


# NUCLEAR WAR OR...

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# NUCLEAR WAR OR...

*In this article, the author is mindful of an historic weakness of Soviet aggression: the will of the people.*

By Maj Edward J. Bronars

**D**URING recent years some military analysts have held that the Soviet Union and its satellites enjoy a superiority in conventional forces in Europe. In discussing the defense of Western Europe, typical conclusions give the Russians a capability of rapidly deploying ground forces along the present line of contact to gain an initial three-to-one advantage over opposing NATO forces. In his article, *The Defense of West Germany and the Baltic* (GAZETTE: Feb. 64) Captain B. H. Liddell Hart further points out that the Soviets have "probably three times as many tanks as the Western forces could deploy;" that "the air strength available to support the Soviet ground forces is, also, much larger than the total of some 3,500 in the Allies' tactical air forces;" and that "the Russians could probably mobilize a total of about 300 divisions" within a month, whereas "the Western total could hardly be more than 40 divisions, if that."

It is just such a numerical comparison that has led military analysts to conclude that, in the event of general war in a non-nuclear environment, the Soviets could sweep across the continent of Europe with relative ease. It has led them to conclude that NATO must place full reliance on nuclear superiority to deter Soviet aggression. A corollary to this line of reasoning is that, in the event of general war, the Western Allies have no alternative to employing tactical nuclear weapons against numerically superior Soviet forces.

These conclusions have merit. They are based

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