Trouble at Checkpoint 14

Situation

You are a supply corporal in the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). The MEU came ashore 6 days ago to assist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with humanitarian operations in a poor Third World country. The city you are in is extremely congested, packed with one- to three-story buildings wherever there is not a street. All streets shown are two lane but very narrow; some also have narrow sidewalks. A maze of alleys and walkways exist throughout the city, but they are too confusing to map. Marines have had very little violence directed at them, but ethnic and religious hatred has resulted in several violent dashes within the local populace. Rules of engagement (ROE) are as provided.

You are running a convoy of relief supplies from a food warehouse at Checkpoint 15 to a distribution point on the north side of the city. Your convoy consists of three 5-ton trucks. Each truck has a driver, assistant driver, and two Marines in back for security. In each truck, one Marine is armed with an M203 and has non-lethal (rubber pellet) munitions; one is armed with an M16A2 and bayonet; and the driver and assistant driver are armed with 9mm pistols and riot batons. All have pepper spray and CS gas grenades. You are in the lead truck. There is a rifle platoon guarding the food warehouse and a reaction-force rifle company located with the forward element of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) Headquarters located ashore.

The time is 1704. As you reach Checkpoint 14, you notice a crowd of about 30-50 civilians filling the street about a block north. As you near you can see that the crowd has just pulled three people from a car and is starting to beat them. You radio the Combat Service Support Operations Center to explain the situation and reach the watch officer. You know the platoon at the food warehouse can send forces there by foot in about 10 minutes. You estimate the reaction force can arrive in about 20 minutes moving by amtracs. By now you can tell there are three victims, two men and a woman. They appear to be Americans or Europeans, either reporters or NGO workers-you can’t tell which. You ask the watch officer for guidance. “Can I help these poor people?” you ask.

Without seeing the situation himself, the watch officer understandably cannot offer much in the way of detailed guidance. “Do what you can to help,” he says, “without causing an international incident. You’re going to have to use your best judgment.”

The crowd continues to beat the three people, and you think some of them may be about to rape the woman. What do you do, corporal?

Requirement

In a time limit of 3 minutes, describe any actions you would take. Then provide the rationale for your decision. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #99-1, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA, 22134 or fax 703640-0823.

Sidebar

Rules of Engagement

1. I always have the right to defend myself, my fellow Marines, other U.S. personnel, and personnel directly supporting U.S. operations.

2. I will use only the force necessary to protect myself and accomplish my mission.

3. l will protect U.S. civilians, facilities, and prop erty.

4. I can detain any individual who interferes with my mission or commits a crime within a U.S. controlled area.

5. Mr actions need to be quick, deliberate, accurate, and never as a result of a desire for revenge.

6. Filing of warning shots is authorized.

7. Use of riot control agents must be approved at the battalion, squadron, MSSG, or higher headquarters level.

8. This ROE takes precedence over all other rules governing the use of deadly force.

9. Nothing in these rules limits a unit leader’s obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action to defend his or her unit and U.S. forces.

*Note: These ROE were created ruing acti al ROE fram past operations. None are original.

Command and Control Fog

Situation

You are commanding a detachment of Marines assigned to a joint task force (JTF) conducting humanitarian relief operations in the drought stricken country of Neptonia. In support of a United Nations (U.N.) task force objective, your mission is to produce potable water and fill local cisterns. The likelihood of terrorist activity in the joint operations area has you operating on a heightened state of alert. Although terrorists have raided cisterns throughout the joint operations area, there have been no cistern raids in your area of operations. (See map.)

The JTF commander is concerned that cistern raids may lead to civil unrest in Neptonia and ultimately upset the balance of power in the region. For diplomatic reasons, the JTF commander decided to follow the U.N. task force’s restricted rules of engagement-individual weapons may be cartied in Condition 1, but JTF personnel may only engage an adversary when fired upon.

Figure 1 contains your force list. Routes 1, 4, 7, and 9 are improved roads, and Routes K, X, and Z are unimproved. The commercial tankers cannot navigate unimproved roads.

For force protection you have limited convoys to 15 vehicles, varied convoy departure times, and directed your engineer company to improve Routes K, X, and Z. Additionally, commercial tankers have been integrated into the convoys, and tactical vehicles with mounted machineguns are in the front and rear of each convoy.

On the 31st day of your deployment, you launch a convoy to Village 2. Your engineer company commander has completed improvements to Route K. He is working in the vicinity of checkpoint 4 and anticipates completing Route X in 5 days. You are located in your command post (CP).

The lead element of the convoy has passed checkpoint 8 and is proceeding east when the convoy commander, a staff sergeant, reports hearing an explosion and seeing a column of heavy black smoke east of checkpoint 2. The excited staff sergeant reports two off-road vehicles (ORVs) approaching the convoy from the north at a high rate of speed. After forcing a tanker off the road and causing it to sink in the loose sand, the ORVs retreated to the hills north of the road. The staff sergeant states that the ORVs appeared to have gun mounts, but he did not see any guns.

While talking to the staff sergeant you hear the unmistakable sound of machinegun fire. The staff sergeant confirms machinegun fire coming from the vicinity of the rear of his convoy but states that he cannot see the rear of his convoy.

Requirement

From your CP 12 kilometers away, in a time limit of 3 minutes, what orders do you give to your subordinates, and what do you tell higher headquarters? Provide the rationale for your actions and a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-4, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or email <[email protected]>.

Part V: “Meanwhile On the Road.”

by Staff, Marine Corps Gazette

You are the S-4a (Assistant Logistics Officer) for 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. You are an infantry 2nd Lieutenant, but when you graduated IOC, you took 30 days PCS leave, plus 8 days of travel and proceed. By the time you checked in to the battalion, there were no platoon commander assignments left unfilled. The battalion XO gave you a choice between Adjutant and S4a, and you obviously chose to support the Marines in the field the rather than do paperwork and make coffee for the XO.

Since deploying to Raz Al Dezzel, you and the Marines of the S-4, the Motor Transport Platoon and Battalion Supply, have been “outside the wire” conducting convoy operations to sustain the battalion and the company (-)(reinforced) at “COP Ritz” and to support various humanitarian relief tasks. You have personally led 12 convoys through complex attacks, including IEDs, small arms fire, and indirect fire. Despite the high level of proficiency you and your Marines have developed, you have lost two M1113 “up armored” HMMWVs, numerous Marines WIA, and you have been wounded twice. You have already experienced more close combat than most of your fellow infantry lieutenants.

You have been assigned as the convoy commander for a eight-vehicle resupply convoy to COP Ritz. You have four M-1113 HMMWVS armed with a mix of .50 Cal and MK-19 Heavy Machineguns and four MTVRs with ring-mounted .50 Cal and M240B machineguns. One infantry squad from C Company is attached to your convoy as local security and to provide a dismounted counter ambush force. The convoy is carrying a mix of Class I, III, and V plus mail and personal demand items for the company at the Ritz. The class Iw (bottled drinking water) is a high priority for resupply since the water in the city of Minna Sultan Usween might carry cholera. Ammunition is always a priority as are batteries and fuel for the COP’s generators.

The route from the battalion FOB to COP Ritz is only about 3.5 miles and crosses gently rolling rocky semi-desert terrain. Off road movement is possible, but it is very slow and damaging to all tactical vehicles. There are numerous small shacks used primarily by shepherds and smugglers throughout the area, none closer than about 100 meters from the road. There is seldom any local vehicle traffic on the road; however, foot traffic, pedal “trikes,” and animal-drawn carts are common in early morning before the heat and humidity become oppressive.

Your experience leads you to ensure that in addition to the infantry squad you also have two MUGA commandos who serve as your interpreters, an Independent Duty Corpsman, HM1 Zorba, and two additional Corpsmen. You coordinate to depart friendly lines at noon since the route will be clear of local civilians during the heat of the afternoon and you will arrive at the COP before sunset. You plan to remain overnight at the COP and return to the battalion FOB the following day.

The JTF continues operating with degraded and denied communications. Since working radio sets are in demand only your MTVR and the four M1113 HMMWV heavy machinegun vehicles have communications within the convoy. You also have a radio capable of reaching the battalion, the forward company, for calls-for-fire, or for the dedicated MEDEVAC coordination net.

Fire support is currently limited to the battalion’s organic mortars, and Marine rotor-wing CAS on alert +15 at the battalion FOB. The battalion’s alert +5 section of MEDEVAC helicopters has a dedicated radio net. Response time is less than 10 minutes, and the JTF Level III treatment facility is 45 minutes flight time.

Your lead vehicles are almost a mile away from the outskirts of the city when there is a large explosion between your second and third vehicles. The third vehicle, an MTVR with the mounted infantry squad, stops and pulls off to the left (west) of the road. Your MTVR is next in the order of movement. You stop and the rest of the convoy comes to a halt and disperses in herringbone fashion to the left and right of the road. The machinegun section leader, Corporal Oh, reports on your convoy control net that no one was killed or injured in the IED explosion; however, most of the Marines in the MTVR “look like they walked out of the gas chamber.” They are unable to see clearly due to burning watery eyes, and are coughing violently with red rashes on their exposed skin. Corporal Oh reports the area “smells like a swimming pool or some kind of industrial cleaner.” Also, the MTVR took the blast under the front axle and engine compartment and is no longer drivable but looks like it can be towed. Of course, all of your MTVRs are equipped with tow-bars.

You direct HM1 Zorba to take his corpsmen to assess and treat the Marines in the MTVR and you start working on getting the MTVR on-tow by a second truck when you are wanted on the battalion radio net. COP Ritz is under attack by a force of roughly 40 unidentified enemy. A VBIED hit the barriers northwest of the mosque followed by two teams with suicide vests and automatic weapons. The Marines at the COP were ready for the attack and have fired an effective FPF disrupting the attack. No enemy have yet penetrated the perimeter of the COP, but the Marines are in imminent danger of being overrun.

Do you continue to recover the MTVR, treat the injured, and press the resupply mission when able; leave the convoy and join the fight at the COP; or do something else completely?

Requirements:

  • 1. What are your orders to your Marines?
  • 2. What is your report to the battalion?

Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of your rationale. Submit your solutions by email at [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 07-17, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.