

Peekaboo with Mars or: How I Learned to Love *Jus ad Vim*

The ethical implications to the changing character of war

by LtCol William R. Soucie

Located beyond the borders of the United States, peer competitors are serving as the primary drivers for a host of defense innovations ranging from technology to operational doctrine. The Department of Defense has shifted its focus from counterterrorism efforts to thwarting the rise of revanchist regimes around the world. This reassessment is nothing new, yet

historically, thinkers failed to precisely define war and treated the moral problems of war as parallel to many peacetime dilemmas This shows an intuitive recognition that, whenever force and coercion are involved, we enter a moral universe where the straightforward moral demands of peacetime can no longer so easily be applied.¹

The foremost national security concerns of the U.S. are categorized as the four plus one: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations. In the sprawling expanse of ocean that is the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. has adopted geographically dispersed, maritime-oriented, and host-nation-integrated methods of addressing several of these threats. These actions may be conducted at a significant distance from possible targets and inside the territorial boundaries of allies and partners. Young women and men in the service of the United States will be asked to make decisions about the taking of human life, increasingly at the push of a button, which will make not only the

>LtCol Soucie is the Commanding Officer, 1/10 Mar, 2d MarDiv.

button pusher, but the innocent civilian population of the area into casualties of retaliation or escalation. What, then, constitutes just action on today's battlefield?

The crux of the change is in the increased autonomy that military professionals will be asked to live and operate in, juxtaposed with the last twenty years of counter-insurgency and set-piece battle before that. If military personnel are bound to act within a framework, then it is crucial to make certain that all members are educated on the worthiness of the framework. The character of warfare is changing, and the U.S. military must address the ethical implications of military operations short of war before blood and treasure are spent on a global scale.

Part 1: Policy Change and Operational Approach Requiring a Shift

U.S. policy directions and guidance, ranging from "rebalance to the Pacific" to the formal 2018 National Security Strategy, have sought to bring the national security structure to the recognition that a great competition for power is upon the country. An overarching theme of this change in approach is that global environments encompass the competing interests of current and emerging great powers,

which has brought American foreign policy and strategic military preparations to a newfound appreciation that the twenty-first century is likely to see converging, trans-regional, compound security dilemmas.² In directing the shift in strategic focus, the current leadership seems to understand that, although "every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions," we can no longer operate in a manner of status quo hegemony.³ Military bureaucracy is historically risk-averse and prone to culturally acceptable low levels of risk tolerance among senior personnel. Given the reluctance to accept risk, any changes to operations will require altering the risk culture and immunizing military personnel, to the greatest extent possible, against fear of the unknown.⁴

From the most senior level of decision making to the most junior personnel, there is little appreciation of the magnitude that these changes will entail across the force. The current shortcomings reside in the U.S.'s strategic culture and therefore permeate the country's understanding or lack of understanding of the competitive space between peace and war.⁵ To overcome these shortcomings, military practitioners must accept that there are few circumstances in an interconnected world in which joint actions do not in some way affect regional or global rivals of the U.S.⁶ It is through the lens of interconnection that we seek here to identify ethical shortcomings, given that little forethought has yet been

applied to this field. This exploration is not new, and it is in keeping with the intellectual tradition of attempting to square the use of force with evolving socially acceptable or moral frameworks—for instance, the work of both Aquinas and Walzer on just war thinking.

An ethical study at the individual level would equip service members in the force with the ability to deter future actions in competition below armed conflict by effectively and ethically responding to current challenges, including through personal study for future application.⁷ As directed by policy, the foil for the use of force below the level of war is now those nations that are characterized as players in the great power competition. It is the actions of these actors below the threshold of open warfare that have driven, directly and indirectly, a shift in the character of war. These regimes have targeted cultural institutions, media organizations, businesses, academia, and policy communities internally in the United States and other countries to achieve their strategic objectives.⁸ These actions support the notion that rising, or some may argue arrived, powers seek to challenge the status quo, and a failure by the U.S. and her allies to reflect on the appropriate framework for responding may lead to a threat that pervades free people's lives in unimaginable ways. If these matters are not studied and reflected on, service members may find themselves ill-equipped to make ethical decisions far afield from a home base or station due to not having the requisite skills.

The need for a change in focus stems from a multitude of approaches by peer competitors. For instance, China's approach to war, which extends well beyond the Western appreciation of armed conflict with some of those holding power in China who "see confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives."⁹ There seems to be extraordinarily little consideration, from the Chinese perspective, of individual well-being or of the ethical dilemmas that the country's conduct short of armed war may have in the long term. The PRC may be assessed as calibrating its coercive activities, across its range of instruments

of authoritative national power, to fall below the threshold that would provoke armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁰ Similar methods and approaches are being adopted and implemented in Russia though perhaps more muscular military and diplomatic approach in central Europe.

At present, some may advance the claim that the U.S. is behind, relative to the societal embrace of cross-domain warfare that peer competitor seem to be mastering. This raises the question whether Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran are deficient across their respective societies in the ethical component of their actions, specifically regarding military force, or whether these are so interwoven that they give their respective regimes an advantage in execution over the U.S., which has spent little time crafting a contemporary response and rests on tired and widely misunderstood frameworks. Despite the apparent proficiency of these nations to embrace a changing approach to war, this work is intended to at least start considering ways to regain a relative advantage rooted in ethical study and practice.

How, then, does the U.S. seek to regain initiative, or at least parity, from a position of relative military and potentially moral advantage, with what it views as potential rivals or its most likely competitors? The challenge is great when "the varieties of skullduggery which make up the repertoire of a totalitarian government are just about as unlimited as human ingenuity itself, and just about as unpleasant."¹¹ Logically, a creative approach is necessary to avoid repeating the same actions or being bound by the same restraints while expecting a different outcome. For instance, the force must recognize that warfare is a segment of a larger spectrum known as the *competition continuum*, and that even when not in war—in the sense of open hostility—it is still in a state of competition that requires conduct conforming to ethical standards.¹² Because engagements can span multiple domains below the level of armed violence, it is important to understand what factors into holding an adversary's command networks at risk while bolstering

partners' cyber defenses, and the second- and third-order effects of actions on the adversary, the individual, and third parties who might suffer without experiencing direct violence.¹³ These scenarios and the judgements required in them can serve as examples for a new application of JWT and renewed, if not revised, ethical education to answer unexamined questions.

In this environment, how does the U.S. move forward? One position holds that by leveraging the latent potential of U.S., allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the first island chain—an "Archipelagic Defense"—and, in so doing, deny Beijing the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.¹⁴

It is this scenario, offered in Foreign Affairs, the result is a vast *ethical dead space* that must be addressed. Ethical dead space may be understood to mean increased geographical and temporal isolation from higher headquarters directing one's actions. It is here that uncertainty can translate into risk if it is not addressed through ethical study and reflection. Failure to do as much could lead to personnel being engaged in a protracted conflict racked by the impacts of unexamined natural human factors. Here we should recognize that philosophical frameworks may offer insights into the human dimension of competition that could serve the entirety of the joint force.¹⁵ Moreover, they are applicable regardless of the particular competitor or geographic area in which one may be operating.

Considering the Competition Continuum

In the past, leaders have treated a professional military education (PME) as the nearly exclusive domain of thought. This is a wonderful starting point, but it is not enough to touch every fiber of the force in the manner required for every member of the armed forces and the nation at large to achieve the necessary ethical positions. Our personnel are more than just weapons to be pointed in various directions, and although shifting the character of war can be a positive

thing, it is not enough to rely on hope to address the associated challenges.

The frame through which the United States engages with the world has changed and now requires a shift if the country wishes to sustain the relative peace and stability of the world. The previous understanding of a world at war or at peace has been circumvented by countries seeking to regain either a modicum or all of the power they perceive themselves as having lost. Arguably one may assert that the “emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington’s ability to provide military support to its allies and partners,” but this statement rings true of virtually any peer or near-peer competitor one may choose to ascribe such criteria to.¹⁶ Seeking “to influence the future, we must consider how we can exploit our competitor’s weaknesses while protecting our own,” regardless of the uncertainty in who that competitor may ultimately prove to be.¹⁷

It may be beneficial to view this through the lens of moral symmetry, or more accurately moral asymmetry. It has been proposed that “moral asymmetry is a ‘fact’ of the contemporary battlefield and is one of the few things that can virtually be taken as a given.”¹⁸ We must, therefore, first seek to understand our weaknesses and then shore them up to the greatest extent possible; the moral and ethical foundations for justifying actions are one such weakness. By thinking through an ethical framework and applying it accordingly, both in the service and individually, the country can fill in its gaps while positioning itself to retain the advantage of the moral high ground.

The world is no longer a simple serial sequence of events but all sorts of things going on at once ... with diffuse, discrete centers of power and influence, no longer a phenomenon in which the calculations and intentions of the protagonists have any value, or in which the desired outcome is clearly defined in terms of competing interests.¹⁹

An approach that applies a complex adaptive system would be the best suited to capture the state of relationships, both friendly and unfriendly, across the planet. How, then, does the Joint Force re-envision the world through a new

lens? One leading effort portrays a projected “security environment forecasting a future in which adversaries will employ stratagems to gain influence and undermine U.S. interests with techniques well short of traditional armed conflict.”²⁰

The familiar and oddly comforting dichotomy of the world either at peace or at war has been displaced by the competition continuum. This depicts the enduring competition around the world as a mixture of cooperation, competition below the level of armed conflict, and outright armed conflict.²¹ There is clear evidence along this spectrum that rivals’ views of the legitimacy of aggression in the forms of cyber operations, election meddling, and disinformation to change the status quo in international relations is increasing.²² This is a new mindset that must be explored and potentially adopted in the U.S., but only after careful ethical consideration to ensure that the ethical high ground is retained. The notion of enduring competition, in contrast to the “at peace or at war” construct, presents a domain in which the struggle for advantage is rife with setbacks and potentials for both success and failure,²³ and where that the potential for actions that capitalize on the threat of violence, or short-duration violent acts, to achieve ends is limited only by creativity.²⁴

Despite the Department of the Navy’s status as the vanguard adopting the competition continuum model, the remainder of the Department of Defense has only belatedly come to appreciate the need to respond more adroitly at levels that fall short of war to multi-functional and multi-dimensional threats.²⁵ Described by many as “the Gray Zone,” this is perhaps best characterized as an “intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.”²⁶ Along this spectrum, competition is continuous among actors and across instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.²⁷ Within the Department of Defense, there is a growing belief that something more than a traditional military response is required to counter

this form of conflict. A more nuanced approach is required to “establish or reestablish a broader framework for conflict short of violent warfare that incorporates a wider range of tools beyond traditional tools.”²⁸

There are historical examples of U.S. personnel being deployed in situations below the violence threshold, after which the circumstances changed, resulting in political groups executing violent acts counter to U.S. interests. Although in some instances the actions took place above the threshold of armed violence, the disciplined response of those on the ground narrowly prevented escalation to conventional war and returned events to below the threshold of violence, as in Beirut, Lebanon, with the U.S. Marines ashore.²⁹ These conceptual changes are being adopted quickly because they are not too far removed from core foundational doctrines. Take, for example, the principle of combined arms operations: “Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation.”³⁰

It follows that military professionals ought to view ethical foundations at the individual level as another weapon to be leveraged, at least in the cognitive domain, to retain an advantage in military operations short of war. If the goal is to use all available resources to the greatest advantage, then why would this exclude an ethical framework for guiding decisions?³¹ It follows that the resource most readily available to any service member will be their ethical framework. However, the desired end may only be realized if actions are considered carefully on an ethical foundation before execution.

Part 2: Just War Thinking as the Foundation

If war is constantly adapting to different contexts, where does that leave our ability to analyze what constitutes a just action on today’s battlefield? No less a figure than Carl Von Clausewitz said of war that “though its nature or, if you prefer, logic, has been consistent since the dawn of time, its character—

or grammar—is always adapting itself to the environment in which it is expressed.”³² The same can be said for justifying the use of violence on one’s foes. The contemporary moral justification for war is found in the tradition of just war thinking. The JWT “represents a cultural consensus on when war is justified and what limits should be observed in fighting justly.”³³

Regarding its application, “more generally, just war theory has tended to focus on conventional forces, such as would be deployed on traditional battlefields by warring nation states. Does conflict really work that way anymore?”³⁴ Political leaders around the world make every effort to subordinate or at least attribute their actions to the principles of JWT. The reason for such broad application by strategic leaders, rightly or wrongly, “may be ... that the concept of war itself is treated as a binary concept by contemporary just war thinkers.”³⁵ All too often, we do a disservice to those required to take action by using terms “including ‘conflict,’ ‘competition,’ ‘violence,’ and even ‘war’ as part of an organic whole,” without following up on when and where a given framework may actually apply.³⁶

Proponents of just war thinking, who define war as the purposeful use of violence to achieve political aims and create ambiguity, do not address the use of force that falls short of war.³⁷ Military forces are “hierarchical and communal in nature, functioning as a team and a group, particularly in combat.”³⁸ Moreover, they require “the ability to see and understand the competitive forces in the environment, understand what tools are available to them, and be able to envision how they can contribute to a campaign of competition.”³⁹ The division at the thresholds of force and overt war requires greater review. In this area, “boundary (or threshold) stretching occurs when an actor uses measures short of war to force movement or change in the nature of a boundary to gain greater regional influence, access, and control.”⁴⁰ To address or at least identify this gap, Michael Walzer “introduced the term *jus ad vim*—the just use of force short of war—in contrast with, or perhaps to

complement the well-established notion of just war, *jus ad bellum*, and its correlative notion, *jus in bello*.”⁴¹

Part 3: The Need for *Jus ad Vim*

There is a gap in the standard dual nature of the argument of war and peace. Reflection leads us to the logical conclusion, “that war is not a binary category, but rather a space along a continuum marked by war and peace at its extremes.”⁴² In distinction to acts of war,

jus ad vim actions present diminished risk to one’s own troops, have a destructive outcome that is more predictable and smaller in scale, severely curtail the risk of civilian casualties, and entail a lower economic and military burden factors make *jus ad vim* actions nominally easier for political leaders to justify compared to conventional warfare, though this does not necessarily mean these actions are morally legitimate or that they do not have potentially nefarious consequences.⁴³

In the context of the new operating environment and guiding thought process, it becomes clear that “vim is not only intellectually plausible but morally necessary.”⁴⁴ Thus, *jus ad vim* actions apply violence and even the potential taking of life with the desire not to cross the threshold to war.

The country asks its young men and women to remain in this precarious position for protracted periods with no clear indication of when they will be required to “click off safe,” or “stand down.” The questions raised by this requirement must not stop with who designs and should integrate strategic approaches in measures short of armed conflict, or for that matter who addresses how the military should organize itself to face these challenges.⁴⁵ There is an ethical component that is either assumed to exist or is altogether ignored in current discourse, and at present the leadership seems comfortable relying on “do or do not” forms of ethical decision that do not seem sufficiently nuanced to account for real-world scenarios short of war. Although JWT principles are still invoked by contemporary scholars and remain of practical use, the increasingly recognized but undefined space between peace and war needs to be

identified and calls for a focused ethical analysis.⁴⁶ It may be appealing to remain wedded to the false choice of the just war dichotomy and cast aside uses of force that can be exploited in borderline ethical cases, doing so sets the conditions for a disconnect between theory and practice that increasingly may lead to abuses.⁴⁷

Although the application of force is not a certainty, “the general task of the military implies the threat of or the actual use of (lethal) force.”⁴⁸ Moreover, “just like in war, ambiguity seems to be everywhere we turn in competition.”⁴⁹ Having highlighted the gap in the standards of just war thinking, namely the lack of clear articulation of the space between war and peace, “the *jus ad vim* project emerged from an international context in which states employ limited force on a more recurrent basis, but arguably lack the moral precision to evaluate such decisions.”⁵⁰

The phrase *jus ad vim* literally means “the just use of force,” and it refers to “a moral framework calibrated to the use of limited force (what others sometimes refer to as force short of war).”⁵¹ This category ranges from freedom of navigation to drone strikes, raids, and even hostage rescues. As states continue to operate on the competition continuum and in the area of uncertainty, it is important to recall that “the fog of war can become so thick at this end of the spectrum that it can be difficult to discern when one is merely participating in acts short of war or when one has found themselves in the midst of an actual war.”⁵²

In place of what was once “easily defined as a zone of combat where lethal force was justified (to be distinguished with a zone of peace, where it is not), the struggle against terrorism has created ‘in-between spaces’ of moral uncertainty where force is used on a consistent and limited scale but war is not declared.”⁵³ Military personnel will have increased opportunities to decide for themselves what is right or wrong on the battlefield in the future. They will have less access to or direction from senior leaders, who have historically retained ethical decision-making authority, or at least the responsibility for it. Despite this, little consideration has been given to the moral or

ethical underpinnings of such actions, particularly among practitioners. To remedy this, “the concept of *vim* serves a useful function by giving a name to the space between war and peace. It can provide a space for evaluating the ethics of activities ranging from sanctions to targeted air strikes to cyber-acts to foreign imposed regime change.”⁵⁴ From our collective experience with counterterrorism, we have demarcated this area: “between peace and the coercive violence of war lies a spectrum of activities, which can be helpfully captured by the category of *vim*.”⁵⁵

The actions taken on behalf of a nation by an individual in service of that nation may still be viewed as the use of coercive force outside of war.⁵⁶ Actions like joint training missions, freedom of navigation operations, and even medical and dental missions are meant to demonstrate a capacity and willingness that other nations do not have. Forward personnel who do the bidding of a nation state as part of a complex adaptive system are still subject to their patrons’ actions. When operating outside the context of military action, a strict, literal adherence to the analytical framework of just war thinking leaves little or no room for the ethical evaluation of uses of force that do not constitute war.⁵⁷

The false war-or-peace dichotomy is no longer sufficient for the reality that U.S. service members exist in. The complex, uncertain, volatile, and ambiguous nature of the *vim* environment offers challenges and opportunities for all current players that are unique to our present lifetimes. Adversaries have eschewed the American way of war, with its iron-clad preparations to support mass personnel mobilizations prior to conflict. U.S. rivals are increasingly seeking to use or create ambiguity to cloak their actions. These actors intentionally obscure their aims until it appears too late for the U.S. to react effectively.⁵⁸ The small amount of literature on this current action-and-reaction cycle has determined that “such conflicts involve some aggression or use of force, but in many ways their defining characteristic is ambiguity—about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have

been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response.”⁵⁹

The shift from viewing peace and war as an exclusive dichotomy implies that we are living in a more or less constant state of tension that erupts into violence and then dips quickly below the threshold again.⁶⁰ Though novel to us, it involves a set of circumstances not vastly different from what generated early JWT scholarship in the Middle Ages. Contemporary competitors often aim to create uncertainty by injecting situational ambiguity so that a rival will hesitate to act, opening the window to attaining their desired ends incrementally.⁶¹

As an imperative, though, if U.S. military practitioners are expected to act consistently with the JWT framework, then all personnel must have explicit training not only in JWT but in the ethical underpinnings of the military’s actions.⁶² Stated plainly, if military personnel are bound to act within a moral framework, then it is crucial to make certain that all members are educated as to why the framework is worthy of their adherence. If not anchored appropriately, this form of engagement is prone to mission-drift that leads to moral injury. Because moral injury often results in suicide and other destructive behaviors, limited wars are unlikely to produce just benefits that outweigh the total cost of participating in them.⁶³

Conclusion

The character of warfare is changing—this much can be agreed upon. At the level of policy, the U.S. has recognized as much and is directing the country to prepare itself for the new form of conflict. The rising powers for which plans must be devised span the globe, and with that there is an appreciation that the traditional American approach to war is likely to be inadequate, as the preponderance of actions will probably take place below the threshold of war but still require violence. To remain agile as a force, the Marine Corps has laid out an approach to warfare along the competition continuum. Specifically, as Marine leaders progress through their careers, they must develop an understanding of concepts that provide the ability to lead organizations like the

Marine Corps through the cycles of innovation that are essential to staying at the forefront of competition. These concepts go beyond just adaptation.

Although it is helpful to understand the context in which we exist, and the familiar tools at our disposal, neither the redirection nor the competition continuum addresses the ethical foundation required to survive, let alone succeed, in such actions. JWT is a good foundation for ethical decisions of the conduct of warfare. However, it is clear that just as there are gray-zone operations that are less than declared warfare, so too are there gray-zone ethical matters that must be addressed. The consequence is that “the use of limited force challenges the simple dichotomy between peace and war as far as the term ‘war’ does not adequately capture the full spectrum of lethal force states use to counter international threats.”⁶⁴

The *jus ad vim* framework has been applied here to determine the ethical rectitude of actions that fall below the register of overt war. We discussed the need to establish an awareness of ethical frameworks to prepare service members to thrive in uncertainty. The use of *vim* is meant to “contribute to the ethical debates about the use of force by asking us to look more closely at the dilemmas of limited force.”⁶⁵ Recognition is increasing of the reality that

participation in our Nation’s competitions starts at recruitment. The quality level of individuals brought into the Service provides the raw material to build a credible force. Attributes like education level, physical fitness, and mental resilience determine how quickly these individuals can be transformed into members of a coherent, capable organization. These attributes also help establish the range of possibilities available to adapt the existing force or innovate to create a new one.⁶⁶

Although this is wonderful, and in most respects true, it is imperative to keep in mind that service members are parts of a greater whole. Beyond the DoD, they are community members and also individuals, and “as humans we all have frailties and failings, but there is a difference between a personal moral failure (which will always happen) and systematic fail-

ures to take ethics seriously as part of the institutional culture and DNA.”⁶⁷

There is much work still to be done on this subject if the requirement for moral rectification following drift or injury is to be made as minimal as possible. There is no panacea, but it is readily understood that “while no moral education or training can possibly prepare students for every eventuality, it can anticipate common issues, categories, and problems that might be encountered and do some preparation along those lines.”⁶⁸ Ideally, these concepts are applicable across the force. We must adopt an explicit approach to ethics that permeates the very fabric of our military institutions and can facilitate thoughtful actions. Doing so will serve only to bolster the personal and professional advantage of each member, their respective services, the nation as a whole, and promote righteous action.

Notes

1. Danielle L. Lupton, Valerie Morkevičius, and Jai Galliot, “The Fog of War: Violence, Coercion, and Jus ad Vim,” in *Force Short of War in Modern Conflict: Jus Ad Vim* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019).

2. Wojciech Labuz, Kari A. Thyne, Joseph E. Long, and Christopher D. Hughes, “Ethics in Special Operations and the Joint Special Operations Forces Senior Enlisted Academy,” *Small Wars Journal*, December 25, 2020, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/2020/12/25/ethics-special-operations-and-joint-special-operations-forces-senior-enlisted-academy>; and I. Wilson III, *Sharpening the Edge of SOF’s Advantage: Towards an Adapted Vision and Plan of Action for JSOU “NEXT”* (white paper, 2020).

3. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War*, vol. 117 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

4. Benjamin Jensen, “Distributed Maritime Operations: Back to the Future?” *War on the Rocks*, April 9, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/distributed-maritime-operations-an-emerging-paradigm>.

5. See David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, “Peacetime Engagement” in Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor, *America’s Armed Forces, A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).

6. Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine Note 1–19, Competition Continuum* (Washington, DC: 2019).

7. Ibid.

8. Mark T. Esper, ed. *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress* (Darby: Diane Publishing, 2020).

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946–47* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990).

12. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1–4, Competing* (Washington, DC: December 2020).

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OF DISTANCE EDUCATION AND TRAINING

BLENDED SEMINAR PROGRAM




FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT:

[HTTPS://WWW.USMCU.EDU/COLLEGES-AND-SCHOOLS/COMMAND-AND-STAFF-COLLEGE/](https://www.usmcu.edu/colleges-and-schools/command-and-staff-college/)

[HTTPS://WWW.USMCU.EDU/EWS/](https://www.usmcu.edu/EWS/)



OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
MILITARY EDUCATION



13. "Distributed Maritime Operations: Back to the Future?"
14. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., "How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense," *Foreign Affairs* 94 (2015).
15. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
16. "How to Deter China."
17. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
18. Shanks-Kaurin, *The Warrior: Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2016).
19. Umberto Eco, "Reflections on War," *La Rivista dei libri* (April 1991), reprinted in *Umberto Eco, Five Moral Pieces*, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1997).
20. Kevin Scott, *Joint Operating Environment 2035* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff/J7, 2016).
21. *Joint Doctrine Note 1-19*.
22. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
23. *Joint Doctrine Note 1-19*.
24. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
25. *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the Evolution of Hybrid Warfare and Key Challenges*, 115th Congress (2017) (statement of Francis G. Hoffman).
26. *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities*, 113th Congress (2015) (Statement by Joseph L. Votel); Philip Kapusta, *Defining Gray Zone Challenges* (white paper, April 2015).
27. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
28. *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the Evolution of Hybrid Warfare and Key Challenges*.
29. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Zachery Tyson Brown, "Unmasking War's Changing Character," *Modern War Institute*, March 12, 2019, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/unmasking-wars-changing-character>.
33. James Turner Johnson, "Just War Tradition and Low-Intensity Conflict," *International Law Studies* 67, No. 1 (1995).
34. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans, and Adam Henschke, *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War; Just War Theory in the 21st Century* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
35. "The Fog of War."
36. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
37. "The Fog of War."
38. Pauline Shanks-Kaurin, *On Obedience: Contrasting Philosophies for the Military, Citizenry, and Community* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2020).
39. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
40. Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan Madden, *Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016).
41. Seumas Miller, "Jus ad vim: The Morality of Military and Police Use of Force in Armed Conflicts Short of War," in *Force Short of War in Modern Conflict: Jus ad vim* (Edinburgh University Press, 2019).
42. "The Fog of War."
43. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, "The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition," *Ethics and International Affairs* 25, No. 3 (2011).
44. "The Fog of War."
45. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); James M. Ludes, *A Consistency of Purpose: Political Warfare and the National Security Strategy of the Eisenhower Administration*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2003. On informational activities to counter Soviet influence efforts, see Herbert Romerstein "The Interagency Active Measures Working Group," in Michael Waller, ed., *Strategic Influence, Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare* (Washington, DC: Institute for World Politics, 2009).
46. "The Fog of War."
47. Ibid.
48. Peer de Vries, "Virtue Ethics in the Military: An Attempt at Completeness," *Journal of Military Ethics* (2020): 172.
49. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
50. "The Fog of War."
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. "The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition."
54. "The Fog of War."
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
59. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Fighting and Winning in the 'Gray Zone,'" *War on the Rocks*, May 19, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone>.
60. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
61. Ibid.
62. *The Warrior*.
63. "The Fog of War."
64. Micah Zenko, *Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World* (Stanford University Press, 2010).
65. "The Fog of War."
66. *MCDP 1-4, Competing*.
67. *The Warrior*.
68. Ibid.

>Author's Note: The contents of this article reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Marine Corps or the Department of the Navy. This work was adapted from a longer form monograph published at the US Naval War College and at the Australian Defence (sic) College's online forum, The Forge. It served as the basis for a presentation at the International Society of Military Sciences held at the Royal Military College of Canada in the fall of 2021. The author retains ownership rights of this work for future endeavors and publication.



Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.