

Diplomatic Spurs

Our Experiences in Santo Domingo (Part II)

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by Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps

POLICIA NACIONAL DOMINICANA

On April 7, 1917, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, now designated as the Policia Nacional Dominicana, was organized. Its strength until October, 1922, when definitely fixed by Executive Order at eighty-eight commissioned officers and twelve hundred enlisted men, had been a variable quantity fluctuating with the amount of national funds appropriated for its establishment and upkeep.

The Guardia or Policia when first organized operated under the Department of Interior and Police, but later was assigned to the Brigade for the purpose of organization, training, and military operations. The Department of Interior and Police only retained a nominal control over certain administrative functions relative to appropriations.

During the time the Policia was maintained as an activity of the Military Government, it was officered almost entirely by Marine officers and non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers and petty officers of the Medical Corps, U. S. Navy. A few of the junior officers and all of the enlisted personnel were Dominicans.

Due to the uncertainty of the duration of the Occupation, the shortage of government funds, and the probable conditions surrounding the withdrawal, the adoption of a well defined, progressive, and permanent program for the organization and training of the Policia was impracticable. Nevertheless, a general scheme for training and organization had for its motive the taking over of the Brigade's duties after the evacuation of Santo Domingo in so far as would be conformable to the Dominican law. Later when the Dominican people signified an intention to accept proposals

for the evacuation, a plan was prepared, approved, and placed in operation. The salient features of this plan were as follows:

(a) The policing of the provinces by the Policia during the year 1923 and the withdrawal of the Brigade to ports of embarkation.

(b) Progressive training of native officers for duties they would fall heir to and for the gradual assumption of responsibility by carefully regulated steps.

(c) The establishment of training centers and the intensive training of native officers and enlisted men so as to attain maximum authorized strength by March 1, 1923.

(d) Prior to the withdrawal of the armed forces, the operation of the Policia under the same distribution that would prevail after the withdrawal.

It was believed, that if the above plan could be carried out in its entirety, some degree of success would be assured to the establishment of a national constabulary force qualified as a relief for the forces of Occupation. This was a paramount military necessity and of prime importance in any policy involving a change of government. A government capable of surviving could not hope to safeguard its integrity without the support of a strong, loyal, and efficient constabulary force.

An adherence to this plan in all items was frustrated shortly after its inception by the installation of the Provisional Government. There was, however, no material interference in the training feature of the plan, which was carried out in the main essentials. Two training centers were established and a course of eight weeks' training was given to the enlisted men, similar in many respects to our recruit training, supplemented

by instruction in constabulary duties. A school for native officers was also instituted, comprehensive in character, entailing a few months' course of instruction.

During the time the Policia fell entirely under the jurisdiction of Military Government, its forces were usually stationed by companies in the provincial capitals less detachments at smaller towns and along the Haitian border. Its principal duties were those of a constabulary force, and as such, it was charged with the suppression of out-lawry and other crimes, apprehension of fugitives from justice, prevention of smuggling, execution of court orders, care and custody of civil prisoners, and the enforcement of the laws in general. It performed splendid service both independently and in cooperation with the Brigade in the suppression of banditry.

Regardless of the fact that the organization and training of the Policia Nacional Dominicana has been confided solely to the Brigade, and accepted without reservation, the Brigade could not assume the responsibility for its military efficiency. Any attainment towards proficiency was dependent upon time, control, and unity of command. Conditions approaching such an ideal situation did not long prevail. The change in the status of the Military Government, together with the contemplated evacuation of the Occupation, placed the Policia in an insecure position, vulnerable to influences that might affect its morale, and ultimately destroy its efficiency and terminate in disorganization.

From observations of the past, the constitution of a native military force must be viewed in the light of an experiment for such a force, organized, trained and controlled, had never existed. There are no precedents upon which to form

a basis for estimating in advance those military assets that might naturally accrue to a force recruited from the native population.

CIVIL PATROLS

The training and employment of civil patrols or guards was not an established practice. As a matter of fact, they were seldom, if rarely resorted to, and then only in cases of emergency. An account of this activity might be dispensed with, yet it may be of conspicuous interest to know, that their organization was frequently advocated by the civil authorities and not infrequently recommended by officers of the Occupation. Moreover, in the few instances where they were employed, when placed under analysis give rise to certain deductions, which constitute a set of rules governing their general use.

As far as can be determined, there was no policy appertaining to the employment of the civil population for purely military reasons. However, some intimation of a radical change in the political situation in Santo Domingo, led the Navy Department in May, 1923, to announce a policy which had for its main object the divorcing of all civil and police functions from the Brigade, and the assumption of these functions by the Policia. This seemed to cover the problem as far as the Brigade was concerned. The terms, "civil guards" and "civil patrols" are used synonymously, although the former was intended to apply to civilian organizations employed defensively in communities where the absence of the military forces or the numerical weakness of the municipal police did not afford adequate police protection against the descent of the bandit groups upon the more populous districts. While never specifically organized for this purpose, they were, however, employed offensively against the bandit groups. Therefore, the term civil patrols would appear to be more appropriate.

The employment of the native population by a force in occupation, as an improvisation, for police or military purposes should ordinarily be condemned and viewed as an undesirable recourse to means that properly belong to other

agencies. Numerous disadvantages inseparable to the formation of civil patrols can only be neutralized by the most inflexible supervision. Where such forces were authorized to operate either independently or in concert with the forces of the Occupation, the Military Government was accountable for their acts, and thereby became the likely recipient of severe censure. Furthermore, with patrols of this sort, there was the

such a policy. Based on this idea, the leadership of a civil organization, possessing military characteristics, might be expected to develop certain political aspects. The command of a large patrol would naturally enhance the prestige of the leader, and in a country where politics play a predominant part in the lives of the people, the supposition was, that the leader would be disposed to use his influence for political aggrandizement.



The Receptoría, San Domingo City, D.R., now remodeled, President's Palace.

grave possibility of encountering the forces of the Occupation or the Policia, who might mistake their identity with disastrous results. Again, any carelessness in the selection of the members composing these patrols was potent with the danger of placing firearms in the hands of irresponsible, inefficient, and undisciplined persons—much to the detriment and chagrin of the Military Government.

Like so many problems affecting the population, the Occupation could not ignore giving some attention to the political side of the military induction of the civil population. Especially did reflection seem imperative in such cases, where the civil authorities or politicians sponsored movements associated with the military affairs of the Republic. If the Military Government desired to adhere to a policy which had for its purpose the divorcement of the civil authorities and politicians from all military connections, then the sanctioning of civil patrols was in direct discord with

One example will serve to illustrate some of the disadvantages outlined above. A Dominican of considerable prominence in the Province of Seibo was authorized to collect about fifty native followers to operate against the bandits. This band was armed, and directed to destroy a certain notorious bandit leader and his followers. Outside of securing information, the band rendered no service whatsoever to the Occupation. On the contrary these irregulars did irreparable damage, and were an actual embarrassment to the Military Government by making hosts of enemies among all classes of Dominicans. Evidently the leader interpreted the authority conferred upon him as carrying with it an unbridled license to commit depredations against the peaceful inhabitants, whose cause he had agreed to support by force of arms. According to reports, the history of the band was one of pillage and lawlessness, which necessitated the immediate disarming and disbandment of the group,

and the placing of the leader under surveillance.

Another example where civil guards were utilized would tend to discredit many of the above objectionable features, and, moreover, offered, in lieu of, certain redeeming virtues. But in this instance, the most rigid control was exercised. The system used was similar in many respects to the method followed in the western part of the United States when outlaws were numerous; namely, the employment of posses of civilians, inhabitants of the country in which the outlaws were operating, and who in a great many cases were impelled to action by some personal grievance against the outlaws. In Santo Domingo these groups consisted of the better known, more courageous and trustworthy citizens, practically all of whom were actuated by a grudge against the bandits. They were organized into small bands of not more than sixteen men. These small groups had the advantage of being highly mobile, easily concealed, and readily controlled. Each member of a group was thoroughly instructed by the armed forces of the Occupation in the use of the rifle and automatic pistol, especially, in firing rapidly and accurately at short ranges. The groups were not permitted to operate until they were competent to handle their firearms with some degree of skill, and with some knowledge of their powers and limitations. To obviate any promiscuous use of these weapons, they were kept locked in gun racks when not absolutely required.

Four groups were originally established at posts where the military forces were stationed. With some assurance of their success, three more groups were organized later. Each group was placed in charge of an officer, who supervised the training and accompanied the group when on patrol. In order not to restrict the initiative of the groups, or to interfere with their freedom of maneuver, this officer allowed the native leader to employ his own methods in the conduct of the patrol, but was, nevertheless, in a position to observe and correct the behavior of the group should the necessity arise.

The character or composition of the groups facilitated the gathering of

information concerning the bandits, their movement, location of camps, and rendezvous. An inhabitant would have little or no hesitancy in giving pertinent information to the native leader of a group, that he would under no circumstances divulge to a member of the Occupation. As already cited the collection of bandit information was a most essential item looking towards the destruction of banditry.

Each patrol's operations were confined to a well defined section of the country with which all the members were thoroughly familiar. Upon the receipt of information of any bandit movement within an area, the proper group was ordered out, while all the armed forces of the Occupation were simultaneously directed to remain in their garrisons until the group was recalled. This precaution eliminated any possibility of mistaking the armed natives for bandit groups. This system possessed the marked advantage of keeping the bandits continually on the move.

A variation of this method, frequently consisted in sending out all the native groups, each group assiduously patrolling within its designated area for three consecutive days of a week. Upon their return, they were promptly relieved by the military patrols, which scoured the country for the remainder of the week.

The operations of these groups gave evidence of the confidence reposed in them for their behavior was irreproachable. They were able to secure a number of contacts with the bandit groups, and in each encounter conducted themselves in a most creditable manner, inflicting severe punishment on the bandits. Then again, the effect of witnessing their own countrymen assist the Military Government in the repression of lawlessness and disorder must have been demoralizing to the bandits. These patrols combined with the activities of the military forces were primarily conducive to the final suppression of banditry.

Shortly before the installation of the Provisional Government, the Military Government directed the severance of all relations with the native guards, although several of the sugar estates were authorized to retain their services. It

was felt that with the installation of the Provisional Government any semblance of control over these civil guards by the forces of Occupation would create an unfavorable impression in the minds of Dominicans.

It is doubtful if this same system could have been successfully employed in the early days of the Occupation, in face of the general opposition to the Military Government and the mistrust of its purposes. In other words, a change in conditions demanded or permitted the application of new remedies to old ailments, that formerly would neither have been suitable nor advisable.

MAPS AND HANDBOOKS

As a narrative of the Brigade's activities, relative to the preparation and completion of military maps and a handbook of Santo Domingo has no direct bearing on the problems effecting the occupational or military rule of the Republic, the subject will be treated briefly. Yet this is in no way intended to belittle the magnitude and importance of the work, or to detract from the credit and praise due those officers and men who undertook and accomplished a most tedious and laborious task.

Not until late in 1921, did circumstances seem to favor or fully warrant the utilization of any considerable force to carry through to completion so significant an undertaking as the production of a combined map of Santo Domingo, augmented by additional data in the shape of handbooks and monographs. So a plan was prepared that set in operation a well directed and coordinated system of mapping, and the collection and compilation of other data, that could not be placed on maps, or otherwise dispensed with, because of its great importance.

Any task culminating in the efforts of several organizations required the concentration of control in a central authority, and in conformity with this rule, the Brigade Commander directed the Brigade Intelligence Office to assume immediate charge of all activities. Upon it fell the task of outlining all preliminary arrangements and the exercise of general supervision. Appreciating the value of attaining uniformity in procedure, and

the necessity of facilitating and simplifying the innumerable details incident to a problem of these proportions, the Intelligence Department issued a series of mapping circulars. These circulars prescribed instructions regarding the proposed maps, instruments, sketching methods, conventional signs, standardizing strides, methods of computation, control maps, and miscellaneous instruments and data.

Each Regiment was made responsible for the mapping of its district. Regimental schools were instituted for the training of an ample personnel in mapping, using the subject matter of the mapping circulars as a basis for instruction. To retain continuity of control and to further systematize the work a mapping section was organized in each regimental intelligence office, with the intelligence officer directing all operations within the military district.

Approximately eighteen months were consumed in the preparation and final production of the maps and handbook. Six or eight months were devoted to the actual field work of mapping during which time about one hundred men were engaged in sketching. In order to expeditiously record, combine, and complete the great amount of material submitted, the office work was continuous over the entire period. In the year and a half the following maps were completed:

- (a) Strategic Map, scale 1:63360, consisting of forty-four sheets, covering the entire Republic.
- (b) Political, Judicial and Administrative Map, scale 1:15840, showing extent of provinces of the Republic, their communes, together with the latest census figures.
- (c) Road Map, scale 1:21120, consisting of ninety-six sheets, covering the most important areas of the Republic.
- (d) City or Town Maps, scale 1:4000, consisting of twelve sheets, which are composite of airplane photographic mosaics and ground maps, showing all important cities and towns of the Republic.

The Handbook of the Dominican Republic, 1922–1923, was prepared simultaneously with the maps, and appears in two parts: Part I consists of



Ozama River, 1920.

253 pages covering the Southern and Eastern Districts; Part II consisting of 203 pages, covers the Northern District. This handbook is in tabular, graphical, pictorial, and descriptive form, and contains both original and research work. It was meticulously prepared as to verification of fact and statistics, and is a broad comprehensive study of the geographical features, climatic conditions, resources, industrial and economical conditions, communication systems, civil government, history, inhabitants and military defenses of Santo Domingo.

PROVOST DEPARTMENT

In an effort to give a clear portrayal of other tasks, that fell as a heritage to the Brigade, repeated mention must be made to the activities of the provost department. Therefore, in passing, occasion is taken to explain, somewhat in detail, the duties and organization of this important adjunct of the Military Government, and the extent of its influence in relation to the Occupation and Dominican people.

The status held by the provost marshal service was unique and distinctive, and it early proved an invaluable accessory to the efficient management of the administrative machinery of the Military Government. With the exception of a few native interpreters, the personnel of the provost offices

was drawn exclusively from the Brigade, and, moreover, performed duties under the command of the Brigade. Nevertheless, the innate character of provost system, not only made it advisable, but necessary to maintain it as a separate and individual establishment, unhampered by the ordinary routine of Brigade affairs.

The provost department performed all those duties peculiar to its office, together with other tasks not generally assigned to this recognized institution of military occupations. The organization and disposition of the provost offices, while clearly marking a channel of command for the enforcement of many orders and mandates of the Occupation, simplified their execution, and overrode the many delays which otherwise would have meant a real loss to their effectiveness.

The Brigade records fail to show when the provost offices were first instituted, though presumably their establishment occurred either simultaneously with the announcement of the Occupation or shortly thereafter. Undoubtedly, a provost office, which later became known as the district provost office, was immediately installed at each regimental headquarters, and furthermore, it appears to have been customary to open a provost office promptly upon the establishment of any military post

of importance. The number of offices varied at times, that is, they were opened or closed as the necessity demanded, or abandoned with the withdrawal of garrisons to which regularly assigned. At one time there were as many as sixteen, all actively functioning and turning over a considerable amount of business. During the greater period of the Occupation an office was located at each provincial capital, where it was easily and readily accessible to the inhabitants, and, moreover, facilitated the execution of the orders of the Military Government in conjunction with the local civil officials.

Not until 1920 were the various provost offices really organized into a department. Prior to that time there seems to have been little or no connection between the different offices; each carried on its duties independently of the other within the limits of its jurisdiction. When Santo Domingo was divided into military districts, a district provost marshal was appointed at each district headquarters. This officer either by force of seniority or appointment did, in instances, exercise some administrative control over the provost offices of the district, and was even permitted to prescribe general methods of policy. However, this authority seems to have depended largely upon the degree of latitude and confidence the district commander was willing to repose in his subordinate. All records, reports, and recommendations relative to pertinent matters were forwarded or referred to the district commander and in some cases sent direct to Brigade Headquarters.

In September, 1920, the office of provost marshal general was established at Santo Domingo City. This office was charged with the administration of all provost offices, and even through constituted primarily for the purpose of regulating the collection and distribution of provost funds, resulted in a much closer amalgamation of the provost system.

The amount of personnel attached to the different offices bore no uniformity in strength, nor was the sphere of their activities equal in all respects. This was due entirely to the location of the various offices, together with extent

of their duties and the strength of the commands to which they were attached. In one or two instances, the office was represented by the provost marshal himself, who was usually the senior officer present at the smaller posts. Frequently the personnel consisted of the provost marshal, a small office force, an interpreter, and a few military police; while again at the larger posts, especially at the district headquarters, the office was augmented by an increased office force, a provost prison guard, and a considerable force of military police.

The object for which the department was maintained is briefly and best illustrated by the following duties, many of which were a matter of almost daily performance by several of the offices:

1. Maintenance of peace and order throughout the Republic.
2. Detention and bringing to justice offenders against the Executive Orders and the Proclamation of Intervention.
3. Repression of crime.
4. Enforcement of the Executive Orders and execution of the mandates of the Military Authority.
5. The trial of persons charged with offenses against the Military Government or the preparation of charges and specifications for the trial of persons by exceptional military courts.
6. Execution of sentences of exceptional military courts.
7. Arrest and detention of suspects. Investigation of reports bearing on important matters.
8. Special investigation of complaints made by civilians against members of the Occupation, Policia, municipal police, etc.
9. Observe civil officials in performance of their duties, and report any official found violating his trust.
10. Intelligence surveillance and espionage. (This in conjunction with the brigade and regimental intelligence sections.)
11. Custody of certain prisons and their inmates, enforcement of prison regulations and supervision of prison labor. Care and treatment of prisoners.
12. Issue and cancel firearm permits in accordance with Brigade Orders.
13. Control over the storage and release of firearms, ammunition, and

explosives imported into the Republic. The sale of ammunition to persons possessing arms on permits.

14. The enforcement of the road laws and traffic regulations.

15. Receive and forward to the Department of Foreign Affairs all applications for passports made by Dominicans. To issue emergency passports when necessary.

16. Receive and forward to the American Legation, Santo Domingo City, certificates in case of Chinese requesting passports.

In order that the military authorities might be kept thoroughly informed of the many activities of the provost department, all of which more or less affected the entire fabric of the occupational administration, each office was obliged to submit numerous and sundry reports. The following were regularly submitted to Brigade Headquarters:

1. Monthly report of arm permits issued and cancelled.
2. Monthly report of provost funds.
3. Quarterly report of ammunition sold.
4. Quarterly report of provost prisoners to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy via Brigade Commander.
5. Report of investigations and provost courts when occurring.

The provost department, through a process of development and a knowledge of conditions gained by experience, built up a high state of efficiency, and combined with the activities of the troops rendered the violation of the orders and decrees of the Military Government, if not extremely rare, at least precarious. It demonstrated on more than one occasion the undeniable right to be regarded as an indispensable attribute of the government of the Dominican Republic as administered by the Military Government of the United States, and was virtually an elemental corollary to the necessity of the Occupation. If the provost service was brought into being for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the Occupation, it was no less created for the reason of benefiting the inhabitants of the country. In fact the provost marshals were the representatives of the Occupation to the civil population, and acted as impartial in-

intermediaries between the Military Government and the people. Not only did they look after the interests of the Occupation, but listened to the grievances and complaints of the inhabitants, and when within their scope and authority made the appropriate adjustment, or lacking the necessary power directed the individual to the proper place for adjudication. The very character of the duties of provost marshal offices made them, in truth, an important part of the police and judicial system of the Republic.

One difficulty prevailed within the provost department, which previous to the appointment of the provost marshal general's office, bid fair to undermine the efficiency and the maintenance of the offices. For several years the provost service was erroneously supported by various funds: Brigade Intelligence funds, Secretary of Interior and Police appropriations, certain small allotments from the Marine Corps, and fines imposed by sentences of provost courts. The aggregate amount of these contributions or revenues was not only unreliable but insufficient, and the provost marshals were continually casting about for other means of defraying the expenses of their offices.

Unfortunately the chief source of the above income was the penalizing of offenses committed by the inhabitants against the Military Government. The very idea of exercising justice for maintaining the provost offices by the imposition of fines was fundamentally wrong and repellent to a due sense of justice. Then again, it was calculated to offer undue temptation, for provost marshals or members of exceptional military courts might unthinkingly be moved to impose larger fines than the offenses warranted for the purpose of covering the expenses of the provost offices, realizing full well that the continuance of these offices was for the ultimate good of the people. Such a practice, if it had once been recognized by the Military Government would have been an invitation for the invidious condemnation of its methods in administering justice.

There seems to have been an unwillingness on the part of some of the



Marine Corps pack train, Seibo, D.R., 1930.

authorities to concede that the cost of upkeep of the provost department was a legitimate expenditure of funds from the Dominican treasury, incident to defraying the expenses of the government of the occupied territory, and to admit fully that the provost service was dedicated to the improvement of the inhabitants and to the security of their lives and property. This contention, if it can be called such, was refuted, when in December 1920, the Military Governor issued an order stating that in the future the upkeep of the provost system would be borne by the Dominican treasury in so far as fines, etc., did not suffice to cover the necessary cost of the service. This action, while materially obviating further trouble, was the first official recognition of the provost system as constituting a part of the Dominican Government, notwithstanding the fact that it was an appendage of the Military Government; furthermore, that it in no way belonged to the Navy or Marine Corps, and therefore the cost of maintenance by the United States would have been an improper expenditure.

A few words should be spoken of the officers who served in the position of provost marshals as their selection had a great influence in establishing friendly relations with the inhabitants, and in the inculcation of the proper attitude of the members of the Occupation toward the inhabitants. The success of the

provost offices depended largely upon the individual judgment and actions of the provost marshals. The selection of an officer unsuited for the performance of provost duties, either through a lack of the necessary qualifications or sympathy in the work, while probably not vitally derogatory to the interests of the Occupation, was not contemplated to promote its prestige and standing in the community. However, as a rule the choice of officers for these positions appears to have been well made, for a great many of the provost marshals, as their military records will attest, gained an enviable reputation among the inhabitants for fairness, impartiality, and kindly thoughtfulness, and were spoken of as "muy sympatico." The provost marshals were thrown in daily contact with the people and had the opportunity of studying their characteristics, customs, prejudices, and shortcomings. Possessed with an inflexible sense of justice and duty, together with a thorough knowledge of the inhabitants and a keen understanding of the object of the Occupation, the provost marshals made their offices serve a most admirable purpose, which was unsurpassed by any other institution or organization of the Military Government.

DISARMING THE POPULATION

The disarming of the Dominican people followed instantly upon the for-

mal declaration of the Military Government, and must be regarded as the most drastic and effective step in the restoration of domestic tranquillity. This measure divested the inhabitants of the only physical means of protracting armed resistance, and conclusively convinced them of the futility of further opposition in the face of the new order of things.

Although the disarming of the native population of a country in military occupation will be the invariable rule, its application to the case of Santo Domingo was an immediate and imperative necessity. It was customary, as statistics later proved, for every man and boy, who could afford it to carry a firearm, notwithstanding that such possession was contrary to the Dominican law. There was a logical and basic reason for the extraordinary large number of weapons in the hands of the inhabitants. The arbitrary methods whereby the political activities were carried on, frequently culminating in armed revolutions, and the lawlessness practiced by a perceptible portion of the population greatly influenced the conduct of human affairs in the Republic. The professional politician, and the revolutionary and bandit leader, together with their numerous cohorts were habitually armed. The legal institutions could not prevail against this distressing condition; persons and property were left to the mercy of unscrupulous despots, until in self preservation peaceful and law abiding inhabitants were forced to have recourse to arms. In this respect the Dominican people virtually constituted themselves an armed garrison.

No incident of the Occupation could have been fraught with graver consequences than a failure to deprive the Dominican people of all firearms and other deadly weapons. In this dispossession the Military Governor promptly removed one of the most likely causes for fostering enmity and hatred, and further served to cut off a large supply of firearms to the revolutionary and bandit leaders. An unprejudiced estimate would disclose in the light of past situations and circumstances that the disarming measures were as much, if not more, to the interest and protec-

tion of the Dominican people than to the forces of Occupation.

On November 29, 1916, the Military Governor issued the disarming order, forbidding all inhabitants to carry or have in their possession firearms, ammunition or explosives, except under exceptional circumstances of whose existence and duration the Military Government was the sole judge. This order was addressed to the Brigade Commander, directing that he place it in effect. It specified that the prohibited articles would be turned in to the proper officers of the forces of Occupation, who would receipt and care for such as were voluntarily surrendered, but that such articles as were not voluntarily surrendered would be confiscated. It further stipulated that the carrying of concealed weapons of any description was forbidden, and that any person cognizant of the above orders and knowingly violating them would be liable to punishment by the Military Government. As would be expected the details of carrying out the order, that is, the manner in which arms, ammunition and explosives would be turned in, and the methods that would be adopted in securing those prohibited articles not voluntarily surrendered, was left to the discretion of the Brigade Commander.

To give the order the force and character of a public notice, it was published in the "Gaceta Oficial" for the information and guidance of the citizens of the Republic. It might be well to mention here, that the "Gaceta Oficial" was the official publication of the Dominican Government, issued periodically and comprised a complete record of all the acts and laws enacted by the Government. This governmental record had a wide circulation, being distributed among the provincial, judicial, and municipal officials of the Republic. The Military Government continued to use this well established medium of expression for the official and public announcement of its executive and administrative orders. Therefore, on this occasion, as in many others, the Dominican officials became responsible for bringing the contents of the disarming order to the attention of the inhabitants and to impress upon them

the significance of complying with the order.

It has not been possible to discover from the Brigade files, what written orders, if any, were issued to the armed forces simultaneously with the disarming proclamation, relative to the procedure to be followed in the collection of firearms and other deadly weapons. Furthermore, there has been no way to determine whether or not any time limit was fixed within which the inhabitants were to surrender their weapons. No date was specified in the Military Governor's order; it apparently was not deemed practicable. However, it is manifest from a reading of certain papers that the Military Government did lay great stress upon prompt obedience to the disarming proclamation, and that the armed forces instituted the most energetic measures to secure all firearms in possession of the Dominican people.

The following forces or agencies were employed in the collection of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other deadly weapons:

- (a) Provincial governors and local police authorities, particularly jefes comunales (communal chiefs) jefes de orden (chief of police) and alcaldes pedaneos (rural policemen).
- (b) The forces of the Brigade.
- (c) Special agents or operators of the Brigade intelligence office or provost marshal department.
- (d) The forces of the Policia.

From an examination of the records, it is inferred that the civil authorities received supplementary orders, occurring with the disarming proclamation, stating explicitly the manner in which firearms, ammunition and explosives would be collected and later turned over to the military forces. There are evidences of where field commanders visited various towns and communes, and issued verbal instructions to the local officials imposing restrictions as to the time and place the prohibited articles would be surrendered. The civil officials were either obliged to make personal delivery of the collected articles, or a detachment was sent to procure them at some place previously designated.

Great quantities of firearms were collected by this means and contrary to expectations met with more success and favor than first predicted. Many of the civil officials conscientiously complied with the demands made upon them as demonstrated by the expeditious manner in which they acquired large number of firearms. However, some of the officials, considering the disarming order an unjust imposition, performed their duties in a most perfunctory manner, while a few, unworthy of any trust that could be placed in them, disarmed some of the people and permitted others to retain their weapons for personal or monetary reasons. In some instances, the inhabitants reacted against this behavior on the part of the local authorities by reporting the maleficent official, and suggested that other measures be taken to collect their weapons.

The disarming of the inhabitants through the intervening instrumentality of the civil officials possessed many redeeming features over the utilization of the armed forces for the same purpose. It was the most peaceful means of accomplishing the desired object, less provocative, and the least likely to engender antagonism and end in friction. It gave the peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who were worn out by the constant political abuse of the past, the opportunity to gracefully hand over their weapons without being subjected to what they might consider the indignity of making a personal surrender to the military authorities. Misunderstandings were avoided that would have otherwise occurred had the armed forces been employed, because of a difference in language and custom. Moreover, it relieved the armed forces of an unpleasant responsibility and eliminated the factor of personal contact at a time when the population must have viewed the intentions of the Occupation with considerable doubt and suspicion.

However, it is not to be assumed from the success already noted that an order so exacting and far reaching in its effect was to meet with a willing and universal compliance. An appreciable percentage of the inhabitants deliberately failed to surrender their firearms or reluctantly obeyed the summons of the order. As



San Pedro de Macoris, D.R.

a consequence of this attitude, it was necessary as a military measure to resort to the most drastic methods; the employment of the military force followed, in order to compel the recalcitrants to surrender their weapons. Either the prohibited articles, or the armed forces conducted a house to house search for concealed weapons. These forcible measures while not tending to promote good feeling were unavoidable and wholly justifiable in the effort for an early return of peace and order.

There were incidents where special agents or operators of the Brigade Intelligence Office and the provost marshal offices made collection of deadly weapons. In these enterprises, action was taken on more or less reliable information relative to the hiding or retention of large quantities of firearms and ammunition by certain notorious individuals. The success of these operations depended upon the skill and courage of the agent as he had to rely solely upon his own initiative and resources. In December 1916, an operator from the Brigade Intelligence Office made a trip to the San Juan valley and the Haitian border and succeeded in returning to Santo Domingo City with 826 rifles and over 14,000 rounds of ammunition. The trip was made in less than three weeks, practically alone and unassisted, and at

great personal risk to the operator. He fearlessly confronted the rulers of San Juan valley and intimidated them into surrendering their weapons.

With the establishment of the Guardia, this organization assisted the Brigade in the collection and confiscation of firearms. It performed notable services in this connection, and as a native constabulary force had the marked advantage of ferreting out the more difficult and pertinacious cases.

In June, 1917, the Brigade Commander issued an order directing that in the future, Marines and Guardia would be the only persons authorized to represent the Military Government in the collection of arms. What may have been the occasion of this order, the writer has no way of knowing, though it is imagined that the Military Government now proposed to deprive the civil officials of further authority or interference in the matter, and concluded that the inhabitants had had sufficient time in which to surrender their firearms. This decision made the enforcement of the disarming order a purely military activity, and at the same time charged the Occupation with the duty of gathering all evidence for the conviction of persons found in possession of arms, ammunition and explosives in contravention of the disarming order of November 29, 1916.

It is not contemplated to give an account of the manner in which the invading forces secured and collected arms from the date of entrance into the Republic to the date of the Proclamation of the Military Government, other than to state that considerable quantities of firearms were taken by compelling the leaders of the Dominican military forces to lay down their weapons in token of surrender, assisted by a search of suspected areas, where arms were reported to be secreted. As an incentive to the Dominican leaders, and to prevent the indiscriminate scattering of arms throughout the Republic with the increased difficulty of securing them later, it was recommended by the military authorities that money be furnished by the Dominican Government for the purchase of arms voluntarily surrendered.

In order to keep a complete record of the arms acquired by the Military Government, the district commanders were directed shortly after the beginning of the Occupation to submit monthly reports of all arms and ammunitions collected within their respective districts. A compilation of these reports indicated that by July, 1922, the Brigade had collected in round numbers about 53,000 firearms of all descriptions, approximately 200,000 rounds of ammunition and some 14,000 cutting weapons. The greater portion of these collected articles were procured during the early years of the Occupation.

The firearms consisted of revolvers, rifles, shotguns and "pata de mulas" (sawed off rifles or shotguns), and in the order named the percentages were roughly 66, 26, 5, and 3. The larger part were of an obsolete pattern and in such poor condition as to render them of little or no practical value. Huge quantities were destroyed either by burning or dumping at sea. The better types were retained by the forces of Occupation or issued to Dominican officials, and in some instances to deserving individuals on firearm permits. A few found their way into the hands of the inevitable souvenir hunters.

It may be interesting to know that on a basis of a population of 800,000 Dominican inhabitants, the figures for firearms as already presented show

that one firearm was confiscated or turned in for every fifteen inhabitants, including men, women, and children. Counting one male inhabitant to each six inhabitants, which is believed to be a conservative estimate for Santo Domingo, this meant approximately two firearms for every five adult men. With this in mind, together with the knowledge that the Military Government was unable to gain possession of all firearms in the Republic, as large quantities were reported to be buried there appears substantial evidence that the male population of Santo Domingo went about armed.

The collection and confiscation of firearms, ammunition, and other deadly weapons by the Brigade did not terminate until the Provisional Government had been inaugurated. The showing made by the Brigade in this capacity was remarkable and was highly commendatory to those officers and men who were directly engaged in the collection of the prohibited articles as defined in the disarming order of November 29, 1916.

CONTROL OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES

The fact that the population had to all intents and purposes been effectually disarmed was not in itself conclusive evidence that many of the inhabitants would not again hasten to arm themselves, provided energetic means were not taken to discourage any tendency in this direction. Some plan had to be evolved without delay by means of which it would be impracticable and dangerous to procure firearms either from within or from without the Republic; if the Occupation was to reap the full benefits of the Brigade's successes in disarming the population. Careful thought had to be given to those methods the Military Government resolved to adopt, in order that it might prevent the derelict condition of authority that existed under the Dominican regime, which imposed no restraint whatsoever on the unlawful ownership and the promiscuous use of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Not until the Military Government had satisfactorily assured itself, that the

inhabitants had been disarmed to the point where they no longer menaced the public safety, was the Occupation prepared to dictate the terms of prohibition by which it proposed to govern the use of firearms and explosives. When the Military Government was disposed to reflect upon this measure of restriction, two courses of action were open: one, the absolute refusal to the possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and the other, the permission to possess and use these articles subject to regulation.

Had the Military Occupation decided upon the former course of action, its decision could hardly have been interpreted as an abuse of authority, but nevertheless such use of prerogative would have been looked upon by Dominican and sojourner alike as unjust and high-handed. Considering the numerical strength of the armed forces and the inadequacy of local police protection in their relation to the great extent of Dominican territory, it is extremely doubtful whether ample police refuge could have been furnished to all parts of the Dominican Republic. Should such a condition have arisen, aggravated by a deplorable lack of quick communication and means of rapid transportation for the purpose of summoning aid, the denial to possess and use firearms would have been viewed rightfully as an unreasonable imposition. Then again, for example, there were numerous outlawed parties, such as the bandit groups and remnants of old revolutionary bands, which the Occupation could not hope to disarm except after months or probably years of strenuous campaigning. As a consequence of this situation, had the Occupation persistently denied the use of firearms, and unequal balance would have been created, extremely prejudicial to the law abiding elements. The knowledge that commercial and industrial establishments and well to do citizens were without armed protection would have greatly encouraged the lawless factions to broaden their scope of operations.

In a like manner, it did not seem possible or reasonable that the Military Government could overlook the value and need of explosives within

the Republic. As revealed later there was a considerable demand for explosives both for constructional purposes and engineering projects. To have declared prohibitory restrictions against their use would have materially arrested the development and improvement of industrial and commercial enterprise.

If the Occupation was desirous of achieving a reputation for liberal policies in matters of equity, it seemed that the above causes were ostensibly of sufficient importance to impel the Military Government to authorize the use of firearms and explosives, even if conditioned on the retention of certain reservations. So it was prompted to act as evidenced by the closing paragraphs of the disarming order.

This order, it is to be remembered, enjoined the inhabitants to voluntarily surrender their weapons and as an additional precaution specified that the carrying or possession of these articles would be liable to punishment by the Military Government. It further stated that after the above orders had been complied with, the following would apply to the legalized use of firearms and explosives:

“After these regulations have been put into effect, explosives needed for peaceful public or civil purposes may be released by competent authority of the Military Government in the necessary quantities for immediate use, provided that the intending users are responsible persons and that they accept responsibility for the proper custody and use of the released explosives to insure that they will not be employed for any purpose inimical to public order.

“Under exceptional circumstances, of whose existence and duration the Military Government will be the judge, responsible parties in exposed locations may be permitted to keep a limited supply of arms and ammunition by competent officers of the Military Government; conditioned upon the acceptance of responsibility by the recipients that the arms and ammunition do not fall into improper hands, and that they will be used only for self-preservation, and not for any purpose inimical to public order.”

It was an estimable decision that prevented the people from availing themselves of the above privileges until the population as a whole had been disarmed, or otherwise the military authorities would have had great difficulty in maintaining a rigid check over the use of firearms and ammunition. In working out the details of the Military Governor's order, the military authorities had to consider first, the conditions that would govern the legalized use of firearms and explosives, and second, the extent and character of supervision that would be requisite to control the sources of supply of these same articles. Once these points had been solved, and given shape in the form of instructions to the command, they were incorporated in Brigade General Orders. As will be noted the provost marshals were to play the principal role in the execution of all orders relative to firearm permits.

The Brigade Orders at one time or other empowered the following officials or commanders to issue firearm permits: provost marshals, district commanders, and the provost marshal general. The provost marshals were authorized to grant permits to carry arms within their own jurisdiction in certain excepted cases only. These cases referred to civil officials, such as provincial governors, judges, procuradores generales, procuradores fiscales, alcaldes, alcaldes pedaneos and other officials exercising police functions. Originally, no other permits were issued without first having the express approval of the Brigade Commander. This procedure was later altered and district commanders were authorized to issue permits without reference to higher authority, but which were valid only within their respective districts. The provost marshal general was authorized with the approval of Brigade Headquarters to issue general permits to government officials, which were valid in two or more districts. When general permits were granted the district commanders were notified accordingly, in order that they might be previously informed of the identity of the holder.

Before any permit was issued, the person who desired to possess a weapon

had to make application to the nearest provost marshal in the district in which he desired to carry the firearm, and at the same time had to establish his identity beyond every reasonable doubt. In all cases where the provost marshals were not authorized to issue permits, these officers in the forwarding endorsement of the applicant's request had to state or verify the nationality, character, affiliations (political, commercial, etc.), occupation, and address of the applicant, and, furthermore, the necessity for granting the permit, including the actual danger to be guarded against. This information was mandatory before a standard permit could be completed and issued. In this connection, provost marshals and district commanders were cautioned to exercise the greatest care to the end that permits be issued only where real necessity existed, and that any application which had the appearance of enhancing the prestige of the applicant should be promptly refused.

Permits were issued on a standard form with a description of the person to whom issued, together with the character and serial numbers of the firearm, and the purpose for which it was to be used and the locality in which it could be carried. These permits were non-transferable and had to be renewed each year or otherwise they were concealed and the firearm turned in to the provost marshal. As a warning to holders of permits, they were impressed with the fact, that the unauthorized use of their firearms would lead to their trial by military court and the immediate confiscation of the firearm.

Permits were granted for the possession of revolvers, pistols and shotguns only. No other firearms could be legally possessed by any person within the Dominican Republic, other than a member of the armed forces of the Occupation. The privilege of possessing rifles was refused consistently because of the injury that might result through their falling into the hands of enemies of the Military Government. As a matter of fact, it was exceedingly difficult to secure a permit for any kind of weapon. This was particularly true in the early days of the Occupation, although later a more liberal view was taken in au-

thorizing their possession. At no time did the number of weapons held by the inhabitants under permits exceed 2,200. Firearms that were retained under permits were obtained from the confiscated weapons held by the military authorities or through importation.

In order to maintain a strict and close count of all firearms granted on permits, the provost marshals were directed to keep a record of all permits issued by them, a copy of which was forwarded to the district commander. The district provost marshals in turn submitted to Brigade Headquarters annually a list in duplicate of all permits issued within their respective districts. In addition to this yearly report they also rendered a monthly change sheet in duplicate, containing a list of permits issued and cancelled during the month.

As the Marine forces were not armed with the various type of firearms held by owners of firearm permits, the ammunition for these weapons had to be secured from other sources than within the Brigade. The greatest portion of ammunition, in fact all of the revolver ammunition for sale to persons authorized to have firearms was purchased by the provost marshal general from the Intendant General, Policia Nacional Dominicana. This ammunition was turned over to the district commanders, who distributed it to their provost marshals for sale. Certain merchants were also authorized to sell shot gun shells to persons possessing shot guns under firearm permits.

There were no facilities within the Dominican Republic for the manufacture of firearms, explosives and ammunition, other than a few hand loading devices for the making of cartridges. Therefore as these articles had to be obtained from sources outside of the Republic, it permitted the Military Government to control their introduction into the country through the medium of importation. As the Brigade Commander was charged with the regulation and use of firearms, ammunition and explosives within the Republic, it was only proper that he should exercise some similar supervision over the sources of supply. Accordingly, he was granted sufficient latitude and authority to decide

upon the great majority of all applications for the importation of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Any person, or representative of a business, commercial or industrial firm desiring to import these articles was obliged to make written application for permission for each separate shipment of arms, ammunition or explosives in which had to appear in detail the quantity and character of the stores to be imported, together with the name of the firm from which the stores were to be purchased, and the port from which they would be exported. All applications were forwarded through the local provost marshal, who endorsed the request with such information or recommendation as would establish the character and identity of the applicant.

They were automatically vested with the authority to make arrests and were empowered to apprehend all individuals ...

In the event the application was approved certain formalities had to be undergone before the articles could be shipped to the consignee. For example, with few exceptions all firearms, ammunitions and explosives were procured from United States, but as the President had issued a proclamation in 1905, prohibiting the export of arms and munitions of war from any port in United States or Puerto Rico to any port in the Dominican Republic, it was necessary to obtain an exemption or exoneration for each shipment. The Brigade Commander forwarded a notice of the applicant's approved requests to the Secretary of Foreign Relations, in order that the proper notification might be sent to the Dominican diplomatic representative in the United States. This official in behalf of his constituent made representation to the the United States Department requesting the usual declaration of ex-

emption, and when this authorization had been secured the exporting firm was allowed to make shipment.

Immediately upon the arrival of the arms, ammunition or explosives at a Dominican port of entry, the customs officials notified the local provost marshal of the receipt of these articles. They were then deposited in the provost store room or in such place as the provost marshal might designate. The imported articles could then be drawn by the consignee in such quantities or under such conditions as the provost marshal might indicate. Usually these particular imports involved small quantities of stores, unless it was an unusually large shipment of explosives for engineering or constructional purposes.

The disarming of the population, the breaking up and the surrender of the bandit groups, together with the strict enforcement of the permit regulations destroyed the last vestige of any illegal traffic in firearms or munitions of war. This policy was heartily approved by many Dominicans, and even the most prejudiced who had been bitterly inimical towards the Occupation, later proclaimed it the one outstanding and redeeming feature of the Military Government, which has proved beneficial to the welfare of the people.

POWERS OF ARREST

When the United States had determined upon the formal occupation of Santo Domingo, the Brigade became the moving factor in the enforcement of the Executive Orders, and the Proclamation of Intervention, the maintenance of order throughout the Republic, the prevention and suppression of banditry, unlawful assemblies and uprisings, and the repression of crime, breaches of peace and other violations of the laws. This assignment of tasks virtually made the members of the Brigade or such portions of them as were specifically charged with the performance of the above duties, peace or police officers. They were automatically vested with the authority to make arrests and were empowered to apprehend all individuals or groups of individuals suspected or detected in the act of committing offenses against the Military Govern-

ment, or offenses against the civil laws as remained in force under the sanction of the Occupation.

The offenses under which arrests were most commonly made, comprised banditry, insurrection, illegal possession of firearms, smuggling of contraband, violation of censorship rules and immigration laws, criminal acts of a serious nature, disturbance of the peace, malfeasance of civil officials, falsely posing as officials of the Military Government, destruction and theft of government property or personal property of members of the Occupation, defamation of character, and physical assaults upon members of the Military Government.

In the absence of a well defined policy governing the actions of the armed forces in the opening phases of the Occupation, it would be exceedingly hard to state definitely where the Brigade's powers to make arrests actually began and ended. Generally speaking, the armed forces were primarily and ini-

tially interested in the enforcement of the orders of the Military Government, and yet the added responsibility of preserving peace and order and repressing crime obliged the Brigade to act both as a civil and constabulary police force. From the viewpoint of international law, the forces of the Brigade had unlimited authority to make arrests regardless of the offender or offense committed. However, if such jurisdiction were exercised at any time it was only for a short duration at the beginning of the Occupation, when chaotic conditions prevented the ordinary employment of the civil institutions in the enforcement of law. Aside from the practicability of reserving the exclusive right to make arrests, such action would have been incompatible with the spirit of the Proclamation of Intervention, which specifically stipulated that the Dominican statutes would remain in effect in so far as they did not conflict with the objects of the Occupation, and would continue

in the hands of duly authorized Dominican officials under the supervision of the Military Government. Here was the clear intention of trying civil offenders by the Dominican Courts, and the apprehension of such offenders by civil officials was but a natural assumption.

With this conciliatory stipulation in mind, it is not surprising to find two other agencies actively engaged in making arrests, the civil police and Policia Nacional Dominicana. In these instances the authority to make arrests was derived from or delegated by the supreme governing power, the Military Government. However, the degree or sphere of authority wielded by these two police forces was not equivalent to the powers of the Brigade serving in a similar capacity.

The civil police, municipal and rural, operated under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of Interior and Police, and their authority as police officers embraced infractions of the civil



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law and municipal ordinances, and even then the authority was restricted to local boundaries. No cognizance was taken of the Executive Orders of the Military Government, except inasmuch as they related to the execution of purely civil affairs. The retention of the civil police in spite of many cases of inefficiency possessed certain commendable features. Principally did it compel an observance of the local laws, the violation of which the forces of Occupation could have had no concern and, furthermore, which would have been difficult to prevent, because of the reticence of the inhabitants to give evidence or divulge the identification of the violators to the Occupying forces. Moreover, had the forces of the Brigade been called upon to enforce the local laws and ordinances it would have been a great drain on their already overtaxed efforts.

The powers of the Policia to make arrest was projected both ways, that is, it possessed jurisdiction to make arrests for infractions against the civil laws and also against the orders of the Military Government. Notwithstanding, this dual authority did not eclipse all offenses either under the civil law or orders of the Military Government. Civil officials were jealous of sharing their prerogatives and reluctantly acquiesced to any appreciable indulgence on the part of the Policia to make arrests for misdemeanors triable by the local courts. In other words the Policia ordinarily was not authorized to arrest persons for violations of municipal ordinances. This was rather vividly illustrated by Policia orders which directed that the organization would restrict its operations within municipal limits to assisting local authorities when the latter were unable to cope with a given situation, and to guard against any interference in strictly municipal or communal affairs. They were, however, required to execute lawful warrants or orders of arrests issued by any judge of the Court of First Instance or any other official authorized by law to serve a warrant, and in this connection were frequently referred to as judicial police. It was their duty, when not in direct opposition to the civil authorities, to make arrests in cases of crime by violence,

such as homicide, highway robbery, and burglary. They did arrest a large number of fugitives from justice, who had seized the opportunity to escape from the prisons during the general state of lawlessness that existed just prior to and immediately after the Proclamation of Intervention.

When the Policia was employed to enforce the orders of the Military Government, the authorities did not fail to overlook the fact that the Policia was primarily a constabulary force belonging to the Dominican Government, even though that Government had been temporarily deprived of its sovereignty. It would have been manifestly unfair and improper had the Military Government insisted that members of the Policia make arrests for the violations of all executive orders. For instance, had the Policia forces been directed to enforce the censorship rules for attacks upon the Military Government and the United States, and ordered to make arrests for verbal insults or assaults against the members of the Occupation, the Policia would never have acquired prestige or popularity in the eyes of Dominicans. Such employment of the Policia would have given rise to strong prejudices which the organization would never have surmounted.

This triple police system was not without its complexities, and because of its complex nature there was frequently a lack of coordination, understanding, and a partial defectiveness in the combined system that was not always conducive to an effective enforcement of the civil and municipal laws. It was not unusual, especially in the early days of the Occupation, for the Brigade to assist the civil police and Policia in the normal performance of their duties. Again in exceptional cases, the forces of the Brigade were impelled to usurp the prerogatives of one or both of these agencies in making arrests, in order that offenders be summarily and vigorously punished. But as stated before, there was a strong and growing tendency during the succeeding years of the Occupation to inhibit the armed forces from participating in the administration of civil matters.

In discussing the subject of arrests, it might be proper to mention here the causes that led to the Brigade's decline in civil affairs. The perturbation that arose from the political crisis that immediately preceded the invasion of the American forces, along with the disorganization of the civil institutions occurring with the Proclamation of Occupation, precluded the rigid enforcement of the local laws and ordinances by their former servers; civil officials were either incapable or unwilling to preserve peace and maintain justice under the civil law. The resultant effect of this situation made it mandatory to utilize the armed forces to act as civil functionaries. It followed then, that the Brigade's authority in making arrests had to include violations of the civil laws, and particularly a close scrutiny of criminal cases, serious disturbances, and such other acts as jeopardized the public safety. But as the Occupation was undertaken with no ulterior motive of permanent conquest, but with the idea of returning Santo Domingo to its former possessors as soon as the object of the Occupation had been accomplished, every effort was made to restore the administration of civil affairs to the Dominican officials. The tension which had developed between the time of the invasion of Dominican territory and the formal declaration of the Intervention gradually let down under the administration of the Military Government, and conditions improved until the civil officials were encouraged to resume their former official tasks, at the same time feeling assured of the support of the Military Government. With this gain in adjustment and stabilization, civil officials were entrusted more and more with the conduct of civil affairs, and the Brigade receded from its former position as a civil instrument. Arrests for violations of the civil law finally devolved wholly upon the civil police and Policia.

