

# Channeling Realism to Avert a War Over Taiwan

The need for a contemporary policy

by Maj Franz J. Gayl, USMC(Ret)

Americans do not want to see Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines sacrificed in a foreign war when it is known in advance that the cause is questionable and there is no path to victory. We also do not want outdated legacy policy to lull us into a war that is ill-advised in contemporary context.

Nevertheless, in the absence of informed debate, the path to war between the United States and China over Taiwan is predestined. If Taiwan attempts to secede from One China, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) will act under its Anti-Secession Law to prevent it, likely preemptively. Any sitting U.S. President will be pressured,

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or politically incentivized by China-averse members of Congress, to militarily intervene on Taiwan's behalf under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Since China's sovereignty over Taiwan is the PRC's core national security priority, the conflict will escalate without limit. In contrast, Taiwan's fate does not pose an existential threat to U.S. sovereignty or democracy. Many Americans will likely be sacrificed before the United

States recognizes the expedition is both misguided and unwinnable.<sup>2</sup>

The origins of the crisis are clear. In 1971, the United Nations (UN) seated the mainland PRC as China's legitimate representative and ejected the Republic of China (ROC) ruling Taiwan. Despite U.S. ideological preference for the ROC, in 1979, the United States followed UN suit by abrogating its security treaty with the ROC and severing formal relations. We then established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC.<sup>3</sup>

Three communiques jointly developed by the United States and PRC are the foundation of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Three Joint Communiques delineate an agreed path to political unification of the mainland and Taiwan that leads to the end of the Chinese Civil War. None of the communiques entertain Taiwan's secession, and all seek peaceful unification. Still, the PRC maintains that the civil war is an internal Chinese affair and has not ruled out the use of force to unify.<sup>4</sup>

Separately, a lingering fear of PRC invasion prompted Congress to enact the TRA in 1979. The TRA ignores One China sovereignty and mandates U.S. provision of military capabilities directly to Taiwan for its self-defense.



Figure 1. One China.<sup>1</sup>

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It also requires the United States to remain militarily ready to intervene if the PRC acts to unify One China non-peacefully.<sup>5</sup>

The TRA is not a binding treaty, and ambiguous language affords the United States options including inaction in response to PRC aggression. But fearing a loss of credibility with regional allies, U.S. decision makers feel pressured to treat the TRA suggestions of intervention as legal obligations. The PRC warned that a U.S. security relationship with a Chinese province countermanded the joint communiques and would lead to conflict—and has prepared for war with the United States ever since.<sup>6</sup>

Initially, prospects for peace were hopeful as the PRC Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and ROC Kuomintang worked cooperatively towards unification. But in 2000, the separatist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency and reversed progress. Emboldened by TRA suggestions, the DPP pursued an independence platform that alleged Taiwan's non-Chinese identity. Since 2016, the DPP has held the presidency and dominates the legislature.<sup>7</sup>

Today, the DPP's independence ambitions are encouraged by China-averse U.S. Cabinet-level officials and the 163-member, bicameral, bipartisan Congressional Taiwan Caucus. Over time, Taiwan's relationship with the United States has become indistinguishable from a security alliance. PRC skepticism with the TRA in 1979 proved prescient, as the United States has abandoned the spirit and intent of the communiques.<sup>8</sup>

Still, the PRC continues to look for reasons *not* to force unification considering the devastation that war would bring to Taiwan, the mainland, the United States, and the region. However, in recent years, PRC doubts regarding the sincerity of U.S. commitment to One China have grown.<sup>9</sup>

To emphasize its seriousness on Taiwan's secession, the PRC imposed on itself a legal obligation to forcefully prevent the renegade province's split from China. All the while, the balance of military power shifted as China's capabilities came to overmatch previously



Figure 2. Qing Dynasty in 1644–1912.




Figure 3. One China in 1979.

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unchallenged U.S. military supremacy in many areas. The TRA no longer has the deterrence value that it did when enacted.<sup>10</sup>

Taiwan's independence advocates deride PRC claims to sovereignty over Taiwan as propaganda and talking points. Yet, since the 1600s, the territories of the Qing Dynasty have defined China, and they encompassed the mainland and Taiwan. Taiwan's recent alienation is instead an artificial byproduct of China's humiliating century-long colonization by foreign powers, to include Taiwan's occupation by Japan beginning in 1895.<sup>11</sup>

In 1927, the Communist PRC challenged the Nationalist ROC for Chinese leadership, igniting the Chinese Civil War. Following Japan's defeat in 1945, all Qing Dynasty territories were returned to the still-reigning wartime ROC. But, in 1949 a tactically defeated, though politically intact ROC withdrew to Taiwan from the mainland. The civil war paused as the strategically undefeated ROC and PRC adversaries continued to claim legitimate rule of all China.<sup>12</sup>

DPP assertions of a non-Chinese Taiwanese identity present a false history. Taiwan's citizens are ethnic Han

Chinese with deep cross-strait familial ties, economic interdependencies, and a shared Mandarin language, culture, and dynastic history. As for U.S. acknowledgement, Figures 2–4 are official maps dating from the 19th century through 1979 showing the United States' contemporaneous knowledge of Taiwan's provincial status within the sovereign nation of China.<sup>13</sup>

As the last major unresolved civil war contention, Taiwan is the PRC's core national security priority. Civil wars are particularly brutal because of the

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***Taiwan is the PRC's core national security priority.***

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underlying passions prompting them, as demonstrated in China, Korea, and Vietnam: the three deadliest civil wars in modern history. We had our own emotionally charged experience with the attempted secession of renegade territories resulting in the American Civil War: the deadliest war in U.S. history.

The legitimacy of Taiwan's secession is equivalent to that of the Confederacy.<sup>15</sup>

Additionally, China's history of whole of society commitment to regime survival is legendary. The Taiping, Muslim, and other 19th century unrest cost 60 million Chinese lives. Twentieth century civil war losses ranged between five and eight million, and 400,000 Chinese perished in Korea. In each case, the regime(s) emerged stronger, and this resolute traditional self-narrative is a source of great pride for all Chinese. These civilizational precedents are useful in anticipating PRC actions as they pertain to Taiwan.<sup>16</sup>

If the Chinese Civil War is reignited, massive societal costs and casualties will not demoralize a motivated PRC citizenry but rather fuel its patriotism. Nationalist fervor is sure to tolerate battlefield setbacks and extend CCP legitimacy. Militarily, the PLA will also have distinctive advantages. These include fighting along internal lines and benefiting from an extant PRC command economy that enables recovery from losses faster than the United States and its allies.<sup>17</sup>

In contrast, core U.S. national security interests will not be at stake, and historical precedents are again relevant. A cold calculus deliberately delayed U.S. entry into the European theater even though U.S. leaders knew the Holocaust had begun. Also, costs, casualties, and debatable justifications for military expeditions compelled U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia short of mission accomplishment. Likewise, pragmatism discouraged the United States from intervening when at different times the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. Finally, desperate humanitarian need was insufficient to motivate U.S. action to stop the Rwandan, Cambodian, or Darfur genocides.<sup>18</sup>

Neither the United States nor Great Britain intervened on Hong Kong's (HK) behalf in response to the PRC crackdown because the cause did not justify the costs. With these interest-based precedents, there is no U.S. ideological or national security justification to militarily intervene on Taiwan's behalf, especially as HK's fate would mir-



Figure 4. Republic of China in 1912–1949.<sup>14</sup>

ror Taiwan's in a politically unified One China.<sup>19</sup>

The United States blames the PRC for the Taiwan dilemma. But it was the DPP that voluntarily and with full knowledge of the dangerous consequences brought on the current crisis. The DPP chose to depart from the spirit of the communiqués by rejecting both political unification in One China and the One Country, Two Systems model under which both Taiwan and HK have and will continue to get rich and prosper in One China.<sup>20</sup>

These and other incendiary DPP actions baited the PRC and likewise energized the Congressional Taiwan Caucus. The DPP can wag the American dog by holding the U.S. military hostage to its irresponsible rhetoric. It takes TRA assurances for granted, as a blank check to employ American patriots as it suits Taiwan's whims. Even though the United States has generously provided arms and training to

special interests in dire warnings and noble arguments.<sup>23</sup>

Congressional interests are deeply conflicted. Since 1979, the TRA has opened Taiwan as a major market for foreign military sales by the U.S. defense industry. The total value of arms sales since its enactment now exceeds 100 billion dollars. More importantly, Taiwan has an outsized impact on the overall U.S. defense budget and defense industry profits, as Taiwan is portrayed as crucial to U.S. strategic objectives in the western Pacific.<sup>24</sup>

The reciprocal relationship between defense contractors, lobbyists, contributions, and a member of Congress' re-electability is well established. It renders obvious the Congressional support for increasing both arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. defense capabilities in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Our fawning admiration for and default dismissal of PRC positions on Taiwan form a bipartisan U.S. echo chamber.<sup>25</sup>

and free enterprise in Southeast Asia. Their choice of words is ominously similar to statements of the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), the powerful lobby that pressured the United States to commit to the fateful Vietnam War.<sup>28</sup>

But the balance of power between the PRC and United States has shifted in ways we did not anticipate in 1979, and the opponent we face is in many respects a peer superpower. What we think of the PRC's government, ideology, culture, internal behaviors, and sovereign claim to Taiwan is irrelevant from the perspective of realpolitik. Taiwan will always mean more to China than the United States; in terms of U.S. interests, we are no longer capable of dictating foreign outcomes in our favor.<sup>29</sup>

Others optimistically assume the PRC's citizenry longs for a western-style liberal democracy like Taiwan's, and that war will trigger popular revolt on the mainland. But throughout Chinese history, it has been political elites that prompt change from within, not the masses, and the PRC political class is fiercely nationalistic.<sup>30</sup>

Still, others believe that Taiwan's status is undetermined, and the PRC should accept Taiwan's democratically enabled self-determination. But for the PRC, Taiwan never ceased being sovereign China. Also, centralized CCP messaging motivates 1.4 billion citizens to speak with one emotional voice that renegade Taiwan is sovereign China. The United States' lack of such a unifying message will be evident when a violently polarized public reacts to a major, costly, and above all *optional* foreign military expedition.<sup>31</sup>

Strident PRC-averse politicians and lobbyists have suggested replacing the ambiguously worded TRA with the clarity and certainty of U.S. intervention under a legally binding defense treaty that extends the U.S. nuclear umbrella to cover Taiwan. U.S. military professionals have joined the chorus proposing the United States station thousands of U.S. forces on the island as a casualty tripwire.<sup>32</sup>

But Chinese military potency is confirmed, and evidence from Chinese history, such as the PRC's mass entrance

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***Some insist we must stand up for Taiwan as a beacon of hope and last line of defense for liberal democracy and free enterprise in Southeast Asia.***

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Taiwan to defend itself and ensure peaceful unification, the DPP behaves as though U.S. military protection is a permanent entitlement.<sup>21</sup>


Independence fervor of older secessionists and naivete of younger Taiwanese who lack twentieth century Chinese Civil War memories ignore the suffering and renewed devastation that will come from conflict with the PRC. Similarly, Taiwan's U.S. champions dismiss omens in Chinese history that U.S. support for Taiwan's independence will contribute to that bad ending.<sup>22</sup>

The Congressional Taiwan Caucus continues to imply that Taiwan's fate is core to U.S. national security. While the caucus includes an ideologically diverse membership, its most hawkish members hold sway on caucus policy. Neoconservative advisors, journalists, authors, and think tanks are incentivized to assist with messaging that cloaks

Many experts minimize the dangers of a military confrontation with the PRC over Taiwan. They contend the status quo will hold, and if not, a conflict would be swift and limited. Also, a U.S. alliance that includes Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and others can be counted on, while the PRC will be isolated as a pariah without axis friends.<sup>26</sup>

But U.S. allies are conscious of China's grit on the topic of Taiwan, and alliance considerations are tempered by their countries' PRC proximities and vulnerabilities. Also, the PRC shares a mutual defense treaty with the nuclear-armed Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). A war with the PRC over Taiwan is primed to escalate without limit, and short of PRC victory will not end swiftly.<sup>27</sup>

Some insist we must stand up for Taiwan as a beacon of hope and last line of defense for liberal democracy



**Figure 5. China's global port ownership clusters around key trade routes and maritime chokepoints.<sup>35</sup>**

into the Korean War, guarantee such reckless actions would not deter but rather ignite war. In fact, they would probably trigger PRC preemption and an end to the PRC's no-first-use nuclear weapons policy. In short, such actions would cause the very catastrophe that must be averted.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, some will ask what the Taiwanese think, and do they even have a say? Yes, they do. But fate made them Chinese just as fate made us Americans. No peoples can wish away their historical identities. We also know that inventing and carving away a country from an existing nation incurs a steep price, one the Confederacy paid not long ago.

Still, there does exist a broad spectrum of righteous causes to confront the PRC. They include enforcement of UN-verified allied claims to resources in the South and East China Seas and neutralizing armed artificial islands if they come to threaten freedom of navigation in international waters. Other causes are threats to allied sovereign nations with whom we have binding treaties. Figure 5 (on following page) shows how Chinese footholds in the Middle East, Africa, and South America could also come to threaten vital U.S. interests.<sup>34</sup>

Additionally, if the PRC threatens the United States directly, achieving a whole of American society commitment to defeat China is guaranteed—just as we mobilized to defeat Imperial Japan.

For example, if premeditated PRC causation of a pandemic, socialism-inspired violence in the United States, or other existential threat to our nation were proven with certainty, total war might be justified. But supporting the DPP's prideful ambitions falls well short of that high bar.<sup>36</sup>

The United States could advise DPP secessionists to peaceably accept One

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Country, Two Systems and cease Taiwan's independence ambitions. If the DPP does not modify its rhetoric, we could rescind the TRA, as baiting the PRC to fight is of the DPP's own choosing. If the Taiwan Caucus obstructs TRA rescission, the President could direct all national security agencies to stand down if the PRC takes DPP bait.<sup>37</sup>

Otherwise, we will sleep-walk into a catastrophic war with China, lacking both a compelling cause and whole-of-society buy-in. The FMF mission in the

Western Pacific assures that Marines and Sailors will bear the initial brunt of a collision between strong existential PRC and weak elite U.S. interests in Taiwan. Rational Taiwanese will understand when the United States steers clear of the unresolved Chinese Civil War in the best interests of both the United States and Taiwan. Of course, in the end, the Taiwanese will do as they please, but as honorable people, they should not expect the price of their free will decisions to be paid in American blood.<sup>38</sup>

**Notes**

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regardless of whether the PLA actually manages to capture the island and eliminate organized opposition ... China will likely want to terrorize the civilian population into submission early with its initial missile and airstrikes ... once fighting starts in urban areas casualties will be in the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands ... the society and economy will be brought to their knees.”

23. Ibid; “Taiwan Separatist Lobby Try Hijacking U.S. Policy,”: “Especially with the conservative Republicans with anti-Communist mentality, the island has found common ideological ground with them ... in the 1980s, the Democrats also found they have political values in common, so even though Taiwan politicians provided material benefits to influence U.S. foreign policy, they would not be criticized in U.S. public opinion due to ideological reasons”; and Rosie Gray, “The Free Beacon Fired A Top Reporter For A ‘Financial Transaction’ With Someone He Frequently Covered,” *Buzzfeed*, (October 2019), available at <https://www.buzzfeednews.com>: “On Friday, the Free Beacon’s leadership published a note saying that the site ‘recently learned that senior editor Bill Gertz entered into a previously undisclosed financial transaction with an individual or an affiliate of that individual whom Mr. Gertz had covered in some of his reporting.’ ... Guo lives in New York and has been a vocal critic of the Chinese government, and has applied for asylum in the U.S.”

24. Information regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan available at <https://en.wikipedia.org> and Kensaku Ihara, “Taiwan Invites U.S. Defense Contractors as Diplomatic Chess Heats Up,” *Nikkei Asia*, (May 2018), available at <https://asia.nikkei.com>: “Taipei is eager to build up Taiwan’s submarine force, part of which is pictured here at a naval base in Kaohsiung, Taiwanese and U.S. defense industry executives gathered here on Thursday for a first-of-its-kind conference that shows President Tsai Ing-wen’s desire for closer ties with Washington at a time when Beijing is whittling away at the island’s diplomatic partners.”

25. Matthew R. Kambrod, *Lobbying for Defense: An Insider’s View*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007): “While ethically one could take the high road and say that it is wrong for Members of Congress at times key to the funding cycle, understand that this is part of the process of lobbying and contributing does give you an advantage,” and “In the plus-up process it can be very useful to have powerful Members of Congress dealing with Defense appropriations in one’s corner”; and Dr. Jeffrey Record, *Japan’s Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S.

Army War College, 2009), “There can be no justification for a foreign policy that consciously propels a state into a war against an inherently undefeatable enemy. [Clausewitz stated] ‘[The] presumption of moral or spiritual superiority can fatally discount the consequences of an enemy’s material superiority.’”

26. Bartlett, Duncan Bartlett, “How Far Will Japan Go to Help Keep Taiwan Free?” *Japan Forward*, (October 2018), available at <https://japan-forward.com>, “Taiwan’s president has urged Japan to help protect the island from what she calls ‘tremendous pressure’ from mainland China”; and U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Relations with Taiwan: Bilateral Relations Factsheet*, (Washington, DC: 2018): “The United States does not support Taiwan independence ... The United States insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and encourages both sides to continue their constructive dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect.”

27. PRC and DPRK, *Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic*

*People’s Republic of Korea*, (Beijing: July 1961). In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal; and Emma Moore, “Attrition and the Will to Fight a Great Power War,” (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019): “The first 48 hours of a hot war ... with China could see erosion of U.S. credibility call into question which allies would respond to a call for support against China ... The public tolerance for casualties may be low compared to twentieth-century conflicts.”

28. Karla Jones, “At a Time When Global Democracy Is in Retreat Taiwan Offers Hope,” *American Legislative Exchange Council*, (February 2018), available at <https://www.alec.org>: “Against this bleak backdrop, Taiwan serves as a democratic beacon of hope ... Taiwan’s steadfast commitment to democracy is all the more remarkable because its democratic traditions developed so recently ... Taiwan has upheld rule of law and democratic values in the face of significant geostrategic challenges and has definitely earned America’s contin-

ued support”; and Senator John F. Kennedy, “America’s Stake in Vietnam,” (speech, American Friends of Vietnam, New York, NY: 1956): “It is a genuine pleasure to be here today at this vital Conference ... sponsored by the American Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which I am proud to be a member ... Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia ... Her economy is essential to the economy of all of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia—and indeed the world ... However ... the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchangeable facts ... If this democratic experiment fails ... then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment ... We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.”

29. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “Realpolitik Political Philosophy,” available at [www.britannica.com](http://www.britannica.com): “Realpolitik, politics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean ‘real’ in the English sense but rather connotes ‘things’—hence a politics

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of adaptation to things as they are. Realpolitik thus suggests a pragmatic, no-nonsense view, and a disregard for ethical considerations. In diplomacy it is often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest"; and "We Asked an Expert to Imagine a U.S.-China War. We Wish We Hadn't": "The United States will have to face the 'was it worth it?' question. In victory or defeat, the U.S. will suffer substantial military and economic damage."

30. Ibid; and Yuhua Wang, "Can the Chinese Communist Party Learn from Chinese Emperors?" in *The China Questions*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018): "Lesson two: Elite rebellion is the most important cause of dynastic fall. Most dynasties were overthrown not by foreign enemies or the masses, but by political elites ... the biggest threat was from within the regime rather than from society or foreign countries"; and Timothy R. Heath, "The Consolidation of Political Power in China Under Xi Jinping," (Washington, DC: RAND 2019): "Potential involvement in elite politics. The possibility of powerful political leaders conspiring with PLA units raised itself in the Politburo aspirant Bo Xilai's shocking downfall in 2012. News reports have suggested elements of the 14th Group Army had supported Bo's bid for power."

31. Charles I-hsin Che and Ingrid Tang, "America vs. China: a Proxy War Through Taiwan?" *The National Interest*, (September 2019), available at [www.nationalinterest.org](http://www.nationalinterest.org): "For Taiwan, this new and emerging proxy war is both good and bad. In a way, Taiwan may benefit from this new model; it could be a free-rider relying on Washington to secure its diplomatic relations. In another way, Taiwan may be the victim of this proxy war for it is likely to lose allies depending on the power competition between the United States and China"; and Anne-Marie Brady, "Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernization of Propaganda in the PRC," *International Journal*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publishing, December 2002).

32. Shay Khatiri, "Treat Taiwan Like the Independent Ally It Is," *The Bulwark*, (April 2020), available at <https://thebulwark.com>: "The U.S. should also explicitly extend its nuclear security umbrella to cover Taiwan ... Stationing American troops on the island is a key factor: Even if the United States extends a nuclear guarantee to Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party might still take a gamble and invade Taiwan. But if such an invasion led to thousands of dead Americans over a few days, the American people would be outraged and would demand their leaders punish China"; and Capt Walker D.

Mills, "Deterring the Dragon: Returning U.S. Forces to Taiwan," *Military Review*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Army University Press, 2020): "U.S. ground combat forces are the most capable in the world, and it would be extremely unlikely that the U.S. government would not commit to a larger conflict after U.S. ground forces were engaged in Taiwan ... Without U.S. forces in Taiwan, it is increasingly likely that China will attempt to integrate Taiwan into its republic by force."

33. Kuni Miyake, "What if U.S. Forces Return to Taiwan?" *Japan Times*, (September 2020), available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/>: "Hu Xijin, the editor of *China's Global Times*, tweeted, 'I must warn people in the U.S. and Taiwan who hold this kind of thinking. Once they take the step of returning U.S. forces to Taiwan, the PLA will definitely start a just war to safeguard China's territorial integrity'; Department of Defense, *China Military Power Report*, (Washington, DC: 2019): "China continues to improve its ground and submarine-based nuclear capability and is pursuing a viable nuclear 'triad' with the development of a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missiles."

34. United Nations, *Bulletin Number 91: Law of the Sea*, (New York, NY: 2017): "Historic rights and the 'nine-dash line,'" and "Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention"; and James Holmes, "China's Nightmare: How the U.S. Navy Could Sink Its Prized Aircraft Carriers," *The National Interest*, (April 2019), available at <https://nationalinterest.org>: "PLA ballistic missiles could menace U.S. and allied warships plying the seas anywhere within Asia's second island chain. The upper figure for DF-26 range, moreover, would extend ASBMs' reach substantially beyond the island chain."

35. James Kyngé, Chris Campbell, Amy Kazmin, and Farhan Bokhari, "Beijing's Global Power Play: How China Rules the Waves," *Financial Times*, (January 2017), available at <https://ig.ft.com>: "Beijing has spent billions expanding its ports network to secure sea lanes and establish itself as a maritime power."

36. David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable*, (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2016): "[I]t cannot be excluded that such a Sino-U.S. war could develop characteristics of the two great-power wars that became "world wars": drawing in others, engulfing and spilling beyond the region, lock-

ing the two political systems and populations into a fight to finish, ending in unconditional surrender, dictated peace, occupation, regime extinction, and domination"; and Jeffrey Record, *Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), "The Japanese decision for war against the United States was the product of Japanese fatalism, racial arrogance, cultural incomprehension ... Yet the end result of this drive for power, honor, and reputation was Japan's complete destruction and subsequent occupation by the United States."

37. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Will the U.S. Go to War with China over Taiwan?" *Financial Times*, (October 2020), available at <https://www.ft.com>: "However, U.S. leaders should also make it clear that Taiwan is on its own, and alter the TRA's language to remove any implied defense commitment. As fond as we might be of a vibrant, democratic Taiwan, risking a catastrophic war with China is far too great a price to pay to preserve the island's de facto independence"; and Riyaz ul Khaliq, "Stop Arms Sales to Taiwan: China Tells U.S.," *AA*, (May 2020), available at <https://www.aa.com.tr>: "Beijing says recent U.S. arms sale to Taiwan could further harm ties, warns against meddling in China's 'internal affairs' ... Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said 'We urge the U.S. to earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiques and stop arms sales to and military ties with Taiwan, lest it should further harm China-U.S. relations and cross-straits peace and stability.'"

38. Henry A. Kissinger, "Former U.S. Secretary of State Comments before the National Committee on U.S. China Relations," (remarks, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, NY, November 2019): "[a conflict between the U.S. and China would result in] a catastrophic outcome that will be worse than the world wars that ruined European civilization."

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