



years; 1940 should, if nothing else, have put a stop to that. And the discussion of Germany's preparations for total war seems quaintly irrelevant in view of the evidence turned up by the various Strategic Bombing Surveys after 1945. The last two chapters, which are the only new chapters in the book and deal with WWII and the cold war, are disappointing since Dr. Vagts has unexpectedly shifted his ground and is concerned with a different theme. The traditional militarism of the officers, he admits, did not develop during the war, but was superseded by "civilian militarism"—that is, the tendency of civilian leaders to adopt militaristic values and impose them upon all of society. Nothing in the earlier pages has provided adequate preparation for such an abrupt transition; nothing he has written would suggest that the officers were capable of accepting civilian restraints, and he offers no explanation of why the militarism of the soldiers did not develop as anticipated. His discussion of the militarism of the civilians is sometimes convincing—as, for example, when it deals with Hitler and Mussolini—but is marred by such dubious generalizations as the assertion that it was civilian influence which in all countries made war more total and terrible than the professional officers desired. Moreover, though Dr. Vagts believes that the civilian heads of state in the western powers did a far better job than their Axis counterparts, he tends to petty fault-finding in his account of Roosevelt's and Churchill's war leadership and, at several instances, seems on the verge of denying them

much share in the Allied victory.

The sum total of these criticisms does not mean that *A History of Militarism* is a book which professional officers may ignore as merely another anti-military diatribe. One might wish that Dr. Vagts had chosen to discuss themes other than the excesses of the officers and their allies; if he had not, for example, been so blinded by their faults and had given some attention to the evolution in the twentieth century of a true professionalism in many armies, he might not have been so surprised by the fact that the traditional militarism he feared did not develop after 1939. But even with its many limitations, Dr. Vagts' volume is a valuable storehouse of information on a wide variety of military subjects. It will undoubtedly irritate many officers to have the sins of their profession portrayed so unsympathetically, but it is also valuable for them to be reminded that military men—like any other group of professionals with their own interests to guard and advance—have committed their share of sins of both omission and commission. And modern Americans, who in recent years have shown a lamentable tendency to let foreign policy be dominated by military needs, might also be reminded that there is such a thing as militarism and that, as history has shown, it is dangerous.

Reviewed by Dr. R. D. Challenger

TURNCOATS, TRAITORS AND HEROES

JOHN BAKELESS. 406 pages, Lippincott. \$6.50

Mr. Bakeless is a military man—has been since 1918—and he has the

perceptive eye of a highly skilled observer. He has something else that makes his writing stand out: a vivid style that weaves the personal stories of his characters into an intensely suspenseful and fascinating narrative. The reader is right there—breathing the same air—with the turncoats, traitors and heroes, those men and women who fought that shadowy, silent type of war that forms the background of naval and military history.

At least 85 per cent of the stories are new—have never been told before—and the remaining 15 per cent shed new light on such well-known incidents as the Nathan Hale tragedy and the plan of Sergeant Major John Campe, one of Light Horse Harry Lee's cavalymen, to kidnap the traitor, Benedict Arnold, from under the noses of the British. And the reader lives and breathes right alongside Ann Bates—rated as the best woman secret agent in history—a Tory working for the British, and her opposite number, Lydia

"Don't miss this book—not a dull paragraph."

Darragh, a Quaker housewife who slipped military intelligence to Gen Washington inside the buttons of her young son's coat.

Don't miss this book. It is chock full of lessons for today's intelligence officers—lessons that may be applied right here and now. Fundamentally, espionage methods haven't changed very much since Gen Washington's Director General of hospitals collected highly secret information and fed it to the British in Boston for a price.

Reviewed by E. A. Dieckmann, Sr.

STRATEGY

B. H. LIDDELL HART. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. \$5.95

Written by one of the world's leading military theorists, this book is a valuable asset to any officer's basic professional library. The thought-provoking nature of Capt Liddell Hart's analysis of military history and the soundness of his conclusions are attested by the fact that this is the book's third printing.

The author is probably more familiar to GAZETTE readers through many articles in our publication (See page 14 for his latest).

Liddell Hart has been both damned and praised for his theories

on military history and the art of warfare. In arriving at your own conclusion, consider the following quotes from *Strategy* in the light of our current Marine Corps doctrine. In discussing the German tactics of WWI he comments on the concept of unit separation: "The knowledge brings confirmation of two historical lessons—that a joint is the most sensitive and profitable point of attack, and that a penetration between two forces or units is more dangerous if they are assembled shoulder to shoulder than if they are separated and organically separate."

Again in the Preface he sets forth his views on the use of hydrogen weapons in the struggle against Russia. "The H-bomb is more handicap than help to the policy of containment. . . . for the 'containment' of the menace we now become more dependent on 'conventional weapons.' That conclusion, however, does not mean that we must fall back on conventional methods. It should be an incentive to the development of newer ones."

Certainly Liddell Hart's continual emphasis on "the strategy of the indirect approach" bears thoughtful consideration when faced with the mass tactics of the Chinese in Korea and the vast numerical superiority of our potential enemies.

Reviewed by Col H. D. Pratt

FLATTOP

BARRETT GALLAGHER. 128 pages, illustrated; Doubleday, Garden City. \$5.95


A Foreword by Adm Arleigh Burke, CNO, leads off this interesting pictorial essay on the US Navy's aircraft carriers. Beginning with WWII operations the presentation carries on through to the advent of

An interesting pictorial essay.

the atomic-powered carrier. The author, a professional magazine photographer and writer, served as a naval officer during WWII. This volume reflects his professional ability. With but two exceptions, all photos were made by the author. Consequently the book avoids the sameness of picture books made up from official pictures. The photos are well selected and captioned. These are adequately varied to give a good idea of carrier operations.

Marine Corps Gazette • January 1960

The author's text is supplemented by some thoughtful professional comments by such famous carrier admirals as Brown, Wright, Pirie, and Johnson. Of particular interest to Marine readers will be the comment by Gen Shepherd emphasizing



the importance of carrier operations in the Korean War. This book is not a history in the ordinary sense of the word. Rather it is a review of the developing importance of the aircraft carrier. The use of carriers in extending and lending flexibility to our striking power, as well as in antisubmarine warfare, makes these ships worth some study. Critics of the aircraft carrier would do well to look at this book and to pay particular attention to the remarks by Adm Burke and Gen Shepherd.

Reviewed by LtCol R. H. Rankin

MR. LINCOLN'S GENERAL, U. S. GRANT

EDITED BY ROY MEREDITH. 252 pages. E. P. Dutton and Company, N. Y. \$6.95

THEY WHO FOUGHT HERE

BELL IRVIN WILEY. 273 pages. MacMillan Company, N. Y. \$10.00

Both books are musts for the Civil War student whether a seasoned Senior School graduate, or a beginner in Basic School.

To know the real Grant takes reading his diary: "I never ranked Lee as high as some others of the

army, that is to say, I never had as much anxiety when he was in my front as when Joe Johnston was in front." To know the real Grant—the inside story—read *Mr. Lincoln's General, U. S. Grant*.

In this book we explore the masterful mind and sobering thoughts of a truly great fighting general, one with whom, unfortunately, the word "sober" is seldom associated.

The editor is an authoritative, much-published writer on Lincoln, Brady, and other Civil War personages. Roy Meredith combines excerpts from Grant's *Personal Memoirs* with more than 300 illustrations (many rare and unpublished Bradys) which add body and insight to the mental pictures conjured by Grant's own hand.

A specific purpose of the book is to correct a popular opinion—shared by many, but which Editor Meredith says is unfounded—that Grant was a "drunkard, a butcher and a bungler."

For the Marine, it offers further study of one of history's real masters of "combined warfare," the man who took Forts Henry and Donelson and the City of Vicksburg.

Wiley's book, *They Who Fought Here*, is essentially a portable museum, a summation of highly readable facts and figures on the War Between the States. These are supported by 162 fine, glossy prints which provide outstanding detail, all within the purview of the "four staff sections."

It ranges the "1" and "2" fields far and wide, covering both sides: number of troops, job backgrounds, their reasons for fighting, and how they went about getting in uniform (nearly 120,000 of 150,000 Northerners drafted for service were actually hired substitutes).

A thorough study of the "4" situation unearths information on short rations: "I was usually so hungry I could eat a rider off his horse and snap at the stirrups."

A chapter devoted to the "3" side of the war weaves a spell of tactics and deeds that will hold salty old Marines and neophyte future generals alike.

Summing up: a military library would be incomplete without both these books on its shelves.

Reviewed by Maj W. J. Davis