Archives: Gazette Magazines

By Maj Matthew K Lesnowicz

In March 1967 in Khe Sahn, Company B, 9th Marines engaged the 18th Regiment of the 325C Division of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The company, assigned to Khe Sahn, through its patrolling effort prematurely triggered a division-sized operation to seize the American combat base.¹ How was a rifle company able to defend an airstrip and project combat power across approximately fifty-four square kilometers to spoil a division-sized attack? The answer is: they weren’t. A mixture of Marine mechanics, artillerymen, engineers, and Seabees performed much of the defensive work and local security patrols to allow Company B to project combat power into the hills that overlooked the base. The Marine Corps ethos of “every Marine, a rifleman” paid off and allowed the relatively small detachment to hold off an NVA assault until 3d Marine Regiment eventually reinforced the position and held it throughout what became known as the Hill Fights of Khe Sahn.

Today, there is an element of the Marine Corps that is both physically and psychologically disconnected from the battlefield. Marines repeat, “Every Marine a rifleman” as a mantra and struggle to interpret its meaning and how it applies to them. The ethos is at risk of being a hollow and vestigial bromide covered in an undeserved shadow of irrelevance. During an annual rifle qualification, a Marine may rediscover a glimmer of its true meaning, but our ethos, a vehicle to communicate the mindset of one who locates, closes with, and destroys the enemy, possesses a depth beyond marksmanship. Why is this important? “Every Marine a rifleman,” if embraced, gives the Marine Corps flexibility. It frees the infantry to concentrate more combat power at decisive points. Some in the infantry community who see non-infantry Marines usurping and, therefore, diluting the hard-earned title of rifleman have attempted to minimize the ethos. Ironically, infantrymen would be the primary beneficiaries of an entire institution prepared to maneuver and employ modern infantry tactics. Just as in Khe Sahn, Marines entrusted to perform infantry missions, when needed, free infantrymen to fight elsewhere. It is a combat multiplier and our institution should take measures to strengthen it. The Marine Corps should adopt rules for a Marine rifleman to not only improve infantry proficiency but to strengthen its ethos to increase its effectiveness as a warfighting organization.

The three rules of a Marine rifleman, derived from the German Army’s storm troop tactic rules, are functional for the infantryman because they assist understanding of modern infantry tactics. Today, Marines arriving to their first infantry unit are not primed to understand modern infantry tactics. Young infantrymen screaming, “2’s rush!”² is an indicator that the essence of even basic fire and movement can be lost in the current instruction of our infantry schools. Marines require a more effective yet simple tool to help them understand their tactics.

Modern infantry tactics are direct descendants of the storm troop tactics of World War I.³ During the Great War, the German Army developed three rules (see Figure 1) to guide violent and disorderly operations to break through enemy defenses.⁴ Though nearly a century old, these tactics have changed little and lie at the heart of a modern rifleman’s trade. While expected to perform many different tasks, a rifleman’s primary purpose is to destroy enemy forces as part of an offensive or defensive tactical system. This system is storm troop tactics.

If storm troop tactics are the system in which the rifleman exists then ideally every rifleman is a basic practitioner of storm troop tactics. Marines require some simple conceptual structure to understand the tactical system they inhabit. The three rules of a Marine Rifleman (see Figure 2), based upon the German Storm Troop Tactic Rules provide this mental framework for the individual. However, this simple tool goes beyond the individual and reinforces Marine Corps doctrinal concepts.

The three rules of a Marine Rifleman are a tool to achieve command and control concepts in maneuver warfare. They provide the framework for the “implicit communication” and “harmonious initiative” that Marine Corps doctrine charges Marines to achieve.⁵ Modern science illuminates the presence of simple rules guiding implicit and harmonious behavior in the animal kingdom. Scientist Craig Reynolds’ experiments with artificial life simulations demonstrated that complex systems can “arise from the interaction of individual agents adhering to a set of simple rules.”⁶ Reynolds developed a computer program with just three simple rules for his boids (bird like objects) that produced complex flocking behavior. Without these simple rules, the boids would have been a desultory mess; however, just three simple rules rallied these objects to move as a group with focus. Reynolds’ experiments assisted the scientific community in understanding complex animal behavior. Marines, who are complex animals, require their own simple rules to focus their behavior in a chaotic environment. Marines that internalize the three rules of a Marine Rifleman can grasp the movements of their team implicitly. Gathered in groups, Marines would achieve harmonious initiative as they break through a defensive system. Marines primed with the three rules will ease the task of small unit leaders and more importantly, open opportunities to exploit. The infantry can gain value from simple rules that clarify modern infantry tactics and offer a way to command and control aligned with Marine Corps doctrine. These rules have value beyond their utility for the infantry.

The three rules are a tool to expose Marines at the individual level to maneuver warfare doctrine. Our organization holds that “individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance.”⁷ Marines can apply the spirit of these rules to excel and meet their combat objectives within their particular specialty. Conceptually, they challenge Marines to accomplish the unit’s mission under adversity, a common condition to any Marine, through individual initiative and responsibility. Imagine each Marine primed with rules emitting initiative, personal responsibility, and a focus on the enemy whether he is engaged in an immediate action drill during a security patrol of an adhoc unit or turning a wrench on an important set of equipment. Each rule, when seen through the lens of our warfighting doctrine, provides universal themes to all Marines.

Rule 1. If you can go forward, go forward—go through gaps.

• Maneuver warfare indoctrination: Exploit gaps.
• Challenge a Marine to observe: Where are the gaps?
• Challenge a Marine to think: How do I determine if I can go forward?

Rule 2. If you come under fire, take cover! Take the source of fire under attack.

• Maneuver warfare indoctrination: Avoid surfaces.
• Challenge a Marine to observe: Where is the source of fire or resistance?
• Challenge a Marine to think: You have encountered resistance that you can’t bypass. How are you going to fight back?

Rule 3. If you are a supporting unit be prepared to assist units to your flank.

• Maneuver warfare indoctrination: Re-designate main effort and redirect combat power.
• Challenge a Marine to observe: Which adjacent unit has a better chance of success?
• Challenge a Marine to think: How do you support your adjacent unit? How do you reinforce success?

In addition to thumbing through MCDP-1, Marines realistically need introductory guidelines for their ethos and maneuver warfare concepts. While these rules are simple, they are an elegant and accessible “Cliff Notes” to entry level maneuver warfare. At recruit training, Marines should be indoctrinated in the three rules as a complement to the eleven general orders of a sentry. The eleven general orders are an introduction to basic duties of interior guard. New recruits also deserve an introduction to the spirit of our warfighting philosophy. New events at our basic training institutions can test Marines to apply these rules to combat simulations. An early introduction to the three rules conditions legions of Marines to move like Sun Tzu’s water through the battlefield.

In conclusion, the Three Rules of a Marine Rifleman are a way to transform our ethos into a vessel that conveys both modern infantry tactics and maneuver warfare in simple manner to all Marines. At a functional level, the rules provide infantrymen a way to understand modern infantry tactics and their leaders a way to command and control them. This translates to improved infantry proficiency. At a conceptual level, the rules provide a simple way to condition all Marines in our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Rather than abandon our ethos, the Marine Corps should recognize the opportunity it has to connect its traditions to its doctrine. Nearly 50 years have passed since the Marines at Khe Sahn displayed the tactical benefits of every Marine believing and acting as a rifleman. Our ethos remains a remedy to the challenges of the modern battlefield, but our institution should go further to place meat on its bones and unlock its potential.

Notes

1. John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sahn, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 88–89.

2. The phrase “2s rush!” indicates that each Marine in an assaulting unit has been assigned a number by their small unit leader, usually 1 or 2. During the assault, the small unit leader screams a number as a command for those assigned that particular number to advance towards an objective. This trend is not new, see: Michael F. McNamara and Paul J. Kennedy, “Why Doesn’t First Fire Team Rush?” Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994) 77, no. 7 (07, 1993): 54–56. http://search.proquest.com. Or, Daniel J. O’Donohue, “The Last 300 Yards,” Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994) 77, no. 8 (08, 1993): 59–62. http://search.proquest.com.

3. John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), passim.

4. These rules were compiled by Dr. Bradley Meyer: Rules 1 and 3 are derived from Manual of Position Warfare for All Arms, Part 14 (Provisional) The Attack in Position Warfare 1-1, 1918 with amendments dated 26-1-18 and 27-7-18, GHQ (General Headquarters) 11 October 1918. Rule 2 is from Waldmer Pfeiffer, Entwurf eines Exerzierreglements fuer die Infanterie, (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1921), 175–176.

5. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP-1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 June 1991), 79, 88.

6. “Boids,” Wikipedia, accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org.

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP-1 War fighting, (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 June 1991), 78.

1. If you can get forward, get forward—go through gaps.

2. If you come under fire, take cover! Take the source of fire under attack. Launch a forehead or a pincers attack.

3. If you are a trailing unit, be prepared to roll out to assist units to the flank.

By Col Alex Vohr, USMC(Ret)

The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) held a period of instruction entitled “Terminology” as part of the Warfighting Seminar portion MEF exercises. The purpose was to impress upon the training audience the importance of using the correct terminology in planning and the development of orders. The incorrect use of technology at best increases friction and at its worst can result in battlefield disaster.

Dr. Bradley Meyer, one of the founders and curriculum architects of the School of Advanced Warfighting stood, one overcast windy and cold day in January, on the remnants of Verdun, a World War I battlefield in France. The discussion focused on “defense in depth,” a topic for which Dr. Meyer is arguably the foremost expert on in the United States. The students, all majors in a second year of professional education, were working to get their minds around the intractable tactical challenges faced by the World War I combatants in breaking the stalemate of the Western Front.

At one point, one of the students suggested the solution could have been found through the application of the Marine Corps doctrine of “maneuver warfare.” Dr. Meyer, an eminently thoughtful man, noted that maneuver alone would not be the solution to the tactical challenge so pervasive that it dominated and paralyzed operations and strategy for the Great War. On the battlefields of World War I, with the front lines stretched from Switzerland to the sea, there was no space for any of the armies to maneuver to gain advantage. The defense in depth Dr. Meyer has suggested, was the centerpiece tactical challenge in 20th century warfare requiring doctrinal paradigm shifts to overcome.

Dr. Meyer’s broad and simplistic interpretation of the doctrine of maneuver warfare was literal and focused on the term “maneuver.” The word suggests a doctrine advocating the use of maneuver to gain advantage over the adversary. On the battlefields of World War I, the challenge that favored the defender and precluded freedom of maneuver was an interdependency between the symmetry of the armies in the field and the lack of operational mobility. In 1918, the German Army, through concentration of the best troops and the employment of the new “Stormtroop” tactics, overcame the challenge of symmetrical forces. The Germans were not, however, able to overcome the problem of operational mobility. It would take them until 1940 to solve that problem.

The exchange with Dr. Meyer raises questions. The Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare has survived largely intact since it first was codified in the late 1980s into what has become Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (HQMC, Washington, DC: 1997). The doctrine was significantly based on the work of Air Force Col John Boyd, a modern day war theorist most famous for his observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. Boyd’s OODA loop encapsulated in a single diagram a complex theory for fighting and winning. The distilled doctrine of maneuver warfare leverages a theory for winning at war, perhaps from a position of disadvantage, in a complex, chaotic, and dangerous battlespace. Both Dr. Meyer and the students were correct in their staff ride discussion. Maneuver warfare, a doctrine advocating paradigm changing approaches may have offered a solution to the challenge of the World War I battlespace, but that solution was not to be found in maneuver alone.

The OODA loop alone has a richness and depth far beyond the basic understanding held by most Marines, limited vaguely to the idea of cycling rapidly through the loop to operate at a higher tempo than that which can be achieved by your enemy. To offer a simple analogy for the broader reach of the doctrine, it is about how to look at problems that confound the best minds, such as the problem facing the generals of World War I, and to find a mismatch or an asymmetric seam that can be exploited to win. Maneuver may be part of the solution, but the solution is not limited to maneuver. Like an Ultimate Fighting Championship fighter who gamely maneuvers his way around the octagon only to be viciously submitted when his opponent drags him to the ground and pounds the maneuverer to a pulp, we understand maneuver alone has its limitations.

Asymmetry and attrition are popular words in the defense lexicon. How common is it to hear the sage assertion from a 24-hour news cycle talking head that we don’t want to get involved or tied down in a war of attrition? Is this really true? Because of overwhelming advantages in all warfighting functions at the tactical level, attrition is the approach American forces most often employ with great success. Perhaps given the right circumstances, it can be the most effective approach to warfighting, especially when one considers the attrition ratios in current engagements are well over 100 to 1 in favor of U.S. forces.

Attrition in these cases is our asymmetric advantage. The bottom line is that if attrition works to bend the will of the enemy, then by all means use it. What those who decry attrition warfare most likely intend on conveying is that we should avoid wars of symmetry. Battles between symmetrical forces generally incur somewhat balanced casualty rates as armies grind away at each other without decisive result. This was certainly the case in World War I, but is not necessarily so for all scenarios. Specific words have specific meaning.

The term “asymmetry” is most often attributed to our enemies. In the conflicts that have spanned the last decade, the enemy is often described as being a force that is asymmetric to our capabilities. The underlying unspoken assumption in these assertions is that U.S. forces are designed and best suited for conventional fights. The implication is that the asymmetry of insurgency brings challenges U.S. forces find difficulty in confronting. I’d suggest that looking at this challenge through the lens of Marine Corps warfighting doctrine would assess any asymmetric battlefield as one with great opportunity to find and exploit mismatches to our advantage. Some of these advantages may be found through maneuver, but again, maneuver alone is not the extent of the opportunity. Other advantages could be found and exploited through deception, through fires, or even through non-lethal methods such as diplomacy or economics.

The point of this article is that words carry specific meanings and as MSTP would assert, using the right words is critical. Marines need to say what they mean and mean what they say. With this in mind, I’d offer the following recommendations:

• Consider renaming the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine of maneuver warfare. As one option, the title “asymmetric warfare” more completely describes the intent behind the approach while reducing the friction caused through the limitations and imprecise use of the word maneuver. In today’s sound bite world, the term maneuver has become somewhat of a “bumper sticker” for the doctrine. If a bumper sticker impression is all some take away in their depth of understanding, that bumper sticker should be as accurate and complete as possible.
• Reinvigorate efforts to examine, reflect upon, and study Marine Corps doctrine throughout the careers of Marines. Too often doctrine is taught only at the entry level and is not effectively revisited as Marines—especially officers—progress. An understanding of our doctrine should serve as the backdrop and foundation for all training and education. As Marines gain practical experience, new perspectives on our doctrine emerge when it is the doctrine that is periodically re-examined. Most critically our doctrine, descriptive more than prescriptive, provides context for how to think about warfighting.
• Theory is analogous to hypothesis and doctrine is simply theory that has survived limited testing. Gen James N. Mattis has been attributed as saying, “doctrine is the last bastion of the unimaginative.” This is true to the extent that we as Marines can’t allow our doctrine to mature into unquestioned dogma. The theory behind our doctrine needs to be constantly re-examined through the lens of change in the warfighting environment outside the Marine Corps. In short, we can’t drink our own bathwater. If the theory and doctrine no longer meet the requirements of an evolutionary and sometimes revolutionary world, it should be discarded and replaced; better to rigorously pursue this effort during times of peace than to find ourselves with doctrine that does not meet the requirements of the day as did our predecessors during World War I.
• Consider adding Colonel Chet Richards’ (USAF [Ret]) book, Certain to Win, (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2004), and Frans P.B. Osinga’s book, Science, Strategy and War; The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2006), to the Commandant’s reading list at the grade of major or lieutenant colonel or in the “Roots of Maneuver Warfare” section. These books provide color and insight into the work and into the man of Col Boyd. They bring a deeper perspective to the source of much and the Marine Corps’ excellent doctrine.

By Capt Daniel R Grazier & William S Lind

In the early 1990s, the United States Marine Corps officially adopted maneuver warfare, also known as Third Generation War, as doctrine, in a movement led by then-Commandant Gen Alfred M. Gray. The Corps issued a set of excellent doctrinal manuals, starting with FMFM-1, Warfighting, and including MCDP 1-1, Campaigning, which focused on the operational level of war, MCDP 1-3, Tactics, and MCDP-6, Command and Control.¹

With Gen Gray’s retirement, that is where the effort largely stopped. Attempts to move forward since that time, such as the Jaeger air experiments sponsored by Gen Charles C. Krulak when he was Commandant, began with promise, but received no long-term support. Individual commanders of units and schools have here and there attempted to change what the Marine Corps does to match what it says, creating “islands” of maneuver warfare. But these usually last only until the next commander arrives, when the second generation sea sweeps over the island. For the most part, Marines have been content to apply the terminology of maneuver warfare to their accustomed practice of attrition warfare, often to a degree that verges on the farcical. When one civilian visitor to the CAX at Twentynine Palms said that it did not seem to reflect maneuver warfare, the senior Marine officer replied, “Marine Corps doctrine is maneuver warfare, so anything Marines do is maneuver warfare.”

Several factors are to blame for the Corps’ failure to institutionalize maneuver doctrine. Over the past decade, the bulk of intellectual energy has been expended studying counterinsurgency theory and practice. This, combined with constant deployment preparation and theater-specific training, has left little room for attempting to change fundamental doctrine. Today’s Marines are a generation removed from people like Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), and Col Michael D. Wyly, who initiated the maneuver warfare movement in the late 1970s in response to America’s defeat in Vietnam. The military reform movement of the 1980s is unknown to most serving Marine officers.

The greatest challenge to overcome, however, has been the U.S. military’s natural tendency towards attrition. That style of warfare fits within our existing military culture of perfect alignment, ruler straightness, and impeccable grooming. It is a continuation of the culture of order of First Generation War, war of line-and-column tactics. An attritionist, second generation approach covers every base, pours firepower on every threat, and leaves nothing to chance (except war itself). This is the style of war best suited to rigidly hierarchical organizations. It embodies the American military ideal of seeking to eliminate all friendly friction. The culture of order, of inward focus, is maintained by making all decisions at the highest possible level with little room for initiative at the bottom.

Improved weapons have driven changes in procedures and techniques. However, neither tactics nor the underlying mindset—the corporate culture—have moved beyond the second generation. Pivoting the focus away from objectives defined as terrain or attrition levels to seeking “to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating environment with which the enemy cannot cope,” to quote FMFM–1 (now MCDP-1), the Corps’ most basic doctrinal manual, is a feat not easily accomplished.

The end of America’s ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan offer an opportunity to launch a new maneuver warfare effort in the Marine Corps, one with the goal of making maneuver warfare what Marines actually do, not just words on paper. In our view, such an effort is critical to the Marine Corps’ future. The outcomes of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show the limits of attrition warfare in the face of fourth generation threats. If the Corps is to remain relevant to America’s defense needs, it must move to make maneuver doctrine real. Irrelevance threatens the Corps’ continued existence.

The purpose of this article is to suggest concrete, specific actions the Marine Corps can take quickly, inexpensively, and relatively easily to restart the maneuver warfare movement that largely ended when Gen Gray retired. That is not to say deeper and more difficult changes are not also required. The most important of these is reforming the personnel system. Maneuverist militaries have personnel systems that work completely differently from those of attritionist militaries.

But we believe much can be done simply and quickly to make maneuver warfare real in the Marine Corps. Among these changes are the following:

• The most important first step is to eliminate some of the heavily scripted exercises and embrace true freeplay training. This would require a dramatic alteration to the overall concept of training in the Marine Corps and a move away, to a certain extent, from the current training and readiness program. Training should not always be planned to incorporate specific mission essential tasks. The current methodology is counterproductive, but it is born from the fact that in the U.S. military, techniques have been raised to the level of tactics. Freeplay exercises are extremely useful for forcing leaders at all levels to make decisions in an environment of uncertainty against a thinking enemy—the same conditions they would face in war. Certain exercises should begin with no other goal than to provide subordinate units time to conduct force-on-force training in any way the commanders see fit. Training evaluators could observe such training and, using their judgment, identify training and readiness tasks demonstrated for reporting purposes.
• For 2dMARDIV, restart the freeplay exercises at Fort Pickett, which Gen Gray began when he took command of the division in the 1980s and proclaimed maneuver warfare the doctrine for the division. These were the first freeplay exercises most Marines had experienced, and they did a great deal to convince Marines of the merits of maneuver warfare and teach them how to do it.
• Reissue the original versions of the doctrine manuals that were written during Gen Gray’s tenure. These remain the best. MCDP 1-3, Tactics, is a hopeless muddle compared to the original FMFM. It is available for comparison at maneuverist.org. The other manuals have not suffered as badly, but the first versions are still superior.
• Again require the Marine Corps Institute (MCI) Warfighting Skills Program for lieutenants and, now, for staff sergeants as well. The only maneuverist MCI ever issued, it offers an excellent means for self-study. It is also available at maneuverist.org.
• Require all officers teaching in Marine Corps Schools to read The Canon, the seven books which take the reader from the first through the second and third and into the fourth generations of modern war. The Canon should also be required as a pre-requisite for Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) and Command and Staff College.²
• Teach the tactics developed by the German Army during late World War I at TBS instead of those of 1914. The Infantry Officer Course should then build on that base (instead of having to tell its students, “Forget everything you learned about tactics at TBS”) by teaching true light infantry, Jaeger, tactics.
• Restore the extensive maneuverist reforms incorporated in the curriculum at EWS over the past half-dozen years. Those reforms were recently abolished and the curriculum was returned to its previous attritionist orientation.
• Allow company commanders, at their discretion, to reduce the “soldier’s load” as they see appropriate for the situation, including giving them authority to dispense with helmets and body armor. Until Marine infantry can move as fast on its feet as can its adversaries, it will have few options other than hoping to bump into the enemy, and then call in fire support. Foot mobility is a direct function of the soldier’s load.
• Pivot away from the excessive focus on combined arms integration in live fire exercises. This is a sensitive subject because Marines pride themselves on their skills with regard to combined arms integration. While it is important to skillfully employ weapons and have the ability to concentrate combat power at the decisive point, it is much more important to understand what that decisive point is. Far too often, the focus is simply on the how of employing massive coordinated fires rather than on why you are doing so. Complicated fires packages directed squarely at the strongest part of an enemy’s system will almost never achieve results as good as a lesser volume of fire at his most vulnerable point.
• Emphasize the simple fact that the integrated training exercise (ITX) is not the capstone of Marine Corps training. ITX does an excellent job training the procedures necessary to execute combined arms operations. But as the exercise is currently conducted, that is where its utility ends. To be successful at ITX, a unit has only to follow an execution checklist and ensure its geometries are clear. This works to teach proper techniques for combined arms integration, but in slow-moving, predictable situations. It does nothing to foster rapid decision making, improvisation, or learning how to defeat the will of a thinking enemy.
• Large-scale exercises beyond the ITX level should not involve live ammunition. Since combined arms skills are taught at ITX, exercises beyond that should be aimed at a higher level. Exercises such as Steel Knight and Desert Scimitar should be force-on-force exercises pitting one unit against the other. Units should make use of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and test their skills against the independent will of a thinking enemy.
• Reorient experimentation in the Marine Corps away from complete focus on equipment to add attention to tactical innovation as well.
• Consider making a series of doctrinal manuals for fourth generation war developed in recent years by Marines and published as manuals of the K.u.K. Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps into U.S. Marine Corps manuals.³ In the period from the late 1970s through the early 1990s, the Marine Corps established itself as the most thoughtful and intellectually innovative of all the American Armed Forces. By doing so, it not only profited internally, but also gained immense credit with the press, the public and Capitol Hill. Although the Corps has largely stagnated intellectually since, individual Marines have continued the earlier tradition. Much of their work has been embodied in these unofficial fourth generation war manuals. They represent an opportunity for the Corps to again establish its intellectual pre-eminence simply by making them official USMC publications.
• Teach Marines how to critique field exercises. Most of the learning from field exercises is currently lost because Marines mistakenly think a critique is simply an (often endless) recapitulation of what happened. A real critique draws out why events took the course they did (which in freeplay training is unpredictable). Such maneuverist critiques are focused, honest about successes and failures on the part of all participants regardless of rank, and short.
• In training, practice with degraded systems. For example, firing tank Tables I through VI is largely a waste of ammunition for the M1A1 Abrams. The system is so advanced, even a moderately trained crew can hit targets at long distances when the system works properly. Crews can become quite proficient at basic gunnery skills in the Advanced Gunnery Training System. Live ammunition should be largely reserved for degraded mode gunnery in tables the crew is unable to anticipate. In such a manner, training will achieve two goals with the same allocation of ammunition: advanced proficiency with a weapons system and improvisation through rapid decision making.
• In field exercises, kill key officers, and make those still living take over. At times, kill all the officers and leave SNCOs in command.

The Marine Corps has an opportunity now to reset itself properly to meet the challenges of the future. With all the discussion about the need to “get back to the basics,” it is critical to ensure the Marine Corps gets back to the right basics. Reverting to training methods relevant only to an outmoded firepower attrition force, the Marine Corps will continue to find itself increasingly irrelevant in a changing world.

Maneuver warfare, when properly embraced, properly prepares leaders to face the challenges posed by a world descending into the fourth generation of warfare. A maneuverist leader is empowered to look beyond the doctrinal publications and warfighting manuals and develop innovative solutions to problems generated by an enemy who does not have manuals. We believe making a few adjustments in the way the Marine Corps conducts business will prepare adaptable and flexible leaders, capable of operating effectively long into the future.

Notes

1. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM-1), Warfighting, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1989); Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-1 (MCDP 1-1), Campaigning, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997); MCDP 1-3, Tactics, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997); MCDP 6, Command and Control, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1996). MCDP 1-1 and MCDP 1-3 were originally published as FMFMs.

2. The Canon:

• a. Charles White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militaerische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805, (Wesport, CT: Praeger, 1989).
• b. Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1986).
• c. Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989).
• d. Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1995).
• e. Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982).
• f. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939–1945, (NY: The Free Press, 1991).
• g. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (NY: The Free Press, NY, 1991).

3. The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps field manuals were developed through a series of seminars involving Marine officers led by Mr. Lind on fourth generation warfare. The draft versions can be accessed at https://www.traditionalright.com/resources.

By Col Thaddeus Jankowski, USMCR

Then-LTC Paul Yingling, USA, famously published “A Failure in Generalship” (Armed Forces Journal, 1 May 2007) at the height of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), cautioning that the United States was at risk of losing a second war in a generation. Deliberately forgotten lessons from Vietnam had threatened success in OIF. Success in OIF was also threatened by leadership shortcomings far from the battlefield, occurring deep in what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates termed the “Pentagon establishment.”

The Marine Corps’ mission is unique relative to other Services, but its support establishment is not. Mr. Gates repeatedly criticized the Pentagon establishment, including the Marine Corps portion of that establishment. Cultural precedent predicts future behavior, so the Marine Corps’ development of a new amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) capability is a worthy topic. This article presents the need for reform, addresses common counterarguments, and provides 10 guidelines required to build the next expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV). Requirements for ship-to-objective maneuver must necessarily begin with maneuver in Quantico, else we’ll have impressive tactics but no way to execute them. Reform of the Pentagon establishment is a very important “warfighting” innovation: like it or not, the rate of technological change is increasing, and the importance of technology relative to other aspects of strategy is also increasing. Relevant amphibious forces for a combatant commander require a relevant support establishment.

Critiquing the support establishment organizational character is timely. Looking beyond OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), we seek to reset core amphibious capabilities. Even though the Corps is exemplary at counterinsurgency (COIN), COIN is not our Title 10 justification.

Now, leveraging the national pivot back to the Pacific region, we refocus on the amphibious mission. In refocusing, the Corps demonstrates some intellectual agility. But an expeditionary vision languishes as a mere hallucination if combat developers cannot realize it. The Marine Corps’ development of the ACV capability is critical in this: Marine Corps innovators must keep pace.

ACV innovation has been the charge of Supporting Establishment leaders, including generals who excelled operationally. The EFV program’s 2010 cancellation followed decades of chronic program underperformance. Outsiders unfamiliar with how Quantico really works ask how such a failure was even possible. The EFV was a top priority, and senior officers with distinguished careers were leading it throughout. What went wrong? How could the Marine Corps spend $3 billion in 30 years without producing a functioning vehicle? Is a failure of Marine generalship even conceivable? And if so, how do we make sure our next EFV-like initiative does not likewise fail? It is, after all, in the Supporting Establishment that the technology-dependent future of the Marine Corps is hatched and grown.

The EFV similarities to recent equipping debacles are compelling. Everything regarding combat development should be on the table for overhaul including organizations, their functions, recorded behaviors, and typical habits of leadership. Headquarters Marine Corps and other Marine and Joint influences warrant scrutiny. But in understanding the most problematic of the Supporting Establishment’s frameworks of thought, this discussion focuses on Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC).

Past As Prologue

During OIF/OEF a stark contrast existed between the performances of Marine Corps combat units and the Supporting Establishment organizations that equip them. Operating units were rightly praised for physical courage, adaptability, and foresight, while several very important Supporting Establishment decisions resulted in repeated, withering criticism for misplaced priorities and inertia. Repeated excoriations for lack of moral courage also came from the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

Throughout OIF we witnessed several high-profile cases where MCCDC/MCSC collectively failed to adequately prepare for or respond to capability gaps in the field. For example, the Marine Corps’ foreknowledge that the up-armored HMMWV would be a “deathtrap” when encountering landmines comes to mind. Alerted by experts in the 1990s who foresaw the tragic carnage that landmines would cause, MCCDC planners had no contingency plans for those vehicles. South African wheeled vehicles (from the 1970s) were even studied in 1989 at the Infantry Officer Course, right before going out to practice “hardening” a vehicle by stacking sandbags around the cabs of 5-ton trucks. If second lieutenants knew about South African vehicles in the 1980s, wheeled vehicle planners had to be aware of them. Worse, even after quantitative battlefield data was provided, the establishment in Quantico was still trying to minimize the number of MRAPs purchased irrespective of their utility on the battlefield.

Senior Department of Defense (DoD) and Congressional leadership obviously concluded that thousands were killed and wounded unnecessarily. Only an embarrassing spotlight forced MCCDC and MCSC staffs to correct armor and other neglected areas. The Naval Audit Service Report on the Marine Corps’ urgent universal needs process (28 September 2007) eventually led to a new Marine Corps order on urgent needs, forcing Quantico bureaucrats to apply at least some maneuver warfare principles to their areas of responsibility. Remember: Maneuver warfare theory does not just apply to the battlefield. Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), also quoted Taiichi Ohno, applying Ohno’s perspectives on maneuver in business to his military theory.

Unfortunately, MCCDC has not been fundamentally reformed. The same culture that enabled unnecessary OIF casualties and the EFV cancellation appears to be intact. Organizational adjustments have evidently occurred to decrease some civilian influence, but no officers or bureaucrats have been held accountable. The same personnel continue in Quantico—those who neither foresaw the need for COIN toolsets nor exhibited moral courage to change priorities when battlefield realities were repeatedly documented for them. These permanent personnel remain in place and continue to get promoted.

With OIF at an end and OEF drawing to a close, Marine Corps Order 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS) (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 17 October 2008), has lost its immediacy and bite. As with similar instances in nature where accountability and consequences are absent, the spotlight gets turned off and the problems invariably return. This is especially true whenever transient and overwhelmingly nontechnical operators are at the helm.

Counterarguments

Some dispute any assertion that leadership, vision, or execution were lacking, flatly contradicting 4 years of speeches from Mr. Gates. They repeat the traditional Marine argument that leaders who perform well operationally can perform well anywhere, including in the Supporting Establishment. They tell us leadership is a fungible character quality. A generalist is sufficient at the top, assuming that competent and honest subordinates permanently populate the staff. Marines at all levels rise to new challenges. And by placing revered general officers in charge of organizations like MCCDC, permanent personnel are energized. Technological foresight is not so difficult that retired or former officers cannot populate the MCCDC/MCSC staffs.

Supporting Establishment leaders had the opportunity to critique a draft of this article in October 2013. One identified a recent decrease in civilian influence in MCCDC. This is certainly a welcome step in the right direction, but suggests the Hydra can actually be defeated with minimal reform effort. Another leader mentioned that there are no examples herein postdating 2011, as if to suggest meaningful change in MCCDC actually has occurred since 2011. Yet, if MCCDC really has been reformed, why do calls for reform still continue? How many more calls for comprehensive, expansive change must there be in military management technology? Experience in leading change—not to mention change management literature—suggests that leading change in large organizations requires a much more fundamental overhaul.

Given the hubris in the Pentagon establishment, reformers’ critiques are reflexively discounted by officers with dubious backgrounds in technological foresight. Important calls for reform continue in 2014. Senior DoD leaders advocate fundamental overhaul. Examples: The January/February 2014 issue of the prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine featured an article by recently retired Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, entitled “Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops What They Need.” On 24 June 2014, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, testified before the House Armed Services Committee on very similar themes. Finally, recall the slow-burning anger in former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’ autobiography! Calls for reform are not just coming from one Reserve colonel.

If these minor changes were really efficacious, if these counterarguments were really plausible, the EFV would be available right now for amphibious contingencies. If they were plausible, Mr. Gates, the U.S. Congress, and DoD auditors would not have felt compelled to intervene in Marine Corps combat development and acquisition processes to insist on rapid and immediate change, to stem the rise in OIF casualties. The media would have had no incentive to dedicate an inordinate amount of time, ink, and bandwidth to report on Marine Corps casualty and combat equipping issues if they had no basis in fact.

Egregious Supporting Establishment failures not coincidentally occurred during OIF on the watches of general officers whose operational credentials were superior. Misunderstanding of technological innovation is common. Active duty officers have the same basic set of very deep and very narrow training and experience. Structural reasons in academia exacerbate this knowledge gap, a topic for another monograph.

With the recent and parallel experience of OIF/OEF as a backdrop, we can now focus on the to-date futile effort to replace the amphibious assault vehicle (AAV).

Ten Guidelines for a New ACV

We know the proverbial definition of insanity is to keep doing the same thing and expect different results. The following 10 principles can guide Marine Corps officers as we consider our next attempt to replace the AAV.

Question every assumption about how to do business in MCCDC and MCSC. What did Boyd say when he took over the F–X (F–15) development program? Start with a blank sheet of paper. Start with cold air comes in the front, and hot compressed air goes out the back. Similarly, when Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (MCDP 1) (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, March 1989), was first published, Boyd warned senior Marine Corps officers not to let doctrine become dogma. Without reform in Quantico, we will likely make the same errors the Air Force’s F–X (F–15) program was making before Boyd got involved. MCCDC/MCSC need a multiyear, comprehensive reform program planned as carefully as former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Al M. Gray, planned and executed the maneuver warfare revolution. Both crisis technology planning during OIF/OEF and deliberate technology planning experiences warrant this rethinking.

Don’t just tolerate the proven innovators—embrace them as you embrace chaos on the battlefield.

The proven military innovator is sometimes—but not always—a maverick. The innovator is a thoroughbred looking for a track to run on. He might see the world just a little bit differently than that all-too-common officer who is always yearning for his next command (to be Someone) and speaking derisively of staff jobs (to do Something). Yet it is that diversity of thought that makes him valuable—say, for example, in avoiding thousands and thousands and many more thousands of unnecessary casualties, as we all observed in OIF and OEF.

Using the innovators is often more effective.

Toolsets initiated using military innovators are usually much more effective in combat and much less expensive for the taxpayer. Consider the Higgins boat (World War II), the light armored vehicle (1980s), and the MRAP (2005–07). Consider the deliberate stalling and roadblocks placed in the way of GBOSS (Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System) (2006), or short-sheeting unmanned aircraft system requirements (2006–07). All of these examples have been variously written about in military biographies, the Small Wars Journal, and multiple internal audits. All these ideas were born outside typical Quantico innovation processes. All were resisted in varying degrees before they were embraced. Yet these toolsets all proved to be highly useful in combat.

Hold Quantico bureaucrats to the same standards of integrity that we require of officers in the field.

For example, fire anyone in MCCDC or MCSC who engages in character assassination. This is the seedy side of what it means for a retired officer to attempt to hold on to power over budgets. This tactic is not uncommon. When an officer proposes change, all too often the establishment intentionally generates fog and sows confusion as a means to keep control of budgets. Officers and civilians in MCCDC start ludicrous rumors about an individual that, once repeated, become “true.” Since the imagined “truth” is convenient, it is allowed to stand, because it serves the end of protecting existing programs. This author’s contempt for this particular tactic is grounded in direct, repeated, personal observation.

Put your innovators in charge of new initiatives like the ACV. In the late 1960s, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force did the unthinkable: He put a blunt-speaking innovator in charge of the F–X (F–15) program. Eventually Col Boyd and his circle of acolytes would build the F–16 and another aircraft that became the F–18—and yet another aircraft, the A–10. The keys to air supremacy came from this group of innovators.

We have institutionalized a pipeline of successful combat commanders—now do the same for military innovators. The establishment, by hubris and habit, makes it incredibly difficult to change anything. The innovator has to thread the needle as the perfect field officer, the perfect internal diplomat, the perfect navigator of the treacherous bureaucracy. Even then, someone in Quantico teams up with a vendor or an ally on another staff and begins a whispering campaign such as, “He’s not a team player.” Meanwhile, the accepted standards of conduct for the Quantico bureaucrat are wide. He can repeat establishment technobabble with impunity. Turn this on its head: figure out how to embrace the innovators, and make it difficult for bureaucrats to be bureaucratic.

In the late 1980s, an intellectual renaissance occurred in the Marine Corps. Gen Gray was looking for someone to help him rewrite all Marine Corps doctrine from top to bottom. He began with an outcast colonel whom a number of general officers had been systematically and deliberately suppressing for quite some time—Col Mike Wyly. Gray called Wyly home from “exile” in Okinawa and put him in a position of influence. Gray also tapped a captain—a captain!—to write FMFM 1, Warfighting (now MCDP 1). He did not assign the warfighting manual to a 1980s equivalent of a gold-plated retired colonel GS–15 with a well-worn DESERT STORM coffee mug and three DoD master’s degrees. Gray found new blood, new thinking, new ideas, new perspectives. Where would the Corps be now if former Commandants John A. Lejeune or Gray did not personally embrace LtCol “Pete” Ellis or Col Mike Wyly, respectively?

We embraced disobedience of a direct order in a recent Medal of Honor winner when lives were at stake: Apply that same logic to innovators. In other words, don’t court-martial or fire your innovators for specious reasons when larger principles—lives, limbs, combat effectiveness—are at stake. This may seem obvious, yet the AAV/EFV record ($3 billion, 30 years, no vehicle) requires underlining the obvious. The Air Force attempted to court-martial Boyd four times in his career while maintaining its treatment of him was always just. Boyd sometimes had to reach outside the Air Force to get proper reform. Similar treatment occurs today in the Marine Corps. Consider the case of the only 100-percent successful DoD whistleblower of the past 10 years. Senior Marine Corps leaders would maintain that GS–15 Franz Gayl, Science Advisor, Plans, Policies, and Operations, was granted due process after approximately 1 year on administrative leave. But any DoD officer or civilian who would consider bucking the system to advocate reform, note carefully: Gayl had to reach outside the Marine Corps to get justice. Only after the White House Office of Special Counsel got involved (7 October 2011) was he reinstated. The message from senior leaders today is no different than in Boyd’s day: If you rock the boat, you will be made to pay a severe price. You will be exiled to a remote island, accused of magically becoming a poor performer after decades of stellar performance, or quieted to a remote corner of the Marine Corps far away from innovation. That is the real lesson of Pentagon “leadership.” Careerism stems directly from the treatment Boyd and Gayl received; most officers conclude it is just not worth bucking the system. Mr. Gates liked to give speeches about Boyd and moral courage, but he never supported any of the innovators on his watch. Driving this point home, Gayl was correctly singled out for praise for his contribution to the war effort, once again by someone from outside of the DoD: On 1 October 2012 he was praised by Vice President of the United States Joe Biden during the MRAP program transition ceremony. Establishment mavens may feel like innovators bring chaos, yet do we not honor our best warriors for thriving on chaos? “Chaos” was one famous officer’s call sign.

Foster and promote officers who have technological competence. Tools are integral to warfighting, yet we teach officers to be commanders while leaving military technology to serendipity. The Marine Corps finds innovators by accident, tolerates them for a short time, and discards them, only to deliberately forget the lessons of innovation.

If a civilian in MCCDC or MCSC lacks foresight, get rid of him. Do not reward those who preside over chronically underperforming capabilities with promotions, lofty titles, awards for “foresight,” or highly prized school seats at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The bureaucrats who need to be replaced often fit the following intellectually incestuous profile: they retire as a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel on Friday and come back to work at MCCDC or MCSC on Monday in a business suit, in the same building, at the same office, sitting at the same desk. As Col James Burton, USAF, taught us in Pentagon Wars (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1993), intellectual inbreeding yields feeble minds.

Apply maneuver warfare principles to the Supporting Establishment. MCCDC had to be repeatedly asked for multiple years to revise the urgent technology rule sets so that they would have a meaningful “seat at the table” in MCCDC at MCSC. MarCent officers asked MCCDC several times in 2006 for major revisions to MarAdmin 045/06, Urgent Universal Need Statement Process. Major reform to urgent UNS handling was advocated via the first Lean Six Sigma project at MCCDC in 2006, but meaningful urgent UNS reform would not be fully implemented until October 2008 with MCO 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS) (HQMC, Washington, DC, 10 October 2008). Naval Audit Services auditors asked at least twice for MCCDC to comply with its finding to write a Marine Corps order for urgent needs in 2007 and again in 2008, and Department of Defense Inspector General auditors in 2008 were similarly involved with advocating that MCCDC reform the urgent needs process. This was all a big, multiyear bureaucratic game of rope-a-dope to protect careers and prevent changes in the MCCDC staff’s budgetary priorities for military technologies while troops went unsupported in the field: stall any meaningful change, erect every possible barrier to technological maneuver imaginable. Battalion or regimental commanders get fired for this level of performance, but it is rewarded at MCCDC as stated above. All these multiple internal reform efforts anticipated many of then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’ frequent appeals to actually support the troops in combat by prioritizing toolsets needed for current wars instead of what would be proven to be poorly designed technologies for potential future wars (like EFVs). The establishment has still not internalized that maneuver warfare must apply to the support establishment too. This means the Marine Corps needs to write doctrine for technological aspects of strategy—and apply it as soon as practicable. Consider the typical staff functions at a MEF or in Marine forces. Each is aligned with an MCDP of the same title: intelligence, logistics, operations, plans, and so forth. We need an MCDP 10, Technology, that links MCDP 1, Warfighting, to two downstream orders, MCO 3900.15B, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS) (HQMC, Washington, DC, 10 March 2008), for deliberate planning and MCO 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS) (HQMC, Washington, DC, 10 October 2008), for crisis technology planning. This needs to be written by officers with proven technological foresight and expertise in rapid technological maneuver. Note the use of war planning terms in describing these two orders—we will need technology requirements for all contingency plans. MEFs and Marine forces will need uniformed, trained principal staff officers for technology and innovation. The MEF/Marine forces’ science advisor does no science: rename that billet “technology advisor,” reporting to the senior uniformed trained technology strategist on the general officer’s staff.

Conclusion

The prescription to build an EFV is not complex, but it is enormously difficult to do. Follow Gen Gray’s example: Bring in the innovators. Rehire the thoroughbreds. Put a new generation in charge of important technology programs. Treat them like welcome members of the team. By leveraging good ideas even from those who knew how to evaluate technological efficacy when the chips were down in a real war, the likelihood for creating an ACV vehicle that works actually increases.

The Marine Corps Gazette, as the professional journal for Marines, provides articles that may, on occasion, address topics that “keep officers up at night.” Any young officer faced with the prospect of conducting an amphibious attack in the next 20 years should lose sleep over existing Quantico establishment organizations in charge of building the next ACV. Albert Speer, the German’s chief technologist during World War II, was actually pleased when the Allies bombed his requirements and acquisition command, ridding him of unnecessary “ballast” for a few months. If LtCol Ellis were alive in 2006 he’d have had his character assassinated by twilight-tour colonels in Quantico or HQMC as someone who was difficult to work with and, well, kind of weird.

On the other hand, if we apply these lessons to the son-of-EFV effort today and begin using all our resources—even all those highly successful innovators—the Marine Corps will be much more likely to get a new amphibious troop carrier with an over-the-horizon as well as inland capability much sooner than we would otherwise.

By Maj Romeo P Cubas

The American military’s painful Vietnam War experience and the doctrinal and technological revelations of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War drew attention to its demoralized and unprepared state. It became evident that the U.S. Armed Forces required a complete overhaul in order to contend with future potential adversaries.¹ As a result, the military underwent a dramatic transformation that went hand-in-hand with a revolution in operational art. The interpretation and implementation of intellectual concepts, innovative doctrine, and novel approaches to overcoming military challenges dictated how the United States approached conflicts in the post–Vietnam War era.²

The evolving nature of war mandates that the American concept of operational art account for an assortment of enemies that will seek innovative ways to frustrate American interests. Today’s adversaries are achieving shocking levels of barbarity that challenge the traditional Western notions of war.³ Understanding the operational art renaissance of the post–Vietnam war period should prepare U.S. officials to judiciously address contemporary threats and resist the temptation to adhere to an operational art concept that is highly reliant on overwhelming force and technological dominance.

A Rebirth of Operational Art: The Immediate Aftermath of the Vietnam War

During the 1970s, operational art underwent a Clausewitzian renaissance of sorts that focused on linking successes in battle with an overall strategic purpose.⁴ This military art form has its foundations in a collection of institutional beliefs and experiences known as “doctrine.” Until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Armed Forces developed doctrine in a unilateral manner, concentrating on individual Service interests. These myopic views prevented the Services from coalescing and developing a joint campaign plan; instead, the focus was on ground combat and how to support it. Cold War doctrine limited the traditional conduct of war and restricted doctrinal innovation. The operational failures of the Vietnam War and Arab-Israeli War prompted many changes in the U.S. Armed Forces such as a doctrinal reawakening, the emergence of performance standards, institutional integration, and organizational discipline.⁵

In October 1973, Egypt and Syria conducted a surprise attack on Israel from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights with thousands of Soviet-provided armored vehicles, air-delivered precision guided munitions, and antitank guided missiles. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was eventually able to counterattack and overcome the Arab two-prong assault, its heavy artillery, aerial bombardment, and advanced air defense system; however, the results of the evolving nature of combat were quite evident to Western powers.⁶ The Yom Kippur War illustrated the effectiveness of modern weapons and the gap in American warfare capabilities. As the Services downsized and refocused internally, the United States realized it needed to quickly gain parity with Soviet Union. GEN Creighton Abrams’ creation of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TraDoc), his appointment of GEN William DePuy as its commander, and the contributions of GEN Donn Starry as TraDoc’s Armor Center Commandant and TraDoc’s second commander were instrumental to the ensuing revolutionary changes in doctrine, organization, equipment, and training.⁷ One of these changes was the 1976 edition of the U.S. Army operations Field Manual 100–5, Operations (FM 100–5).⁸

The “active defense” concept of the new doctrine accepted the Soviet’s overwhelming manpower and countered it with a system of linear defenses-in-depth and offensive flanking movements focused on destroying command and control networks and supply lines of communications.⁹ “Active defense” advocated moving forces along the battle line to prevent a breakthrough while simultaneously conducting deep envelopments to attrite the enemy. Confronting a high-tempo assault required commanders to embrace the German model of Auftragstaktik, which encouraged decentralized command, the flexibility provided by mission-type orders, and having the initiative to meet a commander’s intent.¹⁰ However, the new manual received immediate resistance due to its unsettling realities of battlefield lethality, a reliance on analytical information, and formulaic approach to war reminiscent of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s obsession with quantitative data.¹¹ After 10 years of development and transformation, the doctrine evolved to the Air-Land Battle concept, which eventually evolved into the modern and joint conventional form of fighting known as maneuver warfare.¹²

The new operational concepts in FM 100–5 relied on the expert use of terrain, demanded rapid movement, required quick strikes, and demanded that the defender achieve target identification overmatch. The Army wanted to avoid the pitfalls of focusing on the last war and embraced its renewed doctrine by investing heavily in highly advanced acquisition programs such as the Abrams tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache attack helicopter, and the TOW missile.¹³ Desiring to further break from the Vietnam era, TraDoc also set about restoring the Army’s warfighting tradecraft by identifying individual tactical tasks and associating compliance criteria to them. Within a few years, the military evaluated and enhanced tactical tasks via the National Training Center (Fort Irwin, CA) with force-on-force exercises and through the use of simulation and laser technologies.¹⁴ These initiatives improved military standards and elevated the proficiency of the U.S. military.

The Evolution of Operational Art: Focusing on the Right Threat

Nowadays, the United States continues to heavily invest in technology such as the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Zumwalt-class destroyer (DDG 1000), advanced air-to-air munitions, and the next amphibious vehicle (even though its current capabilities are more than sufficient to maintain its status as the sole superpower).¹⁵ The United States can ill afford to train, equip, and sustain a military solely focused on conventional warfare like it did for Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, where overwhelming aerial attacks were followed by superior ground forces outfitted with the most modern technology.¹⁶ Instead of entirely new systems, investments should be made to extend the service life of perfectly acceptable and sustainable aircraft, ships, munitions, and weapons platforms. Furthermore, today’s leaders need to understand that unconventional conflict is the most likely and enduring threat.¹⁷ This does not imply that the operational concepts of the 1970s and 1980s should be neglected or that conventional threats should be ignored. Doing so would lead to a loss of institutional knowledge and result in fatal consequences.

Failure to prepare for irregular threats could repeat the failures of the Vietnam War, the Lebanon interventions of 1982–83, and the Somalia operation of 1992. In these examples, technological and military superiority were effectively offset by unsophisticated means. Guerrilla warfare, suicide bombers, and warlord-led militias understood American operational art and avoided its strengths, conducted surprise attacks, and patiently waited to exploit a moment of weakness.¹⁸ The actions of present-day radical Islamic extremists mirror those of irregular adversaries of the past 50 years. Terrorists and nonstate actors are proving that the traditional American way of war based on overwhelming force and industrial might is vulnerable to rudimentary tactics, primitive arms, and an unwavering ideology.¹⁹ The 1993 and 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the 1998 car bomb attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 strike on the USS Cole (DDG 67) foreshadow a dangerous future that cannot be solved with a traditional mindset. Conventional responses like cruise missile attacks or awe-inspiring air campaigns are very expensive and arguably ineffective against autonomous, resilient, and illusive opponents who blend in with the population.²⁰

Unconventional adversaries are also able to thoroughly study Western militaries and combat their weaknesses with modern state–like capabilities. In 2006, Hezbollah attacked Israel from southern Lebanon with thousands of rockets and missiles of short and intermediate range.²¹ The IDF was confronted by a highly disciplined, decentralized, and adaptive enemy that was willing to inflict and absorb attacks. As a well-organized political and paramilitary movement, Hezbollah merged its anti-Zionist ideology with guerrilla tactics and state-of-the-art technology such as encrypted communications equipment and fiber optic networks, eavesdropping and antijamming devices, human intelligence sources, armor-defeating weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles to control ungoverned urban areas.²² Hezbollah’s successes against the IDF revealed the vulnerabilities of a superior conventional force and the dangers of a hybrid form of warfare. American civilian and military leaders should learn from recent history and realize that opponents willing to employ irregular methods can significantly threaten the Nation’s domestic and international security interests. The first step in countering today’s adversaries lies in reflecting on the very nature of operational art and accepting, as GEN DePuy did, that its associated doctrine is an evolving and fluid document, much like a French pot of soup that gets better as ingredients are added over time.²³

Conclusion

The Vietnam War, the defense of Europe, and the lessons of the Yom Kippur War heavily influenced an American renaissance in operational art. As a result of an aggressive doctrinal reformation, changes in warfighting concepts soon led to transformations in equipment, manpower, and training.²⁴ Although initially controversial, FM 100–5 was the result of an intellectual rediscovery that promoted the concept of active defense to counter potential Soviet encroachment in Europe. Subsequent versions in the early and mid–1980s espoused a more aggressive model known as Air-Land Battle, and became the foundation of the contemporary theory of maneuver warfare.²⁵ In order for this operational concept to be effective, commanders were empowered to seize opportunities, force the enemy to adapt to their own terms, and maximize their troops’ abilities.²⁶ Another critical aspect of this new style of warfare depended on units having the ability to quickly move forces to the right location and dominate the battlefield. Commanders needed their vehicles to have exceptional speed, outstanding mobility, and superior firepower.²⁷ Technological investments of the early 1970s prepared the military for a future war with investments in billions of dollars and a great deal of time and effort toward research and development.²⁸

In the current era, advanced weapons coupled with irregular forms of warfare are adding complexity to the modern battlefield.²⁹ Maintaining proficiency across the range of military operations with a large and technologically advanced force is economically unfeasible; therefore, the Department of Defense must continue evolving its operational art concepts.³⁰ However, the military must reform in a judicious manner while not jeopardizing its ability to fight and win against a near-peer conventional competitor. Contemporary threats will be adequately addressed when U.S. leaders begin to understand the operational art renaissance of the post–Vietnam era and how concepts need to evolve in order to avoid the pitfalls of past military failures.

Notes

1. Wineman, B.A., “Rebuilding After Defeat: Air-Land Battle and the U.S. Military,” course card, Marine Corps University, 5 April, 2013.

2. Van Riper, LtGen Paul K, USMC(Ret), “Operational Art and its Study,” course card, Marine Corps University, 8 August, 2012.

3. Strong, Mark A., “US Government Responses to Irregular Threats,” course card, Marine Corps University, March 22, 2013. See also Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, December 2007, pp. 15–16; and Romeo Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats While Bound to Traditional Forms of Dominance: An Analysis of Irregular Warfare and the 2010 National Security Strategy,” unpublished manuscript, 15 April 2013.

4. Swain, Richard M., “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army in The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War,” edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 1996, p. 148.

5. Ibid., p. 148.

6. Ibid., p. 150.

7. Ibid., p. 149.

8. Ibid., p. 153.

9. Ibid., p. 151.

10. Swain, p. 152. See also Donn A. Starry, “A Tactical Evolution: FM 100–5,” Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 1978, p. 11.

11. Swain, p. 151; Starry, p. 10.

12. Swain, p. 153.

13. Starry, pp. 2–3.

14. Swain, p. 152.

15. Cubas, Romeo, “Focusing on the Right Threats While Bound to Traditional Forms of Dominance: An Analysis of Irregular Warfare and the 2010 National Security Strategy,” unpublished manuscript, 15 April 2013.

16. Cassman, Joel F., and David Lai, “Football vs. Soccer: American Warfare in an Era of Unconventional Threats,” Armed Forces Journal, Washington, DC, 17 October 2003, p. 51; Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats.”

17. Cassman, p. 51; Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats.”

18. Cassman, p. 52; see Maj Romeo Cubas article cited in Footnote 3.

19. Cassman, p. 52; Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats.”

20. Cassman, p. 52, 54; Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats.”

21. Hoffman, p. 35; Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats.”

22. Eschel, David, “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War,” Defense Update, 2007, accessed at defense-update.com. See also Hoffman, p. 36; Cubas, “Focusing on the Right Threats.”

23. Swain, p. 150.

24. Starry, p. 3.

25. Wineman, p. 7.

26. Herbert, Paul, Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1988, p. 34.

27. Ibid.

28. Starry, p. 4.

29. U.S. Department of Defense, 2008 National Defense Strategy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, June 2008, p. 11. See also Romeo Cubas, “The United States Military’s Ability to Meet the National Security Strategy (NSS),” unpublished manuscript, 4 October 2012.

30. Cubas, “The United States Military’s Ability to Meet the National Security Strategy (NSS).”