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**THE COMPLETE BOLIVIAN DIARIES OF CHE GUEVARA AND OTHER CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.** Edited by Daniel James. (Stein and Day, New York, 1968, \$6.95—\$2.95 in paperback.)

**"CHE GUEVARA ON REVOLUTION.** Edited by Jay Mallin. (University of Miami Press, Coral Gables, 1969, \$7.95.)

Reviewed by Col T. I. Dickson, Jr.

These two books are about the same man and, to a large degree, they are about the same thing, the making of revolution. They are, nonetheless, very different.

The Bolivian diary of Ernesto "Che" Guevara was first published in the July 27, 1968, edition of *Ramparts* magazine. That edition lacked some entries where pages had been omitted from the photo copy of the original diary that had been given to the Bolivian Minister of Government, who made it available to the Cuban government. But Mr. James has done much more than fill in the missing entries. He also provided a long explanatory introduction, a chronology of the Castro-supported, Guevara-led insurgency in Bolivia, the diaries of three of Guevara's Cuban associates in the venture, and identifying listings of the guerrillas and certain other persons mentioned in the diaries.

The introduction, occasional footnotes and other material provided to explain obscure references in the diary texts are especially helpful to the reader because, without a detailed prior knowledge of Bolivia and the circumstances surrounding the development of the insurgency, much in the diaries is not clear. Mr. James analyzes the causes of failure of the Bolivian insurgency in a fashion that stands in stark contrast to Fidel Castro's introduction to the *Ramparts* edition, which passes the failure off on fate and the narrow chauvinistic outlook of the Moscow wing of the Bolivian Communist Party.

Jay Mallin, who contributed an article on Guevara's Bolivian campaign to the July 1968 *GAZETTE*, has brought together a collection of writings by or about Guevara that deal with Guevara's concept of revolution. The outlook illustrated here is conceptually much broader than the day-to-day chronology and attention to detail of Guevara's diary. These documents reflect more Guevara's strategy of revolution than his tactics of guerrilla warfare.

Mr. Mallin's collection includes well-known works by Guevara such as "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method" and the article published by the executive secretariate of the Tricontinental Conference (Executive Secretariate of the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America located in Havana) in which Guevara sets forth his strategy for destroying Yankee imperialism by creating several Vietnams. New material in the book is an account by Ciro Bustos, an Argentine happenstance associate of Guevara, of his brief connection with the Bolivian campaign. This account supplements material available elsewhere on certain aspects of the guerilla campaign and the rationale behind it.

Guevara's formal writing tends to be circumlocutory, as the Latin style often is; his diary, written as notes to himself, is cryptic and allusive. To the reader who may not want to wade through two large doses of Guevara, this reviewer offers the following suggestions. If you are primarily interested in the story of the organization and conduct of a guerilla campaign as seen from the inside—its logistics, its tactics, its hardships—read the diaries collected by Mr. James. If you are primarily interested in the theory of insurgency as an arm of revolution, read Mr. Mallin's collection of documents.

**THE FAST CARRIERS: The Forging of an Air Navy.** By Clark G. Reynolds. (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1968, pp. 498, \$12.50.)

Reviewed by LtCol Paul R. Hines

The traditional Navy conservatism which shies away from frank and critical historical research into the activities of the "silent service" has as one of its products "military pop literature. . . propounding a message no deeper than, 'Look, mom, I'm flying.'"

So claims naval historian Reynolds in his preface to *The Fast Carriers*. And the author does more than merely recognize this conservatism in his preface. As the focus of the wings-versus-gun club conflict which accompanied the Navy's transition from battleship to aircraft carrier, it figures prominently in Reynolds' account of the fast carrier concept from shortly after the Wright brothers to the Vietnam War.

In fact, Reynolds deals with the aviation-battlewagon feud in such detail

that the reader wonders, along about the middle of the book, how the admirals found time to fight the Japanese when they were so hotly engaged in their own fraternal fracas.

The fast carrier task force came into full flower during World War II, so Reynolds' work deals primarily with the 1941-45 era, between an opening chapter on pre-Pearl Harbor steps toward the development and use of fast carriers, and a closing chapter on the post-World War II period.

Tactics and the hardware of carrier warfare—planes, ships and weapons—take subsidiary roles to personalities in Reynolds' book. And, since strong personalities usually make good reading, particularly when they are engaged in making war, *The Fast Carriers* is good reading. Reynolds obviously has done his homework, and he calls the shots as he sees them—always highly desirable traits in any historian.

Although Reynolds' scholarship is impressive, one can sometimes have too much of a good thing. There are times when his reporting of command changes and staff reassignments, because of their very thoroughness, leave the reader bogged down in a confusing game of "who's on first?" But over-all, this is a thorough, well-done study of the evolution of the fast carrier task force. It may be of only passing interest to Marine infantrymen and artillerymen, but to the naval history buff, particularly those interested in the roots of the modern Navy, it is priority reading.

This is Reynolds' second venture into historical accounts dealing with carrier operations. He collaborated with Admiral J. J. "Jocko" Clark, one of the *dramatis personae* of *The Fast Carriers*, in writing Clark's World War II story, *Carrier Admiral*, which was published in 1967. A former assistant professor of history at the U. S. Naval Academy, Reynolds last fall joined the faculty of the University of Maine.

**MORALE: A Study of Men and Courage.** By Maj John Baynes, Scottish Rifles. (Frederick G. Praeger, New York, pp. 286, \$8.50.)

Reviewed by Maj Henry W. Austin

The author is a professional officer serving with the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), a regiment in the British Army whose World War I experience provides the subject for this book.

Major Baynes' thesis is "to find out why the infantry, which suffered the most as it always must, was able to show courage and determination" in one battle—the Battle of Neuve Chapelle—that would appear to characterize the rest of the infantry battles of World War I.

Combat morale has been dealt with before by historians and professional