## SETTING THE COURSE

SPIRITUS INVICTUS, AN UNCONQUERABLE SPIRIT, WILL BE MY STANDARD. I WILL NEVER QUIT,

I WILL NEVER SURRENDER AND I WILL NEVER FAIL. I WILL ADAPT TO THE SITUATION. I WILL GAIN AND

MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE. I WILL ALWAYS GO A LITTLE FARTHER AND CARRY MORE THAN MY SHARE.

October 2021
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MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

IDEAS AND ISSUES

Cover

A Marine assigned to the 24th MEU carries a girl at the Kabul International Airport. (Photo by 1stLt Mark Andries. Courtesy U.S. Central Command Public Affairs.)

DEPARTMENTS

18 August 2021

Marines,

As each of us tries to comprehend the speed and scope of events in Afghanistan this week, some may be struggling with a simple question: "Was it all worth it?" We see videos and photos, we read stories that bring back memories for some of us, and it becomes intensely personal. We value human life, and we want to believe that what Marines have done in Afghanistan made a difference. While Sergeant Major Black and I don't presume to speak for you or your family, we would like to offer our thoughts, so you know where your senior leaders stand.

We both believe—without question—that your service was meaningful, powerful, and important. You answered the call to serve, proudly carrying the torch of so many generations of Marines before you. You put the good of others before yourself. You fought to defend your country, your family, your friends, and your neighbors. You fought to prevent terror from returning to our shores. You fought for the liberty of young Afghan girls, women, boys, and men who want the same individual freedoms we enjoy as Americans. You fought for the Marine to your left and the Marine to your right. You never let them down. You never, ever gave up. You lived with purpose, with intention. Whether you realize it or not, you set an example for subsequent generations of Marines—and Americans—by living our core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Was it worth it? Yes. Does it still hurt? Yes.

Since 2001, Marines have served honorably and courageously to bring peace to the people of Afghanistan. You should take pride in your service—it gives meaning to the sacrifice of all Marines who served, including those whose sacrifice was ultimate.

Over the coming days and weeks, we encourage you to connect with your fellow Marines and their families—particularly those you served with overseas. This is a time to come together and give further meaning to our motto, Semper Fidelis. Let us remain faithful to our fellow Marines, faithful to our Marine families, and faithful to the memories of all who have sacrificed.

We are intensely proud to serve alongside you as your Commandant and Sergeant Major.

Semper Fidelis,

David H. Berger
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Troy E. Black
SgtMaj, U.S. Marine Corps
Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps

MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

Editorial: Focusing on Leadership

I would be remiss if I did not open this month's editorial by recognizing the loss of 11 Marines, one Navy Corpsman and one Army Special Forces Soldier on 26 August outside the Kabul airport. These young men and women join the 2448 U.S. service members killed in action in Afghanistan. We must honor the service and sacrifice of all of these warriors as well as our allies, Afghan partners and the tens of thousands who returned home with life-altering wounds changed forever by their experiences in the service of the nation. These latest chapters of our war in Afghanistan are deeply troubling, and for all who have fought there since 2001, recent events have been emotional, personal, and intensely frustrating. Many veterans and their families question whether their service and sacrifice was "worth it?" The Commandant and Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps' letter to the force of 18 August on page 2 still says it best:

> We both believe—without question—that your service was meaningful, powerful, and important. You answered the call to serve, proudly carrying the torch of so many generations of Marines before you. You put the good of others before yourself. You fought to defend your country, your family, your friends, and your neighbors. You fought to prevent terror from returning to our shores. You fought for the liberty of young Afghan girls, women, boys, and men who want the same individual freedoms we enjoy as Americans. You fought for the Marine to your left and the Marine to your right. You never let them down. You never, ever gave up.

I strongly encourage all Marines and especially recent veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq to read and re-read this letter and to reach out to each other and to our Vietnam veterans. Connect with our veteran Marine community not to commiserate but to find our unique brand of strength and gain the perspective of their greater years of experience.

This month's edition of the Corps' professional journal focuses on leadership. This multi-faceted subject is so much a part of being a Marine that authors of various ranks from across the Corps regularly offer their insights and opinions on improving leadership and leader development throughout the Service. In addition to the articles highlighted on the cover, I recommend "Dark Every Thirty" by Maj Daniel Sanchez on page 14, which offers practical recommendations to reinforce "eyeball leadership" without interference from our ubiquitous digital devices. In "Making Power Personal" on page 20, LtCol R. Alan Fairley examines the two complimentary but often conflicting "power bases" available to leaders.

Other articles of note this month continue the ongoing professional discourse on the range of "trending topics" including Strategy & Policy, Future Force Design/Innovation, the MCISRE/OIE, and Talent Management. We also present additional articles on Suicide Prevention/Resilience building on last month's content on this important and often uncomfortable subject.

Finally, this month also includes the latest installment of the Maneuverist Papers. Here, Marinus investigates the application of the tenets of Maneuver Warfare in Information Operations through a case study of the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Your professional association remains the authoritative source for debate on the topics of greatest importance to the Corps, and we provide access to a plethora of resources for PME and leader development. Visit us at https://mca-marines.org, explore what we have available to support you, and let us know what else we could provide in the future.

Christopher Woodbridge

Response to Olympus

We appreciate Bill Lind's contribution to the development of Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine, as we have acknowledged in the Maneuverist Papers. We are happy to have him re-engage, and we welcome his always-provocative arguments (although we could do with less of the snark). He asks:

> But what does it say about the state of intellectual life in the Marine Corps that it is again fighting over old ground, ground traversed 40 years ago?

He did not ask us specifically, but our reply is this: We do not presume that maneuver warfare circa 1989 is the answer for the Marine Corps today. In fact, we have introduced the Maneuverist Papers precisely because we believe the Marine Corps needs to have that conversation. Marine Corps doctrine is over 30 years old now, and we suspect that many Marines active today do not know its genesis. They were not around when the pages of the *Gazette* were filled with heated arguments for and against. So, yes, part of our objective in the Maneuverist Papers is to provide historical context. If we are to have an informed conversation about where we are going, we ought to understand where we are and how we got here.

Moreover, we would like to think we have done more than merely refight over old terrain. With our discussions of *Dreikampf*, defeat mechanisms, maneuver warfare in cyberspace, and criticality versus vulnerability, we have tried to advance the theory. Mr. Lind himself has grudgingly acknowledged the concept of *Dreikampf* as progress. In other cases, we have suggested areas where there is soil fertile with possibility for new thought. But in so doing, we have chosen always to adjust from a known point—that point being our current doctrine. With respect to the strategic failure that Mr. Lind mentions, we suspect he has a strong ally in Marinus Era Novum, and we would be eager to hear what they may have to propose as a solution.

Since we have mentioned the *Dreikampf*, we fully agree with Mr. Lind, from his earlier letter to the editor (*MCG* Jul21), that the population is likely to be a collection of factions rather than a monolithic will—just as each side in an interstate war is likely to be an alliance or coalition of states that have each temporarily subordinated their separate interests to the greater mutual interest rather than a single belligerent. However, from a system-dynamical point of view, the distinction Mr. Lind makes between *Dreikampf* and *Vielkampf* is less important than he argues. The shift from a two-body problem (solvable) to a three-body problem (generally unsolvable) at the aggregate level is what accounts fundamentally for the exponential increase in complexity or, in Mr. Lind's phrasing, "wickedness." The existence of multiple factions is merely additive to that exponential increase.

Finally, we could not agree more with Mr. Lind's point that ideas matter. That is the whole reason behind the Maneuverist. We are guardedly hopeful that Mr. Lind may be willing to join the conversation in a constructive way.

Marinus

Bill Lind: Enough is Enough

In his letter "Groundhog Day in the Marine Corps" (*MCG*, Aug21), William "Bill" Lind failed to see the irony in his claim that today's Marines are ensnared in a Groundhog Day. Clearly, it is not the Marine Corps but Mr. Lind who has been living in his own Groundhog Day. Since his co-authored article proclaiming a fourth generation of war appeared in the *MCG* (Oct89), he has continuously tried to sell the idea, only to have it rebuffed by some of the most respected and renowned military historians and strategic and operational theorists. During this same time the Marine Corps has moved on, cultivating knowledgeable and forward-thinking leaders of the first order.

But it is not only in the intellectual arena where Lind has lived a repetitive existence. From his earliest writings, he has been habitually monotonous with an unpleasant inclination to insult and rebuke those he is trying to influence. He carried this inclination into his letter where, among other unsupported affronts, he asserted "the Marine Corps is more than a few bricks shy of a load."

After reading Lind's letter, younger Marines might be apt to ask the question: "Where did Mr. Lind come from?"

Lind appeared on the Marine Corps scene as a civilian member of the broader military reform movement in the 1970s, offering a stark critique of the Corps' approach to operations. From the outset, Marines both praised and condemned him. The condemnations were more often for his unnecessarily inflammatory presentations and personal attacks on Corps leaders than for the substance of his arguments, which Marines often took to heart.

We have personally read and listened to Lind now for over 40 years. But because his approach was considered subversive by some leaders, he was often kept away from official activities in the mid-1980s. Prevented from entering Marine bases by one Commandant, he was "brought into the tent" by the 29th Commandant, Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr. in 1987. Subsequently, he was frequently invited to visit and speak at Quantico's schools and to operational units. One of us spent considerable time discussing ideas with Lind and supporting his activities at Marine Corps University in 1988–1991 and Marine Corps Combat Development Command in 1995–1997.

Not all Marines could look past Lind's style and abrasive personality. Some saw him as a dilettante dabbling in a profession of which he had no personal knowledge. Nonetheless, with the exception noted, Lind has pretty much had free rein throughout the Corps for many years. He has been granted a fair and lengthy hearing by the Corps' leadership.

Early on, his observations were useful and pointed many to shortcomings in the Corps' warfighting doctrine and practice. In addition, he guided instructors and doctrine writers to important German sources of tactical and operational thought. Most importantly, he introduced the Corps to the iconoclastic retired U.S. Air Force Col John Boyd and his unique insights into warfare. The

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Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the *Gazette*. They should not exceed 300 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to gazette@mca-marines.org. Written letters are generally published three months after the article appeared.

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MARINES

Marine Corps accepted, synthesized, adopted, and eventually incorporated much of what Lind and Boyd had to offer into its seminal doctrinal manual *Warfighting*. In the years since, Lind's value to Marines has steadily declined until, at this point, we believe he has little to say that is of value. Warfare has changed dramatically, as has the Marine Corps, but Lind has been singing the same tune since 1989.

Lind's letter contains several unsupportable allegations. Early on he asserts that Marines adopted maneuver warfare in 1989 but have failed to practice it. We contend that remains an open and debatable question—and has been since the Corps officially adopted maneuver warfare with the publication of *Warfighting*. It is a question we have heard Marine leaders discuss often over the years. They have come down on both sides of the issue. Nearly all these leaders saw combat in such places as Grenada, Somalia, Kuwait, Iraq, or Afghanistan, we among them. To the best of our knowledge, Lind has never gone forward to see Marines in action in past or recent conflicts, so his assertion is based on mere supposition, or he is repeating arguments he has heard from others. In more blunt terms, there is little evidence that Lind's assertion is based on either first-hand observations or any thorough study of the subject.

We do not believe a person needs to experience combat or even to wear the uniform to write authoritatively about military operations. One of our favorite historians, the late John Keegan, is proof of this. However, to become such an authority one must do extensive reading and research. Lind offers no evidence he has done so with his criticism of the Marine Corps' practice of maneuver warfare. To be credible he needs to be forthcoming with the evidence underlying his declaration that Marines have failed to practice maneuver warfare.

As always, Lind is highly critical of the intellectual capacity of the officer corps. Based on our long service teaching and leading in various parts of the Marine Corps' PME programs, we can attest, without reservation, that today's Marine leaders are the most widely read, inquisitive, and innovative we have encountered since enlisting in 1956. Lind's malicious comment that "the officer corps seems to have left its brain at the hat check" is utter nonsense. There has been no "intellectual collapse" in the Marine Corps; the reality is just the opposite.

Lind's thoughts no longer carry much weight. The time has come for Marines to listen to other voices inside and outside the Corps. We are far more interested in the thoughts of James N. Mattis, John F. Kelly, Anthony C. Zinni, John L. Gaddis, Hew F.A. Strachan, Lawrence D. Freedman, Donald J. Stoker, B.A. Friedman, and others than those of William "Bill" Lind. Regarding the so-called fourth generation of war, we favor by far the voices of Antulio J. Echevarria II and the late Colin S. Gray.

If there is a fourth generation of war, then by necessity there must be first, second, and third generations of war. Lind and others have purported that there is such a construct, and their faith in a fourth generation of war derives from that construct.

We argue, as does Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, a distinguished historian, author, and the current Editor-in-Chief of the U.S. Army War College Press, that war does not unfold as generations that evolve over time along a continuum. Rather, war, be it regular or irregular, has an immutable *nature*, as Clausewitz so meticulously demonstrated two hundred years ago. While the nature of war does not change, what can change over time is the *character* of war as new ways and means are introduced to warfare. (Warfare is the manifestation of war's character.) But such changes do not occur in a generational manner with one generation succeeding its predecessor as Lind contends.

Moreover, many of the *characteristics* that Lind identifies as central to the fourth generation of war—the rise of non-state actors, decentralization, and the blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians—have dominated wars of past ages. They are not new to a so-called fourth generation of war. Dr.

Echevarria expressed similar views, particularly in a work he published in 2005, when he wrote, "the generational model is an ineffective way to depict changes in warfare."[1]

If the generational model of war is not a viable concept, is there anything of merit solely within the so-called fourth generation of war? There is, but first we will identify several of the many faults lurking in the fourth generation of war theory.

First among the key faults is its assumption that nation states are on a path of unalterable decline leading to the demise of interstate warfare. This is demonstrably untrue. Even today the most likely potential conflicts confronting the United States are war with Iran, North Korea, or China. The late Colin S. Gray, the most consequential strategist of our times, set this fact out clearly. While addressing the fourth generation of war he wrote in 2005 that "faith in the decline and fall of the state is lethally premature."[2] There are other faults.

In place of interstate warfare, Lind and his advocates claim violent non-state actors will be the major participants in warfare. These non-state actors will not seek victory through greater economic or military power. Instead, according to Lind and his followers, these non-state actors will achieve victory through superior political will. Gray makes it plain that this is simply a restatement of the structure of irregular warfare, that it is a rediscovery of the obvious and the familiar. He further states that fourth generation of war theory "contributes nothing new to the intellectual tools available to help us understand the dynamism of strategic history."[3] (For other critiques of the fourth generation of war, we recommend "Elegant Irrelevance: Fourth Generation Warfare," authored by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., and published in *Parameters* in 1993.)[4]

Despite its many faults, the fourth generation of war theory has one merit; it forewarned the western world in 1989 that insurgency in the form of irregular warfare would be the dominant form of warfare in the future and regular warfare of significantly less consequence.

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TRANSHIELD

That advanced warning came in "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," published in the October 1989 issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette.* Martin Van Creveld offered a similar warning in *The Transformation of War* published in 1991. But Lind has continued to champion the fourth generation of war concept ever since, without success,

> *... we encourage Marines currently serving to look beyond the views and opinions of Lind.*

having failed to operationalize it in any meaningful way. Meanwhile, Marines have of necessity wrestled with that challenge through two wars over nearly two decades.

Based on what we have learned in over 105 years of combined service in uniform and subsequently as PME instructors, we encourage Marines currently serving to look beyond the views and opinions of Lind. His thoughts have no worth remotely comparable to what today's Marines garner from service under fire or through professional education and training.

Mirroring Lind's annoying comment at the close of his letter, we find ourselves compelled to respond in kind, noting that in continuing to insist on the merits of a fourth generation of war Lind reveals that he has only one broken brick in his load.

Notes

1. Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2005).

2. Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, (London: Orion Books Ltd., 2005).

3. Ibid.

4. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. was promoted to the rank of general in March 2019 and is currently serving as Commander, United States Central Command.

LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret) and Col James K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret)

Diversity

📄 l believe that the authors of the article "Diversity, Equity & Inclusion" (*MCG*, Jul21) were wrong when they suggested that the total number of Marines in every grade should be made up of targeted percentages (diversity goals), for different races, genders, ethnicities, etc. For example, fifteen percent black, twenty percent female. Rather than using diversity goals (percentages) for each grade, I suggest use of MOS performance goals for personnel in each grade. The performance of individuals or groups in any service organization, military, police, fire, rescue, medical, etc., does not depend on their race, ethnicity, or gender. Sample proof: if you were in critical condition in a hospital would you want the best qualified and dedicated surgical team or

the team with the most diversity? The answer is obvious. Diversity would not even enter your mind! Performance only depends on the professional qualifications and dedication of people to serve others, even in the face of danger to themselves. To put the Marine Corps in the best position to maximize its contribution to helping all of America's military forces keep the peace and win future wars, we must focus on finding, through fair competition, the best qualified individuals—not groups, to be admitted into, promoted within, and then retained for as long as practical. ln conclusion, consistent rewarding of individuals that have the highest level of qualifications and dedication to serving others is the only thing we should be seeking in our Marine Corps. Not diversity!

Col Robert W. Falkenbach, (USMC)Ret

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Manners Matter

A call for courtesy
by Maj Leif Halverson

>Maj Halverson is a Logistics Officer and Africa Foreign Area Officer currently serving as the Africa Desk Officer for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC. His previous assignments include Company Commander, Assistant Logistics Officer, and Maintenance Management Officer at Division and MLG units.

Do we ever address development of the softer sides of leadership and character? (Photo by LCpl Jodson Graves.)

As Marines, we pride ourselves on stoicism, severity, and austerity. We collectively see ourselves as frugal stewards of taxpayer trust and take great pride in self-denial and self-deprecation. We idolize decisiveness, demonize sloth, and beat the drum of honor, courage, and commitment. All of these attributes have merit and contribute to our enduring legacy, but do we ever address the softer side of good character? This article does not propose a revolution in military thinking, a softening of our hard exterior, or a reversal in Service culture; rather, it argues that tempering severity with courtesy and stoicism with approachability leads to higher levels of trust, implicit communication, and combat effectiveness within a unit. Our leadership principles tend toward traits of action and boldness, with good reason. However, there remains room in every Marine's development for those squishier characteristics we often forget about or take for granted. This article offers a summary of those traits for your consideration.

Humanity. Throughout our Marine Corps careers, regardless of rank, most of us have encountered exceptionally personable or notably robotic leaders and supervisors. All else being equal in terms of tactical proficiency and professional competence, most of us would simply like to work with someone who asks about our personal lives, cracks a smile, and seems—well—human. This trait is the question of relatability and stands in direct contrast to the automaton—that person so focused on mission accomplishment that they fail to make time to foster lasting connection with peers and subordinates. I had bosses who never asked what I did on the weekend or how my family was doing, just as I have had ones who

were happy to sit down over a beer after working hours. How do you deal with the automaton, that unapproachable peer or superior? Exemplify to them the empathy and personal connection you would have them demonstrate to you; ask about their families, hobbies, and preoccupations. Volunteer information about yourself through small talk. Make a joke and see if they respond in kind. True, jumping out on a limb in this way can be awkward, nerve-wracking, or just plain weird, but the results might open the door to a warmer relationship that facilitates candor and implicit communication. No Marine stands alone,

and our hierarchy need not be so rigid that we become unapproachable or unrelatable.

Humility. The other day, a general officer held the door for me—twice. Here is a leader undoubtedly busier, more sought after, and more preoccupied than I am, but he took the 3.5 seconds needed to demonstrate good manners and common courtesy. As Marines, we rightly emphasize customs and courtesies and take pride in our organization. However, we need to be careful that pride does not mutate into arrogance or haughtiness. For example, most of us have met someone who

believes that they have "arrived." That is to say, someone so proud of his achievement and dedication that he feels owed and entitled based on experience and time in service, which comes across as repugnant arrogance. Some of us may have even subconsciously become these Marines, which demands a humble, objective, and thorough self-examination. By contrast, humility opens the door to unique ideas from unexpected avenues and protects well-meaning leaders from unexpected blunders. On many occasions, I have had smart privates first-class, lance corporals, and corporals give me a good idea just because I sat them down and explained that I needed help. Additionally, humility teaches us that, when it comes to arguing, even if you win, you lose. We all like to win, but burning bridges and creating resentment out of foolish pride damages the team as a whole. Combatting arrogance and fostering humility requires active correction by peers and subordinates empowered to speak hard truths. It also requires each of us to discern between proper pride, which sets our Corps apart, and the poisonous pride that attacks our personal and professional relationships.

Kindness. It is easy to mistake kindness for weakness, but mature Marines know that kindness is the expression of strength and confidence. The key to kindness is the absence of the expectation of reciprocity; being kind guarantees you nothing in return. Instead, being kind takes time and effort to cultivate but eventually becomes second nature and self-fulfilling. In a thriving command, kindness looks like birthday cards for every Marine, visits to the house or delivering flowers when illness strikes, donating clothes or furniture when a newborn is on the way, or simply letting the Marines go home early when a holiday is near. Most of us are great at these things, most of the time. The struggle with kindness is in keeping it a priority when the operational tempo gets heavy, deployment is around the corner, or the command is under scrutiny. Kindness is not a nice-to-have; it is a must-have.

Empathy. Not everyone is capable of what you are capable of. Not everyone

How often do leaders encourage input from junior Marines? (Photo by LCpl Aaron Henson.)

is at the same stage in life or dealing with the same personal issues. Empathy teaches us to relate to others, find common ground, and build worthwhile relationships. It is the antithesis of egoism and self-importance. Most tellingly, empathy relates directly to the Marine Corps leadership trait of unselfishness, but remains different in that empathy emphasizes relating to feelings, while unselfishness deals with disregarding one's own comfort and advancement. I have no idea what it is like to have marriage problems, an abusive spouse, or substance dependency, but empathy makes me want to relate to those who do. More importantly, empathy tells me to lead from the perspective that it very well *could* be me in any one of those situations and that I am beholden to do my best to be helpful. Not just because I am the boss but also because we are all human, all Marines, all family, and all in the same boat.

> **Demonstrating humanity, humility, kindness, and empathy not only complements our established leadership traits but also helps us build stronger interpersonal relationships …**

None of these traits should surprise the reader, and they are certainly not a comprehensive list. Rather, highlighting these characteristics reinforces positive qualities that the Marine Corps does not regularly address and proposes that their active cultivation will improve your relationships and strengthen your unit. If anything, this article dives into subcomponents of integrity and serves as a counterbalance to our cultural tendency towards stoicism, emotional detachment, and singular focus. Demonstrating humanity, humility, kindness, and empathy not only complements our established leadership traits but also helps us build stronger interpersonal relationships, professional dedication, and reinforces the strong moral character our country demands of us.

The 12th Leadership Principle

Hold your Marines accountable

by Capt Michael Hanson

>*Capt Hanson is the Company Commander of Lima Company, 3/4 Mar, at Twentynine Palms, CA.*

Generations of budding Marine leaders, whether young non-commissioned officers (NCO) at Corporals Course or candidates at Officer Candidate's School, have been groomed in the fourteen traits and eleven principles of Marine Corps leadership.[1] These classic guidelines have served Marine leaders well since they were first established. However, a critical principle of basic military leadership has been missing from these: hold your Marines accountable.

The first lesson every prospective leader of Marines learns is to lead by example. This is a sound principle but in many cases it only goes half way. A leader can, and should, set the example in every possible facet of the military lifestyle—whether in manner and appearance, customs and courtesies, physical fitness and mental toughness, technical and tactical proficiency, mentorship and counsel, and the many other attributes of a complete Marine. However, there are times when merely displaying an example for others to follow is not enough. There are plenty of Marines that are perfectly content with giving only the bare minimum. Indeed, there are some Marines who seek to contribute even less. Acceptance of substandard performance is a guaranteed path to failure as a leader and can invite catastrophe. Thus, there will inevitably come a time when a leader must hold their subordinates accountable.

It is always challenging to require deficient Marines to live up to expectations. This is the hardest part of leadership, but it is the most important part. As an example, no Marine officer enjoys being saluted. In fact, many detest it. However, what officers dislike more than not being saluted is having to remind Marines to render that proper custom and courtesy. Thus, some officers will look the other way and pretend not to notice when a junior Marine fails to salute. These officers do not want to be seen as petty or egotistical for demanding to be saluted. Though understandable, this attitude is unwise because that officer is setting a bad precedent and signaling to the junior Marine that it is permissible to shirk from an expectation, no matter how trivial it may seem.

Likewise, many staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO) dislike inspecting the barracks after field day. As can be expected, few adults like verifying that other grown adults satisfactorily cleaned their rooms on a weekly basis. Despite this, SNCOs dutifully inspect their Marines' domiciles to ensure that the task was in fact completed in an acceptable manner. Though this too may seem trivial, it is of great importance to the Marine Corps as it is simple maintenance to safeguard the proper care of living spaces. Considering the amenities available today, some barracks are comparable to some of the finest dormitories on some of the best college campuses in America. Though many SNCOs may dislike the tediousness of inspecting barracks rooms, most would agree as to the importance of this weekly task to certify

Motivating deficient Marines to perform up to expected standards is one of the challenges of leadership. (Photo by PFC Vanessa Austin.)

that young Marines respect their billeting and take care of it. The quarters do not belong to the Marines, they belong to the taxpayers of the United States. As stewards of taxpayers' money, it is incumbent on Marines at all levels to treat them as such and maintain them. A good SNCO has no problem telling Marines to take their feet off the furniture in the common rooms so as not to damage it. Again, there are times when Marines must be held accountable.

Few NCOs relish inspecting their Marines' weapons for cleanliness, but every NCO realizes the vital importance of this task. The employment of weapons systems is what the Marine Corps is in business for, and dirty weapons that fail to operate can lead to mission failure and, even worse, the deaths of Marines. Thus, every good NCO knows they cannot just take for granted that their Marines cleaned their weapons suitably. Good NCOs know instinctively that they must stick their finger into the chamber and see if it comes out black. If this happens, that NCO knows they simply cannot permit that weapon to be turned into the armory.

At every level, leaders must hold their Marines accountable and inspect what they expect to make their Marines actually do what they are supposed to be doing all along. Whether correcting Marines on the effective employment of weapons systems, the safe use of equipment, the proper wear of the uniform, or appropriate customs and courtesies, these small things all add up to something much larger. This is the instilment of a system of accountability that conditions Marines to good habits of thought and habits of action that reinforces a sense of responsibility to respect standards, no matter which ones. These are the natural checks and balances that are bred into the Marine Corps.

The officer that allows a Marine to not render an appropriate salute has now made a new standard which could potentially compromise the entire system. That officer has just demonstrated to that wayward Marine that not all standards really matter. Now that Marine may mistakenly think that other standards, practices, and expectations do not matter either. Leaders that pick and choose which standards to enforce create Marines that pick and choose which standards to follow. In a system governed by compliance to lawful orders and regulations, this can lead to serious problems of discipline, tactical effectiveness, general accountability, and even safety.

The NCO sticking a finger into the chamber of a rifle and the SNCO telling a Marine not to put their dirty feet on the barracks furniture are not only reinforcing their own authority but that of their higher leaders. Thus, the officer that neglects to correct a Marine for failing to salute is not only squandering his own leadership capital but also of those above and below him. This all may seem trivial, but there will inevitably come a time when that officer needs the Marines to respect the authority of subordinate leaders because that officer cannot always be present in situations where Marines need guidance.

The hardest level of leadership is leading among peers. It is easy for a lieutenant, staff sergeant, or a sergeant to give a directive to a group of junior Marines. However, it is much different for junior Marines to tell their peers what or what not to do. In many cases, it takes a good degree of moral courage to be that voice. Additionally, the other members of the peer group have to respect that voice. It can be hard for them to respect the message if they do not respect the voice. This is why it is absolutely vital that officers, SNCOs, and NCOs continually reinforce the aforementioned system of accountability: because when neither of these leaders are present and junior Marines try to hold their peers accountable, that message needs to be heard regardless of the voice that delivers it. It needs to be recognized as the voice of higher authority, whether they are present or not.

In the complex world that encompasses the future operating environment, many Marines may find themselves in physically and morally challenging situations that will require them to make decisions on their own, without higher leaders to guide them. Whether on a patrol dispatched in a decentralized manner, in high intensity combat that results in the death or incapacitation of senior leaders, on a convoy in an isolated location, or in a garrison environment when no one higher is looking, Marines will find themselves in awkward, uncomfortable, and difficult situations with no one but themselves to look to for guidance. When this happens, Marines must have a baseline to fall back on. That baseline is the sum of the habits of thought and habits of action that were invested in them at every turn leading up to this ultimate one.

This is why leaders must hold their Marines accountable. Leaders must hold their Marines accountable because when the chips are down, they will need their Marines to hold themselves accountable. Leaders train units, and disciplined units hold themselves accountable. It is the job of every leader to cultivate a disciplined unit. In order to help our future leaders with this solemn mission, it is time for the Marine Corps to add the twelfth leadership principle: Hold your Marines accountable.

Notes

1. 14 Traits: Justice, Judgment, Dependability, Initiative, Decisiveness, Tact, Integrity, Endurance, Bearing, Unselfishness, Courage, Knowledge, Loyalty, and Enthusiasm. 11 Principles: Know yourself and seek improvement; Be technically and tactically proficient; Know your Marines and look out for their welfare; Keep your Marines informed; Set the example; Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished; Train your Marines as a team; Make sound and timely decisions; Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates; Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities; Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.

USMC

Dark Every Thirty

Communications, leadership and human interaction
by Maj Daniel Sanchez

High-quality communication builds trust and relationships between officers and junior Marines. These relationships can grow to become high-quality connections. However, the nature and demands of email, digital and electronic tasks, reporting, and meetings rob our junior officers of high-quality and undistracted troop-time. This reduction in meaningful and human interaction has a negative correlation and forfeits their ability to identify deteriorating attitudes, risky behavior, bullying, online activities, financial and relationship stress, signs of depression, and perhaps the subtle precursors of suicide or suicidal ideations. (See Figure 1.) Officers looking Marines in the eyes without the E-Anchor burden is needed one day per month.

"E-Anchor" is a term I use to describe our high-degree of dependency on electronics and staff meetings. It is the sum of an email inbox, smartphone, electronic deliverables, and meetings that depend on electronic media or device. These are the weights that moor an officer to the keyboard. The E-Anchor has become the plan of the day. Junior officers need support as our greatest fire radars for suicide and other deviant behavior.

Malcom Gladwell highlighted LtGen Paul Van Riper as the Red Team Commander during Millennium Challenge 2002 in his book titled *Blink*. The phrase, "I will be in command, but not in control," and his desire to push boundaries resonated with me. The courage to give guidance combined with leadership and patience affording subordinates the time and space needed to exploit opportunities while off the grid.

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Email and Electronic Media Reduce High-Quality Communication

We are drawn to new technology and products of marginal value such as slide shows and storyboards like moths to the flame. Relying on technology as much as we do in our communication architecture can become our Achilles heel, especially with the lengths it takes to defend against electromagnetic pulses and corruptible geo-location on devices.

Figure 1. Junior officer and enlisted engagement function.
(Figure provided by author.)

For example, cellphone use during large exercises—like those conducted at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, CA—can produce significant amounts of intelligence for those who know how to access it.

Communication disciplines use the word, schema. It is our mental history of experiences from school, life, sports, relationships, and combat. Our ability to effectively communicate and, more importantly, *share* understanding is largely a function of schema. When our schemas differ to a significant ex-

tent, personalities will often fail to make sincere connections because of a lack of common understanding. Conversations can be high impact and very short, so to make a sincere connection, one must actively listen and be ready to be an active participant.

Unfortunately, many leaders chose to use rank and authority as a simple solution to address the functionality of schema. This approach is having diminishing returns of effectiveness. Our communication climate worsens as increasing demands on time spiral communication further into the electronic abyss. We default to communicating via email and time spent in exclusive meetings. This does not build schema. E-Anchors make it difficult to resource and plan for the junior leaders. It is up to the staff officers and senior staff non-commissioned officers, somewhere in the middle, who should be trying to remove barriers for junior leaders, understanding that staff work cannot go undone.

Marginal Returns to Suicide Reduction and Deviance

Despite years of training and more of the same, suicides continue to elude solutions. There have not been significant improvements. Getting left of bang requires persistent relationship patrolling via soft skills. Proficiency requires practice over a period of invested and uninterrupted time.

Given my previous challenge to online training, a few deviants on social media can quickly cast the Marine

Corps in a bad light at the national level. Given the questionable return on investment for such demands on an already full training plan, instances such as the Marines United scandal casts doubt on the emphasis put on required online activity. This was one illegal activity in addition to the many singular Marine-on-Marine issues commanders must investigate after-the-fact.

Too Much Time Is Excised from Junior Officers

Our attempt to satisfy reporting demands of higher headquarters is the business of the day. Meetings and electronic tasks are trending and normalized as E-Generators. These are actions that proliferate other electronic and online tasks. This kind of direct oversight stymies initiative and is not aligned to maneuver warfare.

The pushing away of keyboards and smartphones is a weak or non-existent habit in our officers. Start-and-stop in-terruptions caused by our E-Anchor and unproductive meetings can leave little time to work and engage in high-quality communication with more than a few

> *This kind of direct oversight stymies initiative and is not aligned to maneuver warfare.*

people per day. Platoon commanders have dozens of Marines, giving them little time to notice behaviors and intervene in the cases of Marines who are slipping through the cracks.

Suicides and other deviant behavior, such as sexual harassment, are unusual. These are binary events measured as fail = 1 and success = 0. Investing in operations to reach zero as success is a cost and benefit dilemma requiring dedication and time commitments that cease production.

Skylab 4 was among NASA's longer and historic space missions. The mission commander made an unprecedented move six weeks into operations. On 28 December 1973, he broke standard operating procedures and went dark by turning his radios off for the welfare of his crew. The commander was frustrated with ground control's micromanagement and endless demands. His name was LtCol Gerald P. Carr, Marine Corps.

Recommendation: Conduct Dark Every 30 (DE30) One Day Per Month

Officers looking Marines in the eyes, without the E-Anchor burden, is needed one day per month. Invest one full, intentional, and uninterrupted day to Marines and their immediate officers via one electronic-free DE30 day. Perhaps this could be modified to a

partial day of guarded and undistracted time spent between junior officers and SNCOs and their Marines. Taking a page from LtGen Lejeune, these young men and women are in their formative years and require increased and focused levels of mentorship.

DE30 Scheme of Maneuver

- The commander of the DE30 unit has autonomy per the *Marine Corps Manual*.
- The DE30 company/platoon submits the morning report as early as possible.
- Set autoreply on for email and forward calls to voicemail.
- Confirm "Going Dark" with the chain of command.
- No authorized electronics (issued or personal) except for systems delivering munitions.
- Per the Commandant, reduce your electro-magnetic signature.
- Do not stack work onto a dark unit on a dark day.
- CCIRs/SIRs/OPREP-3s overrule DE30 until reporting is complete.
- End DE30 at 1600, confirm "Online" with the chain of command, and secure.

> ### Invest one full, intentional, and uninterrupted day to Marines and their immediate officers via one electronic-free DE30 day.

Test one company per battalion with morale and welfare as the measures of effectiveness by the company first sergeant and battalion sergeant major. This is scalable and an opportunity to exercise junior officer boldness while reinforcing the senior enlisted advisor role. If entire formations cannot go dark, consider just the officers going dark. To address concerns, guide all outsiders to call the unit hardline or officer of the day for serious issues. Leaders coordinate contingency plans. Should this practice prove to significantly increase morale and welfare, expand and share it with our sister Services and consider inclusion into *Marine Corps Bulletin*

1500, Annual Training and Education Requirements. Should DE30 not produce positive changes in morale and welfare after six months, cease the operation.

We are all dedicated to exploring and developing feasible solutions to issues that plague our Marines' welfare. This is a low, not zero-cost approach as everything comes with a price. Monthly DE30 drills are my recommended course of action to help junior officers identify and prevent suicide, deviant behavior, and practice tactical electronic darkness.

Dark Every Thirty

Zero Dark 30 is a colloquial term that has come to refer to somewhere after midnight but before sunrise. It is a time none of us particularly like. Natural vision and visibility is usually severely degraded but that *is* when we prefer to fight. We have tools and techniques to see in the dark and train to periods of limited visibility as a given condition. So, if we are going to fight, it is at Zero Dark 30.

We own the night. That is something you will read or hear if you study modern battles or talk to senior officers. Let us do what we do best but in an electronic media sense and go dark—apply our winning calculus.

Dark

I shuffled the word dark to the beginning, which is also a reference the absence of light or sun. The word dark is symbolic. There is a gravity-like and relative meaning here. Darkness comes every night—you cannot fight it, so put it up front. I welcome going dark to bring the light of the next day. Darkness in a computer sense will bring light between people. I argue our Marines that are suicide-risky have trouble seeing that today's problems are temporary. Now

seems like an eternal sentence and they quit. DE30 teaches subordinates that we as leaders *can* push away from electronic media and devices. Subordinates will hopefully emulate and connect with living breathing people. This also has value on the modern battlefield where personal electronic devices can be used to geo-locate a position.

Every

Next, rather than keep Zero and minimize Dark, I want us to challenge our fear of darkness and again welcome it. We should be bold in a Heracles manner. This is also a reference to say the darkness (depression) is here whether you acknowledge it or not. We need to walk boldly-together, to not go gentle into that good night. I want us to rage against the dying of the light. Let us do this religiously, as one performing the Eucharist.

Thirty

Keep the number 30 in place but change it a few orders of magnitude to symbolize this is big—minutes to hours, days, weeks, a month. Though it is DE30 days, it is still a month. This is a three-part pneumonic device that Marines are already somewhat familiar with and thus is more easily remembered.

"Dark" is the left bookend and describes the condition. "Every" satisfies a need for consistency and regularity like a Eucharist. "Thirty" is the right bookend and the frequency. "Dark Every Thirty" is a complete thought in a military mind.

Hypocrisy

A misunderstood aspect of leadership?

by Maj Nathan Wood

>*Maj Wood is a reserve Intelligence Officer and an attorney for the Department of Justice.*

There are few things worse, in the eyes of a Marine, than hypocrisy. Hypocrisy—saying one thing while believing or doing another—is the polar opposite of what may be the most revered Marine Corps leadership trait: integrity. No Marine would claim to be a hypocrite, nor stand to be called one. Those are fighting words.

Yet, the uncomfortable truth is that to be a leader, one must become a hypocrite. The two go hand in hand. A full understanding of leadership, therefore, is incomplete without an understanding of hypocrisy. It may be the case that hypocrisy is just as important an aspect of leadership as any of the more familiar—and more honorable—leadership traits.

Why Leaders Are Hypocrites

Why are leaders hypocrites? For the simple reason that no leader, however virtuous, can always live up to the standards that he believes in and champions. Even Chesty Puller must have had moments of cowardice, however fleeting. Even George Washington must have lied on occasion. But in order to effectively lead their organizations, leaders *must* demand that others consistently meet the standards; indeed, the hallmark of good leaders is that they reliably set and enforce high expectations for their subordinates.

This is the very definition of hypocrisy—saying one thing (meet the standards) while doing another (failing to meet them, at least occasionally).

Any parent understands this dynamic. Even the best parents routinely require their children to meet behavioral standards that they fall short of themselves. That is to say nothing of parents (myself included) who require their children to meet behavioral standards that the parents failed to meet when they were kids. Parental hypocrisy, "do as I say, not as I do (or did)," is the same sort of hypocrisy that even the very best leaders exhibit.

Good vs. Bad Hypocrisy

There are two types of hypocrisy, one much worse than the other. On one end of the spectrum is hypocrisy that is intentional and deceitful—when a person professes to believe one thing while knowingly and deliberately conducting themselves to the contrary. Think of the public figure (real-life examples abound) who decries the moral decay of society while cheating on his spouse behind closed doors. This type of hypocrisy has no place in the Marine Corps.

But there is another form of hypocrisy. I will call it "good hypocrisy," but perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it is neither good nor bad, but simply unavoidable: when humans try their best to impose and enforce standards of conduct yet predictably fall short, hypocrisy is the result. Good hypocrisy is a far cry from the flagrant hypocrisy of the cheater in the previous paragraph; rather, it is the well-intentioned hypoc-

No leader, however virtuous and well-intentioned, can always live up to all the highest standards of the Corps. (Photo by LCpl Tyler Pender.)

risy of loving parents (or leaders) doing their best but occasionally failing to model the behavior they want their kids (or Marines) to emulate.

Several writers have recognized that this sort of hypocrisy is not just inevitable but perhaps even desirable. *Washington Post* columnist Michael Gerson, for example, wrote in 2016:

> In one sense, hypocrisy is unavoidable and necessary. If people were required, at all times, to live up to ideals of honesty, loyalty and compassion in order for those ideals to exist, there would be no ideals. Being a moral person is a struggle in which everyone repeatedly fails, becoming a hypocrite at each of those moments.[1]

Similarly, Harvard Law professor and author Jack Goldsmith has written that

> [h]ypocrisy is an underappreciated political virtue. It can palliate self-interested and politically divisive government action through mollifying rhetoric and a call to shared values.[2]

Additionally, commentator and journalist Ramesh Ponnuru sounded a similar note in 1996 when he wrote that

> hypocrisy serves an important social function. If a public standard of moral conduct is to have any force at all, inevitably some people who believe in that standard will sometimes fail to meet it.

According to Ponnuru,

> [f]or a society to be both decent and tolerable requires a healthy amount of hypocrisy. ... If a society doesn't want to see many of its members fall short of its moral standards, it can only have minimal or nonexistent standards.[3]

As these writers observed, good hypocrisy is inevitable, even in a decent and tolerable society made up of moral people. Similarly, good hypocrisy is inevitable even in good units led by the best Marines.

What's the Right Amount of Hypocrisy?

Although hypocrisy may be an inevitable byproduct of good leadership, I am not arguing that Marines should *aspire* to be hypocrites. To the contrary, as Gerson noted, "[a] just and peaceful society depends on hypocrites who ultimately refuse to abandon the ideals they

Good leaders can always look at themselves in the mirror and know they are at least striving to meet the standards they champion. (Photo by LCpl Yasmin Perez.)

betray."[4] Likewise, strong units depend on leaders who refuse to abandon their ideals, even as they fall short of them again and again.

However, leaders can go too far in attempting to avoid hypocrisy. A singular focus on aligning what one says with what one believes or does can be crippling. In a misguided attempt to align the two, some leaders, out of a sense of guilt, may even go so far as to stop enforcing standards that they fall short of—they level down (ignore the failure of others) to avoid hypocrisy rather than level up (improve their own behavior). Think of the leader who fails to enforce body composition standards because he is carrying a few extra pounds himself. While this may have the virtuous effect of avoiding hypocrisy, it has the catastrophic effect of corroding standards of conduct. It is hard to tell which is worse. (Although it pains me to say it, worse.

I would take the hypocrite who enforces standards over the Marine who fails to—but manages to avoid being a hypocrite—every time.) Any attempt to eliminate hypocrisy entirely is not only futile but also counterproductive.

So what to do? How can Marine leaders find the right balance between accepting that they will be hypocrites without either resigning themselves to that fate or trying too hard to prevent it? Put differently, what is the right amount of hypocrisy?

Good hypocrisy ... is the well-intentioned hypocrisy of loving parents (or leaders) doing their best but occasionally failing to model the behavior they want their kids (or Marines) to emulate.

If they stopped and thought about it, the best Marine leaders would probably admit that they are indeed hypocrites. But they would also likely point out that the important question is not whether they are hypocrites but whether they are making reasonable attempts not to be. Good leaders can look themselves in the mirror because they know they are trying to meet the standards they

profess. At the same time, however, they are forgiving enough of themselves not to dwell on those occasions when they came up short, and they are confident enough not to be paralyzed by feelings of guilt when enforcing standards they have sometimes fallen short of.

Perhaps one reason this type of leader is so effective is that he tends to strike a similar balance when dealing with subordinates; he can be just as forgiving of his Marines as he is of himself.

A Soft Spot for Good Hypocrites

It has been my experience that Marines respond well to this approach—I certainly do. This may be because Marines understand that their leaders will sometimes fall short but do not mind so long as their leaders are trying not to and it does not happen too often. I have also found that Marines appreciate leaders who set high expectations and pull no punches in enforcing them—even if, occasionally, such enforcement is hypocritical. In fact, good hypocrisy of the kind exhibited by loving parents and caring leaders can even engender affection and loyalty; there is something noble and inspiring about people who continue to struggle even when they are bound to fail and who refuse to abandon the ideals they betray. Marines may also take a certain kind of comfort in knowing that, like them, their leaders are fallible.

Conclusion

So maybe it is not true that there are few things worse, in the eyes of Marines, than hypocrisy. Rather, it may be the case that Marines intuitively grasp the difference between good hypocrisy—an inevitable byproduct of even the best kind of leadership—and bad hypocrisy. In that sense, hypocrisy may be one of the most misunderstood aspects of leadership. A fuller understanding and appreciation of hypocrisy and its various forms is therefore essential for leaders—and followers—at every level in the Marine Corps. Marine leaders should recognize that hypocrisy is their fate without resigning themselves to it.

Notes

1. Michael Gerson, "Trump's Hypocrisy Is Good for America," *Washington Post,* (November 2016), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com.

2. Jack Goldsmith, "Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?" *The Atlantic*, (October 2017), available at https://www.theatlantic.com.

3. Ramesh Ponnuru, "In Defense of Hypocrisy," *Washington Examiner,* (September 1996), available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com.

4. "Trump's Hypocrisy Is Good for America."

Making Power Personal

An approach to improve leadership effectiveness
by LtCol R. Alan Fairley

The literature on leadership is vast and often confusing. As a result, military leaders may find it challenging to discern the most effective leadership development tools and methods. This article provides a simplified conceptualization of leadership that has been meaningful in my own pursuit of leadership development. Specifically, the idea of leadership in terms of applying positional versus personal power. The case is made that personal power is often the more effective, albeit harder to develop, method of influencing others. Historical examples and recommendations are provided with the intent to help us all, author included, work to improve our personal power and be more effective military leaders.

Defining Leadership

Literature is peppered with hundreds of different definitions of leadership. Even each of the military Services have a different take on defining leadership as shown in Table 1. Nonetheless, a common thread in most definitions centers on influencing people's behaviors. This is accomplished through the use of power, or the ability to influence the actions or attitudes of others.[1] Simply stated, power is the leader's influence potential.[2]

> *... personal power is often the more effective, albeit harder to develop, method of influencing others.*

Table 1. Military Definitions of Leadership

In 1959, French and Raven were the first to conceptualize leadership in terms of the type of power leaders use to influence.[8] They introduced five power bases: coercive, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent. These are defined in Table 2, along with information power which was later introduced by Raven as a sixth power base.[9]

Table 2. Bases of Power

These power bases can be further categorized into the general categories of positional or personal power. Thinking of power bases in terms of these two categories provide a simple way for military leaders to think about how they influence those around them. These categories are shown in Figure 1 on the following page.

Positional Power

Positional power is given to a leader based on his or her rank or title. Those with higher rank are often granted positional power commensurate with their title or position in order to influence the actions of others. If one vacates the position, they lose their positional power, and the power is transferred to the next to hold the title. Positional power is useful to increase compliance or conforming to a specific requirement or demand in an organization. Often our goal as military leaders is to generate and maintain compliance in our unit consistent with our intended outcome. Followers,

Military Service	Leadership Definition
Army	The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.[3]
Marine Corps	The sum of those qualities of intellect, human understanding, and moral character that enables a person to inspire and to control a group of people successfully.[4]
Navy	The art, science, or gift by which a person is enabled and privileged to direct thoughts, plans, and actions of others in such a manner as to obtain and command their obedience, their confidence, their respect, and their loyal cooperation.[5]
Air Force	The art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission.[6]
Coast Guard	You influencing others to achieve a goal.[7]
Space Force	(Definition not available)

Table 1. Military definitions of leadership.

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Bases of Power	Definition
Coercive Power	Originates from a leader's threat of force to gain compliance. Within the military, this can range from administrative paperwork, extra duties, loss of rank, pay, or even confinement. While this form of power may produce short-term compliance, coercive power often stifles creativity, innovation, and lack of commitment to a leader's vision.
Reward Power	Is nested with a leader's ability to provide a reward to others for compliance and need not be tangible to be effective. Rewards can incentivize positive behavior to perform.
Legitimate Power	This form of power is common in formal organizations such as the military. The institution has granted authority to lead based on recognized position. Service members wear easily-identifiable rank commensurate with the authorities granted by the military.
Informational Power	While not as commonly referred to as the other bases of power, some scholars recognize informational power as a sixth element. Sharing information, or conversely the threat of withholding information, is a source of power that may be used to influence the actions of others.
Expert Power	Regardless of rank, this form of power is bestowed upon a leader based upon the individual's specialized skillset, unique experiences, or increased knowledge. They influence behavior because of their expertise, not because of rank or threat of reprisal. Examples include trust in the instructions from the aircraft crew chief during a flight or trust of our medical provider's advice when favoring an injury.
Referent Power	Referent power generates from others. It comes from earning respect and trust. If others find a leader likeable, charismatic, or generally trustworthy, then the leader has referent power to use to influence others. This form of power takes time to develop but is an impactful tool which can be used to shape long-term cultural changes.

Table 2. Bases of power.

especially those in military circles, recognize a leader's rank, title, or position and are expected to immediately comply with the leader's orders or directives. In the military, this type of power is important especially in urgent or unpredictable situations when immediate action is needed. While research has shown the use of a positional power base on its own was positively associated with compliance, the downside of compliance is it leads to decreased satisfaction amongst followers.[10] Positional power consists of coercive, reward, legitimate, and information power bases.

Personal Power

Unlike positional power, personal power is granted to a leader from their followers. It has nothing to do with rank or title, and instead focuses on the leader's personal abilities. Subject matter experts, and those viewed with admiration or trust, possess increased levels of personal power. Followers look to these leaders because of these personal qualities. Leaders with personal power demonstrate increased influence potential because people trust them. While positional power generates com-

pliance, it is personal power which generates commitment amongst followers. Personal power is associated with skills like expert knowledge, empathy, active listening, conveying strong rational, and communicating an inspirational vision. With commitment or buy-in from followers, the leader has now increased the long-term collective dedication and allegiance to an organization. The benefit to personal power is not only commitment but satisfaction.[11] The expert and referent power bases are nested within a leader's personal power.

Figure 1. Positional vs. Personal Power

Effective personal power often leads to the most noteworthy outcomes, and as a result, greater positional power. The historical examples below highlight how personal power fueled some of the most noteworthy leaders in military history.

Historical Examples
Alexander the Great

As a 22-year-old king and military general, Alexander the Great had positional power to lead his troops into battle against a numerically superior and capable Persian force during the battle at Granicus River. During battle, he demonstrated to his troops a remarkable ability to read his opponent and adapt quickly to changing battlefield circumstances, thus increasing his expert power. Alexander himself killed the Persian commander Mithridates in front of both armies, instilling even greater confidence and trust in his troops.[12] Despite his standing as king, after the battle Alexander combed the ranks and talked with many of his troops about their individual roles in battle and the details surrounding how they received their wounds. This remarkable display of humility and compassion amplified Alexander's personal power and formed an enduring bond with his followers. From this moment until Alexander's death, he achieved not only compliance, but full commitment from his troops.[13]

BG Charles McGee

In October 1942, Charles McGee was called to join the U.S. Army Air Forces. He became a pilot with the Tuskegee Airmen, the famed all-black

Figure 1. Positional vs. personal power. (Figure provided by author.)

male aviation unit in the U.S. Army Air Forces. In his first tour, he flew 137 combat missions where he earned significant respect and trust from fellow pilots. In total, he is credited for flying over 409 combat missions during World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam conflict.[14] His many successes and expertise as a pilot, especially while fighting for a Nation divided by racial inequality, paired with his ability to earn the trust of those around him afforded him great personal power. As he earned increased rank, he continued focusing on inspiring others as a way of influence. As a result, he continued a trailblazing career and ultimately achieved the rank of brigadier general. To this day, he remains a respected leader and mentor.

LT Vincent Capodanno

In April 1966, LT Capodanno, U.S. Navy, deployed to Vietnam to serve as the chaplain for 3/5Mar. The Marines gave the well-respected chaplain the

Figure 2. Outcomes of positional and personal power. *(Figure provided by author.)*

nickname "Grunt Padre" for working and living in the same conditions as the Marines with whom he served. When a nearby platoon was being overrun by enemy forces, LT Capodanno circulated throughout the battlespace, administering last rites and rendering medical aid. Although an exploding mortar caused multiple wounds, he refused medical assistance and instead directed other Marines to help their wounded comrades.[15] While the chaplain eventually died in the battle, it was his personal power which inspired the Marines around him. The lieutenant's rank alone did not influence the heroic actions of the Marines; it was because

he had earned and maintained their respect, trust, and confidence.

As evidenced in the examples above, it is typically personal power that has lasting, significant impact. However, we must also remember the use of personal power does not guarantee positive results. Leaders may be well-respected, trusted, and seen as experts in their

> *... sound judgment and careful consideration of ethics becomes even more important when leaders utilize personal power to supplement their positional power.*

field, but they can set conditions that lead to harmful behavior and ethical violations. Whether it was the 1956 drowning of recruits at Parris Island, the 1968 My Lai massacre, or the abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, we need not look far to find scars in our history fueled by misuse of personal power. Thus, sound judgment and careful consideration of ethics becomes even more important when leaders utilize personal power to supplement their positional power.

Maximizing One's Leadership Potential

One of the 11 Marine Corps Leadership Principles requires Marines to "[k]

now yourself and seek self-improvement." I know first-hand that relying on positional power is often easier and more expedient to get through a growing task list. The rank and position entrusted to a military leader is enough to influence the behavior of others. However, as leaders we should not depend on our positional power alone for we will fall short of reaching our true potential. By solely relying on positional power, we limit our options to customize various approaches to best influence others. Relying on rank and position should never be enough (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Outcomes of Positional and Personal Power

So how can military leaders learn to move beyond positional power to gain more personal power? Below are recommendations I have challenged myself to implement and offer to others as a starting point as well:

Reflect. We should reflect on the power bases we rely on most. Do we tend to influence others because of our positional or personal power? Are we achieving actions through short-term compliance or long-term commitment? Do we need to develop greater emotional intelligence in order to make calculated adjustments between positional and personal power to achieve the best results?

Seek feedback. We all carry biases which may affect our interaction with others. We should learn to welcome feedback from those around us and use it as an opportunity to learn more about ourselves, how our actions impact others, and how we can improve.

Never stop learning. We face thinking adversaries who are exploring conventional and unconventional means to gain a competitive advantage over us. We must continue to learn and innovate. Former Secretary of Defense and retired Marine Corps Gen James Mattis once said, "'Winging it' and filling body bags as we sort out what

works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession."[16] In addition to striving to be expert strategists and tacticians, we should pursue learning opportunities to become better leaders, mentors, and people of character.

Train, trust, and empower. Even the best leaders cannot achieve maximum effectiveness without the collective efforts of a team. Plan and conduct realistic individual and unit training, with a strong emphasis on teamwork. Empower others to make decisions at appropriate levels and trust they will operate within the leader's parameters. Welcome well-attempted and aggressive efforts in training, even if they result in failure, for they generate powerful and irreplaceable learning opportunities.

Empathize. To increase our personal power, we must practice being more mindful of subordinates' needs and feelings, treating them fairly, and defending their interests when acting as their representative.[17] We must attempt to understand where others are coming from, even if we do not share their reasoning.

Listen. Listen to understand the communication from others; not just to reply. This can be challenging given a pressing operational tempo, but it is a great way to learn about those around us. What challenges do they face and what inspires them? Demonstrating a genuine interest will develop personal and professional bonds while increasing a leader's influence potential.

Communicate. This should be done clearly and often. Communication includes easily understood mission-type orders with clearly defined intent, task, purpose, and endstate; however, communication need not stop there. We must learn to take the time to know the people we work with, up and down the chain of command. If we demonstrate honesty and sincerity, we are likely to receive the same.

Love them. Maybe the best recommendation was expressed by LtGen (Ret) Lori Reynolds. Her advice on military leadership is commensurate with what one can expect from a true trailblazer. The U.S. military prides itself on providing challenging training, equipping troops appropriately, and putting them in harm's way. "What sets us apart and makes this organization extraordinary," she opines, "is we love them."[18] As leaders, it is our job to treat them like we love them. If we strive to do that, we will no doubt improve our personal power and be more effective leaders.

In sum, leaders can influence behavior through positional power, which garners quick compliance, and personal power, which fosters satisfaction and commitment. Effective leadership includes adjusting our reliance on the various power bases to appropriately address separate situations. There are times when a leader must choose between generating immediate compliance and long-term commitment. There is an obvious time and place for compliance. However, the long-term goal for any leader should be promoting true commitment to a cause by earning and effectively utilizing personal power.

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USMC

First Impression

Effective leadership principles for lieutenants arriving to the fleet

by Capt Daniel Tudor

Each year approximately 240 second lieutenants are designated as logistics officers and report to Logistics Officers Course. Over the past eighteen months, while instructing and supporting the lieutenants of the Logistics Officer Course, I have been asked by each of the ten iterations of the course for guidance on effectively assuming initial billets and how to lead Marines effectively upon arrival. Similarly, I have fielded questions on how to effectively build relationships with staff non-commissioned officers while maintaining the *trust but verify* mentality reinforced throughout the training pipeline. I was unprepared the first time these questions were asked and tripped my way through answering with anecdotes and personal experiences, which, judging by the glassy eyes and blank stares, provided the students with no new meaningful insight on the topic. Since then, I have reflected on past experiences assuming new billets and the steps I took to make a lasting first impression, maintain existing momentum, and create a seamless transition. I discovered that my success has always followed the development of personal authority with the Marines of the section, platoon, or company.

MCDP 6, Command and Control, provides the following on a leader's authority:

> The basis for all command and control is the authority vested in a commander over subordinates. Authority derives from two sources. Official authority is a function of rank and position and is bestowed by organization and by law. Personal authority is a function of personal influence and derives from factors such as experience, reputation, skill, character, and personal example. It is bestowed by the other members of the organization. Official authority

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provides the power to act but is rarely enough; most effective commanders also possess a high degree of personal authority.

Through the development of influence and connections with subordinates, especially early in my career, I have been able to supplement my official authority and find success—even when I lacked experience. The cultivation of this personal authority has reduced struggles in transition and has contributed to my ability to develop effective teams. To assist future lieutenants as they prepare to assume their first billet in the fleet,

as well as any other leader preparing to commence a new billet, I have detailed the steps I take in each new billet.

Observe

The best advice I ever received about preparing to assume a new billet was from our company first sergeant, SgtMaj Soto (then 1stSgt Soto). His recommendation to all the platoon commanders was to observe a new unit for a minimum of two weeks before trying to implement changes except in cases of negligence or illegal activity. His justification for this observation period was three-fold.

Showing up to a new unit or assuming a new billet and immediately making procedural changes erodes the professional image of the previous billetholder. These changes may place the incoming officer in a vulnerable position where they risk losing subordinate's respect that held the previous billet

Inspections are an opportunity for a new lieutenant to observe their new unit. (Photo by SSgt Edward Guevara.)

holder in high regard. Allowing time for the actions and effects of the previous leader to fade reduces the risk of tarnishing their professional reputation while also allowing the new billet holder to establish rapport with subordinates.

External agencies typically control billet change timing with little to no consideration for current and future operations. These disruptive changes to manpower compound when new leaders institute extensive modifications to existing processes. Destruction of momentum and continuity follows substantial changes, forcing leaders to address internal frictions before the unit can function as a cohesive team once more.

While doctrine and policy provide a framework for how the Service operates as a whole, units have small nuances that make up their internal standard operating procedures. By taking time to observe the current processes and making a conscious effort to understand why these processes exist, the new billet-holder can gain clarity as to why the unit operates the way they do. Only after developing an understanding of these processes, and the background behind why they exist, will a leader be able to effectively initiate small changes, targeting specific inefficiencies or unnecessary steps without detriment to the unit's mission and operations.

Ask Questions

Instead of attempting to reshape your new unit immediately upon arrival, take time to ask questions. Asking questions and genuinely listening to the answers about what your Marines are doing, why they are doing that, and what is required of them to complete their task builds the foundation for a trusting relationship. Theodore Roosevelt's quote, "Nobody cares how much you know until they know much you care," demonstrates the importance of building relationships with subordinates. By learning about your Marines, your unit, and the processes that affect both, you will understand the thought process behind procedures and, armed with that knowledge, can begin to affect change if required. Making changes without fully understanding the current state leads to

Asking questions and listening to Marines during tactical exercises can give new lieutenants insight into the Marines they lead. (Photo by SSgt Edward Guevara.)

uninformed decisions that may inhibit forward progress or erode professional credibility.

When I first started asking questions upon assuming a new billet, I had the sole interest in seeking to understand the current state of the unit. As I asked these questions, I discovered an unintentional biproduct that proved helpful in the trust-but-verify department. Junior Marines and non-commissioned officers typically tell you what they know and are often proud of demonstrating their expertise and knowledge. On the other hand, some SNCOs, along with some of their subordinates, tell you what you want to hear so you leave them alone, and they can finish whatever it is they are working on. Asking questions of everyone in the section, coupled with genuine listening, quickly highlights the Marines in your section or platoon that are proud of their work and those that are just getting by. On this point, though, I have found that SNCO's get a bad name at OCS, TBS, and MOS school with all the talks of trust your SNCO but verify the work they are doing. I have been fortunate enough to work alongside some of the most professional SNCOs who were vital in shaping my leadership skills and mentoring me to a successful career. Assume your SNCO's are competent professionals within their field until they give you a reason to doubt them. A trust-but-verify approach should not be an exercise in

looking for faults but rather a tool to gain insight and build rapport.

Be Present

When SgtMaj Robertson took over as the CLB-1 sergeant major, he published his leadership philosophy to the leaders within the unit. One of the items that stuck with me from that point on was a simple bullet that read: "Leaders must be present to win." This statement is especially true when attempting to build personal authority with subordinates. Being present means more than merely showing up to work; leaders must fully embrace their new position. As brand-new lieutenants arriving at the fleet, you likely have your heart set on specific billets or specific things you want to achieve. You will quickly find that the Marine Corps has a plan for you, and often your plan and the Marine Corps plan do not line up perfectly. Too often, lieutenants start their career disgruntled because they did not receive the billet they desired. Instead of feeling sorry for yourself, take ownership of your billet and become a master in that subject. By design, lieutenants spend a limited amount of time in one billet before changing to another, and your actions in your first billets may have a direct correlation to follow-on billets within that command. Additionally, actively seeking to change billets, always inquiring about possible deployment opportunities, and voicing frustrations

about not receiving your desired billet translates to your Marines as you do not care about them or the work they do.

Another aspect of being present is having some situational awareness of how the operations of your unit affect the Marines and their families. As a young platoon commander with 1st TSB, providing general support to I MEF, I was quickly made aware of how busy the MEF was and how often we provided support to external field operations and training events. While I had very little control over when these events took place, duration of exercises, or location, I had almost complete control over how these missions were messaged to the Marines, specifically how much notice I gave the Marines. One way my platoon sergeant and I managed this messaging was to inform the Marines anytime we received a notification of the possibility of supporting another event. We established a precedent that the Marines would know, at a minimum, dates, and locations for all training events as soon as we knew about them, even if those dates and locations were tentative. As my time progressed within the unit, the Marines become comfortable with the fact that dates continuously change, and events could be adjusted or canceled. This transparency enabled the

Marines to manage their own work-life balance by understanding what events could take place while building their trust in their leadership by knowing that if any changes were to happen, they would know as soon as we knew.

Set and Hold Clear Expectations

Many enlisted Marines become frustrated with the constant turnover of officers within their unit. The driving factor in this frustration is the fact that few officers clearly define their expectations of the Marines upfront, and the Marines have to figure out their leader's expectations of them over time. By the time all the Marines understand the expectations of their leader, their officer-in-charge rotates, and someone new comes in.

To mitigate these frustrations, leaders need to clearly articulate their expectations down to the most junior Marines as early as possible in their tenure in a billet. These expectations can be communicated by a written leadership philosophy and guidance or by merely speaking to the Marines and explaining what you expect and why you have those expectations. Before communicating your expectations to your Marines as a whole, it is crucial to discuss these in-depth with your leadership team and ensure complete buy-in and un-

derstanding of your expectations by your immediate subordinates. Buy-in is critical; without buy-in, there is an increased chance for competing priorities and expectations—leaving the Marines confused, conflicted, and disenchanted.

Clearly defined expectations are excellent but hold no weight if you do not actively adopt these expectations into your own life and hold others to the expectation you have set. Once every Marine knows what you expect, you must hold them to those expectations. The essential trait for any leader, regardless of experience level, skill, or reputation, is consistency. Do not be afraid to have the uncomfortable conversations with your senior non-commissioned officers or non-commissioned officers about how they are not meeting your expectations. By letting minor inconsistencies occur without making corrections, your Marines may develop an attitude of disregarding your expectations if they are inconvenient for the Marine. Lack of consistency generates perceptions of favoritism, laziness, or lack of ability and skill, ultimately eroding unit cohesion.

The hardest part of being a Marine is learning to interact with a wide variety of individuals. The best leaders develop personal authority within their units to build momentum and accomplish their unit's mission. While this is far from an all-inclusive list of how to be successful in leadership positions at the onset of one's career, it should provide a framework to begin building your leadership philosophy. Leading Marines is, without a doubt, an art that requires constant reflection, adjustment, and mentorship. The aforementioned steps have contributed to my personal success within the specific billets I have held leading the specific Marines of those units. Every leader, unit, and group of Marines is different, and there is no one-size-fits-all process but leveraging tried and true concepts early in your career enhances the development of your leadership style.

Understanding the effects of training and deployments on Marines' families is another requirement for the new lieutenant. (Photo by WO Bobby Yarbrough.)

MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION
EST 1913

GEN ROBERT E. HOGABOOM LEADERSHIP WRITING CONTEST

Gen Robert E. Hogaboom.

The *Marine Corps Gazette* is proud to announce the commencement of its annual Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest. The contest honors the essay that is the most original in its approach to the various aspects of leadership. Authors should not simply reiterate the Eleven Principles of Leadership or the Fourteen Leadership Traits of an NCO addressed in the *Guidebook for Marines*. Authors must be willing to take an honest, realistic look at what leadership, either positive or negative, means to them and then articulate ways and methods of being an effective leader of Marines.

E-mail entries to: gazette@mca-marines.org

Mail entries to: Marine Corps Gazette
Hogaboom Writing Contest
Box 1775
Quantico, VA 22134

DEADLINE:
31 January

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Background

The contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacific battles in World War II, he later served first as assistant division commander, then division commander, 1st Marine Division, in Korea in 1954–55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a lieutenant general while serving as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general.

Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for first place; $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place; and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

Instructions

The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submitted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a file and send to gazette@mca-marines.org. A cover page should be included identifying the manuscript as a Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest entry and include the title of the essay and the author's name. Repeat title on the first page, but author's name should not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are acceptable, but please include a disk in Microsoft Word format with the manuscript. The *Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest during February and notify all entrants as to the outcome shortly thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry per author will receive an award.

The Principles of Bureaucratic Leadership

Formally recognizing the most uninspiring yet critically essential form of leadership

by Maj Leo Spaeder

The Marine Corps does not teach bureaucratic leadership; instead, it teaches personal leadership via the established lists of traits and principles. However, these are not interchangeable skills or ideas. The Corps does not teach this type of leadership because bureaucratic leadership sounds—and, frankly, is—lame. It does not connote the bold, warfighting spirit that the Service lionizes and values at the expense of other necessary styles of leadership. But if the Marines cannot afford to lose the first battle (and potentially, with it, the entire campaign) in the age of

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great power competition against peer competitors, then it must have an agile, responsive, and innovative supporting establishment capable of navigating the concept development, defense acquisition, and Capitol Hill landscapes to retain or regain our advantage over the enemy. This cannot be accomplished without savvy bureaucratic leadership. As the majority of general officers serve at non-operational (aka bureaucratic) commands, we must arm our senior leaders with these skills. Even with their operational nature, there is still a need for bureaucratic leadership principles at and within the MEFs since those headquarters are the transition between personal and bureaucratic leadership spaces.

Below is a list of ten bureaucratic principles to describe how this leadership is different than the 11 Personal Leadership Principles currently taught by the Marine Corps.

1: Leading a Bureaucracy Is the Most Difficult Type of Leadership

With due respect to peer and combat leadership, bureaucratic leadership is the most difficult to master because Marines are least prepared for it by the typical career path. The scale is typically more vast, the mission is less clear, there are more peer-level leaders and co-workers in a bureaucratic landscape, and personal example and charisma only have limited effectiveness. First, the majority of assignments involve personal leadership, mostly at the platoon/company/battalion-level, and most Marines will never make it into a bureaucratic leadership position within their careers. Once in these fewer positions, there is a tendency to *do what got you there* since it has proven effective before, even though it is not the most effective strategy once you have arrived. Second, bureaucracies are usually sprawling organizations with a scale and scope much larger than the

To succeed as the future "Inside Force," the Marine Corps must prepare leaders for the complex bureaucratic terrain of Washington, DC. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Carlos Vazquez II.)

well-defined units within which most Marines operate. This proves challenging for the best Marines as the transition from personal to bureaucratic leadership is simultaneously combined with a larger span of responsibility. Third, this larger span of responsibility is often met with less clarity of purpose. Many bureaucracies have forward-looking responsibilities: develop the future force required to compete/deter/win in the future operating environment. That mission is wholly different from "seize MEF objective A." Next, there are more peers in a bureaucracy. While there is always a clear chain of command in a bureaucracy, the power and authority that comes with rank is not as applicable. There is a different power dynamic between Marines and civilians/contractors than the typical Marine-only encounters in the fleet. Process bestows power, and multiple and different sources of power lead to more "peers." Finally, personal charisma only projects so far and the span of the bureaucracy is often farther. If personal example is key to your leadership, how does that relate when many of your subordinates will never physically see you or hear your incredible motivation? This is why the Marine Corps needs to teach something more than well-cultivated charisma.

2: Many of Your Subordinates and Stakeholders Are Not on Your Team

This fact is unfortunate yet entirely true. Many of your subordinates have been at the organization longer than you, will be there longer than you, and therefore think they know better than you. The unity of effort experienced in combat where a unit divided is one about to be defeated does not translate into bureaucracies, where defense of rice bowls often reigns supreme. Internal resistance comes in many forms: slow-rolling initiatives, shaping conditions to limit options to those acceptable to the subordinate but not fully in-line with leadership, and mobilizing resistance through external communities of interest. External stakeholders also occupy a more important status in bureaucracies and your organization's performance or expanding influence can be a direct threat to their mission. Understanding

this principle is essential for an effective bureaucratic leader.

3: Your Energy Powers the System

In bureaucracies, there are no fire and forget missions: you must always be engaged or your initiatives will wither on the vine. First, leaders of large organizations are often trying to overcome some cultural or structural deficiency that has led to sub-optimal results. In these cases, the direct and continued engagement of the leader is essential to overcome some of the hurdles outlined in principle [#2] and improve outcomes. Secondly, external organizations—more on this in principle [#9]—will only engage with your action officers if they know that the organization's leader is invested in this mission. If they know your action officers do not have your support (and your accompanying rank/authority) behind them, their influence will wane and effectiveness minimized. Bureaucracies cannot succeed with lethargic or disengaged leaders.

4: Own Your Calendar and Schedule It Purposefully

Everyone is busy, but leaders of bureaucracies are distressingly so. However, successful leaders must drive their calendars. Too often, calendars are filled with questionably valid engagements that do not contribute to the organization's success. Worse, these poorly applicable engagements' opportunity cost may actually undermine performance, since the leader is not thinking about or addressing the organization's key challenges. When planning the schedule, leaders should ask two questions: Is this critical to the mission? If yes, then must I personally need to attend, or can an empowered subordinate go? This purposeful scheduling will open the calendar for important events and create time to attend battle-rhythm events (as a chair or just an observer to assess the "pulse" of the room), interact with your team on key challenges or just build rapport, and, most importantly, think. Every leader—bureaucratic or not—should also schedule a weekly Shultz hour: a time to close the door, move beyond the close-fight bedlam, and reflect on longer-term goals and

the organization's general direction.[1] Critical thinking is essential to success (more on this next in principle [#5]) but requires time, and a packed calendar is a prominent roadblock that leaders must remove.

5: Process Does Not and Will Not Replace Leadership or Critical Thinking

Effective bureaucracies need established processes to function, but process cannot exist simply for process' sake nor to replace decision making, yet this occurs far too often. The same organization that instills the idea that an 80 percent solution executed violently now rather than a 100 percent solution executed later is still debating a unisex dress uniform after almost a decade of consideration.

There are certainly arguments supporting group genius and process, but process must be linked to the effect of the decision and the appropriate decisionmaker. Also, leaders must recognize people's unconscious bias to conform within groups; often, processes that should indicate rigorous critical thinking merely serve as a rubber-stamp for previous work without challenging underlying—and often invalid—assumptions. Leaders must generate time (from principle [#4]) and think critically about both the process and the recommendations it has generated.

6: You Must Be Able to Connect With Subordinates Without Physical Presence or Personal Charisma

Bureaucracies are normally large, spread across multiple locations if not multiple states, and have competing events and battle rhythms; there are limited opportunities for an all-hands formation. Receiving instruction directly from a leader is not a feasible long-term strategy in a fast-paced military bureaucracy. Leaders must transition from traits of personal leadership and develop communications means that can overcome the inherent distributed nature of bureaucracies as well as the insidious challenges related under principle [#2].

Then-acting Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Modly, demonstrated a fantastic example with his SECNAV

Vectors. These weekly messages were direct, personally written communications to the large and disparate Department of the Navy bureaucracy about cutting edge topics affecting the Naval Service. These concise one-to-two-page letters informed the entire workforce about his priorities and commander's intent directly, avoiding potential distortions or outright stonewalling of the message. However, the former secretary provides a welcome reminder that bureaucratic leadership principles are a supplement to, not a replacement for, the essential character traits and leadership principles.

7: Know Your (and Your Principal's) Reference Point and Risk Tolerance

This principle is firmly derived in prospect theory and absolutely essential for every organizational leader and staff officer to know. Everyone has a reference point—a hallmark event that defines your worldview—and an accompany risk tolerance, either risk-adverse (the default setting for military officers who are conservative by nature according to Samuel Huntington) or risk-seeking. For example, after the disastrous 1806 war with Napoleon in which the decisive Battle of Jena-Auerstadt was fought, Prussian King Frederick William III's reference point was imprinted to that humiliating defeat. The famed Gerhard von Scharnhorst—arguably the ultimate bureaucratic leader—exploited this reference point to introduce wholesale reform to the Prussian military system. When the king waivered on implementing needed reform, Scharnhorst used his reference point to highlight the cost of maintaining the status quo and reinforcing the king's risk-seeking tolerance in order to regain his lost kingdom and personal honor.

Most leaders of large organizations are risk-averse, while subordinates are risk-seeking. Many Marines—certainly myself—are guilty of providing at least one "blow it all up" recommendation to a senior because they would not be the one accountable for its effects. Using the current Commandant as an example, his force design initiative is certainly risk-seeking as it has upended the previous Service strategy and capstone operating concept. Why is he risk-seeking? Maybe his reference point is his tour as the Marine Forces Pacific commander, where many have postulated a Jena-Auerstadt moment for the United States. Knowing reference points and risk tolerance, you can identify your own, know how you may be sold on ideas (different tolerances require different strategies), and how you can convince your senior to adopt a course of action.

8: Set Priorities, Advertise Them Thoroughly, and Resource Them Accordingly

Tropes such as, "If everything is your number one priority, then nothing is your number one priority," and "If you don't set priorities, someone else will," are well-understood yet consistently violated in large organizations. Ever-changing number one priorities waste resources and prevent the organization from achieving its goals, yet leaders consistently violate these principles. As an aspiring bureaucratic leader, deliberately consider what you want your organization to accomplish over different time horizons. Understand the threats that may undermine these goals (which could include a higher headquarters not following this principle) and the opportunities that may reinforce them. Make long-term priorities more durable to changes, while short-term priorities are more concrete. Outline these priorities in accessible forms. Lastly, resource them accordingly and then follow the plan. Deliberation, dissemination, and discipline are required to fulfill this principle.

9: Peer Leadership Is Managing Adjacent Organizations Who Have the Same Problems Listed Above

Hopefully, the appreciation that bureaucracies are not unitary beings moving in lockstep has taken hold. Since adjacent organizations are peers of fellow bureaucracies, an effective leader must adeptly manage the effects of these peers, which themselves have subordinates operating not in line with their leader's intent, lethargic leaders unable to connect to their workforce across a large span of control, and are constantly changing priorities while also under-resourcing them. This description of a complex environment is another key difference between the burdens of bureaucratic versus personal leadership.

10: Leading a Bureaucracy Is Thankless

As a bureaucratic leader, do not expect Marines to read your Legion of Merit citation and laud your accomplishments long after you have hung up your uniform. While this type of leadership is essential to any successful military organization and campaign, it is thankless by nature. Again referring to Scharnhorst, he never received personal command or accolades that he deserved in his lifetime, despite creating the Prussian system that dominated the continent for the next century. Bureaucratic leaders must internalize President John F. Kennedy's quote that "victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan." To be successful, bureaucratic leaders must recognize and accept that they will not be recognized for positive achievement, more likely being the target of scorn. Only then can you fight with a happy heart and achieve your organization's goals.

Through its approach to personnel development, the Marine Corps has been wildly successful in developing personal leadership in its Marines. This is why outside organizations regularly study the Marine Corps and attempt to adapt its principles and traits. However, the Marines have not accepted the idea of bureaucratic leadership as uniquely different than personal leadership, requiring a different set of principles for application. Hopefully, the list of ten principles above can serve as a foundation for recognizing this need and fill some of this vacuum. While bureaucratic leadership is not exciting, it is essential for the continued success of the Marine Corps in the future.

Note

1. The Shultz Hour refers to Secretary of State and former Marine George Shultz who advocated this scheduling approach to students at Marine Corps University.

USMC

EI and the Warfighter

Why soft skills contribute to a hard Marine

by 2ndLt Kayla Olsen

Our Nation's battles are won with our greatest weapon: the individual Marine. As outlined in his *Commandant's Planning Guidance*, Gen Berger directed that education and training must be

> focused on winning in combat in the most challenging conditions and operating environments—from the thin air and high altitudes of the mountains, to the sweltering heat of triple canopy jungles, and including the sprawling self-organized chaos of dense urban terrain.[1]

No matter the occupational specialty, Marines are unified by fundamental infantry skills. The foundations of marksmanship and close combat skills taught during indoctrination, in conjunction with the Corps' core values, encourage Marines to maintain sharp bodies and minds. Hard skills such as technical and tactical proficiency are timeless and indispensable, but cognitive intelligence, physical fitness, and kinetic tactics are not enough. A compelling stream of research in human performance prompts consideration for a new focus area in the development of this caliber of warfighter: *emotional intelligence*.[2]

Emotional intelligence (EI) compromises a distinct set of interpersonal and self-governance skills that consistently emerge as competitive performance differentiators. EI was first conceptualized in 1990 by psychologists John Mayer and Peter Salovey.[3] In his 1995 *New York Times* bestseller, *Emotional Intelligence*, Daniel Goleman introduced a five-pronged, performance-based model of EI, and proposed that skills comprising *emotional literacy* are a better indicator of success than cognitive intelligence or IQ. His model was further refined to include four competencies

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including self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, and relationship management. The Marine Corps ought to make a calculated effort to effectively train and evaluate these soft skills.

Doctrine recognizes the importance of an emotionally intelligent warfighter. Look no further than Warfighting:

> Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions.[4]

When our Nation decides to send in the Marines, they must be equipped to act under the emotional duress of combat. The human dimension will outlast every technological advancement. Where friction exists, psychological implications will remain. Mental toughness and emotional intelligence are not mutually exclusive. It is not a question *if* Marines will overcome fear, but rather, *how effectively* they will harness it.

Goleman labels the human fight-or-flight reaction as the "amygdala hijack."[5] Fear-invoking stimulus can suspend logical decision making when the emotional brain "hijacks" the rational brain. In *Emotional Intelligence*, he submits, "Fear, in evolution, has a special prominence: perhaps more than any other emotion it is crucial for survival."[6] In combat applications, the challenge is

Emotional intelligence can help Marines more effectively harness their natural fear responses. (Photo by Sgt Emmanuel Ramos.)

to recognize fear, assess threats, identify potential courses of action, and act logically. Perhaps we might develop training scenarios in which we frame and analyze Boyd's observation, orientation, decision, action (OODA) loop from an emotional, self-management lens.

The necessity for emotional intelligence spans well beyond combat applications. These skills are just as valuable in the garrison environment.

The Marine Corps has considered emotional intelligence as a tool to measure effective leadership and command climate. In October 2017, Gen Neller inquired about instating an emotional intelligence diagnostic test for Marines seeking re-enlistment.[7] The request for a toxic leadership test followed allegations of hazing by Marine Corps drill instructors at Parris Island, and the Marines United revenge porn scandal.

If employed, emotional intelligence training has the potential to reduce the number of annual active duty, reserve, and veteran suicides.

This inquiry alone illustrates an unexplored avenue for producing stronger warfighters and maintaining a stronger Corps. Though the test was not implemented, the implications of emotional intelligence as it applies to leadership and command climate were recognized. Analysis of the current evaluation system for competitive selection reveals another, perhaps subconscious, effort to measure EI as it pertains to a Marine's potential.

Marines are evaluated on several proficiencies that demand emotional intelligence. Effectiveness under stress, courage, decision-making ability, leading subordinates, communication skills, and judgment, each a measure of performance on a Marine's annual fitness report, are closely tied to emotional intelligence. Why then does the Marine Corps not place a larger emphasis on training these competencies and evaluating them effectively?

Increased emphasis on emotional intelligence could even lead to better retention rates. High end of service (EAS) and non-EAS attrition rates indicate our institution might be losing top performers to civilian-sector careers, and in unacceptable cases, substance abuse and misconduct. A 2012 study on retention of Australian police officers found that EI positively affects job satisfaction, well-being and engagement, perceptions of affective commitment, and turnover intentions.[8] Strong parallels between the emotionally demanding work environment of law enforcement officials and our Marines give reason to consider including EI in talent retention strategies.

Perhaps the most compelling argument is this: emotional intelligence could be *lifesaving*. Research indicates that a high level of EI is instrumental in combating suicidal behavior.[9] If employed, emotional intelligence training has the potential to reduce the number of annual active duty, reserve, and veteran suicides. In a holistic approach to fitness, integration of emotional intelligence training would further prepare Marines to execute tasks in a highly complex, emotionally demanding environment by boosting morale, cohesiveness, and resiliency.

Gen Berger has called for doctrine to frame new learning models with an emphasis on teamwork, problem solving, and a bias for intelligent action.[10] It is time to reevaluate the way we train the warfighter. Emotional intelligence is a necessary investment to building a stronger Corps because the strength of our Corps is in the individual Marine.

Notes

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Reading to Lead

And leading others to read

by Maj Dustin J. Nicholson

I discovered books later in life than I should admit. For nine of my first ten years as a Marine, I carried the secondary title of student: from college courses while enlisted in the reserves, to entry-level officer schools on active duty, to distance military education, then over to graduate school on nights and weekends. That chain of curricula dragged books of all sorts onto my to-do list. A well-meaning though busy student, I read much but reflected little. Regrettably, I only began to grasp the transformational value of reading in my eleventh year spent at resident Expeditionary Warfare School. I now look back on that time as a personal renaissance.

Dr. Williamson Murray taught an elective seminar for a handful of Expeditionary Warfare School students that challenged us to read, write about, and discuss ten of the greatest works in military literature. That small group of sharp-minded captains formed my most rewarding academic experience to date. Professor Murray, my peers, and the leaders we studied forever changed my perspective on reading. I returned to the FMF as busy as ever but with greater resolve to make time to read. I now look at books not as a chore to be finished but as a concentration of thoughts to be had. Those unassuming chunks of bounded paper offer the cheapest yet richest investment opportunity a leader can take toward self-development. This article hopes to short circuit for others what took me a professional decade to spark.

Reading to Lead

Marines learn great leadership qualities from following great leaders, and a Marine with a book can be led by history's best. Gen Ulysses S. Grant's *Personal Memoirs* are a case in point. A

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man who braided leadership with humility, Grant's writing projects the quiet confidence with which he led. In one illustration, MajGen Sheridan arrives to his meeting with Grant and readily pulls out his map to explain that "if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the Confederates, and that he could 'whip them.'" Grant then reveals to the reader how he had already drawn up his own plan for Sheridan's advance; however, "Seeing that [Sheridan] was so clear and

The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: The Complete Annotated Edition *by Ulysses S. Grant, David S. Nolen, Louie P. Gallo John F. Marszalek, Editors, Frank J. Williams, Preface.* **Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press , October 2017.** *ISBN: 978-0674976290,* **816pp.**

so positive in his views and so confident of his success, I said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket." Having made clear the plan was Sheridan's alone, Grant goes on, "Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met [the Confederates] at the crossing of Opequon Creek, and won a most decisive victory—one which electrified the country."[1] Grant accepted Sheridan's plan over his own and fixed all credit to Sheridan's name over his own.

The careful reader can also hear Grant's quiet ego from what he *omits* from his 700-page memoirs. MajGen Sherman intended to arrange the Union's retreat from Shiloh following a bitter day of loss on 6 April 1862. Sherman recorded the affect Grant's stoic leadership had on him late that night when he approached his solemn commander, found leaning against a tree. Grant's hat was tilted low and his coat collar up to keep away the rain; a cigar quietly stoked in his teeth. Sherman felt "moved by some wise and sudden instinct" to withhold discussion of retreat. Instead, he began, "Well, Grant, we've had the devil's own day of it, haven't we?" Grant drew from his cigar in the night rain, then replied with quiet confidence: "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow though."[2] Leaving out this exchange with Sherman, all Grant writes about the licking he led on 7 April is, "This day everything was favorable to the Union side."[3]

Of course, reading empowers leading in *many* ways, and plucking admirable qualities from history's giants is just the surface. The variety of books one reads matters as much as the act's frequency. Casting a wide net helps leaders become sense-makers of the world around them, capable of putting recent history and current events into context for their people. With enough variety

and enough frequency, history's greatest lessons—its patterns—begin to emerge. A really good book speeds this along, connecting large puzzle pieces that expand the reader's mind. As an American military officer, *The Accidental Superpower* is that kind of book. It explains how the post-World War II American-led global order cooled geopolitics in many historically hot areas, "ushering in the greatest peace and prosperity this world has ever known,"[4] a phenomenon often overlooked by Cold War fixation. By 1944, the United States had become the world's preeminent naval power and embarked upon an unprecedented grand strategy of safeguarding *all* commercial shipping across the global commons, dawning the era of American-backed free trade that lasts to this day. Written in 2014, the author also stresses America's growing weariness with funding the lion's share of free trade and Western-alliance commitments: a clairvoyant concern. Defending the world's rules-based order in the years ahead will require uniform-wearing sense-makers who understand why pressures are mounting from both outside this order and within it.

This gets to the third reason why leaders must be readers: reading fosters the resiliency to face tomorrow's trials. Like so much else written here, I have long known this truism—but realizing it took time. My first battalion commander, having finished another book on Lincoln, remarked casually, "None of my problems can compare to his." That comment stuck with me.

Knowing how past leaders overcame the extreme trials of their day helps us do the same. In this regard, Grant's memoirs offer another gem. Grant shares his innermost thoughts from a watershed moment he had as a regimental commander early in the Civil War. Marching his men toward contact with Col Harris' Confederate regiment, Grant discloses, "My heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat." Upon reaching the enemy's campsite, however, Grant finds it abandoned, "My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him."

Grant stresses the significance to his reader: "From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy. ... I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his."[5] This revelation in 1861 as a colonel sowed the resolve he would later display while facing his most able adversary from 1864–65 as General of the Union Army. Breaking from his contemporaries, Grant refused to ascribe "superhuman abilities"[6] to Gen Robert E. Lee. Instead, Grant attests, "I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that I felt this."[7] Grant's confidence in his enemy's imperfection fostered war-winning resiliency.

> **One reality is that nations seldom know where their next fight will occur.**

Some people will always find the strengths of America's foes fascinating. As such, it will always be healthy to read the memoirs of British Field-Marshal William Slim who turned defeat into victory by focusing on enemy weakness. Slim entered the Burma theater of World War II admittedly "ignorant ... of the Japanese, their methods and their commanders."[8] His immediate defeat "taught a good deal, but with the Japanese as instructors it was an expensive way of learning."[9] More damaging than any physical losses suffered was the optimism Slim's men surrendered, now cloaking their unstoppable enemy in a "spell of invincibility."[10] To restore his army's resilience, Slim had to break the common soldier's urge to lionize Japanese capabilities. He drew their focus onto enemy limitations that sparked local triumphs that soon flared into Allied victory in all of Burma.

History could tell a thousand tales of militaries found ill-prepared for the war at hand—a lesson much easier to comprehend than to solve. One reality is that nations seldom know where their

next fight will occur. A relatively recent case, Argentina sunk British ships in the 1982 Falklands War using Exocet missiles for which the Royal Navy lacked proper countermeasures. A senior British officer clarified why that was: "The Russians have no Exocet." Captivated by an expected war in Eastern Europe, Britain found itself steaming for the unexpected in the South Atlantic. Its naval task force would have to press hard to win "a close-run thing." The British had the training, education, and leadership to win, but the fighting showed "how dangerous it is for defences to become too scenario-oriented."[11]

When officers who neglect rigorous reading *are* the leadership in a scenario-oriented military, catastrophe can come in a flash. Such was the context in May 1940 that hastened the fall of France. Marc Bloch, a French historian who fought in both world wars, witnessed firsthand the Maginot Line's irrelevance. He wrote *Strange Defeat* just three months after his heartland collapsed. Surrounded by French officers "incapable of thinking in terms of a *new* war," writes Bloch, "the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect."[12] Of the officers "who did even a little reading," he admits in anger, "I scarcely ever saw one with a book in his hands which might have helped him to a better understanding of the present by shedding on it the light of the past."[13] He concedes in his final pages a thought that remains painful to read: "We find ourselves today in this appalling situation—that the fate of France no longer depends upon the French."[14]

However, a well-read mind tends to chase after what *can* be done, and Bloch went on to fight in the French Resistance. In mid-June 1944, as the Allies pressed inland from Normandy, Bloch's life ended before a Nazi firing squad. Only his work would survive the war, somehow elevating the power of *Strange Defeat* and its compelling lessons.

And Leading Others to Read

Meaningful reading is too often the first virtue sacrificed by busy Marines. Countless lessons go unlearned, sitting

Leaders must set the example and work to encourage their Marines to be readers. *(Photo by Cpl Isaac Martinez.)*

inert in our unread books. Leaders must work to convert the non-readers in their unit, and nothing beats giving them an example to follow. Not surprisingly, I discovered what books were worth around the same time I finally learned *how to read them*. A mentor had cautioned against pouring water into sand. Be selective with books and deliberate with the time spent reading them. After

> *... the best reading advice to give Marines is no different than investment guidance: start young ... because reading, like money, possesses its greatest value in the future.*

all, readers carry forward only what they are willing to lift from the page. This is why a red pen is in one hand any time a book I own is in the other. Underlining, bracketing, and writing along the margins are tactile ways to engage the print, argue with the author, or snatch a fleeting thought. This is not to say that purposeful reading must be taxing. Chipping away at *Once an Eagle* an hour each night put a relaxing end on many busy days in Darwin, Australia. Thoughts of that 1,300-page odyssey

in officership will forever stir memories of the Outback's smoky night air and star-studded sky. A few months after finishing a book, I like to review the red marks I made. Those that hit hardest are typed into a set of distilled notes no greater than a page, front and back. This gets folded and put back in the book, a memory booster for some future date. This simple method helps to carry ideas forward, without wasting too much water.

Ultimately, the best reading advice to give Marines is no different than investment guidance: start young. This is because reading, like money, possesses its greatest value in the future. New thoughts borne from old books tend to spark fresh ideas in conversations at work, while listening to the news, or while even doing mundane tasks. The real treasure of that gem unearthed in chapter six may not come for another

month or another two years. Lacking any scientific studies, I offer this clumsy guesstimate as to the *time value* of books: An hour of daily reading in your twenties is worth three in your thirties and likely some absurd number in your forties and beyond. Though less tangible than that of money, the time value of reading counts every bit as much. However, if you find that the best advice of starting young no longer works for you, then let me attest to the second best: start now!

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USMC

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Self-imposed restrictions

by Capt Sebastian D. Bailey

The current rules, regulations, and bureaucratic hurdles associated with employing small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) are prohibitive to developing training and proficiency with our systems, often resulting in the attitude that training with the systems causes more headaches than solutions. The solution, much like the problem itself, is administrative: proscriptive hurdles associated with sUAS training need to be lowered or removed to enable consistent, effective training across all levels and types of sUAS employment.

These hurdles quickly create a fairly standard and problematic path for Marine units. Small UAS is not incorporated into standard training, so both operators and small unit leaders fail to develop proficiency in employment. When these units deploy, they do not suffer from the same restrictions as they do in garrison and so they employ sUAS more often. However, since there was no sUAS incorporated into the pre-deployment training plan, dozens of training opportunities have been missed and Marines are attempting to learn through use. If a units wants to use sUAS to their full potential and take advantage of their capabilities, they need

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to consistently and effectively train with the systems prior to arriving in country.

The first bureaucratic hurdle is perhaps the most significant: there simply are not enough systems available for units to effectively train. According to Total Force Structure Management System tables of equipment, GCE units rate sUAS according to the table below.

Using 1st MarDiv as a model, there are (twelve) infantry battalions, (three) infantry regiments, (four) artillery battalions, (one) artillery regiment, (two) LAR battalions, (one) recon battalion, (one) AAV battalion, and (two) combat engineer battalions. Given the table of equipment, 1st MarDiv's sUAS demand is therefore (62) RQ-20s, (62) RQ-11s, (74) RQ-12s, and (480) SkyRangers. However, the Training and Logistical Support Agency (TALSA) warehouse responsible for supplying all of I MEF with sUAS only has a total of (23) RQ-20s, (52) RQ-11s, (23) RQ-12s, and

(12) SkyRangers. Clearly, this is insufficient to supply 1st MArDiv, let alone the entire MEF.

This profound shortage has a detrimental impact on those units' ability to train. The current solution is to keep all systems localized at the TALSA warehouse and only check them out, as required, for training exercises. This creates an additional administrative hurdle to clear before training and limits the amount of potential white space training that could occur if units were to own the systems they have been assigned. Further, if the TALSA warehouse is not within a unit's geographic region, it can be prohibitively difficult for units to receive the necessary support. It is all too easy for technical knowledge to lapse and extremely difficult to train operators to the level of proficiency necessary for proper employment without continuous access to the systems. Even maintaining proficiency through the use of simulator time requires access to a system.

The solution is simple. With additional funding, enough systems could be purchased to cover the current deficiency, and each unit would be able to use the systems that they technically rate in TFSMS. TALSA would continue to

	Infantry Battalion	Infantry Regiment	LAR Battalion	Recon Battalion	Artillery Battalion	Artillerly Regiment	Combat Engineer Battalion
RQ-20	2	2	4	2	2	2	6
RQ-11	4	0	4	0	0	0	3
RQ-12	6	0	0	2	0	0	0
Sky Ranger	40	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 1.

act as the managing agency, providing maintenance, instruction, and support as needed. In the meantime, if systems could be checked out to higher-level units in large numbers, the necessary systems would be organizationally and physically much closer to training units. This would enable white space training and more simulator time, and training units would have a clearer picture of available capabilities—as they would not have to coordinate with an outside agency. Additionally, units would not have to subject themselves to a first-come first-serve allocation.

However, access to the requisite gear is only the first issue units face. Once the systems are in the hands of the unit conducting training, they must wade through the litany of range regulations and deal with Range Control's seeming lack of understanding of sUAS. This bureaucratic marathon begins with submitting an additional line item on their RFMSS request and provide the type/model/series of aircraft, max altitude requested, and information on a frequency request that was submitted a minimum of 60 days in advance. On the face of it, these requirements are fairly easy to meet, but each step of that process is made more difficult by a lack of a standard operating procedures for UAS at range control and redundancies in the bureaucratic process necessary to receive approval for this request. For example:

- If a unit is attempting to train with systems that operate on the commercial open net and, therefore, do not require assigned UHF frequencies, such as the InstantEye and SkyRanger, they must get confirmation from the frequency manager that those do not require frequencies each time a training request is submitted.
- If any air unit is planning on training in the area, range control will not deconflict via altitude, so sUAS training is shut off.
- If an aircraft crosses into the training airspace, the expectation is that all UAS are immediately grounded—given the transmit times from aircraft to range control, from range control to the sUAS operator (and the need to properly land the system), this is not feasible.

- Small UAS are often limited to 500 feet AGL, a ceiling that does not allow them to be used to the extent of their capabilities.
- Lateral deconfliction requires UAS to stay 1 km or further from the training area (TA) boundary, an extremely limiting restricted operating zone given the size of many TAs—particularly urban ranges.
- Range Control expects notification at the launching and landing of each individual system; this creates an almost continuous stream of transmissions for a unit attempting to train with multiple systems launched from multiple sites with short flight times.

This approval process needs to be streamlined to allow consistent and effective training by the units that will be employing the sUAS downrange. To that end, a more detailed range SOP needs to be developed for major training installations that, at a minimum, addresses the following concerns:

- *Information about routinely used systems:* Most units training use one of the systems mentioned above—Puma, Raven, Wasp, SkyRanger, and InstantEye. Each of these systems should have a reference page with standard information. Knowledge of and adherence to this information is required for training units and deviation from it is possible but requires additional communication with range control. However, operating within those standard limitations is expected, and no explicit communication is needed. This reference page should include at a minimum: max altitude, loss of link procedures, frequency requirements (commercial open net vs UHF), and range/endurance of the system.
- *Deconfliction:* The amount of TAs and airspace available for UAS training will drastically increase if deconfliction rules are loosened to a more reasonable standard. A hard ceiling, such as 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) for all UAS flights should be established across the installation, allowing for vertical deconfliction with aircraft conducting training. This would allow sUAS training in any TA in which an aircraft is not ac-

tively taking off, dropping ordinance, or landing. Further, confining sUAS to stay a full kilometer away from TA boundaries often leaves little to no room to train, especially on urban ranges that take up less than a square kilometer in total. This buffer between TAs should be lessened to 250m. This would allow for more training space and still keep 500m between SUAS in adjacent TAs.
- *Reporting Requirements***:** If current reporting requirements are followed to the letter, it would necessitate an almost continuous conversation with range control during more involved sUAS ranges (such as initial training courses). However, for deconfliction and safety purposes, it is safe to assume that once the first launch is called in, there is a system in the air at the maximum allowed altitude at all times until training is ceased. Reducing the necessary reporting to these two times will free up the range control frequency from useless chatter.

Implementing these changes will have a drastic impact on sUAS employment in the Marine Corps. Immediate access to systems will facilitate more training, resulting in much more skilled operators ready to support exercises at every level. Couple skilled operators with fewer restrictions on flight time and not only will units become more proficient at integrating sUAS into their scheme of maneuver, but the operators will begin to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures, enabling an even broader application of these valuable systems. Seamless integration, innovation, and breadth of options is, and will continue to be, a necessity on the modern battlefield.

USMC

Professionalizing Air Intelligence, Part VI

A functional concept for air intelligence

by Maj Christopher A. Denzel

Air intelligence is under-conceptualized, leading to an underresourced, ad hoc, and disintegrated approach to improvement and modernization. Against peer competitors, this under-conceptualization and consequent underinvestment create immense risk for the Service. Put bluntly: one maneuvers in the Pacific by boat and plane—and the Marine Corps does not own many boats.

An explicit conceptual foundation allows practitioners to describe how air intelligence activities support both Marine aviation and the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE). Such a foundation also allows for identifying capability gaps to drive doctrine, organization, training & education, materiel, leadership and communications synchronization, personnel, facilities, and cost (DOTMLPF&C) solutions.

The Problem

Despite advances in intelligence during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, these conflicts failed to stimulate meaningful advancement in air intelligence. Deprioritization was a rational decision. Despite the individual tragedies of Marine aircraft lost to enemy fire, the air defense threat has been operationally insignificant—air *supremacy* was assured. In comparison, the risk from ground threats rightly stimulated immense investment, resulting in ballooning ground intelligence tables of organization (T/O) and considerable expansion of ground intelligence equipment and training. Since DESERT STORM, an infantry battalion T/O has grown from four to sixteen intelligence

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Marines; the typical squadron T/O remains at two.

A ground-centric approach to intelligence amplified this rational neglect by failing to consider the differences in ACE and GCE organization, operation, and intelligence support requirements. Against peer competitors, this neglect jeopardizes the Service's ability to execute its operational concepts, which rely on Marine aviation to provide critical capabilities to the Naval Expeditionary Force and Joint Force Commander (JFC).

The inadequacy of ACE intelligence readiness in contested operating environments is regularly acknowledged. However, the lack of defined requirements has frustrated the application and prioritization of resources to improve this readiness. Meanwhile, novel capabilities, such as cyberspace and information operations, explicitly demand increased intelligence investments—continuing to starve ACE intelligence as the MCISRE attempts to rebalance.

Without a concept, the community cannot derive validated requirements across DOTMLFP&C, which has, in turn, led to an intelligence enterprise that provides incomplete and inadequate support to Marine aviation. Without comprehensive air intelligence support, the Marine Corps cannot support mission accomplishment within airspace contested by a peer.

The Central Idea Supporting a Concept for Air Intelligence

ACE and GCE operations differ in a few fundamental ways that drive how intelligence supports Marine aviation. While intelligence principles (e.g., processes and cycles) are the same, the ways ACE intelligence formations organize, train, and equip to execute those fundamentals differ considerably from the GCE. In Clausewitzian terms, the *nature* of intelligence remains the same while the *character* differs. Marine aviation has three distinct operational areas that define the character of supporting intelligence.

Air intelligence aligns with airspace, mission planning, and the geographic location of aircraft and sensors. Intelligence satisfies these requirements through flexible and dynamic configurations that support the FMF and MCISRE. The first alignment is the airspace in which the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) facilitates the ACE commander's command and control (C2) of Marine aviation. The second alignment is mission planning elements, providing commanders with support for planning aviation and aviation ground operations at squadrons, groups, and wings. The third alignment is the geographic locations from which aircraft launch and recover, or where aircraft sensor data is first available for processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED).

The confluence or divergence of these three alignments is *the principal driver* of how the ACE employs, organizes, trains, and equips its intelligence elements across the ACE.

This framework describes the task organization of ACE intelligence elements in past wars. It also allows ACE commanders to optimize task organization of intelligence elements for future operations across the competition continuum, including the dynamic and distributed operations required by operating concepts.

Before discussing these intelligence alignments, we must first understand the nature of the operational differences driving them.

The Operational Differences between the ACE and the GCE

In the last two years of developing and communicating this concept, the few who oppose it universally start with the assumption that ACE and GCE operations are functionally similar. This assumption constructs a mental barrier to understanding how or why ACE intelligence should be different. We must first dispel this obstacle and recognize what is evident in ACE doctrine.

The primary way the ACE and GCE differ is their C2 of attached forces within their assigned airspace or battlespace. In the GCE, for maneuver forces capable of achieving FMF objectives, battlespace usually is partitioned in a "fractal" manner, with similar *character* at each echelon. For example, a division may partition its assigned battlespace to its regiments and those regiments to their battalions (see Figure 1). Because each echelon's operations are essentially "fractal," differing primarily in scale (geographic or temporal) rather than character, their intelligence support requirements are similarly fractal. Consequently, the concept of intelligence support for a battalion is not significantly different from that of a regiment.

However, in the ACE, airspace is typically managed in a centralized and unified manner (see Figure 1). Because of the vast distances the ACE can cover in very short periods and the high demand/low density of ACE capabilities,

unified airspace provides the FMF commander an efficient allocation of scarce resources while enhancing their responsiveness. This responsiveness is achieved through the centralized command of tactical air operations while decentralizing control authority to subordinate agencies, all without the necessity of dividing an operational area into small zones of action through multiple echelons of command (as it is more typical in the GCE). This responsive management is accomplished by the MACCS.

Through the MACCS, the ACE establishes a single Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) to command Marine aviation and surface-to-air assets across the area of operations (AO) and balance aviation assets in support of the FMF. Control is decentralized to the Direct Air Support Center and Tactical Air Operations Center. This limited decentralization obviates the need to partition airspace below the senior ACE echelon and integrates all ACE assets across the AO dynamically, responsive to FMF requirements. Squadrons are not assigned to a unit or battlespace but to discrete and short-lived operations that change daily, even hourly. Where one squadron operates today, another operates tomorrow.

C2 lines are extended from the TACC directly to individual sorties in flight, bypassing intermediate echelons of command, resulting in unified planning through the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and realtime C2 of sorties in-flight. This unified C2 also creates

a secondary "site command" C2 construct for sortie-generating activities where subordinate commands may be tasked only with launching and recovering aircraft, providing sustainment and mobility at the site as well as site force protection. Site command responsibilities may bear no relation to normal organizational charts. A MAG commander can act as the site commander for a site with adjacent MAGs or even the MAW.

Another consequence is that the ACE has both fixed and variable "costs" to support operations. Some support varies with the size of the ACE, such as refueling capacity. Other support, such as producing and ATO, targeting, or airfield operations, are fixed whether there are 20 or 200 aircraft in the ACE. ACE intelligence has similar fixed and variable costs.

Furthermore, certain aviation missions are inherently and always joint, such as the integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and long-range interdiction. Consequently, the ACE makes assets available to the JFC for these missions and all sorties in excess of FMF direct support requirements, establishing a unique relationship between the ACE and the JFC (or Joint Force Air Component Commander) for theater fires, apportionment, and ATO development. Thus, even the smallest components of the ACE routinely and *directly* support the joint force. By extension, ACE intelligence elements routinely support


Figure 1. A simplified depiction of how GCE battlespace is fractal and ACE battlespace is not. *(Figure provided by author.)*

sorties outside the FMF's AO and assigned mission—a rarity for GCE intelligence. An analogy would be if infantry companies had to make patrols available for direct Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) tasking outside the battalion's AO.

ACE operations' unique characteristics are on display nowhere more clearly than an honest appraisal of the command authority and decision points available to a squadron commanding officer (CO). Does the squadron CO have the authority to launch an aircraft not on the ATO? Only in the most extenuating circumstances (e.g., base attack). Can a squadron CO order a sortie to return to base (RTB)? No. A squadron CO often even lacks direct communications with aircraft in flight. Can a squadron CO direct delivery of fires (even in airspace owed by the MAW)? Hardly. It is only marginally better for a MAG CO when the MAG is not the senior ACE echelon. These examples make it evident that C2 in the ACE differs significantly from the GCE. It follows that intelligence differs as well.

Why the Difference?

Why is this? The explanation is relatively straightforward. The significant speed that aircraft traverse the battlespace provides inherent flexibility to mass force quickly at a critical point and time. Speed and its consequent flexibility increase the force multiplication of airpower (raising demand) and expand its range of influence (lowering density). Thus "high-demand/low-density" is not a trite cliché but a real operational challenge solved by the unitary C2 of the MACCS.

The logic and rationale behind this unified C2 can be challenging for ground commanders to understand as it goes against their operating paradigm. In contrast, aviation commanders since World War II have acknowledged the value of centralized control of airspace. During that conflict, small packages ("penny packets") of direct support aircraft were assigned to ground commanders to ensure they always had at least some degree of air support. This *penny packing* constrained available airpower, reducing its effect on the bat-

tlespace, leading to centralized control doctrine. While the MACCS adopts decentralized control, this is branding more than truth. Control is decentralized only to subordinate agencies (Tactical Air Operations Center and Direct Air Support Center) but retained within the TACC, commanded by the senior ACE commander.

This centralization, far from being an assault on Mission Command, makes good warfighting sense. When it is possible to sustain a 24-hour combat air patrol from a single squadron hundreds of miles and multiple countries away, there is little logic in dividing up airspace by geographic region or subordinate element—even less so if that mission (and airspace) is divided across two squadrons from separate bases and commands. Instead, even single missions are divided up sortie-by-sortie and hour-by-hour or day-by-day. This is the essence of the ATO.

Intelligence Implications

The ACE's unique time/distance relationship with the battlespace has consequences for intelligence support requirements and intelligence collection potential.

First, time is compressed in air and air defense operations, increasing distances considered and decreasing re-

ACE operations' unique characteristics are on display nowhere more clearly than ... the command authority and decision points available to a squadron commanding officer ...

action time. These time factors place greater emphasis on combat information of more immediate value as compared to finished intelligence.

Second, this time/distance relationship simultaneously gives the ACE a collection *capability* not easily achieved by other Major Subordinate Elements while also generating collection *requirements* that outstrip the FMF's organic capabilities. Because the ACE allows FMF commanders to observe the bat-

tlespace in greater depth, it can be an optimal collection tool in the deep battlespace or for indications and warnings. These same traits also mean that targets for many ACE missions, especially interdiction and antiair warfare, may be beyond the reach of organic collection means, necessitating increased reliance on theater or national intelligence capabilities.

Finally, this time/distance relationship uniquely impacts the ACE's geographic disposition, placing unique constraints on intelligence elements. The geographic constraints on sortie generation activities (e.g., planning, basing, maintenance, fueling, and arming) starkly contrast the operational flexibility in and decentralized nature of sortie execution. Even the most routine sortie-generating activities require centralization and mass. Therefore, while the ACE is less affected by restrictive terrain in maneuver, it has less flexibility in where and how long it can operate before returning to reconstitute combat power (e.g., refuel and rearm, maintenance).

These differences have significant consequences for the operational employment and deployment of the ACE. These consequences are no less impactful for ACE intelligence elements, evident in the fact that a JFLCC intelligence directorate (J-2) will rarely read or analyze a company's patrol report, but a Joint Force Air Component Commander's J-2 regularly analyzes every sortie's mission report throughout the theater.

The Three Alignments

Understanding these differences allows us to return to the three alignments of air intelligence support. These alignments (Figure 2) describe every signifi-

Figure 2. Three alignments of intelligence support. *(Figure provided by author.)*

cant historical employment of an ACE, going back as far as DESERT STORM, as much as they describe possible future employments across existing operations plans (OPLAN).

Airspace-Aligned Requirements

Airspace-aligned intelligence support requirements of the ACE support sensing and making sense of the complete air and air defense intelligence picture and intelligence support to campaigning or plans beyond the ATO cycle.

Airspace-aligned support, in simple terms, meets the intelligence requirements of MACCS agencies. Therefore, these requirements are not dependent on the FMF element's size but must be carried out by the senior ACE echelon as long as it executes some form of the TACC (including the Expeditionary TACC or Austere TACC).

Subordinate ACE elements are not generally assigned primary responsibility for portions of the ACE AO and will operate across the entire airspace, integrated alongside other ACE subordinate commands. Thus, subordinate intelligence elements inherently rely on the senior ACE intelligence element to collect, fuse, and analyze intelligence data from throughout the AO and make AO-wide decisions such as targeting priorities. These functions are not possible in subordinate ACE intelligence sections, even for small areas within the AO, but are standard across GCE echelons.

Airspace-aligned requirements are usually those associated with the MAW G-2. Still, they may fall to the Group S-2 in a MEB ACE or even the squadron S-2 in a MEU ACE when operating independently ashore. When Marine forces are not assigned a battlespace for any substantial period, as in traditional MEU theater reserve operations, the senior ACE echelon may not have any intelligence support requirements associated with airspace alignment.

Mission-Aligned Requirements

The mission-aligned intelligence support requirements of the ACE are those that directly support commanders' planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycle.

Commanders at every level have intelligence requirements that necessitate some intelligence capacity directly aligned to that command echelon. Broadly, these include intelligence that informs the direction and execution of assigned missions and the unit's force protection. These requirements involve planning specific missions and sorties within the ATO cycle, whether as single-type/model/series (TMS) missions or large integrated aviation packages with multiple squadrons. At the sortie-execution level, mission-aligned requirements include specific and essential capabilities such as estimating the threat in the objective area or modeling radar, acoustic, and electro-optical propagation effects.

In recent decades, mission-aligned intelligence support requirements have customarily been associated with squadron S-2s, facilitated by mature and low-air-threat AOs where TMS "business rules" allow for integrated objective area planning without dedicated headquarters intelligence support. In peer conflicts, this capability will be necessary at headquarters echelons when and where sizeable integrated planning occurs. True integrated planning is regularly seen at Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course during larger evolutions. In these evolutions, intelligence capability is concentrated for overall scheme of maneuver development; only intelligence liaisons are provided to TMS ready rooms to support the last steps of detailed planning.

Geographic-Aligned Requirements

The geographic-aligned intelligence support requirements of the ACE are those inherently tied to the geographic location where aircraft launch from and recover to or where aircraft sensor data is first available for PED. Requirements include: the final intelligence updates as aircrew walk to their aircraft (sometimes a day after the full mission brief for a major operation), timely end-of-mission debriefing (or at intermediate stages where they may RTB), and the PED of intelligence collected during the sortie (e.g., recorded/transmitted data from onboard sensors, assessment of damage from enemy fire sustained by aircraft).

For site command activities, geographic-aligned requirements support local site C2, launching and recovering aircraft, providing mobility and maneuver at the site, sustaining and supporting the site, and site force protection.

In recent decades, geographic-aligned support requirements are typically associated with squadrons but may be concentrated at higher echelons in the form of a Flight Line Intelligence Center.

Intelligence Task-Organization in Various ACE Configurations

These alignments can be used to task-organize ACE intelligence elements in various ways.

The confluence and divergence of these alignments across multiple ACE configurations drive both the intelligence capacity (i.e., number of intelligence personnel and equipment) as well as the intelligence capability (type of intelligence personnel, training, and equipment) necessary to support each ACE echelon (Figure 3).

Suppose the airspace is partitioned with more than one TACC, such as in a major theater conflict where Marine forces may have multiple, non-contiguous AOs. In that case, the ACE requires multiple intelligence elements capable of providing airspace-aligned intelligence support tailored to the size of the respective TACCs.

When operations are such that one echelon has few mission-aligned intelligence support requirements, its intelligence capacity may be reduced. For example, where all three echelons are present but sortie requirements are exclusively met by mission planning at the squadron, the group would have limited mission-aligned intelligence capacity and capability. Most of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns exemplify this mode of operations. In a major theater conflict, where aviation operations may be highly-integrated operations with multiple squadrons and primary mission planning occurs at the MAG, a squadron's intelligence capacity and capability may be limited. Open conflict in the Pacific would likely use this mode of operations.

Finally, when geographic-aligned requirements diverge significantly from mission-aligned requirements or squadron headquarters, intelligence capacity may need to be detached from normal echelons and placed in general support of multiple units, as in a Flight Line Intelligence Center. Such a configuration mirrors the logic behind the "site command" concept. This condition can occur during a significant movement, as in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, when some aircrews did not RTB for many days, overnighting at forward

Figure 3. ACE intelligence enterprise disposition. (Figure provided by author.)

arming and refueling points. In such an example, squadrons might have to detach (and pool) geographic-aligned intelligence capacity/capability to the units establishing such forward arming and refueling points, or they may simply be the temporary deployment in hub-and-spoke operations. In some cases, this may require the attachment of intelligence Marines and equipment to aviation ground elements or specific aircraft packages to self-deploy their intelligence capacity independent of the unit's headquarters.

The significant impact of these alignments and how they describe intelligence planning is best seen at the Group echelon. The MAG T/O of thirteen intelligence Marines may be adequate in garrison or combat operations under a MAW. However, operating as a MEB ACE requires an intelligence section of at least 40–50 Marines. The HQMC MEB ACE Primer calls for an S-2 of 92 Marines. This variability (between 13 and 92) cannot be explained by a concept of echelon-based responsibilities, especially when the number of subordinate units and mission types may not vary at all. However, the *variability in alignments* between a garrison MAG S-2 and MEB ACE S-2 readily explains the order of magnitude differences in requirements between these two scenarios.

Importance of Air Intelligence across the Competition Continuum

Evidence from the permissive operating environments during the Global War on Terror show that the Service accepted risk in air intelligence with few consequences due to a relatively low threat to air operations. There are two primary sources of risk: risk from enemy action (the "red threat") and risk from a mishap (the "blue threat"). The red threat is generally mitigated through intelligence, whereas the blue threat is mitigated through operational measures (e.g., safety of flight decisions or control measures). When these mitigation measures are in tension, they require deliberate balance (i.e., an approach into the wind may decrease risk in landing or weapons delivery but place the aircraft over a higher-threat area during ingress or egress).

At the "left-side" of the competition continuum, the red threat is relatively low while the blue threat is comparatively higher. In this environment, operational considerations tend to override competing intelligence considerations.

As the competition continuum intensifies, the blue threat rises as the ACE conducts inherently riskier operations (i.e., more aggressive/complex maneuvers or compressed planning timelines). Self-evidently, the red threat increases as well. Even in low-intensity conflict,

the blue threat may remain higher than the red threat. But at some stage, these threats reach a crossover point, and the red threat becomes the predominant consideration for risk (Figure 4), increasing the relative contribution of intelligence to operations.

Consequently, the relative importance of air intelligence varies across the competition continuum. This variability in importance shapes both the consideration of intelligence factors in mission planning/execution and the capacity and capability requirements of ACE intelligence across this continuum. This variability in relative importance not only explains the rational underinvestment in ACE intelligence in recent decades but also argues for increased investment going forward.

Figure 4. Notional ACE risk across the competition continuum. (Figure provided by author.)

Objections and Challenges

There are three logical objections to this concept.

First, no concept is necessary at all. This objection logically requires ACE and GCE intelligence to be identical across DOTMLPF&C pillars. The existence of distinct air and ground intelligence secondary military occupational specialties suggest this is not the case. So, too, does the Air Combat Intelligence section's unique formulation in support of the MACCS. Thus, ACE and GCE intelligence *are not* identical. Those who argue the two *should be* identical must first contend with T/Os that differ substantially and address how intelligence must support the ACE with considerably less capacity. The *means* gap presented by wildly different T/Os requires a different concept (*ways*) for intelligence support. This first objection, therefore, does not stand.

Second, this *particular* concept is fundamentally wrong. The concept outlined above describes all major ACE employments and deployments in the last 30 years by abstracting multiple specific ACE employments to a common framework. Thus, while abstract (a requirement of concepts), it is derived from historical reality. This second objection, therefore, requires an extensive historical counterproof. Such refutation seems unlikely.

Third, there is a superior alternative concept. I developed this concept over two years based on dozens of discussions and debates with intelligence Marines of varying backgrounds. It is based on specific and varied ACE employments over the last 30 years and validated against personal accounts and official histories as well as within multiple current OPLANs. Furthermore, the genesis of this concept was the failure of the apparent alternative (a concept with echelon-based responsibilities) to explain the problems of Group S-2 scalability described above. A concept with echelon-based responsibilities must also contend with ACE deployments where intervening echelons (i.e., the MAG) have been absent or where echelons have downsized (i.e., from MAW to MAG) without a corresponding shift in intelligence roles and functions. Therefore, this third objection requires a complete and distinct alternative concept. The only alternative proffered has been the inferior echelon-based concept.

Fortunately, opponents to this concept have not made any of the three logical objections. The objections that opponents have raised have been opinions, not positions, and fall apart quickly.

The first thematic argument against the concept has been that it may confuse junior enlisted or officers. Calculus, too, is confusing—but no less true or useful. It is worth noting that during the adoption of maneuver warfare in the late 1980s, field-grade officers were confused about how the command element could ever be more than a *coordination* element. Confusion and concern over the then-new Functional Component Command concept preceded DESERT STORM. And finally, the confusion over new operating concepts has the Marine Corps codifying and teaching these concepts (see *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*), not freezing them in draft until divine revelation strikes junior Marines with comprehension. It is also embarrassing to need to explain that doctrine is *not* just for junior Marines. Senior Marines who feel they have nothing to learn from doctrine do not earn their boat space.

The second thematic argument against the concept has that it has no obvious parallel in Joint concepts or other Marine Corps intelligence subdisciplines. The lack of similarities in Joint concepts is immaterial to discussing Marine Corps concepts. It needs no further consideration. Ironically, the lack of parallel in other sub-disciplines is evidence *for* the concept, not

against it. Even a cursory list of unique characteristics in each sub-discipline demonstrates this point: Signals Intelligence Operational Tasking Authority in Signals Intelligence, Embassy and CIA coordination in Human Intelligence, and Reconnaissance and Surveillance mission planning in ground intelligence. In each case, the fact that these characteristics have no parallels is the *strongest argument* for their thorough and rigorous exploration by supporting concepts and doctrine. Similarly, the ATO's centrality and the unitary C2 of the FMF's airspace (to select only two examples) are no less impactful to ACE intelligence operations than these other examples are to their sub-discipline. Therefore, they are no less important to explore within doctrine and codify into any concept of intelligence support.

The remaining challenges (largely unvoiced) are valid but not cause for abandoning the concept. These include the lack of formal concepts for either the MCISRE or Marine aviation under which this functional concept would logically nest. One can argue that if air intelligence requires a formalized concept, the MCISRE or Marine aviation need one, too. The identification of greater challenges should not paralyze us, however. One can also argue that the MCISRE and Marine aviation have sufficient advocacy to obviate a more formal articulation than those that exist. The Van Riper Plan's seven intelligence principles offer an informal concept for the MCISRE. The six (or seven) functions of Marine aviation do the same for aviation.

Conclusion

A functional concept for air intelligence tailored to the ACE's unique modes of C2 and operations and flexible and scalable across all echelons of command and the competition continuum will set the foundation to ensure the Service is prepared to execute its op-erating concepts. Such a concept helps identify DOTMLPF&C requirements necessary to support Marine aviation in future operating environments. When ACE commanders and MCISRE leaders apply this concept to various ACE employment scenarios (from standard MAGTFs to specific OPLAN force packages), they will be able to develop task-organized intelligence elements with the organization, training, and equipment to meet aviation requirements for survivability and lethality in the future operating environment.

>USMC

Cyber Reconnaissance

Focusing on the adversary

by Maj Allison Warwick & CWO2 Christopher DiPalma

The Marine Corps must prioritize and maximize our understanding of adversary actions within the challenging domain of cyberspace in order to counter, exploit, and dominate near-peer threats. *MCDP 1, Warfighting,* tactics and principles apply to actors resident in the logical and persona dimensions of cyberspace as much as within the exclusively physical warfare domains. The "changing face of war" requires us to modernize, adapt, and innovate to win.[1] William S. Lind reminds us that maneuver warfare is not a new concept; modern day warfare requires us to think spatially, creatively, and critically to avoid fixed, predictable, and telegraphable schemes.[2] Applying American psychologists Joseph Luft's and Harry Ingham's Johari Window Model to the cyber warfare domain by manipulating and intentionally positioning our tactical, organic infrastructure and capabilities (reconnaissance assets) to not only defend but to observe could strategically enable us to gain insight into our blind spots.[3] Observation of enemy activity can allow for rapid response to crisis and rapid transition from the defensive to offensive operations in the form of a counter attack. Cyber-reconnaissance techniques, such as Digital Network Intelligence analysis contained in the traditional concept of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Cyber Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, provide a systematic methodology to define the cyber landscape by mapping and observing adversary actions to support operational planning efforts. Understanding the dimensions of the cyberspace warfare domain and applying traditional warfare concepts

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to it is crucial to the modern-day warfighter's success in competition and in conflict with near-peer adversaries.

The Need for Cyber Reconnaissance

We need not look far to forecast the potential future effects that our adversaries' cyber-reconnaissance efforts could wage against us across all warfare domains, further necessitating our aggressive actions within the same domain. In 2017, alleged Russian cyber hackers released NotPetya onto Ukrainian Linkos Group's update servers, with devastating impacts totaling an estimated $10 billion across multiple corporations. This attack crippled Maersk shipping and FedEx's European subsidiary in particular.[4] How exactly did the alleged Russian hackers engineer this attack? Through reconnaissance activities, knowledge of routine server updates on Linkos' servers provided an opportunity and a vehicle for rapid malware delivery to their intended targets. More recently, in May of 2021, Dark-Side held Colonial Pipeline hostage at a bitcoin ransom valuing over $5 million while threatening a data breach of sensitive information should the company not pay the ransom. This hack against America's largest fuel pipeline paralyzed east coast U.S. energy distribution, resulting in public panic over

gas shortages.[5] This particular example concluded when Colonial Pipeline reportedly paid the ransom in full.[6] These examples only underscore vulnerabilities in cybersecurity defenses, the ambiguity of how the U.S. Government and the DOD define cyber-criminal acts, and challenges associated effective responses to cyber criminals within the cyber domain. Now, think about the cost of our tactical inaction in the cyber domain when it comes to protecting our nation's military branches, corresponding weapon systems, capabilities development, and network infrastructure.

There Are Existing Models to Understand and Get After the Adversary in the Cyberspace Domain; We Just Need to Recognize and Apply Them

A critical step in enabling the Marine Corps to influence the adversary, in accordance with the friendly forces' endstate is pursuing relentless, aggressive reconnaissance across all warfare domains. Reconnaissance helps us to identify vulnerabilities, gaps, and exploitable opportunities. When it comes to reconnaissance, perhaps a universally understood Marine Corps analogy to draw is from within the infantry in support of ground combat operations. The best way to find out what is in that valley is to go over there and see what is in

it. Similarly, if we want to know what is on the other side of that obstacle (in this case a firewall), there is a way to find out.

In the traditional warfare domains, we would never allow our forces to hunker down in defensive positions without pursuing and manipulating the enemy to break his will to fight. During World War I, the Allied Powers, in static defensive positions along the Western Front, made little and often insignificant or short-lived forward progress against the enemy until they were able to overcome the lethality of the combined arms effects brought about by machine gun and artillery fires. Forces only truly overcame these technological military advances by means of resource attrition, a tactic absent in modern day warfare. Once sufficient attrition had been achieved, only then did the advent of new maneuver warfare tactics and the utility of tanks supersede the previously impenetrable wall of static defensive positions supported by combined arms effects.[7] Any course of action that would rely on the attrition of our current adversaries' resources to impact their capabilities in cyberspace would be not only costly but would represent an overestimation of our current capability to affect our competitors. However, the key difference when relating current cyber threats to the drastic technological advances of the early 1900s is the concept that the Allied Powers' warfighting capabilities were on par with that of the Triple Alliance along the Western Front, which facilitated the nearly four years of defensive stalemate. In the current cyber domain, we may be critically behind our competitors with regard to our ability to effectively use cyberspace technological advances to conduct defensive or offensive cyber operations in such a way as to force a stalemate.

To break this stalemate, we must not only identify the adversary centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities (within the cyber domain or by means of cyberspace operations) but use these same reconnaissance techniques to better understand our own vulnerabilities from the cyberspace perspective. According to GEN Paul Nakasone, Director U.S.

Cyber Command, Director of the National Security Agency, and Chief of the Central Security Services, those who seize the initiative in cyberspace also seize the advantage. GEN Nakasone refers to the activity conducted external to friendly networks as "defending forward," or enabling future outcomes to shape the enemy in line with the friendly scheme of maneuver. Persistent presence is required to operate effectively in the future cyberspace fight. Friendly forces must aggressively pursue action to understand enemy actions and track

> **Persistent presence is required to operate effectively in the future cyberspace fight.**

our adversaries in cyberspace.[8] In other words, and similarly to any other prepared defensive position, the most effective method of employment would be a defense-in-depth strategy coupled with aggressive cyberspace "patrols" outside of the cyberspace defensive "perimeter." These aggressive actions would allow friendly forces to remain cognizant of adversarial posturing activities in order to enhance the ability to defend and attack. Most importantly, this course of action provides the option to choose when to defend or when to attack rather than respond to threats retroactively.

Dually beneficial to both protecting friendly networks and gaining knowledge of adversary composition, disposition, and strength, cyber-reconnaissance enables the tactical warfighter to preempt weak defenses and capitalize on exploitable opportunities. In the cyber domain, MITRE defines reconnaissance as the first step in enabling the cyber-attack lifecycle, which includes both opportunities for exfiltration of valuable information (intelligence gain) and disruption operations (Offensive Cyber Operations):

> Attacks in cyberspace are no longer limited to simple (albeit significantly harmful) discrete events such as the

spread of a virus or worm, or a denial-of-service attack against an organization. Campaigns are waged by the advanced persistent threat (APT), following a cyber-attack lifecycle. Campaigns involve stealthy, persistent, and sophisticated activities, to establish a foothold in organizational systems, maintain that foothold and extend the set of resources the adversary controls, and exfiltrate sensitive information or disrupt operations.[9]

We can apply this lifecycle concept to cyber-reconnaissance methods with relative ease. Unmasking the enemy's concealment behind aliases, social engineering methods, and operational security measures exposes key terrain within cyberspace for us to leverage. "Local security patrols" in the cyber domain can be sent to areas as a feint for kinetic actions launched in a different direction. To use another common ground defensive tactic, listening posts/observation posts help us sense and detect enemy activity in order to alert our forces to potential danger to provide a defense in depth for a prepared position. Military staffs, in particular intelligence sections, apply the process of intelligence preparation of the battlespace to the cyberspace domain in a highly technical manner to map the cyber landscape and identify opportunities to support operational planning.

II MEF Information Group's Pursuit of the Adversary

One application we have learned at II MIG is the seamless integration between Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) and intelligence units. A clear focus on processes allows teams to collaborate to complement each other's end states, while building domain-specific expertise in respective functional areas. The application of traditional maneuver warfare concepts to the cyberspace warfare domain is endless. Taking this concept one step further, multiple information capabilities can participate in cross-domain competitive acts to further enhance actions on target. For example, Defensive Cyberspace Operations identifies known actors who attempt to penetrate friendly networks and can enable attribution in the form of public mes-

saging to "name and shame" the adversary, thus capitalizing across domains.[10] In a recent exercise, DCO-Internal Defensive Measures Company established named areas of interest around critical terrain, typically a network boundary shared by two organizations. They conducted reconnaissance missions to confirm or deny adversary presence. In one instance, DCO-Internal Defensive Measures Company discovered adversary attempts to cross that boundary and applied fused intelligence capabilities to determine the specific actor, not only to increase our understanding of the actor(s) operating against our tactical networks but also offer options to other cyber mission forces to understand that threat. This situation allowed for II MIG to interface with national and theater level assets, which enhanced national tactical integration and began to define a clearer process to navigate the DCO to Offensive Cyber Operations handoff. But what if tactical units not

only attributed known actors but *uncovered* and attributed previously unknown actors, keeping the knowledge of our "blind spots" close hold in order to fuel our deliberate targeting cycle? What if we crafted an intentional, controlled chink in our armor, intended to enable the enemy's reaction and observe tactics, techniques, and procedures, to further harden and safeguard friendly networks?

In addition to intelligence and targeting gain, an element of cyber reconnaissance can also be applied to military deception operations. Once we turn the tables on the problem set and understand how the enemy perceives our vulnerabilities and strengths, we can manipulate the enemy's avenues of approach to our advantage. Once again, operations in the cyberspace domain look different yet necessitate the same principles of maneuver warfare to defeat the enemy. Counter-surveillance operations in the cyber domain

require detailed analysis, assessment, and dedicated focus to identify opportunities. Misleading the enemy about our friendly-force structure may lead to improved detection methodologies, proactive defensive measures, and deliberate targeting efforts.

Though physical warfare domains enjoy a relative amount of detectable and predictable action in times of peace, operations in cyberspace are in constant motion and persistent competition at all times—necessitating our focus in the area. Critical information requirements of operations in the information environment do not differ from critical information requirements when compared to land, sea, or airbased combat operations. It is essential to comprehend that capabilities and limitations of our adversaries' kinetic weapon systems and the non-kinetic, cyberbased weapons are no different. These elements should be treated with the same amount of priority and concern due to the potential high

stakes impacts to friendly communications, friendly intelligence collection methods, operational security, navigation, weapons systems command and control, and our heavy reliance on automated capabilities that would cripple us if the enemy denied or exploited them. We should actively seek to identify these unknowns about our adversaries to enable us to go toe-to-toe in competition with them across all warfare domains.

Collective Service Actions to Increase Operational Capability in Cyberspace

As warfighters, we should remember that risk is equally present in both action and inaction.[11] The enemy operates largely unchecked in the cyber domain, whereas our current friendly forces balance risk aversion with capitalizing on traditional intelligence gain while maintaining our own non-attribution. This situation creates a challenge to answer tactical requirements and priorities. Cyber capabilities are rapidly available and constantly evolving, which further enable actors to take bigger risks in logical dimensions than in physical dimensions. Enemies face minimal repercussions for their offensive cyber actions because of challenges associated with attributing and prosecuting actors appropriately and in a timely manner. As GEN Nakasone explains, we gain the advantage in cyberspace by taking and maintaining continual action.[12]

The question on everyone's mind is: *how* does the Marine Corps position ourselves for success within such a tumultuous domain? The very top priority if we want to graduate to "varsity-level" operations in the cyber domain needs to be technical training and proficiency across the intelligence disciplines, cyber MOSs, and MIG functions. Digital Network Intelligence in support of Cyber Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace requires technical training, experience, and a thirst for knowledge as tools and capabilities modernize rapidly. At II MEF, we are already focusing our efforts towards developing, sustaining, and growing our technical capacity. In addition, and recognizing technical proficiency as a top priority, Marine Forces Cyber Command is already taking steps

to stabilize Marines on station for longer duration tours to offset the technical and tactical proficiency required to work alongside national-level agencies in order to achieve mission success for the Marine Corps.

Second, national- and tactical-level organizations need to realign and reprioritize efforts to enable America's military branches to take requisite actions in the cyber domain. The current posture of Marine Corps cyber assets and personnel with the training and authorities to conduct this level of reconnaissance in cyberspace does not support the operational priorities of any MEF, nor are they tasked in such a way to shift focus as needed. A "cyber call for fire" would require each MEF to coordinate with a sister Service cyber component, whose tasking is based on NSA mission alignment—and for a completely different strategy—to provide information and intelligence to national policy and decision-making entities. Even in the best-case scenario of an established working relationship with these sister Service cyber components, current authorities would not allow for these activities to support MEF priorities. Any support provided would be in the form of research and reporting marginally related to MEF requirements and would not allow for direct, continued reconnaissance activities on behalf of MEF operational planning. To put it simply, there are currently no task organized cyberspace reconnaissance assets available to the MEFs for tasking to gather intelligence on the enemy for operational planning purposes. The current alignment will not enable the Marine Corps to answer tactical requirements to protect and defend our tactical networks while exploiting opportunities on the offensive.

Conclusion

As in any domain, combined, joint, and national efforts are how we win. Enhancing synchronization between MEF-level defensive operations and strategic Offensive Cyber Operations will allow for the rapid response and deployment of desired effects against known adversaries. Understanding adversary actions within the cyberspace

domain will enhance our knowledge of adversary intent and priorities across all domains. Ultimately, those who are reticent to arrange for and make reconnaissance in the cyberspace domain should consider the positive impacts of precise, combined actions contained within cyber-reconnaissance methods to support the tactical warfighter.

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The 9/11 Wars Are Over

Charting the best way forward

by Maj Michael Anderson

The 9/11 wars are over. It is time to stop using 9/11 as a call to arms. The United States has entered a new era of a persistent engagement with various violent extremist groups across the globe and a resurgence in growing state competitors, such as Russia and China. This is an era inherited from the 9/11 wars, otherwise referred to as the Global War on Terrorism. The al-Qaeda of 9/11 has ceased to exist in its previous form and the war with Saddam's Iraq ended with a sovereign Iraq and withdrawal of U.S. troops, leaving the authorizations for use of military force for the 9/11 wars overused. The "forever war" against the Taliban, the first expansion to a non-specified enemy from the post-9/11 congressionally approved Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF), is ending. A new, different threat environment has emerged, requiring new or adjusted authorizations. It is important for the Nation and its military to fully understand the environment they are in to determine the best way forward in this new era and to recognize that the 9/11 wars are concluded and that the Nation is engaged in a new set of wars.

Al-Qaeda Transition and Bin Laden's Death

With Osama Bin Laden's death on 2 May 2011, many concluded this was the end of the al-Qaeda of 9/11, the specified enemy in the original post-9/11 AUMF. In actuality, the al-Qaeda that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks and instigated the 9/11 wars (Global War on Terrorism) already felt its death knell circa 2009 after a steady decline starting in 2004. Bin Laden's death in 2011 simply put a new face to the replacement,

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a changing al-Qaeda after the decline and end of the core, original al-Qaeda.

Between 2004 and 2009, the al-Qaeda base in Pakistan contributed to only 6 of the 21 most serious plots against the West. A report by British terrorism expert Paul Cruickshank found the other fifteen were from affiliated groups without training or direction from the core group, or from independent terrorist groups and homegrown radicalized terrorism.[1] Another study found three of twenty plots, specifically two of six planned against the United States, came from affiliate offshoots—not from the core who planned and orchestrated 9/11. In comparison to the plans prior to 2009, these plots lacked the vision, depth, and audacity in scope the traditional al-Qaeda had provided to the 9/11 and previous international terror plots.[2] Prior to the decline and transition to more affiliate or inspired copy-cats, the core al-Qaeda group from 2001 to 2005 planned and conducted successful attacks in the United States, Bali, Madrid, and London—demonstrating a different approach, focus, and capability.[3] In fact, the failed 2009 New York subway plot seemed to be one of the last core al-Qaeda internationally planned events. Two other plots were also planned and foiled for attacks in Britain and Norway.

Starting in 2009, al-Qaeda accelerated its shift to the new strategy of the local fight, focusing on de-centralized, affiliate-style perpetrators; in 2011 with Bin Laden's death, legitimately shifted to a new "face" with the loss of its iconic figurehead.[4] Whatever the cause was for this shift, whether it was natural evolution of the organization or if it was because of the external pressure on al-Qaeda post-9/11, the organization fundamentally altered its methods and structure.

Bin Laden's death affected three critical features of al-Qaeda as a global organization:

> Its legitimacy as a core organization capable of choreographing catastrophic global terrorist events ... Its ability to claim that it was the base for certain victory ... [and] a credible unfettered training area for global jihad—on the area most critical to its own mystical lore: Afghanistan and western Pakistan.[5]

Aside from the damage his death caused the global organization, more than anything it damaged the core—the "brand name."[6]

Further emphasizing the disconnect between direct core al-Qaeda control and independence of associated affiliates was that after Bin Laden's death, there were increased occurrences of the organization ignoring the ideological background of those they were aligning with—namely the increased involvement in the transatlantic drug trade.[7]

The new al-Qaeda shifted funding from donations largely garnered by Bin Laden's notoriety and message of jihad to illicit drug trade, kidnapping, and international financial system loopholes. These efforts are largely overseen and managed by affiliates for self-sustainment and less for a global group support managed by the core as had been done previously and for 9/11.[8] In contrast, Bin Laden's 9/11 al-Qaeda core had less affiliates and centrally managed majority of funding, forcing the few affiliates to fall in line with the direction of the core. Even so, some groups such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's affiliated al-Qaeda in Iraq (later to become the Islamic State) started giving Bin Laden pushback as early as 2006, revealing the decline of the centralized 9/11 al-Qaeda.[9]

The affiliates, of course, shared views and inspiration from the traditional al-Qaeda of 9/11, but there is no clear evidence of Bin Laden's al-Qaeda leadership directly influencing and planning the affiliates operational actions or support.[10] This undercuts the idea of the elusive mastermind or puppeteer, and more like a role model and later a martyr. A study by the Institute for Peace and Conflict stated,

> Al Qaeda of bin Laden, once an organized structure with set endgames and long term plans has been replaced with al-Zawahiri's al Qaeda: one that is fractured, has short-term goals, and riddled with communication issues.

It goes on to argue the difference between the two leaderships and their inherently effected organizations is a result of "the nature and political climate they had to operate in."[11] Al-Qaeda post-Bin Laden has become steadily more decentralized, more of an inspirational, advisory model for the increasingly more independently funded affiliates and independent, like-minded terrorist organizations.[12]

End of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and withdrawal of Operation NEW DAWN in 2011

Though tenuously connected even at the time of its instigation, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, later christened Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, was included under the umbrella of the Global War on Terrorism as a result of 9/11. Although it did have a separate authorization for use of military force provided by Congress, it was initially presented as a continuation, or broadening, of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—the 9/11 war that was ongoing in Afghanistan.

As the Iraq war dragged on, feeding off of the 2006–2007 "surge" in Iraq coupled with the aligning of the Sunni Awakening, negotiations paved the way for the U.S. military withdrawal. These negotiations ended with the Strategic Framework Agreement and the partner security agreement, outlining the future conduct of American military in Iraq and a timeline for the gradual withdrawal.[13] The security agreement, meant to be a broad baseline for the U.S. military withdrawal, remained the final agreement between the United States and Iraq when subsequent negotiations failed to achieve consensus.[14] This lengthy process eventually led to the final transition from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to Operation NEW DAWN in January 2010, which oversaw the final withdrawal of U.S. troops the following year.

> *By the last troop departure in 2011, the Iraq War had ended. Iraq was now a sovereign nation ...*

On 31 December 2011, Operation NEW DAWN ended, leaving the only U.S. military residual presence supporting the embassy-based Office of Security Cooperation and normal, albeit robust, defense attaché team for the routine interaction of the Department of State and DOD with the Iraqi government.[16] All eyes were on Iraq after the U.S. military departed with so much blood and treasure poured into the nation. After the American forces departed, violence remained at levels similar to those of the preceding, last three years of the American presence,

hovering around 4,000 civilian deaths a year.[17]

The violence in Iraq had largely stabilized and with multiple successful elections, the government had established its sovereignty. According to an NPR report in April 2011, the residual murder-violence rate in Iraq was on par with that of Brazil or Mexico and less than Colombia or Venezuela—by multiples. The American occupation and Iraqi government had established and supported a full government of services, regular elections, and a ratified constitution.[18]

By the last troop departure in 2011, the Iraq War had ended. Iraq was now a sovereign nation, standing on its own, making its own decisions, for good or bad. Continued U.S. presence arguably would be nothing more than a crutch for a nation that needed to learn how to manage its own affairs.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES Conclusion in 2014

The impetus for America's expansion of the 9/11 response to the Philippines was by invitation to help them deal with their extremist threats and terrorist groups in the Philippines hiding Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber and the main planner of the 9/11 attacks in 1994 and 1995, respectfully.[19]

The initial involvement of the United States in the Philippines revolved around the hunt for Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) affiliated with al-Qaeda terrorists who had kidnapped two U.S. citizens, a missionary couple. Additionally, beyond ASG an Indonesian jihadist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, was on the hit list as well. Starting in February 2002 and lasting fourteen years until 2016, what became known as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) remains little known successful theater of the 9/11 wars. Originally named Operation FREEDOM EAGLE before being consolidated under ENDURING FREEDOM banner, the initial deployment was under the guise of a regular occurring U.S.-Philippines joint training exercise called Operation BALIKATAN 02-1. This joint exercise was the peak

The Marine Corps has a long-standing partnership with the Philippine Marines. (Photo by Cpl Tyler Giguere.)

of U.S. involvement, totaling 1,300 personnel who provided assistance, advice, and supported both training and air support. Of the total personnel involved, 160 came from special operations forces—largely U.S. Army Special Forces—along with Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and limited number of U.S. Navy SEALs and Marine special operations.

Because of socio-political sensitivities, the Philippines authorized only six hundred Americans in the operational area at any given time. After the first six months and the completion of that mission, resulting in the liberation of one hostage (the husband died during the rescue attempt) and successful targeting of ASG leadership, OEF-P's mission evolved to building Philippine forces' self-sufficiency. The new mission was based on building competency within the Philippine forces for internal defense with the mission balancing out around 500–600 troops. This transition being the residual 500–600 coming from special operations forces remaining under a new Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). During the entire period, the Philippine government and local forces took the lead, with the American troops providing advice and assistance but not partaking in any combat missions or direct action. However slow, this process successfully

built the Philippine forces up to conduct independent missions and kept the United States from taking the reins and relegating the Philippine forces to the background as was largely done in Iraq and Afghanistan. This overriding effort in the long run served as a forcing function to make the Philippine troops improve as they could not use the United States military as a crutch.[20] U.S. special operations leadership along with the Philippine leadership agreed that the Zamboanga siege response by the Philippine forces validated the final phases of the gradual withdrawal of the JSOTF-P, showing the Philippine forces capable of planning and executing a complex joint mission in a challenging, urban environment on short notice.[21]

The Philippines response and handling of the Zamboanga crisis served as the culmination of OEF-P. In October 2013, rogue members of the Moro National Liberation Front broke away from their base during ongoing negotiations with the Philippine government and seized the city of Zamboanga, starting with twenty hostages and soon growing to taking two hundred. Within the day, the Philippine government sealed off the city, both land and sea, and over the course of a week fought through the city, killing over 180 rebels. In totality, the siege lasted 28 days, with more rebels surrendering as they took casualties.

Philippine military and police suffered casualties as well, with over a 100,000 left homeless from the fighting.[22] During the crisis, Americans supported the Philippines with planning and advice, but no involvement beyond that as a result of the involvement of the Moro National Liberation Front and not the ASG or Jemaah Islamiyah, which were the only two international extremist groups the operation authorized U.S. direct support to Philippine response.[23]

When JSOTF-P's withdrawal effectively ended OEF-P, the international terrorist presence in the Philippines had declined, shown by three factors reported in the RAND study on effectiveness of OEF-P. Enemy initiated attacks declined up to 56 percent between 2000 and 2012 in the ASG's primary operating areas. Estimated membership declined for ASG, the primary targeted group, from high of 2,200 members to 400. Independent polling data indicated decreased public support for the ASG declining from 8 percent to less than 3 percent coupled with an increase in positive views from 51 percent to 63 percent of the Philippine government's forces.[24] After 9/11 wars, new threats evolved.

Islamic State Emergence from al-Qaeda in Iraq

Although the Islamic State (IS) came from al-Qaeda in Iraq, itself an al-Qaeda offshoot, IS remained a distinct entity. In scope (financing, ideology, and tactics), IS stood apart from al-Qaeda. IS is not al-Qaeda and is not the protégé or standard-bearer for the organization that conducted the 9/11 attacks. It is distinct and fundamentally different, even though it acted as an affiliate to al-Qaeda during the height of the Iraq war (2004–2007).

What was once al-Qaeda in Iraq, then renamed the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in October 2006, broke with al-Qaeda officially in February 2014 over disputes about its spread into Syria. Al-Qaeda, now under al-Zawahiri after Bin Laden's death, attempted to divide the affiliates between al Nusrah in Syria and ISI focused in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi, leader of ISI, ignored him and continued operations in Syria, resulting in

Zawahiri disowning the organization. Al-Qaeda's al Nursah forces now joined other anti-ISI groups combating the newly renamed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), later to become ISIL and then settle on just Islamic State.[25]

The Islamic State's financial plan focused on raising money through local means, pillaging, black markets sales, taxation, and robbery, in contrast to how al-Qaeda focuses on its funding through international donations.[26] The tactics used by the Islamic State to establish itself in a new area were consistent: small cells would infiltrate an area, conduct an assassination campaign to foster deep social antagonism and delegitimize the government, and finally establish intimidation over the population before attempting complete control of the area. The manufacturing of chaos is how the Islamic State made itself a legitimate player in the region, a technique its affiliate offshoots adopted in places such as North Africa and Asia.[27]

The Islamic State ideology, inspired by the teachings of Abu Bakr Naji and his "management of savagery," is that out of chaos comes the just rule of the caliphate. The Islamic State's own hyper-obsession with territory contrasted sharply with al-Qaeda's global, transnational organization. While al-Qaeda attempted to co-opt other groups into working with al-Qaeda, the Islamic State either absorbed them into their own or fought them. In the Islamic State world view, you were either with them or against them. This was in direct contradiction to Bin Laden's al-Qaeda, who preferred to be "guests" in other lands, such as guests of the Taliban and earlier guests of Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State preferred to conquer, control, and hold territory directly under their banner.[28] While the Islamic State and the various other violent extremist groups scattered around the disaffected areas of the globe are threats, they are not the threats of 9/11 but something new and different.

The War with the Taliban

The original post-9/11 authorization for military action was directed at al-Qaeda as the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks; however, the Taliban's intransigence in handing over Bin Laden and his group resulted in the Taliban being the first expansion of opponents from within the specified named enemies in the congressionally approved authorization for force. Although the war in Afghanistan did not start with the Taliban, had the Taliban turned over Bin Laden there would have been no war with the Taliban; over time it evolved to be largely a contest between the United States and NATO against the Taliban.

Regardless of how the al-Qaeda targeted authorization was used to justify the prolonged conflict against the Taliban in Afghanistan, even that war has come to an end. Signed on 29 February 2020, the "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan" between the United States and the Taliban agreed to Afghanistan not harboring terrorists, a ceasefire between the United States and Taliban, and beginning of negotiations between internal Afghan groups for continued peace, and most importantly to this analysis, the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, namely the United States and its coaltion.[29] Orginially set for withdrawal by 1 May 2021 according to the agreement, the current adminstartion of President Joe Biden shifted the date to 11 September, and then to 31 August. With the closure of the last major U.S. base at Bagram in early July, the war against the Taliban effectively ended for the United States.[30]

The Overuse of the 9/11 War's Authorization for Use of Military Force

On 18 September 2001, Congress passed a joint resolution *Public Law 107-40 Authorization for the Use of Military Force*. The text reads in part,

> the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or harbored such organizations or persons,

providing the legal context for the emerging 9/11 war against al-Qaeda worldwide and the Taliban in Afghanistan. This Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) has been broadly applied since the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Africa, and Philippines and the Taliban in Afghanistan began in the first years after 9/11 and later Yemen. It now is used to legitimize support against most notably the Islamic State but additionally against a myriad of other terrorist organizations across North, Northwest, and East Africa; through the islands of the Pacific; and Syria and the broader Middle East—all somehow tied to "nations, organizations, or persons ... planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001." This broad application possibly falls under the second half of the AUMF stating the use of force against those nations, organizations, or persons associated with the 9/11 attacks is "in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States," except it finishes with, "by such nations, organizations or persons." Many of these currently targeted groups were not affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban on 9/11, some existing before with no connections, others not even in existence until afterward. As demonstrated, even the Islamic State, which is arguably the most violent extremist group, is a stretch to connect directly to 9/11. To hold the Islamic State accountable as an organization or persons responsible for the 9/11 attacks, although arguably a morphed descendant of an al-Qaeda offshoot, would be like holding Turkey or Bulgaria responsible for specific actions of the Ottoman Empire—from which they came. Although a nuanced argument, when a democracy goes to war it should be under very specific direction.

In comparison, the congressional joint resolution, *Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002* made into *Public Law 107-243* on 16 October 2002, provided a very specific and lengthy Iraq AUMF. The key authorization stated,

> The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to- (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security council resolutions regarding Iraq.

This resolution for what would be the second campaign of the Global War on Terrorism clearly identified the target and the scope of the use of military force. The 2003 invasion and the resultant 2011 withdrawal definitively marked the beginning and end of this AUMF, to such an extent that the campaign against Islamic State in Iraq years later fell under the original September 2001 AUMF since it was such broadly written.

A new or adjusted AUMF, or multiple AUMFs, pertaining to the broader conflicts of the post-9/11 wars provide a distinct benefit to the United States, in that it focuses the national efforts, clarifies the message both domestic and foreign audiences, and provides a better governmental and professional military framework for action. Without a congressional challenge, there is nothing inherently incorrect in a broad application of a specifically congressionally approved AUMF within a democratic system. However, appropriately adjusting the AUMF provides improved ability for practitioners to narrow their efforts and for continual public discourse on this new era of persistent conflict with various, evolving, and morphing violent extremist groups and threats. The Biden administration supports a congressional replacement of the post-9/11 AUMFs as well with more appropriate frameworks. This effort supports increased congressional involvement in deciding and regulating America's current and future military actions.[31]

With the end of the 9/11 wars there is a shifting paradigm in our global engagement. The proliferation of violent extremist organizations and emergent state competitors still require a U.S. response—however, one more appropriately guided by a new or adjusted authorization for use of military force. As the measure for congressional approval for the President to take military action, a more directed AUMF better guides the military and national leaders while providing public debate on the use of force on behalf of the people.

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Survivorship Bias

Applying an old concept to new opportunities for leader development
by Col Kyle G. Phillips

"The responsibility of the commanders for their commands is absolute except to the extent that the commander is relieved of responsibility by competent authority or by regulations. While the commander may delegate authority to subordinates for the execution of details, such delegation of authority does not relieve the commander of responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of the entire command." [1]

Command is the pinnacle of leadership within the Marine Corps. From the earliest days of the Basic Officer Course, the Marine officer aspires to command. Every level of command throughout the career of an officer presents unique challenges. As an officer progresses, the responsibilities and scope of leadership in command increases. The Marine Corps provides the most dynamic and successful leaders to prepare future leaders for command. Lacking in the preparation for the incumbent leaders is an acknowledgement that even the most celebrated and respected officers in command are vulnerable to ethical, moral, and professional missteps that result in the relief of the commander and a degradation of unit combat readiness. Training and educating Marines to prepare for the multitude of challenges in command is critical to ensure the success of the commander, the Marines within his charge, and the combat readiness of the unit.

The focus for the Marine Corps must always be combat readiness. Combat readiness applies to both the operating forces and the supporting establishment. Each Marine must be *employable* and *deployable* within their MOS and as a basically trained Marine rifleman. Therefore, commanders at all levels and throughout the multitude of organizations in the Marine Corps must focus on combat readiness and support the readiness of Marines throughout the force. Commanders must also ensure the health, safety, and welfare of their subordinates. Command presents the greatest professional satisfaction but can also be accompanied by the highest levels of stress and frustration for military leaders. Task saturation within this environment creates unfortunate opportunities for frustration, bias, arrogance, or egoism that may lead otherwise talented individual leaders to make bad choices.

The Marine Corps has a well-established progressive path to command. Company-grade officers will exercise limited command authority while being held accountable for their Marines' actions, readiness, and adherence to standards. The professional military education program provides leadership education through career-level and intermediate-level school. Field-grade commanders are most often "board-selected" by seasoned leaders who evaluate their record and their potential to serve as a battalion- or squadron-level commander with increased authority and responsibilities. After selection and either prior to or immediately after assuming command, selected leaders attend the Commandant's two-week Cornerstone Course to prepare those for the challenges of command. [2] A review of a recent lieutenant colonel command screening board highlights the competitive, merit-based system of how Marine officers are placed in positions of command.

The Fiscal Year 2019 Command Screening Board had a selection rate of 27 percent of lieutenant colonels who were eligible and had not removed their names from consideration. [3] If the entire eligible population is considered, the selection rate is closer to sixteen percent. [4] There is little doubt that those selected are capable of success in command. So, what is the Marine Corps to make of the fact that selected commanders, in such a competitive system, find themselves relieved of command?

As highlighted by the former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the majority of reliefs do not involve the considerations of technical competence within their unit or MOS. [5] So with all the training, education, and selection criteria for commanders, does the current level of reliefs simply represent "normal" command attrition? An

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argument can be made that if there were more opportunities to study and learn from the reliefs of otherwise exceptional commanders, it could prevent the attrition described above.

Within leader development, there exists a certain survivorship bias that could impede learning from known hazards that commanders could encounter. Leaders who have risen through the ranks provide their experiences and approaches to incumbents in order to educate future commanders. However, there is remarkably little attention focused on failures and what future commanders can learn from failures, both organizationally and personally.

Survivorship bias is commonly associated with Abraham Wald's study of World War II bombers. The story is almost mythical in the lesson of *beware the data that you see.* Bill Casselman provides an excellent summary in his article "The Legend of Abraham Wald."[6] As described in the article, Wald was assigned to evaluate enemy hits to Allied bombers in order to allow Army Air Corps personnel to determine how best to armor the airplanes to increase survivability. Although most of the bombers studied had fragmentary and bullet holes through the wings, fuselage, and ailerons, Wald recognized that the study of these bombers likely indicated that armor in these areas was not necessary—the bombers, of course, survived to make it back. By mathematically randomizing the hits, or so the story goes, any increase in armor was best applied to the cockpit and engines, as these more vulnerable—and critical—areas likely were more catastrophic:

> What you should really do is add armor around the motors! What you are forgetting is that the aircraft that are most damaged don't return. You don't see them. Hits by German shells are presumably distributed somewhat randomly. The number of damaged motors you are seeing is far less than randomness would produce, and that indicates that it is the motors that are the weak point.[7]

As commanders, discovering the weak points is critical to not only personal success but, more importantly, the success of the organization. Survivorship bias may leave those preparing for command vulnerable to missteps, mistakes, or faults in the execution of their command tours. A deeper learning through evaluating the failed experiences of other similarly situated commanders would greatly enhance leader development. A leader who consciously evaluates how they approach leadership challenges by reflecting on both successes and failures will be equipped to understand potential friction points, account for chance, external influences, and environmental factors, and ultimately be more capable to face similar challenges in the future.

To overcome survivorship bias in leader development, it is not enough to simply provide a summarized list of those commanders who were relieved and the generic basis for the relief. A deep approach to leader development would seek out those former commanders who were willing to publicly discuss their case and engage in a meaningful dialogue on the factors that contributed to their relief. Although institutionally it is essential that the Marine Corps hold commanders to the highest moral, ethical, and professional standards, the Marine Corps must also recognize the

Evaluating the failures of similarly positioned commanders is a valuable part of leader development. (Photo by LCpl Sean Evans.)

> ... the Marine Corps must also recognize the fallibility of the human experience and work to mitigate this for future generations of leaders.

fallibility of the human experience and work to mitigate this for future generations of leaders.

An example of how this highly personal experience of learning through failure is found at the Admiral Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership. The Stockdale Center sponsors the leadership Capstone program for 1st class midshipmen preparing for graduation and commissioning. One of the most successful (and impactful) events is when a former Naval Academy graduate and Marine aviator presents his experience when he was involved in an aviation mishap that killed twenty civilians in Aviano, Italy. The presenter very openly and frankly discusses the professional and ethical failings and provides the

human and environmental factors that led to the tragedy and the subsequent actions resulting in his conviction at a court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer.[8] The experience not only exposes the vulnerability to failures for the soon-to-be-officers of the Naval Academy but also provides an opportunity to reflect on their own values. The desired outcome is that by presenting scenarios not only of successes but also failures, future leaders will recognize when they reach a crossroads in their leadership experiences and choose the path of ethical and professional actions that benefit the Naval Service, their subordinates, and themselves.

Survivorship bias exists in leader development. The *Planning Guidance* of the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps emphasizes that we must be a learning organization. The Commandant further stated that "[t]hose selected for command have earned our special trust and confidence and are account-able for all decisions and actions. When commanders fail to measure up to standards, they will be held accountable."[9] Future commanders should be equipped to learn from those who came before them in order to minimize blind-spots. The perception exists that the relief of commanders is shrouded in secrecy with the broadest reasons for the sacking released to the general public. Privacy considerations rightly shield those who have gone down a path resulting in the loss of trust and confidence to lead from continued shame and ridicule. However, if those who have stumbled are willing to share their experiences, the Marine Corps should embrace the opportunities to provide those leaders for future commanders to learn and develop. By providing opportunities in a non-attribution forum to frankly and honestly discuss not only the basis but the underlying circumstances involved in a relief for cause, the Marine Corps could also advance the efficiency and effectiveness of our force and better care for the most important asset—the individual Marine.

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China's Active Defense Military Strategy

Competition considerations for U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region

by Maj Timothy A. Ornelas

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The People's Republic of China's (PRC) strategic foreign policy decision making is framed by what Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials and state leadership have characterized as "inviolable" or "indestructible" core interests. These interests are traditionally communicated in various public statements and strategic correspondence, such as periodic defense white papers. An examination of CCP rhetoric reveals three distinct themes tied to China's strategic core interests: the survival of the CCP and the stability of China's political system, the defense of national sovereignty and maintenance of territorial integrity, and the continued long-term economic growth and social development of China.[1] Understand-

weaving diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions in a holistic effort to exert influence and, at times, coerce actors within the Indo-Pacific region.[2] Evaluating the individually distinct strategies of each constituent piece of this broader holistic approach is useful in understanding how China is operationalizing their overall strategic core interests.

ter understanding of Chinese decision making and intent related to military force modernization and reform, and explore considerations for U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region.

Active Defense Strategy Overview

China's perceived invasion threat from the Soviet Union in the 1980s was a significant turning point in China's military strategy. Following the Chinese Civil War, China's primary military strategy was influenced heavily by Mao Zedong's approach to guerilla warfare, which sought to draw an adversary deep into Chinese territory then reclaim any lost territory through a long protracted war of attrition using China's geography and population to its advantage.[5] However, in 1980, China adopted new guidance which no longer called for the ceding of territory to an invading force but rather sought to actively repel an invasion and use counter-attack forces to remove any remaining occupying force. This shift was the foundation of the current active defense strategy.

China's active defense strategy has been, and continues to be, an evolving strategy that has traditionally focused

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> *China's approach to asserting power takes an whole-of-nation approach, interweaving diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions in a holistic effort ...*

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ing these strategic core interest helps to explain and understand Chinese actions within the international system, providing context for observed behavior when China exercises elements of national power (e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information).

China's approach to asserting power takes a whole-of-nation approach, inter-

Over the past three decades, China's operational military strategy has focused on an approach Chinese literature refers to as active defense.[3] China characterizes their active defense strategy as "strategically defensive but operationally offensive."[4] This article will provide an overview of China's active defense strategy in order to gain a bet-

on three key elements: forward-edge defense, effective control, and localized war.[6] The emphasis on each of these three elements has varied over the years based on China's threat perceptions; however, despite the varying emphasis, these themes have remained consistent

> *Perhaps the most pronounced example of forward-edge defense is found in the ongoing military modernization efforts, which has resulted in an increasingly contested environment within the Indo-Pacific region ...*

with observations in China's military modernization and reform efforts, which have reinforced the key elements of active defense. The following sections will discuss each element of the active defense strategy and provide examples of how the PRC has operationalized each component through military modernization and reform efforts.

Forward-Edge Defense

Based on Chinese defense guidance, forward-edge defense is designed to seize the initiative in a military struggle by establishing positional defensive positions in order to conduct operational or tactical level offensive operations against an invading force upon its advance.[7] Perhaps the most pronounced example of forward-edge defense is found in the ongoing military modernization efforts, which has resulted in an increasingly contested environment within the Indo-Pacific region and recent military reforms which have placed an increased emphasis on joint operations to elevate overall People's Liberation Army (PLA) operational and tactical-level offensive capabilities.

One of the most significant aspects of the PLA's military modernization efforts is clearly visible in the continued development of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which has increased the PLA's forward-edge defense posture by fielding a growing number of ballistic and cruise missiles with increasing ranges and precision-guided capabilities, intended to actively repel

an advancing threat upon its initial approach.[8] According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the PLARF boasts hundreds of theater-range missiles and over 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles capable of conducting precision strikes against civilian and military landbased targets as well as targeting naval vessels (to include aircraft carriers) operating on China's periphery.[9]

It is important to understand that

Figure 1. PLARF Support to China's Forward-Edge Defense Posture. (Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project.)

military modernization is only one component of China's continued implementation of forward-edge defense. Military reform is also a distinct and crucial component to the overall success of the PLA's application of forward-edge defense. Beginning in 2015, the consolidation of seven former Military Regions into five Theater Commands

(TC) has placed an emphasis on joint operations in order to increase the effectiveness of the PLA's combined capabilities from across its traditionally insular service-level entities (e.g., PLA Army).[10] The new joint model employs a unified commander over the joint forces within the geographic TC, providing the commander the ability to integrate operations across multiple domains (e.g., cyberspace, maritime) to increase the complexity and sophistication of the PLA's forward-edge defense posture.[11]

Effective Control

Effective control addresses China's primary approach toward offensive operational- and tactical-level warfare outlined in Chinese defense doctrine, which is commonly referred to as systems confrontation. Effective control focuses on the China's ability to conduct systems confrontation, and subsequent systems destruction, in a potential conflict by gaining dominance in three distinct domains: information, space, and air with information dominance being a prerequisite to achieving dominance in any other domain.[12] Through continued military modernization and

reform, the PLA has tailored their approach to systems confrontation to engage a "high-tech adversary" in order to paralyze the enemy's operational system, thus rendering the enemy ineffective in their ability to resist.[13]

Chinese literature defines information dominance as the ability to protect one's own information while attacking or disrupting an adversary's information system.[14] By disrupting an enemy's information system, the PLA believes it can constrain an adversary's actions and slow their deployment of forces.[15] Moreover, PLA doctrine suggests that by protecting their own information system, the PLA can employ integrated joint force operations to achieve "comprehensive dominance" across all domains in a conflict against a technologically advanced enemy force.[16]

Following the 1991 Gulf War, China observed the effectiveness of the U.S. approach to network-centric warfare, which included sophisticated intelligence sensing capabilities, the use of precision-guided munitions, and the integration of advanced command, control, and communication systems.[17] Analyzing how the U.S. system outcycled and paralyzed the Iraqi operational military system informed China's future military modernization and reform efforts, particularly in those areas which focused on achieving information dominance, as they found themselves unprepared to meet the challenges of warfare under high-technology conditions.[18]

Perhaps the most significant component of recent PLA reforms that support achieving information dominance, and by extension establishing effective control, is the formation of the PLA's Strategic Support Force (SSF). In 2015, the PLA created the SSF as part of a broader reorganization, which fundamentally changed the nature of employment for cyber, electronic warfare (EW), space, and psychological warfare capabilities.[19] Since the PLA views cyber, EW, space, and psychological operations as interconnected elements of a larger information warfare campaign, the reorganization of these capabilities under one unified command structure offers the PLA the ability to gain ef-

ficiency and synergistic effects across the information domain.[20] Through a unity of effort across information-related capabilities, the SSF intends to create an "information umbrella" that will integrate with land, air, maritime, and rocket forces to enable joint operations and PLA force projection in the event of a conflict against a technologically advanced adversary.[21]

Figure 2. SSF Insignia. *(Source: DIA China Military Power Report, 2019.)*

Localized War

Localized war began to appear in Chinese strategic guidance in the late-1980s, which was a significant departure from previous guidance that focused on total war.[22] Total war doctrine called for a long and protracted attrition-based conflict, usually within Chinese territory. Localized war envisioned the future of warfare being localized geographically on China's periphery and limited in scope, duration, and means.[23] The limited and geographically localized aspects of localized warfare support China's core interest of ensuring territorial integrity. This approach also addresses an emerging concern of Chinese military planners: the potential for chain reaction warfare.[24]

In chain reaction warfare, regional rivals exploit defensive gaps created by the PLA's focus on a regional conflict in

order to solidify their own interests in the regions along China's periphery.[25] To limit the potential for chain reaction warfare, localized war focuses on the rapid application of force to achieve operational objectives and force a quick resolution to a conflict.[26] The PLA's continued military reforms and renewed focus on joint operations support the execution of localized warfare and underscore the PRC's commitment to the evolving active defense military strategy.

Joint military reforms focus on mutually supporting operations among the air, maritime, land, information, and rocket forces to create dominance across multiple domains, swiftly and efficiently.[27] Amphibious assaults, maritime blockades, integrated joint firepower strikes, and anti-air raid operations all require integrated joint operations and are designed to geographically localize a conflict as well as bring the confrontation to a quick conclusion on Chinese terms.[28] Establishing TCs under a unified commander supports the implementation of these joint operations in a cohesive manner. Additionally, the unity of command created by the reorganization to TCs also supports potential multi-theater joint operations, which prepares the PLA to meet threats from multiple strategic directions and control the geographic scope of possible chain-reaction scenarios.[29]

The limited and geographically localized aspects of localized warfare support China's core interest of ensuring territorial integrity.

Considerations for U.S. Forces

The active defense strategy carries a number of implications for U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly when evaluating how U.S. actions may influence PRC behavior within the context of China's strategic core interests. Notably, the active defense strategy is only one aspect of China's whole-of-nation approach (i.e., military) toward power projection; however, this aspect is the one that carries perhaps

Figure 3. PLA Marine Corps units conduct an amphibious assault training. *(Source: DIA China Military Power Report, 2019.)*

the most significant consequences in the event of a miscalculation among actors. After analyzing the components of active defense, there are two primary considerations for U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region to confront China's military strategy: leveraging the U.S.' competitive advantage to foster strategic partnerships and alliances with Indo-Pacific regional actors and supporting an enduring national competitive campaign plan through the forward-basing of operational-level capability in the region.

The United States' competitive advantage is rooted in its commitment to the Nation's enduring culture, interests, and values which have manifested themselves in the Nation's scientific, economic, technological, and military strength.[30] Leveraging the United States' competitive advantage to foster strategic alliances and partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region addresses two components of the active defense strategy: forward-edge defense and localized war. Alliances with regional actors such as the Philippines, Vietnam,

Japan, and South Korea provide access for U.S. forces within the interior lines of China's forward-edge defensive posture. This dynamic directly challenges the PLA's evolution in their defense doctrine, and to some extent their military modernization and reform efforts, by requiring the PLA to potentially defend against an adversary that is already deep into Chinese territory (i.e., revert

> *Alliances with regional actors such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea provide access for U.S. forces within the interior lines of China's forward-edge defensive posture.*

to Mao's guerilla warfare approach). Additionally, the presence U.S. military capability within a diverse geographic region within the Indo-Pacific would require Chinese military planners to account for the potential for multiple dilemmas in the event of a conflict (i.e.,

chain reaction warfare), likely requiring them to commit resources to counter the potential cost imposition created by combined and credible capabilities created by U.S. partnerships and alliances. A commitment of resources to counter capabilities across a broad set of regional partnerships directly challenges the PLA's ability to control the scope, duration, and means of a con-

flict by introducing a complex adaptive system of cooperation underpinned by a competitive advantage that the CCP cannot replicate.

By demonstrating how mutual interests align and through creating positive-sum agreements with allies and partners

in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States can attract actors to work toward creating a meaningful framework for engaging China along the competition continuum. Eroding the effectiveness of China's forward-edge defensive posture and introducing uncertainty into China's ability to control the geographic scope and scale of a potential conflict through a complex adaptive system of allies and partners could serve as an effective deterrent against Chinese courses of action above the threshold of violence, ultimately contributing to improved peace and stability within the region. Related but distinct in purpose, the forward-basing of operational-level information-related capabilities is necessary to address perhaps the most significant aspect of active defense: effective control.

The enduring nature of competition at the national level requires a campaigning mindset.[31] This mindset is characterized by long-term thinking of how military actions will integrate and mutually support all other elements of national power (e.g., information, intelligence, diplomatic) throughout the competition continuum. In order to effectively support an enduring national competition campaign, U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific must posture themselves to effectively compete against China's system confrontation/ systems destruction approach to operational- and tactical-level warfare. Serving as an enabler, U.S. forces could effectively degrade the PRC's ability to create an "information blockade" through the forward-deployment of capabilities designed to challenge the PLA's use of ubiquitous and layered intelligence sensing capabilities; precision-guided munitions; and integrated advanced command, control, and communication systems.

Establishing durable, integrated, and forward deployed information-related capabilities, which would directly compete against China's information system, would erode China's ability to achieve information dominance within the Indo-Pacific region and complicate their ability to conduct systems destruction warfare in the event of a conflict. Below the threshold of violence, main-

Figure 4. Competition Continuum. (Source: MCDP 1-4 Competing.)

taining a persistent forward deployed information-related operational system will allow U.S. forces to actively compete against the PLA's system confrontation approach to achieve information dominance, potentially delaying operational- and tactical-level decision making by introducing uncertainty about the PLA's ability to gain and maintain information dominance.

Conclusion

Examining the PRC's military strategy over the past several decades suggests China's active defense strategy will continue to evolve to keep pace with advancements in technology, developments in the global security environment, and in response to internal changes within China. External and internal forces may drive adjustments in the execution of China's active defense strategy; however, the inviolable core interests that have guided the development and implementation of the active defense strategy will likely remain the foundation of the broader CCP national strategy and foreign policy decision-making framework. As in the past, this resolute commitment to China's indestructible core interests will continue to produce common themes

and characteristics in China's overall approach to national defense. Based on the unwavering nature of China's core interests, it is likely that future iterations of China's military strategy will continue to include approaches characterized by establishing a forward-edge defense; gaining and maintaining effective control; and controlling the scope, means, and duration of a conflict (i.e., localized war).

Through studying and understanding each aspect of China's military strategy, U.S. forces can actively contest each pillar of China's military strategy and compete more effectively within the Indo-Pacific region. The forward-posturing of resilient and redundant strike capabilities in what China perceives to be their interior lines will erode the PLA's forward-edge defense posture. The deployment of durable and integrated information capabilities (i.e., C5ISR-T, C-C5ISR-T) will directly challenge the PLA's ability to gain and maintain effective control in the event of a conflict. Finally, actively leveraging the United States' competitive advantage to foster alliances and partnerships will expand localized war across geographically dispersed avenues of approach, creating multiple dilemmas

for PLA planners in their attempts to guard against chain reaction warfare. By directly challenging the three aspects of China's active defense strategy, United States' forces can introduce uncertainty into China's military planning process and effectively deter against PLA aggression, ultimately supporting regional peace, prosperity, and freedom for all actors within the Indo-Pacific region.

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Civil Affairs

More than a boutique MOS

by LtCol Jeremiah Root

Two decades of the long war among the people have solidified past lessons learned for the Marine Corps, lessons that go back to the *Small Wars Manual*: "American forces must understand and influence the populations among whom the war is fought."[1]

The Marine Corps has a habit of learning hard lessons during combat operations in the cognitive civil environment—only to later shelve the knowledge once the conflict is over. Past successful Operations in the Information Environment (OIE)—specifically civil affairs (CA) and civil-military operations (CMO)—were done largely ad hoc and, despite the merits of these capabilities, were not fully understood or endorsed by commanders.

Nowhere was this more evident than in operations in Vietnam where the Marine Corps was able to achieve rare lasting operational success through the Combined Action Program (CAP). While the CAP is not a contemporary topic and not specifically CA, it was an irregular warfare concept. The CAP was also the suggestion of the 3/4Mar Adjutant and Civil Affairs Officer, Capt John J. Mullen, Jr.[2] The CAP expertly combined advising, civic action programs, and CA into a pacification program. LtGen Walt (Ret) stated in his memoirs, "Of all our innovations in Vietnam none was as successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful for the future as the Combined Action Program."[3]

The now declassified government document, *A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN),* stated, "The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won."[4] Despite the

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success of the CAP and the PROVN report, the program did not receive support by either GEN Westmoreland or Secretary of Defense McNamara.

The intent of this exposition is not to point out the flaws in the strategy of Vietnam but to show that 55 years ago we conducted *war among the people*, just as we did in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the documented success and merits of the CAP, the program was shelved by the Marine Corps at the conclusion of the Vietnam War. The program is now a footnote to the war

and likely only studied by Marines at the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) and during the Marine Advisor Course. The CAP is a hallmark example of how the Marine Corps invests human capital into irregular warfare concepts only to treat it as an axillary duty, or as something that is done as needed.

Evidence that we have not moved far enough from Westmorland's thinking continues to be exemplified during the planning for each new conflict. In

1999 MajGen Anthony Zinni (Ret) anticipated many of the CMO issues that would follow the Invasion of Iraq, but his concerns were largely ignored.[5] A more contemporary example occurred in 2019 when then Secretary of the Army and former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper called for the closure of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.[6]

This leads to the most pressing and relevant lessons the Marine Corps must take from the last twenty years of conducting CA. First, leaders must

> *... leaders must understand the value and capabilities that CA has to offer specifically to inform, influence, shape, and gain access to the cognitive civil environment.*

understand the value and capabilities that CA has to offer specifically to inform, influence, shape, and gain access to the cognitive civil environment. The Marine Corps must do a better job of inculcating officers on CA, CMO, and OIE—starting at the basic school and through all levels of professional military education. Leaders need to understand that CA is not just for stabilization and humanitarian assistance operations. The value of Civil Information Management (CIM), Civil

Reconnaissance (CR), green cell analysis during the Marine Corps Planning Process, human network analysis, and Civil Engagement (CE) are relevant from the beginning of the planning cycle and across the competition continuum.

I observed the dearth of CA appreciation in 2015 while serving as a future operations planner at II MEF. I was assisting in the revision of the tactical standard operating procedure for II MEF and the review of the battle rhythm. During a battle rhythm analysis discussion, the conversation moved to the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell. The fires officer looking over the targeting working group lamented the fact that he needed to integrate CA and military information support operations Marines into the targeting cycle by stating, "I don't know what to do with all these *boutique* MOSs." The intelligence chief then stated, "The CA guys think they are recon." There were no words of objection in the room.

This splenetic view of CA was surprising considering we were now fourteen years into the war in Afghanistan where counterinsurgency and security force advise and assist teams were the prevailing wisdom for success. This only reinforced a common theme where CA is viewed as something done after operations are over, that it is second tier with regards to traditional kinetic operations. I had previously been a combat advisor on an embedded training team with an Afghan National Army infantry company and a commander's emergency relief program officer. Since my Afghan National Army company was experienced and well trained, much of my deployment was spent conducting ad hoc CA through the commander's emergency relief program and conducting key leader engagements along with my counterpart. My role as an advisor gave me great access to the cognitive civil environment, and I was able to gather considerable civil information in our area of operations.

During that contentious II MEF meeting, I should have replied that CMO is the responsibility of the commander. That CA Marines assist, plan, and coordinate civil affairs operations in support of CMO.[7] Or more specific to his targeting wheel house,

> CA planners using CIM products and analysis can provide nonlethal targeting options to support the commander's end state when appropriate and support lethal targeting with analysis of second and third order effects and mitigate the effects of lethal targeting on the civil environment and local population.[8]

The second lesson is the need to create a primary MOS (PMOS) for officers in CA and IO. How can we expect our peers to understand the professional credibility of a CA officer if the skill set is treated as a free MOS? For example, a logistics officer that becomes a CA officer will always be evaluated for promotion potential or command as a logistics officer no matter how skilled and adept the officer is at CA, CMO, or OIE. On the active duty side, officers who serve in CA and IO will do so as a temporary duty assignment and will eventually rotate back to their PMOS. This not only prevents those who are keen to understand the cognitive civil environment from staying and mastering this field but also prevents the development of a professional career track commensurate with a traditional MOS. In the reserve forces, where officers have a greater latitude to control their billets, if an officer chooses to go up against tradition and stay in a CA or IO billet, they risk selection for promotion or command. On a promotion board, there is a tendency toward "ducks pick ducks": board members selecting officers with career tracks similar to their own.[9] If an officer commits to an irregular career track dedicated to CA or IO, they do so at the hazard of promotion.

A reserve officer who attempts to maintain a traditional promotion pipeline will not only be required to maintain MOS proficiency in their PMOS but maintain the unique skills of CA all while maintaining relevance in a civilian occupation. With limited access to training and school in the reserves, this bifurcated career plan only attenuates the knowledge, skills, and abilities of an officer in either field. Just by looking at the 2020 MOS manual for 0530 Civil Affairs officer, there are more follow-on skills progression courses listed than for most tradition occupational specialties.[10]

Going forward, as the Marine Corps modernizes for great power competition, it is imperative to create a career PMOS pipeline for officers in CA. The best solution to this was posited by CWO4 Jabinal and Col Jackson in *Forward and Enduring Rethinking Marine Civil Affairs* (2019), in which they recommended the creation of both a Civil Reconnaissance and a Psychological Operations PMOS at the 1st lieutenant level and that eventually converge in an Information Activities Officer PMOS at the lieutenant colonel level.[11] Another more likely CA PMOS solution is currently being reviewed by the Deputy Commandant for Information (DCI) as the 17xx Influence Officer PMOS. This pre-decisional PMOS will merge CA and psychological operations into one professionalized MOS. Either construct would provide professionalization of CA as a career field and would also be consistent with the *National Defense Strategy Irregular Warfare Annex* framing principle to "prioritized investments in human capital as the primary competitive advantage in irregular warfare over our adversaries."[12]

The Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen D.H. Berger's *Commandant's Planning Guidance* (*CPG*) firmly places the modern Marine Corps back in our traditional maritime role. The CMC's force realignment envisions a Marine Corps conducting distributed operations in contested littoral areas in support of expeditionary advanced base operations. While the *CPG* does not specifically address CA or CMO, the guidance does state, "Future force development must also contribute to an integrated operational architecture and enable information environment operations."[13] The Marine Corps *Force Design 2030* more specifically articulates the need to conduct maritime gray zone operations as well as "combine the physical and information domains to achieve desired outcomes."[14] The *Marine Corps Operating Concept* further states, "In future conflicts, the Marine Corps will have to fight for information and with information."[15] Looking at the *CPG*, the *Expeditionary Advanced*

Base Operations Handbook, Force Design 2030, and the *Marine Corps Operating Concept,* it has become self-evident that CA will be essential for strategic success of the next conflict especially as it feeds into the larger information dominance landscape.

CA will need to modernize in two ways. First, there is a need to increase information operations training in order to posture the CA force as a reliable integrated information-related capability (IRC). Second, ensure CA activities are fully integrated at all levels of Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) specifically within the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept.

Information is the newest warfighting function, and information dominance will be the *sine qua non* for strategic success in future maritime gray zone operations and peer conflict. In order to fight and win in a contested information environment, commanders need to have integrated planning and employment of information related capabilities. IRCs are tools, techniques, or activities employed in the operational information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. There are fourteen IRCs, with the touch point to CA being CMO. Other IRCs that directly relate to CMO are Communication Strategy and Operations (COMMSTRAT), military information support operations, and counterintelligence.[16] In order to maximize CA's interoperability with other IRCs, the Marine Corps needs to send all CA Marines to the Intermediate MAGTF Information Operations Practitioner Course. This course will ensure a greater understanding of how other IRCs conduct OIE and how CA can better plan and integrate into information operations. CA officers and SNCOs also need to attend the Advanced MAGTF Information Operations Practitioner Course.

JADC2, while currently being developed by the Air Force, is a joint requirement plan and is intended to incorporate artificial intelligence and machine learning to converge all warfighting functions across in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the

information environment.[17] Through a process of convergence, there is a globally integrated effects both kinetic and non-kinetic on adversaries. The JADC2 concept specifically indicates it will encompass any sensor, any shooter. While traditional sensors in the air domain are easy to envision (e.g., ground-based radar detecting an aircraft), sensors in the information environment are far more nebulous. CA is not an intelligence function, yet civil affairs activities must be incorporated into the overall information domain. The civil affairs activities that will provide input to JADC2 are CR, CE, and CIM.

The goal of JADC2 is to create battlespace awareness through multiple inputs across domains. *(Figure provided by author.)*

If the goal of JADC2 is to create battlespace awareness—enabling and integrated fires that encompasses any sensor, any shooter—then it is imperative that critical aspects of the operational environment are included into the common operating picture. In order to do this, there needs to be modernization in CA such that products and CIM are accessible to the enabling technologies processing the sensing grid to shooter grid. While CA operators are not sensors in an intelligence fashion, CA must still be considered a sensor in order to converge with all traditional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. Presently, the Marine Corps relies on the Marine Civil Information Management System (MARCIMS) to share CIM in support of CMO. MARCIMS is an unclassified

Semantic MediaWiki-based cloud hosted service that enables users to collect, organize, analyze, and share civil information. While the MARCIMS system is intuitive to use, it is not integrated jointly or with interagency partners. Presently, there are a number of CIM systems such as the All Partners Access Network, USSOCOM's Civil Information Management Data Processing System, the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System, and the intelligence community utilizes the Distributed Common Ground System.[18] This lack of interoperability raises the question: Is MARCIMS is a sufficient platform for integration into the burgeoning JADC2 system or to support integrated all-domain naval power?

There are endless planning scenarios where CA's understanding of the civil environment could play an important role in the overall information domain. For example, managing displaced civilians, tracking refugee boats, or receiving complaints in a Civil Information Operations Center from fishermen about Chinese mines interfering with fishing operations. The impact is clear: the more distributed the operations become the more likely CA will need to interface with civilians. One mishap commensurate with the Médecins Sans Frontières Kunduz airstrike would get weaponized against the United States,

especially during maritime grey-zone operations. This would not only be costly in terms of building partner relationships but would limit access to the civil environment and degrade our ability to inform, influence, and shape. Ensuring CIM, CR, and CE are adequately incorporated into not only the commander's operating picture but JADC2 is critical as we modernize.

According to Sean McFate in his book, *The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder* (2019), "The best weapons does not fire bullets."[19] When considering the JADC2 concept of any sensor, any shooter it is also important to remember that not all targets need to be destroyed. Frederick Kagan stated, "It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded."[20]

The Marine Corps has made significant CA advancements over the last twenty years that must be sustained. The most notable was the creation of the MCCMOS in October of 2011. MCCMOS is the proponent for all facets of CA and to be the focal point for CMO and CA doctrine, training, and standards. MCCMOS is robust in their outreach efforts to ensure the entire CA community is up to date on doctrine, training, circulars, and other pertinent updates. The school-house outreach to the CA professionals not only ensures CA relevancy but provides a sense of community in a specialty that operates seemingly on the fringes of the Marine Corps. MCCMOS is the MOS qualification schoolhouse for both enlisted and officers as well as CMO Chief, a CMO Planner, the Civil Affairs Integration Course for non-CA personnel, and the proponent for the 0534 Female Engagement Officers.

Further advancement were the establishment of information as the 7th Marine Corps warfighing function, establishment of the Deputy Commandant for Information, establishing the Marine Corps Information Operations Center, the forming of the MEF Information Groups, merging the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group, and the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Education and Training Center into the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, and creating two Marine Corps Advisor Companies. These schools and specialties while not specifically CA are all complementary fields that further contribute to understanding of the cognitive civil environment.

In future conflicts if commanders employ CA effectively, they will see just how important the cognitive civil environment is with regards to translating tactical success into lasting victory. CA Marines know how to gain access to the cognitive civil environment it is up to leaders to realize that CA is far more than a boutique MOS.

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USMC

EABO with a Side of Bacon

What the Marine Corps supply chain can learn from Waffle House

by Maj Benjamin Phillips

Civilian companies in the United States often find themselves required to operate and conduct business during and immediately after natural disasters. Several companies, particularly in the American Southeast, have developed standard operating procedures and techniques which allow them to thrive after hurricanes. One example—Waffle House—perfected its model to the point that the Federal Emergency Management Agency informally uses a "Waffle House test" to gauge how well an effected area is faring following a storm.[1] Analyzing the strategies used by Waffle House to operate in degraded environments and applying them to Marine Corps supply chain processes would increase readiness and preparedness for expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). From unpredictable weather to operating in contested and degraded environments, Waffle House's emergency operating procedures contain helpful strategies that can inform and develop Marine Corps EABO practices. The Marine Corps' emerging logistics and supply chain practices in support of EABO should incorporate concepts used by Waffle House following natural disasters to cope with operations in a degraded environment.

The current Marine Corps supply system faces a distinct challenge from the EABO environment. Building the *iron mountain* at a small number of large operating bases, such as Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan, trades efficiency and linearity of the supply chain with the risk of maintaining a preponderance of supplies within close proximity at limited geographical locations. Prac-

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tices used in Afghanistan and Iraq will not stand up to a peer adversary with capabilities in all warfighting domains. The EABO concept deploys small elements to temporary locations as part of a structure of shooters and sensors integrated with naval assets.[2] Marine units will be spread throughout an area of operations (AO) in isolated cells conducting simultaneous distributed operations. *Marine Operating Concept 2025* describes that battlefield actions throughout all warfighting domains will be contested.[3] Combat losses must be assumed in this future peer fight. Fires, aviation, and logistical support will not be guaranteed as the struggle of wills occurs.[4] Resupplying these small, isolated units will challenge the supply chain system. Transportation of all supplies, particularly class I, III, and V, will be contested. Units will not be able to rely on a single supplier or supply chain to receive requirements within a necessary timeline.

The EABO concept often looks toward the future to address how logistics and supply chains functions occur. Advanced technologies, such as unmanned vehicles and surface connectors to transport supplies and personnel, fill many of the capability gaps in future EABO execution. The Marine Corps

EABO looks toward the future to address how supply chain functions will occur. (Photo by Cpl Desire Mora.)

faces a substantial challenge successfully implemented EABO until these assets become fully developed. As described in *Marine Corps Hybrid Logistics*, the Marine Corps must remain capable with current technologies while researching and developing capabilities for the future.[5] The Marine Corps must look toward innovative ways to utilize current assets and technologies in order to create a functioning supply chain for EABO.

Expeditionary advanced bases should be viewed as staging areas for supplies, and all operating units should have the enduring task of conducting resupply missions if necessary.

Civilian companies operating through the degraded environment of natural disasters provide a comparable lens for Marine Corps operations in an EABO environment. Waffle House in particular utilizes key concepts that can provide resiliency, survivability, and capability to the Marine Corps operating within the confines of EABO—such as managing non-linear supply availability throughout a dispersed environment, streamlining required equipment and supplies in order to expediently recover from disruption, and the preparation for operating in a degraded environment. Implementation of these strategies and concepts into the current supply chain system increases the Marine Corps' ability to conduct EABO in both the near and distant future.

Waffle House successfully implemented a supply chain in support of natural disaster recovery which focused on inventory management and the staging of known requirements. As the path of a hurricane becomes more defined and known, Waffle House stages key assets—such as generators, recreational vehicles for worker billeting, and larger supply stocks—at locations immediately outside the forecasted path of the storm.[6] Each of these creates resiliency in operations immediately following the passing of the storm by enabling loca-

tion's capabilities to serve customers in a degraded environment until they are back to full capacity. EABO can utilize the same concept by staging supplies and equipment at multiple bases just outside the suspected engagement area. Instead of having a small number of large supply nodes, each smaller unit or base would serve as a staging area. This starfish effect of decentralizing and flattening the supply chain ultimately allows for the rapid and flexible aggregation of supplies and equipment to a desired location or unit.[7] Expeditionary advanced bases should be viewed as staging areas for supplies, and all operating units should have the enduring task of conducting resupply missions if necessary. Using a non-linear supply chain, such as a cache network, with supplies dispersed throughout the battlefield would minimize the amount

of loss that would occur from an enemy attack on a single location and better enable overall supply chain survivability. Implementing such changes requires little new technology and only requires each unit operating in an AO to carry a larger supply stock.

Waffle House streamlines supplies required to maintain operations immediately after a storm. Stores in affected areas typically shift to a limited menu in order to resume operations as soon as possible. Doing so allows maximum use of grill space, available power, and fuel resources.[8] Locations are able to focus on maintaining higher volumes of a reduced quantity of ingredients and supplies. The EABO environment supply chain would benefit from similar standardization of supply parts and consumables in order to increase survivability. For example, the current vehicle employment within an EABO construct would include Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements, multiple High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle variants, and some form of Material Handling Equipment. Few, if any, parts between these vehicle variants are interchangeable. The addition of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle in the following years as it continues to be fielded will only increase strain on the supply chain.

Inventory management and the pre-positioning and staging of known requirements are essential in disaster relief and operations in remote austere environments. (Photo by Cpl Desire Mora.)

Something as simple as a single type of tire, oil filter, or tool set places less strain on the supply chain and increases the likelihood that multiple mutually supporting operating bases in the vicinity could provide resupply to the end user. Reducing variances within all Table of Authorized Material Control Number classes reduces overall packaging and bed space requirements, thus increasing the effectiveness of transportation. The overall effect of streamlining supply requirements reduces the weight of the Marine Corps to create a more agile force.

Waffle House structures its supply chain to expect disruption from natural disasters. Preparation for a natural disaster is not viewed as merely a response task; it is viewed as a planned and anticipated event necessary for normal business operations.[9] The Marine Corps should, at a minimum, implement non-linear supply chain practices into scenarios and training exercises preparing for EABO. According to Keick and Sutcliffe in *Managing the Unexpected: Resiliency Performance in an Age of Uncertainty*, resilient organizations operate "under the assumption that uncertainty is irreducible" and successfully resilient organizations invest in more resources to prepare for the unexpected.[10] By accepting the necessity of operating in a degraded environment, the Marine Corps can begin establishing proficiency in EABO supply chain operations. Varying supply chains through multiple nodes in exercises prepares staffs and planners to creatively support the end user by varying means based upon scenarios or opposing force actions. For example, an exercise using multiple small Combat Service Support Areas (CSSAs) to support an infantry battalion would face a scenario that impeded resupply of a particular company from the closest CSSA. Resources would have to be diverted from alternate CSSAs in order to complete resupply. Doing so would incur risk of completing the infantry company's mission essential tasks but allow the supporting logistical unit to increase competency in operating under the strain of a degraded environment. Implementation of such scenarios enables Marine forces to train for the complex environments in the *Marine Operating Concept* and build resiliency within all levels of the MAGTF.

As the Marine Corps finds itself in a period of hybrid logistics where the use of old and new technologies are implemented to create new operation procedures, a tendency will emerge for policies and standard operation procedures to stagnate until new technologies are fully developed.[11] Currently, such practices do not increase the lethality of EABO practices. Many may argue that the implementation of the aforementioned changes to supply chain practices would create a burden on current operations and incur greater fiscal costs. In the case of Waffle House, their commitment to mitigate disruption risk from natural disasters increases overall operating costs due to the significant resources dedicated toward storm preparedness. However, this process ensures the company is best able to perform under extremely degraded environments.[12] The Marine Corps should hold a similar mindset toward the degraded environment of EABO. The possible training loss and monetary cost to establish non-linear supply chains during exercises and begin streamlining consumables and repair parts throughout the fleet is substantial; however, implementation of such practices can begin immediately with little use of emerging technology. Failure to do so leaves the Marine Corps vulnerable when operating in the EABO environment against a peer competitor.

The future EABO operating environment brings with it a host of challenges that stress current supply chain practices. The Marine Corps can look toward private industry on how to adapt to operating in degraded environments. The Marine Corps should apply Waffle House's practices to counter natural disasters, such as the use of non-linear supply chains, streamlined and simplified supply requirements, and the implementation of those two concepts throughout day-to-day operations in order to increase success and lethality on the EABO battlefield. Implementation in standard operation procedures using current resources and technologies ensures the Marine Corps is prepared to fight tonight in support of naval operations.

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USMC

Of Mines and Marines

Seizing opportunity in fleet design

by Capt Walker Mills & Maj Brian Kerg

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Pursuant to the goals of the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* (*NDS*), the Navy and Marine Corps are aggressively pursuing the means required to execute sea control and sea denial.[1] Naval forces must remain capable of fighting and winning decisive combat operations at sea and in the littorals if necessary. However, controlling and denying access to key maritime terrain and sea lines of communication is a much more efficient path to securing the interests of the nation.

The Navy-Marine Corps team has been moving at a rapid pace to develop operational concepts, design warfare organizations, and acquire supporting technology that will enable sea control and sea denial. Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment are mutually supporting, threat-informed operational concepts that will allow naval forces to overcome the capabilities of peer adversaries.[2] The Navy's changes to fleet design and the Marine Corps' *Force Design 2030* aim to divest of obsolete capabilities in order to reinvest in new capabilities and reorganize in ways to meaningfully employ them.[3] Naval Warfare Development Center and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab continue to test these concepts and designs with new and emerging technologies, closing the gap between what naval forces *can* do and what they *must* do in order to support the *NDS*.

The Marine Corps, for its part, it is focusing on how it can better serve as an extension of the Navy's fleet, ensuring support to naval operations and campaigns rather than acting as it has for

some decades as a lighter, second land army. The most visible product of these efforts to date is *Force Design 2030*'s emphasis on expeditionary advance base (EAB)-enabled long range precision fires. This will place Marines inside an adversary's weapons engagement zone (WEZ) to hold enemy shipping at risk, exert control over key maritime terrain, provide greater freedom of maneuver to friendly naval forces, and facilitate follow-on access, entry, and operations.

Taken together, these initiatives, the speed at which they are being sought,

The Navy needs the Marine Corps trained and ready to provide added capacity for mine warfare. A Navy Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) technician with EOD Mobile Unit 5, 31st MEU, exits a UH-1Y with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262 (Reinforced) to conduct counter mine training. (Photo by Sgt Dominic Clay.)

and the harmony between the Navy and Marine Corps in this mutual endeavor is inspiring and unprecedented. All the efforts to date are exemplary and should be lauded. Yet, the Marine Corps is missing an opportunity to adopt a mission set it is now uniquely positioned to perform, that will exponentially increase its ability to support the Navy: mine warfare.

Mine Warfare Is Missing

Mine warfare (MIW) has proven to be an incredibly powerful tool in the maritime domain. In the past 125 years, mines have damaged or sunk more ships than all other weapons systems combined.[4] Far more than having a merely quantitative effect, mine warfare has been operational and strategic in its impact. By the end of World War II, the United States critically disrupted Japanese maritime commerce and sea lines of communication by laying thousands of naval mines and sinking hundreds of Japanese ships.[5] During the Vietnam War, the mining of Haiphong Harbor and other harbors effectively stopped all maritime delivery of material to the North Vietnamese.[6] Mining supported by sustained reseeding proved decisive in forcing North Vietnam to discuss terms that would eventually lead to the war's end.[7]

During Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. amphibious assault planning was crippled by Iraqi naval mining. Both the USS *Tripoli*, an amphibious assault ship, and the cruiser USS *Princeton* were taken out of the fight by Iraqi naval mines.[8] More recently, the implicit Iranian threat of mining the Strait of Hormuz has been a perpetual worry to nations around the globe.

America's adversaries are also aware of the value of naval mines, and they have equipped themselves accordingly. An authoritative study on the state of mine warfare in China concluded: "China's mine inventory is not only extensive but likely contains some of the world's most lethal MIW systems."[9] Similarly, the Office of Naval Intelligence has noted that mine warfare is a "a critical component" of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps' strategy in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.[10]

A Navy rigid-hull, inflatable boat with dock landing ship USS Ashland *(LSD 48) gets positive confirmation on a dummy explosive during a counter-mine training exercise with the 31st MEU. (Photo by Sgt Dominic Clay.)*

Finally, it is telling to note that since the end of World War II, while fourteen U.S. Navy ships have been sunk or damaged by mines, only two have been damaged by missile or air attack, both of which consistently receive far more attention and funding in the U.S. Navy than MIW and mine counter measures (MCM).[11]

Despite the seemingly obvious utility of MIW in naval operations, MIW has been glaringly absent in the discussions of force design that are dominating the time and attention of U.S. naval planners. The Navy's first strategic document written to align with the 2018 *NDS*, *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0*, never mentions mines or mine warfare.[12] The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 2021 *Navigation Plan*, which supersedes *Design 2.0* and was written to align with the *Tri-Service Maritime Strategy*, mentions the word "mine" once, only to note mines as a capability for delivering lethal effects.[13] The *Tri-Service Maritime Strategy,* "Advantage at Sea," mentions MIW twice: once to note that MIW is often a contribution of U.S. allies and a second time to note it as an area of future development.[14] Both serve to underscore the current deficiency. *The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations* mentions "mine" only in a sample operational order, and lists MCM in its glossary while not otherwise using MCM throughout the document.[15] Additionally, *Force Design 2030*, which described the sweeping changes the Marine Corps was making at the time of its publication, briefly mentions mines as a threat to be overcome—that is, in terms of MCM, but not in terms of offensive MIW.[16]

Herein lies the opportunity for the Marine Corps. *Force Design 2030* goes on to ask:

> As the preeminent littoral warfare and expeditionary warfare service, we must engage in a more robust discussion regarding naval expeditionary forces and capabilities not resident in the Marine Corps ... We must ask ourselves whether it is prudent to absorb some of those functions, forces, and capabilities to create a single naval expeditionary force whereby the Commandant could better ensure their readiness and resourcing.[17]

Based on the needs of an optimized naval expeditionary force, and the manner in which the Marine Corps is transforming to operate on and around key maritime terrain, the Marine Corps is primed to take on this crucial mission in support of naval operations. The Marine Corps must embrace MIW.

Marines Can Fill the Gap in Mine Warfare

The concepts, organizations, and systems described above will be employed together at key maritime terrain to limit adversary freedom of maneuver while

increasing access and maneuver for friendly forces. However, the focus on EAB hosted precision fires and distributed Navy platforms afloat will be significantly limited by sustainment challenges.[18] The targets that adversaries can present in the vicinity of their home waters will dwarf the magazine capacity of Navy ships and Marine rocket artillery firing from EABs. This severely limits the credibility of the threat that naval expeditionary forces can present to adversaries, in turn significantly limiting their deterrent value. In the event of conflict, these forces may expend all their munitions before creating conditions for follow-on naval forces to enter the area of operations.

Marines can conduct naval MIW to obtain sea denial and facilitate sea control without being challenged by such limitations. The same methods under development to insert Marines and precision fire systems into contested areas can just as easily insert Marines with deployable naval mines. Operating forward inside an adversary's WEZ, Marines can deploy and monitor stationary naval minefields, as well as control and move mobile minefields. EAB-hosted forces could deploy mines using surface, subsurface, or aerial means, and use networked technologies to monitor and maneuver smart minefields.[19] Marines could deploy and control mines from small boats, or from the future Light Amphibious Warship that the Marine Corps and Navy have outlined in a request for proposals.[20]

The Navy is currently prototyping such capabilities through its Smart Mining Initiative, which aims to develop autonomous and remotely operated smart mine fields that can be launched from various platforms.[21] However, current offensive mining systems like the Quickstrike are outdated and "will require a complete redesign"[22] for the future fight.

Alternatively, EAB-hosted Marines could monitor, control, and move mines deployed via other means, such as aircraft-laid Quickstrike mines and the Submarine-Laid Mobile Mine. Networked, remotely controllable, and maneuverable as a result of Smart Mining Initiative programs, the footprint

The ACE can assist with Mine and Countermine Warfare. Marine Attack Helicopters on the flight deck of USS **New Orleans** *(LPD 18) with 31st MEU. (Photo by Sgt Dominic Clay.)*

of Marines required to deploy and persist forward indefinitely in support of EABO will be greatly reduced, allowing other platforms that remain outside the WEZ to deploy what are, in effect, loitering munitions that are easily reseeded and will not face the same magazine capacity challenges as EAB-hosted rocket artillery. Using Marines to monitor or employ naval mines is consistent with the *Tri-Service Maritime Strategy*'s for expanding lethality to "lower signature, highly maneuverable forces."[23] Only months ago, the Marine Corps released *NWP 3-15M, Naval Mine Warfare,* as a Marine Corps publication, potentially foreshadowing service interest in MIW.

Perhaps more critically, Marine involvement in MIW can directly complement the Commandant's recent call for EABO to support the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission.[24] As smart mines are de facto munitions, Marines employing them from EABs aligns perfectly with this concept of sensing and striking enemy submarines, while supporting fleet and joint ASW. The Navy's Advanced Underwater Weapon System (AUWS) combines autonomous weapons and sensors in a subsurface environment, using unmanned underwater vehicles as a key control mechanism.[25] Using Advanced Underwater Weapon System in its current form, or optimized

to support the deployment and control of smart minefields, will allow Marines to decisively contribute to ASW in and around key maritime terrain.

Breadth and Depth to Mine Countermeasures

By the same token, Marines could execute MCM. Adversaries are capable and likely to use naval mines as a central pillar of their anti-access/area denial strategy. The Navy's *Avenger* class minesweeper is highly capable of surface-borne MCM, and the sailors in this community are extremely talented and committed to their mission.[26] However, because of competing requirements at higher headquarters, the state of readiness of the *Avenger* class is in notoriously bad shape and has been described as, "the ships that the Navy forgot."[27] Given the chronic nature of this challenge, minesweepers alone are not sufficient to support naval campaigns against a credible opponent. Award-winning commentary in *Proceedings* has previously decried the state of MCM in the Navy, noting that the even with the addition of the long-delayed Littoral Combat Ship MCM modules, the Navy's MCM capability is so anemic that in wartime it would be forced to rely on Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures groups.[28] While not

seeking to replace this capability, the Marine Corps could help increase it.

While the Navy possesses exceptionally skilled MCM personnel in the form of its Expeditionary MCM (ExMCM) companies resident within the Naval Expeditionary Combatant Command (NECC), it is challenging to mass produce operators with this level of skill and specialization.[29] EAB-hosted Marines, using easily reseeded smart mines as mine clearing devices, can greatly expand a naval component's MCM capacity, perhaps even as Marine MCM platoons placed under Navy ExMCM companies for the command and control of certain MCM missions. Part of this effort could incorporate the Marine Corps' own strong, independent Explosive Ordnance Disposal community, training these same Marines in naval MCM. Regardless of the method of employment, EAB-hosted Marines will add much needed breadth and depth to U.S. naval MCM.

The Navy Needs Marines in Mine Warfare

The *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance* insisted that we must ask ourselves, "what does the Navy need from the Marine Corps?"[30] Based on the Navy's current deficiencies in MIW and MCM capacity, one answer is clear: the Navy needs the Marine Corps to get involved in MIW. While the Navy has capable platforms and qualified personnel, it lacks the capacity to fully support MIW within the context of great power competition. Moreover, while EABO seeks to address the challenge presented by adversary A2/AD dilemmas, EAB-hosted long-range precision fires will continue to be vexed by sustainment challenges and magazine limitations. By embracing this mission set, the Marine Corps can buttress the credibility of EABO, better provide sea denial and facilitate sea control, and best support the Navy.

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Without Firing a Shot

Prioritizing civil-military operations with an emphasis on culture, education, and manpower

by Matthew Peterson

To capture relevant lessons from almost two decades of war, it is helpful to begin with a thought experiment. Imagine waking up in the United States to realize there is no longer a DOD and no memory of the DOD as it previously existed. Beginning with a blank canvas and with only the current state of world affairs as a guide, how would one begin to design a new DOD? What capabilities should it have? What branches should there be? What should be the role of the Marine Corps? Should there even *be* a Marine Corps? In such an experiment, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the world as it is—and likely will be—requires military forces with greater capability in civil-military operations (CMO).

CMO are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. CMO support U.S. objectives for host nations and regional stability. Every conflict, including those with equally matched belligerents, contain elements of CMO. When a military force employs CMO effectively, it denies the enemy an advantage in the human dimension where otherwise inferior enemies leverage their advantage among the population. When a military force treats CMO as a secondary undertaking, the human dimension is ceded to the enemy.

The relevant lesson after two decades of war is that the Marine Corps is a light infantry force unparalleled in its conventional role yet limited in its ability to conduct effective CMO. The Marine Corps' limitations in CMO are a self-inflicted phenomenon brought about by an institutional tendency to regard CMO as a secondary or tertiary

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effort. The Marine Corps must begin by treating civil-military affairs as a central rather than auxiliary effort, which will require adaptation in recruiting, education, and manpower management.

Recruiting Foreign Citizens

Regardless of any effort put into learning about the language, history, politics, and religion of a particular region, an outsider will never be mistaken as a native. It *is* possible, however, for a foreigner to be recruited, screened, trained, and equipped to serve as a

> ***The benefit of recruiting foreigners to ... serve as regional experts is obvious.***

functioning member of a Marine fire team. The question is whether it is more likely for someone to develop a native level of understanding of a foreign area, or for someone from that area to learn the skills of a basic infantry Marine. The benefit of recruiting foreigners to become Marines and serve as regional experts is obvious, and it is not a new idea.

Foreign citizens have served with distinction in the U.S. military since the Revolutionary War and have been able to apply for citizenship after one year of honorable service since 1952. The most recent program to capitalize on the unique skills of foreigners is the Military Accessions Vital to National Interests (MAVNI), a recruiting program approved by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2008. MAVNI was designed to screen and enlist foreign citizens with specialized skills critical to the U.S. national interests. Articulated in the list of specialized skills was language and associated cultural backgrounds. In spite of a requirement for higher minimum scores on entrance exams and zero waivers for moral infractions, more than 10,000 men and women were recruited under MAVNI. Contrary to the fears of the program's opponents, not one MAVNI accession has presented a threat to national security.

In 2016, the DOD found that noncitizens perform better and have lower attrition rates than their citizen counterparts. In spite of this history and long record of success, MAVNI has been suspended, and in 2017 greater obstacles were placed on the path to citizenship in the form of stricter vetting procedures. Since then, there has been a 70 percent decrease in naturalization applications from the Armed Forces.

At a time when the American military is in urgent need of cultural and regional understanding, the DOD has made accessing those who can provide it even more difficult. Policies that discourage their recruitment or that fail to assign them to the billets where they can be of the most service are counterproductive.

To effectively leverage the value of native cultural knowledge and thus

The Marine Corps could improve CMO through modifying professional military education to incorporate relevant lessons. (Photo by SSgt Brian Buckwalter.)

maximize the effects of CMO, the Marine Corps should recruit foreigners and organize them into teams of advisors manned by officers and staff non-commissioned officers that are American citizens as well as sergeants and below who are native to the region. These teams should be permanently assigned to combatant commands and remain in direct support of Marine units deployed to their area.

Education Modifications

A second way for the Marine Corps to improve CMO is to modify its professional military education to incorporate lessons of effective CMO. History shows conventional wars of attrition are rare. Conflicts where belligerents are unevenly matched and relationships with civilian populations are necessary for success are much more common. In spite of this reality, the Marine Corps continues to place a higher emphasis on killing than on winning.

In the peculiar and unique jargon of Marine Corps sub-culture, "KILL!" is a word with broad versatility. From the yellow footprints of recruit training to the grounds of the oldest post in the Corps at 8th and I, the word "KILL" can be heard as a way to acknowledge an order, as a greeting or a farewell, or as an utterance in physical training

when Marines glorify what has been done by Marines in the past or what they will ostensibly do in the future. By the time a Marine is deployed, the idea of killing someone has become his de facto mission. As one colonel summarized, "It all really comes down to this; we're here to kill the enemy and break his toys." Amidst such a climate, the Marine Corps has no reason to wonder why it does not do well with CMO.

An argument against killing in combat is not being made here. After every attempt at peaceful reconciliation has been sincerely attempted and failed, there will be irreconcilables on the battlefield who must be killed. Those who do not accept that premise are ignorant of combat and have no place in a responsible conversation about war. However, those who think every conflict can be resolved by greater application of violence are equally ignorant of combat. The history of conflict at any period of time in the last 5,000 years offers a

stark contrast between military campaigns that took CMO seriously and campaigns that wanted only to kill and destroy. A force that embraces cultural awareness as a factor in military success is historically more likely to experience success. A force that ignores or subordinates cultural concerns is likely to experience pyrrhic tactical victories coupled with operational stagnation and strategic ambiguity; the last twenty years in Afghanistan is only the most recent example.

CMO has been practiced in the Philippines, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and China. Men like Herman Hanneken, Ed Lansdale, and Frederick Funston are exemplars of CMO worthy of study. To more effectively conduct CMO in the future, the Marine Corps should balance its professional military education by rediscovering these lost lessons and figures from its past. A study of these conflicts and the men who fought them offer a treasure of lessons learned, particularly for CMO, but they have been overshadowed by the lessons of conventional operations.

Lessons from the Marine Corps' history in CMO cannot be institu-

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... those who think every conflict can be resolved by greater application of violence are equally ignorant of combat.

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tionalized if they are merely discussed in *Gazette* articles from time to time. CMO concepts and history should be as central to professional military education as any other military operations.

Modifications to Manpower Management

A third way for the Marine Corps to demonstrate a meaningful commitment to CMO is to restructure its promotion system to ensure the most qualified and experienced Marines are being employed in a way that optimizes success in conflicts. Service limitations that equate to an "up-or-out" system of advancement are counterproductive

and should be replaced by a system that allows Marines to determine for themselves whether they want to be considered for promotion.

Currently, when most Marines complete their initial training, they are assigned to a deployable battalion. They will complete a deployment as a member of a fire team and gain valuable experience. Typically, they will deploy again with the same battalion, though usually not to the same place. Following their second deployment, they are required to accept a new assignment, often to a non-deployable billet like recruiting command, recruit training, or embassy duty. When they leave their battalion to report to their new assignment, they take with them all of the experience they gained during their first two deployments. In their absence, the battalion reforms again and continues its cycle of deploying to new areas with mostly new and inexperienced Marines. Allowing Marines to forego promotions and remain in a deploying battalion would enhance the maturity, leadership, and experience of Marines at the tactical level.

The practice of spending a career at the tactical level is an institutional practice among law enforcement agencies. Policemen regularly spend an entire career as a uniformed patrolman. Everyone starts at the tactical level, and those who desire promotion proactively seek it by taking exams and subjecting themselves to a selection board. Those who do not desire promotion remain patrolmen. The law enforcement community benefits from both types. Some promote through the ranks while thers remain at the tactical level where their experience provides invaluable intuition and maturity.

Similar models of promotion exist in militaries throughout the world. For instance, in the Canadian Armed Forces a soldier who maintains aircraft can choose to be an aircraft mechanic for his entire career and receive incremental pay raises linked to time in service that allow him to make a decent living.

The current model is based on a monolithic view of Marines in which every Marine must be developed into a

Effective CMO may require Marines to spend their entire careers at the tactical level. (Photo by Cpl Jessika Braden.)

leader and promoted through the ranks or shown the door. As a consequence, many Marines choose the door, and the depth of practical knowledge gained through experience is continuously erased within fire teams and squads. The Marine Corps would benefit from experienced Marines in the junior ranks, especially in the complicated environment of CMO where complicated and nuanced circumstances call for experience and maturity.

> **CMO is where Sun Tzu's teachings transition from principles into practice.**

Conclusion

Armed conflicts where meaningful relationships with the civilian population are essential to success are not passing fads; they are the most prevalent form of conflict in the history of mankind, and they offer irrefutable lessons. Among the most valuable lessons is that conflict resolution requires not only lethal skill, but a deep understanding of culture, and CMO. These lessons will either be

learned and applied or forgotten and painfully relearned.

In The Art of War, Sun Tzu identifies the ability to subdue one's enemy without firing a shot as the highest form of warfare. His work is familiar to every military professional, but the last twenty years of conflict indicate Sun Tzu's teachings are little more than philosophical musings revisited from time to time during PME schools. CMO is where Sun Tzu's teachings transition from principles into practice.

If the DOD were to start over and shape itself based on the current strategic situation, a force that is organized, trained, and equipped for CMO would be a necessary component. Whether the DOD will adapt to the world as it is or continue to define innovation merely in terms of technological advances remains to be seen, but history will not be kind to modern militaries that marginalize the CMO dimension of conflict.

>USMC

Three-Block War in the Information Environment

Updated tactics are necessary

by 1stLt Emily Peterson

The UN predicts that 68 percent of people will live in urban areas by 2050.[1] Three-Block War is a commonly accepted Marine Corps concept to describe the spectrum of challenges within urban environments. The blocks correspond to humanitarian assistance, counterinsurgency operations, and high intensity conflict—all existing potentially within the span of three city blocks.[2] Technology has undisputedly altered the future operating environment, especially with respect to information operations. In a 2005 article titled "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," Gen Mattis and LtCol Hoffman designate a "fourth block" concerning psychological and information operations. They describe this block as "how we extend our reach [and] influence populations to reject the misshaped ideology ... offered by insurgents."[3] Information operations can be

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level ramifications within their profession. The Marine Corps and DOD as a whole has, and is continuing to, pour money into advanced technologies and weapon systems. However, in order to fully succeed in the future operating environment, the Marine Corps must update the corresponding tactics taught within both the officer and enlisted training pipelines as well.

In the book *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, author David Kilcullen cites population growth, urbanization, littoralization,

ing Index assessment on global mobile data traffic, smartphones will be more common globally than running water by 2021.[5] This environment creates the perfect concoction for the utilization of information operations—both for the Marine Corps and for our enemies. Information operations, defined by the 2014 *Joint Publication 3-13*, is

> the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.[6]

In 2019, information became the official seventh Marine Corps warfighting function; however, it is not taught thoroughly to young officers and junior Marines to the extent that the six others are covered tactically and operationally within schoolhouses and training. Commonly, the discussion of information operations remains among joint command publications, thinktanks, and at strategical levels of thinking; however, information operations have critical operational and tactical impacts, which young leaders and Marines encounter daily. Marines are taught and rehearse procedures for encountering sniper fire and IEDs, but we lack standard operating procedures and training for adversarial commercial off-the-shelf drones and in determining whether or not our

> *... for this to be model to be effective, all service members must be educated on information operations and be cognizant of the consequent tactical through strategic level ramifications ...*

a way to make a new model for a four-block war actionable. However, for this to be model to be effective, all service members must be educated on information operations and be cognizant of the consequent tactical through strategic-

and connectedness as the four current global megatrends. The combination of these trends reflects the conflict environment we live and fight in today: crowded, coastal, and online.[4] According to the 2016 Cisco Visual Network-

electronic emissions are compromising our physical security. As emerging technology capabilities rapidly advance, our ground-level tactics and training must keep pace or we will be unprepared for the next fight.

Information operations greatly influence the high intensity conflict block of warfare and impact all MAGTF operations, far beyond only the communications strategy, cyberspace, intelligence, and communications MOS subject areas. The information environment spans the entire battlespace, consisting of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. Respectively, they describe the physical networked systems and their electronic emissions, the flow of information across these systems, and how we and others view and analyze about the consequent information. The information aspect must be addressed at each level of command within the commander's intent. Although all Marines do not need to necessarily need to have a strong academic understanding of how all of their technologies specifically function, they do need to understand how their weapons and systems are connected within a larger system of systems and how their individual actions can affect the local population, allied forces, public opinion, and the greater strategic mission. There have been some strides to teach tactical-level impacts of information operations. Currently, Marines are trained how to continue operation if communication devices and weapon systems fail; however, most of the training is binary—technology is working or it is not. Marines need to understand how to identify non-binary attacks such as spoofing where systems appear to be working, but outputs and displays are being intentionally manipulated by an adversary. For example, Marines are trained how to follow a GPS device and how to navigate with a compass and map if the GPS is unavailable. However, for the future operating environment against very capable near-peer adversaries, we need practice identifying and reacting to the ability—not to just to shut off—but to alter the coordinates and directions on our GPS devices.

An integral part of the information operations mission is to control the narrative, which bridges the informational and cognitive dimensions of the information environment and is crucial to successful military operations. Portraying the right narrative can defuse crises before they escalate further, help set conditions for future missions, and aid in restoring peace and order after military conflicts. This narrative can be shaped by deliberate operations such as dropping pamphlets, broadcasting information on social media, and official public affairs platforms, as well as the day to day interactions Marines have both abroad and at home. The Communication Strategy occupational specialty Marines are not solely responsible for controlling the narrative. It is critical for all Marines to understand how vital their individual influence can be within highly charged political, cultural, and ethically questionable environments, common in today's crowded urban potential battlespaces. In the past few decades, the Marine Corps has greatly improved awareness surrounding the importance of controlling the narrative; however, much of the education is already outdated because of the rapid nature of new cycles, click-bait media, and virality of social media. In *Like War: the Weaponization of Social Media*, author P.W. Singer writes:

> The web that many connected to years ago is not what new users will find today. What was once a rich selection of blogs and websites has been compressed under the powerful weight of a few dominant platforms. This concentration of power creates a new set of gatekeepers, allowing a handful of platforms to control which ideas and opinions are seen and shared. ... What's more, the fact that power is concentrated among so few companies has made it possible to [weaponize] the web at scale."[7]

The virality and strength of these online platforms continue to blur the lines between professional and military life and home and personal life.

Marines and Sailors currently take annual online training covering the more traditional notion of operations security such as not openly discussing deployment cycles or port call locations. A potential detriment to operational security is the availability of vast quantities of open source and information that can be easily accessed by nation states, non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and even watchdog vigilantes. This open-source data includes social media postings, geographic location data, and even photos from databases of print photobooks created online by family members of military members. An example of a large-scale use of open-source data is the 2008 attack in Mumbai conducted by the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. From the group's tactical operations center in Karachi, they viewed and monitored text messages, Skype calls, Twitter feeds, and satellite images from Google Maps and Earth all in realtime. Twitter was monitored to gauge and track government and law enforcement reaction times and procedures. Their multi-stage, simultaneous attacks on areas around the city, including a large hotel hosting many foreigners, resulted in the deaths of at least 174 civilians, foreign travelers, and security personnel.[8] Tactical ground commanders should be educated on how to integrate open sourced data into their planning and reconnaissance in addition to the more traditional intelligence collection methods. Moreover, they should be aware of how easily accessed open-source data from their own Marines, potential adversaries, and the local population can be used against their mission goals.

Kilcullen uses a biological ecosystem as a metaphor for a dense coastal city, dividing the city into the coastline area, ports, and urban core. He describes the functions and activity of the city as a metabolism with input and output flows. These flows include materials (food, water, power, fuel), economic flows, and informational flows—which all impact both the local and international dynamics and conflicts of the city. To model behavior in this ecosystem, he uses the theory of competitive control to describe a population's predictable normative system and patterns of life for its members. This system is the collection of the regional, cultural, and societal aspects of that specific area's information environment. With regard, to the humanitarian assistance and peacekeep-

ing block of war, removing or altering the existing normative system can create mass chaos. The more data and information we have on the local populace's normative system, the better we will be able to understand where the points of friction are within the area.

These patterns of the normative system can also help us understand insurgent forces and develop specific tailored counterinsurgency tactics. Kilcullen characterizes Mogadishu circa 1993 as a "feral city" because of its lack of rule of law while simultaneously being relatively modern and digitally connected. This metaphor can help explain how a seemingly benign humanitarian operation led to the Battle of Mogadishu and the broadcasting of American soldiers brutally being dragged through the streets. On the surface, the city seemed to be prospering and strong. It was not the Western stereotype of an area lacking a strong government system nor a desert full of refugees and obvious anarchy. However, in hindsight, understanding the normative patterns of the city, the lack of police and government control, and the local habits and behaviors could have greatly aided to the planning and execution of the Rangers' mission.[9] Creating a thorough picture of a specific area's information environment helps us set conditions for any military operation rather than just relying on an archaic archetype from previous wars and engagements. This picture is constructed from intelligence reports, our efforts to control the narrative, and the education of each Marine or service member deployed forward. This education should incorporate physical and cognitive information on the local area as well as the capabilities and limitations of our own organic assets. Most importantly, Marines should analyze the dynamic interaction between our assets and the environment, much in the same way that we match our weapons to the target.

The 2019 Marine Corps Bulletin which establishes information operations as a warfighting function states that this new function "helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application across all operational phases and the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)."[10] It is imperative for these observations and subsequent implemented actions to flow down the chain of command and be taught at the tactical level. Most of the official doctrine regarding information operations and emerging technical areas, such as space and cyberspace, is written in vague generalities and lacks consistent nomenclature between Services and occupational specialties. Further, the initiatives that are given are usually at the scope of the broad service level, such as implementing cloud storage or 5G connectivity, rather than providing actionable information and trainable scenarios to the Marines at the tactical level. The Marine Corps schoolhouses teach young Marines how to use their weapons and equipment well but within an outdated twentieth-century framework: the curriculum is still weak concerning the mitigation strategies for the information operations realm of warfare. As the world gravitates further toward crowded coastal cities, it is important for Marines—from general officers to the strategic corporal—to understand the impact of information operations within each of the three blocks of war and any current and future threats.

The 2020 Department of the Navy *Information Superiority Vision* defines information superiority as "delivering the right information to the right hands, ready to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than the adversary" and calls for every Sailor, Marine, and civilian to be "a cyberspace sentry."[11] Generally speaking, Marines need a general understanding of how electronic signatures, computer networks, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security impact their daily tasks. More narrowly, Marines need to know what new and evolving threats they may encounter within their job in parallel with the emerging technologies as they are created. We cannot begin to understand how to thwart attacks on our electronic emissions if we do not realize the attacks are happening in the first place. These scenarios must be included in both strategic-level wargaming and tactical-level field exercises conducted by Marines in every MOS. In the past, we have lost battles and engagements because our tactics have been out-cycled by our technology, equipment, and weapons systems. Failing to incorporate information operations as a lens to warfighting, the Marine Corps loses their competitive edge at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is imperative for all Marines to understand their role within the information environment as thoroughly as their weapon systems and MOS-related doctrinal publications.

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It's Time for a Staff Officer Career Track

Is command that important?

by Maj Nathan Wood

Officer development is largely focused on preparing Marines for command, and promotion decisions are chiefly based on the potential of Marine officers to serve as commanders. But only a small minority of officers are in command at any given time. Even fewer are destined to command battalion-sized or larger units. The truth is: most officers will serve as staffers for most of their careers. Good staff officers are rare and valuable. Yet, the Marine Corps does a poor job of identifying and using them, the term "staff officer" has an undeservedly negative connotation, and the organization forces every officer onto the command track—or out of the Service—even if their talents and interests lend themselves to staff work. How to fix it? Create a staff officer career track.

The Root of the Problem

Commanders are more important than staff officers. So, it makes sense for the Marine Corps to groom its best officers for command rather than for service on a staff. But some Marines believe not just that staff officers are less important than commanders, but that staff work itself is somehow dishonorable. It is almost a point of ritual for staff officers to trivialize their own work—after all, "[n]o little kid ever grew up wanting to be the best at briefing slides, brewing coffee, or writing operations orders."[1]

To some extent, this is just Marines doing what Marines do best: complaining. But it has a darker side. In an effort to encourage its strongest officers to become commanders, the Marine Corps has discouraged everyone else

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from embracing their staff roles. Since staff work is trivialized, Marines do not fully invest themselves in it.

Of course, not all staff roles are equally disparaged. An infantry battalion operations officer (OpsO), for example, still enjoys quite a bit of prestige. But that is primarily because the billet is a proving ground for future commanders. Staff roles that are not stepping stones to command lack the same stature. As one Army officer put it: "Time spent on staff, where officers spend the majority of their career, is thankless, laborious work that is too often viewed as a block check between command positions."[2]

The denigration of staff work has led the Marine Corps to treat nearly all staff roles the same. In the eyes of the organization, if you are not a commander, then you are a staff officer. It is the default; it requires no special screening or selection. As a result, just about any Marine with the right rank and MOS can fill any staff role. All staff officers are interchangeable and equally skilled. They are fungible.

But that is untrue—not all officers are equally suited for staff work. In fact, good staff officers are exceedingly rare. My experience in 2017 as the current operations officer for the 24th MEU Command Element opened my eyes

Has the Marine Corps emphasized the importance of command to the point that commanders are seen as "more important" than their staff officers? (Photo by LCpl Wesley Timm.)

to this bleak reality. Toward the end of the deployment, the MEU commander asked the OpsO and me to assemble a team to draft the post-deployment brief that he planned to present at the Pentagon. Sounds easy—it was not.

Every officer on that MEU was capable of churning out passable emails and slapping bullets on slides when it came to low-stakes, routine staff work. But when it came time to write papers and make briefs that the Commandant himself would read—about as high stakes as staff work gets—most Marines could not hack it. After scouring the ship, the OpsO and I finally found a few officers who could make decent slides and write and brief well. They proved invaluable.

The Marine Corps identifies its best leaders through command screening, but it has no equivalent process for staffers. Since the Marine Corps does not know who its best staff officers are, they are underutilized and the organization is unable to put the right Marine in the right job. That is inefficient. Additionally, there is no career path, at least formally, for strong officers who are suited for staff work and uninterested in high-level command. This one-size-fits-all approach unnecessarily squanders talent and needlessly disregards the interests of Marines. It is time for a better way.

What Is Staff Work?

Staff work is everything that supports a decision maker. The most familiar military staff roles are on a commander's functional staff (S-1, S-2, etc). Less familiar positions include aides, executive assistants, speechwriters, special projects officers, and members of advisory and action groups. Staff work is not unique to the military. Every organization has staffers who support decision makers. Members of Congress have staffs. CEOs have staffs. Xi Jinping has a staff.

Staff members research, write, brief, and plan. They analyze issues and develop options for decision. They lead meetings, provide recommendations, and staff documents: "They find and condense masses of information into manageable packets for review by and decisions from senior leaders."[3]

Staff officers play a critical role at every level of war, in both peace and combat. They range from company grade officers on a battalion staff to some of the most senior officials in the DOD. There are key staff roles in both the operating forces and the supporting establishment. Staff officers support both commanders and decision makers not invested with command authority (such as the Deputy Commandants in Headquarters Marine Corps). Being a staff officer does not necessarily mean riding a desk in the A-ring of the Pentagon. It can mean working on a laptop perched on a stack of MRE boxes in a bombed-out building while being shot at. Staff work is staff work, regardless of its circumstances.

What Makes a Good Staff Officer?

Good staff officers have much in common with good journalists, attorneys, and management consultants: they are able to immerse themselves in an unfamiliar subject, rapidly learn about it, identify the most salient issues, and present their findings and analysis clearly and efficiently—both orally and in writing. They pay attention to the smallest details, have a good eye and aesthetic sense, and are highly organized. These characteristics allow them to provide the best possible support to decision makers.[4] Not every Marine officer is gifted with these qualities.

Since these skills are generally applicable to any topic, they transcend mere MOS proficiency and subject-matter expertise. They are equally valuable in both peace and war. A staff officer with these traits is the utility infielder—give him any task and it will be done right and on time.

Good staff officers are also strong leaders in their own right, a quality that is often overlooked. They must lead their staff sections. They often honcho working groups and planning teams. They must be skilled at building consensus and encouraging collaboration. They must be able to influence others, despite not being in charge.[5]

Staffers vs Commanders

It is true that some good staff officers may also make good commanders; the two pools of talent may overlap. Some Marines are good at everything. The Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting, for example, selects the best applicants and develops them to be both "lead planners *and* future commanders."[6] Likewise, general officers have proven themselves, again and again, to be exceptional in a range of command and staff billets.

However, while the very best or highest-ranking Marines may be good at everything, that is hardly true of everyone else. Some Marines have a knack for command. Others have a knack for staff work. Indeed, the very traits that make a Marine a good staff officer may make him less effective in command. Good staff officers sweat the small stuff. Good commanders often do not and tend to wear the crown lightly. As *Warfighting* puts it:

> We should recognize that all Marines of a given grade and occupational specialty are not interchangeable and should assign people to billets based on specific ability and temperament. This includes recognizing those who are best suited to command assignments and those who are best suited to staff assignments—without penalizing one or the other by so recognizing.[7]

Whether a Marine has a knack for command or staff work is not the only question. Just as important is what the Marine prefers. Not every officer wants to be a senior decision maker. Many would prefer to contribute in a staff role.

Fixing It

Despite the obstacles, some officers have been able to carve out careers as staffers. Over time, they develop a reputation as an effective staff officer and are assigned to increasingly demanding staff roles. They eventually find themselves in staff billets commensurate with their abilities from which they can make the greatest possible contribution to the organization. The problem is that this happens only informally. It is inefficient, ad hoc, and unreliable. While some Marines might be lucky enough to stumble into a career that makes the most of their talents and interests as a staffer, many are not.

A staff officer career track would recognize the varying interests and talents of Marine officers and offer an

alternative to the command track. It would result in greater efficiency by making the best use of strong staffers. It would reduce the pressure Marines feel to pursue command and make it easier for good staff officers to plan their careers. It would also enhance the prestige of staff work; rather than being seen as the graveyard for those who were not good enough for command, service as a staff officer would be seen as a worthwhile end in its own right. This would benefit both Marines and the Marine Corps.

Establishing a Staff Officer Career Track

Here are some steps the Marine Corps could take to establish a staff officer career track:

Identify the best staff officers. The Marine Corps would first need to identify and track its best staffers. One way would be to create a new secondary MOS: "Staff Officer." Perhaps Marines could apply for the MOS or be nominated for it by their commanders. Maybe the top graduates of Marine Corps Command and Staff College (and other intermediate-level schools) could earn the MOS upon graduation. Just as the 0505 MOS—which marks graduates of SAW and other advanced intermediate level schools (A-ILS)—identifies the organization's best planners (and, perhaps, future commanders), the Staff Officer MOS would identify the Marine Corps' best staffers.

Create a model for staff officer development and promotion. Marines on the command track are expected to check certain boxes on their way up the ranks. Future battalion commanders are expected to have served as company commanders and OpsOs, and it would not hurt to have commanded a recruiting station or to have served as an instructor at TBS (or to be an A-ILS grad). Commanders who deviate from this well-trodden path are the exceptions that prove the rule. A staff officer career track would turn this model on its head. No longer would Marines have to spend a prescribed amount of time in command in order to be competitive for promotion and desirable assignments; rather, the concept of key billets could

be expanded to include staff jobs that would prepare Marines on the staffer career track for future staff roles of greater importance. This would give the strongest staff officers the opportunity to build a career around their strengths and interests and compete for promotion based on their potential to serve as staffers rather than commanders. It is not a radical change; this sorting happens already, albeit informally. But there is much to be gained by approaching it systematically.

The timing is critical. Officers need a broad base of experience, in both command and staff billets, before they will be capable of making an informed decision to pursue a career as a staff officer. For that reason, the decision to pursue a command or staff career track should be made at the time captains are promoted to majors. That would ensure most officers approach the decision having spent time as a company commander and in at least one staff role. They will be fully aware of what they are good at and what they like to do.

Put good staff officers in key billets. Once the best staff officers have been tagged with the Staff Officer MOS, key billets could be coded for it so that the most important decision makers can be guaranteed to have at least a few exceptional staffers supporting them. Like 0505s, the best staff officers, placed in the right roles, could have an outsized impact on the organization. The idea is *not* to lock staffers in the Pentagon and keep them there in a closed loop until retirement—far from it. There are important staff billets at every level of warfare, in both the operating forces and supporting establishment. Anywhere there is a decision maker or commander, there is a need for good staff work.

Risks

There are real risks to creating a staff officer career track. If not done right, it could create separate officer cultures that steadily drift apart. Rather than having the intended effect of elevating the prestige of staff work, it could entrench staff officers as permanent second-class citizens and will challenge the "every Marine a rifleman" ethos that the Marine Corps holds dear.

However, those risks are worth the potential rewards. As effective as the Marine Corps' generalist approach to officer development has been, there is a clear trend—in every profession, not just the military—toward specialization. Specialization allows Marines to do more of what they do best and are most interested in. It is efficient. The Marine Corps benefits when Marines spend their time doing the things they are best at doing. Specialization can certainly be taken too far, but creating a mid-career alternative to the standard command track is a modest, low-risk tweak to the status quo.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps—rightly—invests tremendous effort in selecting its best leaders through the command screening process. Yet, it has no equivalent process to track and employ its most skilled staff officers. As a result, good staff officers are undervalued and underutilized. This is inefficient and unnecessary, especially in an era of increasing specialization. A staff officer career track could help fix that.

Notes

1. Nate Stratton, "7 Ways to Fail as a Staff Officer," *The Military Leader*, (n.d.), available at https://www.themilitaryleader.com.

2. Ibid.

3. Joint Staff, *Joint Officer Handbook: Staffing and Action Guide*, (Washington, DC: August 2010).

4. Ibid.

5. LtCol Donald Thieme, "Staff Officer Leadership: Not Everyone Gets a Command," *Marine Corps Gazette,* (Quantico, VA: April 2009).

6. School of Advanced Warfighting Mission Statement is available at www.usmcu.edu.

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting,* (Washington, DC: 1997).

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Objective Havana

Joint/amphibious warfare

by Joseph Miranda

In October 1962, the Pentagon prepared a contingency for an invasion of the island of Cuba. This was a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the Soviet Union had moved missiles capable of launching nuclear weapons at the United States onto the island of Cuba after the recent revolution brought Fidel Castro to power. Historically, President John F. Kennedy resolved the crisis through a combination of diplomacy and a "quarantine" (military blockade). At the same time, the U.S. military began preparing for an invasion.

Modern War magazine covered this potential campaign with a wargame: *Objective Havana*. The game places the player in command of joint U.S. forces in planning and executing an invasion of Cuba, all set against a background of international tensions that could escalate into World War III. The opposition Communist forces (Cuban and Soviet militaries) are controlled by the game system.

The player has available a wide array of combat forces: amphibious, airborne, air, naval, special operations. These include expeditionary formations such as the II MEF and XVIII Airborne Corps. All this adds up to an exercise in joint warfare. The game map shows the island of Cuba with various landing zones and beaches for force insertion. But it is not just a matter of getting the troops ashore. There is a considerable amount of preparation required before you can hit the beaches and the landing zones.

One aspect is intelligence. Most of the unit counters representing opposing Communist forces are initially placed face down on the map. These units include maneuver forces as well as missile sites and nuclear weapons storage depots. This adds up to a strong element of *maskirovka* (deception operations).

>Mr. Miranda is a prolific board wargame designer. He is a former Army Officer and has been a featured speaker at numerous modeling and simulations conferences.

The U.S. player has various intelligence assets that can reveal these counters, such as U-2 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. This is critical because you are up against the Escalation Index. If the Index goes too high, then the game comes to a cataclysmic end as World War III breaks out. Therefore, the player has to win the game quickly by identifying and then

eliminating those missiles and nuclear depots.

Reducing the Escalation Index becomes an important part of strategy. One tactic is to employ psychological warfare, propaganda, and other political actions to stabilize tensions all around. You also have various anti-communist guerrillas on the ground in Cuba for unconventional operations. This sets up the situation for airborne and amphibious operations. Once you have seized beachheads and landing zones, you can transport follow-on forces onto the island then drive for critical geographical objectives such as the capital at Havana.

Game units model U.S. military forces at the highpoint of the nuclear era. Army units are organized according to the Pentomic battlegroup concept with task forces for mobility, dispersion, and concentration at critical points. Air units include the century series fighters as well as carrier-based strategic bombers such as the A-3 Skywarrior. Marine air wing groups provide close support for amphibious operations, backed up by naval gunfire task groups. You can enhance attacks by committing command control aircraft which provide a tactical edge for forces on the ground. Determine the locations of enemy centers of gravity and then concentrate joint forces against them.

Furthermore, there are tradeoffs. Instead of using airpower for close support of ground forces, you can attack the Communist Reaction Index, which quantifies enemy command control and logistical capacity. By lowering the Index, you reduce the number and intensity of enemy counterattacks. The Reaction and Escalation indexes provide the wider strategic parameters that shape operations within the theater.

In *Objective Havana*, you have to win quickly and decisively in the face of the specter of nuclear conflagration. Employing joint operations is the key to victory.

Focusing on a Marine's Tomorrow

A timeline approach to suicide in the Marine Corps
by 1stSgt Joseph R. Walling

Institutionally, we may be focusing the discussion about military suicide too heavily on the wrong end of the event timeline.

I recently sat through a PME discussion about suicide that went into great lengths about what leaders in the room felt regarding *why* Marines and veterans (or anyone for that matter) decide to end their lives. Students offered their perspective about what are the general and specific reasons that an individual gets to the point of choosing suicide. Opinions varied from "I think they are selfish" to "our society glorifies it these days." I cannot fault the participants for their opinions, and if anything is to be gained from such conversations, it is that we are at the point where we can discuss the topic amongst other Marines openly and that everyone views the causes of suicide slightly or immensely different.

It was immediately evident that the forum had opinions based on two prejudicial categories of Marine suicide. Losing someone to the residual demons of combat and losing those in a generation of adulthood with uncertainties and frictions that would rival any insurgent conflict. For over a decade those who are in positions of senior leadership became accustomed to the idea, with growing regularity, that the horrors of combat and the grief of losing comrades that we had sweat and bled with was cause for the rise in suicides amongst combat vets. Focus groups and crafted discussions flooded annual trainings and conference rooms across the force. They met and continue to meet their intent. These forums make people aware and teach us what to look for. More importantly, they open the doorway of opportunity to

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those effected by loss(es) to speak about mental trauma and grief—something that our cultural bravado had hereditarily convinced us to avoid.

There is truth to the fact, that today, suicide is more publicized than it once was. Popular culture has approached the phenomenon on multiple fronts in an effort to draw awareness to the

> *... today, suicide is more publicized than it once was.*

once unthinkable topic. It is now out on the table in music, movies, books, and threaded into all platforms of social media. This continuous occurrence, to many, is believed to cause a normalization effect. To be clear, this is an opinion—and we have a right to *any* opinion. Data and study could show truth or add complexity to this line of thought. As the group discussion veered toward the reasons why junior, combat inexperienced Marines may be committing suicide, leaders in the room were openly offering their beliefs on what would bring a young Marine to the point that they would take their own

life. The input was both opinionated and factual, in that each reason had been a cause or is a significant contributing event to a person's end state of choosing suicide over living. Statements offered included: anger/retribution for a personal wrong, social ostracism, bullying (in any form), loneliness or emotion mixed with alcohol or drugs. Like the previously discussed "category" of suicide, putting the topic and opinions "out in the open" can benefit the audience if the discussion is guided correctly.

The common theme of both schools of thought is that we are looking at the *why*. Why are combat vets taking their own lives? Why are junior Marines, who have never seen combat, taking their lives? Why are military family members taking their lives? Why is there a seemingly growing sect of our culture that is facing the reality of being left behind by someone who *chooses* to not live another day, to not look for another outlet, and to stop crying out (internally or externally) for help? We have spent more than a decade with the science of resources and reasons, but our greatest ability to combat this plague may lie inherently within our ethos.

Let us look at the act itself as if it were a chronological event. First, we have the past (the factors that contributed to the suicide). Next is the instant that the individual takes the final action. Within this moment, all personal experience, thoughts, and beliefs culminate in a monumental decision that leaves an impact on anyone but the individual. Lastly, after a suicide, there is the grief, pain, anger, memories, and living with the loss that follows. This is the timeline of suicide: past, present, and future. Unless we are omniscient beings, we can

never know everything that is going through an individual's mind at the moment they take their lives. Therefore, we tend to focus on what specific acts or perceived thoughts drove them to that point. This is the easiest discussion to have because everyone enters the room with an opinion, and as stated before, none are wrong because they are an internal belief. A residual effect of these discussions, however, may be that barriers are built as participants listen to what others have to offer. We can get caught focusing on who said what, and why we think they are wrong, and leave the discussions feeling like we were competing to prove why our approach was right. This dynamic can take away from the intent of the importance of simply opening up about the topic.

We spend the bulk of the effort on the front end of the why behind a suicide, that the part we may be missing is the commonality within the timeline. Those who choose to end their life can see no scenario in which living until tomorrow is worth bearing the internal conflict of the present.

It is important to remember throughout this discussion that their choice was not yours to make or dissect in hindsight because we can never understand the complexity of the individual and the conflict. So how can we abate the situation? As Marines, we conduct reverse planning all the time. When we are looking to impact the other end of the timeline, we begin to have a new discussion, one that annual training already touches, and one in which we can refine our tactics as long as we understand the end state differently.

If you were given direction to be involved with your Marines—to learn who they are and be their advocate, to know who their biggest influencers are, and know them for the person they are, or what their breaking point is—we could brush that aside and say, *"of course, that's just being a good leader."* But if you were told to focus on ensuring that each Marine under your charge has something to look forward to tomorrow, even in their greatest moment of despair, then I argue we can begin to see the momentum we are looking for.

Initial and monthly counseling gives seniors and subordinates an opportunity to get into the discussions necessary to learn about our Marines. Marine leadership development has us involved and deepening our understanding at moments that naturally present themselves in a Marine's career. However, we will miss it all if we do not genuinely care for our Marines. They will read their leaders like a book if they perceive that we lack empathy, concern for well-being, or fail to *want* to know what our Marines are getting up each day and putting on the uniform for.

In the Museum of the Marine Corps, there is an artifact from Vietnam that was on the tail pylon of a helicopter belonging to HMM-364 (the Purple Foxes). The unit's mission was to fly resupply and medevac missions in order to support the fight. This particle piece was recovered from the crash site of a YK-13 at the Hai Van Pass. There were no survivors. Words on the logo speak volumes for Marine leaders both in combat and in garrison. That same mantra was echoed to me by leadership of a Marine division over a decade ago, and it still resonates. You can look at the actual words via an internet search, but to paraphrase without using profanity, it reads, "Give a _____." In everything we do as leaders, we cannot lose sight of the fact that our Marines have a future. One that is dissimilar to our own. Some Marines have growing personal conflicts and lose sight of a purpose or goal. They can forget that they have people that care and need them to do more than just work proficiently. As leaders, we are all in the people business. We cannot win any future engagements without investing in each other.

Suicide prevention and awareness training must continue. We have to ensure Marines understand signs that can give us cause for concern. We have to be ready for uncomfortable conversations about feelings, futures, families, and whatever other topics or concerns our Marines have. Sadly, we also have to know what to tell a grieving unit when a Marine takes their life, so we can help them heal. Adding the identification of what a *Marine's tomorrow* looks like to our aperture can help us to open a new front in the battle against suicide. Using that goal or aspiration as a touch point in casual conversation or during a mentoring moment reminds that Marine that there is more to them than the present. Widening our breadth on what the discussion of the once sensitive and provocative topic looks like helps us see how true leadership is a good place to start.

Getting involved with the future goals of our Marines is an essential tool for leaders to understand how individuals can stay positively motivated. (Photo by PFC David Walters.)

More Lethal, More Survivable ... Still Vulnerable

Toward an engineering lexicon to support institutional combat stress control efforts

by Mr. Robert Wehrle

>Mr. Wehrle writes from his home in Greeneville, TN. A former 0302, he spent over 35 years in the acquisition community after serving 10 years on active duty.

Historically, acquisition efforts to improve the equipment for the individual infantryman were focused on individual pieces of gear for a single soldier. Equipment improvement efforts were piecemeal, stove-piped, poorly coordinated, and competed poorly in semiannual budget competition. The result was sporadic improvement in the gear carried and employed by the foot soldier. Frequently, improvement in one piece of gear actually made the overall load carried by the grunt heavier, more unwieldy, or interfered with other pieces of equipment.

In the recent past, a systems approach to equipping the infantry squad has taken hold in countries all over the world. Squad equipment improvement programs are simultaneously focused and constrained by considering a number of system characteristics such as survivability, lethality, and mobility. The investment of significant intellectual and financial resources within the international community fostered the establishment of yearly technical conferences where participants meet to present papers, share technological breakthroughs, and discuss current trends. Vendors hawk their wares and participants prowl the booths looking for widgets to complement their efforts.

At a previous International Soldier Systems Conference, every presentation predictably focused on the technical detail of this system or that, and all embraced the unstated assumption that human beings only break mechanically. While some of the presentations focused on anthropometric limitations of the human apparatus, none addressed emotional or spiritual human limitations in general and no one even remotely considered examining possible links between technology and combat stress.

Participants were challenged by one speaker to consider the "elephant in the room": combat stress. While the speaker made an excellent point, his presentation highlighted a larger issue. Technologists never consider emotional or spiritual limitations to the human apparatus because there is *no* standard way of talking about these limitations; there is no lexicon for addressing this body of knowledge.

This is not to say that there has been nothing written about human emotional and spiritual limitations associated with combat stress, only that there has never been any serious attempt to develop an organized, systematic, and disciplined way of incorporating these issues into the design of technology.

The literature addressing combat stress directly focuses exclusively on command issues. This body of knowledge has been formally incorporated in military thinking and action through the publication of *Field Manual 22-51, Leaders' Manual for Combat Stress Control*. While the principles and practices established in this FM are unevenly and imperfectly applied, they nevertheless represent a solid repository of corporate knowledge. The primary challenge for commanders lies in implementation.

There is, however, no equivalent corporate knowledge associated with the interplay of combat stress and traditional weapon systems development and acquisition efforts. Design engineers who may be acutely cognizant of human anthropometric limitations never consider the spiritual and emotional limitations of the human apparatus. In their defense, until recently, there was no real necessity to develop this technical capability. Warfighting systems were

> *Technologists never consider emotional or spiritual limitations to the human apparatus because there is no standard way of talking about these limitations ...*

developed in a relatively stove piped environment. Capability improvements in one area rarely had any impact on the capability in another. The only cross fertilization between technical areas was primarily focused on weight limitations; how much more weight can a grunt carry? Improvements in communications bandwidth were pursued independently of what impact that might have on the individual war fighter.

The systems approach to equipping a squad has changed that approach. Now the individual soldier is considered only another element of the system—one of the systems of systems—and we are suddenly aware of the fact that bandwidth improvements in communication technology have a direct and immediate impact at the individual soldier level. We have recreated for the infantryman the same problem that for years, indeed to this day, plagues pilots, information overload, and we must now be careful about what data is delivered, when it is delivered, and how it is delivered.

Now, we are just at the beginning of these kinds of issues. For instance, the systems approach to squad equipage focuses on, among other things, making the squad as a whole and the individuals as part of that whole more lethal and survivable. These increases are not attributable to any single piece of equipment but represent the aggregate of improvements. New body armor SAPI plates, night vision devices, day optics, and intelligence gathering and distribution systems combined with medical advances ensure soldiers, sailors, and Marines are indeed more lethal and survivable than ever before. Recent combat experience in multiple theaters with these devices demonstrates conclusively their contribution to the lethality and survivability of our men and women in uniform.

With that lethality and survivability, we are now faced with questions we never considered before. Data overload has already been mentioned. We are now forced to consider cognitive limitations we never considered in designing infantry systems. I submit our lethality and survivability success will force us to consider emotional and spiritual limitations never confronted before.

As technology makes our individual soldiers more lethal and more survivable, the risk of combat trauma rises dramatically. More lethal soldiers will kill more enemy and be exposed to emotional and spiritual trauma consistent with this new lethality. More survivable soldiers in an all-volunteer force will live longer, be subjected to more frequent combat tours, and therefore be at higher risk of experiencing some level of combat trauma. We can no longer afford to ignore the impact of technology in the emotional and spiritual lives of our combatants. Just as we must consider the anthropometric limitation of the human body, we must now also consider mental, emotional, and spiritual limitations.

> ## ... we must now also consider mental, emotional, and spiritual limitations.

However, we have no convenient way of addressing these issues in the design community. Within the command structure, the doctrinal guidance of *FM 22-51* is wholly adequate for addressing these issues, but how do we in the design and acquisition community come to grips with these issues when we have no way of talking about them in a disciplined, organized, and rigorous fashion?

In short, we cannot address these issues in the technical community given our present acquaintance with the issues. We have neither the requisite knowledge nor a way to communicate our findings in a reliable and repeatable fashion. That does not mean we cannot proceed; indeed, the consequences of taking no action may not be bearable.

In fact, *FM 22-51* contains a troubling warning about not understanding the technology human spirit interface. Paragraph 1-6 "The Potential High-Tech Battlefield," warns:

> The emergence of new technologies has significantly increased the range of weapons, reduced reaction time, and changed conditions over which battles are fought. This new technology has the potential to exceed the capacity of human crews to fight. ... Future combat will strain human endurance to unprecedented levels. Failure to consider the human factors in an environment of increased lethality and uncertainty could cause a nation's concept of warfare to be irrelevant. ... These conditions will tend to neutralize the potential gains of new war-fighting technologies.[1]

There are at least two steps that can be taken immediately:

1. The ground combat weapons and communications development community must begin incorporating the findings and recording/reporting standards used in the aviation cockpit development community in order to come to grips with the cognitive limitations of human operators outside of the combat environment.

2. SYSCOM must establish a standing committee focused on understanding and developing ways to measure and record human mental, emotional, and spiritual endurance and develop sound engineering practices for incorporating these measures in equipment development and acquisition efforts.

The technical community must come to grips with this troubling hole in our knowledge base and simultaneously develop a vocabulary to communicate our findings. No small challenge, but one that we cannot afford to ignore.

Notes

1. Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 22-51, Leaders' Manual for Combat Stress Control,* (Washington, DC: September 1994).

USMC

Remembering Things I Never Knew

A call to reorient on suicide

by LtCol Brian J. Wilson

Six days after Gen David H. Berger assumed duties as Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance* (*CPG*) was published. Commentators described it as initiating the most radical redesign of the Corps in over 50 years and demonstrating Gen Berger's, "fresh thinking, candor, and unusual courage."[1] The *CPG* is the most dynamic, complete, and forceful document of its type in my sixteen years as a Marine officer. Whether directly or coincidentally, the CMC provided clear, decisive, and identity-defining direction for the Corps that many Marines were seeking.[2] The Service has been reoriented to China and the world's littorals in an audacious and high-risk maneuver that is designed to put the Service "where we want the Marine Corps to be in the next 5–15 years."[3] The *CPG* also described equally as bold personnel and administrative initiatives to better employ Marines such as expanded parental/maternity leave, an innovative approach to talent management, and significant revisions to the fitness reporting system. However, despite all its possible good, to me, it exposed an inability, unwillingness, or lack of recognition of the need to apply this same boldness to the organizational scourge of suicide. The Marine Corps has conceded mediocrity by not attacking this plague with the same approach being demonstrated in the plan and actions of reorienting the force. Speaking of the new direction of the Corps, the CMC said, "as maneuverists we are prepared to make bold decisions more rapidly than others."[4] Yet, our Corps seems more tentative in the critical area of suicide prevention, as our most vital

>LtCol Wilson is an Infantry Officer with combat tours in both Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently serving as a Planner at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

component—the Marine—continues to die outside of armed conflict at an alarming rate. The momentum being generated during the dynamic refocusing of the Service must also be used to establish a real understanding of why Marines are taking their lives and then using that information to change our course.

> *"I believe in my soul that Marines are different. Our identity is firmly rooted in our warrior ethos. This is the force that will always adapt and overcome no matter what the circumstances are. We fight and win in any clime and place."*
>
> **—Gen Berger**

A Statistical View

For the past ten years the Marine Corps has maintained a suicide rate double that of the national average. In 2018, the rate nearly tripled the national average. However, those numbers do not paint an accurate picture. Factually, the Marine Corps is no different than the Nation statistically when it comes to suicide. In 2018, 14.2 of every 100,000 Americans took his or her own life, but that number includes both genders and all ages. The Marine Corps has a typical age range of 18–44, 92 percent of whom are men. The national suicide rate for 18–44-year-old men was 25.6 in 2018. The Marine Corps was 25.3 in 2019. Marines were no different, and therein lies the problem. The Corps was only normal, falling into its designated place on an analytical trend line. While suicide has gained significant attention and effort from the Corps' leadership, unfortunately, there has been little resulting change. In 2019, one in 4,000 Marines committed suicide. Comparatively, even that staggering statistic showed success, having improved from one in 3,333 in 2018, which was the worst year in the last ten.[5] The Marine Corps is derived from the American population; thus, we will experience the same challenges as our Nation. We are, however, self-proclaimed, fewer and prouder. With that, we have a greater responsibility to positively impact our limited population in a manner that diminishes the symptoms of societal problems.

A Vital System

A Marine is a system, just like the purpose-built service rifle. He or she is the result of centuries of research and development, field experimentation, and real-world application. This system is the lynchpin of the Corps. As the CMC

> *Imagine a year where one rifle from every infantry battalion malfunctioned, disastrously injured Marines, and was reduced to scrap in the process.*

explains, "Marines are the centerpiece of the Corps—our principal emphasis must focus on recruiting; educating and training; instilling our core values and sense of accountability; equipping; and treating them with dignity, care, and concern."[6] However, the Corps stands on the same shaky footing regarding suicide as the rest of America. Our greatest weapon system is catastrophically failing at a rate far above that of anything else in our arsenal. Though exactly why eludes us, the result is blatantly apparent in the form of untimely death.

A Common Reaction

At an impromptu press conference on 31 July 2020, the CMC said, "All AAVs [Amphibious Assault Vehicles] across the fleet will be inspected and out of an abundance of caution, I've directed an immediate suspension of water operations until the causal factors of this mishap are better understood."[7] This was less than 24-hours after an AAV sunk off the coast of California, leaving one Marine dead and seven other Marines and a Sailor missing. His reaction to this tragic event was decisive, substantive, immediately safeguarded the force, and sent a clear message of the prioritization of preserving life. Decisive orders of this nature are characteristic of the institution in cases where the cost of life is high or the results of negative safety patterns or culture emerges. When seven Marines died on a Hawthorne Army Depot training range in 2013, the Marine Corps halted the use of the 60mm mortar system the next day. This order was expanded to a DOD-wide prohibition on the use

of most ammunition for the weapon shortly thereafter.[8] When a KC-130T refueling aircraft crashed in a Mississippi soybean field, killing sixteen Marines in 2017, the Marine Corps Reserve KC-130T fleet was grounded within hours. The next day, all of the same aircraft in the Navy, Navy Reserves, and Air Force Reserves were also grounded.[9] Paradoxically, when our most important weapon system suffers a catastrophic failure and commits suicide, having degraded or destroyed the individual and collective effectiveness of the Marines associated with him or her, the reaction is much more subdued.

A Defective Rifle

There are currently 24 active duty Marine infantry battalions consisting of approximately 1000 personnel each. The Marine Corps' 2019 suicide statistics are the equivalent of each of those units having lost a Marine to suicide. This seems unreasonable in an environment of consistently aggressive reactions to mishaps. Imagine a year where one service rifle from every infantry battalion malfunctioned, disastrously injured Marines, and was reduced to scrap in the process. What would happen? Would it actually be possible for it to happen more than once, or perhaps twice, before limitless resources were committed to understand the cause and correct it? Consider this from a purely quantitative standpoint: If the previously mentioned tragedies off of California, in Hawthorne, and in Mississippi all occurred on New Year's Eve 2019, the year would still have ended with more Marines having died from suicide.

> *Do we know our own center of gravity in this fight?*

A Maneuverist Approach

In addressing this issue, the goal should not necessarily be to directly reduce the suicide rate. In many ways it seems we are simply trying to apply

strength against strength. We have all repeatedly heard the simplistic refrains and seen the same tired approaches on suicide prevention. More intense screening for entry to the Service is not solving this problem. Challenging Marines to not give up on the team and their families is not solving this problem. New and more prescriptive initiatives such as the Force Preservation Council Program is not solving this problem. The Strange Model for center of gravity analysis provides a simple way to look at how the Marine Corps has gone about addressing suicide.[10] The key to the model is deeply exploring, thus understanding the enemy as a complex system. Do we really understand Marine suicide? Have we clearly identified what critical requirements provide opportunities to be attacked as critical vulnerabilities? Do we know our own center of gravity in this fight? If we are truly the maneuverists that we project ourselves to be, there is no more appropriate way to use that skill than in the preservation of our force.

> *Suicide in our Corps had been normalized by cloaking distance and frequency in a shameful hush.*

A Self-assessment and Observations

Unfortunately, I do not have a solution. However, I do offer three observations on how I personally lost sight of this problem and two observations of what I believe to be cultural contributing factors. A closer look at all of them might serve as a good starting point to understand suicide in our Corps.

On 20 August 2020, former Marine Sgt Thomas Alan Moss killed himself. We had served together in the same platoon in 2006 in Ramadi, Iraq. I was the platoon commander, and he was a squad automatic rifleman in 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3/8 Mar. While Thomas had left the Corps, his death opened my eyes to the reality of

suicide inside the Marine Corps. I recognized that, for me, three things had made the constant death of Marines by suicide, both current and former, minimally impactful. That muted impact, which I assume is shared by others, creates a huge hurdle in correcting it.

First, suicide had not occurred close enough to me. Like far too many Marines, I had been relatively close to it in one way or another. However, just like the death of a Marine in another company on a combat deployment, even if you knew him or her, the separation was enough to make it seem distant. Looking back on it, I can recognize this reaction for the protective mechanism it was. Anything that could be done to make a death more distant helped prevent contemplating my own mortality. I could not do that with Thomas: he was me and I was him. Though our demons may have differed slightly, most were born on the cold streets of Ramadi together.

Next, distance and the overall frequency of suicide combined to numb the harsh reality. A lot of Marines take their lives. It is not really an event; it is just something that is happening on the periphery of other matters. It is seemingly no different than a broken vehicle in a motor pool: not a good thing. It would definitely affect operations, but it was not something you spent a lot of time worrying about because it was a part of doing business.

Lastly, the impact of the frequency was dampened by a delay in learning of the event. Many suicides were happening remarkably close to me, but I would not know until much later. That much later allowed the possible sting to be avoided. It was simply logged away like the previously mentioned broken vehicle metaphor. Often, you would only hear about a Marine dying and nothing more. A few weeks later someone with real knowledge of the situation would provide the grim notification of the grisly demise. Suicide in our Corps had become normalized by cloaking distance and frequency in a shameful hush.

The first facet of Marine culture that I argue matters when talking about suicide is that the Marine Corps removes-

most inhibitions with firearms and inserts training on functionality and employment. Talking about guns and suicide can be very hard in American culture. Frankly, most just do not want to hear it. We, as Marines, do not have the luxury of turning a blind eye. The numbers paint a clear picture that matter when having a meaningful conversation about suicide in the Marine Corps. For instance, gun owners are four times more likely to die by suicide than non-gun owners. More confounding is that men who own handguns are eight times more likely to die of gun suicides than men who do not, while women who own handguns are 35 times more likely to take their lives with their own gun than women who do not.[11] While reliable data on active duty Marine gun ownership is scarce, it is known that 249 Marines attempted suicide in 2018 with 64 percent using a gun; 41 Marines died as a result of those attempts.[12] Firearms have the highest fatality rate of any mechanism of injury in suicides with the national rate of mortality at nearly 85 percent[13] The number one posthumous norm in American suicides is access to a firearm.[14] It is remarkably simple mathematics: states with the highest number of guns have the highest number suicide attempts and the most successful suicides per 100,000 people.[15] Marines are extremely comfortable with guns and many own guns.

The second aspect of Marine culture that I argue matters when talking about suicide is a Marines' morphs view of dying. The highest and final honor of a Marine comes at his or her internment—when the general and the private are equal. In a military funeral, they are both carried by Marines and are covered by the national ensign, which will be folded and presented to a loved one on behalf of the President, the CMC, and a grateful Nation. They will both re-

ceive a three-volley rifle salute, have taps played, and be memorialized as a part of our Corps' heritage. Furthermore, those who die in combat are immortalized, with death because of valorous acts being viewed with saint-like awe. Names like Basilone and Bobo evoke a reverence that transcends memorialization and nears divinity. This is problematic in that the basic survival instinct of fear has been partially trained out of Marines. Marines lack a reasonable fear of death, partly because they have been inoculated to it. From day one, they are inundated with celebrity-like figures who displayed superhuman ability and only fell once the feat was complete. Marines commonly, and sincerely, speak of the post-death reunion to be had with fallen brothers and sisters in Valhalla, when we will feast and fest in a hall celebrating eternal life for warriors. Nothing said here is meant to cheapen the extraordinary commitment and sacrifices of men and women who have died courageously on the battlefield or is it to discount the purpose of this type of admiration. This is noted to simply point out the side effect of a narrative that portrays death in a near glamorous light. Doing so comes at the risk of unintentionally converting something horrible into a subconscious prompt for an unparalleled celebration. We have suppressed the reality and finality of death, making the private and general peers, and granting the hero an afterlife. This impacts how Marines view dying. I sincerely believe that this is our most vulnerable flank in this fight and that we must explore it more.

A Call to Action

These words simply represent my thoughts after musing on the tragic end to the life of Thomas Moss and many other Marines. The points herein are clear, sharp, and presented unapologetically.

> *"Courage is almost a contradiction in terms. It means a strong desire to live taking the form of a readiness to die."*
>
> **—G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy**

> **_Suicide is a foundational element in the legacy of my generation of warfighters._**

They are not, however, meant to imply that our leaders have anything less than genuine concern, compassion, empathy, and an insatiable desire to fix this. Comparing the *CPG* and the ensuing attack to meet the tasks it contained with our recent approach to suicide prevention led me to believe we have accepted defeat. If Marines are different and the Corps' centerpiece, then it is only responsible that we give this issue at least the same energy and rigor as force design and mishaps. This is my cry for something more and something different: more research, more commitment, more investment, more anything, until it works, and different approaches, different gimmicks, different resources, different anything, until it works. More and different move us closer to a solution that, as noted, I do not have. I do, however, have faith in the organization that I have committed my entire adult life to. Like all Marines, I was indoctrinated into a culture where maximum effort is the only acceptable level of effort. A place where mission accomplishment sits above all else. Where the only acceptable failure is to, actually or metaphorically, fall on the battlefield charging forward to silence the enemy's guns. Some will feel attacked by my words. That is not my goal. Some will point out all that has been done. Unfortunately, it has not worked. Some will say it is bigger than simply doing more and doing different. If not more and if not different, then what?

In a May 2019 video address to the Corps, then CMC, Gen Robert Neller, is seen finishing his 71 second plea to stop suicides, removing his microphone and despondently saying to the production crew, "See what you can do with that. Not sure if it's going to do anything or not."[16] His frustration was understandable and his concern for effectiveness accurate. Little has changed since that video other than a new Commandant carrying the burden of Marine lives lost to suicide. In the words of Gen Berger, "We cannot afford to continue to admire problems or fail to take the necessary decisive actions."[17] While he was speaking on the warfighting posture of the Corps, I dream of a day those words from the CMC will be directive in nature and spoken about suicide prevention. I simply want the Marine Corps' spirit, legacy, and ethos, which is being plainly demonstrated in the sweeping direction of our Corps today, to be applied in addressing this problem. During my recent journey on this subject—which begin at awareness, passed through research, and ended with acceptance—I triggered memories of things I am not sure I ever actually knew. Those memories forced me to acknowledge that suicide is a foundational element in the legacy of my generation of warfighters—but that distressing fact does not have to be the end of our story.

Notes

1. Dan Goure, "Will Commandant Berger's Planning Guidance Mean the End of the Marine Corps," *Real Clear Defense,* (December 2019), available at https://www.realcleardefense.com; and David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "A Striking New Vision for the Marines, and a Wakeup Call for the Other Services," *War on the Rocks*, (October 2019), available at https://warontherocks.com.

2. In 2019, Marine Maj Leo Spaeder published an article, entitled, "Sir, Who Am I? An Open Letter to the Incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps," where he asked him to define the role of the Service. See, Leo Spaeder, "Sir, Who Am I? An Open Letter to the Incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps," *War on the Rocks,* (March 2019), available at https://warontherocks.com.

3. Gen David H. Berger, *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*, (Washington, DC: July 2019).

4. Ibid.

5. Department of Defense, "Calendar Year 2017 Department of Defense Suicide Event Report," (Washington, DC: 2017); Department of Defense, "Calendar Year 2018 Department of Defense Suicide Event Report," (Washington, DC: 2018); and Department of Defense, "Calendar Year 2019 Annual Suicide Report," (Washington, DC: 2019).

9. *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance.*

10. Gina Harkins, "Marines Suspend All AAV Water Ops as Search for 8 Missing Troops Continues," *Military*, (July 2020), available at https://www.military.com.

11. In 2013, a 60mm mortar round exploded in the cannon after the mortar was double loaded, killing seven Marines from 1/9 Mar, during a live-fire training exercise at the Hawthorne Army Depot in Nevada.

12. In 2017, a Marine C-130T crashed in Mississippi because of the failure of a corroded propeller blade, killing all sixteen Marines on board.

13. Dr. Joe Strange created a model for Center of Gravity (COG) analysis in 1996. His method identifies the COG, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities then seeks to disrupt the weakest point in the system.

14. D.M. Studdert, "Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California," *The New England Journal of Medicine,* (Waltham, MA: Massachusetts Medical Society, 2020).

15. "Calendar Year 2018 Department of Defense Suicide Event Report."

16. Senate Joint Economic Committee, "Guns and Suicide," (Washington, DC: 2019), available at https://www.jec.senate.gov.

17. Kerry Shaw, "10 Essential Facts about Guns and Suicide," *The Trace*, (September 2016), available at https://www.thetrace.org.

18. Ibid.

19. Gina Harkins, "Top Marine Makes Plea to End Suicide, Says 'Zero Shame' in Admitting Problem, 2019," *Military,* (May 2019), available at https://www.military.com.

20. *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance.*

Coping with Death in Combat

A Vietnam veteran's perspective
by Ralph DiPietro

The day I left Vietnam was the best. As the Continental flight lifted off from the Da Nang airport, a cheer spread through the cabin. I looked through the window at Marble Mountain for the last time. A weight lifted from my shoulders. No more patrols and ambushes—never knowing who might not make it back.

We headed for Okinawa—our in-country staging area for Vietnam one year before. There I had filled out my last will and testament, at nineteen years of age. It had been comical back then, but some of my friends never got this flight out. They went back to the United States in a C-130 transport inside flag-draped coffins.

Once in Okinawa, we were bussed to Camp Hansen-Butler, a Marine Corps base on the other side of the island. We got off the bus and passed Marines heading to Vietnam. They watched us. We were hardened combat Marines. We yelled, "You'll be sorry" and "Not too late to go AWOL." These guys were laughing. The year before, I had been in the group leaving for Vietnam. What a difference a year makes. It was not funny anymore.

At Camp Hansen-Butler, I exchanged my jungle fatigues for the military greens I had stored there a year before. Three days later, I boarded a plane heading for Travis Air Force Base in California. The cabin was filled with rowdy grunts. The flight took eleven hours. I had plenty of time to think about what I lived through during the last year.

I thought about PFC Liggett and Sgt Roses. We had been members of the same recon platoon. On the last patrol a month before, I was wounded and they

> Mr. DiPietro was a Navy Corpsman in Vietnam, acting as a Medic to Marines in combat.

died. I remembered their smiles and laughter and wondered how their families reacted to seeing their coffins. The platoon had held a remembrance service for them just before I left. The chapel was crowded as the chaplain spoke of their contributions to the platoon and to each of us who had fought by their side.

Liggett had been my buddy. I ached for his family. He told me about his mom and dad and his ambitions once he got out of the Service. I wanted to write to his parents. But the more I thought about it, the more I felt a letter from a nineteen-year-old combat buddy might hurt them even more.

I experienced so much death in Vietnam. Maybe I was becoming immune to it. Death did not seem to matter anymore. What was I supposed to do? How was I supposed to act? I remember a Marine telling me once, "Don't worry about the bullet that has your name on it. Worry about the one that doesn't." I

wondered how my family would have reacted if I had been killed. How might things have been different had it been two Navy officers and a Navy chaplain pulling up at my dad's door?

When the big jet landed, the grunts cheered. We were finally home. After a few days, I received my discharge papers and boarded another flight home to New York. After I got home, I moped around for a few days. Then my dad noticed a change in me. It was not for the better.

I wished I was still in Vietnam with the guys I had fought beside. I was home, safe and sound, but they were not. They were still plodding through

> *I wished I was still in Vietnam with the guys I had fought beside. I was home, safe and sound, but they were not. They were still plodding through the rice paddies and humping the jungles …*

the rice paddies and humping the jungles of Happy Valley and Charlie Ridge. Day after day, I became more depressed. The only relief I needed was hearing from the guys in my platoon that they were all safe, and that no one else got killed. My father said I needed some help. I told him I was okay, but I was not. The chair I sat in day after day became my flak jacket. It protected me. I was back on the front lines with my platoon again and fighting the enemy beside my friends.

Just 35 days after getting wounded and discharged, I sat at in my parents' house trying to manage the images in

my head. The jungles of Vietnam were my real home. I did not need to be with my folks. My family was the guys who fought by my side, now ten thousand miles away. What were they experiencing? Did they need me?

Then, miraculously, I received a letter from one of the Marines in my outfit. He said he was on his way home, 90 miles from me. He wanted to stop, see me, and let me know what had happened since I left.

I was so happy to see him. He told me that the platoon had gone on patrol a few weeks before, and two more Marines were killed. I knew both of them—more deaths to face.

He also said that I would not recognize the platoon anymore since many had rotated back to the states. That comforted me. I did not know the new Marines in the platoon. I would not grieve over them the way I did for my dead buddies.

The visit helped. After my friend left, I snapped out of my funk. I did not want to fight the battle in my mind anymore. I thought about the strong feelings I had for the guys I fought next to. I thought about when a Marine was promoted, we celebrated for him. We were all part of his promotion ceremony. We would pin his new stripes on him. We knew what he had been through because we had been through it.

When you have been on patrol with guys that are protecting your back, you develop a closeness that's hard to define. In combat, you never know what might happen. Any situation can blow up at any time. Among Marines, there is a special kind of bond and respect that I missed. I came to understand that it is a kind of love. Marines do not call it "love." That is too sentimental. But that is what it is: the strongest love I ever felt.

I returned to the Navy Reserve where I had enlisted years before. I was asked by the command there to present the United States flag to the family of a Navy Corpsman who had died in Vietnam. I was honored. I felt closure.

Today, I am still dealing with many of the same psychic wounds I left Vietnam with. The memories of seeing your friends die never go away or weaken, and I do not want them to. They are sacred to me. They are with me always. The best you can do is cope. So, I talk and write about what happened. I tell others about it.

I am coping, and I am content.

USMC

2021 LtCol Earl "Pete" Ellis Essay Contest

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In an essay of 2500 to 3000 words, answer the following question:

Given the growing importance of Marine Corps installations as platforms for force projection and sustainment, what innovations will be required to support the future force designed to conduct a range of expeditionary operations including EABO? What changes or advances in ranges and training areas; virtual and constructive training support; energy, security and maintenance infrastructure and community relations/public-private partnerships are most important to the future of installations?

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Information Operations and Maneuver Warfare

Maneuverist Paper No. 13

by Marinus

Conventional information operations, what people often call "propaganda," resemble campaigns of attrition. Just as the attritionist attempts to wear down the enemy's will to resist by slowly inflicting a large number of relatively small injuries, the propagandist deploys many modest messages in order to convince others of the virtue of his friends, the justice of his cause, and the iniquity of his enemies. Clever practitioners of information operations, however, do things differently. Rather than casting to the winds a myriad of minor memes, they employ the informational analog of maneuver warfare to achieve decisive effects.

An excellent example of such maneuver in information space played a role in the outcome the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, a conflict that began on 27 September 2020 and ended, 44 days later, on 9 November 2020.[1] In this struggle, the winning side (the Republic of Azerbaijan) combined skillful information operations with kinetic actions of various kinds to in order to capture, and ethnically cleanse, land it had lost in an earlier conflict.[2] At the same time, the losing side (composed of a pair of intertwined Armenian republics) found itself drawn into what might be called information ambushes, some of which were of its own making.

The bone of contention in the war between Azerbaijan and the two Armenian republics was a contiguous collection of territories that, in rough terms, corresponds to an area long known as Karabakh. With an area of some 4,500 square miles, these territories cover more than twice as much acreage as the state of Delaware but somewhat less than Connecticut. In 2020, about 150,000 people lived in Karabakh that, apart from a short frontier shared with Iran, were entirely surrounded by land in the obvious and unencumbered possession of Azerbaijan.

All but a handful of the people who lived in Karabakh in September of 2020 spoke the Armenian language, embraced Armenian culture, and claimed Armenian descent. Indeed, the population of the polity they formed in the course of the breakup of the Soviet Union, a state originally called the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, contained a somewhat higher proportion of Armenians than the eponymous, and substantially larger, Armenian ethnostate, the Republic of Armenia. (While many people around the world continue to refer to the smaller state by its original designation, Armenians are much more likely to refer to it by its newer name of the Republic of Artsakh.)

The relationship between Artsakh and the larger Republic of Armenia is a complex one. While so closely allied that they draw both military personnel and weaponry from a common pool, the inhabitants of Artsakh had much more skin in the game than their cousins in the Republic of Armenia. In the

In the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, the forces of Azerbaijan skillfully combined traditional operations with OIE to achieve victory. (Photo by SSgt Ryan Whitney.)

event of defeat at the hands of Azerbaijan, all of the residents of Artsakh faced the very real danger of being converted into refugees. For people living in the Republic of Armenia, however, an Azerbaijani victory, while painful in many ways, was much less likely to result in the loss of hearth, home, or livelihood.

Prior to the early 1990s, some 400,000 people who were not Armenian, the vast majority of whom were Azerbaijanis, had also lived in the contested territories.[3] Nearly all of these people, however, had left their homes in the course of the long war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis that ended in 1994. In some parts of Karabakh/Artsakh, the towns and villages vacated were soon occupied by Armenians who had lost their homes in the course of the recent war. In others, however, few, if any, people took the places of those who had been driven out. As a result, the contested territories were rich in ghost towns.

On the battlefield, the first great event of the war that broke out on 27 September 2020 was the destruction, at the hands of Azerbaijani unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), of a substantial proportion of the Armenian inventory of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and mobile anti-aircraft systems.[4] While this was going on, Azerbaijani artillery units fired a small number of long-range rockets into a handful of built-up areas in Karabakh, most of which were located dozens of kilometers away from the places where the mechanized units of the two belligerents had been deployed. (While fired from multiple rocket launchers, few of these rockets seem to have been launched as part of the salvos such weapons were optimized to deliver. Rather, the damage done by the explosion of the rockets suggests that most of the rockets were either fired singly or in pairs.)

Soon after the start of hostilities, Azerbaijani information operators began to share a large number of photos that depicted, and considerable film footage that documented, the demise of Armenian armored vehicles at the hands of flying robots. They refrained, however, from publishing any pictures, moving or otherwise, of the terminal effects achieved by the

Armenia and Azerbaijan. (Map by author.)

rockets fired at civilian targets. On the contrary, Azerbaijani publicists categorically denied that anyone in the Azerbaijani armed forces had taken part in the bombardment of civilian communities. (Every once in a while, moreover, Azerbaijani information operators took a break from the celebration of the anti-armor achievements of aerial automatons in order to publish complaints that Armenian artillery units had fired rockets at civilian targets.)

From the start, Armenian press officers worked hard to counteract stories of the success achieved by Azerbaijani UAVs. To do this, they showed pictures of the wreckage of Azerbaijani UAVs that had been shot down, celebrated the service of Armenian soldiers equipped with hand-held air defense missiles, and documented the destruction of Azerbaijani armored vehicles by Armenian ground troops. Armenian publicists also took pains to deny all tales of Armenian rocket attacks upon civilian communities. At the same time, the bulk of the materials promulgated by Armenian press releases and social media posts told heart-rending tales of homes destroyed, women wounded, and children orphaned by the explosion of Azerbaijani rockets fired at long range into places inhabited by Armenian civilians.

On 4 October 2020, the first day of the second week of the war, the Armenian armed forces fired a pair of tactical ballistic missiles into the middle of Ganja, the second largest city in Azerbaijan.[5] The resulting explosions, recorded by closed-circuit television cameras, destroyed two large buildings and damaged many others. According to reports published by Azerbaijani sources, the strike also resulted in the death of one civilian and the wounding of thirty others.

Later that day, three Armenian authorities disseminated separate statements about the missiles that had exploded in Ganja. Maj Shushan Stepanyan, the press secretary of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, categorically denied that any Armenian missiles had been fired against the city. Mr. Vahram Pogosyan, the press secretary of the Republic of Artsakh, claimed that the Armenian missiles had destroyed the Ganja International Airport, which is located about five kilometers (three miles) away from place where the two missiles had landed.[6] (Armenian sources had long claimed that this airport, which had been closed to civilian traffic in March of 2020, was being used as a base for the aircraft, both manned and unmanned, of both Azerbaijan and Turkey.) The president of the Republic of Artsakh, Mr. Arayik Harutyunyan, explained that the missiles, which had been aimed at military installations in Ganja, had been fired in retaliation for Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian settlements. He added that, in order to minimize the chances of civilian casualties, he had previously warned the civilian inhabitants of Ganja to leave that city.[7]

In sharp contrast to his Armenian counterparts, Mr. Hikmat Hajiyev, a senior civil servant serving as the director of the war information center set up by the Republic of Azerbaijan, issued a coherent series of press releases, media kits, and social media posts that contrasted the humane precision of Azerbaijani combat operations with the crudely executed warcrimes perpetrated by the Armenians. In a war in which

Azerbaijani forces were using precision strikes against purely military targets, these materials explained, the Armenians were tossing poorly aimed projectiles into the middle of a city that lay nearly 40 kilometers (24 miles) away from the nearest battlefield and 130 kilometers (80 miles) away from the site of the fiercest fighting.

On 5 October 2020, Mr. Pogosyan, who had previously claimed that the missiles had struck the airport at Ganja, posted a message on social media that included a painfully bombastic threat of follow-on attacks. "A few more days," he wrote, "I'm afraid that the archeologists even won't be able to find the place of Ganja."[8] This statement enhanced the credibility of the Azerbaijani information campaign, which aimed to convince the world that the Armenian armed forces were deliberately targeting places where civilians lived. The following day, Maj Stepanyan, acting for the Armenian Ministry of Defense, published figures for the number of people killed and wounded, and the number of buildings destroyed or damaged, by Azerbaijani attacks upon Armenian towns and villages.[9] (While Maj Stepanyan may well have been trying to divert attention from Mr. Pogoyan's self-inflicted wound, the timing of this message gave the unfortunate impression that she was attempting to justify the missile strikes on Ganja as retaliation for rocket attacks on Armenian settlements.)

Over the course of the two weeks that followed the attack of 4 October 2020, additional Armenian missiles struck Ganja. These, according to figures published by the Azerbaijani government, resulted in 31 additional deaths among the civilian population. As before, Armenian publicists responded to Azerbaijani messaging on the subject of these losses with press releases and social media posts describing Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian civilians. They also identified a number of military support facilities located in, or near, Ganja.[10]

While public affairs officers engaged in their war of words and projectiles fell upon civilian communities, Azerbaijani ground combat forces conducted a long series of attacks with limited objectives. These served three purposes. First, they pushed Armenian units out of the patches of woodland that protected them from the prying eyes of Azerbaijani UAVs. Second, they facilitated the occupation of towns, villages, and farms. Third, they allowed Azerbaijani ground forces to approach, day-by-day and step-by-step, the most populous urban center in the contested territory. (The Armenians refer to this city of 55,000 people, which serves as the capital of the Republic of Artsakh, as Stepanakert. Azerbaijanis call it by its old Turkish name of Xankendi.)[11]

The last, and largest, of the Azerbaijani attacks resulted, on 6 November 2020, in the capture of a hill adjacent to Stepanakert/Xankendi, one that rises a good 600 meters above the city. In addition to dominating the surrounding terrain, this hill is also home to a town, known to Armenians as Shushi, and to Azerbaijanis as Shusha, of great significance to both sides in the long struggle between the two peoples. Prior to 1992, Shushi/Shusha had been inhabited by some 15,000 Azerbaijanis. On 9 May 1992 of that year, however, Armenian forces captured the town, and the Azerbaijani inhabitants of the place became refugees. In the three decades that followed,

more than 4,000 Armenians, many of whom had previously fled their homes in Azerbaijan, moved into the town.

Preparations for the Azerbaijani attack on Shushi/Shusha began nearly a month before Azerbaijani ground forces entered that town. On 8 October 2020, two large projectiles of undoubted Azerbaijani origin struck the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral. A building of great significance to Armenian culture that also served as a symbol of Armenian ownership of Shushi/Shusha, the cathedral had only recently been renovated, refurbished, and reconsecrated. (Sources differ as to the specifics of these projectiles. Some describe them as rockets or missiles, others as bombs dropped by aircraft. What is certain, however, is the precision of the two strikes, both of which landed within two meters of each other upon the cupola of the cathedral.)[12]

The centerpiece of the Armenian response to the strike upon the cathedral in Shushi/Shusha was a carefully crafted video in which a world-class Armenian cellist set up his instrument in the ruined building and played a haunting piece by Armenia's greatest composer of sacred music. As propaganda, the video, which depicted Armenians as highly cultured and determined defenders of Christian civilization, succeeded brilliantly. As a maneuver in information space, however, it failed. In particular, by reminding viewers of the precision with which the Azerbaijani strike upon the cathedral had been delivered, it supported the central message of the Azerbaijani information campaign, a message that, in turn, convinced tens of thousands of Armenians to act in ways that set the stage for Azerbaijani victory.

From the start of the war, the combination of depiction and denial employed by Azerbaijani information operators sent a powerful message to the Armenian population of the contested territories. The first element of the message was the ability of the Azerbaijani armed forces to conduct precision strikes. The second part of the message, inadvertently magnified by Armenian propaganda, was the willingness of the Azerbaijani leadership to conduct such strikes against Armenian settlements in the contested territory. As a result, thousands of Armenian civilians decided to abandon their homes well before the anticipated arrival of Azerbaijani troops.[13]

The power of Azerbaijani information operations to multiply the psychological effect of bombardment becomes evident when one compares the casualties caused by rocket strikes in the two battles for Stepanakert/Xankendi. Between November of 1991 and May of 1992, Azerbaijani artillery units fired thousands of unguided rockets into the city, killing 169 civilians and convincing nearly all of the city's 70,000 inhabitants to flee.[14] Between 27 September 2020 and 9 November 2020, Azerbaijani gunners launched a much smaller number of projectiles at the city, killing 13 civilians and driving 50,000 people (out of a total population of 55,000) from their homes.[15]

A similar pattern can be seen in a comparison between the Azerbaijani bombardments of the first war for Artsakh/Karabakh and the conflict that took place in 2020. Between December of 1991 and January of 1993, long-range weapons

fired by the Azerbaijani armed forces killed about 1,500 Armenian civilians. Between 27 September 2020 and 9 November of the same year, weapons of that type killed 29 Armenian civilians. (In addition to this, Azerbaijani unmanned aerial vehicles killed four additional civilians.)[16]

The Azerbaijani campaign in Artsakh/Karabakh contained many elements alien to the maneuver warfare tradition. The use of fleets of unmanned aerial vehicles to destroy so many of the armored vehicles deployed by the Armenians in the first few days of the war was an act of unalloyed attrition. The terrain-oriented attacks with limited objectives were likewise products of scripted, stereotyped, and methodical battle plans. At the same time, when combined with limited (and thus more deniable) rocket strikes and a messaging campaign that stressed the precision of their weapons, the Azerbaijanis were able to achieve, in 44 days, the most important of its war aims.

In much the same way, the Armenian forces defending Artsakh/Karabakh were highly decentralized. This proved to be a great advantage when fighting in the wooded areas that sheltered them from Azerbaijani unmanned aerial vehicles. The same mentality that enabled the Armenians to fight so well in the forest, however, proved a liability when it came to the employment of the two weapons that the Azerbaijanis wielded so well. Thus, the tactical ballistic missiles dropped on the city center of Ganja proved to be a self-inflicted wound, one made even worse by messages sent by Armenian propagandists bereft of a common vision.

This is not to say that the combined arms effect achieved by Azerbaijan provides a template for the conduct of maneuver warfare in information space. After all, the effect achieved by the combination of limited rocket strikes with a messaging campaign owed much of its effect to memories of bombardments that had taken place three decades before. What the Azerbaijani victory does tell us, however, is that our philosophy of maneuver warfare provides a solid foundation for the study of ways that deeds in the realm of ideas and images might be combined with deliberate actions of other sorts.

Notes

1. For a brief, but authoritative, overview of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, see Cory Welt and Andrew S. Bowen, *Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno- Karabakh Conflict*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021).

2. For an accessible account of the earlier conflict, often described as the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, see Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*, (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2013).

3. For a brief, but comprehensive, discussion of the number of people living in the territories in recent times, as well as the number who became refugees, see *Black Garden*.

4. For a systematic attempt to account for items of military equipment destroyed, damaged, or captured, see Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans,

"The Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses on the Sides of Armenia and Azerbaijan," *Oryx,* (September 2020), available at https://www.oryxspioenkop.com. (The date of this article is misleading. The initial report, which dealt only with losses on the first day of the war, was subsequently updated many times. The losses described thus pertain to all 44 days of the war.)

5. The tactical ballistic missiles that landed in Ganja on 4 October 2020 seem to have been of a type designated by NATO as "Scud B." These have a maximum range of 300 kilometers (180 miles) and a payload of 985 kilograms (2,167 pounds.)

6. Republic of Artsakh, "Ganja Airport was Destroyed," *Telegram*, (October 2020), available at https://www.telegram.com.

7. Arayik Harutyunyan|Artsakh President, "As act of self-protection ..." *Twitter*, (October 2020), available at https://twitter.com.

8. Ваграм Погосян,Боюсь, археологи не смогут даже найти место Гянджи» [Vahram Poghosyan: "I'm afraid archaeologists won't even be able to find the place of Ganja"], *U1+*, (October 2020).

9. Shushan Stepanyan, "Civilian Losses Caused by Azerbaijani Aggression," *Twitter*, (October 2020), available at https://twitter.com.

10. Staff, "Armenia: Unlawful Rocket, Missile Strikes on Azerbaijan," *Human Rights Watch*, (December 2020), available at https://www.hrw.org.

11. For an accessible and authoritative description of the Azerbaijani campaign of successive attacks with limited objectives, see John Spencer and Harshana Ghoorhoo, "The Battle of Shusha City and the Missed Lessons of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War," *Modern War Institute*, (July 2021), available at https://mwi.usma.edu.

12. Staff, "Azerbaijan: Attack on Church Possible War Crime," *Human Rights Watch*, (December 2020), available at https://www.hrw.org.

13. See, among others, Lillian Avedian, "Displaced Armenians of Artsakh Receive Aid, but No Status," *Armenian Weekly*, (January 2021), available at https://armenianweekly.com.

14. Rachel Denber, Alexander Petrov, and Christina Derry, "Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Indiscriminate Bombing and Shelling in Nagorno Karabakh," *Helsinki Watch Newsletter*, (July 1995).

15. Staff, "Azerbaijan: Unlawful Strikes in Nagorno-Karabakh," *Human Rights Watch*, (December 2020), available at https://www.hrw.org.

16. Republic of Artsakh, Human Rights Ombudsman, *Interim Report on the Cases of the Killing of Civilians in Artsakh by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan*, (Stepanakert: January 2021).

USMC

Monsoon and Maneuver

reviewed by Capt Charles Dowling, Jr.

*Whoever is Lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice.*
—Tomé Pires ~1514

>Capt Dowling is an Intelligence Officer. This essay won the 2020 Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude Writing Contest.

MONSOON: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. By Robert D. Kaplan. Random House, New York, NY, 2011.
ISBN: 978-0812979206, 400 pp.

Gazing east across the breakers from Durban's scenic and commercial Golden Mile, one may be tempted to envision how some five thousand quiet, lonely miles across the southern Indian Ocean rises the western coast of Australia, steadfast and welcoming. But if one allowed his gaze to drift northward from Australia to Sumatra, up the Burmese coast, across the tempestuous Bay of Bengal, past Sri Lanka and the jutting Indian subcontinent, across the Arabian Peninsula, and down the East African coastline, that vision would be jarringly different; this is the vision that Robert Kaplan sees. In *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, Kaplan asserts that the Indian Ocean "rimland," arcing widely from Indonesia, across Southeast/Central Asia, and down East Africa, is not only a hotbed of interethnic violence, religious extremism, crime, and humanitarian crises (exacerbated, in part, by rampant corruption and devastating weather events) but the decisive arena for great-power maneuverings in the 21st century. This is a reality the United States has struggled to acknowledge and, consequently, to exploit. To date, based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the interconnectivity and strategic significance of this region, the United States has

continued to neglect and marginalize the Indian Ocean and its rimland, thus leaving it exposed to the operational and strategic maneuverings of its adversaries. But there is still time. Though both great-power rivals and international Islamic terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, have already made significant military, economic, and diplomatic inroads from sub-Saharan Africa to Southeast Asia, by recalibrating its understanding of the cohesiveness and geopolitical consequence of this turbulent region, the United States may still posture itself to create decisive advantages against our adversaries and exploit them.

Based initially on the predictability of the monsoon winds, the Indian Ocean has been a veritable superhighway since classical times—not just for trade but also for the spread of information and ideas. Most recently, these ideas have often manifested in the form of violent religious extremism. "Herein lies the entire arc of Islam," Kaplan writes in *Monsoon*,

> from the eastern fringe of the Sahara Desert to the Indonesian archipelago; thus it follows that the struggle against terrorism and anarchy (which includes piracy) focuses broadly on these tropical waters, between the Suez Canal and Southeast Asia.[1]

Indeed, almost immediately upon its inception in the seventh century, Islam sprung from its birthplace in the Arabian Peninsula and spread like wildfire along established maritime trade routes—southwest down Africa's Swahili Coast to Zanzibar and east across Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Burmese Coast, and Indonesia.[2] Perhaps surprisingly, Islam's propagation throughout the Indian Ocean rimland was initially relatively liberal—facilitated, as it was, by maritime trade. In fact, the very interactive, collaborative nature of international commerce brought with Islam increased literacy, the understanding of advanced maths and sciences, and the sort of laissez-faire cosmopolitanism indicative of members of a mutually beneficial, participatory trade relationship.

To say that this is no longer the experience of Islam in the Indian Ocean rimland would be a gross understatement. Even since before the events of 11 September 2001, radical Islamic organizations like al-Qaeda have used the exponential proliferation of information technology to exploit conditions of human suffering

from East Africa to Sumatra in order to enflame disenfranchised populations and incite anti-Western rhetoric, activities, and violence. While it may seem the United States has adequately acknowledged the trans-border nature of Islamic extremism by supporting sustained peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations in locations as varied as Eastern Africa's Great Rift Valley and the countless islands of the Filipino and Indonesian archipelagoes, the very lack of consistency and unity of these efforts has led not only to the United States' inability to stymie the expansion of Islamic terrorism in the region over two decades but also to the expenditure of incomprehensible amounts of resources—both fiscal and human.

Grander than Islamic extremism, perhaps, in terms of great-power jockeying in the Indian Ocean, is the fact that it's home to 70 percent of the world's oil reserves, 40 percent of its natural gas reserves, and incalculable amounts of priceless mineral deposits: aluminum, copper, coal, lead, nickel, zinc, tine, and iron being the most prevalent.[3] Additionally, over 70 percent of the world's petroleum products travel over land and sea by way of the Indian Ocean and its littorals—including over 85 percent of China's

energy consumer, China, understands innately.

It is no secret that China's machinations in the Indian Ocean rimland are ambitious and vast. What is less apparent is precisely how comprehensively China views the Indian Ocean littoral and to what extent they desire to bring it under the umbrella of Beijing's influence. Across multiple domains and harmonizing their diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments, China has surreptitiously sought to place a stranglehold on the Indian Ocean rimland. From financing, building, and subsequently controlling the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar in Pakistan; to building the Hambantota port complex in Sri Lanka; aiding in the construction of a deep-water port in Bangladesh; financing the Pakistani port of Karachi; and to investing in civilian and military maritime infrastructure in Kenya and Djibouti—China's so-called "String of Pearls" strangles the Indian Ocean rimland nearly entirely.[5] While China's instruments of national power are less "stovepiped" than those of the United States and China's machinations in the Indian Ocean are largely based on its insatiable search for energy resources, China's desire for a formidable "two-ocean" Navy to project

(and alarmingly capable) submarine program.[6] Because China understands both the value of this strategically critical region and its interconnectivity, it is not only been able to execute indirect influence operations in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, but it has been able to do so in a cohesive, synchronized manner—all with impressive results.

When then-Secretary Mattis announced in 2018 that the Nation's largest geographic combatant command (GCC), U.S. Pacific Command, would be redesignated "U.S. Indo-Pacific Command," he did so "in recognition of the increasing connectivity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans," but he did so in name only.[7] In truth, the boundaries the United States has determined for its GCCs and, perhaps more damningly, for its numbered Naval fleets, in the Indian Ocean littoral have more in common with the problematic, Western-centric Mercator (1569) and Gall-Peters (1855) world map projections than they do with establishing unity and focus of effort in this strategically critical geographic region. Instead of viewing the Indian Ocean and its rimland—from the Strait of Malacca to the Horn of Africa—systematically as a comprehensive, cohesive network, the United States has instead split its military accountability between three separate GCCs (U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) and, accordingly, three separate Naval Fleets (Fifth Fleet, Sixth Fleet, and Seventh Fleet). Similarly, the United States has split its diplomatic accountability between four separate State Department Regional Bureaus (Bureau of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

This distinction is more than superficial. *MCDP 1* connects unity of effort with achieving focus and the generation of tempo—both fundamental aspects to maneuver at any level. It then goes on to describe the essence of maneuver as "attack[ing] the enemy 'system'—to incapacitate the enemy

> *It is no secret that China's machinations in the Indian Ocean rimland are ambitious and vast. What is less apparent is ... how ... China views the Indian Ocean littoral ...*

energy requirements and 90 percent of India's (the world's fourth largest energy consumer).[4] Furthermore, almost all of these products travel through a combination of contested maritime chokepoints—like the Middle East's Bab-el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz and Southeast Asia's straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Makassar—en route to their destinations. The resultant significance of this region is something the world's single largest

and protect its interests overseas also seem to be coming to fruition. Beyond the fundamental understanding that any Chinese enterprise abroad necessarily serves the government in Beijing either overtly or covertly, reports of Chinese naval activity in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean periphery seem to be growing, whether they be regarding advanced basing in Cambodia, China's nascent aircraft carrier program, or its intentionally-secretive

systematically [*sic*]."[8] In order to defeat an enemy system, *MCDP 1* explains, it is advantageous to bypass points of strength, target points of weakness, identify (and sometimes create) critical vulnerabilities, and exploit those vulnerabilities to attack an enemy's center of gravity; logically, this first requires a comprehensive understanding of the enemy system. *MCWP 5-10* describes the various ways in which understanding must precede planning

maneuverings" do not always require great maneuverings; in other words, many small, distributed operations executed in a focused, cohesive manner, can often have greater effects in the aggregate. This is what China has been quietly executing in the Indian Ocean over the span of the past two decades, and it is precisely how the United States should conceptualize its response as it attempts to shift its strategic focus. The United States is

adversaries like China but create positions of decisive advantage in support of its own strategic objectives. All the United States will have to do then is exploit them.

Notes

1. Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, (New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2011).

2. Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population, is some five thousand miles from Islam's birthplace in Arabia.

3. Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, (New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013).

4. *Monsoon*.

5. Robert D. Kaplan, "China's String of Pearls?" *STRATFOR*, (February 2013), available at www.stratfor.com.

6. H.I. Sutton, "China's Submarines May Be Catching Up With U.S. Navy," *Forbes*, (November 2019), available at www.forbes.com.

7. Tara Copp, "INDOPACOM, It Is: US Pacific Command Gets Renamed," *Military Times*, (May 2018), available at www.militarytimes.com.

8. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 1997).

9. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process*, (Washington, DC: 2018).

10. *Monsoon*.

> **Through the joint lens of Marine Corps doctrine and *Monsoon*, *it seems apparent that the United States is-not postured to effectively conduct maneuver in the Indian Ocean ...***

and execution (something Col John Boyd understood instinctively) and describes the critical functions of orientation, understanding the problem, and understanding the environment.[9] Only based on this understanding, *MCWP 5-10* asserts, can friendly forces develop and execute a plan for long-term mission accomplishment.

Through the joint lens of Marine Corps doctrine and *Monsoon*, it seems apparent that the United States is not postured to effectively conduct maneuver in the Indian Ocean littoral, primarily because it suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding of its nature. If the United States is going to defeat its adversaries' systems (be it in great-power competition or combatting transnational terrorist organizations) in the strategically vital Indian Ocean rimland, then it must first mature its understanding of the operating environment; it must first conceptualize the Indian Ocean rimland holistically, as a system uniquely in and of itself. As the United States (particularly its naval forces—the Navy and Marine Corps) attempts to transition from low-kinetic operations in the Middle East to containing and countering near-peer adversaries like China and Russia in the Pacific, one must remember that "great-power

already strengthening alliances and partnerships with Indian Ocean countries from Africa and the Middle East to India and Southeast Asia through exercises like TIGER TRIUMPH and AFRICAN LION. The United States is already executing counterpiracy and counterterrorism operations from the Strait of Malacca to the Horn of Africa. The United States is already first to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises in the Indian Ocean littoral—thanks largely to the expeditionary flexibility and responsiveness of its naval forces. In *Monsoon*, Kaplan declares that

> the Indian Ocean is where the rivalry between the United States and China in the Pacific interlocks with the regional rivalry between China and India, and also with America's fight against Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, which includes America's attempt to contain Iran.[10]

By recalibrating its understanding of the interconnectivity of the Indian Ocean rimland and viewing it as its own complete system—vice an amalgamation of dissociated parts from other systems—the United States will gain focus of effort in its current ongoing labors in a unified manner, which will not only stymie Islamic terrorism and counter great-power

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