

III MEF and Navy Logistics

Unconstrained integration with Navy logistics systems and force structure adaptations

by LtCol Chris J. Nelson with Maj Dante A. Jones & Mr. Freddie Hatch

III MEF is not integrated with Navy logistics and is not postured to seamlessly transition into operations. Logistics Automated Information System constraints require a significant amount of manual intervention for the Navy and Marine Corps to “talk.” All of the energy being spent across the Service right now to make GCSS-MC talk to Navy sources of supply could be spent elsewhere if we just used Navy systems. The proposals contained in this article are based off of the premise that we integrate with our Navy partners and 7th Fleet to optimize our sustainment and maintenance processes, and posture ourselves in a way that requires no transition if we must enter into conflict as the FMF. The phrases “that’s too hard,” “that’s not what policy states,” or “that’s not the way we do things” were not allowed in the discussion. In addition, and probably most significantly, nothing proposed considers the challenges of stakeholder opinion, institutional bias, or bureaucratic resistance.

This article is in no way meant to imply the changes discussed and recommended within it could, or should, occur at I MEF, II MEF, Marine Forces Reserve, or the supporting establishment. Everything contained in this article is meant for III MEF and analyzed through a III MEF lens looking at our Western Pacific Area of Operations, our garrison location in relation to our near-peer competitor and two specific portions within the 2019 *Commandants Planning Guidance*:

1. “Likewise, we are not defined by any particular organizing construct-

>LtCol Nelson currently serves with MARFORCOM, FMFLant, and MARFORNORTH as the Branch Head, Ground Material Management Branch.

>>Maj Jones, USMC(Ret) is a BAH Contractor working in III MEF G4 Plans Office.

>>>Mr. Hatch, USMC(Ret) is a Distribution Analysis contractor for INDOPACOM.

the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) cannot be our only solution for all crises.”

2. “The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) will remain our principal warfighting organization; however, our MEFs need not be identical. III MEF will become our main focus-of-effort, designed to provide U.S. INDO-PACIFIC Command (U.S. INDOPACOM) and the Commander, 7th Fleet with a fight-tonight, stand-in force capability to persist inside an adversary’s weapons systems threat range, create a mutually contested space, and facilitate the larger naval campaign.”

System Explanation and Sustainment/Maintenance Process Flow

Navy systems: I am aware that the Navy’s future logistics IT program Navy Operational Business Logistics Enterprise is coming online in the future, but the capabilities resident within that program will not be discussed in this paper. However, the emergence of the Navy Operational Business Logistics Enterprise program lends credibility to the prospect of III MEF transitioning to Navy Systems now in order to be considered a stakeholder by the Navy Program Office and to secure a seat at the table for future discussions and

to register program customer requirements.

As displayed in Figure 1 on the following page, the Navy uses different logistics systems at each level of com:

Maintenance:

1. OOMA: Optimized Organizational Maintenance Activity
2. OIMA: Optimized Intermediate Maintenance Activity
3. Optimized NALCOMIS: Optimized Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System

Supply:

1. R- Supply
2. ARP: Automotive Repair Parts
3. PUK: Pack-up Kit
4. OneTouch
5. ERP: Enterprise Resource Planning

Fiscal:

1. Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System-Navy (SABRS-N).

As an illustration of how these Navy systems are integrated, consider a flying squadron whose primary system for maintenance is OOMA. This program allows the squadron to open maintenance forms and conduct maintenance actions on their equipment, with or without the execution of supply requisitions and resultant financial obligations.

Navy Maint/Supply/Fiscal systems				USMC Maint/Supply/Fiscal systems			
	Maint	Supply	Fiscal	Maint	Supply	Fiscal	
Wholesale / Depot FLCs / FRC	X	X	X	Wholesale / Depot DLA / LOGCOM GCSS-MC		X	
Retail/ Intermediate MALS	X	ERP OneTouch	X	Retail/ Intermediate Supply Bn / Maint Bn GCSS-MC	X	X	
Using Unit/ Org/ Flying Squadrons	X			Using Unit/ Org/ Battalions GCSS-MC	X	X	
	O-NALCOMIS OIMA	R-Supply ARP / PUK	OPTAR Reporting		GCSS-MC	SABRS	

Figure 1. Navy (left side) and Marine Corps (right side) systems used for maintenance, supply, and fiscal purposes as well as the levels of commands who use the different systems. (Figure provided by author.)

In the event the squadron needs a part they do not have, they have the ability to create a maintenance action form (MAF), which is sent from the flying squadron to their Marine aviation logistics squadron (MALS) who receives the MAF. At this point, the part requested within the MAF is either pulled off the Intermediate Supply shelf resident within the MALS, or the MALS creates a supply requisition within R-Supply for the part. If a requisition is created, it is sent to ERP who through its own algorithm will source the part from either the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) or DLA wholesale warehouse closest to the TAC 2 address of the original requisitioning unit. Concurrently, the R-Supply requisition creates a financial obligation in SABRS-N, which travels up to the Type Command (TYCOM, which will be discussed in more detail later in the paper) who manages the budget for the type/model/series aircraft supported by the MALS. Once the part is received by the MALS, the requisition is closed out in R-Supply and the part is sent from the MALS, to the original requisitioning flying squadron where it is hung and the MAF is closed out in OOMA.

Another intermediate-level sourcing solution for the part requisition

is for the MALS to contact a lateral MALS or any of the ships within 7th Fleet to see if they have the part on their shelves. While this process is not automated through a logistics system, manual execution via phone call and e-mail achieves the parts transfer. Similarly, the most equivalent process the Marine Corps has is our supply battalions transferring inventory in support of each other. The current force structure has three supply battalions in the Marine Corps, and they are spread across three MEFs with minimal benefit gained by laterally transferring inven-




Figure 2. Process flow using Navy Systems. (Figure provided by author.)

tory. If the Marine Corps used the Navy system, there would be ten Intermediate Supply Activities in III MEF alone (see Figure 3) and distribution would also be dispersed among the ships in 7th Fleet moving throughout the INDOPACOM region. In the event none of the intermediate-level options can source the part and the requisition is passed to ERP, all of the Navy Supply Command (NAVSUP)/FLC and DLA wholesale locations in INDOPACOM will be solicited before it must be sent back to the United States for requisitioning. This represents an additional six or seven sourcing options within INDOPACOM.

When a flying squadron needs to send equipment to intermediate level (I-level) maintenance, the equipment is sent to the MALS, and the item is inducted in OIMA. The flying squadron only needs to be told if they need to turn-in the bad part. If the squadron has a bad part, they will order a replacement. The MALS attempts to issue from the shelf, repair it if they have the capability, or order it from the wholesale level—in that order. When parts are requisitioned in OIMA for the wholesale level, which is resident in the MALS with R-Supply, it feeds into R-Supply where the requisition process for the parts follows the path previously mentioned for part requisitions coming from OOMA.

Within these systems, financial obligation authority resides within the MALS at the intermediate supply and maintenance level, so there is no budgetary funding for either supply or maintenance passed to the flying squadrons. Consequently, the responsibility for overall supply and maintenance resides more with the MALS CO than the line squadron COs, although the Line CO is still responsible for organizational-level maintenance. Further discussion of this process will be discussed in the “Regimental HQ” Section.

Marine Corps systems. Within the Marine Corps, Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) does supply and maintenance at every level for every command (with varying degrees of success based on

what the Marine Corps was promised GCSS-MC would do, the timeline GCSS-MC would be ready to do it, and who you talk to). O-5 commanders are responsible to do everything in house with a single source for intermediate supply support and a single source for intermediate maintenance support to the entire MEF. This is a much different structure than a MAG which has a specific command to handle intermediate supply and intermediate maintenance, with flying squadrons focused on METS and METLS in support of operating aircraft. Albeit, flying squadrons do have responsibility for operator-level maintenance, a small PEB, and parts ordering. Ground units are responsible for their operational METs and METLs while also conducting all of their own unit-level supply functions, operator-level maintenance, and manage a budget. Why are we asking commands, who we do not advertise to Congress as legitimate supply and maintenance activities, to execute supply and maintenance activities and be good at it?

Figure 3 illustrates the lack of a distributed laydown for intermediate supply and intermediate maintenance support within III MEF and the current lack of Naval Logistics Integration. While economies of scale are gained through consolidation of ISA and Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) functions at supply battalion and maintenance battalion, the efficiencies gained are in direct conflict with distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concepts.

Data. We compared data from units who use GCSS-MC and MALS-36 who uses the Navy Supply/Maintenance systems. We pulled GCSS-MC Due-and-Status File records for:

1. 3/12 Mar.
2. Division, Headquarters Bn (HQBN).
3. HqCo, CLR-35.
4. 5th ANGLICO.
5. Marine Wing Communications Squadron-18 (MWCS-18).

We were provided Transaction Item Report's and Transmittal Letters from




Figure 3. Current supply and maintenance support for III MEF units on Okinawa. (Figure provided by author.)

1st MAW for MALS-36. In order to have all the records cover roughly the same timeframe, we used as close to one year as our length of time. Additionally, any document over 365 days in length was capped at 365 days. There were multiple documents that showed upwards of two years, for which it was determined that there was a high likelihood the items were received and just not properly closed out by the supply section. Instead of adding a 600-plus day statistical outlier document to the unit averages, every unit had their document numbers capped at the same 365 days.

The reason there is a black box describing the percentages if DLA Okinawa is removed on each map chip is to provide a better idea of how many requisitions were sourced in CONUS versus outside CONUS. By keeping the DLA Okinawa population in the equation, it skews the outside the continental U.S. numbers by making them look larger but not providing us the distribution we are trying to achieve across the Western Pacific. In fact, all the DLA Okinawa inventory does is make another larger egg (a DLA egg) physically sit across the street from the supply battalion egg (the SMU) and keep them both in the "Okinawa basket." That is the last thing we want to do if the goal is to get the supply chain distributed across the Western Pacific, so III MEF can be supported from multiple nodes in a time of conflict. What the reader should note is the drop off in total document sources from the light yellow box to the black box. That will provide the reader an understanding of how much that unit relied on the DLA Okinawa inventory

to obtain the total doc sourced in the yellow box. MWCS-18 and MALS-36 share the smallest drop off in CONUS sourcing when taking DLA Okinawa out of the equation.

The data is below:

- GCSS-MC Using Units
 ANGLICO 367 Day Period: Jan 8, 2018 – Jan 10, 2019
 A01 – AS1 - D6T total requisitions: 130 requisitions
 A01 – D6T: average length 58 days
 AS1 – D6T: average length 28 days
- Combat Logistics Regiment-35*
 354 Day Period: Jan 18, 2018 – Jan 7, 2019
 A01 – AS1 - D6T total requisitions: 48 requisitions
 A01 – D6T: average length 47 days
 AS1 – D6T: average length 41 days
- Division Headquarters Battalion*
 371 Day Period: Jan 4, 2018 – Jan 10, 2019
 A01 – AS1 - D6T total requisition: 1,239 requisitions
 A01 – D6T: average length 29 days
 AS1 – D6T: average length 21 days
- 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines*
 344 Day Period; Jan 30, 2018 – Jan 9, 2019
 A01 – AS1 - D6T total requisitions: 1,137 requisitions
 A01 – D6T: average length 33 days
 AS1 – D6T: average length 21 days
- Marine Wing Communication Squadron – 18*
 343 Day Period: Jan 5, 2018 – Dec 14, 2018
 A01 – AS1 - D6T total requisitions: 288 requisitions
 A01 – D6T: average length 31 days
 AS1 – D6T: average length 17 days

Navy Supply/Maintenance System Using Unit Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron-36373 Day Period

A01 – DRA (D6T in the Navy supply system): 1,085 requisitions
 A01 – DRA: Average length 19 days
 (Since the MALS is an ISA there is no AS1 created when the MALS cannot fill the requisition because they are the document originator. Unlike the GCSS-MC side of the house where the SMU is the ISA, but is not the document originator, and passes on the requisition [AS1] if they cannot fill it.)

Figure 4 shows a stark contrast in supply support to III MEF units while also illustrating the increased flexibility, distributed laydown and integration with NAVSUP and their FLC commands across INDOPACOM.

How Units Would Change after Transitioning to Navy Systems

If III MEF adopts the current suite of Navy systems, it allows them to fully integrate into the same supply and maintenance systems used by our Navy partners and 7th Fleet. I recommend we stop trying to tip-toe into naval logistics integration by attempting to make our systems work with Navy systems, rather III MEF needs to adopt Navy Systems as the primary logistics C2.

“Line Battalions” is a term used to identify units contained in the “Using Unit Supply” and “Operator Level Maintenance” box in Figure 4. These units would not carry a primary requisitioning Department of Defense Activity Address Code (DODAAC) and would not have an “account” the way we know it to sign for upon assuming command. The primary focus for the line battalions becomes the training schedule and exercises supporting their METs, and METLs without the distraction of executing all the functions of supply, any maintenance above operator level or fiscal execution and budgeting. Their supply sections would be minimal compared to current sections with only two to four supply Marines (2d/1st lieutenant, staff sergeant, and clerk/s) accounting for *MCBUL 3000* equipment and submitting and tracking battalion request to the support battalion. All requisitions would be sent to the support




Figure 4. Proposed Supply support for all III MEF units. (Figure provided by author.)

battalion for execution and document retention based on the financial obligation occurring at the support battalion and not the line battalion. Voucher files would be created and retained for the *MCBUL 3000* equipment but nothing else. All non-readiness reportable ground equipment (*MCBUL 3000*) would be on the support battalion T/E and would be sub-custodied to the line battalions. The line battalions would have Consolidated Memorandum Receipts (CMRs) for garrison and pack-up kits (PUKs) issued from the support battalion for use at exercises. Readiness reporting responsibilities for *MCBUL 3000* equipment would come from the line battalions and would be rolled up and reported by the support battalion for all equipment across the regiment/group. Non-*MCBUL 3000* equipment would be accounted for and reported by the support battalion. Operator-level maintenance and records retention would occur as it does now; however, the records retention would only apply to *MCBUL 3000* items. No funding would be provided directly to the line battalion; all supply and maintenance funding would remain at the support battalion while non-supply and maintenance related funding would remain with the regimental command staff. The line battalion would not have independent Field Supply & Maintenance Analysis Office (FSMAO) inspection. FSMAO inspections would be on the support battalions, with portions of the

inspection that would visit the line battalions to validate property accountability and other issues, but no independent FSMAO inspection would occur on the line battalion. The FSMAO inspection really becomes an inspection on the “Regiment as a whole,” with the bulk of the inspection occurring at the support battalion.

Supply Battalion. For supply battalion, the retention of the Medical Logistics (MedLog) company and ammo company is a critical decision. For MedLog company, the disaggregation of the MedLog capability among the support battalions (part if the intermediate supply company) is one option. As an alternative, if there was a desire to consolidate Navy medical capability and capacity in one unit, they could become a viable addition to medical battalion. Although not very distributed in nature, the addition to medical battalion is effective in consolidating limited resources to parcel out only when needed. If you break MedLog up and distribute the automated medical allowance lists (AMALs) and automated dental allowance lists (ADALs) to the ten support battalions based on what the regiment/group rates, you add Class VIII capability and capacity to the regimental commanders but with the increased responsibility to store and manage all AMALS and ADALs. This is not insurmountable, but it is something that the regimental surgeon and support officer would need to learn to

jointly manage. However, this would assist in distributing III MEF's AMALs and ADALs across the Western Pacific and provide units transiting through or training in another regiment's area the ability to request support from their sister regiment's support battalion if needed.

Ammo company would be divested to better mirror the current aviation ordnance storage model. The Aviation side has all ammunition supply points (ASPs)/Bunkers owned by base and stations. Marines can have a permanent change of station to Marine Corps Installations Command-Pacific to form the core of the ASP/Bunker manpower requirement while the Marines in ammo company that are in excess of the core amount could be spread across the regiment/groups and provided back to the ASPs/Bunkers through a tax if necessary. Otherwise, they would be added to ammo sections within III MEF for added depth.

The SMU would roll up their flag and be elevated to a wholesale position as part of the Navy FLC Yokosuka (FLCY) Command. While this would only be a company moving up to the wholesale level, it would make sense for the Marine Corps to ask the Navy if we could combine with the current FLCY Site Okinawa and place a Marine in command of the Okinawa site. With the command of FLCY Site Okinawa in mind, it would be reasonable to keep the O-6 who is slated to command supply battalion in the future. The Service should obtain concurrence from NAVSUP that while the FLCY O-6 is the overall FLCY Commander, the FLCY Site Okinawa position would become a permanent Command Screened Marine O-6 billet. The Marine O-6 would be subordinate to the FLCY O-6 Commander while being the senior Marine within the FLCY Command (and hence senior NAVSUP Marine in the Western Pacific). They would also control the primary wholesale supply support to III MEF units while they are in garrison, as well as be the primary sustainment advocate for III MEF needs being requested by the III MEF AC/S G-4. In addition to taking command of the FLCY Okinawa site there should be

FMF Codes (Departments) established within the FLCY Singapore site, the Manila detachment, the Sasebo Site, and the Yokosuka headquarters locations to provide advocacy and support to Marine units who are operating north and south of the South China Sea.

Maintenance Battalion would be divested and its personnel, tools/kits/chest, and equipment would be divided between the support battalions based on the equipment sets resident within each regiment. The negative aspect of this would be the increase in maintainers, tools/kits/chests, and equipment. The positive aspect would be flexibility gained by each regiment/group commanding officer and the overall distributed nature of III MEF forces. This would lead to a distribution of IMA capability across INDOPACOM, albeit not a complete IMA capability at each location across INDOPACOM, but a level of IMA capability related to the regiment/group equipment set who is based there.

New Support Battalions. Drop the "DS" concept and divest of single digit combat logistics battalions (CLB). Create organic support battalions within the regiments/groups that report directly to the regimental/group commanding officer and support the line battalions with IMA, ISA, Fiscal, and EABO support capability. This would look somewhat similar to CLB-3 and CLB-7, in that they carry ISA and IMA capability because of their geographic location, and if they were made or-

ganic to 7th and 3d Mar. There would also be an addition of a new company called the expeditionary advanced base (EAB) support company whose primary responsibility is to be the conduit between the "line battalion" units/EABs and the "rear" (in whatever form that takes) where the supplies and maintenance would be conducted to support those EABs the regiment/group has established. As a metaphor, these teams would be the "pit crews" who would appear at the last minute to descend on an EAB to provide the resupply and maintenance needed, in as short a time as possible, while disappearing back into the surrounding environment as soon as they completed their resupply and maintenance to the EAB (See Figure 4). This is a "SOF-like" capability for logisticians; highly trained and "older and more senior in rank" supporting and execute a specific mission tailored from various MOSs but cross trained to be a self-supportive team ready and able to execute the regimental/group command officer's EABO support objectives.

- Four Companies:
 - H&S Co
 - Expeditionary Advanced Base Support Co (EAB Sup CO)
 - Intermediate Supply Company
 - Intermediate Maintenance Company (IMC)
- H&S Co. No changes from a current H&S Co.
- Expeditionary Advanced Base Support Co




Figure 5. Proposed force design for a support battalion. Note the H&S company, EAB support company, intermediate supply company (IS Co), and the intermediate maintenance company (IM Co). The exact composition of the IM Co would change within each support battalion because of the regiment/group equipment set. (Figure provided by author.)

o Creation of the optimal Marines on these teams has not occurred at this time

- Team members should be cross-functional logisticians (Figure 4).
- Creation of the cross-functional logisticians could follow the 02XX field.

■ Marines should all be second term Marines at the least and be prepared to change career fields permanently with the new MOS.

■ Specific feeder MOSs (center of the 5 rings in Figure 6) could be used to provide the core capability, but the new/added capabilities (outer rings in Figure 6) would be obtained from a year plus in resident schools after acceptance to the program.

■ Contract for this MOS program could be anywhere from six-eight years after further evaluation by Manpower to determine the time required to obtain value from the Marine after the training time and cost incurred.

■ Incentive pay could be added for the MOS designator reflecting the abnormally high skillsets obtained by the individual as well as jump pay once jump qualified.

■ In order to obtain a career path for the Marines while in their “OpFor” tours they could rotate between MARSOC and III MEF where their cross-functional capabilities could be just as useful.

■ Teams are primarily enlisted and more senior in rank and age (Figure 7).

■ Teams are expected to be able to function autonomously in support of the EABs.

o Wheeled Operators & Food Service are carried across the team so the task could be rotated amongst all team members.

o Other skills are doubled up for added capacity within the team when executing their EAB support missions.

o Some skills, such as field ordering officer will require an exception or change to policy regarding separation of function (field ordering officer to carry the SF44, disburser to



Figure 6. Visual composition of skillsets for cross-functional logisticians. The center is the core skillset while the outer rings show added skillsets obtained once selected to the program and training is complete. Skillsets shown need to be adjusted as Pacific Plans planning matures and support missions are more clearly defined. (Figured provided by author.)

carry the money, and contracting officer to carry the warrant) as we currently have in order to make the individual truly useful by themselves.

o Food Service school must expand or change to include instruction on how to kill an animal, butcher, and prepare animals for human consumption in order to make the teams proficient in scavenging from the local environment if needed. It is unrealistic to expect the teams to sustain themselves off the local economy, only eating fully prepared food.

o Most of the schools must shift from teaching how to fix or drive a specific military vehicle into a school that teaches how to fix common mechanical and electronic systems found in most vehicles. Learning how to fix an MTVR may not prepare the Marine for fixing a bongo truck, and in an EABO environment, the bongo truck may be more useful.

o Figure 7 provides a visual representation of a notional EAB Support Co.

o Colors in Figure 7 correspond to the colors used in Figure 6.

- Intermediate Supply Company
 - o The IS Co would have NALCO-MIS, R-Supply, and SABRS-N (See Figure 8).

o Supply inventory in the IS Co can be finely tuned by the regiment/group commanding officer's desire, the equipment set organic to their regiment/group and oversight recommendations by the MSC or MEF (or FMF TYCOM if it becomes a reality).

o Holds the only requisition capable Supply DODAACs within the regiment/group.

o IS Co creates the supply requisitions for items “not on the shelf.”

o Financial obligation would be created out of the IS Co.

o Requisitions from line battalions would be sent to IS Co for fulfillment.

o Asset accountability would be resident at the IS Co.

■ “CMRs” for equipment used by the line battalions would be rolled up at the IS Co for regimental/group level management, reporting, and oversight.

o IS Co would be led by a Major with CWO/Captain and GySgt/MSgt billets running the sections allowing career growth from the Line Bn level where the 2nd Lt/1st Lt and Sgt/SSgt billets reside.

o IS Co is responsible for the supply and sustainment of units within the regiment/group.




Figure 7. Visual Representation of a cross-functional logistician teams with size, rank, and skillsets shown. Colors of each individual represent the same colors used in Figure 6. (Figure provided by author.)

- IS Co has lateral support from IS Cos at other regiments/groups within III MEF (Figure 4).
- IS Co has higher level support from the FLC/NAVSUP wholesale level across the INDOPACOM AO (Figure 4).
- DODAACs are subject to FSMAO inspections for the regiment/group.
- Intermediate Maintenance Company
 - The IM Co would have Optimized-NALCOMIS (O-NALCOMIS) and O-IMA to induct equipment for intermediate maintenance (See Figure 8).
 - IM Co is responsible for all intermediate maintenance for the regiment/group.
 - IM Co holds the intermediate maintenance records for the regiment/group. Responsible for all readiness reporting for regiment/group equipment.
 - Communicates with the FMF TYCOM to manage equipment service-life and/or upgrades and new fielding of equipment resident within the regiment/group. Tools/Sets/Chests and MOS composition is specific to the equipment resident within the regiment/group.

- This very likely will lead to an

... the MLR Commander has the ability to adjust the rheostat of support to their different units ...

increased requirement in overall tools/sets/chests and maintainers for the Service.

- Maintenance records are subject to FSMAO inspections for the regiment/group

Regimental Headquarters

For Division regiments, this would support the *Commandants Planning Guidance* shift towards MLRs being the primary units of employment within the FMF. With an organic Support Bn carrying out the EAB support missions, all intermediate supply activity (ISA) responsibilities and intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) responsibilities for the Regiment, the MLR Commander has the ability to adjust the rheostat of support to their different units based on the MLRs primary effort at any specific time. This allows the allocation of resources to be focused on the proper units at the proper time based on regimental priorities. This structure and relationship should assist the regimental commander with attaining and maintaining unity of command across a large distributed geographical area in a contested environment.

For MLG Regiments, CLR-3 and 35 would be divested in name. CLR-3 would become the CLR HQ for LSB,

Navy Maint./Supply/Fiscal System Access Levels			
	Maint.	Supply	Fiscal
Wholesale/ Depot FLCs / DLA / LOGCOM	X GCS-MC@ LOGCOM	X	X SABRES-N @ FMFTYCOM
Retail/ Intermediate Support Bns/ MALS	X O-NALCOMIS/ O-IMA	X R-Supply ARP / PUK	X SABRES-N/ SABRES
Using Unit/ Org Maint Line Bns / Line Squadrons	X O-OMA		

Figure 8. Visual illustration of the levels of command and the associated Navy maintenance, supply, and fiscal systems that would be used by III MEF with the adoption of the Support Bn design and the use of Navy maintenance, supply, and fiscal systems. The disconnect that needs further study in this figure is how to integrate LogCom into NALCOMIS. (Figure provided by author.)

TSB, ESB, and medical battalion and moved up to be a direct reporting MSE to the MEF CE, much like III MIG. CLR-35's O-6 and staff would move up to the wholesale level in the FLC construct with the Supply Bn's Supply Co. CLR-37 would remain to support the MLG CE in its new role or be consumed by the MLG CE if its new role requires greater manpower than the MLG CE currently contains.

MLG CE conversion to FMF TYCOM

MLG would be left with the MLG CE and CLR-37.

Headquarters company CLR-37 should still be retained to provide support to the MLG headquarters, albeit with a new name and function while their "support to the MEF" functions should be moved to CLR-3

The MLG CE should be disbanded and reflagged as the FMF TYCOM situated at the right hand of MARFOR-PAC. With support battalions being organic to III MEF regiments/groups and receiving their direction from their GCE/ACE/MIG O-6 commanders, there is a requirement for the support battalions to be able to reach up to logistics advocates on their behalf. With MLG reflagged as a FMF TYCOM, they would have the responsibility to resource and manage the lifecycle of all FMF unique equipment, advocate on behalf of the support battalions back to NAVSUP, LOGCOM, SYSCOM, and DC, I&L for any issues or concerns they might have and assist with supplies and sustainment coming into and out of INDOPACOM. While this may seem counterintuitive to the MAGTF concept the Marine Corps has put at the center of our culture, this is simply one more step that better aligns us with 7th Fleet and aligns our command roles and responsibilities to better reflect each other.

Converting the MLG into a FMF TYCOM would provide a 1-stop shop for manning, training (logistics and new equipment training), and equipping all III MEF units. While the FMF TYCOM would not be the TYCOM for MALS-12/24/36, it would be the TYCOM for the MIG Support BN, Division Support Battalion, 3rd Mar sup-




Figure 9. Wire diagram of current III MEF Command relationships using GCSS-MC. (Figure provided by author.)




Figure 10. Wire diagram of current III MEF Command relationship using Navy Supply and Maintenance Systems. (Figure provided by author.)

port BN, 4th Mar Support Battalion, MLG Support Battalion, MEU Support Battalion and MALS-18 in Figure 3. This would provide consolidation of new equipment fielding, new equipment training, equipment sustainment funding, personnel training, equipment di-

vestment, inspections, and all the other things Navy TYCOMs are responsible to conduct. In addition, they could function as a gatekeeper to III MEF FMF units as there is almost no chance of a HHQ or supporting establishment command having to interact with III MEF FMF units outside of the purview of the FMF TYCOM's responsibilities. Additionally, this provides a great opportunity to consolidate concerns across III MEF and recognize trends and issues arising from the seven support battalions that would directly interact with the FMF TYCOM.

Conclusion

As the III MEF Supply Officer, my primary billet responsibility is to effectively supply and sustain all III MEF units within INDOPACOM. The ideas presented in this paper reflect a mindset focused on optimizing supply sustain-




Figure 11. Wire diagram of proposed III MEF command relationships and using Navy Supply and Maintenance Systems. (Figure provided by author.)




Figure 12. Visual depiction of IMA and ISA capabilities with color codes identifying GCSS-MC run IMA/ISA sites and Navy Supply and Maintenance run IMA/ISA sites.

Figure 13. Visual depiction of IMA/ISA and gained wholesale FLC sites if using Navy Supply and Maintenance systems. (Figures provided by author.)

ment and maintenance support to III MEF units. The proposed construct supports a distributed force laydown and provides autonomy and flexibility at the O-6 level, which is likely beneficial to the MLR concept for the future. Figures 9 and 10 show the current command relationships using GCSS-MC and the Navy supply and maintenance systems. There is a gap in the reporting of supply and maintenance for units who use Navy supply and maintenance system within III MEF; these are the

flying squadrons. There is no Department, branch, or section within the MEF staff that tracks and advocates for aircraft supply and maintenance. Figure 11 shows the proposed command relationships if the changes presented in this document were executed. The Figure 11 structure also shows how III MEF would gain visibility of supply and maintenance actions across the entire MEF. Figure 11 shows what in essence are pre-MLRs within the Division; they just need to be tweaked and finalized by

force design to complete the transition. Figures 12 and 13 show the differences in supply and maintenance support if the changes presented in this paper were adopted and implemented. In addition to the ISA and IMA capabilities gained and spread across the Western Pacific, most ships within 7th Fleet would serve as an additional ISA and supply support if they were operating in an area where Marines were located. This was shown to be the case in the MALS-36 requisition data where the USS *Kersearge* and the USS *Iwo Jima* both fulfilled supply requisitions from MALS-36.

If we want to be serious about integrating our logistics with 7th Fleet and our Navy partners in the Western Pacific, we need to be bold. All too often ideas proposed are scaled back by bureaucracy and end up equating to shaving the corners off a square peg to try and make it fit into a round hole.

> *Additional support and technical expertise Provided by Maj Dante A. Jones, 6602; III MEF G4 NE Asia Exercise Planner and Mr. Freddie Hatch, USMC (Ret) 667, BAH Supply Analyst to III MEF Supply.*

