Maneuver Warfare Collection - Marine Corps Association

Preparing for Maneuver Warfare

Commentary

Re Mr. [William S. Lind]'s "Preparing for Maneuver Warfare" (Jun84).

Anzio-A Sedentary Affair

In conducting a forcible entry the Marine Corps must avoid the mistakes of the commander of the assault forces at Anzio.

Dubbed Operation SHINGLE, the planning for the Anzio assault began immediately. The basic problem in conducting an amphibious assault along the west coast of Italy was noted by Gen [Eisenhower] when he stated: "If we landed a small force, it would be quickly eliminated, while a force large enough

Educational Philosophy

Letter to the Editor

by Capt G.R. Ing Capt Moore’s article (May84) on the legacy of Gen J.C. Breckinridge is successful in its attempt to reawaken the reader’s appreciation for the efforts of our

Maneuver Warfare at Tinian-1944

A few principles of war have been the keys to victory in the past and will continue to unlock the door to victory on battlefields of the future.

What lessons can this battle fought four decades ago present to a commander using modern weaponry? The answer is many. Although the weapons and tactics have changed in the intervening years, the principles behind the victory at Tinian are as meaningful today as they were in 1944. The first and most

Preparing for Maneuver Warfare

Planners need to ask themselves what needs to be done on a broad institutional basis if the Corps is to be able to do maneuver warfare.

It seems about time to take the next step: to move beyond describing maneuver warfare to discussing how the Marine Corps must change if it is to be able to do it. In order to do maneuver warfare in combat, it is of course necessary to understand what it is. But that is only the beginning.

A Traveling Command Post

For the battalion command configuration, both a tactical CP and an administrative CP were established. The tactical CP functions during displacements or whenever the battalion commander intends to move forward from the combat operations center (COC) and retain tactical control of the maneuver

Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures

A Marine Corps Perspective

One significant obstacle to a clear understanding of C^sup 3^CM is that as a strategy, it is often confused with electronic warfare. Elements of EW are included in C^sup 3^CM-jamming and electronic deception (Figure 2)-however, EW is a discipline in its own right, just as communications, logistics,

The Legacy of J.C. Breckinridge

The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations has endured as the bible of amphibious warfare for nearly 50 years. Its publication was the direct result of the influence of James C. Breckinridge on the educational and intellectual climate at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

[James C. Breckinridge], who would redirect the focus of the Marine Schools during the final year of the Roaring Twenties and return to Quantico as a brigadier general 18 months later to ensure the completion of his educational revolution, brought a rare combination of operational experience and

Battlefield Mobility and Survivability of the MAGTF

Tactical ground mobility is generally perceived within the Marine Corps as a function of ground mechanized/armor systems, and the availablity of adequate firepower systems and tactical aviation assets. Unfortunately, this is not a comprehensive assessment of all of the factors involved nor does it

Tactical Deception

Letter to the Editor

by Capt Stephen A. Raub The Aug83 article on tactical deception by Maj Daly was excellent. It points out how critical it is that we thoroughly understand and effectively employ

The Defensive Naval Campaign

An Appropriate Mission

Restructuring the Marine Corps to defend naval bases does not necessarily mean that the Marine Corps must forsake the amphibious assault. It is possible that its day is not past and that the Marine Corps still needs to provide forward deployed amphibious units. Fortunately, the Marine Corps has the