



**BGen
Samuel B. Griffith**

Gen Griffith, with 27 years active Marine Corps duty (he retired in 1956) holds a Ph.D. in Chinese History from Oxford. He translated Sun Tzu's

Art of War and Mao Tse-tung's treatise on guerilla warfare (GAZETTE: Jun '41). The former, published in 1962, is much in evidence these days in Washington military circles.



**Professor
O. Edmund Clubb**

Mr. Clubb was appointed to the US Foreign Service in 1928, after graduating from the University of Minnesota. He went to China the next year

where, excepting short tours in Indo-China (he was interned by the Japanese), USA, and USSR, he served until 1950. He retired in 1952. To date he has published over 65 articles and one book, Twentieth Century China (Columbia University Press, 1964).



Mrs. Peggy Durdin

Mrs. Durdin was born and brought up in China. She and her husband, Mr. Tillman Durdin, a foreign correspondent for the NY Times, have written

on Far Eastern affairs for many years. Mrs. Durdin has contributed to the NY Times Magazine and other periodicals. She is currently with her husband on assignment in Sydney, Australia.

Has the bomb affected China's sense of direction? Where is she trying to go? Three experts with close ties to China's past assess the present and the future.

FOR some time the colossus of China has reminded me of the Barnum and Bailey circus of my youth: a vast extravaganza of side-shows, menageries, crowded tents, clown buffoonery, the several rings with simultaneous acts, the frustration felt at missing something for the watching of something else.

This analogy occurred even before the explosion of either the atomic pile at Lop Nor in October, 1964 or that of the more sophisticated atomic bomb on 14 May, 1965. It was the result of numerous magazine and newspaper articles and of three books in particular: Edgar Snow's *The Other Side of the River* (Random House), George Paloczi-Horvath's *Mao Tse-tung* (Doubleday), and Harry Schwartz's *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars* (Lippincott).

In embracing the past, present and future of China from such standpoints as the internal, external, economic, political, military and diplomatic, these sources, always interesting but sometimes vague and often contradictory, provided material in such abundance as to preclude total assimilation by the non-specialist reader. In so doing they offered ample prelude to the feature acts in the center ring: the atomic explosions.

Although western officialdom downplayed these achievements as technically primitive and as both expected and indeed inevitable, the effects mushroomed far beyond the circumference of the le-




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The John A. Lejeune FORUM

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thal clouds. They first of all yielded distinct propaganda victories for Mao both at home and abroad, particularly among the neutral nations and the emergent African nations. They further aroused or anyway awakened old fears in China's neighbors, fears expressed nearly a quarter of a century earlier when Manuel Quezon, first president of the Philippines, told General MacArthur, "My great fear is the Chinese. With their increasing militarism and aggressive tendency, they are the great Asiatic menace. They have no real ideologies, and when they reach the fructification of their military potential, I dread to think what may happen."

While the two explosions scarcely represent military fructification, they nonetheless suggest considerable *fructifying*—indeed, the lethal clouds, no matter how small, form a significant hallmark to the progress of 15 years by a nation which, in the opinion of many observers, is now supported by a very real national ideology. Taken with China's intentions as expressed in word and deed, this fact offered increased emphasis to Quezon's apprehensions, and not alone as applied to such nations as Russia, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and India, but to most of the rest of the world which is wondering what next will happen.

To gain some insight into the future is to understand something of China's strange and generally tragic past, and this is the subject of our first question:

To what extent have the internal developments of China in the last two centuries influenced her rise and her position in the world today, particularly vis-à-vis America?

Mrs. Durdin: Anyone familiar with Chinese history who exposes himself to Peking's daily press and radio fulminations against the United States is reminded at once of the 19th century Dragon Throne's pronouncements to *Western barbarians* (including Queen Victoria).

Today, to be sure, the centuries' old xenophobia, the sublime arrogance, the conviction of superiority and of a corner on rectitude and monopoly of truth are not clothed in classic and Confucian terms. They are re-cut, re-colored (red) and reinvigorated according to Marxist-Leninist theology "interpreted and creatively developed" by Mao Tse-tung. Today the old imperative to civilize outside *barbarians* is hallowed and guaranteed success by an irrefutable Process of History beyond the power of capitalists, imperialists and revisionists to block or change. If Mao is not the Son of Heaven and Lord of the World, the Party has certainly given him (rather than any living Russian) the status of a 20th century deity. He is sole heir to the mantle of Lenin and Marx, the Great Leader whose every word is sacred gospel. Nor is there much to choose between Emperor Tao Kuang's

characterization of the British as *the barbarian dogs* and Mao's of the Americans as *the most vicious enemy of all the people in the world*.

However, the contrasts between the 19th century and present-day policy of Peking toward the outside world and the effectiveness in its implementation are striking. Necessarily they are rooted in, grow from, and are circumscribed by, the internal situation of China in the two periods.

By the 19th century, the great Chinese Empire was embarked on one of its periodic declines into conservatism, disorder, inertia and decay. The once brilliant Manchu dynasty, now on the wane, faced but could not deal with successive rebellions and with deterioration in economy, governmental authority and control of the huge territory, in law and order and artistic productivity.

An Englishman of that period said with indignation and accuracy that a China "nursing itself . . . in solitary grandeur and treating as inferior all other nations" was, in terms of power, "no more than the shadow of a shade." To borrow a phrase from Mao, it was only a *paper tiger*.

Such a China, weak and disoriented, was negative and defensive in foreign affairs, more acted upon than acting. China's plan was to erect and hide herself behind barricades, preventing what had so often benefited the great empire in the past—intercourse with the outside world.

This line of action, or inaction, was born to failure and disaster. No *Great Wall* erected by the Manchu emperors could withstand an expansionist Europe (or her recent but apt student, Japan), strengthened and invigorated by great scientific and industrial revolutions.

So, for the 19th and part of the 20th centuries, China lost territory, wars and various sovereign rights to Western and "dwarf" (Japanese) *barbarians*. At gunpoint she was forced to sign ignominious "unequal" treaties giving Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States economic and trade concessions and their citizens extra-territoriality on Chinese soil.

This period of Chinese helplessness before foreign exploitation reached its climax and finale in the eight-year Sino-Japanese war. By its end in 1945, foreigners had relinquished all "unequal" treaties and special concessions or rights.

To a proud nation that for several thousand years regarded itself as the whole of the civilized world, this was a belated return of sovereignty. It did not magically erase from memory the past century of imperialist aggression and Chinese impotence, humiliation and defeat. It did not magically cure the anti-Western neuroses common to an ex-semicolonial status. One could expect, therefore, any post-war government of China to exaggerate grossly the crimes of Western imperialism and attribute to it virtually every one of the country's formidable array of woes and almost insoluble problems. One could also expect this

government to be extremely sensitive about full sovereignty and international status; also highly emotional in response to real or imagined slights.

Fueled, then, by unpleasant memories and by a new nationalism (first learned from the West), any post-war Chinese government presumably would have worked passionately toward two goals, one internal—the transformation of the country into a strong, modern nation—one external elevation of the country to world power status.

Implementation of these two objectives depended, of course, on the existence of a strong, vigorous, single-minded and perhaps even fanatic government. This description did not fit the post-war *Kuomintang* headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

It did and does fit the Communist government of Mao Tse-tung, which has effected and is effecting a fantastic internal change while at the same time pursuing no less an ambitious foreign policy than that of communizing the entire world.

This policy, which I shall discuss later, has almost automatically demanded open enmity toward America. It is one of history's little ironies that a China at length fully sovereign after a century of "unequal" treaties picked as Public Enemy Number One the United States, whose hands, as far as imperialist aggression against China is concerned, are not spotless but are considerably cleaner than those of Great Britain, Russia, France or Japan. It is true our policies of the Open Door and the maintenance of China's territorial integrity were probably as practical as they were idealistic. But the idealism was there, on both the governmental and private levels. On balance we were as humanitarian as we were acquisitive and a good deal more humanitarian than any other power.

In view of China's Communist government, however, this is academic. As the world's strongest "capitalist" nation, we are by Marxist theology, Maoist version, the arch devil—a position I shall later discuss in detail.

What are modern China's main strengths and what are her main weaknesses?

Professor Clubb: China's main strength derives from the immense vitality of the Chinese people, their urge to power and the political unity, discipline and direction imposed upon the nation by its Communist government. The nation's historically demonstrated capacity for survival, combined with an ingrained certitude regarding universal values in the Chinese culture, has given the Chinese a self-confidence that contributes in large measure to the country's internal powers. And the Chinese Communist Party offers a leadership avowedly designed to give the Chinese at least one of the things they consider to be their natural heritage—national aggrandizement. In this mass mobilization for the military, political and economic ends of the state, there is great power.

I am often asked how much of this stems from

the cult of Mao—what will happen when he goes? My answer is that the Chinese Communist Party applies iron discipline to itself as well as to the population it rules. In that discipline, it finds a guaranty for continuation of its reign. It is probable that the transfer of power at the top of the monolithic Party will be accomplished smoothly when the present chieftain passes from the scene, and that the Communist control will be maintained for the visible future.

China is thus found regimented for the exercise of its fullest strength for the attainment of national goals in the domestic and foreign fields. But if the Chinese have their strengths, they have weaknesses too. They remain handicapped by an ideological arrogance and intolerance springing from the same ethnocentrism that is a part of their strength. Their capacity for perverse monumental error was demonstrated when they attempted the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, and when they began a war of political attrition against their one strong ally, the Soviet Union, in 1960—while they still occupied an inferior position.

This points up China's main weakness—the debilitated state of its economy. In terms of cultivable land, the country is poor; in terms of agricultural techniques, it is backward. The net result is that China chronically borders close to hunger and to shortages of industrial raw materials and export products. And the difficulties of the agricultural situation are compounded by the country's industrial backwardness. The Communists made an important start, in their first Five-Year Plan (1953-57), in the direction of that "economic reconstruction" so long dreamed of by Chinese nationalists. But when Peking sought to correct accumulated imbalances by recourse to the "Great Leap," it aggravated the economic dislocations that had set in; and when it tried to save the situation by pressing the Soviet leadership for both a sharing of the Communist wealth and a major shift in the Communist world strategy, Moscow pulled its technicians out of China and stopped delivery of goods the Chinese were unable to pay for. Then the full weight of China's shortage of engineering and managerial skills, and of foreign sources of supply, began to be felt.

Even though Peking subsequently undertook major readjustments, the detrimental effects of the political and economic excesses of 1958-60 are still manifest. Herculean efforts have been made to train engineers, technicians and administrators, but the country is still in short supply at the upper levels of those categories. China's partial shift of its trade away from the Communist bloc has not yet won sources of supply equivalent to those it renounced. Finally, there is a heavy drain of scarce material and human resources into the armaments industry—and particularly into the development of a nuclear weapons system.

China's economic underdevelopment has a di-

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rect bearing on its military and political positions. For all of its explosion of two nuclear devices, China remains a second-rate world military power. Its effort (which can be assumed) to build up nuclear weapons and delivery systems can hardly proceed by Great Leaps, and will in fact probably interfere with a balanced military development. By its breach with the USSR, on whom it was depending for modernization of its armed forces, China has assured continuation of its inferior military status for the period immediately ahead. Correction of this deficiency will not be easy: by its actions generally, China has to an important degree isolated herself from the chief alternate source of military and political aid.

In sum, until she overcomes economic backwardness, China will suffer impediments in both the military and political fields as she presses toward her national goals.

BGen Griffith: On 29 December, 1964, delegates to the Third National People's Congress assembled to hear one of Mao Tse-tung's representatives, Senior General Lo Jui-ching, deliver a report on the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. The subject of the General's address was "The Army Armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thinking is Always Invincible."

We do not know what concrete information relating to the state of readiness of the People's Liberation Army (the PLA) the General chose to impart to the delegates. My guess would be not much, if any. After announcing that during the past few years the army had "taken a big stride forward along the road of proletarian revolutionization and modernization by holding high the great Red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking," Gen Lo stated that both the political and military qualities of the army had recently shown an "all-around improvement"; that the technical equipment had been "greatly improved" and that the PLA was "stronger than ever before."

This refrain, one as familiar to the delegates as to foreign observers (who with spectacular lack of success try to follow military developments on the mainland), sheds no light whatever on the actual state of affairs in the PLA. Of course, Gen Lo had no intention of dispelling the murk which envelops all mainland military activity. On the whole, the Chinese Communists have been extraordinarily successful in preserving security of information relating to their armed forces. Discussion of such matters is a serious crime against the State; practically nothing ever appears in the press, and even the lightest crumb of information is pounced upon by foreign analysts.

While breeding a certain suspicion of weakness, such a paucity of information makes our subject almost entirely speculative. As good an estimate of purely physical military strength as any is that

made by the ISS, "The Military Balance 1964-65," which credits China with 115 divisions divided into 30 field armies, besides giving other pertinent estimates. Past and present developments also allow a number of general observations.

Since the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese Communists have been forced to rely almost exclusively on indigenous resources in their struggle to fulfill the ambitious scientific, technical and industrial program originally designed, in a spirit of glowing optimism, with Moscow's help. It is common knowledge that all these programs have suffered; many, including plans for methodical modernization of the People's Liberation Army, were drastically curtailed.

The actual status of China's war industry at the present time is an open question. But we would be prudent to assume that since 1962 (when after the debacle of the "Great Leap" the economy regained a position of relative stability) the leadership has taken steps, if only on a selective basis, toward further modernization of the armed forces.

The Chinese are determined to attain "Great Power" status: to possess nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems, a modern air force and a technically mature army. International developments will radically affect the rate at which China's arms program advances. Although there is little reason to believe that the Russians or the European satellites have sold the Chinese any military hardware since 1959, we must not anticipate that this policy will necessarily continue. Even before this Forum is in print we may have encountered unwelcome contrary evidence in the skies over Viet-Nam where Chinese pilots flying MIG 21s armed with air-to-air missiles would pose a qualitatively different problem from those flying obsolescent MIG 17s.

Some observers argue that, as compared to the number of scientists available in the US or USSR, the number available in China is small, and that this relative disparity will be maintained despite the efforts of the Chinese to close the gap. Therefore, the argument continues, the Chinese will not be able in the foreseeable future to muster the scientific, engineering and skilled technical effort necessary to create a modern military establishment. This bad habit of dealing in absolute statistical terms when discussing Chinese problems can easily lead one down the garden path. China's pool of trained personnel is much smaller than ours, but the personnel are readily maneuverable, and all are engaged in productive enterprises. In China, huge and expensive laboratories and staffs are not dedicated to the creation, care and maintenance of facial creams or detergents.

How effectively China can deploy human and material resources was illustrated by the Lop Nor atomic explosion last October, an achievement noted in *The Journal for the Advancement of Science*:

Production of weapons-grade uranium-235 is an impressive technological achievement indicative of considerable industrial capability . . . A technically incompetent people could not have succeeded in producing weapons-grade U-235 without massive help; the French, after six years, have not yet announced production of highly enriched uranium. Nevertheless, the new accomplishment was not surprising to many US scientists who have had contact with individuals of Chinese extraction and have known of their first-class aptitude for science and technology.

Another member has joined the nuclear club. He already has impressive credentials, and his long-term possibilities should not be underestimated.

These words were written before China's second atomic explosion in May, 1965.

Any discussion of Communist China's military capabilities invariably involves the question of loyalty of the armed forces to the regime. In my opinion the armed forces are entirely loyal to the Party. The PLA is a creature of the Party. Every senior officer in the PLA is a Party member. Given the nature of Party organization in the armed forces, it is inconceivable—at least to me—that the anti-Party cliques could long endure.

The PLA has been repeatedly "rectified" in the past five years; undesirables have been eliminated; only young men with untainted class background are inducted; "class criteria" are rigidly applied to all aspirants for commission.

The PLA is "red," but is it "expert"? The professional competence of the officer corps is unquestionably high. A very large percentage of present general and field grade officers fought in Korea as did senior career NCOs. Technical training of enlisted men has, however, left something to be desired. This can and undoubtedly will be remedied, as standards of literacy in the PLA improve. Our experience in Korea should have taught us not to underrate the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldier. Nor should we now understate his technical competence.

Back of the PLA stands Chinese science, technology and industrial capacity. None of these has by any means realized as yet anything approaching full potential. Barring a major war, or a succession of natural calamities, this potential will be realized *provided* the Party can learn to cease, or lessen, its interference with progressive development. This may not transpire until Mao has departed from the scene, and some of the ideological rubbish associated with the Maoist cult has been cleared away.

What are China's long-range diplomatic goals—in short, where is she trying to go?

Professor Clubb: China's long-range policy goals are to be viewed as complex, not simple, and

as progressive, not static. They are expansive both geographically and ideologically. They envisage as a minimum the restoration of the state's frontiers to the old dimensions of the Manchu empire. The national concept of the "Chinese race" supports this ambition—and goes farther. It includes not only the five peoples—Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and the Turki peoples of Eastern Turkestan—but is readily expanded to embrace various other ethnic elements of Asia as well. For the Thais of Thailand, the Shans of Burma, the Meo of Laos, and the inhabitants of the Himalayan border states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, are all blood relatives of ethnic groups resident in China as native "Chinese." So too, of course, are the Tungusi and Buryat Mongols of Siberia, and the Kazakhs and Uzbeks and other Turkic peoples of Western (Russian) Turkestan. All these, by Peking's logic, belong properly to the Chinese "family of nations."

The Chinese Communists clearly aim, as have Chinese republicans before them, at restoration of a renaissance China to the position of the ancient Middle Kingdom, surrounded by satellites, dominant in all Asia. There is a corollary proposition. Peking has revived the essence of the Japanese war-time concept of "Asia for the Asians." It proposes in effect that Occidentals, whether representing land or sea powers, shall be expelled from Asia *including Oceania*. With this accomplished, China's position as a world power would be consolidated. Then, by Maoist theory, China would be able to mould events in Africa—and even Latin America.

It is of course never certain that either vague dreams or well-calculated plans will prove feasible of realization. The Chinese are confronted by a variety of opposing forces. This circumstance will influence the formulation and implementation of Chinese strategy. The dynasts of Peking will undoubtedly endeavor to reach their strategic goals abroad as at home by "walking on two legs," that is, by combining modern and ancient methods and materials to do the best they can. It remains to be seen whether the best the Chinese can do will suffice for realization of all their national aims.

BGen Griffith: One obvious, major and practical tenet of Chinese Communist foreign policy is to inspire and support so-called "Liberation Wars." The Peking government makes this perfectly clear, as on countless occasions during the past 15 years it has made clear its intention to cause the United States, its allies and friends, as much trouble as possible, wherever and whenever it can. This does not mean that Peking would provoke direct hostilities with the United States. But neither are hostilities impossible. For both they and we can, in a moment of stress, misread or misjudge what are believed to be the other party's intentions.

While China poses no threat to the security of

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the United States at present except insofar as the security of southeast Asia affects us, she is a regional military power of the first magnitude, and a constant menace to the security, if not indeed the very survival, of an independent India. Premier Chou En-lai made this clear enough in his speeches of 21-22 December, 1964, to the National People's Congress when he accused the Indians of occupying 90,000 square kilometers of "Chinese territory" south of the McMahon line "in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border," and "wanting to occupy 30,000 square kilometers more of Chinese territory" in "the western sector." (Chou was referring to Chinese claims in India's northeast Frontier Area and Ladakh. He pointedly reminded New Delhi that China had never "relinquished sovereignty" over the area south of the McMahon line.) Whether these bellicose pronouncements presage another "self-defense counter-attack" which will eventually put Chinese arms in the valley of the Brahma-putra is anybody's guess. In view of the source, one should not dismiss them as mere bluster. China has more than sufficient military force, deployed close to the borders of India, to impose her will in either or both of the disputed areas.

A matter of more immediate concern at the moment of this writing is China's intentions in respect to South Viet-Nam. Will she intervene there with "volunteers," as some people think likely? I think it extremely doubtful that she would commit any military units to South Viet-Nam, as she now appears to consider the situation there favorable and a Viet Cong victory only a matter of time. Should the increasing US counter-effort neutralize the latter hope, Communist China will undoubtedly think long and hard before deciding on open intervention.

Mrs. Durdin: I have mentioned earlier the fantastic internal change in China effected by Mao's government. In extraordinary and ruthless fashion, the Chinese Communists have pacified and unified their huge country, prevented meaningful rebellion, provincial separatism or even "loyal opposition," enforced absolute social, economic and political dictatorship down to the level of the smallest village to a degree never before achieved in China and mobilized, in time of great economic distress, the energies of 650 million people.

A government as dynamic, energetic, single-minded, ruthless and incapable of compromise as Mao Tse-tung's is at home can be expected to exhibit the same qualities abroad. The "normal" foreign policy one might have foreseen for any non-Communist, post-1945 Chinese regime would be to become, gradually but persistently and steadily, the power in Asia and one of several recognized world powers. The scope of this aim

has been enormously expanded—and its time table shortened—by the Chinese Communist Party and its increasingly deified leader, Mao Tse-tung.

As a country traveling at home and abroad by roads and techniques whose success is irrevocably guaranteed by an invincible historical process (known by the Chinese but not the Russians), as far and away the biggest *pure* and orthodox Communist country in existence (by Mao's god-like edict), its stage is far, far greater than Asia. It is in fact the world. The Chinese Communist Party openly and almost daily advertises an objective, a commitment, or rather a dedication to help communize the entire globe by destroying imperialists and capitalists and by aiding and fomenting revolution, rebellion and chaos by every possible overt and clandestine method, including, irrevocably, Mao insists, the use of armed force.

Anyone not allowing a distaste for Chiang Kai-shek and/or a basic affection for China can see the disruptive effects of these policies of Peking's today right around the globe. Nor do China's recent nuclear explosions, coming on the heels of some years of economic crisis and absence of Russian technical assistance, herald a future relaxation of tension for the non-Communist or non-Chinese dominated world.

China's extraordinarily aggressive—and wide-screen—policy in foreign affairs has involved her in open enmity toward and conspiracy against the two greatest world powers today. No Manchu emperor commanding *western barbarians* to repent ever outdid Peking's present arrogance toward Moscow. And I should think only Hitler, toward the Jewish people, ever equaled in pure hate and vituperation Mao's campaign in and outside China against the United States.

I have earlier stated that as the world's strongest "capitalist" nation, America is by Marxist theology, Maoist version, the arch devil. Peking's mission to "overturn" society, not just in Asia, but in Africa, South America and Europe, conflicts with our world power, influence and alliances. And an extremely important reason that Peking works so relentlessly to make 650 million people hate the United States is that American political, sociological and philosophical ideas and, particularly in education, medicine and social work like famine relief, American "humanitarianism," have made a profound impression on the peoples of China, a traumatic re-discovery the Communists made during the short "Hundred Flowers" era.

If we had not existed for perversion in the Communist image, we would have had to be invented. Indeed, we are largely invented and nothing we could have done—including, in my opinion, offering China recognition or helping her toward a United Nations seat—could have prevented this.

This is perhaps a tragedy even more for the Chinese people than the Americans.

I see no near end to it.

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