

pared by the Reserve Liaison and Training Branch, MCDEC, Quantico, relates an incident in which a Turkish POW, in Korea, suspected of collaboration, was tried by kangaroo court; convicted, he was severely beaten, as was his defense counsel. He was admonished that a recurrence would result in his summary execution. What Marine, in attending a Code of Conduct class, has not heard more extreme examples in support of the absolute need for cohesiveness in a prisoner of war environment?

Martial Justice is an interesting narrative of a point of history which reached what may be regarded as its only logical conclusion. Of interest is the international diplomacy involved in notifying (in accordance with the then-existing Geneva Convention) the protecting power, Germany, of the trial and conviction of the seven accused, Germany's immediate reply notifying the United States of its "conviction" of a like number of Americans, and the negotiations for their mutual release which concluded only with the defeat of Germany. Its value, however, lies in the caveat that we should fully advise military personnel of the consequences of their acts as prisoners of war, lest they be judged in accordance with precedent established by their country.

THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By Ross Gregory. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971, pp. 157, \$6.95.)

reviewed by W. F. Sheppard

In the early years of this century, American meat packers proudly proclaimed that they profitably used every part of the pig except its squeal. Professor Gregory has been equally efficient. This brief book appears to be a by-product of the research for his prize winning *Walter Hines Page: Ambassador to the Court of St. James*. It contains little if any new material and is basically a short summary of the events leading up to our entry into World War I.

The book is primarily intended for college students and serves as a good introduction to the complexities facing President Woodrow Wilson in making one of the landmark decisions in American history. It traces the development of our economic dependence on war orders from the Allies and shows that the domestic consequences of stopping this trade effectively prevented Wilson from using the threat of such action as a weapon to force England to respect American neutral rights. Gregory also points out how Wilson was caught between the urging of such Anglophiles as Ambassador

Page and Secretary of State Robert Lansing to enter the war, and the demands for a truly neutral posture coming from the midwest. Those of us who remember World War II recall the virtually unanimous support for the war effort which existed after Pearl Harbor, and tend to accept that unanimity as the normal state of affairs during hostilities. Professor Gregory reminds us that Wilson did not have the advantage of such a preponderance of popular support. Even at such a critical juncture as the vote on the declaration of war, six senators and fifty representatives voted against the president.

Gregory also illustrates the frequently overlooked point that the options open to the American government are largely determined by the actions of others. For example, he shows that after David Lloyd George and the "hard liners" came to power in Britain, that nation was less susceptible to American pressure than it had been during the tenure of Herbert Asquith and Sir Edward Grey. The same transformation occurred in Germany when Bethmann Hollweg's influence was eroded by the rise to power of Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff. As European attitudes hardened, American options narrowed.

We seem determined as a nation to identify the causes of war and to question the chief executive's decision to embark on that course. In 1971, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, introduced a resolution in the Senate calling upon the scholarly societies to nominate historians to write, under government sponsorship, a "definitive" history of the Vietnam War. At its September 71 meeting, the Council of the American Historical Association voted not to participate, expressing its doubt that objectivity could be achieved with government affiliation. In view of this American propensity to challenge and question, our great-grandchildren will doubtless be reading not only accounts of Vietnam, but also "new" versions of the events of 1914-1917.

WAR COMES TO LONG AN; REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT IN A VIETNAMESE PROVINCE. By Jeffrey Race. (University of California Press, 1972, \$11.95.)

reviewed by Maj M. N. Carter

Author Race has produced a significant book on the Vietnam War and that portion fought in Long An Province. This province, strategically located in the Mekong Delta southwest of Saigon and along enemy approach routes from sanctuaries in Cambodia, is analyzed in detail from the days of the Viet Minh until late 1970. Mr. Race does not ap-

pear to espouse views either for or against the American effort in Southeast Asia and is only concerned with presenting the facts from both sides along with detailed analyses of key events and time periods.

The book begins with a detailed look into the hamlet and village level situation between 1954 and 1956. During this period the province was relatively peaceful and the Viet Cong, under direction from the North, lay "patiently in ambush, gathering one's forces, waiting to strike at the right moment." Preparations for war were made during 1956-1959 by both sides and it is during this period that the basis for future success or failure was established. The period 1960-1965 is analyzed in depth with a separate chapter on the differences in strategy, organizations and policies between the government leadership and the revolutionary movement. This section of the book is most valuable for Marines and emphasizes the low level leadership and actions necessary to counter insurgent apparatus.

By 1968 the situation in Long An Province had deteriorated on both the GVN and Viet Cong sides such that both needed external forces to increase available manpower and war efforts. For the Viet Cong, this meant NVA units; for the GVN, it was U.S. combat forces. The author investigates the use of these forces and finally concludes that they did not affect the outcome to any great degree because they were fighting against each other while the real need was for security at the hamlet and village level. This does not mean that conventional forces are not needed but that their use must coincide with the provision of security throughout the area rather than just in the vicinity of the large bases. This strategy was finally replaced by the introduction of improved Regional and Popular Forces designed to provide the people with security.

The author concludes that while the situation in Long An Province in late 1970 favored the government of South Vietnam and that the revolutionary movement was in a difficult position, the battle still has not been finally decided.

Source material for this book included extensive interviews with former Viet Cong, ARVN and U. S. officers who served in the province and some official Vietnamese government documents never before released. The author himself spent four years in Southeast Asia and was an Army advisor in Long An Province.

Despite its price this book is a valuable addition to the professional Marine's library and contains an objective view of the revolutionary movement within one of South Vietnam's key provinces.