

How Low Can You Go?

Authorities delegation in support of EABO

by Maj Candace R. Valentine

Capt Smith commands C Co, 3d Littoral Combat Team, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment. He is also the commanding officer of an expeditionary advanced base (EAB) on a sparsely populated Japanese island. The mission is to retain control of the island to deny enemy access and enable friendly operations in the area of operations. The EAB has NMESIS and anti-aircraft batteries but two days ago lost communications with higher headquarters. The signals intelligence/electronic warfare officer reports an off-coast fishing trawler is emitting signals that interfere with radio and satellite communications.¹ Capt Smith turns on his cell phone, which is normally unauthorized. He receives a text message.

*"American soldiers, leave now. Or they'll find your bodies when the tide falls."*²

His non-commissioned officers received the same message.³ They hear the rumble of military aircraft overhead. Marines outside observe its wings are dirty.⁴ Capt Smith alone receives the next message.

*"Any American military action will violate international law.⁵ State will issue arrest warrants for war crimes."*⁶

His executive officer asks, "Sir, what do we do?"

In Capt Smith's mind flashes standing rules of engagement, unit protection, high-risk escalation, and accidentally starting World War III.⁷

Introduction

The Marine Corps' eighth leadership principle is to "make sound and timely decisions."⁸ When commanders act rashly, legitimacy is lost. When commanders hesitate, Marines get hurt. Since either type of blunder compromises the mission, Marine leaders must balance judgment with decisiveness.⁹ For EAB leaders, these decisions will

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occur in an increasingly complex battlespace. They deserve training and tools to enable their success. The Marine Corps currently lacks doctrine regarding critical authorities delegation for littoral forces conducting expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO).¹⁰ There are three problems with the Marine Corps' current authorities structure.¹¹ First, authorities are complex legal frameworks that often anticipate traditional—rather than irregular or gray-zone—military actions. Second, current delegation processes are resource-intensive and lack the flexibility to support EABO. Third, decision makers receive inadequate authorities training. Marine Corps leadership can solve these problems by developing a methodology for higher headquarters (HHQ) to grant springing authority to employ capabilities during EABO, and better training junior leaders on these important tactical considerations. To ensure mission accomplishment for isolated EABs, the Marine Corps should develop a system that forecasts gray-zone scenarios and delegates pre-approved, conditions-based authorities to small-unit leaders capable of acting autonomously.

Problems with the Current Approach to Authorities

The first problem is that the Marine Corps' current authorities framework is complex and anticipates only traditional military actions. Authority is simply

"the power to perform some act," but *military authorities* are the product of a complicated bureaucratic process integrating law, policy, and military doctrine.¹² Authorities become complex because they are mission- and circumstance-dependent. Our authorities construct is historically grounded in conflicts with adversaries who used physical violence. America's binary "peace-or-war" outlook differs from China's "unrestricted warfare" and Russia's "permanent struggle [in] blurred area."¹³ Although Marine Corps doctrine increasingly emphasizes military action across the spectrum of conflict, we have not adopted an adequately enemy-centric perspective on authorities.¹⁴ Relying on "reactive authorities development" risks authorities lagging behind operations, thereby jeopardizing both mission and forces.¹⁵ America's adversaries, including China and Russia, engage in a variety of gray-zone activities that include harassing and legally ambiguous actions designed to avoid triggering an armed response (like those in the vignette above).¹⁶ Lawfare, or the use of laws to achieve outcomes that traditionally required military action, is an effective tactic enshrined in both Russian and Chinese doctrine for use before and during armed conflict.¹⁷ "Battlefield lawfare" includes enemy tactics that exploit known loopholes or ambiguity in friendly rules of engagement (ROE) to gain tactical advantage, like degrading friendly decision-making speed.¹⁸ Distinction and deniability issues delay positive identification, induce hesitancy, and risk accidents and escalation.¹⁹ For example, Russia utilized "patriotic citizen hackers" against Georgia and "little green men" in Ukraine.²⁰ China has streamlined its maritime authorities and used composited military, civilian, and commercial enti-

ties during gray-zone activities in the South China Sea, where civilian ships conducted military reconnaissance and disrupted U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs).²¹ When our *Tri-Service Strategy* condemned China's malign use of military, paramilitary, and proxy actors to obscure their aggressive gray-zone behaviors, Chinese strategists studied our criticism (as they study our other work).²² Despite publishing a reaction acknowledging the risk of low-level maritime conflict causing escalation, their malign behavior continues nonetheless.²³ The problem of complex, traditionally-focused authorities harms operational effectiveness by retarding decision making, inducing hesitancy to employ authorized capabilities, and incentivizing enemy use of lawfare to gain tempo and out-cycle us.²⁴

The second problem is that the Marine Corps' current authorities delegation framework is time-intensive and communication-reliant. Our authorities delegation process came of age following the Unified Command Plan publication in 1946, Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, and the Joint Chiefs' Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) promulgation in 1995.²⁵ Since then, America enjoyed overwhelming military superiority against its adversaries in terms of intelligence, communication, and fires. This dominance allowed for the growth of bureaucratic bloat (and sluggish authorities delegation processes) without catastrophically impacting American operational success. Intelligence dominance allowed us to maximize battlespace awareness and minimize collateral damage—two interests that may be less practicable with the large-scale combat operations possible during EABO. Communication dominance allowed Americans to reach back for advice and authorities delegation as needed. However, EABO necessitates signals management and forecasts comm-degradation or comm-denial in a high-end fight.²⁶ Fires dominance allowed Americans to withhold sophisticated capabilities (anti-air, anti-ship, etc.) at higher levels because those effects were likely unneeded against counterinsurgency (COIN) enemies lacking near-peer as-

sets.²⁷ While COIN involves sustained combat operations of low to moderate intensity, EABO will occur across the competition continuum—which significantly increases the risk of unforeseen contingencies.²⁸ Planners must account for rapidly evolving tactical situations since EABO occurs during non-combat periods that could quickly escalate into high-intensity conflict with minimal forewarning or opportunity for coordination.²⁹ The problem of time-intensive and communication-reliant authorities causes several harms including micromanagement, lengthy staffing for requests and approvals, reliance on reach-back support and staff judge advocate advice, decreased operational tempo, and lack of preparedness in comm-degraded environments.

The third problem is a lack of training regarding authorities delegation at lower levels. The Geneva Convention requires that State parties “respect and ensure respect” for the conventions while also disseminating, training, and educating both their military and civilian populations.³⁰ Individual Marines should receive “instruction commensurate with their duties and responsibilities.”³¹ Expeditionary advanced base operations require this concept to be extended to lower-level leaders including captains, lieutenants, and enlisted decision makers. To the extent there is training on authorities delegation and decision making within war games or exercises, it typically occurs at the division level or higher, whereas EABO will necessitate developing those skills at the company level (or lower). Currently, Marines' pre-deployment law of armed conflict (LOAC) training consists of an SROE brief. Merely receiving ROE briefs does not adequately inform potential decision-makers about theatre-specific authorities or their delegation processes. The problem of inadequate training causes several harms including the risk of accidental escalation (too much action) on one hand and delegitimizing American deterrence strategies (too little action) on the other.

Solutions

In response to the problem of complex traditional authorities, the Marine

Corps should adopt a proactive mindset to forecast gray-zone authorities issues.³² This approach aligns with Gen Berger's emphasis on “mental and institutional flexibility” while developing capabilities responsive to future challenges.³³ Joint doctrine instructs the commander's staff to understand authorities, assess their operational impacts, and “seek additional authorities critical to mission success.”³⁴ Such additional authorities should anticipate Chinese gray-zone tactics like ongoing civil-military compositing and outfitting fishing fleets with commercial sensors.³⁵ Planners should create internal ROE Working Groups and external authorities communities of interest to identify the adversary's current and future irregular tactics.³⁶ Lawyers and intelligence officers can collaborate on streamlining identification timelines to extend commanders' decision space.³⁷ Finally, EABO can provide *credible deterrence* by understanding enemy perspectives and ensuring America signals its willingness and preparedness to react promptly to irregular activities.³⁸ As a threshold matter, the Marine Corps must also define a command and control (C2) structure that best optimizes EAB contributions and integrates EABs into the naval architecture of the composite warfare construct.³⁹ To mitigate the harms of complex traditional authorities, the Marine Corps should proactively forecast gray-zone authorities issues within the finalized C2 structure.

In response to time-consuming and communication-reliant delegation procedures, the Marine Corps can enable mission accomplishment for isolated EABs by anticipating comm-degradation and developing systems to delegate pre-approved, conditions-based authorities to small-unit leaders capable of acting autonomously. In an era of great-power competition against adversaries with near-peer capabilities, Americans must “train to operate in a low-bandwidth communications environment.”⁴⁰ If an environment moves from comm-degradation to comm-denial, these conditions-based authorities can spring into effect upon the unit's isolation. Pre-approved au-

thorities increase EABs' autonomy and resiliency. Such "springing authorities" are common legal frameworks in other operational fields, for example, naval warfare, which relies on pre-planned responses developed in anticipation of potential friction points.⁴¹ By anticipating branches and sequels, proactive ROE development supports plans, mitigates vulnerabilities, and streamlines decision making.⁴² Staffs should "proactively generate appropriate and robust supplemental ROE" to maximize operational effectiveness and allow time for training subordinates on ROE expansions.⁴³ The proposed model requires commanders to balance risk in delegation decisions and consider factors like sustained loss of communications, indications or warnings of adversary action, and potential effects on civilian populations. The problem of complex traditional authorities can be mitigated if the Marine Corps creates springing authorities delegable to capable subordinate leaders based on anticipated risk.

In response to the problem of untrained decision makers, the Marine Corps should set EAB leaders up for success by maximizing cross-training and qualification related to authorities delegation. The model proposed would require the Marine Corps to screen and select EAB leaders for maturity and initiative, subject them to realistic training with an emphasis on civilian interaction, and provide them with tools/references to aid them in the field.⁴⁴ These subordinate leaders can then work collaboratively with HHQ to proactively develop or request authorities that are pre-approved for use when certain circumstances arise. Unless otherwise constrained, Title 10 grants commanders broad discretion to delegate authority subject to the conditions/limitations they see fit.⁴⁵ Senior and junior leaders can build competencies by leveraging existing tools to get realistic sets and reps of authorities-related decision making. Marines need practice reconciling authorities (stating what *can* be done), with the commander's intent (guiding what *should* be done).⁴⁶ The Marines' hallmark training philosophy is *crawl, walk, run*. Developing legal training

programs to allow company and platoon commanders to crawl and walk is the only way to ensure they run in the dynamic EABO setting. Potential training tools can include authorities matrices, tactical decision games, decision-forcing cases, historical and vignette-based studies, and legal injects in deployment certification exercises.⁴⁷ These activities would support Gen Berger's "training modernization" initiative in *Training and Education 2030*.⁴⁸ The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab can field test these injects in controlled war games.

Counterarguments

There are three significant counterarguments to updating the Marine Corps' authorities delegation scheme for EABO. First, leaders may argue that small units lack sufficiently trained or experienced leaders to entrust with broad authority. Company-grade leaders are admittedly in the early stages of professional development, while senior officers have more tenure, command, and PME experience—along with dedicated staff to assist with complex functions. While small-unit leadership may lack the capacity of HHQ, this deficiency can be offset by the conditions imposed on delegated authority as well as comprehensive training, supporting enablers, and preemptive HHQ planning.

Second, some may argue that lower authorities delegation will hinder coordination, synchronization, and unity of effort. However, such divergence is not necessarily detrimental. Based on their mission and operating environment, individual EABs will likely need different authorities anyway. Rules of engagement function like tactical control measures, fire support coordination measures, and engagement criteria by regulating the time, place, and amount of violence employed to achieve the commander's end-state. A uniform understanding of authorities vertically and horizontally enables operations within the commander's guidance and decreases the chance of conflicting actions at different echelons.⁴⁹ Unconditional delegation of all authority would lead to widely divergent outcomes. However,

similar divergence may ensue if multiple EABs become isolated without springing authorities. By crafting authorities delegation to be conditioned on such scenarios, commanders retain a greater degree of C2 than they would otherwise. The commander's authority is preserved through the conditions placed on authority delegation and exercise. When HHQ can no longer communicate with EABs, this methodology allows commanders to continue acting to preempt enemy action—the authority equivalent of *go/no-go* criteria or supplemental/alternate engagement areas.

Third, some may argue that delegation below a certain level incurs an unacceptable risk of escalation. Gray-zone tactics are designed to exploit friction in decision making and can lead to unintended consequences. However, delegating conditions-based authorities does not expand the risk of escalation beyond the risk that already exists under the current self-defense ROE. Applying conditions may actually *deter* the overeager application of force in response to hostile intent, which could prevent a major conflict by accident. The DOD could further consider declassifying (or confirming the existence of) certain conditional ROE to deter enemy efforts to antagonize friendly forces. Well-planned conditions and communication can offset risk. While these three counterarguments highlight useful considerations, each can be mitigated.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Marine Corps must act early and deliberately to minimize legal friction by anticipating and requesting mission-essential authorities while planning dispersed operations.⁵⁰ Three problems currently complicate this endeavor: complex traditional authorities, resource-intensive delegation, and untrained subordinate decision makers. These problems developed during an era of American intelligence, communication, and fires dominance against actively violent enemies. Expeditionary advanced base operations involve a different mission set, environment, and enemy—and require a different authorities structure. Per our

Service's fundamental leadership principles, EAB leaders will be expected to "make sound and timely decisions."⁵¹ The Marine Corps, its operational planners, and staff judge advocates must empower EAB leaders through exposure and training to prepare them for tactical contingencies and enable their battlefield success.

Notes

1. James Kraska and Michael Monti, "The Law of Naval Warfare and China's Maritime Militia," *International Law Studies* 91 (2015). (Citing examples of hostile nations including Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China using ambiguously marked shipping vessels for intelligence collection). See also, Shuxian Luo and Jonathan G. Panter, "China's Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders," *Military Review, Special Edition: China Reader* 10, No. 1 (2021). (Noting "some fishermen have collaborated with the CCG and/or the PLA in gray-zone operations, indicating that the maritime militia does exploit the plausible deniability afforded by their dual identity as military personnel and civilian mariners," although cautioning readers against the unrealistic assumption that all maritime militia are systemically collaborating with PLAN and CCG for deception missions.)

2. Raphael Satter and Dmytro Vlasov, "Ukraine Soldiers Bombarded by 'Pinpoint Propaganda' Texts," *Associated Press News Online*, May 11, 2017.

3. Ibid. (Describing Russian use of cyber capabilities to target Ukrainian soldiers' cell phones in 2014.)

4. Christopher Woody, "Here Comes This Russian Hot Dog: The Story Behind a Navy Warship's Dangerous Encounter with Russian Fighter Jets," *Business Insider*, October 7, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/story-of-navy-donald-cook-unsafe-incident-with-russian-fighters-2019-10?op=1>. ("Wings dirty" means that an aircraft is flying with ordnance, which is a fact that impacts the commander's assessment of hostile intent for defensive engagement and other ROE considerations.)

5. Orde F. Kittrie, *Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016). (Noting PLA's cyber prowess and suggesting PLA may attempt to contact individual U.S. or allied commanders online and "seek to dissuade them from engaging in some or all military activities by asserting [they] would violate international law.")

6. Ibid. (Citing the possibility that China or third-party nation proxies could harass and create friction by issuing arrest warrants for U.S. and partner military and political leaders.)

7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *CJCS Instruction 3121.01B: Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. Forces* (Washington, DC: 2005), classified SECRET. Note: This document is routinely cited in open-source publications. The contents themselves are not disclosed, but the name and existence of the document are cited. See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Army and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C: The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare* (Washington, DC: 2019); and The Army Judge Advocate General's School (TJAGLCS), *Operational Law Handbook* (Washington, DC: 2020).

8. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCWP 6-10: Leading Marines*, (Washington, DC: 2019).

9. Ibid. (Discussing the leadership traits of judgment and decisiveness.)

10. See Headquarters Marine Corps, *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*, (Washington, DC: 2021). (Acknowledging current gaps in authorities for capabilities new to littoral forces and directing planners to robustly assess and experiment to support doctrine development.)

11. Note to readers: The actual documents containing military authorities are generally classified. As such, this essay draws upon unclassified doctrine, historical examples, and recent open-source material.

12. Deployable Training Division, J7, U.S. Joint Staff, *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Authorities*, 2nd ed. (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff, 2016).

13. *Lawfare*; and Oscar Jonsson, *The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019). (As of the book's publication in 2019, Jonsson explains Russia developed an "insatiable insecurity" from perceiving Russo-American relations as perpetually existing in an area "between war and peace.")

14. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-4: Competing*, (Washington, DC: 2020).

15. *Insights Paper: Authorities*.

16. Secretary of the Navy, *Tri-Service Strategy. Advantage at Sea: Prevailing With Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, (December 2020).

(Noting U.S. maritime strategy "focuses on China and Russia, the two most significant threats to this ear of global peace and prosperity.")

17. *The Russian Understanding of War*, (Russian leaders have a broadened understanding of war that recognizes they can achieve military outcomes through nonmilitary—non-physically violent—means). See also, *Lawfare*. (Identifying China's long history with lawfare; noting that nearly three decades ago, the Chinese President told international law experts "We must be adept at using international law as a weapon.")

18. Ibid.

19. James M. Landreth, "The Strategic Significance of the Chinese Fishing Fleet," *Military Review, Special Edition: China Reader* 101, No. 3 (2021). (Noting the "toxic mix" of qualities that make the maritime militia deniable—civilian crews and dual-use technology—also render them more susceptible to accidents and escalation.)

20. David Kilcullen, *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). (Utilizing the term "liminal warfare" rather than "gray zone," Kilcullen describes the Russian technique of using civilian hackers as "liminal actors" to impede an adversary's ability to react, respond, and communicate—thereby "creating time and space for them to shape the international narrative in the early days of conflict.")

21. Shinji Yamaguchi, "China's Air and Maritime ISR in Coastal Defense and Near Seas Operations," in *The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context*, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2021). (Explaining China made the CCG part of the People's Armed Police, which was then placed under the direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC), whereas the coast guard's previous dual-command system placed it under management of both the State Oceanic Administration/SOA and CMC); "China's Maritime ISR." (Discussing the increasing integration of China's People's Liberation Army [PLA], People's Liberation Navy [PLAN], China Coast Guard [CCG], maritime law enforcement agencies, and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia [PLAMM]. This also refers to the Chinese government ordering the Sansha Maritime Militia and Tanmen Township Maritime Militia to conduct military sensing missions during 2013–2014. Finally, this describes PLAMM use of phalanx formations to disrupt the American FONOPs.); and "The Strategic Significance of the Chinese Fishing Fleet."

22. *Tri-Service Strategy*; Shi Xiaojin & Lui Xiaobo, “The Prelude to All-Encompassing Maritime Competition Between China and the U.S. is about to Bring—An Appraisal of America’s Newest Maritime Strategy,” *Website of the National Institute for South China Sea*, December 29, 2020, http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/506.html. Translated by China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, February 19, 2021, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20488810/cmsi-translation_tri-service-strategy_17-feb-2021.pdf and posted by Sam Legrone, USNI, <https://news.usni.org/2021/02/19/chinese-assessment-of-new-u-s-naval-strategy>; and David Ochmanek et al., *U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning*, Research Report no. 1782 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017).

23. *Appraisal of America’s Maritime Strategy*. (The Chinese strategists recommended China “strive to control potential maritime conflicts with the U.S.” by “maintain[ing] smooth operation of strategic communications channels and crisis control mechanisms, in order to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations giv[ing] rise to conflict or an inadvertent armed clash.” They also noted highlighted that the U.S. “directly regards China as an opponent” and admits it is “losing its advantage at sea.”)

24. See, e.g. *Lawfare*; Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 2018); and Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 6, Command and Control*, (Washington, DC: 2018).

25. *Outline Command Plans of 1946*, approved by Pres. Harry Truman (14 December 1946); see also Cole et al., Joint History Office, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The History of the Unified Command Plan: 1946–1993* (Washington, DC: 1995); U.S. Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 99th Congress (1985–1986), Public Law No. 99-422 (October 1, 1986); and *CJCS 3121.01B SROE/SRUF*, classified SECRET.

26. *Tentative Manual for EABO*. (Acknowledging that widely dispersed littoral force will be vulnerable to enemy SIGINT/EW efforts and will likely operate in a comms-degraded environment, which makes regular direction and guidance from HHQ unlikely.)

27. The LOAC principle of proportionality also discouraged use of these extremely damaging capabilities against, for example, one terrorist driving a pick-up truck.

28. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19*, (Washington,

DC: 2019); and *Tentative Manual for EABO*. (Noting the increased risk of both “the potential for and scope of unforeseen contingencies.”)

29. Ibid. (Imploring EABO planners to “account for the need to anticipate and react to rapidly evolving tactical situations.”)

30. Common Article I, *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field*, 6 United States Treaty 3114 (August 12, 1949).

31. *Commander’s Handbook on Law*.

32. Gary Corn, “Authorities and Legal Considerations for US Cyber and Information Operations in a Contested Environment,” *Modern War Institute Online*, March 29, 2023, <https://mwi.usma.edu/authorities-and-legal-considerations-for-us-cyber-and-information-operations-in-a-contested-environment/> (explaining leaders working on authorities and delegation must approach gray-zone tactics with a different paradigm than traditional kinetic strikes).

33. David H. Berger, “Preparing for the Future: Marine Corps Support to Join Operations in Contested Littorals,” *Military Review*, April 2021, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2021/Berger-1.pdf>. (Stressing the importance of “anticipating the challenge of tomorrow’s environment and investing in new capabilities” needed for the future.)

34. *Insights Paper: Authorities*.

35. “China’s Maritime ISR.” (Which would allow these commercial fishing boats to scan over 1.2 million nautical miles per day—making them a “ready and distributed platform for signals, acoustic, and imagery collection” that could occur “without them losing any UNCLOS protections for fishing vessels.”)

36. *Insights Paper: Authorities*. (Suggesting ROE Working Groups, which should include at minimum the operations officer, judge advocate, intelligence officer, fires officer, and information operations planner, with the Communities of Interest can include DOD, agencies, and foreign partners.)

37. “China’s Maritime ISR.”

38. *Tentative Manual for EABO*. (Noting EABO capabilities support diplomacy by providing “credible deterrence options that enable discussions and negotiations.”) See also *Russian Understanding of War*. (Arguing that understanding the perspective of Russian leadership is critical to developing a deterrent strategy.)

39. Marc Riccio and William Grimball, “Command and Control Considerations for EABO: Marine Corps Integration into the Fleet via the Composite Warfare Commander Concept,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 104, No. 4 (2020); see also Nick Oltman, “EABO Needs a New Naval Command and Control Structure,” *Proceedings* 145, No 5 (2019).

40. David Ochmanek et al., *U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning*, Research Report no. 1782 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017). (Explaining American forces require operational doctrine and procedures to enable military effectiveness despite badly degraded C4ISR capabilities.)

41. U.S. Department of Navy, *Naval Warfare Publication 3-56: Composite Warfare Structure* (Washington, DC: 2010). (Suggesting leaders can create a package of pre-planned responses that can be rapidly executed upon conditions met.)

42. *Insights Paper: Authorities*.

43. Ibid.

44. See, e.g. THULS Manual bridging the gap between the combat-centric *THULS Manual* and senior leader focused publications like the *USMC Fiscal Guidebook for Commanders* (ideally the tools proposed for EABO leaders would bridge the gap between the combat-centric *THULS Manual* and senior-focused *Fiscal Guidebook*).

45. See generally, U.S. Code, Title 10 (2016).

46. *Insights Paper: Authorities*.

47. Ibid. (Highlighting the utility of quickly digestible authorities matrices.)

48. *Training and Education 2030*. (Emphasizing the need for “training conditions [to] replicate current and future operating environments.”)

49. *Insights Paper: Authorities*.

50. Ibid.

51. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCWP 6-10, Leading Marines*, (Washington, DC: 2019).

