

# Inter-Service Investment in the Future Force

Marine Detachment, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence

by LtCol William J. Patrick

Nearly four years ago, in initial guidance to the Deputy Commandants, Marines across the FMF, and those in the supporting establishment, Gen Berger emphasized, “Our force must be an integral element of the Joint Force, able to combine people, processes, and programs to execute globally integrated operations.”<sup>1</sup> The publication of the *38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG)* in 2019 started an intellectual renaissance not only at the highest levels of our institution but all the way down the rank and file. This near-philosophical movement has reexamined the purpose for our existence, illustrated the stark reality of how our current capabilities match up to potential future operating environments, and set a course to align the Marine Corps’ capabilities to the priorities set in the *National Defense Strategy* while serving as a catalyst for creative thought inside our Service and setting the example for bold change during an interwar period inside the DOD and other Services.<sup>2</sup> Following the *CPG*, the Commandant released *Force Design 2030 (FD2030)*<sup>3</sup> and supporting concepts such as *Talent Management 2030 (TM2030)*,<sup>4</sup> and *Training and Education 2030 (TE2030)*.<sup>5</sup> Although sharing common ground with some national security experts advocating for urgently necessary legislative and defense establishment change to deter or defeat our adversaries,<sup>6</sup> there are elements of these concepts that have come under consistent public criticism by some widely known subject-matter experts and legendary retired Marine general officers.<sup>7</sup>



*McGinnis-Wickam Hall is the headquarters for the Maneuver Center of Excellence. (Photo by John D. Helms.)*



*The historic Infantry School building built in 1935. (Photo by John D. Helms.)*

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One does not need to be a proponent of these concepts to recognize that they contain universal fundamentals that are timeless elements of the very foundation of contemporary principles of war, such as the value of the Joint Force, combined with strong alliances and partnerships: “Our wargames have

shown that in any great power conflict, our alliances are an essential factor to achieving success ... We must work with them in peace to be ready to partner with them in war.”<sup>8</sup> Whether critical or fanatical about *FD2030*, both detractors and supporters alike can universally recognize the combined scope, scale, complexity, and depth of dynamic change across many important pillars of our institution poses a considerable challenge to the capacity of both our financial and human resources. In our current fiscally constrained environment, and with manpower reductions to the supporting establishment where a great deal of change must be codified in areas such as training, education, doctrine, modernizing readiness standards, and learning environments, we must look to adopt existing best practices and models of success from within the Joint Force when beneficial.

### **Investing in the Future Force via the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence**

As the Marine Corps continues to experiment with, iterate, implement, and institutionalize the *CPG, FD2030*, and their supporting concepts, we do not need to look very far for proven ways

generating warfighting readiness, developing future force capabilities, and enhancing joint interoperability for the FMF through joint, allied, and partner nation integration during the training of advanced warfighting skills aboard the MCoE.

### **Marine Detachment, Maneuver Center of Excellence**

Located at newly redesignated Fort Moore, GA (formerly Fort Benning),<sup>9</sup> the MARDET, MCoE is a Marine Corps training command that generates warfighting readiness for the FMF and the Joint Force by providing and maintaining a professional instructor cadre that enhances the preparation, throughput, proficiency, and certification of students in advanced warfighting skills. As a matter of historical precedent, the Commander, MARDET, MCoE also serves as the senior Marine representative to the CG of the MCoE, the Commandant of the Infantry School, the Commandant of the Armor School, and further represents all Marine Corps equities and interests aboard the Maneuver Center while serving as a conduit between the Army and the Marine Corps on mutually relevant and beneficial topics.

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to improve our current state as we move toward the desired state. Taking a hard look at what has been successful in our sister-Services can provide effective, economical, and successful examples of best practices that create needed warfighting readiness and lethality in a resource-constrained environment. A demonstrative example of some of the benefits associated with our inter-Service collaboration with the Army is the Marine Corps Detachment, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MARDET, MCoE). The MARDET, MCoE invests in the future force by providing a professional instructor cadre,

Historically, this relationship began about 100 years ago in the 1920s as Marine students attended schools and courses at the Infantry School. Marines started as students, focused on broad resident infantry professional military education, and later began to be assigned as instructors at Army schools. Shortly after World War II, the Commandant of the Marine Corps permanently assigned a lieutenant colonel to the Infantry School at Fort Benning as an amphibious operations instructor and the senior Marine representative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. During the Korean War era, Ranger

School was created, and for decades the Marine Corps sent Marines to this school. From the 1960s to the 1990s, as a Service, we evaluated and utilized best practices, tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by Ranger School and selectively implemented elements of this program of instruction throughout the entire collection of Marine Corps infantry leadership schools.

As an example of providing quality instructors to the supporting establishment, after completing his battalion command tour with 2/4 Mar in Vietnam, Gen P.X. Kelley, then a lieutenant colonel, served at this command as the senior Marine representative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. A few years later, as a captain, MajGen James E. Livingston, who earned the Medal of Honor (also with 2/4 Mar) for heroic actions during the Battle of Dai Do, served with the command as an instructor at the Infantry School. In 2011, as a result of congressionally authorized base realignment and closures, the Army’s Armor Center of Excellence at Fort Knox was relocated to their Infantry Center of Excellence at Fort Benning. During that process, the Marine Corps’ Tank Detachment at Fort Knox joined the Marine Corps Infantry Detachment at Fort Benning, and the Army established both the Infantry School and Armor school under a new common higher headquarters titled the MCoE.

After considering elevating the command, the larger armor-focused MARDET took the reins as the senior Marine representative, ending a 90-year period where the Marine Corps’ exclusive focus at the MCoE was infantry. Over the last few decades, during the Global War on Terror, and to the present, it could be estimated that the limited extent of what the Marine Corps obtains from the MCoE is airborne “jump school” quotas. This estimation, however, would be an uninformed and simplistic view that grossly understates the value of inter-Service integration with the MCoE, lacking comprehension of its enormous potential. There are numerous, wide-ranging, and profound areas of overlapping interest that exist in ground combat operations, basic

and advanced infantry skills training, capability development, doctrine, experimentation, testing, evaluation, and acquisitions that have legitimate applicability and should be of genuine interest to the Marine Corps.

Since 2021, the MARDET, MCoE has been focused on what schools provide the Marine Corps the most benefit toward *FD2030*. In 2022, the MARDET, MCoE realigned to become an additional O5-level subordinate command of the School of Infantry-East to functionally align to and complement the infantry training mission of the Schools of Infantry. Although not well known, the Marine Corps has fostered and benefited from inter-Service interoperability at the MCoE for generations of Marines over nearly a century. With minimal investment in manpower resources, commands like MARDET, MCoE could take inter-Service integration to the next level, aiming to accomplish the spirit and intent of the Commandant's guidance when he prescribed, "we must better integrate ... and work more effectively with other elements of the Joint Force."<sup>10</sup>

### Why Invest in Army Training and Education?

There are numerous examples of how "The Few, The Proud, The Marines" have higher standards in certain areas than a traditional land component soldier. In many cases, our unique functions as an amphibious and naval expeditionary force-in-readiness combined with our exclusive capability of the MAGTF provide bona fide reasons that Marines should train and educate their own at purpose-built, permanent schoolhouses. However, there are situations where the Army, as the executive agent for doctrine, training, and acquisitions for a particular capability within the DOD such as airborne operations where it would be fiscally unwise and too resource intensive for the Marine Corps to duplicate a purpose-built and permanent school. The primary reason to utilize Army schools is to avoid duplicating the entire program of instruction and all the connected costs associated with developing and maintaining such a redundant capabil-

ity unless it is necessary. The point of the Army owning doctrine in a particular area cannot be underemphasized and is not restricted to airborne operations. Whether it is doctrine for heavy-tracked armor, wheeled light-armor operations and vehicle platforms, mortar and machinegun gunnery, or simply shared publications and manuals, the Marine Corps heavily relies upon and should fully integrate with the Army for all MCoE-produced ground combat operations and range and training area doctrine.

A couple of storied examples of the benefits of the Marine Corps using Army training and education schools, courses, and materials are easily illustrated by our continued use of historical examples provided in *FMFRP 12-2, Infantry in Battle*. First published by the Infantry School in 1934 and updated in 1938, the Marine Corps republished this text to familiarize students with relevant examples of the realities and principles of war during peacetime.<sup>11</sup> Perhaps even more widely recognized are our respected Marine Corps Leadership Traits and Principles taught in leadership classes all across our institution. These traits and principles are immensely powerful at assisting an individual with improving upon their personal value set and subscribing to our professional values. However, these

traits and principles were originally developed and published by the Army and likely made their way into our lexicon after having been embraced by Marine Corps students and staff at the Infantry School.<sup>12</sup> Aside from other historical examples, there are two significant reasons we should invest heavily in Army schools at the MCoE.

First, it is an extraordinarily sensible financial investment. In a fiscally uncertain environment—especially as our future force design requires significant investments to be made in testing, evaluating, and fielding new systems, platforms, technologies, as well as all the installations and logistics costs that are tied to these investments—it is wise to find economical ways to achieve all our warfighting readiness requirements.<sup>13</sup> One of the most illustrative examples of being economical is the Marine Corps' process for obtaining airborne quotas. The Marine Corps would have to spend an exorbitant amount of time analyzing the doctrine, organization, training/education, materiel, leadership/communication synchronization, personnel, facilities, and cost requirements to establish a sufficient training organization that could be trained, staffed, equipped, certified, organized, and fully resourced to replicate the Army's Airborne School.<sup>14</sup> The flight hours alone would be an astounding cost, not to



**An instructor inspects and tests parachute functionality from the 250-foot tower at Airborne School. (Photo by Patrick A. Albright.)**



mention no unit in the DOD submits more OPREP-3 SIRs than Airborne School.

Conveniently, by providing four experienced reconnaissance staff non-commissioned officers to serve on the airborne and jumpmaster instructor cadre, the Marine Corps receives hundreds of quotas to these schools that serve the needs of the Reconnaissance and MARSOC communities of interest via an effective inter-Service agreement. This inter-Service agreement requires utilizing a complex input and adjudication process between the Marine Corps and the Army, yet sufficient numbers of quotas can be allocated to the Marine Corps as long as they are efficiently utilized and the instructor requirement is fully sourced. Recently, the Commandant emphasized that the Marine Corps will seek additional airborne quotas to serve as talent management incentives.<sup>15</sup> The MARDET, MCoE is currently working closely with Training Command (TRNGCMD), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), and Marine Manpower Division to meet the Commandant's intent by permanently maintaining the necessary subject-matter expert structure to enable a corresponding increase in airborne quotas that will directly support *TM2030* retention efforts.

The second reason we ought to invest heavily in the advanced warfighting course portfolio of schools and courses at the MCoE is because the Army is truly a world-class learning organization. The MCoE and its Infantry School have excellent ground-combat-element schools, courses, leadership, staff officers, training areas, and their ground doctrine, weapons system acquisition, soldier lethality, close combat lethality task force, holistic health and fitness, capability development and integration, and experimentation efforts are all collocated and integrated aboard the MCoE by design. To further illustrate the quality and value of this type of inter-Service integration, the MARDET, MCoE currently provides one infantry Marine officer in the rank of major to serve as an instructor at Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC), which is



**A Marine jumpmaster instructor conducting a UH60 spot jump while participating in the Army's Jumpmaster of the Year competition. (Photo by Markeith Horace.)**

the Army career-level school equivalent of Expeditionary Warfare School. In exchange for that one officer, the Marine Corps receives thirty quotas for resident career-level schools each year. Not only does this equal the number of infantry officers sent to resident Expeditionary Warfare School in a typical academic year, but it is the equivalent of six infantry battalions' worth of company commanders receiving topnotch resident

PME prior to assuming command of a warfighting formation. MCCC lacks a concentrated focus on amphibious and expeditionary operations, but what it lacks in intensive MAGTF operations, it makes up for with six months of first-rate instruction in planning infantry company and battalion-level operations and arguably produces a more technically and tactically proficient company commander.



**A Marine serving as an instructor at the Army's Maneuver Captains Career Course. (Photo by CPT Tacori Barnett.)**

### Inter-Service Quotas through TIP and Service Manning Decision Review

As part of the aforementioned inter-Service agreement, each fiscal year the Marine Corps receives hundreds of advanced warfighting course quotas for the infantry, reconnaissance, MARSOC, and assault amphibian communities. Although numbering in the hundreds, these are high-demand, low-supply quotas that scarcely meet current FMF demand. In exchange for these quotas, the Marine Corps provides a specified number of Marines who are MOS-qualified and later certified as professional instructor cadre at select Army schools in a manner that is similar to that of a combat instructor at our Schools of Infantry. MCoE quotas are sought out by members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, Special Operations Command, other elements of the Joint Force, and the Marine Corps. All requesting agencies go through a rigid and structured future-oriented process to obtain allocations. For the Marine Corps, TECOM manages the Service's Training Input Plan (TIP) for internal Marine Corps schools and courses, as well as for sister-Service schools. For MCoE schools, TECOM tasks PP&O (assisted by MARDET, MCoE) to utilize their expertise and role as occupational field sponsors to seek and obtain FMF input on what sister-Service schools the Marine Corps should invest in and provide a precise estimate on the number of quotas required by the FMF. For the Army, this process is managed at the Service-level via their annual Service Manning Decision Review process. When considering inter-Service allocations, the Service Manning Decision Review and its adjudication panel look at the Marine Corps' TIP inputs, compare it to the total number of requests, and the corresponding utilization rate of the previous three fiscal years. Failing to keep high utilization rates is the main reason the Marine Corps loses quotas to important inter-Service schools. From 2018–2020, the Marine Corps had airborne utilization rates fall as low as 56 percent, and consequently, the past trend of poor utilization decreased Service allocations

by one-third (down from 627 to 411 quotas) over a three-year span. These utilization trends have been radically reversed by analyzing no-shows, failures, and unused quotas and implementing new business rules. For the last two fiscal years, utilization has remained at 97 percent and has already resulted in a correspondingly significant increase in allocated airborne quotas (up from 411 to 512 quotas) by fiscal year 2025. By reversing negative utilization trends and maintaining sufficient quality and quantity of airborne instructor cadre, the Marine Corps can increase utilization, optimize production, and increase airborne quota allocations in support of *TM2030* retention incentives.

### MARDET, MCoE Warfighting Course Portfolio

In 2021, after nearly a century of inter-Service integration with the Army's Infantry School, the *CPG* and *FD2030* changed the leadership structure of MARDET, MCoE from armor back to an infantry-focused training command. This Service-directed change in mission and focus provided the purpose and motivation to redefine the command mission, develop a framework to increase utilization, optimize production, generate FMF warfighting readi-

ness, and analyze the entire portfolio of advanced warfighting courses offered at the MCoE. The simple criteria for analysis were which courses provided the best return on investment, and produced skills that would be valuable to the future force infantry community. From 2011 to 2021, the primary focus of MARDET, MCoE was the production of officers and enlisted tank crew and leaders, as well as the development of enlisted tank maintenance capability. From late 2021 to early 2022, working with TRNGCMD, TECOM, and PP&O the MARDET, MCoE presented recommendations and options that led to CG, TRNGCMD, PP&O, and TECOM's endorsement to reduce some legacy school requirements and redirect those fiscal and human resources to courses that had strong potential to benefit the infantry communities with respect to future force design. Essentially, significant observation and analysis of multiple programs of instruction revealed that Ranger School was no longer valid or needed Marine Corps training requirement. Simultaneously, this study indicated that previously unutilized or underutilized schools such as Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader, Scout Leader, and Cavalry Leader provided needed capabilities in support of



**Medium Caliber Weapons System demonstration by the Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center aboard the MCoE. Nearly identical to the 30mm cannon on the future amphibious combat vehicle, the Medium Caliber Weapons System is designed to enhance the accuracy and lethality of the M1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle. (Photo by Patrick A. Albright.)**



*FD2030* and should receive additional emphasis and investment.

As an example of the total cost of ownership doctrine, organization, training/education, materiel, leadership/communication synchronization, personnel, facilities, and cost analysis, as well as decisions made to not duplicate effective Army schools, a few years ago the Assault Amphibian (AA) community invested in providing an instructor to the Master Gunner Common Core course. This investment was made by the AA occupational field to develop an internal Marine Corps school program of instruction and instructor cadre. Quickly, the AA community recognized that with current fiscal realities, the best solution was to provide one instructor in exchange for the needed subject-matter expert certification and perhaps never fully realize the standalone Marine Corps school capability. Master Gunner Common Core is a tough gunnery planning and sustainment training prerequisite for the Army's platform-specific Master Gunner Courses. The course develops master gunners that can plan and execute battalion-level live fires and develop long-term sustainment training—essentially a “gunner-light” capability. As the Marine Corps began testing and fielding the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the MARDET, MCoE worked with PP&O, CD&I, and the Advanced Amphibious Assault program manager to study the Stryker Master Gunner course as a pathway to developing an instructor cadre for the eventual fielding of and training with the 30mm cannon variant of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. Our first instructor has graduated Stryker Master Gunner, and the Marine Corps will begin receiving quotas a couple of years in advance of the fielding. Since the MCoE is the doctrinal hub for these weapons systems and platforms, it provides the senior Marine instructor at Stryker Master Gunner an immediate doctrinal connection to the source and provides the FMF with a useful point of contact. A similar concept can be employed within the Light Armored Reconnaissance community, especially if *FD2030* were to eventually arrive at a common platform for the Amphibious

Combat Vehicle and future amphibious reconnaissance vehicle where the occupational fields could essentially be combined and both mission sets merged.

Upon the conclusion of *FD2030* focused analysis, the MARDET, MCoE's Warfighting Course Portfolio expanded its focus across a broad range of schools and courses that includes Airborne, Airborne and Air Delivery, Jumpmaster, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader, Infantry Mortar Leader, Scout Leader, Cavalry Leader, Master Gunner, Stryker Master Gunner, Ranger, Pathfinder, Maneuver Captains Career Course, and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. To assist commanders in making informed choices on their warfighting course investments, a detailed Warfighting Course Portfolio that advertises all advanced warfighting courses at the MCoE has been distributed to MEF, division, and regimental operations sections.<sup>16</sup>

### **Instructor Certification and Incentivization**

Serving as an instructor at Army schools is professionally rewarding and provides a significant return on investment upon return to the FMF. Reconnaissance Marines typically leave with additional career and occupational field-enhancing schools and qualifications. The Marine instructor at the Army's Infantry Mortar Leader Course was selected as the Army's Master Trainer. After significant recognition within the Infantry School, MCoE, and TRADOC, this Marine was selected as the Marine Corps' instructor of the year for fiscal year 2021. Instructor certification is time intensive, demanding, and requires commitment, but the Army recognizes and rewards talent regardless of Service affiliation. Instructors serve OPCON to their Army schools during all academic hours, and when the appropriate conditions are met in SECNAV and Marine Corps policy, instructors are eligible for and receive Department of the Army personal decorations. At MCCC the Marine instructor is surrounded by the Army's top talent, as they see the importance of

identifying high-performing, key, and developmental billet complete officers for assignment to the Army's Project Warrior program. This program selects high-quality, company-grade officers to serve as company commanders, with a follow-on utilization tour as an observer, coach/trainer at their combat training centers. Upon successful completion of an assignment as an observer, coach/trainer (similar to TTECG at the MCAGCC), Project Warrior officers return to Captain's Career Course resident schools to serve as faculty advisors and share lessons learned from leading and training the Army's operating forces. This program is nested with the Army's Talent Based Career Alignment (TBCA) program.<sup>17</sup> These soldiers are highly competitive for promotion and are typically selected to attend intermediate-level school after their tours as faculty advisors. Similarly, the Army has a formal and credentialed instructor certification process that focuses on adult learning and the experiential learning model. This is paired with a badge program where an instructor can achieve basic, senior, and master instructor certifications. Programs such as this, as well as Project Warrior and the Army's TBCA program, offer points of reference for ongoing *TE2030* efforts.

### **Joint, Inter-Service, Allied, and Partner Nation Integration and MCoE Conferences**

Each year, the MCoE holds a Maneuver Warfighter Conference focused on the future operating environment, current operating concepts, peer and near-peer adversary challenges, and features world-class guest speakers. This forum is attended by a wide range of general officers including multiple Army four-stars. The past two years have been exceptionally relevant and focused on China and Russia while also serving as an industry conference. Marine senior-leader participation has been sought, and if not due to emerging priorities, the CG of Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) would have been a panelist and speaker in early 2022. On a similar note, after senior Marine representative engagements with the CG and Chief of Staff of the MCoE on *FD2030*,

the future infantry battalion, and the development of the Infantry Marine Course, Senior Leaders at the MCoE proposed an annual Infantry Summit. This summit was executed in May 2022 and was designed to allow key leaders from the Army and Marine Corps, as well as allied and partner nations, to share infantry training processes, best practices, and challenges. The two-day summit consisted of presentations and discussions with representatives from MARDET, MCoE; SOI-E/SOI-W, Infantry Training Battalions; U.S. Army Infantry School; the Republic of Korea Army; German Army; Royal Australian Infantry; Royal Netherlands Army; British Army; French Army; Brazilian Army; and Chilean Army. Each presenter described their Service's infantry training progression, best practices, and challenges. The discussion topics covered training for large-scale combat operations, the future operating environment, optimizing human performance, 21st-century learning, and efforts to reduce attrition. The MCoE is currently planning to conduct both its annual Maneuver Warfighter Conference and Infantry Summit later this year.

**Areas MCoE Integration Could Assist with CPG, FD2030, TM2030, and TE2030**

The MCoE offers many ideas that merit further exploration and consideration that could benefit the implementation and institutionalization of the CPG, FD2030, TM2030, and TE2030. One future focus area could be working with the Army on infantry and tank integration during training aboard the MCoE, an idea generated by Advanced Infantry Training Battalion-East. It has been stated in FD2030 that armor capability will continue to be provided by the Army, and Marines typically affirm that Marine infantry integrates with tanks in a manner that is different from the Army.<sup>18</sup> Another potential area to evaluate is MCoE annual competitions. In 2001, a Marine instructor with the MARDET, MCoE became the only Marine to ever place first in the Army's Best Ranger competition.<sup>19</sup> In the last couple of fiscal years, the Marine

Corps has fielded sniper teams for the MCoE's Best Sniper competition, and this year the MARDET, MCoE has worked with PP&O and the FMF to field teams for the Best Mortar Competition. The MCoE also has a Best Squad Competition, and in the same spirit, the potential for including the winner of the Marine Corps' Super Squad competition in this inter-Service chal-

to be adequately covered by field-grade officers and senior staff NCOs. The purpose was that this new combined infantry and armor detachment would go from being a representative to a one-star to a two-star, adding more equities and larger staffs, thus requiring more effective coordination. Equally important in the previous planning to elevate this command to an O6 headquarters

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lenge is under evaluation. Doctrine is a topic that surfaces frequently, and there are likely existing formal and informal established relationships for doctrine between the Marine Corps and MCoE, but evaluating the ability to integrate with and collocate a Marine with the MCoE's Directorate of Training and Doctrine may be of benefit to TE2030 efforts.

**Important Relationships**

It was previously noted that the Commander, MARDET, MCoE serves as the senior Marine Corps representative to multiple Army general officers, and in 2021, CG, TRNGCMD added strengthening the relationship with the 75th Ranger Regiment to that list of esteemed organizations. Likewise, there are significant relationships with three training brigade commanders, the Commandant of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, where the Marine Corps owes a joint instructor billet, and the director of MCCC. From 2005–2011, prior to the Marine Corps combining its infantry and armor detachments in 2011, there was significant consideration given to elevating the MARDET, MCoE to an O6-level command with a significant number of action officers assigned as enablers from MCWL, TECOM doctrine, and SYSCOM. Correspondingly, the headquarters structure was postured to grow to allow all of the focus areas in this article

was the idea that the MCoE was the doctrinal hub for all ground combat operations and systems as the Army is the DOD'S executive agency, and the Army's Futures Command has its Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (think GCE portion of CD&I) located at the MCoE with responsibilities that mirror many HQMC CD&I, PP&O, and MCWL functions.

The scope, scale, and cost of FD2030 and all supporting concepts require a gargantuan effort by Training and Education Command as evidenced by the directed actions in TE2030.<sup>20</sup> A way of reducing this cost is as the Commandant said, "We will leverage the investments other Services have made as a fast follower."<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the supporting establishment has long felt the lack of fiscal and human resource prioritization that is encompassed by the Commandant's recognition of the same when he said, "TECOM leads doctrinal development for our Corps, but we have not adequately resourced it to accomplish this critical task—that must change."<sup>22</sup> A textbook starting point is the MCoE. Significant joint, allied, and partner nation force integration occurs in training at the MCoE. Marines train with Army, Navy, Air Force, and special operations forces, as well as over 100 different allied and partner nations while attending advanced warfighting courses at the MCoE. Through joint integration in training, education,

course attendance, mastery, and certification in warfighting skills, the FMF increases its warfighting readiness and enhances its joint interoperability. With a nominal current investment of only 23 assigned personnel, the MARDET MCoE directly contributes to the training of more than 14,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and allied and partner nation leaders from over 100 countries each year. In the highlighted cases of airborne, where a single reconnaissance staff sergeant assigned as an instructor currently equates to the Service receiving more than 100 jump school quotas, and at MCCC where a modest investment of a single major's salary and entitlements produces outsized returns by providing world-class resident PME to five infantry battalion's worth of company commanders each year, it is important to compare and contrast the total cost of ownership if we conducted these schools and courses internal to the Marine Corps. Not only are these small investments delivering disproportionately positive results, but they deliver a huge value in cost savings to the Service. A comprehensive analysis of the total cost of ownership airborne alone would cost the Marine Corps millions of dollars each year. Army schools benefit the FMF, and moderate investments in additional resources could further expand the value to the FMF and the supporting establishment as well as support *TM2030* and *TE2030*. Just as the Commandant-provided guidance that adding Marine structure to Maritime Operations Centers at numbered fleets would benefit Naval integration,<sup>23</sup> the benefits of adding structure to select inter-Service billets in areas such as the MCoE's Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, Maneuver Battle Lab (GCE portion of MCWL), and Directorate of Training and Doctrine (GCE doctrine, T&R, and formal instructor certification) could greatly benefit our *FD2030* and *TE2030* implementation efforts.<sup>24</sup>

#### Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*, (Washington, DC: July 2019).

2. Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy*, (Washington, DC: October 2022), <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF>.

3. Gen David H. Berger, *Force Design 2030*, (Washington, DC: March 2020).

4. Gen David H. Berger, *Talent Management 2030*, (Washington, DC: November 2021).

5. Gen David H. Berger, *Training and Education 2030*, (Washington, DC: January 2023).

6. Christian Brose, *The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare* (New York, NY: Hachette Books, Hachette Book Group, 2020).

7. See articles such as Gen James Amos and Gen John J. Sheehan, "Former Marine Generals: 'Our Concerns with Force Design 2030,'" *The National Interest*, December 12, 2022, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/former-marine-generals-%E2%80%98our-concerns-force-design-2030%E2%80%99-205989>, MajGen James Livingston and Col Jay Vargas, "The Battle of Dai Do and Marine Corps Force Design 2030," *Marine Corps Association*, August 2022, <https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Livingston-Vargas-Aug22-WEB-REVISED-for-posting.pdf>, and LtGen Paul K. Van Riper (Ret), "Jeopardizing National Security: What Is Happening to Our Marine Corps?" *Military Times*, August 18, 2022, <https://www.military-times.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/21/jeopardizing-national-security-what-is-happening-to-our-marine-corps>.

8. *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*.

9. Secretary of Defense, "Implementation of the Naming Commission's Recommendations, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Directs Implementation of the Naming Commission's Recommendations," Department of Defense, October 6, 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092544/-1/-1/1/IMPLEMENTATION-OF-THE-NAMING-COMMISSIONS-RECOMMENDATIONS.PDF>.

10. *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*.

11. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Infantry in Battle*, (Washington, DC: 1989).

12. Marine Corps University Research Library, "Marine Corps Leadership: Values, Ethics, and Qualities," *Marine Corps University Research Library*, January 20, 2023, <https://grc-usmcu.libguides.com/pme/qpme/marine-corps-ethics-values-leadership-development/qualities>.

13. Gen David H. Berger, *Installations and Logistics 2030*, (Washington, DC: February 2023).

14. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCO 5311.1E, Total Force Structure Process*, (Washington, DC: November 2015).

15. Gen David H. Berger, *Talent Management 2030: Update March 2023*, (Washington, DC: March 2023).

16. Please contact the MARDET, MCoE Staff if specific course information is needed.

17. Army's Talent Based Career Alignment (TBCA) program link: <https://talent.army.mil/tbca>.

18. *Force Design 2030* Divestment of Tanks. We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capability, despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground armor capability will continue to be provided by the Army.

19. Sgt Scott Peczkka, "Marine Wins 'Best Ranger' Title," *Headquarters Marine Corps*, May 1, 2001, <https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/Article/Article/551482/marine-wins-best-ranger-title>.

20. *Training and Education 2030*.

21. *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*.

22. *Training and Education 2030*.

23. *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*.

24. Ibid.

