

# The Art of Expeditionary Warfare

The British mission to regain the Falklands

by Maj Jeffrey M. Brewer

Britain's execution of Operation CORPORATE to regain the Falkland Islands in the spring and summer of 1982 offers lessons for today's American expeditionary forces. In a dynamic political and strategic setting where government willpower ebbed and flowed even as British forces moved toward the area of operations, civilian and military planners successfully achieved unity of purpose and composited dispersed air, land, and naval components into a capable joint force. Besides political tumult, this joint force overcame extreme distances and challenging climatic conditions at various junctures to successfully breach a crude, yet capable, anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) defensive envelope. Most importantly, despite the inevitable friction opposing execution of a well-conceived plan and the ever-present temptation to go beyond limited objectives, British commanders achieved their objectives without compromising political goals. From beginning to end, Operation CORPORATE was the quintessential example of a country's resort to war being a "continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."<sup>1</sup>

The British government employed its military to regain the Falklands only because diplomacy and other instruments of power had utterly failed to resolve the enduring debate over ownership of the islands. Appreciating the features of this failure is essential in understanding the conflict's larger political and strategic context. History and notions of national prestige, on either side of

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the divide between Britain and Argentina, informed and drove decades of negotiations over the Falklands. Buenos Aires characterized Britain's seizure and retention of the "Malvinas" islands—beginning some 150 years earlier—as entirely illegitimate. These notions were contemplated at a time when Argentina "was weak and still emerging" as a viable nation and now sustained in

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a period of inarguable British imperial decline.<sup>2</sup> Juan Peron, Argentina's nationalist leader who dominated the country's post-World War II political landscape, only intensified his country's approach to contesting Britain's retention of the Falklands. A larger feature of Peron's foreign policy candidly questioned *all* disputed areas in Argentina's "near" abroad.<sup>3</sup> Authors Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins argue that Peron's specter of influence and insistence on Argentinian control of the Malvinas in-

clined Argentina's ruling military *junta* to agitate for and eventually take the islands by force.<sup>4</sup>

Undoubtedly, on the eve of its invasion of the Falklands, the Argentine military had developed pockets of capability, including a coastal and baseline blue water navy as well as—most significantly—an anti-ship strike fighter capability.<sup>5</sup> The Argentine Air Force, or Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA), and the Argentine naval aviation components fielded a combined 44 Mirage 3 and Mirage 5 fighters, 68 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, between 8 and 10 Canberra bombers, 5 Super Etendard naval attack aircraft, and about 60 IA-58 Pucara ground-attack aircraft.<sup>6</sup> Author Earl Tilford later wrote this strike force "was among the finest in Latin America" at the time of the invasion.<sup>7</sup> Couple these significant aviation means—especially the A-4s and Super Etendards—with the AM-39 air-delivered Exocet missiles Argentina had purchased in 1979, and the *junta* could be confident in saturating enemy fleet defenses with fighters and guided-missiles.

Ironically, even as Argentina had risen in perceived prominence as a regional player under Peron, Britain had retreated from its status as a world power following World War II. Britain shifted focus from global projection

to defending Europe as a member of NATO. Most important in the context of the Falklands, the Royal Navy lost the argument over whether to retain carriers and amphibious assault ships. The 1966 Ministry of Defence White Paper asserted large capital ships were no longer needed for world-wide duty but rather only to support “a landing or withdrawal of troops against sophisticated opposition.”<sup>8</sup> By the end of 1981, only two “mini-carriers,” the *Hermes* and the *Invincible*, remained, and their complement of carrier aircraft included nine to twelve vertical or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) Sea Harrier jets.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, in the spring of 1978, the ruling Labor government determined, to not station a permanent force in the South Atlantic because of cost.<sup>10</sup>

In the immediate run up to Argentina’s decision for war, the strategic setting seemed to favor the Argentinians. British military power had declined and the country’s continued divestment of old imperial responsibilities underwrote increasingly deferential Falklands’ policies. These included the so-called “seduction” initiative conceived in 1970.<sup>11</sup> When seduction failed, in June 1980, the ruling Conservative government proposed a policy of “leaseback.” This initiative treated the Falklands in a manner like Hong Kong.<sup>12</sup> Taken together, Britain’s policies and military withdrawal from the South Atlantic implied London was less than resolved to stand by its claims to islands 8,000 miles away. Additionally, Argentina’s rapprochement with the United States in March 1981 suggested to the *junta* that Buenos Aires would become a key partner in the United States-led anti-communist effort in the Americas.<sup>13</sup> Believing Britain would not fight for the Falklands and assuming U.S. neutrality in the event Britain chose war, Argentina seized South Georgia on 19 March and East Falkland Island on 2 April.

The British initially responded on 20 March to the action at South Georgia. The Royal Navy sent “a lightly armed patrol vessel, the HMS *Endurance*” to that island “to remove the Argentinians, whoever they were.”<sup>14</sup> The government reinforced the *Endurance* nine days later by dispatching a



Map 1. The Falklands (Malvinas). (Map courtesy of the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy.)

single submarine to the South Atlantic. The same day, intelligence reports confirmed five Argentine warships and a submarine were headed toward the Falklands.<sup>15</sup> In Margaret Thatcher’s autobiography, she wrote she intended to “show the Argentinians that we meant business” in sending the submarine.<sup>16</sup> However, it is more likely to believe

Britain’s slight response encouraged further aggression. Indeed, Argentina executed Operation AZUL (BLUE) on 2 April and seized the Falklands and its associated island groups. A detachment of Royal Marines in the capital of Port Stanley on East Falkland Island initially resisted before surrendering to a larger Argentine force.

In a speech to the House of Commons on 3 April, Prime Minister Thatcher indicated the British government's objectives in meeting Argentina's aggression were twofold: "see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment."<sup>17</sup> These objectives, of course, were theoretically attainable through diplomatic maneuver and economic coercion, both of which the British attempted in order to compel Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands.<sup>18</sup> However, Prime Minister Thatcher laid the foundation of Operation CORPORATE during the same speech on 3 April, stating,

The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete. HMS *Invincible* will be in the lead and will leave port on Monday [5 April].<sup>19</sup>

Initially, this task force appeared designed to buy the British government time to employ diplomacy and exert calibrated economic pressure. But by the time Prime Minister Thatcher spoke again to the House of Commons on 14 April, the task force—then establishing itself in the South Atlantic—was evidently dual-purposed to back U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's accelerated diplomatic efforts and also provide the military a range of operational options to use if needed.<sup>20</sup> At the helm of this herculean effort presided the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach.

Admiral Leach's task was formidable, especially considering the daunting logistical plan required to coalesce scores of air, naval, and ground assets into a task force—let alone sustain it at sea and then employ that force. He had, initially, to link Britain's two mini-carriers and three submarines with joint British forces exercising off the coast of Gibraltar. As the rendezvous happened, the task force had to incorporate dozens of other destroyers and frigates, amphibious landing ships, and up to 75 auxiliary transports and 21 tankers that had followed after from homeports in the British Isles.<sup>21</sup> Admiral Leach had to synchronize this "lash up" of naval forces with a sizable contingent

of Royal Air Force (RAF) Hercules transports, which were ferrying from Britain supplies meant for various ships in the naval component linking up at Gibraltar.<sup>22</sup> Aboard these vessels and transport aircraft, the Royal Marines' 3 Commando Brigade and two battalions of the Parachute Regiment were to form the nucleus of the task force's ground combat element, while the RAF would deploy elements of seventeen squadrons, inclusive of fighter jets, bombers, helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, and air refueler tankers.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, the task force featured three sections of Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and two squadrons of the Special Air Service (SAS).

Undermining Admiral Leach's effort to build a component force in Britain, Gibraltar, and ultimately Ascension Island in the south-central Atlantic were vacillating government officials in Britain and the United States. At one point

Leach's ability to deliver a force ready to fight by late April is commendable.

The Ministry of Defence planners in London determined early on 7 April a strategy of escalation would best serve stated political ends.<sup>26</sup> In keeping with the Prime Minister's original intent to use the task force to induce a diplomatic solution to the crisis, military strategists devised a succession of limited operations meant to raise the stakes and convince the *junta* to voluntarily withdraw from the Falklands. Escalation began with the assault to recapture South Georgia on 24 April. Seventy-five Royal Marines, SAS, and SBS troops defeated the Argentinian defenders thereon, *with neither side firing a shot*.<sup>27</sup> Two days later, the British government intensified military pressure against Argentina, asserting a 200-mile radius total exclusion zone (TEZ) around the Falklands.<sup>28</sup> All ships and aircraft, both

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in mid-April, Secretary of State Haig made concessions to the Argentinians, who were alleging the United States had shown favoritism to Britain by allowing the task force to use American facilities at Ascension Island in route to the South Atlantic. The Prime Minister reminded the American statesman that the United States *only leased* the facilities from their British allies.<sup>24</sup> Though ultimately less consequential than Secretary Haig's attempt to limit British use of Ascension, the British Cabinet's indecision in late March and early April undoubtedly delayed launch of the task force. Within a single day on 1 April, troops assembling at Portsmouth Naval Base were told on four separate occasions to stand down or otherwise drastically reduce the force deploying to the Falklands.<sup>25</sup> Admiral

military and civilian, within the zone without authorization were liable to be fired upon by British forces. The same day the TEZ went into effect on 30 April, the United States declared its support of the British position and leveled arms and economic sanctions against Argentina.<sup>29</sup>

On 1 May, the task force launched Operation BLACK BUCK ONE, another purposeful attack targeting the Port Stanley and Goose Green airfields.<sup>30</sup> At the time, British decision makers assessed that Argentinian air power must use carrier-based aircraft or aircraft staged in the Falkland Islands in order to attack the British fleet. Planners did not believe the FAA possessed reliable means for aerial refueling, which theoretically meant aircraft based on the Argentinian mainland—some 425 miles



to the west of the Falklands—could not range the British fleet operating in the waters east of the Falklands. Since carrier operations were minimal, only those Argentine aircraft located in the Falklands were believed to be a credible threat. Author Martin Middlebrook argued further that Operation BLACK BUCK ONE and subsequent air raids and naval fires against land targets were designed to “draw the Argentinian aircraft and ships out from the mainland” into open water and the TEZ, where the British navy, and especially its submarines and anti-ship surface munitions, “could defeat the Argentines before the British landing force arrived.”<sup>31</sup>

Planners anticipated the landing force would arrive in mid-May, and the task force intended to neutralize the Exocet threat by the time Royal Marines and soldiers deployed to the South Atlantic.

The British strategy seemed to have worked when, on 1 May, the British submarine *Conqueror* sighted an Argentine naval task group featuring the *General Belgrano* cruiser accompanied by two Exocet destroyers; the task group was located west of the TEZ

and moving generally south, parallel to the Falklands. London authorized the *Conqueror* to torpedo the *General Belgrano* on 2 May as a means to keep the task group from attacking British ships with Exocet missiles. The attack succeeded, sending the cruiser to the bottom and taking nearly 370 Argentine lives with it.<sup>32</sup> Argentine author Ruben Moro in his book, *The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas*, claims, “Only one hour and seven minutes before the sinking of the *Belgrano*,” Argentina was prepared to sign a peace proposal pushed by U.S. Secretary of State Haig and the Peruvian government.<sup>33</sup> In Moro’s account of the aftermath of the attack, “Argentine officialdom was turned upside down. It was not only inexplicable, in light of the scant military threat ... but also senseless.”<sup>34</sup> While calling the decision to sink the *Belgrano* “the most decisive military action of the war” in compelling the Argentine Navy to remain near its coastline from then on, rather than influencing British efforts near the Falklands, Prime Minister Thatcher acknowledged the terrible loss of life caused cracks in the British ranks. The


French, West Germans, and even the Irish thought the attack unwarranted and made their opinion vocal.<sup>35</sup>

Ironically enough, Argentina’s sinking of the HMS *Sheffield* only two days later inevitably brought both sides to a point of clarity. From 5 May until the middle of the month, the belligerents seemed to purposefully de-escalate. The British pushed their fleet further east to avoid air-delivered Exocets and also sent their Sea Harriers to Ascension Island for rest and repair. Argentina confined its navy to coastal waters to avoid the British submarine threat. The relative quiet was punctuated by British reconnaissance missions and special forces raids to destroy Falklands-based enemy aircraft while the task force shaped for the landing force’s arrival.<sup>36</sup> On the diplomatic front, Secretary Haig continued facilitating peace proposals between Britain and Argentina, none of which were accepted. Even as political settlement seemed a ways off, British planners and political leadership were well aware the brutal South Atlantic winter drew nearer by the day. Exasperated, Prime Minister Thatcher and the War Cabinet determined on 18 May to act decisively and land the assault force.<sup>37</sup> If the Falklands were to be “freed from occupation,” it appeared the task force must invade East Falkland and dislodge an estimated 10,000 well-entrenched Argentine defenders, inclusive of their artillery, communications, and radar. The planners of Operation SUTTON had 5,000 troops from 3 Commando (Royal Marines plus two battalions of Parachute Regiment soldiers)<sup>38</sup> for the effort, plus 35 Sea Harriers aboard both the *Hermes* and *Invincible*.<sup>39</sup> Another 3,000 soldiers of 5 Brigade were enroute from Britain, but they would arrive to the South Atlantic no earlier than 24 May.<sup>40</sup> Weighing heavily on planners was the fact that Argentina’s land-based aircraft could easily range anywhere in the Falklands.<sup>41</sup> Reportedly, the Skyhawks and other aircraft of the Argentine Navy and Air Force outnumbered Sea Harriers aboard the mini-carriers by a factor of five to one.<sup>42</sup>

In picking a landing site, planners selected Port San Carlos on the west coast of East Falkland Island because



**The Type 22 Frigate HMS Broadsword alongside HMS Hermes during the Falklands War, 1982.**  
(Royal Navy official photograph.)



Map 2. Troop and ship movements on East Falklands. (Map courtesy of the U.S. Military Academy.)

of the high hills and short-over water distances in vicinity of the seaward approaches to the landing beach; these two topographical realities limited the usefulness of the Exocet missile and blunted Argentina’s acknowledged air superiority.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, and perhaps most important, a landing at San Carlos would be unopposed—the main Argentine defense lay 50 miles to the east at Port Stanley. Originally, 3 Commando units were to move overland from the lodgment toward their first objectives of Goose Green and Darwin. Helicopters would move them the rest of the way toward their intermediate objectives in preparation for the liberation of Port Stanley. However, the Argentinians sunk the auxiliary ship *Atlantic Conveyor* on 25 May, causing 3 Commando to move disembarked the entire way from San Carlos to Port Stanley.<sup>44</sup>

Operation SUTTON succeeded but not without extreme difficulty—even without Argentine ground force opposition. The plan got forces ashore under cover of darkness. The SAS neutralized the tiny Argentine observation post overlooking the landing beach and prevented Argentine forces from moving north from Goose Green toward the landing beach.<sup>45</sup> But the plan said

nothing about *after* the landing. In fact, the Royal Marines and their commander were forbidden to plan for the breakout from the beach lodgment until 5 Brigade’s 3,000 forces arrived days later.<sup>46</sup> Worse, the Royal Navy’s inability to establish even local air superiority in support of the lodgment, as planners

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assumed it would, led to the sinking of the *Atlantic Conveyor*. Nevertheless, 3 Commando broke out of the lodgment on 27 May before 5 Brigade arrived in San Carlos. Moving east along two principle axis, its subordinate units—now distributed—defeated a large, entrenched Argentine force at Goose Green on 29 May and within 2 days secured intermediate objectives located

40 miles east along the approach to Port Stanley.<sup>47</sup> The victory at Goose Green and the epic overland march in lieu of helicopters postured the force for a final attack on Port Stanley. Furthermore, it highlighted the British forces’ ability to endure and outwork the Argentine defenders throughout the ground combat effort on East Falkland.

To set the stage for the assault on Port Stanley scheduled for 11 June, the task force had only to get 5 Brigade from San Carlos to its pre-assault position at the harbor at Bluff Cove, located south of Port Stanley. After the overland march failed, the task force determined to brave weather and Argentine air attack to re-embark their forces and conduct another amphibious landing at Bluff Cove.<sup>48</sup> On the morning of 8 June, as the landing ship *Sir Galahad* sat anchored in Bluff Cove, off-loading soldiers, the Argentines attacked. Fifty-one soldiers were killed and another 46 wounded. The task force replaced the two companies lost in that attack with two companies of Royal Marines and readied for what became the capitulation of Argentine forces in Port Stanley on 14 June. Their systematic takedown of the Argentine defense in depth, west of the capital, convinced the Argentine commander to surrender before most of his forces directly engaged with their British foes.<sup>49</sup>

Over eleven weeks, the task force soundly executed Operation CORPORATE and accomplished the stated political objectives. In doing so, the force overcame the tyranny of distance between home station and the objective area; broke down the Argentines’ formidable A2AD effort after an initial setback; pressed its technological advantages and especially its submarine capability to render Argentine naval aviation a neutralized land-based air force; overcame terrible tactical setbacks at various parts of the campaign; and ultimately compelled a force of nearly 10,000 soldiers and their supporting arms to surrender with relatively minimal loss of life. The conduct of the war minimized any chance for post-war Argentinian irredentism and reminded a watching world that expeditionary operations, if properly comprised of



capable naval forces and professional light infantry, are a viable option in the pursuit of limited political objectives.

#### Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

2. Martin Middlebrook, *Operation Corporate*, (London, UK: Viking-Penguin Books, 1985).

3. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983). Note: Hastings and Jenkins mention places such as Tierra del Fuego and the Antarctic. Other authors mention Chile's Beagle Channel as a source of irritation for Peron and later the junta. See also a Staff, "Peron in 1953 Tried To Buy the Falklands," Reuters, (London, UK: January 1984), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1984>.

4. Ibid.

5. Norman Friedman, "Surface Combatant Lessons," in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

6. Kevin Michael O'Reilly, "Chile and Argentina: Asymmetrical Air Force Modernization and the Building of Confidence," (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1996). Note: In a piece entitled "Air Power Lessons," author Earl Tilford writes the FAA and naval Aviation component could boast (225) combat aircraft in early April 1982. See his article in Chapter 4 of *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*, edited by Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

7. Earl H. Tilford, "Air Power Lessons," in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

8. *Battle for the Falklands*. Note: The passage goes on to say in that event, Britain would certainly operate with its allies.

9. "Surface Combatant Lessons."

10. Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater, and Peter Gillman, *The Falklands War: The Full Story*, (London, UK: Sphere Books Limited, 1982). Note: Rather, the government drew up plans for

a contingency force to respond to any trouble spots, in the South Atlantic or elsewhere.

11. Ibid. Seduction aimed to socialize Falkland residents to the economic benefits of integrating with Argentina's domestic economy. Assuming the effort succeeded in developing the Falklands' major natural resources—oil and fish—British officials believed "seduced" residents would endorse Argentina's assumption of control of the islands ... within only ten years, perhaps.

12. Ibid. Britain would give Argentina "freehold" of the Falklands, who would lease the islands to residents for a prescribed period of time. After thirty or fifty or one hundred years, Argentina would assume full control of the islands. In her autobiography, *The Downing Street Years*, Margaret Thatcher indicated she disliked "Leaseback" but believed it must be explored. She claims further that she proposed another policy—to enlarge the airport at Port Stanley on East Falkland Island and lengthen its runway; she believed these improvements would make possible the Falklands' "rapid reinforcement by air."

13. Ibid.

14. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1993). Note: HMS *Endurance* was the last remaining British vessel in the South Atlantic, left in the wake of decades of naval drawdown.

15. *The Falklands War: The Full Story*.

16. *The Downing Street Years*.

17. Robin Harris, ed., *Margaret Thatcher: The Collected Speeches: Speech in a Debate on the Falkland Islands in the House of Commons*, (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1997).

18. Ibid. See speech delivered on 14 April 1982. Note: In this instance, Thatcher stated the members of the European Economic Community agreed to stop all imports from Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada did likewise.

19. Ibid. See speech delivered on 3 April 1982. Note: Margaret Thatcher indicates she gave Admiral Leach the go ahead to assemble a joint task force late the evening of 31 March.

20. Ibid.

21. John Keegan, *Intelligence in War*, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2002).

22. *The Falklands War: The Full Story*.

23. *Intelligence in War*.

24. *The Downing Street Years*. In Thatcher's book the Prime Minister references members of the opposition party criticizing the use of force formally in mid-to-late April and suggesting Britain accede to United Nations leadership going forward from the recapture of South Georgia on 24 April. The speech, dated 29 April, reiterates at that late juncture, with the force assembled in the South Atlantic, "it would be totally inconsistent to support the dispatch of the task force and yet to oppose its use. What is more, it would be highly dangerous to bluff in that way." Additionally, in regards to Secretary Haig and Ascension, Only Prime Minister Thatcher's last minute remonstrance to Secretary Haig, reminding him that Ascension was part of Britain, persuaded the Secretary to drop the idea of restricting British throughput of men and material.

25. *The Falklands War: The Full Story*.

26. *Operation Corporate*.

27. Ibid. Margaret Thatcher's speech to the House of Commons on 26 April affirmed the South Georgia operation was not a fait accompli but rather a deliberate operation calibrated to escalate the stakes in the eyes of the Argentinians; she stated, "It in no way alters the Government's determination to do everything possible to achieve a negotiated settlement."

28. *The Downing Street Years*.

29. Lawrence S. Germain, "Appendix: A Diary of the Falklands Conflict," in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). Establishment of the TEZ came nearly three weeks after Britain had asserted a Maritime Exclusion Zone, which was similarly 200 miles in radius around the Falklands and affected surface ships and submarines, but not aircraft. Germain has an additional entry on page 148, which asserts after the U.S. informed General Galtieri implementation of the TEZ would begin 30 April, the General called a meeting of the junta to argue for Argentina's acceptance of UN Resolution 502, which demanded Argentina withdrawal from the Falklands. Germain indicates the other two junta members refused to go along with the General.

30. *Operation Corporate*. In another example of the British determining to use measured responses aimed at escalation rather than overwhelming violence, the British War Cabinet determined to use Vulcan bombers to attack Argentine targets in the Falklands, rather than

conducting raids against targets on the Argentinian mainland.

31. *Operation Corporate*. See also Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins' similar argument in their book, *The Battle for the Falklands*.

32. Ibid.

33. Ruben O. Moro, *The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas*, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1989).

34. Ibid.

35. *The Downing Street Years*.

36. Earl H. Tilford, "Air Power Lessons," in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*. Frank Uhlig's, "Amphibious Lessons," in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*. Uhlig provides details of the SAS raid conducted 14-15 May at Pebble Island, located on the north end of West Falkland Island, where the British force destroyed eleven Argentine

aircraft. These aircraft would likely have been used to oppose the later amphibious landing at Port San Carlos on East Falkland Island.

37. *The Downing Street Years*.

38. "Amphibious Lessons."

39. *Battle for the Falklands*.

40. "Amphibious Lessons."

41. *Operation Corporate*.

42. "Amphibious Lessons."

43. *Operation Corporate*. Avoiding the teeth of the Argentine defense further ruled out landing at Port Stanley. Planners also briefly considered an incremental approach, as in a landing on West Falkland, in a bid to slowly escalate and show the Argentinians the British were serious. Prime Minister Thatcher and others in London squashed any notion of further incrementalism.

44. Harry Summers, Jr., "Ground Warfare Lessons," in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States*. Summers notes that the sinking cost the British ten Wessex and four Chinook helicopters.

45. *Operation Corporate*.

46. Ibid.

47. "Ground Warfare Lessons."

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

