streams suspected of harboring the enemy. Shine instructed Cox to take charge of a mortar section firing on the Japanese emplacements. Cox, a South Side graduate of the University of Chicago, sought a vantage point to spot his targets and was killed moments later. Another platoon leader, 2ndLt John Wisdom Holland, was shot through the shoulder and severely wounded but refused medical treatment while his men were under fire. Three key officers were out of action in minutes; all received Silver Star Medals for gallantry, though only Holland lived to wear his.

Corporal Casamento, meanwhile, was getting his guns into the fight. Hill 78 ap­peared as a bisecting ridge to the ad­vanc­ing Marines; Casamento sent Shaner’s squad to the left while he ac­companied Robarts’ squad on the right. “We were to meet up together again when we cleared the ridge we were on, before advancing to the ridge [Hill 84] directly in front of us,” recalled Private Tortorici. “Corporal Shaner’s squad wasn’t out of sight more than five minutes when our squad came under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire.” Casamento sighted a spot for the gun, directed Robarts to deploy, and ran directly into a crossfire from two Japanese positions. The assistant gunner, Pvt Michael Ciavarelli, was severely wounded; Robarts and gunner Pvt Joseph Seymour received mortal wounds, and PFC Joseph Corriggio died instantly. Japa­­nese mortar rounds sang down, flin­g­ing Private Tortorici 30 feet in the air. The temporary ammo carriers bor­rowed from Co C were all killed or wounded. An entire machine-gun squad was hors de combat—and a heavy Browning could mean the difference between survival and defeat.

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PFC Joseph Corriggio. Courtesy of Tony Corriggio.
Shrapnel dug into Casamento’s leg; “it burns like anything—but I’m so excited I hardly notice it.” He flung himself down behind the Browning. “I picked up [Robarts]. He was sure hit bad all right. He’d been shot right through the stomach. I picked him up: he tried to say something to me, then he died right in my arms. His mouth suddenly began to gush blood, his eyes started to stare, without winking, and I knew he was dead.” He could hear his buddies pleading, “Help me, Tony, oh God, help me,” but crawled to the machine gun instead. “I didn’t give a goddamn. I lost my head, I guess; all my friends were shot, and I was going to take revenge. The shells were booming and kerplunking all around, the shrapnel was whistling, the Japanese were yelling, and it was a plain madhouse.” Firing all but blind, Casamento took out one of the enemy positions, but “they stitched a design of bullet holes in me.” Figuring he was as good as dead, Casamento ordered Pvt Ciavarelli to head for the rear to report the situation and get corpsmen for the wounded. “Casamento told me he was done for anyway because he was so badly wounded and he would try to hold on long enough to cover my retreat to the rear,” recalled Ciavarelli. With Tortorici’s help, the wounded messenger reached the relative safety of the lines. Casamento was left all alone.

The 5th Marines’ message center lit up at 8:40 a.m. with a simple notice: “C/1/5 receiving MG fire.” Twenty minutes later, a report noted “heavy MG and mortar fire,” followed by “hit hard from front … request help from 1st Bn.” At 9:45 a.m., a breathless runner arrived with a written note from Captain Shine: “Hit hard. Many casualties. Need assistance. Right front in woods MGs. My position on ridge—also woods to left front MGs. Request directions of assistance.” Colonel Merritt Edson dispatched halftracks and 37 mm guns to assist his beleaguered 1st Battalion, but these weapons could not reach Co C on the steep slopes of Hill 78. Edson sent 1/5 a message giving coordinates of the regimental aid station and simultaneously directed the 1st Battalion’s reserve—Co B, with attached machine guns—to Shine’s position.

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A Marine mortar team camps a few feet in front of where this photo is captured. Thick vegetation offered excellent concealment for Co A Marines and Japanese enemies. USMC.

For two hours on the morning of Nov. 1, 1942, C/1/5 endured a hell of fire the likes of which few other American units experienced on Guadalcanal. The 7th Company of Major Masao Tamura’s 4th Infantry had planned their defenses well, digging sturdy bunk­ers out of coral rock and expertly camou­flaging their positions. Any Americans who ap­proached would be trapped in a jungle-choked ravine: relief or retreat could only happen by crossing the steep, bare western slope of Hill 78, exposed to flat trajectory fire from Hill 84. Japa­nese mortars and artillery dropped along the ravine and ridge, and concealed field pieces ripped through foliage and flesh at point-blank range. Their patience and preparations paid off as Crosby’s platoon melted away.

By order or by general assent, Co C recoiled from the vicious positions in the ravine. Crosby’s survivors fell back to the ridge, bearing the body of their fallen leader. Pvt William Frank Seiverling of Drexel Hill, Pa., staged a one-man coun­terattack and charged down the bar­ren slope, blazing away with his Browning Automatic Rifle to cover the platoon’s re­organization and withdrawal. Seiverling then ran a gauntlet of fire to assist Holland’s platoon, “killing several Japa­nese before he, himself, was hit by ma­chine-gun fire.” Bleeding heavily, Seiverling opened fire on the enemy gun and silenced it before heading for safety. He was too late: another Nambu chattered, and the 22-year-old Marine fell to the ground, never to move again.

Not far away, Corporal Terrence Joseph Reynolds Jr., another Pennsylvania Ma­rine, was writing his name in the history books. “Terry” was a fanatical athlete, and his buddies all knew his dearest ambition was to get his name on the sports page of a major newspaper. He came close on the baseball diamond and closer still as a boxer but never quite clinched a championship. On Nov. 1, 1942, the sports­man showed his true mettle. As Co C made its “temporary organizational withdrawal,” Reynolds picked up a light Browning machine gun and waded into a Japanese attack, firing from the hip and blunting the enemy thrust. He was shot down moments later, still well forward of friendly lines. Seiverling and Reynolds were both posthumously decorated with the Navy Cross.

These heroics bought time for Co C to withdraw and reorganize about 250 yards short of the O-1 line. Sensing an oppor­tunity, Tamura’s men counterattacked through the ravine. Sergeant Carl Weiss, who had already knocked out an enemy emplacement with a grenade, directed the fire of his machine guns against “the infuriated Japanese” who charged up the hill with fixed bayonets. When a wounded Marine rolled down the slope into the crossfire, Weiss crawled through the spitting bullets and dragged the man to safety. The sergeant would also receive the Navy Cross—posthumously, as he was killed in action the following day.

On the northern slope of Hill 78, Tony Casamento clung to his position. Bullet wounds ran from his instep to his ear; a round passed through his neck, and the corporal used his shirt as a makeshift bandage. Japanese troops crept towards the gun and began throwing grenades and insults. “Retreat, Marine!” they shouted. “Tojo says you must die!” Casamento, “mad as hell,” jumped up and danced “like a crazy man,” challenging the Japa­nese to get him. His curses came out as a breathy whistle: the bullet through his neck clipped his vocal cords. “I know if I pass out, those goddamn Japanese will rush up, grab my gun, turn it around, and start mowing down our own men about 100 yards behind me.” Grenade shrapnel smashed his right hand. Unable to load his machine gun, Casamento first tried to pick up a rifle, then Robarts’ sidearm, but his strength failed. Finally felled by concussion “like the kick of a mule,” the corporal began to lose hope.

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Japanese dugouts on Guadalcanal were made from coral and cocoa palm leaves. Cpl Ernest A. Mathews, USMC.

“I can’t budge. Every time I try, it hurts all over. It’s getting so I can’t see things very well. I’m waiting to die, but I don’t want to die. I keep thinking of my mother and father, and how close it is to Christmas … Any minute I figure the Japanese will be there and stick me, but what worries me is that gun. Any minute they’ll be here and train my own gun on the fellows behind me, and they’ll raise hell with us, and our boys won’t know what it’s all about—one of their own guns shooting at them.”

Casamento could barely make out a figure moving toward him, bayonet at the ready.

It was a Marine. Co B had arrived.

Second Lieutenant Maurice Raphael was appalled at the carnage atop Hill 78. Japanese fire had ripped a hole in the line between companies C and A; Raphael’s platoon of Co B filled the gap. “As we were moving across this hill that was covered with dead and dying men, I came across this body all covered with blood,” he said. “My men had bayonets on their rifles and were ready to bayonet this ‘thing,’ when all of a sudden, I recognized Casamento. I cried out, ‘My God, Casa­mento, what have they done to you?’ He was a bloody mess, and he did a lot of jabbering about the Japanese and his men, crying about losing all of them. Empty rounds of MG ammo were all over the place.” Raphael pulled out his aid kit and bandaged the worst of Casamento’s many wounds, helplessly muttering, “Don’t you worry, fella, don’t you worry.” Incredibly, Casamento survived his ordeal; in 1980, he received a long-overdue Medal of Honor.

Raphael tried to make sense of the slaughter as his men carried Casamento to the rear. He recognized many of the battered bodies personally: Raphael had served as a Co C platoon leader for months and led some of these men in com­bat before transferring to Company B on Oct. 1, 1942. Each fallen figure was like a punch in the gut. “Saw Ausili die,” he wrote in his diary. “Louis Kovacs was dead but still warm, Harland Swart, Carlson, Potocki, Doucette, Waterstraw … everyone was dead … shot to hell and back. It was the saddest and most awful sight I’ve ever seen in my life. I saw Jack Holland, leader [of] 2nd Platoon, shot in the shoulder. Henry Loughman was shot in the groin and died … I found Crosby’s body … poor fellow, he never knew what hit him.”

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An observation post atop Hill 78 near where Cpl Casamento’s squad fought on Nov. 1, 1942. Courtesy of Dave Holland.

Second Lieutenant Richard F. Nellson commanded the machine-gun platoon attached to Co B. “I went forward to re­connoiter for suitable machine-gun po­sitions,” he reported. “I saw Casamento at his gun position. All of his men and those of C Company in his sector were dead or wounded. Casamento was riddled by small arms fire but was still at his gun.” It was evident that Casamento’s cour­age prevented Japanese troops from scaling the ridge and dropping flanking fire onto Co A on the flats below. Next, Nellson and his runner found Cpl Shaner’s machine gun. “It was in a shell hole, but both [the] gunner and his assistant were dead,” Nellson continued. “We put the gun out of action and returned to our lines. Shaner’s gunner had not had time to fire a full belt before he was killed.” As Co C treated their wounded and calmed their nerves, Captain “Tabasco Mac” McIlheney’s men pushed forward down the ridge and into the ravine, finally securing their section of the O-1 line at 11:30 a.m.

Impatient officers at Division Head­quar­ters wasted no time in issuing new orders: in one hour, all units were to press on to the O-2 line, a half-mile be­yond Point Cruz. By now, it was clear that the Japanese facing 1/5 had no inten­tion of retreating to Kokumbona; instead, they were determined to defend a strong po­sition near the base of the Point. This “pocket” was soon surrounded by Ma­rines, but, unfazed by the prospect of death, the defenders contested every step with the massive arsenal at their disposal. Companies B and C crossed the stream marking the O-1 line, but Major Tamura’s men fought so desperately that the Ma­rines made no more headway. The two sides traded blows in a bloody jungle brawl, fighting each other to exhaustion while trying to gain a tactical advantage.

Co A had slightly better success along the coast and managed to advance about 800 yards. They also ran into determined defenders—in this case, Japanese artil­lery positions supported by entrenched infantry. As the machine gunners de­ployed, Private Baumann saw his buddy Private Thomas C. White moving out ahead of his squad, pistol in hand. “See­ing [a] trap, he turned to get back to his gun,” recalled Baumann. “Was shot then. Bullets went in [White’s] back and came out chest. White died in about two mi­nutes. No aid available.” Minutes later came the order to withdraw—just a hun­dred yards back, giving mortars room to fire. Baumann, the assistant gunner, was responsible for carrying the dismounted Browning. “I picked up [the] gun, put it on my shoulder and start[ed] back, sud­denly I got a terrific whack on the back of my head, knocked me down,” he wrote. “MG went flying. Didn’t know what hit me. Placed my hand on back of head and saw it was full of blood.” Pharmacist’s Mate Wesley Haggard bandaged the wound and sent Baumann toward the beach to await evacuation by boat. He was shocked to see so many men from his company “in a bad way” on the beach. “Bonin, Kapanoske, Whalen, Wells, and others … . Few of our boys were killed. In all, D Company caught hell.” Co A fought on until catching the sound of vehicle motors approaching along Gov­ernment Track. Fearful of a tank attack and with their left flank in the air, Com­pany A gave up its gains and returned to the O-1. Despite all the chaos, only two A/1/5 Marines—Privates Charles H. Ludwig and John Monaco—died during the day’s fighting. The exact number of casualties among the attached machine-gunners is not known.

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Corpsmen bring back a wounded Marine from the front lines on Guadalcanal. Forty-one Marines from 1st Bn, 5th Marines died during the fight on Nov. 1. (USMC photo)

There was little sympathy for 1/5 at Division Headquarters. As early as 10:30 a.m., senior officers debated replacing the battalion on the front line with a unit from the 2nd Marines, but Lieutenant Colonel Merrill Thomas (D-3) resisted; he would not mollycoddle what he con­sidered a sub-par outfit. “They’ve had too much of that,” he grumbled. That evening, “it was learned that 1/5 has not yet even passed O-1,” noted Lieutenant Herbert Merillat. “Much disgust at headquarters … 1/5 will never get any­where, D-3 officers say, and 3/5 wouldn’t do any better.” In reality, the battalion had given a good account of itself on a challenging assignment. On Nov. 1, 1942, Major Tamura’s battalion “vanished.” The 7th Company, which caused so much havoc at Hill 78, could muster barely a dozen men by nightfall, and his other companies were in tatters. It would take two more days and five Marine companies to wipe out the Point Cruz pocket. Three hundred and fifty Japanese soldiers were killed, and Marines captured three field pieces, a dozen antitank guns, and 30 machine guns. “Impatience at the CP with the performance of the 5th Marines shows the gulf that often divides a di­vision staff from officers and men on the front line,” admitted Merillat.

The Body Count

While it seems that 1/5 gave better than they got, their casualty report was staggering. Twenty-five Marines were wounded on Nov. 1 alone, while 41 were either killed outright or died of wounds suffered in action. The unusual ratio of killed to wounded speaks to the close-up savagery of the fighting. Twenty-seven of the dead were from C/1/5: no other Marine company suffered so many fatal casualties in a single action during the entire Guadalcanal campaign.

Among the dead were Robert M. Eastburn and Matthew J. Kirchner, high school classmates and neigh­bors from Riverside, N.J., who enlisted, trained, and fought side by side. Pvt Frank W. Lawton of Springfield, Mass., joined up with two buddies from Tech­nical High School; Robert Burdick and Edward Gray were left to mourn his loss. Pvt Austin W. Pollock Jr.’s demise made the Kentucky newspapers: he killed five Japanese sol­diers, reports claimed, before running into the line of fire to cover his sergeant. Pvt Anthony Antonoglou en­dured years at an infamous Florida re­form school; he attacked an abusive teacher and opted to join the Marine Corps to avoid prison time. Privates Theodore Potocki, William Zeigler, William Hall, and Arthur Doucette died before reaching their 18th birthdays.

Nov. 2 was a day of dramatic action at the Point Cruz pocket, culminating in a series of bayonet charges by 3/5—the only such attack by Marine units on Guadalcanal. Meanwhile, 1/5 faced the unwelcome challenge of disposing of dozens of dead men. Extreme heat exacerbated the problem: temperatures reached the triple digits, straining Ameri­can ability to supply their fighters and evacuate the wounded, let alone arrange transport for the fallen. As a result, 30 of the 41 men killed in action were buried in the field at a point “about 400 yards west of Point Cruz [and] about 600 yards inland from the sea.” The Marines had every intention of returning for the bodies—but two days later, American forces withdrew to the Matanikau in response to a perceived threat from Koli Point, far to the east. All of the ground taken was back in Japanese hands. It would take another few weeks of hard fighting to regain the territory—and the front lines would freeze along the Nov. 1 O-1 line until the very end of the campaign.

It is surprising, therefore, that 23 of the 30 field burials are still unrecovered. No other battle on Guadalcanal resulted in so many field burials in a relatively small area—and American troops oc­cupied the location for months—yet there are no known reports of Marine or Army per­sonnel even noticing the graves, let alone making attempts to retrieve re­mains, even after the battle ended. The first graves were rediscovered in March 1944: Pvt Pollock (Co B), Cpl Reynolds (Co D), Sergeants Louis Kovacs and Harland Swart Jr., and Pvt Albert Ausili (Co C) were exhumed by Army Graves Registration and reburied in the island’s military cemetery. Cpl William F. Wheeler (Co C) was discovered in 1945, and Pvt Lawrence Keane (Co C) was found in an isolated grave during a post-war search. The rest have vanished.

The story of Merton Taylor provides a clue to the others’ whereabouts. As a member of C/1/5, Taylor survived the All Saints’ Day debacle but saw four friends cut down around him. He witnessed their burial, which “necessarily consisted sim­ply of placing the fallen comrades in foxholes, covering them with stones, and marking the graves with tiny sticks and bayonets.” Taylor swore to make sure his buddies got “a decent burial,” but malaria forced his evacuation from the island days after the battle. After attending in­telligence school at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, he returned to the island in September 1944 as a member of the 29th Marines. Naturally, Taylor visited the cemetery—where he was evidently told in error that his buddies were not there.

According to the Marine Corps Chevron, Taylor went looking for the spot where he thought the graves to be. “It wasn’t as easy as he expected. The ridge, bare of growth when he was there before, was now covered with dense brush,” reads the article. “For two days, he searched every inch of the ridge. Then he found a rusty bayonet splitting a stick to form a crude cross … then a second cross, the third, and finally the last.”

A press photographer snapped Taylor pointing out a marker to an Army Graves Registration officer, 1stLt John L. Stewart. The story is moving, but prob­lem­atic: Taylor and Stewart arrived on Guadal­canal months after Kovacs, Swart, and Ausili had been reburied in the cemetery, and no other 1/5 remains were found while either man was on the island. Whomever Taylor found was not his combat buddies; indeed, the photo­graph may have been staged and the story enhanced. A com­pelling kernel of truth remains, though. It is highly likely that the missing dead were initially buried in foxholes where they fell instead of a regulation field cemetery.

Today, the National Parliament of the Solomon Islands sits atop the site where Tony Casamento’s squad fought their final battle. Roads and residences run through the ravine, and the creek marking the O-1 line has vanished beneath the city of Honiara. Under these buildings, singly or in small groups, lie the remains of the 1st Bn, 5th Marines—forgotten victims of a hard-fought victory.

Author’s note: Special thanks to Dave Holland for his contributions to this article, and Colonel Pam Baumann, USMC (Ret) for permission to publish extracts from her father’s diary.

Author’s bio: Geoffrey W. Roecker is a researcher and writer based in upstate New York. His extensive writings on the WW II history of 1st Battalion, 24th Ma­rines, is available online at www.1-24thmarines.com. Roecker is the author of “Leaving Mac Behind: The Lost Marines of Guadalcanal” and advocates for the return of missing personnel at www.missingmarines.com.

U.S. Marines, Cuba, and the Invasion that Never Was: Part 2

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The Marine Corps was at the center of President John F. Kennedy’s plan to remove Castro from power and block Soviet military buildup in Cuba. (Photo courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command)
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A row of MAG 26 A-4 Skyhawks line up at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Multiple aerial surveillance missions were conducted to monitor Cuban military activity. (DOD photo)The path to a first direct military confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union became possible when Fidel Castro’s communist revolution toppled Cuban President Fulgencio Batista on Jan. 1, 1959.

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Gen David M. Shoup, 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, left, and ADM George W. Anderson Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, center, meet with President Kennedy at the White House to discuss escalating missile threats in Cuba. (Photo courtesy of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

At the center of President John F. Kennedy’s joint U.S. military invasion plan to remove Castro from power and block the Soviet military buildup in Cuba was the U.S. Marine Corps. Documents declassified over the last decade, along with firsthand accounts, provide fascinating, previously unknown details of the Marine Corps’ role in planning and the II Marine Expeditionary Force’s (II MEF) part in executing the invasion that never was.

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Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Gen David M. Shoup, the 22nd Comman­dant of the Marine Corps; and President Kennedy observe an amphibious landing demonstration conducted by the II Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune, April 17, 1962. (Photo courtesy of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)The Cold War Heats Up
A New Year’s Day parade in Havana on Jan. 1, 1962, provided the world with the first tangible proof of just how far Cuba’s military relationship with the Soviet Union had come. According to the U.S. Atlantic Command’s “Historical Account of the Cuban Crisis,” on parade that day were 60 modern Soviet-made fighter/attack aircraft, light cargo trans­ports, and helicopters as well as thousands of uniformed and well-equipped Cuban infantry followed by artillery pieces, tanks, and an array of armored vehicles. Reports estimated that Castro’s con­ventional ground forces ranged from 75,000 to 100,000 soldiers, a far cry from the 300 or so that had overthrown Batista three years earlier. The Joint Chiefs asked Admiral Robert L. Dennison to keep Cuban invasion planning the U.S. Atlantic Command’s highest priority. Dennison in turn directed his planners to amend its active Cuban invasion plan, OPLAN 314-61, to reflect the realities of this new Cuban army.

Throughout early 1962, Dennison had planners draft two new courses of action. One, OPLAN 316-61, was a “quick reaction” version of OPLAN 314-61 and provided only five days of preparations (including airstrikes) before the airborne assault, with amphibious assaults occur­ring three days or less thereafter. The second plan, OPLAN 312-62, was an air strike-only option with the II MEF reinforcing and expanding the Guantanamo perimeter.

With the invasion becoming less likely despite disconcerting intelligence reports, President Kennedy communicated his resolve through American TV and news­papers. What were normally routine train­ing exercises received national media attention. On April 17, Kennedy and sev­eral senior cabinet and Department of Defense officials traveled to Camp Le­jeune, N.C., to observe one of several II MEF amphibious exercises taking place along the Atlantic seaboard that spring. On hand were Ma­rine Corps Commandant General David M. Shoup, ADM Dennison and his staff, and the II MEF’s new commanding general, Lieutenant General Robert B. Luckey. Lance Cor­poral Stanley E. Gunn from 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines recalled the exercise: “It’s not every day that you get to train in front of the president, so a lot of us thought Kennedy’s visit was more than to observe an am­phibious landing exercise. It was a final rehearsal.”

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Senior cabinet and DOD officials attended the II MEF amphibious landing exercise held at Camp Lejeune. More than 38,000 Marines were spread across two amphibious task forces, 58 ships and four bases in preparation for a Cuba invasion. (Photo courtesy of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)
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LtGen Robert B. Luckey, Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force. (USMC photo)
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Fidel Castro and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev appearing together in public, circa 1960. (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress)

Fidel Castro and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev received Kennedy’s message. The Central Intelli­gence Agency’s Sep­tem­ber 1962 re­port “The Military Buildup in Cuba” linked a Soviet cargo ship surge in Cuba in August (55 dockings) and Sep­tember (66 dockings) to a plan to rapidly “strengthen Cuban defenses against air attack and seaborne invasion.” Delivered to Cuban ports were Soviet-manned SA-2 guided surface-to-air missiles, Soviet-made Badger medium-range bombers, and Komar guided-missile patrol boats, all a clear indication that Castro believed an amphibious assault was imminent. In addition, the CIA estimated as many as 20,000 Soviet military personnel were on the island as stand-ins until trained Cubans could replace them. Most alarm­ing was the CIA’s warning of the potential for Khrushchev to deploy an army group and offensive and nuclear strike capa­bilities (air, surface, and submarine) to Cuba, though the latter was a significant departure from Soviet policy.

Within weeks of Kennedy stepping up aerial surveillance mis­sions over Cuba, an American U-2 recon­nais­sance aircraft pro­duced “hard photo­graphic evidence … that the Russians [had] offensive missiles in Cuba.” Kennedy wanted confirmation before taking any action. The Joint Chiefs and ADM Dennison tasked the Navy and Marine Corps with providing that confirmation. On Oct. 17, Marine RF-8A Crusader crews from 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing’s Marine Com­posite Reconnaissance Squadron 2 endured Cuban ground fire during dozens of photographic missions flown as low as 50 feet above the jungle landscape. “We would go around the island and triangulate to find the radar sites,” retired Lieutenant Colonel Richard Conway explained years later. “We sent that back to Washington, so when they planned our targets, they knew where the sites were. They could direct us over one, over another and another in a straight line because we had located those sites for them.”

President Kennedy met with his na­tional security team and the Joint Chiefs to review the photographs and weigh his options. The military leadership agreed unanimously to air strikes aimed at de­stroying only the sites. A ground invasion, they offered, would be needed to seize the missiles intact. The objective would then shift to defeating Soviet and Cuban forces and removing Castro from power.

Atlantic Command planners revised OPLAN 314-61 and OPLAN 316-61 to reflect the priorities and objectives. Meanwhile, President Kennedy delayed offensive military action for at least 90 days to give diplomacy a chance, but adopted from OPLAN 314-61 the naval quarantine course of action in conjunction with posturing the invasion force to act on a moment’s notice. To do this, the Joint Chiefs directed ADM Dennison in an Oct. 26 memorandum to “abandon OPLAN 314 and concentrate on OPLAN 316-62.”

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Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev took office in 1953 after the death of Joseph Stalin and allied with Fidel Castro during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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An aerial view of the MRBM Field Launch Site in San Cristobal, Cuba, photographed Oct. 14, 1962. (Photo courtesy of National Archives)

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An aerial view of Battery C, 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion on John Paul Jones Hill, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (DOD photo)

Operation Scabbards
While the diplomatic process played out, invasion forces entered quietly into Phase I of OPLAN 316-62. As a testament to the former II MEF commander’s forward thinking, more than 4,000 Marines of the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) were already in the Caribbean preparing for Exercise Ortsac (Castro spelled backward), scheduled months earlier for the period of Oct. 15-30. The DOD secretly suspended the exercise on Oct. 20 but used it and the fast-approaching Hurricane Ella as a cover for moving ships and aircraft out to sea and to Caribbean bases.

LtGen Luckey activated the II Marine Expeditionary Force officially on October 23. In his role as Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) commanding general, he requested on Oct. 19 that ADM Dennison land 2/2 (already in the Caribbean) at Guantanamo Bay and ordered Major General Frederick L. Wieseman to have one of his 2nd Marine Division battalions reinforce them as planned and begin moving his units to their embarkation points. Two days later 1st Battalion, 8th Marines joined 2/2 in Cuba as the core of Brigadier General William R. Collins’ Marine Ground Force Guantanamo. The situation caught many Marines by surprise. “We were in Vieques and we started training to invade Cuba but we didn’t know it,” recalled 2/2’s LCpl Ralph E. Johnson. “They told us to go down to Red Beach and a ship would pick us up. We got on board and they said we were headed to Cuba.”

BGen Collins’ aerial reconnaissance of Guantanamo Bay resulted in a request for a third battalion. With the only available units embarking ships, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) tasked Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) with providing the battalion. The 1st Marine Division’s 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines flew from Marine Corps Air Station El Toro in California late on Oct. 21. The battalion was in fighting positions and running patrols the next day. They were not the only unit from FMFPac to receive deployment orders.

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MajGen Frederick L. Wieseman, (pictured as lieutenant general)Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division. Courtesy of Marine Corps History Division
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BGen William R. Collins (pictured as major general), Commanding Officer, Marine Ground Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Courtesy of Marine Corps History Division.

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BGen William T. Fairbourn, (pictured as major general) Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. (USMC photo)During planning in July 1961, 2ndMarDiv staff raised concerns over conducting “assault landing operations” so soon after seizing Tarara. HQMC agreed and directed FMFPac to create a brigade for the invasion. Given the Cuban Army’s increased capabilities and the potential for direct Soviet military involvement, LtGen Luckey requested on Oct. 23 that BGen William T. Fairbourn’s 5th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) be activated and assigned as Landing Group East and the II MEF’s reserve. FMFPac received the activation message that same day. The entire brigade had to be embarked within 96 hours. Four days later the 9,000 Marine air-ground force departed southern California on board 20 amphibious ships, including the Navy’s newest purpose-built amphibious assault carrier USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2). Embarked were 1st Marines and its two remaining battalions; 1st and 3rd Battalions, 7th Marines; Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361; and a logistics support group. Marine Aircraft Squadron 121 and Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352, with 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion on board, flew ahead of the ships to assume firing positions at Key West, Florida, and Guantanamo Bay naval stations.

The brigade’s only stop was a brief one inside the Panama Canal, where BGen Fairbourn noted, in an interview years later, that his Marines “loaded blood and a hundred coffins onto the carrier Iwo Jima dockside in Panama” in hopes that there was an audience watching. “And then we sailed.” Private First Class Thad McManus of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, on board USS Okanogan (APA-220), remembered how loading the coffins “was supposed to impress the Soviets.” The ploy, however, “sure impressed us.” Just be­fore departing, Fairbourn received a naval message with orders “to land on the coast of Cuba, seize Santiago, and march on Havana.”

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Gen Shoup speaks with a Marine from 2/1 in defensive positions at Guantanamo Naval Base. (Photo courtesy of National Archives)

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PFCs Robert Broughton and Mimmy R. Isabell of 1/8 set their 81 mm mortar on enemy positions along the Main Line of Resistance. (Photo courtesy of Marine Corps History Division)

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A Marine from 2/2 watches over the approaches to Guantanamo Naval Base during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Courtesy of National Archives.With more than 38,000 Marines “mounting out,” LtGen Luckey faced the unenviable challenge of commanding and controlling from Norfolk a force scattered throughout the Atlantic and Caribbean. To take advantage of the communications infrastructure, Luckey and the II Marine Expeditionary Force command element operated from FMFLant command center. There, Luckey and his staff would synchronize air and ground actions by units embarked on two amphibious task forces spread over 58 ships and four bases. The chal­lenge was not lost on even the most junior Marines. “I know that the high ranks thought it was a complete (mess) logistically, command scattered all over the fleet, plans being re-done all the time, but that was way above me,” PFC McManus recalled.

MajGen Wieseman’s staff had the ar­duous process of organizing 2ndMarDiv, the bulk of Landing Group West, into assault elements. Spread out over 40 ships were 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines and 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines with attached artillery batteries from 10th Marines, engineers from 2nd Pioneer Battalion, tanks from 2nd Battalion, and amphibious tractors from 2nd Amphibian Assault Battalion, all of the battalions and combat support attachments of 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, re­inforced by combat support attachments. His 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing counter­part, MajGen Richard C. Mangrum, faced a similar test in commanding and controlling Marine Aircraft Groups 14, 24, 26, 31, and 32 and several independent combat aviation and support squadrons operating from aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and the Cecil Field, Key West, Roosevelt Roads, and Guantanamo Bay airfields.

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MajGen Richard C. Mangrum, (pictured as lieutenant general) Commanding General, 2nd Marine Air Wing, 1961-1963. (USMC photo)

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LCpl Ralph Maynard and Cpl James K. Campbell from 1/8 defend the Main Line of Resistance, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Courtesy of Marine Corps History Division.

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President Kennedy presents personal and unit awards to Navy and Marine Corps aviators at Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida for their actions in support of surveillance operations over Cuba October-December 1962. (Photo courtesy of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

Standing Down
After 13 days of tense negotiations that kept the world on the brink of nuclear war, the crisis subsided when President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev reached an agreement on Oct. 28. In exchange for Khrushchev removing all Soviet nuclear and non-nuclear offensive capabilities from Cuba, Kennedy prom­ised to remove all American nuclear missiles from Turkey at a future date. Had the invasion occurred, the II MEF would certainly have landed at Tarara to establish the beachhead for 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions to pass through.

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Naval aviators CDR William Ecker, left, and Capt John Hudson, right, shake hands, after President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev reached an agreement on Oct. 28, 1962. (Photo courtesy of Michael Dobbs)

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Soviet freighter Kasimov withdraws from Cuba carrying 15 IL-28 “Beagle” bombers on deck. (Photo courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command)Plan­ners changed the 1st Armored Division’s land site back to Regla, inside the Port of Havana, after 2ndMarDiv handed off Tarara, attacked west to clear the northern coast, secured the Morro Castle at the entrance of the Port of Havana, and se­cured Regla. In the event of a delay, the armor landing site was to shift farther west to the Port of Mariel. According to Atlantic Command’s 1963 historical ac­count, estimated casualties in the 260,000 American invasion force (150,000 ground forces) were 18,484 killed, 8,182 of those coming from the II MEF with 4,462 on the first day alone. Planners estimated 800,000 Cuban serv­icemen and civilians would perish during the anticipated 15 days of combat operations.

Within days of Kennedy and Khrush­chev’s agreement the II MEF stood down incrementally. Most of its units were back at their bases by Christmas. The 5th MAB was back in California by Dec. 10, including 2/1. BGen Fairbourn disbanded the brigade but kept his staff together to finalize plans reflecting the Atlantic Command’s updated invasion schemes following OPLAN 316-63’s approval by the Joint Chiefs in early January 1963 and the II MEF’s updated component plan. In the event Khrushchev did not comply, the brigade made plans for assault landings at Matanzas and Mariel and to retake Guantanamo Bay or Santiago de Cuba, if necessary.

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines re­mained afloat in the Caribbean for another two months as part of a multinational observation force. “I was on the deck of the Okinawa when we saw the Russian ships leaving Cuba,” PFC Robert P. Hemingway recalled decades later. “The missiles were plainly visible with binoculars on the decks of the Russian ships.”

To maintain their readiness, all units took advantage of training opportunities at Guantanamo Bay and Vieques, includ­ing those awaiting orders to redeploy to Camp Lejeune.

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Then-1stLt William M. Keys with his platoon sergeant on board USS Boxer (CV-21) during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Keys was aboard an OH-43D Huskie helicopter that crashed at sea in early December 1962. (Photo courtesy of LtGen William M. Keys, USMC (Ret))During an exercise in early December, a Kaman OH-43D Huskie helicopter from Marine Observation Squadron One crashed into the Atlantic Ocean forward of USS Boxer (CV-21) during a fire support training exercise. On board the two-man aircraft was First Lieutenant William M. Keys, who, as a platoon com­mander in 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, was on a temporary assignment to the squadron as an aerial observer. Knocked out upon impacting the water, 1stLt Keys regained consciousness just as Boxer ran directly over top of the wreckage with him trapped inside. “I somehow kept my composure and focus, freed myself, and swam to the surface where a rescue heli­copter pulled me out of the water,” Keys explained. His commanding officer, LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, attributed Keys’ “physical condition and presence of mind” to his surviving the crash. Some 20 years later MajGen Keys would lead 2ndMarDiv in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in February 1991 and, later, command both the II MEF and FMFLant as a lieutenant general from 1991 to 1994. (Editor’s note: The article “Genesis of the Second Breach,” from the August 2022 issue explains more about Keys’ role during Operation Desert Storm.)

The magnitude of the crisis surprised many. “No one knew they had nukes down there. We were aware they had missile sites that put Washington, D.C., and a few other places in range,” retired Col Edward Love said long afterward. President Kennedy presented the Dis­tinguished Flying Cross to Love and fellow Marine aviators Fred Carolan, Richard Conway, and John I. Hudson, who retired as a lieutenant general, for their heroic actions over Cuba. Some were shocked the invasion never materialized. Cpl Robert Thomas of 2nd MarDiv’s 2nd Pioneer Battalion recalled, “I thought we were going to war. It got serious for us when we started firing machine guns off the stern of the ship. We thought something might come out of it.”

Still others were just happy to play a part. “Sitting there watching the TV, you feel really proud about what you contributed,” LtCol Conway added years later. “It was a very rewarding experience.” Few were more pleased than Gen Shoup. “I couldn’t be happier about our readiness in this crisis,” he explained. “This time we not only have been ready, we’ve been steady.”

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View of the wreckage of the VMO-1 OH-43D Huskie spotter helicopter that crashed into the water during the approach to USS Boxer (CV-21) in December 1962. (Photo courtesy of Lt Gen William M. Keys, USMC (Ret))

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A sideview of USS Boxer (CV-21), refueling in Cuba, 1964. (USMC photo)Author’s bio: Dr. Nevgloski is the former director of the Marine Corps History Division. Before becoming the Marine Corps’ history chief in 2019, he was the History Division’s Edwin N. McClellan Research Fellow from 2017 to 2019, and a U.S. Marine from 1989 to 2017.

The Impact: Marines Reflect on Beirut Bombing After 40 Years

The 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) landed in Beirut, Lebanon, on May 29, 1983. The Marines came ashore with mixed feelings. They were the fourth MAU to cycle through Beirut in nine months. Marines that pre­ceded them served as “peacekeepers” of a Multi-National Force (MNF) from the U.S., France and Italy. Despite a full-scale civil war raging around them, Ma­rines were not to be combatants. No fewer than 17 separate political or religious factions fought over the war-torn capital city.

A web of politics shrouded the Ma­rines’ understanding of their mission and limited their ability to respond to threats. Even so, the MNF’s presence seemed justified. Marines briefly pulled out of Beirut in September 1982. During their absence, the newly elected Lebanese pres­ident was assassinated, and Palestinian refugees were massacred in retaliation. Marines and the rest of the MNF returned within the month and maintained a steady presence into 1983.

Lieutenant Colonel Howard L. “Larry” Gerlach arrived in Beirut with the 24th MAU as the commanding officer of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1st Bat­talion, 8th Marines. The 41-year-old had over 19 years in the Corps by the time he assumed command of the battalion. His career included two years as an en­listed Marine before successfully com­pleting the Naval Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (NROTC) program at the University of Mississippi and receiv­ing an officer’s commission. He earned a Purple Heart as a second lieutenant in Vietnam when a bullet tore through his hip six weeks into his first deployment. Following an extensive recovery, he returned to full duty and later shipped out on a second combat deployment as an advisor to the Vietnamese army.

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Marines from BLT 1/8 on patrol in Beirut, Lebanon, during the summer of 1983. 1stLt Miles Burdine, USMC.

One event dominated the minds of Gerlach and his Marines as they relieved their predecessors in Beirut. The month prior to their arrival, on April 18, a ve­hicle laden with explosives detonated next to the U.S. embassy. Sixty-three people died in the explosion, including one Marine Security Guard. Marines in Lebanon had suffered casualties prior to the bombing, and even saw one Marine killed while clearing unexploded ord­nance around Beirut International Air­port (BIA). The embassy bombing, how­ever, was unprecedented. As the Marines of 1/8 considered their new home, they tried to decipher what the attack meant. Could it be, perhaps, an anomaly, or a one-off tragedy? Or, was it an ominous harbinger of a new era in Beirut?

The deployment kicked off peacefully, but soon began a steady descent into violence. The battalion’s first instance taking direct fire from the city arrived in the early morning hours of June 8. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) det­onated around an observation post at the Lebanese University, followed by a furious rattle of heavy machine-gun fire from Israeli soldiers. Whether Marines were the intended target or simply caught in the crossfire, the rockets from an un­identified source exploded on the Ma­rines’ position, and Israeli .50-caliber bullets punched holes in sandbags. July and August saw more instances of rockets falling directly on Marine positions around BIA. Finally, on Aug. 28, the city erupted in violence following Israel’s withdrawal.

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 impelled the MNF to initially de­ploy later that year in an effort to stabilize the country. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) presence in Beirut served a dual effect. They added to the bullets and rockets flying around the city, even en­gaged in several tense interactions with Marines. Fear or respect for the IDF, how­ever, kept numerous other combatant factions at bay. These groups flooded the streets of Beirut after the IDF withdrew, filling the void they left and immediately increasing the number of attacks on the 24th MAU. Despite increasing hostilities, the Marines’ mission of “presence” and “peacekeeping” would not be altered, lest the U.S. appear to endorse one side or the other with an active combat role.

“We were told not to alter the defenses outside our command post because they wanted things to look as normal as pos­sible,” remembered LtCol Gerlach. “This wasn’t a typical military operation. The missions you learned at The Basic School were attack, defend, withdraw, or re­inforce. Well, we weren’t doing any of that. The last thing in the world we were supposed to do was be an overbearing military force in their country.”

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An exterior view of the BLT barracks and headquarters building prior to the bombing that leveled the structure. (Photo by 1stLt Miles Burdine, USMC)

The Rules of Engagement (ROEs) governing the Marines remained strict. Marines could only shoot back if they were actively being fired upon and could see the attacker. Likewise, they were only permitted to respond with a level of force equal to the threat. A typical scene playing out might see a group of concealed militiamen blasting away at Marine positions. Abiding by the ROEs, Marines could fire back with rifles, and perhaps even a machine gun, until the militia fire stopped. Following the engagement, Marines looked on helplessly as the enemy fighters walked out of the building with rifles slung over their shoulders, laughing and shouting, “Bang! Bang!” as they formed guns with their fingers to continue “shooting” at the Marines. Without real bullets coming at them, the Marines could offer only a middle finger in response.

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LtCol Larry Gerlach right, BLT 1/8 Commanding Officer, Col Tim Geraghty center, 24th MAU Commanding Officer, and CDR George Pucciarelli, left, 24th MAU Chaplain, perform a ribbon cutting at the opening of a new chapel for U.S. servicemembers at Beirut International Airport. Courtesy of Larry Gerlach.

Tragedy struck 1/8 on Aug. 29. A salvo of mortar rounds exploded among the tents of “Alpha” Company. Second Lieu­tenant George Losey and Staff Sergeant Alexander Ortega, the Platoon Com­mand­er and Platoon Sergeant of Alpha Co, 1st Platoon, sustained head wounds when one mortar scored a direct hit on their tent. Ortega died instantly, still seated in his chair next to the lieutenant. Losey survived to be medically evacuated but did not recover. In addition, five other Marines suffered minor wounds. The deaths of Losey and Ortega stunned the Marines in Beirut, and likewise shocked Americans back home whose perception of the “peacekeeping” mission in Leb­anon found it hard to believe Marines could be caught in the crossfire.

The situation accelerated downhill. September witnessed Marines embroiled in the war surrounding them, returning fire with artillery and naval gunfire. Even Marine attack helicopters flying above the city came under fire and shot back with rockets. Despite the constant presence of American reporters and an unending flow of VIPs touring the city, it seemed no one outside Beirut could understand or believe what the Marines faced. Colonel Tim Geraghty, the 24th MAU Commanding Officer, and LtCol Gerlach took steps to upgrade security around the MAU headquarters and the four-story building serving as Gerlach’s BLT command post and barracks. Their proposed adjustments to ROEs and se­curity posture met stiff resistance further up the chain of command. Military and civilian leaders not on the ground in Lebanon resolved to preserve the facade of a passive role in the war.

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An aerial view of the remains of the BLT building in Beirut. The structure originally stood four stories tall before the explosion reduced it to less than two.

What Geraghty and Gerlach saw as reality and necessary steps to defend themselves, others viewed as a perversion of their mission of “presence.” If Beirut were a combat deployment, the Marines would plan out their defenses and take appropriate offensive actions. Still, state­side authorities refused to acknowledge Beirut as a combat theater, and limited their defensive capabilities based on political perception. They believed if the MAU were not combatants, they should not expand their positions around the airport, giving the impression of an active role in the combat. Even as American high explosive shells exploded within the city, erasing any perception of passiv­ity the warring factions may have held, Gerlach struggled to procure jersey barriers to place outside his BLT building.

Attacks on the MAU increased. Even through an alleged “cease fire,” Marines paid the price for their presence. On Sept. 6, rockets exploded around Alpha Co positions, killing Lance Corporal Randy Clark and Corporal Pedro Valle and wounding several others. On Oct. 15, gunmen opened fire on Marine jeeps driving through the city. One Marine was shot through both legs. In another jeep, a bullet struck Staff Sergeant Allen Soifert in the chest. The jeep careened off the road and overturned. Others arrived to rescue the Marines, but Soifert died at the battalion aid station.

The following day, a rooftop observa­tion post came under small arms and RPG fire. Several Marines were severely wounded in the attack. Captain Mike Ohler, a forward air controller, braved the fire to spot enemy positions with his binoculars. He located a bunker where the RPGs originated and directed fire onto it. As he observed the bunker, an enemy bullet fatally stuck Ohler in the head. On Oct. 19, Col Geraghty appeared to be the intended target of a car bomb. The bomb exploded less than a minute after Geraghty’s vehicle passed in a con­voy, leaving Geraghty unscathed, but wounding four other Marines. Between the embassy bombing and the attack on Geraghty’s convoy, vehicle-borne ex­plosives were gaining prominence as a terrorist’s weapon of choice. Marines on guard around American facilities kept on the lookout for suspicious vehicles.

The night of Oct. 22 was a busy one for Marines stationed at the BLT building. Machine-gun fire sparked off the pave­ment around the building, rousing the Marines manning guard posts. When several rockets landed nearby, the order came down to upgrade to “Condition One” alert status. Marines exited their bunks on the upper decks and descended the stairs to augment Marines already awake on watch. A tank rolled in front of the entrance to the building, blocking the front door. The high alert lasted several hours, extending into the early morning of Oct. 23. Once the alert status finally downgraded again, exhausted Marines returned to their bunks. Their only saving grace was that today, a Sunday, reveille would sound an hour later than normal, affording them precious extra sleep.

Over 300 Marines, Sailors, and soldiers bedded down once more and passed out. Gerlach was not one of them. His responsibilities as the battalion CO de­manded his presence through the entirety of the condition one status, and well after it ended. Finally, around 6 a.m., Gerlach returned to his corner office on the second deck. He considered an attempt at sleep. As he turned toward his bunk, something flew through the air and smashed into his head, knocking him unconscious. To this day, Gerlach remembers nothing of the events that unfolded that Sunday morning. How he survived remains an even bigger mystery and miracle.

A large yellow box truck had circled the parking lot directly in front of the BLT building. Several Marines on guard observed the truck as it circled, then finally veered right and accelerated through concertina wire barricades. Abiding by their ROEs, Marines manned their posts with loaded magazines in their rifles, but no rounds in the chamber ready to fire. As the truck smashed through the obstacles barring the entry to the BLT building, Marines charged their weapons. By the time they opened fire, the speeding truck passed by and crashed through a sandbagged position at the front entrance to the building, where the tank had stood guard just hours before. The truck finally stopped in an atrium-style lobby that extended from the ground floor to the roof in an expansive shaft occupying the center of the structure.

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A typical view in the war-torn streets of Beirut, as seen by Marines on patrol in the city. 1stLt Miles Burdine, USMC.

The driver then detonated several thousand pounds of explosives and the compressed-gas-enhanced explosion ripped through the BLT building. A Marine who witnessed the resulting mushroom cloud logged the time as 6:22 a.m.

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LtCol Larry Gerlach, left, with SgtMaj Fred Douglas, BLT 1/8 Sergeant Major, in Beirut. SgtMaj Douglas was one of the 241 people killed in the barracks bombing.
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This striking photo depicts the massive crater left by the explosion inside the BLT building, leaving nothing resembling the original structure. 1stLt Miles Burdine, USMC.

The blast force equaled more than 12,000 pounds of TNT. Marines a mile away felt the earth shake and believed an artillery round must have scored a direct hit on their position. Immediately, the entire building collapsed onto the Marines inside, reducing from four stories down to barely more than a single story tall. The bomb disintegrated the 7-inch thick, reinforced concrete floor in the basement below the lobby, leaving in its place a crater measuring 39 by 30 feet, and 8 feet deep. Later analysis by the Federal Bureau of Investigation determined the bomb created the largest non-nuclear explosion ever recorded.

U.S. servicemembers around the air­port raced toward the BLT building to begin rescue efforts within minutes after the bomb went off. They found a completely terrible and chaotic scene. A choking dust cloud hung in the air. Building parts and body parts littered the ground surrounding the mountain of rubble. The earth itself seemed to cry as the screams and moans of buried victims emerged. Rescuers freed Marines from beneath mounds of concrete. They struggled locating the sources of the pleas for help. Rescuers would work feverishly to uncover a Marine, only to discover the victim was already dead, and they were inadvertently piling more rubble onto another living victim nearby. Numerous Marines thought to be alive turned out to be dead. Numerous victims thought to be dead turned out to be alive once they were exhumed. When rescuers located a living Marine, someone would stay with him to keep him company until he was finally extricated, or he passed away. Despite the extraordinarily heroic rescue efforts and the arrival of heavy moving equipment later that morning, the last living victim was rescued around noon, six hours after the explosion. The sounds of the living lingered, traumatizing rescuers as they worked without end for days. Tragically, every remaining victim became a body recovery. In all, 241 U.S. servicemembers died as a result of the explosion.

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Taken seconds after the blast occurred, this photograph from Marine positions on the 24th MAU perimeter cap­tured the smoke rising from the devastated BLT building. USMC photo.

When LtCol Gerlach regained con­sciousness, he’d never been more con­fused in his life. He could not move any­thing. Nothing looked familiar. Even more concerning, he lay on his back surrounded by bearded, middle eastern men.

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LtCol Larry Gerlach, left, with PFC John Blocher in Beirut. Blocher served as Gerlach’s driver in Lebanon and was one of the Marines killed in the Oct. 23 bombing. Courtesy of Larry Gerlach.

“What is your mission here?” one of the men asked.

Gerlach had no idea how he got there, or any memory of the events leading up to his present circumstances.

“I’ve been captured,” Gerlach con­cluded. “I’m a prisoner of war.”

Gerlach was, in fact, one of several casualties from the bombing that went temporarily “missing” in the rush to evac­uate survivors. Rescue workers removed him from beneath the rubble near the outskirts of the blast sight. His weak pulse offered the only evidence of life. Gerlach suf­fered severe head trauma and com­pound fractures on multiple limbs. Hope for his survival waned as rescuers loaded Gerlach into the back of an ambulance and whisked him away. Somehow, Gerlach ended up at an Italian medical dispensary, which immediately triaged him as requiring care far above their capa­bility. The Italians moved Gerlach to a Shiite Muslim hospital facility in Beirut. He lingered in a coma for three days before miraculously awa­king. Unknown to him at the time, the hospital staff treated him ex­ceptionally well, and likely saved his life.

As Gerlach recited his name, rank, and serial number and refused to cooperate with those he believed were his captors, an American reporter named Robin Wright discovered him in the hospital. Wright confirmed Gerlach’s location with the Marines responsible for tracking casualties, and after six days, a helicopter transported Gerlach to a ship offshore, and eventually to Germany for medical care. Most importantly, Wright called her mother in the States and told her to contact Gerlach’s wife, Patty, to inform her that her husband survived the attack.

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Sketch map of the route taken by the terrorist bomber on the morning of Oct. 23, 1983. Long Commission Report.

For two weeks, medical workers moved Gerlach around from location to location, bed to bed, and room to room. His dif­ficulty moving seemed a natural result of his extensive injuries. A specialized X-ray of his neck, however, revealed multiple fractures to his cervical spine and doctors ordered him immediately placed in a halo to stabilize his head and prevent further damage to his spinal cord. The traumatic brain injuries he suffered left Gerlach confused and incapable of understanding the events that led to his present condition. Weeks would pass before he could grasp the magnitude of what happened.

Recovery operations continued for a week following the bombing. Cranes lifted massive chunks of concrete and steel to exhume the bodies. Back in the U.S., the spirit to remain in Beirut dwindled and a political battle ensued debating the Marines’ withdrawal and options for a re­sponse to the bombing. Islamic ter­rorists, backed by Iran, claimed re­spon­sibility for the suicide attack. Little or no response from the U.S. ever materialized. Today, the Beirut embassy and BLT barracks bombings are considered some of the first blows struck in the Global War on Terror, and precursors to events like the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.

The 22nd MAU, with BLT 2/8, ar­rived in November. Their arrival was scheduled near the end of October but was delayed with orders diverting the MAU to Grenada in support of Operation Urgent Fury. The four-day operation began and ended as a combat deployment for the Marines involved. By contrast, Marines in Leb­anon still officially operated as non­combatants on a peacekeeping mission, despite the U.S.’s growing role in the con­flict and thousands of man hours invested to upgrade defenses in the wake of the barracks bombing. On Dec. 4, less than two weeks after the 22nd MAU arrived, two U.S. Navy fighters were shot down on a bombing mission over the city, killing one of the pilots. Later that even­ing, a Marine rooftop checkpoint came under heavy fire. Tragically, a rocket scored a direct hit, killing eight Marines.

Marine peacekeepers remained in Beirut less than six months after the barracks bombing. The increasing hos­tili­ties killed or wounded more American servicemembers. The incidents were met with escalated responses, including salvos from the massive 16-inch guns of USS New Jersey (BB-62) sailing offshore. By February 1984, the order arrived to leave Beirut. Marines conducted a noncom­batant evacuation, removing 800 civilians from the embassy and surrounding area. On Feb. 9, Major Albert Butler succumbed to wounds received from an accidental discharge, becoming the final Marine to die in Beirut. The last of the Marines in the city relinquished control of BIA on Feb. 26.

America moved on from Beirut quick­ly. With the exception of the embassy and barracks bombings, the 18 months Marines spent in the city faded into history as a largely forgotten episode. For those who lived through the barracks bombing, either as a surviving victim or a rescuer, moving on proved more im­possible. Their lives could never resemble what they had been prior to Oct. 23, 1983.

Larry Gerlach spent month after month in various hospitals recovering from his injuries. Responsibility fell to his wife to explain to him what had happened in Beirut, as his mental faculties rejuvenated near the end of 1983. He would never remember the bombing and the events immediately afterward and could not believe the BLT building had been completely demolished until he saw the terrifying images on the television.

“I have searched my soul, over and over,” reflected Gerlach recently, as he remembered his time recovering after the attack. “That’s all I had to do there for a while. I have racked my brain about what I could have done that would have solved the problem, but there wasn’t a damn thing. From the moment that truck entered the parking lot out front, the bomb would have destroyed the building.”

The spinal injuries he suffered in the blast, and the shuffling around im­me­diately afterwards, left him permanently disabled. Doctors in the U.S. diagnosed him with incomplete quadriplegia; while not totally unusable, everything below his neck was affected. Gerlach deter­mined to use his arms and legs as much as his new body would allow.

After nine months of intensive physical and occupational therapy at the spinal cord injury center of West Roxbury VA Medical Center, Gerlach achieved partial usage of his arms and legs, even working up the strength to walk on crutches. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1985 and moved into the civilian world as a defense contractor, then working with Headquarters Marine Corps, then onto his final career with Defense Logistics Agency. Despite limited wheelchair-friendly resources, Gerlach maintained his independence and refused to be a victim of his circumstances. He de­veloped a method of entering and exiting his car to drive himself to work. He also be­came a tournament fisher and avid hunter.

Throughout his recovery and following his retirement, Gerlach remained in touch with his fellow Beirut veterans. He attended the 1986 dedication of the Beirut Memorial in Jacksonville, N.C., and returned to numerous anniversary gatherings in the following years. On the 25th anniversary, other Beirut veterans of 1/8 honored Gerlach in a special cere­mony. In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, an official change of command never occurred relieving Gerlach of his responsibility as battalion commander. At the anniversary gathering 25 years later, the remaining veterans stood in formation and presented Gerlach with the battalion’s colors.

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LtCol Larry Gerlach, USMC (Ret) was interviewed for the documentary, “We Came In Peace,” in April 2021. The documentary is tentatively scheduled to be released in early 2024.

“Commanding BLT 1/8 was the highest honor of my life,” Gerlach said today. “I hope the Marines are proud of what they did. We tried to do something that was peace-loving, but it’s difficult to preserve something that just isn’t there to begin with. There’s a lot of people in this world, with a lot of people up to a lot of good, but there’s always some people up to a lot of bad. There’s always a certain percentage of people that harbor hateful feelings. Hopefully, they are counteracted by peace-loving people. That’s Gerlach’s philosophy anyway.

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Marines and Sailors assist as heavy equip­­ment is brought in to aid recovery efforts following the terrorist bombing of the BLT building. SSgt Randy Gaddo, USMC.

The Healing of a Marine

Editor’s note: We are publishing Col Patty Klop’s story to reinforce the importance of speaking openly about PTSD and other mental health issues and to encourage veterans to ask for help. For information about resources available to veterans, visit: https://www.mca-marines.org/blog/resource/resources-for-veteran-marines/

My name is Patty Klop. I have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and I am not ashamed. I am a wife, mother, sister, and a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Following seven weeks of PTSD treatment in March of 2022, I received the most precious gift of my life—the empowerment to live life with joy and contentment.

As much as I prefer the privacy of my personal and professional life, especially since I am still serving in the Marine Corps Reserve, I am taking a tremendous risk by sharing my PTSD story. However, the worst thing I can do is to keep this gift to myself. Assuming the risk of being transparent and vulnerable as a senior Marine Corps officer, I feel it is my obligation to my sisters and brothers-in-arms to share this incredible gift as encouragement and possible inspiration.

In April 2006, I returned from a seven-month deployment to Iraq (Ramadi and Fallujah) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I had a hard time adjusting to post-deployment life. Reflecting back during this difficult period, I now realize I was experiencing PTSD symptoms. The uncontrollable rage and angry outbursts were shocking and damaging to my family. I had never acted like that before.

Through Military One Source, I was referred to a counselor who assessed my symptoms of agitation, sleep disturbance, low energy, depressed mood, and ir­ri­ta­bility. At this point in my life, I was un­married and had no children.
From May to October 2009, I deployed as the officer in charge of Personnel Re­trieval and Processing (PRP) De­tach­ment, also known as mortuary af­fairs, to Camp Bastion, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Endur­ing Free­dom. As the first Marine Corps mortuary affairs unit to deploy to Afghanistan, we were assigned the daunt­ing task of establishing the first Marine Corps Unit Collection Point. As a PRP team, we provided care in handling and preparing human remains for evacuation and sub­sequent repatriation to next of kin. This was an emotionally fatiguing job with repeated traumatizing experiences.

When I returned home from Af­ghan­istan, I anticipated having the best year of my life with my recent promotion to lieutenant colonel, getting married, and surviving a combat deployment. I thought my exposure to a war-torn and under-developed country and the conditions of how the Afghan people lived would remind me of how good I have it as an American and to live life to the fullest. I thought I would see life through a perpetual optimistic lens, enjoying life for all its worth and embracing each precious moment.

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MARFORRES Courtesy of Col Patty Klop, USMCR

On the contrary, I had one of the worst years of my life, as my emotions, es­pecial­ly anger, were out of control. The first six months of marriage was tur­bulent. I was irritable, easily agitated at the slightest annoyance, and extremely jumpy. My husband and I attended mar­riage counseling funded by Military One Source. I did not think my marriage was going to make it.

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Col Patty Klop with her two sons. Courtesy of Col Patty Klop, USMCR.At this time, my PTSD symptoms were extremely severe with anxiety, agitation, anger, depressed mood, low energy/chronic fatigue, irritability, impatience, hypervigilance (extreme sensitivity to my environment’s noises, temperature, and activities), trouble sleeping coupled with haunting nightmares, loss of interest in activities that I used to enjoy, and feeling like my skin was crawling. I was not aware I had PTSD until our marriage counselor shared her insight about my symptoms.

Our counselor referred me to a psy­chiatrist who prescribed me anti-anxiety medication. I was reluctant to take pre­scriptions as I felt I reached an all-time low by taking medication for my mental health. I was a senior Marine Corps Offi­cer. I should have control over my emotions and behaviors.

During the summer of 2010, I re­mem­bered vividly the moment I knew my prescription medication had taken effect. I was painting the spare bedroom, and I honestly felt my irritability and tension lifting and departing from my body. I finally felt relief and a calmness I had not experienced since I returned from Afghanistan. I instantly knew my experience of relief and calmness was the therapeutic effects of my prescription medication. I now knew that prescription medication was appropriate in my time of need.

In the military, and especially in the Marine Corps, I believe there is a stigma in admitting mental health problems and that pursuing treatment may be perceived as being weak. There is an expectation in the military to handle problems on one’s own.

I was fully aware of this stigma and that pursuing mental health treatment was counter-culture to the Marine Corps, especially as a senior officer. I was will­ing to take this risk because I needed help. I was not the same person when I returned from Afghanistan. My PTSD symptoms were progressively spin­ning out of control and negatively impacting my marriage.

According to the Stress Continuum Model on the Marine Forces Reserve website, I felt like I was living in the “yellow zone” of reacting while slipping forward and backward between the yellow zone and the orange zone. Just give me a lame excuse to advance into the orange zone and I pounce! I like to blame my hot-tempered Irish, fighting spirit as an excuse for my behavior. To be honest, I would like nothing more than to be confrontational, close the gap between me and my offender, and give them a piece of my mind after only the slightest provocation.

I also felt I was unworthy to receive PTSD treatment because I did not think I was qualified in meeting the criteria. I had a false impression that I needed to be an extremely burned-out combat veteran with severe and debilitating PTSD about to hit skid row to be admitted to inpatient PTSD treatment.

On the contrary, to successfully receive intense PTSD therapy, the veteran must be functional to a degree that enables him or her to be fully present, engaged and to participate in the process of individual counseling and group sessions as well as completing writing assignments.

When I finally checked in to the inpatient facility, I was still shell shocked from life and eager to get the help I desperately needed. When I arrived, all of my doubts that I was not worthy of PTSD treatment, that I did not meet the criteria of PTSD treatment, and that I should not take a seat reserved for another combat veteran, vanished instantly.

After a couple of days, I knew with every fiber of my being that I was in the right place. The PTSD treatment deeply resonated with me because it was exactly the relief that I was looking for. I was able to unpack the burdens of my PTSD, disarm them and hit the reset button on my life. It felt like God sent his best guardian angels to my flanks to pull me out of my pit of PTSD hell. My disposition slowly improved from dark ominous stormy clouds to clear blue skies.

Initially, I struggled with baring my soul about my traumatic combat exper­iences to a civilian who never served in the military a day in her life. As combat veterans, I sense we have a common men­tality that only another combat veteran will understand us, which is true to an extent. Outside of therapy and a few close military comrades, I would certainly never share my combat experiences with anyone.

My therapist did not serve in the mil­itary. However, she was an expert in trauma and was unequivocally the best therapist I encountered after 16 years and more than 10 therapists. She may not have served in the military or in a combat zone but certainly understood my trauma and helped me navigate to a healthier state of mind.

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Courtesy of Col Patty Klop, USMCR.

If I was stuck in a mentality that my therapist’s credibility and qualifications were as a combat veteran rather than a specialist in trauma, I would regret in missing out on her expertise. My narrow mindset would have truly prevented me from fully embracing the healing power of my PTSD treatment.

What I Experienced in PTSD Treatment
PTSD treatment was like a sanctuary for warriors to begin the healing process from the invisible wounds of combat trauma, which is what I desperately longed for the last 16 years of my life. The Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) is a self-discovery process of identifying thought patterns, emotions and behaviors that were weighing me down from living my best life. I was immersed in a safe and nurturing environment where I was fully accepted without condemnation or shame of myself, my PTSD diagnosis or my past.

What I Did Not Experience in PTSD Treatment
I did not experience a lecture or an un­ending infomercial of how screwed up I was. I honestly felt like damaged goods but not once did I receive unsolicited advice about how I was doing life wrong, or how bad and destructive my behavior was, or how out of control I was in being a wife and a mother. Not once did I receive condemnation, shame or disapproval for my PTSD diagnosis.

Instead, I was guided in a self-discovery process of exploring my thought patterns, which were challenged and rewritten towards a healthier baseline. Thoughts lead to feelings, feelings lead to actions, and actions lead to results. Everything begins with thoughts, which are produced by the mind. The mind is a battlefield!

What I learned in PTSD Treatment
I approached my health holistically: mental, social, physical, and spiritual health. The mind, body and spirit are con­nected. The best metaphor to describe wellness is imagining the four legs of a table. Each leg represents a major component of health, to include physi­cal, mental, social, and spiritual.

If one leg of the table is too long, then I am spending excessive time in that component of health, such as physical exercise. If one leg of the table is too short, then I am neglecting that component of health, such as my spiritual fitness. The legs of my table must be equal in length in order for me to reap the benefits of optimal health. If the legs of my table are not equal in length, then my foundation is wobbly.

If I stand on my wobbly table, there is a propensity for accidents and injuries that could have been prevented. My table is my foundation for life, especially in the daily grind; therefore, my table must be leveled to create a strong base and prevent the perpetual accidents and injuries that life throws at me.

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Courtesy of Col Patty Klop, USMCR
Exercise serves a purpose for my physi­cal and mental health. Exercise is my personal medicine for my PTSD symp­toms, as it is a natural elixir to remedy anxiety, depression and stress with no negative side effects that medications may have. I definitely experience a pos­itive change in my mood when I exercise. Conversely, I definitely experience ir­ri­tability when I do not exercise.

Due to feeling chronically tired all the time and trying to lose a few pounds, I also pursued whole food, plant-based nutrition, as the health benefits are pro­found in achieving optimal health, pre­venting diseases and managing weight.

Health is one of the most important pre­dictors of happiness. When it comes to health, my motto is “pay now or pay later.” In other words, there’s no success­ful procrastination option in taking care of your health. If you take care of your health today, you are preventing avoidable chronic health diseases. If you take care of your health tomorrow, you are reacting to avoidable chronic health diseases. Investing in my physical health was one of the best decisions I ever made, and I will never regret it.

Author’s note: This article is dedicated to my loving family and to the amazing staff at the VA Fort Thomas Division Trauma Recovery Center, Fort Thomas, Ky. I owe a debt of gratitude to this facility for giving me the most precious and invaluable gift that I have ever received in my life, which was the empowerment to live life with joy and contentment. My eternal gratitude!

Editor’s note: The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense visual information does not imply or constitute DOD endorsement. The views presented are strictly of the author and do not represent official policy positions nor imply endorsements by the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its military services.

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U.S. Marines, Cuba, and the Invasion that Never Was: Part 1

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President John F. Kennedy speaks at a news con­ference in Washington D.C., 1961. The threat of nuclear missile sites in Cuba prompted the president to take defensive action. (Photo courtesy of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)
On Oct. 14, 1962, photographic evi­dence produced by an American U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft revealed the construction of Soviet medium-range nuclear ballistic missile sites in Cuba a mere 90 miles off the southern coast of the continental U.S. Additional reconnaissance flights on Oct. 15 and 16 confirmed site construction as well as the presence of numerous ballistic missiles. One month prior, at the height of the Soviet Union’s military buildup in Cuba that began in 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy had warned Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that “if at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way …. or if Cuba should ever …. become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.” Although Cuba’s bud­ding mil­itary relationship with the Soviet Union and the deployment of Soviet advisors and operational ground and aviation units to Cuba increased American-Soviet ten­sions, the presence of nuclear-capable offensive missiles brought the two super­powers closer to a direct military con­frontation than at any point during their 47-year Cold War.

In both open and back-channel discus­sions with Soviet officials, President Kennedy demanded the construction of the sites cease and that the missiles be removed. To convince Khrushchev of his resolve, Kennedy ordered a U.S. invasion force, including more than 35,000 Ma­rines, into positions off Cuba and through­­out the Caribbean in anticipa­tion of having to take direct military action. Among the tasks assigned to the II Marine Amphibious Force in military contingency plans was the largest am­phibious assault since Okinawa in 1945 aimed at seizing the Port of Havana and follow-on amphibious and ground as­aults to expand the perimeter of the Guan­tanamo Bay Naval Station. Drawn from documents maintained by the U.S. National Archives and Records Admin­istration in College Park, Md., and the Marine Corps archives at Quantico, Va., this article reveals—for the first time to many—the Marines’ roles in the planning and execution plan for the invasion that never was.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff meet with President Kennedy in the cabinet room of the White House in Washington, D.C. From left to right: Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen Curtis E. LeMay; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer; President Kennedy; Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN George H. Decker; Chief of Staff of the U.S. Navy, ADM Arleigh A. Burke; and 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen David M. Shoup. (Photo courtesy of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library And Museum)

Marines and Initial Invasion Planning

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ADM Robert L. Dennison served as the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command from 1960 to 1963. (USN photo)
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Gen David M. Shoup, the 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps. (USMC photo)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved America’s first Cuba invasion plan in July 1959 following communist revolutionary Fidel Castro’s brutal six-year struggle to remove Fulgencio Batista from power. Designed by a multi-service team of planners in Admiral Robert L. Dennison’s U.S. Atlantic Command, Operation Plan (OPLAN) 312-60 called for a brief air campaign followed by an Army XVIII Airborne Corps’ assault on the Jose Marti and San Antonio de los Banos military airfields south of the capital at Havana. After 19th Air Force transports delivered additional Army ground forces to seize the Port of Havana, the Second Fleet’s Atlantic Amphibious Force would land an armored regiment at Regla inside the port to assist in capturing the capital. Planners later changed the armored regiment’s insertion from sea to air. After toppling Havana, the American ground force would have to clear all remaining pockets of resistance east to the Guantanamo Bay. Planners estimated it would take 30 days to complete the invasion.

The Marine Corps did not participate in OPLAN 312-60 planning and, in the event of an invasion, had no role other than defending the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station and providing fixed-wing attack squadrons for air strikes. It is unclear as to why Marines were more or less left out, though the most plausible explanation was President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s open animus toward the Marine Corps and the service’s diminished role in the national defense strategy. With the nuclear triad of missiles, submarines and bombers syphoning off most of Eisenhower’s defense budget beginning in 1953, the Marine Corps endured a more than $40 million budget cut and an end-strength reduction of over 60,000 Marines between 1954 and 1959. The Marine Corps’ 21st Commandant, General Randolph M. Pate, known more for his administrative acumen, overlooked his service’s bloated supporting establishment and deactivated six infantry battalions and six aircraft squad­rons in 1959—a more than 30 percent reduction in combat strength—and left the remaining battalions and squadrons to function at 90 percent and 80 per­cent manning levels. Eisenhower’s misguided policies and Gen Pate’s misplaced priorities kept the Fleet Marine Forces chronically under­strength and incapable of supporting contingency plans like OPLAN 312-60.

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This 1962 painting by Richard Genders depicts Navy and Marine officers as they plan for the invasion of Cuba. Courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command.

The Marine Corps’ scene changed dramatically in 1960 when General David M. Shoup became the 22nd Commandant. Restoring operational readiness as the service’s primary focus, Gen Shoup chose to downsize training and support commands and used a 3,000 Marine end strength increase authorized by newly elected President Kennedy one year later to bring the Fleet Marine Forces back to full capacity. Under Kennedy and Shoup, observed Marine Corps historian Edwin H. Simmons, “technical capabilities had caught up with doctrinal aspirations.” The likelihood that current events would lead the Joint Chiefs to modify the invasion plan were high as were the chances that the Marines would play a part given the changes as a result of Shoup’s operational focus and Kennedy’s defense strategy.

 OPLANS 312-61 and 312-61 (Revised)

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Newspaper headline from 1960.  (Courtesy of Newspapers.com)
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ADM Alfred G. Ward was the Atlantic Amphibious Fleet commander. (USN photo)
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Fidel Castro speaks at a rally in Havana, Cuba, 1959. Castro rose to power after a six-year struggle to forcefully remove Fulgencio Batista from office. (Photo courtesy of National Archives)

The January 1961 Department of De­fense (DOD) study “Evaluation of Pos­sible Military Courses of Action in Cuba,” outlining potential courses of action “in view of increased capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces and militia” and the Soviet military buildup on Cuba was a clear indication that Marines would have a role in invasion planning and a possible invasion. Specifically, DOD officials included in the study the forces available for an invasion, namely the U.S. Atlantic Fleet’s “two carriers, a Marine Division, and a Marine Air Wing.” When Admiral Dennison reconvened invasion planning in February at the direction of the Joint Chiefs, he invited Fleet Marine Force Atlantic planners to help develop the ground scheme. The resultant OPLAN 312-61 added an amphibious assault by a Marine brigade to seize the Port of Havana.

Concepts derived from Major General Robert E. Hogaboom’s Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Boards in 1955 and 1956 offered planners integrated Marine air-ground forces at the exp­e­ditionary unit to force level for rapid deployment anywhere in the world by sea and air. With the pros­­pects of a presidential decision to invade Cuba could come with little-to-no notice, the inclusion of fast landing forces, flexible emergency plans, and pre-loaded combat supplies on amphibious ships in contingency were now essential and part of every discussion.

Intelligence gleaned from the botched Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored Cuba invasion by anti-Castro exiles in mid-April 1961 brought Atlantic Com­mand planners back together. Of par­ticular concern were reports of Soviet-made tanks and antiaircraft systems and a Cuban ground force of upwards of 75,000 soldiers. In turn, planners pro­duced OPLAN 312-61 (Revised). Re­maining in were the air strikes, airborne assault on the military airfields, seizing Havana, and defeating all Cuban forces between the capital and Guantanamo Bay. The most significant change was an amphibious assault east of Havana and a series of land and sea-based attacks by II Marine Expeditionary Force. The Atlantic Amphibious Fleet commander, Admiral Alfred G. Ward, recalled, “We would plan on where the Marines would land, plan what cruisers would be needed in order to provide gunfire support, and what would be necessary to protect these landings.”

Concerned that President Kennedy might order military action with very little notice, the Joint Chiefs directed ADM Dennison to develop a more syn­chronized invasion scheme. Although the concept of operations and force composition remained intact, OPLAN 314-61 now had more elaborate time stric­tures governing force deployments, the air campaign, and the time between the airborne and amphibious assaults. The changes had no impact on II Marine Expeditionary Force’s plan completed during the summer of 1961.

 II Marine Expeditionary Force Operations Plan 312-61

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LtGen Joseph C. Burger, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic, 1959 to 1961. Burger also assumed the command of the II Marine Expeditionary Force in June 1961. (USMC photo)
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Marine Corps HUS-1 helicopters with HMR-262 take off from USS Boxer, during operations off Vieques Island with the 10th Provisional Marine Brigade, March 8, 1959. (Photo courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command.)

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An aerial view of Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba, March 1964. (Photo by William C. Reed, USMC)
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An aerial view of Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, circa 1964. (USMC Photo)

II Marine Expeditionary Force’s in­volve­ment coincided with General Shoup’s directive that Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific headquarters also function as expeditionary force-level command elements during di­vision/wing-level exercises and con­tingencies. Lieutenant General Joseph C. Burger, in addition to commanding Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic, acti­vated and assumed command of II Marine Expeditionary Force in June 1961. Explaining to Leatherneck that same month that being “prepared to react in the shortest possible notice” was his focus, LtGen Burger oversaw the detailed planning and completion of both Fleet Marine Force Atlantic Operation Plan 100-60 and II MEF Operations Plan 312-61. Burger’s blueprint for keeping 25,000 Marines ready involved quarterly brigade-size amphibious assault exercises on Puerto Rico’s Vieques Island with several smaller exercises taking place at Camp Lejeune in between. Doing this kept one third of his units assigned to II Marine Expeditionary Force Operations Plan 312-61 embarked and within a few hours transit time from Cuba.

In the event that President Kennedy ordered an invasion, the II Marine Expeditionary Force owned four major tactical tasks; one within each of OPLAN 314-61’s four phases. In Phase I (Counter the Threat to Guantanamo and Prepare for Offensive Operations) LtGen Burger was responsible for defending the naval station. To do this, the battalion afloat in the Caribbean would land and im­me­diately take up positions the length of the demarcation line sep­arating the naval station from sov­ereign Cuba. Burger would then fly 2nd Marine Division’s “ready” battalion and a reg­imental head­quarters directly to Guan­tanamo Bay where it would absorb an armor pla­toon, an engineer detachment, and an artillery battery de­ployed from Camp Lejeune as augments to the naval sta­tion’s permanent Ma­rine Barracks.

With the 2nd Marine Divi­sion (minus those defending the naval station) and 2nd Marine Air Wing’s helicopter squad­rons embarked on am­phib­ious ships at Little Creek Amphib­ious Base near Norfolk, Va., and anchored off Camp Lejeune, N.C., the II MEF deployed to the Carib­bean for Phase II (Position for Operations).

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Cuba area of operations. (Map designed by Steve Walkowiak)

Once off Cuba, two heli­copter squadrons had to re­locate to Guantanamo Bay to support 2nd Marine Division elements there. Meanwhile, Marine fixed-wing squadrons tran­sitioned to either aircraft carriers or to the Naval Air Station Key West, Fla., and the Naval Air Station Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico.

On the order to invade, 2nd Marine Air Wing’s fixed wing squadrons would strike Soviet and Cuban air defense systems and ground forces in and around Havana and near Guantanamo. As a counter to Cuban and Soviet infantry, armor, and mechanized formations defending Havana, planners tasked the Army’s 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division with landing 10 miles east at Tarara and sweeping southwest and then north into the capital. For this to happen, 2nd Marine Division, in Phase III (Assault Havana Area) and “in coordination with airborne and surface-landing of Army forces,” had to establish a beachhead at Tarara. The division’s two infantry regiments reinforced with engineers and armor and supported by an artillery regiment would then attack west to seize the Morro Castle and the Port of Havana.

During Phase IV (Assault Guantanamo Area) operations, the II Marine Force re-embarked amphibious ships for “assault landing operations” in conjunction with 2nd Marine Division elements attacking west from the Guantanamo Bay. A consolidated II MEF would then attack toward central Cuba and link up with the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps and the 1st Armored Division. Planners assessed that major combat operations would take 60 to 90 days to complete.

President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs grappled over invading Cuba. The Joint Chiefs’ perspective was that in addition to Castro’s growing military capability and ongoing Soviet military buildup, the failed CIA-sponsored invasion exposed gaps in Cuba’s defenses such that if an invasion were to happen, it should be sooner rather than later. Surprisingly, Gen Shoup disagreed. In his novel “The Best and Brightest,” journalist David Halberstam recalled how Shoup’s primary concern was the size of the invasion force needed to control the island and American casualties. To elaborate, Shoup placed a map of the U.S. on an overhead projector and covered it with a transparent map of Cuba. Drawing attention to Cuba’s vastly smaller size in relation to the U.S., he covered the two maps with a transparency containing a small red dot. When asked what the red dot represented, Shoup explained it was the size of Tarawa before adding, “It took us three days and 18,000 Marines to take it.” Whether or not Shoup influenced Kennedy’s decision is unknown. Talk of an invasion, however, subsided. By the summer of 1962, the U.S. and Soviet Union were once again on the brink of war.

Editor’s note: Read Part II of “U.S. Marines, Cuba, and the Invasion that Never Was,” in the October issue of Leatherneck.

Author’s bio: Dr. Nevgloski is the former director of the Marine Corps History Division. Before becoming the Marine Corps’ history chief in 2019, he was the History Division’s Edwin N. McClellan Research Fellow from 2017 to 2019, and a U.S. Marine from 1989 to 2017.

HOLDING THE LINE: Marines Confront Abbey Gate Memories Two Years Later

By Kyle Watts

The U.S. Air Force C-17 began its final descent in preparation for landing. Corporal Von Straight sat packed in among the 25 Marines of his stick. Gear of every sort filled the expansive interior of the aircraft, leaving barely enough room for the Marines, as Straight contemplated the mission ahead. What that mission was he did not fully understand, but it was Afghanistan. After watching Marines fight there for most of his life, Straight yearned to finally have his turn. Would it be a fight, though? Nobody seemed to know. The Marines aboard the plane could never have imagined the world in which they were about to spend the next two weeks.

The aircraft touched down at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in the capital city of Kabul during the early morning hours of Aug. 14, 2021. A few other personnel from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines had arrived earlier, but as a combat engineer, Straight’s squad arrived with the advance party.

Events on the ground outside the air­port had decayed rapidly over the weeks prior. The Afghan government and mil­itary, propped up by the U.S., collapsed under a Taliban onslaught in every city and province. After vacating Bagram Air Base on July 1, the airfield at HKIA stood as the last American toehold in the coun­try. U.S. soldiers and Marines from Joint Task Force-Crisis Response operated out of HKIA preparing for the possibility of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, with 1/8 attached, and Central Com­mand’s Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines attached, were called in for support as the situation deteriorated.

As Cpl Straight prepared for the com­ing evacuation, the entire world watched events happening outside the perimeter wall. On Aug. 15, Taliban forces sur­rounded Kabul and Afghan President Ashraf Ghazi fled the city with numerous other officials of the American-backed government. Afghan army soldiers threw away their weapons and melted into the civilian populace. Taliban flooded the city and seized control of the country. American helicopters evacuated more than 5,000 personnel still on the ground at the U.S. embassy.

News of the takeover spread quickly, and civilians massed at the airport in fear for their lives. The sudden lack of Afghan soldiers left holes on the airfield perim­eter, and crowds seized the opportunity.

Straight was working with his team processing civilian contractors for evac­uation as night fell on the 15th when a frantic call suddenly rose over the radio. Someone across the airfield said they were under fire and civilians had breached the perimeter. The Marines joined forces with Turkish soldiers and moved out. Ambient city lights washed out all night vision devices so vehicles trailed the line of Marines pushing over the open ground, illuminating their way.

Sparks jumped off the tarmac in front of Straight. A vehicle-mounted machine gun behind him opened up on a shadowy figure hiding in a ditch. As they con­tinued, a C-17 lumbered through the dark­ness down the runway. Marines dodged the aircraft and took cover as it throttled up on an emergency takeoff. Farther ahead, a line of black-clad men carrying AK-47s sprinted across the field. By the time the sighting made its way up the chain for permission to engage, the men disappeared into a distant crowd.

Two shots cracked through the air past Straight’s head. He stopped in his tracks. He’d never been shot at before.

“My platoon sergeant standing next to me started dying of laughter as he saw the thought process working through my head,” Straight recalled. “My first thought was that I was not wearing my eye protection, like I was on another damn field exercise at Lejeune or something. We saw the guy who shot at us on the edge of a crowd, but he disappeared. Things just got progressively worse from there.”

A civilian family gives their baby to Marines on the wall at North Gate. Tragically, this desperate act was not isolated or uncommon during the evacuation from HKIA. USMC photo.

When dawn rose on the 16th, just a few hundred Marines and U.S. Army soldiers occupied the airfield amid a rising tide of civilians. Estimates range as high as 24,000 civilians breaching the perimeter. A brief and unintended firefight broke out between Marines and Taliban with two Taliban killed. Air Force airplanes made last-minute emergency takeoffs through the crowds on the runway. At midday, civilians on the ground recorded the now infamous footage of people cling­ing to the outside of a C-17 and bodies plum­meting from the sky as they lost their grip after lifting off. Apache hel­icop­ters flew back and forth over the flight line mere feet off the ground, forcing people back with their rotor wash. Noth­ing worked. The crowd proved largely peaceful but refused to budge.

The swell of people reduced as night fell. No planes would land or take off as long as they remained on the tarmac. Afghan special forces arrived and used extreme crowd control tactics, beatings and shooting civilians who stubbornly refused to retreat. Finally, after more than 24 hours of effort to regain control, U.S. forces reopened the airfield.

Cpl Mike Markland waited in Qatar with the remainder of 1/8 for a flight to Kabul as different news agencies reported the fall of the city to the Taliban. Some Marines were told to prepare for a landing under fire. No one knew what to expect or what was happening on the ground.

As Markland’s C-17 waited for permis­sion to take off, another aircraft landed nearby and stopped on the runway. The aircrew from Markland’s plane exited and ran over. Marines stirred and grumbled over the delay as the C-17 crews gathered around the landing gear of the other plane. Markland eventually learned that the body of an Afghan civilian re­mained lodged inside the aircraft, crushed be­neath the landing gear and frozen solid by the frigid temperatures at high altitude during the flight.

Markland’s plane finally departed and arrived at HKIA on the night of the 16th after the airfield was secure. Upon their arrival, the Marines from 1/8 set up around the north and east gates of the airport to process civilians for evacuation. Markland reached North Gate and climbed above the wall. People were spread out as far as his eyes could see. Strands of concertina wire placed outside the wall lay flat beneath discarded clothes, luggage, and bodies shoved over them.

Marines pushed outside the gate, fight­ing to create space between the wall and the crowd. They screamed at the top of their lungs for people to get back or sit down. Civilians screamed back at the Ma­rines and at each other, holding aloft every kind of paperwork imaginable that they hoped could get them out of the country. Marines scanned for threats as civilians crushed in, and warning shots filled the air, originating from any nation­ality present with a rifle. Taliban soldiers lurked along a road running parallel to the wall less than 100 meters away beat­ing and shooting people who didn’t com­ply with their orders. Afghan army soldiers waded into the crowd outside the gate beating and shooting people for the same reasons.

Marines assigned to the 24th MEU await a flight to Afghanistan at Al Udeied Air Base, Qatar, Aug. 17, 2021.Photo courtesy 1stLt Mark Andries, USMC.

“Nothing in your life gets you ready for something like that,” reflected Markland. “I was immediately met with something so different from anything I ever thought I would encounter; a situation I never even realized could happen with humanity. Everything you’ve learned as a man and as a Marine is constantly being used. It became exhausting very quickly.”

The young Marines knew Afghanistan as a war zone for all of their lives. Many of the older Marines had fought there on previous deployments but were now there under the pretense of an NEO, not combat, and they expected some form of order to make that happen. The chaos that greeted them left everyone looking to each other to determine what was acceptable and what was not.

“We wanted so badly to help these people,” Markland said, “but the only thing messing up the order and regulation of everything was the people. It’s like a two-edged sword. Any time you help one person, everyone sees that, and they get all riled up.”

In one example outside North Gate, Cpl Benjamin Lowther stood shoulder to shoulder with other Marines keeping civilians back. The crowd grew agitated and surged ahead. Warning shots and screaming filled the air. Suddenly, a can of tear gas erupted in the middle of it all. No one knew who threw it—a Marine, ANA soldier, or one of the other nation­alities present. Marines withdrew back toward the gate to shut down processing until the crowd settled. As Marines backed away from the gas, civilians pushed ahead into the void, crushing some of their own beneath the weight of an un­stoppable mass.

Their momentum pinned Cpl Lowther against a thigh-high jersey barrier. He drew his service pistol and fired into the air but could not create enough space to free his legs. He shouted for help and two Marines grabbed hold of his gear. Pulling at his belt and flak jacket, they finally freed his feet and safely returned behind the gate.

Marines hardened themselves to main­tain their sanity. One of the worst duties involved returning “rejected” civilians back outside the gate. With limited guid­ance from the Department of State (DOS) on what paperwork a civilian needed for evacuation, Marines ushered in people who did not meet the criteria. Other times, foreign nations brought in large groups without proper vetting and left them at the Marines’ entry control point. On one occasion, Cpl Markland helped bring in a man who had been shot in the genitals. They rushed him to medical care, but when he was stabilized, were forced to bring the man back outside the wall because he had no paperwork. Many other men, women, and children were forced back outside. Civilians resisted, begging Marines to let them stay, or plead­ing for the Marines to kill them. Unbelievably, they deemed this a more merciful death than being thrown out and left once more to the Taliban.

At the same time as 1/8 occupied North and East gates, 2/1 touched down in waves and moved to Abbey Gate. Unlike a typi­cal combat deployment, the Marines arrived lacking much of the gear that normally came with them. They relied on whatever they could carry, but Marines being Marines, they quickly adapted.

“It’s like if Stephen King and Dr. Seuss got together and wrote a book, that would be all of HKIA,” recalled Gunnery Sergeant Melissa Marnell, a combat photographer attached to 2/1. “It was like the Wild West. Marines were doing anything they could to get by. I saw rifle squads traveling on bicycles, or entire sections moving on bulldozers or fire engines. I had no idea so many Marines knew how to hot-wire vehicles. If you found a vehicle and could get it started, spray paint your name on the side, and it was yours.”

Sergeant Dalton Hannigan served as the assistant team leader for a seven-man sniper team called Reaper 2. He went to work “acquiring” assets. An Army Ranger taught Hannigan how to hot-wire a vehicle, and he picked one out of many scattered around the airport. Now with wheels, the team made their way to the terminal.

Reaper 2 received the task of providing overwatch at Abbey Gate. The team set up in a two-story guard tower presiding over the outer gate and exterior wall of the airport. The position offered a unique perspective. A road led straight out from the gate below, and a high wall rimmed with concertina wire lined one side served as the airport’s outer wall. A shallow canal lined the other side of the road, running directly below the tower and continuing beyond the gate in the opposite direction. A pedestrian walkway ran along the opposite side of the canal with another tall, chain link fence separating the walkway from the rest of the city beyond. In total, less than 50 feet stood between the tower and the fence beyond the canal.

A view from Reaper 2’s sniper tower at Abbey Gate. The Taliban checkpoint at the “chevron” of shipping containers can be seen in the distance on the right side of the photo. (Photo courtesy of SSgt Dalton Hannigan, USMC)

Turmoil enveloped the world within the snipers’ view. A sea of people pressed toward Abbey Gate from up and down the canal. Other Marines from 2/1 held the ground outside, struggling to keep the peace. The canal proved to be an open sewer, and the Marines nicknamed it “shit creek.” The smells of feces, urine, blood and decaying bodies rose into the tower, creating a toxic and intolerable environment around the gate, but the filth and stench failed to dissuade civilians. They waded through the knee-high water up to the side nearest the gate. Marines stood on the wall preventing some from climbing out and helping up others who showed appropriate documents.

Less than 200 yards down the road, a bridge spanned the canal, leading out of the airport toward the Baron Hotel. The British set up their base of operations there, processing people for evacuation. Maintaining the path of entry and exit for the Brits was critical.

Marines worked for hours clearing the road in front of Abbey Gate. The sheer weight of the desperate crowd seemed impossible to push back. After nearly 24 hours, 2/1 finally cleared the road out to the bridge over the canal. Engineers hauled in large shipping containers and placed them in a chevron-shape at the bridge, blocking vehicle entry to the gate.

The chevron morphed into one of the great incongruities representing those ending days of the war in Afghanistan. Taliban soldiers, operating in partnership with U.S. forces, occupied the chevron as an outer checkpoint. Their armed pres­ence at this blocking position prevented the possibility of vehicle-borne impr­ovised explosive devices (VBIED) from reaching Abbey Gate. In theory, the Taliban also provided an initial screening of civilians for evacuation. To the Ma­rines of Reaper 2 observing the Taliban from their sniper tower, reality appeared quite different.

“We saw people getting beaten and executed, but there was nothing we could do,” remembered Sgt Hannigan. “At different points, we’d see the Taliban sit down on the shipping containers and grab a couple kids and the kids would just sit up there with them. What the Taliban were doing with their families I don’t know. But it was just weird seeing a toddler holding their baby brother or sister, sitting up there in the heat alone with the Taliban.”

Random shootings at the chevron drove civilians into the canal, where they by­passed the Taliban checkpoint. The Tali­ban presence left everyone on edge although the crowd remained mostly peaceful.

Marines arriving at Abbey Gate found themselves in a position no training could prepare them for. DOS officials appeared sporadically and in short intervals over the first several days. They alone made the determination on “acceptable” doc­umentation for evacuation. They operated inside the gate, however, and Marines outside acted independently to determine who should be let in. Every Marine rec­ognized an American passport or green card and identified those rare individuals to be let in but what does a German work visa look like? Or an Australian visa? What if a civilian handed you a cellphone and an English-speaking voice on the other end claimed to be a congressman or a colonel or someone else “important” enough to vouch for the person who handed you the phone?

Complicating matters, guidance on ac­ceptable documentation shifted con­stantly. Just like 1/8 experienced at North Gate, 2/1 Marines grew frustrated and exhausted as they processed civilians through to safety, only then to discover the papers they possessed were unaccept­able. Hundreds of civilians fit inside the inner holding area at Abbey Gate await­ing DOS approval. Sometimes, more than 2/3 of these groups were forced back out.

Desperation grew as time passed. Families stood on the road or in the canal for days. Many succumbed to thirst and heat exhaustion. Whenever DOS person­nel left or the airfield shut down flight operations, processing halted. The crowd grew agitated and teetered on the brink of rioting. Marines witnessed unimagin­able scenes as men, women, and children trampled each other to death, were crushed against concrete barriers, or were left for dead in the canal.

Marines clung to a sense of decency. They wanted to help but felt incapable in the wake of so much terror and tragedy. Even so, opportunities arose. Without clear guidance, young Marines acted in­de­pendently, making decisions that meant life or death for people outside the gate.

“The first couple days I was looking around to see everybody else’s reaction, or to see how they handled things, but eventually I realized it doesn’t come down to me asking somebody if I can do something if it’s going to help,” said Cpl Markland. “It came down to understand­ing that right now, no decision is the worst decision for these people.”

Markland found a distraught family at North Gate one day, just after they made it through the initial screening. The family of five entered HKIA, prepared to leave their entire lives behind with a single blue backpack. It contained all their money, documents, and whatever other possessions they could fit inside. Somehow, the backpack disappeared. The frantic mother approached Markland with broken English, explaining their bag went missing during the initial search. As Marines held the family off to the side, Markland backtracked into the holding area looking for the bag. He spotted a blue bag in the crowd, but another civilian claimed it. Markland finally gave up and returned. The mother begged Markland to take her with him to search a second time.

He knew the uncleared civilians pre­sented a security risk and taking her back through the entrance created a problem for everyone else trying to get in. He also understood that without the backpack, the family would not have the required documents and would be kicked out. He took the risk. They walked 100 yards back towards the gate. The woman immediately identified her bag as the one Markland had noticed before and retrieved it from the other civilian, who offered no resistance. They returned to the rest of the family, who wept with joy and thanked Markland for his help.

At another point near North Gate, Cpl Straight received the task of guarding an Afghan interpreter named Reggie. Reggie served with U.S. forces as an interpreter in 2012, then immigrated to the U.S. and enlisted in the Marines. After serving his time on active duty, he returned to Afghanistan as an interpreter once more. Now, Reggie sought evacuation to the U.S., and Straight helped him search the crowds for his wife and children. Miraculously, they found Reggie’s family and got them on a plane.

In the personnel terminal, GySgt Marnell learned firsthand how the smallest of gestures meant the world to the civilians. She found a refrigerator full of water bottles and took several out to a crowd waiting to board their plane. After enduring the heat with no food or water for days, the people beamed with gratitude. Marnell and one of her Marines made trip after trip, emptying the fridge for the people outside.

“I’ve never seen someone so thankful for something so minor in my life,” she remembered. “That was the one time I was happy over there, doing something so small for those people.”

Of all the Marines immersed in the good and the bad playing out at HKIA, the Female Engagement Teams (FETs) held a unique role. Afghan culture dic­tated women and children could only be handled by females. Female Marines across the commands on deck formed together to support processing operations. The significant number of women and children present and the limited number of female Marines available required the FETs to work non-stop.

“They were being worked to a degree where they didn’t have any down time,” said Markland. “We at least changed between the gate, the airfield perimeter, and rest. They didn’t have that as much, it was just gate to gate to gate. And the things they were being used for, with the women and kids, was very emotionally draining.”

Some of the most widely publicized photos to come out of HKIA featured FET members caring for babies. Many desperate families handed their babies to Marines over the gates or left them lying outside where they knew Marines would rescue them, just to give the kids a chance at life. An orphanage was formed on the airfield to care for and protect all the children separated from their parents. Marines cherished the moments playing with all the kids, while wrestling inside with the terrifying reality surrounding them.

Marnell waited with three young girls for their flight out of HKIA. The girls and their parents were cleared and approved for evacuation, but the youngest of them was still unaware of their circumstances. The girl, only 4 or 5 years old, pulled off her bracelets and handed them to Marnell.

“You can have these,” the girl said. “I won’t need them when the Taliban kill me.”

Marnell stared, taken off guard. How could this be the thought of a 5-year-old? She noticed the girls all wore a cross on a necklace. She learned the girls’ parents were English teachers at a school. Marnell reassured the girls they were safe now, held them, and stayed with them until they boarded their flight.

As days passed, units at the gates adopted rest plans to finally relive those who had been on guard for days. Many Marines endured 72 hours or more without sleep. They cycled back for rest and witnessed some results of their work; C-17s loaded with civilians taking off.

By Aug. 25, the situation declined from bad to worse. The President’s deadline to withdraw from HKIA by Aug. 31 approached and the crowds understood their chances of evacuation diminished rapidly. Their desperation increased pro­portionally. Marines felt the pressure, not just from the crowd surrounding the airport, but from desperate people around the world. An avalanche of “special re­quests” overwhelmed the Marines. Thou­sands upon thousands arrived in every way imaginable; from the White House to the Vatican, from congressmen to re­tired colonels, foreign officials, or anyone with someone they knew still outside the airport. The senior officers at HKIA re­ceived emails from the highest levels of government. Lance corporals at the gates who still had working phones found their numbers somehow had gotten out, and they received texts or phone calls about specific people to look for in the crowd. Sometimes the special requests helped identify individuals in the sea of people. More often than not, the special requests, and corresponding efforts to act on them served only to disrupt or even cripple the mass evacuation efforts.

Credible threat streams reached the intelligence community. VBIEDs threatened North Gate with the civilian road running parallel to the wall. Suicide vest IEDs (SVIEDS) were suspected as well with detailed descriptions of bags and people to watch out for. The threat at North and East Gates increased so dramatically that both entrances per­manently closed operations. Abbey Gate remained the only operational entrance for civilians to enter. By nightfall on Aug. 25, commanders decided to also close Abbey Gate for good.

GySgt Melissa Marnell stayed with these three sisters as they awaited evac­ua­tion from HKIA. Visible on Marnell’s right wrist are the bracelets given to her by the youngest of the girls. Photo courtesy of Sgt Benjamin Aulick, USMC.

Cpl Straight arrived at Abbey Gate the morning of Aug. 26 with the task of barricading the gate once Marines from 2/1 pulled back inside. The morning wore on and operations continued as normal, but no word came to shut it down. Straight asked around about the delay. The Brits continued operating out of the Baron Hotel with the road from Abbey Gate as their only means of reaching the airport. Until they ceased processing civilians, the Marines needed to keep Abbey Gate open.

The closure of North and East Gates forced an influx of people toward Abbey. Civilians filled the canal and walkway. The frustrated crowd boiled over, throw­ing trash left on the ground, and grabbing at the Marines’ gear. Marines used flash bangs and other crowd control measures but found little success. Some Marines witnessed one man hold a baby over his head as a tiny human shield when a flash bang exploded nearby. Other civilians threw their children at the wall in a last hopeless act.

“Moms were trying to give away their kids. They would throw the kids to us,” stated one Marine in an interview from Central Command’s declassified investi­ga­tion into the attack at Abbey Gate. “We didn’t have a choice then because the kids would be hurt. You’d be surprised how many people threw babies. You have no idea.”

“They would throw the kids over the fence, hitting the ground,” stated another Marine in the investigation. “Throwing like baseballs. It was crazy.”

IED threats poured in, adding to the mayhem. Marines were told to look for a black backpack with white arrows, but bags and suitcases littered the entire area. Intel provided a full description of a clean-shaven man as a possible suicide bomber. Snipers from Reaper 2 spotted a man matching the description in the crowd and reported the sighting. Other Marines spotted suspicious individuals acting far too calm amid the chaos, ob­serving the gate and taking pictures.

Several reports of an imminent attack arrived throughout the day. On at least one occasion, an incredibly specific IED report arrived with a countdown. Marines received the warning with 10 minutes until detonation, then reiterated at five minutes. Snipers in the tower took shelter and the search platoon outside the gate knelt behind a concrete barrier. Everyone remained sheltered well beyond the expired timeline before resuming oper­ations. The substantial increase in threats led the Marines to collapse back from the road leading to the chevron and hold a small perimeter around the outer gate.

First Platoon from Golf Company, 2/1, assumed duty outside the gate, lining the canal wall directly below the sniper tower. Three FET members exited the gate helping to pull women and children from the canal. A U.S. Army psychological operations (PSYOPS) vehicle arrived at the gate to assist with crowd control. One official estimate placed 2,000 to 3,000 civilians at Abbey Gate. At around 5:40 p.m., roughly 30 minutes after the PSYOPS team arrived, a bomb detonated.

The suicide bomber stood on the op­posite side of the canal, directly across from the Marines. The explosion imme­diately killed or wounded hundreds of people packed into the area beneath the sniper tower. Tear gas canisters held by Marines closest to the blast ruptured, spreading their contents in a cloud over the scene. Screaming civilians fled the area along the canal. Bodies piled against the canal wall, blocking their path and restricting escape.

Cpl Straight stood inside the gate nearly 200 feet away. Even at that distance, the blast wave knocked him off his feet. Sgt Hannigan had just returned to the sniper tower and parked his truck inside the gate less than 100 feet away. He immediately climbed up the tower and found several of his Marines dazed and concussed. He learned one team member, Sgt Tyler Vargas-Andrews, was wounded on the ground outside.

Marines sprinted from every direction toward the unfolding mayhem. Some assumed security positions, expecting a complex ambush or follow up IED. Gun­fire filled the air after the blast. Several Marines interviewed for the CENTCOM investigation reported armed men in a building on the opposite side of the canal. Others witnessed men on their cellphones or taking pictures.

In the sniper tower, Sgt Hannigan ducked as three rounds struck a window facing the canal. The bulletproof glass splintered but stopped the incoming fire. Marines outside on the ground opened fire briefly, some at perceived targets, others blasting warning shots into the air to keep people back from the casualty evacuation efforts.

Marines grabbed stretchers, riot shields, and anything else that could carry the wounded. Navy corpsmen and Marines applied tourniquets and plugged puncture wounds with their fingers. The number of civilians, dead, alive, and wounded, piled up or running for their lives, com­plicated all efforts to help. The individual decisions of Marines on the ground re­mained the only thing holding the situa­tion together.

A chain link fence separated the ma­jority of the casualties from the Ma­rines attempting their rescue. Thinking quick­ly, Reaper 2 team leader, Sgt Charles Schilling, grabbed a pair of bolt cutters and cut a hole in the fence. This single action dramatically reduced the time it took to reach the wounded.

Sgt Jonathan Painter received shrapnel wounds from the explosion but overcame the chaos and pain to set his squad in a security position along the canal before running into the tear gas to help evacuate the wounded. Cpl Wyatt Wilson was blown through the air with ball bearings peppering his entire body. Somehow, in spite of his own grievous injuries and the cloud of tear gas enveloping him, Wilson found another critically wounded Marine lying nearby and dragged him to safety until blood loss prevented him from going farther. Wilson passed the Marine off but refused care for his own life-threaten­ing wounds. Numerous other Marines, corpsmen, and Army medics put them­selves at risk to help their brothers and sisters, as well as the wounded civilians.

As of this writing, the majority of them have gone unrecognized. Sgt Schilling’s life-saving initiative making the hole in the fence is just one example of unreco­gnized actions. Sgt Painter received the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with combat “V.” Cpl Wilson received a Bronze Star with combat “V.”

In less than 15 minutes, all American casualties, both dead and wounded, were evacuated to the initial casualty collection point. Medical facilities at HKIA over­flowed. Aircraft departed with the most severely wounded. The rapid evacuation of casualties no doubt prevented more Ameri­cans from losing their lives. In fact, it happened so quickly that those re­spon­sible for patient tracking struggled to keep up, temporarily misidentifying some of the dead or wounded. In total, the explo­sion killed 13 U.S. service­mem­bers and initially wounded close to 30. This num­ber grew in the following weeks as con­cus­sions and traumatic brain in­juries con­­nected to the blast were identi­fied. More than 150 Afghan civilians died in the attack with an untold number wounded.

The Marines of 1st Platoon, Golf Company, 2/1, on Aug. 26, 2021, immediately prior to taking over responsibilities as the search platoon outside Abbey Gate. Many of the Marines in this photo were among the killed or wounded in the attack that day. Photo courtesy of GySgt Melissa Marnell, USMC.

Following the evacuation, Abbey Gate fell eerily quiet. The civilian crowd dis­appeared, leaving stacks of bodies piled against the canal wall or floating in the water. The ground attack alarm blared from speakers across HKIA, providing the only background noise. Taliban sol­diers remained at the chevron, where they observed and filmed the attack in silence. Engineers blockaded the gate. From then on, apart from special requests, evacua­tion operations ceased.

On the morning of Aug. 27, explosive ordnance disposal Marines conducted a post-blast analysis. They concluded the bomber utilized a suicide vest or back­pack containing 20 pounds of explosives and hundreds of ball bearings. He det­onated the device from the canal wall opposite the Marines outside the gate, only 20 feet away.

At noon, U.S. servicemembers gathered on the runway at the ramp of a C-17. One by one, pallbearers escorted 13 flag-draped caskets onto the aircraft. The lives claimed by the attack ranked as one of the highest numbers of U.S. fatalities in a single incident from the entire 20-year war in Afghanistan.

Marines spent the final days before the Aug. 31 deadline preparing to leave. Many engaged in the “demilitarization” of the airport. The intent was to deny the Taliban use of any military equipment. Hundreds of vehicles, aircraft, weapons, computers, radios, and every other type of gear imaginable would be left at HKIA. Commanders tasked the Marine and U.S. Army units with destroying all of it. Marines dropped thermite gre­nades through engine blocks, slashed tires, and smashed control panels to pieces. Sledge­hammers, halligan bars, axes, and any­thing else they could find replaced rifles as their chosen weapons of opportunity. However, the “demil” order originated, the expectation of what should be de­stroyed swiftly expanded in its translation down to those carrying it out. At the gates, Marines were often left on their own to make life and death decisions for civilians. Now, throughout the airport, Marines were left on their own to decide what items warranted destruction.

“The Turkish military left their bar­racks, and we were standing in their liv­ing quarters,” remembered Cpl Markland. “We just thought OK, if we aren’t going to be here to use it, then certainly not the Taliban. We were going to do everything we could to make it uninhabitable for them. We were going to take away the amenities that anyone would appreciate.”

Marines smashed TVs and refrigera­tors. They broke apart tables and chairs. They forced open every locked door and demolished anything found on the other side. Across the airport, Marines everywhere unleashed nearly two weeks of pent-up anxiety and aggression. They felt helpless in the face of ongoing horror outside the gates. They thirsted for re­venge in the wake of the attack that killed 13 of their brothers and sisters. Every window begged to be smashed. Every blank wall space looked naked without “F–K ISIS” in spray paint. Before them lay an entire base full of cathartic opportunity.

HKIA reserved a final bad memory for many Marines. In their last hours on the ground, Marines were ordered to police call the airport and clean up the destruction just completed. They were told that they took the order too far. They returned to specific areas to pick up the pieces and flip vehicles back onto shredded tires. Some unlucky few were stuck policing the areas where civilians waited in groups to board aircraft. With­out adequate facilities, civilians defecated in whatever container they had or directly on the ground. Trash and filth of every kind imaginable remained. The police call seemed a fitting end to their time in Afghanistan.

The final American aircraft lifted out of HKIA before midnight on Aug. 30, completing the largest NEO airlift in U.S. history. Officially known as Operation Allies Refuge (OAR), 800 military or civilian aircraft evacuated nearly 125,000 civilians over a 17-day period.

The impressive numbers did little to assuage the feelings of the Marines who endured HKIA. Now two years later, the memories are ever-present, and reminders are constant. Tyler Vargas-Andrews, the Reaper 2 team member severely wounded by the blast, gave a compelling testimony before Congress in March, highlighting the questions and concerns about the operation echoed by many Marines. As recently as April, the Taliban announced they killed one of the key ISIS-K players who planned the bombing at Abbey gate.

In August 2022, on the one-year anni­ver­sary of the attack at Abbey Gate, Cpl Joe Laude worked through the contact list on his phone, checking in with everyone he knew from HKIA. Laude served as a machine-gunner with Echo Co, 2/1, working at Abbey Gate and rushing 100 meters to the scene of the attack to evacuate casualties after the bomb went off. An idea arose; rather than contacting everyone individually, what if he created a hub where everyone could come for community when they needed it?

“At that one-year anniversary, I already knew OAR veterans had a lot of un­answered questions, a lot of guilt and shame about their service,” Laude said. “I needed to do something.”

He formulated a plan and worked with others to develop the idea. The group founded a 501(c)(3) called OAR Foundation with the mission to provide a community for OAR veterans, preserve the history of the evacuation, and explore the operation’s “moral injury” on those who were there.

“Moral injury is a guilt or shame-based ailment,” Laude explained. “It can be co-occuring with post-traumatic stress, but I think the biggest difference is the guilt. I think many times, the guilt is what can more quickly lead someone toward suicide. We are slowly researching all of these things and recently brought on a psychologist into the organization to help us build up that research.”

U.S. soldiers and Marines carry the body of a fallen servicemember to a waiting aircraft for transport home on Aug. 27, 2021. (Photo by 1stLt Mark Andries, USMC)

As the vast majority of OAR veterans leave the Corps or move on to different commands, they try to decipher how that horror-packed two weeks will fit into the rest of their lives. Even for veterans with combat deployments prior to August 2021, HKIA held experiences unlike anything they had ever seen before. OAR Foundation hopes to play a key role in finding answers and accountability, while providing a forum for veterans to share their experience. As they forge ahead, those stories will shape the legacy of the Marines and Navy corpsmen whose lives were changed at HKIA and preserve the memories of the 13 servicemembers killed in action.

The lessons learned from this tragedy remain in infancy, even two years later. Most will only be revealed as more truth comes to light. When something horrific occurs, the duality of man emerges. The evacuation of HKIA brought out the worst that humanity has to offer. It also brought out the best. No matter how bad it gets, no matter how completely evil holds the day, there will always be someone willing to act for good, even in the face of chaos and utter exhaustion. Someone will always be willing to hold the line. At HKIA, Marines held.

Author’s note: Our tribute to the fallen servicemembers from HKIA is on page 72 of this month’s issue. For the Marines who served at HKIA, thank you for allowing me to share a glimpse into your experience. Each of you has a story worth telling. I encourage you to do so. It would be impossible to capture everything that happened there in one article. I hope my efforts have done you justice. For more information on OAR Foundation, visit www.operationalliesrefugefoundation.org. For additional photos and information about HKIA and the attack at Abbey Gate, see the expanded version of this story at www.mca-marines.org/magazines/leatherneck/.

Terry Salman: American Marine and Canadian Philanthropist

Most Marines know that the fabric of our Corps is woven from throughout the nation. Marines join from every state and even from foreign countries, often with the goal of becoming a citizen of the United States. But a Canadian citizen who enlists during the Vietnam War with no desire to renounce his Canadian citizenship and become an American? That’s pretty unusual, but even more rare is when that same Marine goes on to become a highly successful businessman and philanthropist. Veteran Marine, successful businessman, and generous philanthropist Terrance K. “Terry” Salman is such a rarity.

Salman recently sat down for an interview with Leatherneck to discuss his service and his focus on philanthropy after his highly successful business career in Canada. Decades after his time in the Corps ended, Salman remains a loyal Leatherneck reader and even referenced two of the magazine’s articles in his recently published book, “What We Give From Marine to Philanthropist: A Memoir.” The interview took place via Zoom which made it easy to see that Salman embodies the old adage, “Once a Marine, always a Marine.” Behind his desk is a large portrait of a Marine waving the American flag, painted by famous Canadian artist, Attila Richard Lukas. It’s clear that Salman is proud to be a Marine.

Canadian by Birth
Growing up in a large family in Quebec, Canada, Terry Salman was a relatively mediocre high school student whose future wasn’t clearly defined. Meeting a Marine recruiter over the border in Platsburg, N.Y., Salman was intrigued listening to all the benefits of service, especially travel, but it was a photo behind the recruiter’s desk that actually sealed the deal. “I had a fondness for JFK [John F. Kennedy], the commander in chief, and behind the recruiter’s desk was a portrait of the commander in chief.” At that time, his only knowledge of the Corps came from reading the Leon Uris classic, “Battle Cry.” Nevertheless, Salman decided the Marine Corps was for him. The recruiter expedited the required green card, and Salman was off to recruit training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island.

Salman said “The DIs were very suspicious,” about his citizenship but added that it was only at Parris Island that being a Canadian was ever an issue during his time in the Corps. “I was happy in the Marine Corps. They didn’t really care if I was Canadian. It never came up after boot camp.” And like many Marines, Salman considers his best day in the Corps to be the day he graduated from recruit training at MCRD Parris Island.

Vietnam
Salman was assigned to the infantry during his six years in the Marine Corps and he quickly advanced through the ranks to the grade of sergeant. He served in Vietnam with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines as a section leader. “I was an 0341, 81 mm mortars,” said Salman. “What mortars have to do to support a platoon is incredibly important and takes a lot of planning and training.” He later took the lessons he learned from his time as a grunt and applied them to both his business endeavors and philanthropy. “Keep your focus on the ultimate objective which the Marine Corps focuses on, whether a combat mission or training a unit or how to train individuals to become a better Marine. Teamwork is incredibly important.”

When asked about the impact his service in Vietnam had on him, Salman responded positively. “It gave me a much different view. I’ve tried to take a worldly view about what is right and what is wrong, that different countries have different ways of looking at things. Having lived in the United States, everybody called it Camelot, it was a high standard. Things are different today, not only in the United States but elsewhere. There’s more political uncertainty than there was in my time.”

Entering the Business World
After leaving the Marine Corps, Salman returned to Canada and began working in the mining industry with a focus on finance. He achieved significant success at Nesbitt Thompson, a Canadian stock brokerage firm, and later at his own financial advisory firm, Salman Partners, where he was president and chief executive officer and where he raised funding for hundreds of companies in the mining and exploration fields. As the current president of Salman Capital and chairman of New Pacific Metals Corporation, Salman’s business successes have been numerous, and he credits his time in the Corps for setting him on the path to success.

“It was really the foundation of my life because the Marines taught me everything was possible. You just have to be patient. You have to work at it. The guiding principles of following procedures, having a good plan, your own plan, your unit’s plan, those are things that I learned from and used.” Salman referenced other lessons from the Corps including discipline, accountability and responsibility. “The many courses I attended in the Marine Corps helped me become sergeant in less than four years. They were incredibly helpful; they taught me a lot about what it takes to persevere, to look for higher goals.”

Salman, pictured here at the Britannia Mine Museum in 2018, was the honorary chairman of the museum’s fundraising project. His father worked as a mining engineer in the Britannia mines. Salman attributes his philanthropic success to the core values he learned as a Marine. Photo courtesy of Terry Salman.

Philanthropy
His philanthropic efforts grew in parallel to his business successes. According to Salman, philanthropy went hand in hand with his service as a Marine. “Philanthropy is not much different. Some of the core values that Marines learn apply in philanthropy. Marines taught me to help people, and philanthropy is all about helping mankind in a broad sense. I don’t see much difference.”

Veterans’ causes are just one of the many efforts upon which Salman has focused over the years. The Canadian organization, Veterans Transition Network, is especially close to his heart. The organization provides post-traumatic stress treatment to Canadian veterans and American veterans who live in Canada. Encountering one recipient of the organization’s programs and support, Salman was reminded again of the impact of helping others. The veteran told him, “They saved my life. I wouldn’t have seen my daughter graduate without them.” Salman strongly believes that for those who have been blessed with health or a good job, the challenge is to do more. “Veterans are the most marginalized in society in many ways. They suffer from so many things, including a large portion of homelessness, which is a big North American and global crisis to be honest. There’s much more to do.”

Of the many ways Salman has given back, his support of those with AIDS at a time when many shunned them was perhaps most impactful. “When you saw people who had marks on their face and losing weight, I was at the forefront of a hospital that embraced them which was so enriching to see. In those days they were the most marginalized/ostracized people, everyone saw it as a gay man’s disease but of course, it wasn’t. It was uplifting to sit in an environment where you could do something.” According to Salman, his support of those suffering what was at the time an incurable disease is one of his greatest legacies, and again, his efforts to support that particular community also had some roots back to his time in the Corps.

“Philanthropy is about trying to overcome adversity; making the world a better place, more giving, more inclusive, and ironically, I learned that from the Marines—inclusion. We could be supportive in other ways. I learned not to turn my back on people who were different than me. That’s what enabled me to take the AIDS initiative, which was so important.”

Loyalty is vastly important to Salman and is a theme throughout “What We Give.” “That came from my time in the Marine Corps. The Marines are big on loyalty. That’s what Semper Fi is all about. I never forgot that.” He continued, “One of the frustrations I have, not so much in philanthropy but in business, is getting the same kind of loyalty. Six years in the Marine Corps today would seem like an eternity to a young person. That’s a big thing with me.”

From the left: Christina Castell, the chief librarian at the Vancouver Public Library; Terry Salman; and Jenny Marsh, stand with the new electric BiblioBike in 2022. Salman’s work has raised millions of dollars for many organizations like public libraries and hospitals. Courtesy of Terry Salman.

Legacy
Like all good Marines, Salman has spent most of his life serving as an example to others. In addition to his philanthropic efforts, which include raising millions for everything from public libraries to hospitals, Salman wrote, “What We Give From Marine To Philanthropist: A Memoir,” in the hopes that his story would serve as inspiration. “The world is full of tragic stories and suffering people. So, for those of us who have the opportunity to give back, it just seems like the moral thing to do.”

He continues to look for opportunities to help others even today. “Giving back gets easier … it has such rewarding characteristics. Small things go a long way. I’m always looking for new ways to help move my philanthropy forward.” And when asked to describe his legacy, Salman again focused on serving others. “I would hope that they would think about not just about how much money I made, helping to create a better world in the charities and philanthropies that I engaged with. There’s more things to do. That’s what I’m looking forward to for the rest of my life; trying to do more, like the Marines do with less.”

Author’s note: More information on “What We Give From Marine to Philanthropist: A Memoir” and how it can be purchased can be found at www.whatwegivebook.com.

Author’s bio: Col Mary H. Reinwald, USMC (Ret) served 27 years on active duty and retired in 2014. She was the editor of Leatherneck and the vice president for strategic communication for the Marine Corps Association until earlier this year.

Office of Naval Research: Preparing the Marine Corps for Battlefields of the Future

“My predecessor told me … ‘we don’t have lightsabers and hover tanks in the basement here, but it’s right down the road.’ ”
—Colonel Frederick Lance Lewis Jr., USMC, Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Research (AVCNR)

The United States military is the most technologically sophisticated fighting force the world has ever seen. Its dominance comes not from its immense size, but from its ability to rapidly project force on a global scale, powered by an ever-improving arsenal of hardware and software the likes of which only a science-fiction writer could predict. The Marine Corps has always organized itself to be as flexible as pos­sible, and with Force Design 2030 re­focus­ing the Corps around that principle, it will need to modernize more rapidly than ever before. Force Design 2030 asserts that it is imperative to “transform the Marine Corps into a more agile, ef­ficient, and technologically advanced force to meet the challenges of the future.” Proudly leading that charge are the devoted men and women of the Office of Naval Research (ONR).

The Office of Naval Research traces its roots back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a time of rapid change. For the denizens of Europe and North America, industrialization changed every facet of life; how we ate, how we worked, how we traveled, and especially, how we fought. The First World War proved to the world’s generals and admirals that a military even a few years out of date would be hopelessly outmatched on the modern battlefield, a fact of which American leaders were especially aware. Exactly 100 years ago this month, on July 2, 1923, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was established to lead technological research and development programs throughout the Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps. Throughout the interwar period and during World War II, NRL completed early pioneering work on many of the technologies we take for granted today: remotely piloted aircraft, sonar, and radar, just to name a few.

Coming out of World War II, American geopolitical strategists rec­ognized that the U.S. had the opportunity to become the dominant military power in the world but could only do so by main­taining a technological edge over foreign adversaries. To that end, on Aug. 1, 1946, President Truman signed Public Law 588, establishing the Office of Naval Research to “plan, foster and encourage scientific research in recognition of its paramount importance as related to the maintenance of future naval power, and the preserva­tion of national security.” Since then, ONR has overseen all U.S. naval science and technology programs, coordinating NRL’s work with that of other laboratories across the country and around the world.

For new technologies to meet war­fight­ers’ needs, the people developing those technologies need perspective on how their work actually makes a difference to the end user. To that end, ONR draws its manpower from the operational mil­itary. Its senior leadership consists of actual warfighters who have already served on air, land, and sea; several have combat experience. Even many of the civilian employees are veterans now in their second careers. Because the Marine Corps is an integral part of the Depart­ment of the Navy, the positions of vice chief of naval research (VCNR) and as­sistant vice chief of naval research (AVCNR) are always staffed by Marines so they can advocate for the Corps’ future needs.

Pushing the Marine Corps into the future is a huge responsibility. As the VCNR, Brigadier General Kyle B. Ellison also serves as the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), the Futures Directorate, and the Wargaming Center. “He’s a very, very busy individual,” confirms Colonel Frederick Lance Lewis Jr., the AVCNR. “What he has put out is a campaign plan for, ‘How are we going to get from where we are now to Force Design 2030?’ My job as the assistant vice chief of naval research is to ensure that Marine Corps’ equities are being met in science and technology development.” Col Lewis came to ONR last summer after three years as the commanding officer of Ma­rine Corps Air Station Iwakuni.

As a pilot with more than 3,900 total flying hours, including more than 400 in combat, Lewis is intimately familiar with the importance of the work ONR does. Throughout his 27-year career, he has observed and directly benefited from a slew of new technologies developed at least in part by the organization he now helps lead.

“It’s interesting because you don’t think about it in real time. I’m an F-18 pilot by trade. When I started flying the F-18 in ’99, there was no GPS in the aircraft! There were no GPS weapons. Laser-guided weapons were … something that was talked about in hushed tones. Targeting pods were in their infancy,” Lewis said. “And now go to today … what I’ve seen is total immersion in GPS. GPS weapons and laser-guided weapons, that’s the norm. If you’re dropping a ‘dumb’ bomb, that’s the rare, exciting exception.”

Beyond precision-guided munitions, Lewis has seen new technologies pervade every aspect of warfighting. “Helmet-mounted queueing system, Link 16, improvements in radar, targeting pods—holy cow, we could talk forever about ad­vances in targeting pods—downlink video, SATCOM, all kinds of things that have been incorporated now into aircraft,” Lewis said. “On the ground side, never did I think when I was doing my first FAC [forward air controller] tour, when I was on my ground tour in Iraq, ’04-’05, that you would be able to livestream video down to a battalion COP [common operational picture], and now it’s normal,” he added.

“Some of the up-armor capability, MRAP [Mine Resistance Ambush Pro­tected vehicles], QuikClot, all of these things, you just think about … holy smokes, none of that stuff was thought of, invented, and it all started in a place like this,” Lewis said. “For me, I’ve seen that arc of technology and just how valuable technology is, and what does it take to deliver it to the fleet, having been on the user end of it.”

Each of ONR’s five departments, called Codes, directly manages programs within a specific area; the Warfighter Perform­ance department, officially designated Code 34, does a great deal of work that directly benefits Marines on the ground. From its headquarters in downtown Arlington, Va., ONR coordinates each department’s work at various research centers throughout the U.S. and abroad, such as NRL, MCWL, and the many Naval Surface Warfare Centers (NSWCs). Secure networks allow scientists and engineers there to collaborate in real time with their counterparts in other services of the U.S. military, allied militaries, re­search universities, and the private sector. Reporting to Col Lewis are five Marine officers, one in each Code, who leverage their scientific education and Marine Corps experience to direct the program officers’ research.

To equip Sailors and Marines for the battlefield of the future, ONR must first be able to predict that future. As the ex­peditionary portfolio director, veteran Marine Billy J. Short Jr. tries to do just that. In the absence of a crystal ball, he and his associates use a three-part time­scale to analyze the future based on the levels of maturity of various new tech­nologies. “The close, deep, and deeper fight is what we call it,” he says. “I need to make sure that we have a spectrum of technologies that the Marine Corps can adopt over that timeline.” In this context, “close” refers to programs which should conclude within the next three to five years, yielding results that will likely benefit many of the Marines reading this article today.

One example of a technology nearing maturity is a device known as the Port­able Fluid Analyzer Plus (PFA+), which prom­ises to significantly streamline the workflow for any Marine whose MOS in­volves vehicle maintenance. An impor­tant but underappreciated part of keeping vehicles running is checking lubricants, fuels, and hydraulic fluid for contaminants or debris that could indicate or even di­rect­ly cause a vehicle to break down at the worst possible moment.

Currently, fluid testing requires the Marine to package a sample and ship it to an offsite laboratory that may be hun­dreds of miles away, then wait days for the lab to send back a detailed analysis. As its name suggests, PFA+ effectively packages all the capability of a fully equipped scientific laboratory into a man-portable Pelican case and completely auto­mates the testing process. With min­imal training, anyone can carry the de­vice to wherever it is needed and quickly test a fluid sample to determine its exact composition and determine what impuri­ties it has. Once it arrives in the fleet with­in the next few years, PFA+ will reduce the processing time from several days to less than an hour, allowing main­tenance technicians to keep more vehicles running with less work.

During field trials at Camp Lejeune, a PFA+ prototype proved its worth when a vehicle unexpectedly broke down in the field. Instead of canceling the trial and calling for motor transportation Ma­rines to recover the vehicle, the quick-thinking Marines in the field used the PFA+ unit to test its fuel. Determining that moisture in the fuel system had caused the breakdown, the Marines were able to quickly restore it to working order and continue the scheduled testing, sav­ing untold manhours of work.

Several of ONR’s current projects in­volve the use of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) to create more opportunities for training. Augmented reality systems combine computer-gen­erated imagery with the wearer’s view of the real world, like an advanced heads-up display. Dr. Peter Squire, Ph.D., the program officer for human performance, training, and education works with VR and AR to improve how warfighters use those technologies. He has degrees in computer science and psychology, a rare combination which makes him uniquely suited to not just develop technology, but understand how people use it. “I don’t do things directly in developing weapons; what I try to do is better understand how we will employ those,” he said.

“I try to help create training capabilities that will support that ‘anytime, anywhere’ training as part of their home station duties,” Squire continued. One of those new training systems is the JTAC Virtual Trainer (JVT), developed in collaboration with the private sector. As part of their MOS, joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) and FACs require complicated training that can be difficult for a unit to arrange. The time and space requirements to set up a practice range, not to mention the fuel and munitions costs the Marine Corps incurs to dispatch aircraft to sim­ulate close air support, are immense.

“For example, it is costly to do close air support training because you have to pay for pilots, the gasoline, the munitions, so if you can do that and still have the same level of proficiency using a simulated system to complement some live-fire activi­ties, I think there’s a huge ability of going after that type of approach,” Squire said.

ONR’s JVT leverages virtual reality technology to turn any space into a vir­tual training environment, complete with virtual aircraft, so that Marines can practice crucial combat skills more often than is currently possible. JVT’s advan­tages in cost and convenience promise to make it a valuable addition to the Ma­rine Corps’ toolbox.

“Some of what we do is early basic research that can take 10-30 years to fully develop,” said Short. Much of the funda­mental tech­nologies ONR is presently investigating at universities will not be mature and ready for deployment until many of to­day’s Marines have already left the military. It will be a very different Marine Corps and a new generation of Marines who field this new hardware. This foundational research can lead to breakthroughs that provide us a dispro­portionate advantage over other evolu­tion­ary developments.

Short, who earned graduate degrees in chemistry and physics, retired from the Marine Corps having served as a combat engineer officer. His combination of a strong science background and exper­ience as a Marine gives him a unique perspective into both the new technologies reaching maturity and how warfighters can use those technologies in their work. In discussing the way new technologies are promulgated throughout the fleet, he divides them into two categories based on what drives them: pull and push.

“Tech pull,” as Short calls it, is what happens when a program works to de­velop some capability requested by the fleet. These programs arise directly from the needs of warfighters, as identi­fied from the results of exercises and war­games. “We see that when we take what we currently have and mix it up with the adversary’s capabilities, we’ve got a big gap here. That gap can then get tran­slated into a technology need that then becomes a ‘pull.’ ”

“Tech push,” on the other hand, happens when ONR’s program managers identify a new or emerging technology which could provide a benefit Sailors and Marines, then develop that technology into a usable form. ONR has an entire portfolio called the Innovative Naval Prototype Portfolio consisting of such programs. “For that portfolio, we don’t need a requirement, we don’t need resources, all we have are scientists and informed discussions with our warfighters to say, ‘hey, we think this technology is … a moonshot and can have game-changing aspects, and regardless of what feedback you’re giving us right now, we’re saying that from a technical level, if this was fully and successfully developed, this is probably going to change the way you fight.’ ” In other words, with tech pushes, the scientists and engineers try to provide new hardware before the men and women in the fleet even know they need it.

Everyone at the Office of Naval Re­search is deeply invested in the work they do and how it affects the men and women in the fleet. When any individual Sailor or Marine identifies a problem that could be solved with new technology, ONR wants to know as soon as possible so their scientists and engineers can develop that technology. To that end, the ONR TechSolutions program allows Navy and Marine Corps servicemembers to submit their ideas for new technologies that could solve existing problems and enhance warfighter capabilities. ONR communicates with the applicant to fully understand the problem, and if the solution can be developed in a timely and cost-effective manner, devotes resources to the project.

“Our job here is to maintain our tech­nological edge over any adversary out there, and … if anybody’s foolish enough to take a swing at the Navy and the Ma­rine Corps, that that’s an unfair fight in our advantage,” said Lewis. “That idea is permeated from the top, from General Ellison, down to every single program officer that I’ve ever come across.”

The researchers’ high level of motiva­tion is palpable. “There are some folks who are really, really hungry to make sure that it is an unfair fight out there, and it is truly, truly exceptional to be in their presence and to feel their energy,” said Lewis. “I mean, you can just feel it coming off of them, you know? You get bogged down with budget and all that stuff, and then you go talk to the folks and they just could not be more excited about this new thing they came up with that’s going to make it unfair for our adversaries,” he added.

Any team succeeds or fails based on the contributions of each of its members, and ONR exemplifies this principle perfectly. From the command leadership to the program officers, the whole organi­zation is pervaded by a strong culture of enthusiasm for the work they do, an understanding of its value, and a sense of responsibility toward the Sailors and Marines they support.

Author’s bio: Sam Lichtman is a freelance writer who specializes in small arms technology and military history. He has a weekly segment on Gun Owners Radio. He is a licensed pilot who lives in Virginia.

Celebrating America’s Music: The 225th Anniversary of “The President’s Own”

On Wednesday, July 20, 2022, the Marine Band performed at a
gala concert at the Zofin Palace in Prague, Czech Republic. (Photo by GySgt Rachel Ghadiali, USMC)
MGySgt Duane King, the drum major of The President’s Own, leads the band down Center Walk during the Friends and Family Friday Evening Parade, Marine Barracks Washington, D.C., April 26, 2019.
Courtesy of LCpl James Bourgeois, USMC

This year marks several significant milestones in the legacy of “The President’s Own” United States Marine Band. July 11 marks the band’s 225th anniversary, and although the organization looks nothing like it did in 1798, its enduring fame and popularity has changed little as the band remains the oldest professional band in the nation.

Less than three years after President John Adams signed an act of Congress establishing the United States Marine Band, the nation’s third president, Thomas Jefferson, claimed the band as his own following his inauguration, bestowing upon the organization their prized nickname and their musical duties have evolved over the years, extending far beyond the White House and Washington, D.C.

It proved to be a struggle to find and enlist the original 32 drummers and fifers in 1798. The band procured financing only through the Commandant’s “suggestion” that the officers in his young Corps of Marines donate roughly 50 percent of a month’s paycheck. Today, the organization operates with stunning sophistication and organic support, consisting of well over 100 musicians and full-time staff.

The band has performed through some of the most signifi­cant events in American history. On Independence Day in 1848, the band celebrated the laying of the cornerstone of the Washington Monument. Members stood alongside Pres­ident Abraham Lincoln in 1863 as he delivered his im­mortal Gettysburg Address. A century later, in 1963, the world witnessed “The President’s Own” on TV as they led the funeral procession for President John F. Kennedy. On Sept. 11, 2002, the band helped Americans honor our fallen at Ground Zero on the one-year anniversary of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks.

The organization’s high profile and highly public role requires the very best musicians America can offer. As early as 1840, the band officially “separated” from the rest of the Corps. The Marine Corps Manual of that year made the first known distinction between enlistees in the band and enlistees in any other occupational specialty, and 40 years later, in October of 1880, The President’s Own entered its most trans­for­mative period under the leadership of legendary director John Philip Sousa. Only 25 years old, Sousa had already been performing with the band for over a decade. He initiated their first national concert tour, taking the band outside of Wash­ing­ton, D.C., to share their music around the nation. Sousa intro­duced many of his own marches during this time, many of which endure today with their popularity. He also inspired the first phonograph recordings of the band during his tenure. In 12 years as director of The President’s Own, Sousa modernized and expanded the band’s repertoire of musicians and events in an unprecedented fashion.

Sousa’s legacy and enduring vision for the organization enabled many other “firsts” to come in the years fol­lowing his departure. The year 1922 saw the music of the band enter homes across the nation as the Marine Band radio program was broadcast for the first time, building upon Sousa’s efforts to have their music recorded. His vision for the national concert tour expanded further in 1985 as the band performed its first international concert in Rotterdam, Netherlands. Since this first overseas tour, the band has also performed in coun­tries such as Switzerland, Czech Republic, Singapore, Japan, and most notably, in 1990, the Marine Band be­came the only American military band to tour the former Soviet Union before it dissolved into independent states.

March of this year marked another significant milestone in the band’s history as it celebrated 50 years since the first woman enlisted in The Pres­ident’s Own. In 1943, then-director Captain William F. Santlemann super­vised the formation of the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (MCWR) Band, a separate entity trained by and operated in conjunction with The Pres­ident’s Own. Santlemann cast a wide net for his auditions, drawing every­thing from professional players at Juilliard to ex­ceptionally talented female Marines serving in the motor pool. Though it lasted only two years during World War II, the MCWR Band toured the U.S., played live on The President’s Own national radio broadcast, and helped the nation celebrate victory in the war and welcome our troops home.

As the most famous director of the United States Marine Band, known for compositions such as “Stars and Stripes Forever,” the official march of the United States Marine Corps, and “Semper Fidelis,” John Philip Sousa maintained an unprecedented level of excellence in his musicians: a standard that has been upheld by every Marine Band director since. Born on Nov. 6, 1854, in Washington, D.C., Sousa grew up near the Marine Barracks where his father, John Antonio Sousa, was a musician in the band.
Sousa served under five presidents during his 12 years as the director of “The President’s Own” before forming his own band, the Sousa Band, which he would lead for nearly 40 years. His presence as a public figure prompted him to pay great attention to his appearance. His uniforms were tailored, and he had a personal valet while on tour with the band. Perhaps one of the most well-known aspects of his public appearance was his use of a new pair of white kid gloves for almost every performance he conducted.
Photos of John Philip Sousa taken while on tour with the Sousa Band in Spokane, Wash., show him wearing these iconic gloves, which he would only use if they were spotless. During one of his tours, he “breezed into a glove shop and ordered 1,200 pairs of white kid gloves at $5 a pair.”
Sousa insisted on a “fresh pair [of gloves] every concert.”
This event, later dubbed Sousa’s “glove mania” in the Boston Post, confirmed the conductor’s unique dressing habit, which would go on to become a part of his public persona.
Now housed at the National Museum of the Marine Corps, these gloves are believed to have been given by Sousa to Earle Poling, owner of the Earle Poling Music Company, who arranged for musical artists like Sousa and his band to perform in Akron, Ohio, on Oct. 11, 1924.
After receiving the gloves, Poling had them dipped in silver as a lasting tribute to the famous conductor.
Jennifer Castro and Briesa Koch

With the MCWR Band paving her way, a 21-year-old French horn player named Ruth Johnson won her audition and be­came the first female to enlist in the Ma­rine Band in March 1973. Women’s roles expanded greatly in the following years with more than 40 women now serving in various playing or administra­tive capacities.

Major Michelle A. Rakers made his­tory with the band, becoming both the first female assistant director and the first female commissioned officer to serve in The President’s Own. Rakers en­listed as a trumpeter/cornetist in 1998 and re­ceived her commission and appointment as assistant director in 2004. Rakers pro­gressed in rank over her career, eventually achieving her position as the band’s executive officer. She held the position for four years prior to retiring after 20 years of service.
“The MCWR Band was an important part of our history,” said Maj Rakers. “Had it not been for them, the paradigm could have taken longer to shift and I may not have had the opportunity to be in [my] position … We owe them an enormous debt of gratitude.”

Like Maj Rakers, the majority of The President’s Own spend their entire career with the band. New positions arise only when current members decide to leave because the unit is restricted in its num­ber of authorized positions. Playing in the organization is a coveted role as vacan­cies are infrequent and limited. Larger sections with numerous Marines playing the same instrument might see one audi­tion per year for new members. Smaller sections, however, can go a decade or more without vacancies. As a result, au­dition­ing for The President’s Own be­comes a nerve-wracking event for the participants.

“Auditions are run in a similar fashion to a civilian orchestra,” said Colonel Jason K. Fettig, the Marine Band’s cur­rent director. “The standard expected is exceptionally high due to our high profile and public mission. We invite all to come to our auditions at their own expense. We can have up to 150 individuals com­peting for a single position. Most of our members hold advanced degrees in music, and although that is not a require­ment, we have found that this level of education and experience is needed to be competitive.”

Staff Sergeant Alexander Garde earned his spot as one of the band’s newest percussionists in March 2022. He com­pleted his bachelor’s of music in 2020 from the New England Conservatory in Boston and also studied at the Shepherd School of Music at Rice University in Houston.

“Prior to my position with the band, I took other auditions for professional orchestras and military bands around the country,” Garde said. “The talent and quality of musicianship in this band rivals any musical group out there. Once I was offered a position, I further understood that I was not just joining a world-class performing group, but a historical institution. All of the musicians in the band today, and those who came before me, have shaped American musical tradition throughout the history of our nation. Being able to observe those practices evolving in real-time is incredible.”

Despite his short tenure with the band, Garde dived headfirst into the concert schedule. In July 2022, just four months after enlisting, he traveled to Europe with the band for a concert tour through the Czech Republic, Austria and the Netherlands.

On Sunday, July 24, 2022, the Marine Band performed at Promenadenhof Innsbruck, Kaiserliche Hofburg in Innsbruck, Austria. Photo by GySgt Rachel Ghadiali, USMC.

“Seeing what our performances meant to the audiences in Europe was unbelievable and showed me just how global the reach of The President’s Own really is,” Garde recalled.

“Performing John Philip Sousa’s ‘The Stars and Stripes Forever’ at a palace in Prague to a sold-out, standing, cheering crowd will forever be a highlight of my career, and, truthfully, of my life.”

Garde plays alongside many Marines with more than 20 years of experience. Master Gunnery Sergeant Alan Prather, the band’s lone guitarist, has 24 years of service, and MGySgt Susan Rider, a trumpet and cornet player, recently celebrated an anniversary with The President’s Own, reaching 26 years with the band. In September of this year, MGySgt Christian Ferrari will achieve an impressive milestone in his career as another trumpet and cornet player, seeing a full 30 years of service with the Marine Band.

New and experienced members alike carry out their role as Marines with the utmost dedication to the band’s mis­sion, providing music at the request of the President. This strictly musical function enables band members to enter service with a rank commensurate to pay struc­tures of professional civilian orchestras and supersedes the requirement of re­cruit training for all others who seek to earn the eagle, globe and anchor.

Other bands around the Marine Corps exist to meet the musical require­ments of their individual commands. These Marine musicians complete boot camp and Marine Combat Training prior to attending the Naval School of Music in Virginia Beach, Va. This category of musician includes “The Comman­dant’s Own” Drum and Bugle Corps. Though seemingly similar in dress, mission, and high profile, The Com­man­dant’s Own is completely separate from The President’s Own in function, organization, and chain of command.

To carry out their mission, Marine Band members live anything but the “9 to 5” life. They must be prepared to perform on short notice and on any occasion. Groups of varying sizes per­form over 200 times per year at the White House, nearly 20 times per month. Almost every day, members take part in funerals at Arlington Na­tional Cemetery. Evening Parades at Marine Barracks, Washington, fill every Friday night through the summer months. Various other ceremonies keep the band busy in Washington, D.C., but they still manage to execute an im­pressive travel schedule. Members play in schools across the nation, mentoring high school students, and performing numerous other public concerts. Most notably, each October, around 65 Ma­rines depart on the national concert tour, continuing the tradition Sousa originated in 1891.

Executing a performance schedule of this magnitude would seem to leave no time for practicing their craft, but Marine Band musicians create the time.

“Practicing is the constant that al­ways remains, no matter what our schedule is,” said SSgt Garde. “As musicians, we think of playing our instruments like eating food: a neces­sity that we need to do, but also some­thing that we love.”

Many members play multiple instru­ments in order to meet the musical re­quirements of the pieces they perform. In the end, the Marine Band does what­ever is needed to produce a song in the way its composer intended.

“We’ve had basically the same in­stru­mentation in the band for over 100 years, but several instruments make an occasional appearance that aren’t in our normal set up,” said GySgt Charles Paul, the Marine Band’s chief librarian and historian. “For example, the alto flute, bass flute, soprano saxophone, bass saxophone, flugelhorn, etc. The percussion section is where you’ll really see some interesting things like bowed vibraphones, water glasses, and whistles. Based on the music, you could see percussion instruments like a Turkish crescent, a typewriter, a donkey jawbone, a trash can, or rustling leaves. There was even a piece by John Corigliano that called for a shotgun blast.”

On a stage as visible as these Marines occupy, a superior level of preparation is required to overcome challenges when they arise. Inclement weather proves a constant worry for all outside performances. In September 2022, the band performed in a torrential down­pour at the Pentagon on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attack. Music sheets disintegrated in the rain and several instruments stopped working. Somehow, the music carried on.

“Even when the weather is fine, we often encounter situations where the plan must be thrown out the window, and we improvise on the spot,” said Col Fettig. “When you have a unit with the capabilities and experience at the level of The President’s Own, as a leader, it gives me the confidence that we can rise to meet any challenge, no matter how unexpected.”

For over two centuries, The United States Marine Band has overcome the unexpected brought about by the ebb and flow of national events. No matter the occasion, no matter the size of the ensemble, no matter the genre of song, The President’s Own continually dem­onstrates their ability to bear their cherished nickname and preserve Ameri­ca’s music.

“I could not be more proud to ac­know­ledge that it is the Marines that have the oldest professional band in the country, and that this organization has been in continuous existence serving our Presidents and our Marine Corps for 225 years,” reflected Col Fettig. “I think that says something very important about the power of music and the arts to bring people, and bring nations, together. No country in the world does that better than the United States of America, and it is the honor of every member of ‘The President’s Own’ to continue to serve in that special way.”

From the Archives: Sea Rescue

From the Leatherneck Archives: Feb. 15, 1945, Pacific Edition

A shrieking Marine-piloted Cor­sair dived on its Marshall Island target. Its bombs released, smoke and dust shrouding the atoll. Suddenly from the smoking blackness below, tiny red balls of fire streaked toward the sky from a well-hidden gun.

The Corsair shuddered as it dropped out of position. A hundred yards from the barely discernible beach the careening fuselage was swallowed by the treacherous surf.

Slowly an oil slick mixed with the green dye of a marker and the yellow of a life raft. The pilot’s comrades circled overhead, radioed his position, and as gas ran low, turned homeward.

The man in the life raft was alone. His one salvation was the well-organized sea rescue service composed of the Navy’s flying boat, the PBY Catalina, known fondly as the “Dumbo,” and the swift destroyers that ply these waters.

In the past six months, 21 men of the 4th Marine Air Wing, commanded by Brigadier General Louis E. Woods, flying with squadrons neutralizing the Japanese-held islands of Mille, Jaluit, Wotje and Maloelap, had been rescued. Twenty of their comrades, shot down in similar actions, were lost. In other words, more than 50 percent of the men shot down in combat have been rescued, most of them to fly again!

Dumbos landed in perilously rough seas, cracking wingtips while effecting rescues, and, like giant crippled birds, the huge planes have taxied miles across the water.

American destroyers steamed defiantly into the range of Japanese shore batteries to pick up crash survivors, at times en­gaging in running battles with the enemy to accomplish their mission.

The vast reaches of open sea that these pilots crossed to bomb Japanese atolls do not seem impressive on a map, but they are incredibly long distances for single-engine planes.

After leaving their own base, the open sea was their only haven of safety if shot down since the only nearby islands were enemy held.

Once shot down, there was fear in their hearts. Fear of failure to be sighted. Fear of slight injuries becoming serious and the even greater fear of being discovered by the enemy. A man without fear is a fool.

They paddled with all the fury that fear inspires. They gave thanks to the heavy, tossing sea, threatening to engulf them, yet offering protective cover from the enemy. In the next breath they would curse it because it made them equally invisible to rescuers.

There was nothing to do now but con­tinue to paddle in the direction of home, and wait.

The length of time pilots spent in the raft is not a matter fate. It may have been a few hours, a day, a week, all depending on the weather and visibility, but in 21 cases, their vigil was rewarded by hearing the drone of a plane, or the sight of the creamy wake of a destroyer.

Once aboard the rescue craft the men were cared for, given clean, dry clothing and fed. At the same time, a laconic radio message, worded thusly, was sent out: “Pilot rescued by aircraft (or ship). Re­turning to base.”

Despite being shot down and rescued, most of these men again took up the aerial cudgel against the Japanese in the Marshalls. Such was the case of Captain George Franck, former All-American halfback at the University of Minnesota.

His head injured in a crash landing, Captain Franck floated in his life raft for two and one-half hours. He was so close to enemy-held Wotje, that he “could count every coconut tree on the island.”

He was picked up by a motor whaleboat from a Navy destroyer that slugged it out with Japanese coastal guns. The destroyer moved in after a Navy PBY, which landed to affect the rescue, was split in two by a 50-foot swell and its crew of six was sent scampering to a life raft. Overhead, Captain Franck’s comrades, who had raced back to their base to refuel and re-arm, joined the fray. They strafed the enemy guns while Franck and the PBY crew were picked up.

Describing his rescue, Captain Franck said, “It was the best piece of teamwork I have ever seen.”

It is not a usual sight to see an Army B-25 pilot affectionately kiss the hull of a battered, weather-beaten Navy Catalina.

First Lieutenant M.B. Watts of Richmond, Calif., did just that to the PBY which brought him and his crewmembers back to Tarawa one day in June 1944.

Shot down in a bombing run, Lieutenant Watts and his crew were picked up at sea by a patrol bomber piloted by Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade Olaf F. Holm, of La Jolla, Calif.

LTJG Holm landed the giant amphibian between two swells and popped 50 rivets in the hull.

By popping rivets, LTJG Holm meant that there were that many holes in the hull where rivets should have been. In addition, several supports were bent as he taxied toward the men on the raft and the PBY started “leaking like a sieve.”

“Two of the Army men had broken legs and a third was badly cut up,” Holm said. “We had a hard time moving them to our ship, but finally managed it by using part of the catwalk for a stretcher.”

“The Army men kept saying, ‘Thank God we’re safe,’ but we weren’t so optimistic about the outlook. My crew kept plugging up the holes with pencils, pieces of wood, and even their fingers. By the time we were ready to take off, we had a foot of water in the plane.”

With so heavy a load aboard and the water in the hull, Lieutenant Holm decided on a downwind takeoff, and recalling his surfboard riding days, rode the crests of three swells until the heavily laden Navy craft was airborne. Tarawa was reached without further incident.

During the rescue of Marine Second Lieutenant Theodore Wyatt, of Chicago, Ill., another triple play was performed. Lieutenant Wyatt, a 4th Marine Air Wing Corsair pilot, was shot down less than 2 miles off one of the Japanese-held atolls he was strafing.

After hitting the water, he managed to get out of the cockpit and into his raft. Members of his flight sighted him and remained overhead until the Dumbo appeared. Also nearby was a destroyer, but as it neared Lieutenant Wyatt’s raft, Japanese coastal batteries opened up. The Navy PBY landed, but was badly damaged by heavy seas, and the nine-man crew was forced to board two rafts and join 2ndLt Wyatt in the water. The shore batteries switched their fire to the plane and rafts, but a motor launch from the destroyer picked up the men without mishap, as Douglas dive bombers provided a curtain of protective fire.

A split second rescue saved the life of Marine Captain Edwin A. Tucker, of Lancaster, Calif.

Capt Tucker, a member of another 4th MAW Corsair Squadron, was shot down into the lagoon of an enemy base in the Marshalls. Capt Tucker was unable to inflate his life raft, and despite his frantic efforts, watched it sink out of sight. He abandoned his plane and was kept afloat by his Mae West. Twenty-five minutes later he was picked up by the ever-present Navy Catalina.

The rescue was accomplished with­out drawing fire from Japanese gun emplacements fringing the lagoon because of continued strafing by Capt Tucker’s squadron mates, who kept the enemy gunners well pinned down.

Another thrilling rescue amid a hail of bullets was the one of Marine Captain Judson H. Bell, of Bel Air, Md., a member of one of the first units of the 4th MAW to use the Corsair as a fighter bomber. Capt Bell was forced into the water after his plane was set ablaze by enemy antiaircraft fire.

For two hours Captain Bell floated in the water, supported by his Mae West, his life raft having gone down with the plane. A destroyer, dispatched to the scene, was kept away by heavy shore battery fire. The destroyer lowered a motor whaleboat, which made its way, amid a shower of bullets to the captain and carried him to safety.

His 13th strike proved unlucky for Marine First Lieutenant Van A. Dempsey. Flying cover for a dive bomber, Lieu­tenant Dempsey’s airplane was hit by antiaircraft fire. Unable to fly the stricken ship home, he pancaked into the ocean. He too, was unable to launch his life raft and had to rely on his Mae West. After 30 minutes of paddling in the water, he was picked up by a Navy flying boat.

These are only a scant few of the rescues of flyers downed at sea. All of them are victories against the ocean and the enemy. Experienced pilots and gun­ners were saved and went on with their mission of neutralizing the Japanese-held Marshall Islands.