The Communist Strategy of Time

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By Dr. Maurice H. Hellner

Communists in Czechoslovakia. Several national scandals had revealed their treacherous methods. A public opinion poll had showed that the popularity of the Communist Party was on the wane. The non-Communist leaders in the coalition government were looking forward to the spring parliamentary elections confident that the Communists would lose a significant percentage of their seats.

By January 1948, however, there was a strange uncertainty in the air. There were signs that the Communists were planning some sort of illegal activity directed toward a take-over before the spring elections. The Communist Minister of the Interior began to remove non-Communists from all important posts in the national police force and to replace them with his own men. Cases of arms were delivered secretly to Communist members of the illegal workers' militia.

As the month of February progressed evidence of Communist designs multiplied. On 17 February the Politburo in Prague called the party to a "state of alertness" and began meeting twice a day. On 20 February Valerian Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, suddenly arrived at the Prague airport without letting even the Czech ministry of Foreign Affairs know of his coming. Commencing the next day, there was an outbreak of terrorism in factories throughout the country. Men lost their jobs for opposing the policies of the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor. Weapons and ammunition were distributed among party members in Prague. Non-Communist officials were arrested. Mass demonstrations were arranged in various cities.

On 24 February the headquarters of all non-Communist parties and newspapers were raided. The national radio was placed completely in the hands of the Communists. When President Benes expressed a desire to speak to the nation on the radio he was denied permission.


Finally, on 25 February, the Communist leaders demanded that President Benes accept a new slate of government ministers, all but one of whom were Communists or fellow travelers. Benes realized full well the implications of this demand, but he also knew that the Communists had the country by the throat. He told one of his close associates that as far as the West was concerned "no one will help us." With aching heart, he gave in to the Communist demands.

That day the Iron Curtain clanged down on Czechoslovakia.

Soviets Strike With Their Party

Had the Soviets waited until after the spring elections in Czechoslovakia the instruments of power would almost certainly have been in the hands of the democratic forces. Under such conditions it would have taken nothing less than the active intervention of the Red Army to gain control of the country. An invasion by the Red Army would have run serious risk of wider hostilities in Europe—a risk the Kremlin was unwilling to take in 1948. Hence, the Soviets struck quickly with their party and underground forces while it was still possible to conquer Czechoslovakia by non-military means.

This is but one example of the manner in which the



Sovfoto

Since before the end of WWII the author points out, Soviet leaders have triggered their international power plays at times precisely calculated to achieve their objectives—and place the West at maximum disadvantage. Only by using similar strategy, he says, can we hope to defeat the Red design


Soviets employ the "strategy of time" in their drive for world domination. When we analyze Soviet actions during the past two decades we find that the Kremlin counts heavily on a keen sense of timing. It is strange, therefore, that this facet of Soviet activity has received relatively little attention in western countries.

Importance of Timing

Before we look at the manner in which Soviet leaders employ time as a weapon we might look for a moment at the importance of timing in general. Success in anything we attempt in life depends to a great extent upon proper timing. The great hitters of baseball—the Ted Williams and the Mickey Mantles—are rightly given credit for perfect timing and coordination. Professional boxers spend endless hours in training to develop their timing. Those who play the stock market are acutely aware that there is a proper time to buy and a proper time to sell.

Similarly, the successful statesmen of history have been the political leaders who were able to discern when the time was ripe for certain types of actions. They have known as if by instinct that certain courses of action would be doomed to failure at one point in history, but possible of achievement at another point. Thus, President Monroe was able to make his famous "Doctrine" stick, not because of the inherent power of the United States in 1823, but rather because of the fortuitous timing of the announcement.

Certainly those who follow the profession of arms should be aware of the importance of proper timing.



Lebanon, where this Marine is readying himself for action, is an example of what good timing can do for US and her allies. Another prime example: Jordan in 1957 when timely action saved King Hussein

This concept lies behind almost everything that is done in a military operation. Again and again, the matter of timing has spelled the difference between triumph and disaster on the field of battle.

In war there is a vast difference between being first or second in the race against time to develop new weapons. What if the Soviets had been the first to produce the atomic bomb? The entire course of events during the past 15 years would undoubtedly have been quite different.

Many of our popular military concepts are directly related to the significance of time. The famous saying "too little and too late" implies poor timing. The concept of surprise attack involves striking at a time when the enemy is not expecting an attack. The term "preventive war" means hitting one's enemy before he has time to build up superior forces. The idea of "buying time" implies granting concessions in order to postpone the day of reckoning until one can build up his own strength. The expressive American slang phrase, "getting there fustest with the mostest," describes in a unique way the importance of timing.

They Time it Right

The primary reason for maintaining an intelligence organization is to obtain knowledge of an enemy's capabilities and intentions in time to permit the commander of one's own forces to take the necessary actions before the battle is joined. The heart of the problem

of military production is the decision as to when to start production of long lead-time items. Thus, the concept of timing permeates almost all of our military thinking.

Turning to the Soviets, we find that the men in the Kremlin are deeply conscious of the importance of timing in international affairs. They always think and plan in terms of time. They know that the context in which an action is taken influences the results obtained as much as the action itself. They appreciate the fact that the same action taken on two different days can have widely different results.

Soviet leaders have developed the strategy of time to a fine art. They make time work in their own behalf and against their opponents. They use it as a weapon in the power struggle. Like a skillful boxer, they try to keep the West off balance through clever timing.

This does not mean that Soviet leaders have a set time-table. In fact, it generally means just the opposite. The strategy of time consists of timing one's actions so as to take maximum advantage of the situation one faces.

It was no accident that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan just one week before the Japanese surrendered in WWII. The men in the Kremlin had ample proof that the Japanese government was about to "throw in the towel." Japanese diplomats had been sent to Moscow requesting the Soviet government to arrange an end to the war in the Pacific. The Soviets

The Soviets raced against time—and US—to be first in space. They won with Sputnik I. And it was no accident that Lunik moon shot took place just a few days before Khrushchev arrived in DC to talk peace

could have served as intermediaries to terminate the fighting. Instead they chose to enter the war in order to share in the fruits of victory at virtually no cost to themselves.

It was no accident that the final Soviet attack on Warsaw in 1944 was delayed for over two months at the very gates of the city. As the Red Army reached the outskirts of the city, Moscow Radio sent out its appeal: "People of Warsaw, to arms!" The people of Warsaw did spring to arms and fought bravely against the Germans, gaining control of over half the city at times. The Red Army, however, sat on its hands just across the Vistula and gave absolutely no support to the people of Warsaw. Not until the Poles were crushed by the Germans after 63 days of heroic fighting did the Red Army try to enter Warsaw. The reason for this unconscionable delay is clear. The Soviets wanted to ensure that the anti-Communist Polish partisans inside Warsaw would be obliterated by the German garrison prior to the fall of the city. In that way the Kremlin could have a free hand to install its own puppets in power in the new Polish government.

It was no accident that the Soviets were able to place their *Sputnik* in orbit before the US could successfully launch its first earth satellite. The Kremlin spared no effort or expense on this project because it appreciated the tremendous political advantages of being first into space. In one bold stroke it persuaded millions of people throughout the world that the USSR had surpassed the US in science and technology.

It was no accident that the Soviets launched their Lunik shot to impact on the moon just a few days before Khrushchev arrived in Washington on his first visit to the US. The boasts which Khrushchev made at Andrews Field on his arrival are ample evidence that this was a carefully timed affair.

One of the reasons for tight security restrictions in



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the USSR is to enable the Kremlin to time its disclosures of scientific achievements so as to gain maximum propaganda advantage. An open society such as ours cannot do this. Our scientific achievements become known as soon as they are made without reference to the world situation at the time.

The concept of timing lies at the very heart of Soviet strategy for world domination. The Soviets know we are living in a revolutionary age. Throughout the world millions of people are not satisfied with their economic and political status. They are obsessed with the desire for change. The men in the Kremlin consider this widespread desire for change as the Archimedian point on which they hope to place their lever to move the world.

Communist Hand in Congo

In short, the Soviets believe that the time is ripe for the spread of their system. They are thus quick to exploit revolutionary situations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Their hope is to be able to direct the course of change to their own ends.

One of the means by which the Soviets try to implement this strategy is to attempt in every way possible to secure the independence of dependent peoples before they are ready for self-government. The Kremlin believes that if this can be done the Communists in those areas will have a good chance to come out on top in the ensuing chaos.

It is worthy of note that the Kremlin has paid relatively little attention to the new state of Nigeria in spite of the fact that it is the most populous country in Africa. The reason seems to be that the Nigerians were carefully groomed for self-government and were capable of achieving an orderly state of affairs when independence day arrived.

In contrast, the Communists have paid a great deal of attention to the Congo because they realized early that the Congolese people were by no means ready to run their own affairs. For months before independence day the Czech consul in Leopoldville invited various Congolese leaders to secret weekly luncheons at his residence. The rapidity with which the Soviets began to move into the Congo just before and after independence day indicates they were literally jumping at an opportunity.

The Krenlin today is counting on capturing various independence movements around the world. It knows that Communist chances are infinitely greater in those areas where the people are not yet ready to run their own affairs. This thought lies behind Khrushchev's demand at the UN General Assembly in September 1960 that complete independence be granted immediately to all colonial countries, trust territories, and other non-

self-governing areas. In making this demand, Khrushchev was employing the strategy of time in a grand manner.

It is also Soviet strategy in the underdeveloped areas of the world to attempt in every way possible to deny these countries the time they need to work out their problems. In this way the Kremlin hopes to create enough dissatisfaction to make such countries receptive to the drastic methods of Communism.

When we look at the underdeveloped areas of the world we find that every one of them has severe economic, political, and social problems. In each of them poverty, illiteracy, and disease assume discouraging proportions. All are suffering from an acute shortage of native personnel who have the proper training and experience for higher positions in the civil service and armed forces—for mayors, judges and police chiefs, and for lawyers, doctors, engineers, and business administrators.

These deficiencies are an accumulation of centuries and can't be corrected overnight. It takes years to construct schools, train sufficient teachers to staff them, and produce large numbers of well-educated people. It takes years to restore fertility to soil which has been depleted by centuries of improper use. It takes years to build the roads, railroads, harbors, power plants, and irrigation projects needed to raise the standard of living of the people in these areas. From this it is clear that the underdeveloped areas of the world need more than technical and economic assistance. They need time in which to work out their problems. It is this time which the Kremlin is attempting to deny them.

The Communists in these countries seek to build up false hopes for a dramatic rise in the standard of living. They lead the people to believe that construction work on new schools, new roads, new factories, new hospitals, and new houses ought to start the morning after the independence ceremonies. When the people find that this doesn't happen, the Communists tell them that the fault lies in their economic and political system. They drum it into the people that the only way to achieve rapid economic progress is to adopt the Communist system.

Contest Shifts from Military

Along with attempts to build up false hopes in the minds of the people, the Communists seek in any way they can to block economic progress by creating almost continuous crises in these countries. They foment one strike after another. They sabotage industrial projects. They do their best to create an unfavorable climate for the attraction of western investment.

It is widely believed today that in the Cold War the contest is shifting from the military to the economic. Those who hold this view assert that if we step up our economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries we can thereby reduce our military posture and our military assistance programs. This is a dangerous fallacy.

The newly emerging nations certainly require economic assistance to develop their human and natural resources. But they also need assurance of a peaceful climate in which to develop these resources. This is

precisely what the Kremlin is attempting to deny them. The Communist strategy is to keep these countries in such constant turmoil that they will never be able to gain impressive results from their economic programs.

Economic aid is therefore not a substitute for military strength. We need both if we are to successfully combat Communist influence in the backward areas of the world.

We must bear in mind that it took both economic assistance and military aid to save Greece in 1946 and 1947. It took both the Marshall Plan and NATO to preserve Western Europe in the early postwar years.

Admiral Mahan pointed out many years ago that the purpose of our military power is to provide time for moral ideas to take root. Of all the things we can give the underdeveloped countries today, the most important is time in which the democratic forces can gain strength and in which the economic assistance programs can develop. Unless we can give them this, nothing else we do will matter very much.

Victory in Jordan

In those instances when we have appreciated the importance of proper timing we have been able to block Communist designs. Our experience in Jordan in 1957 is a dramatic example of this.

In the spring of 1957 a serious crisis was brewing in Jordan. There was danger not only that Jordan might be lost to the Free World, but that it might disintegrate altogether and start a scramble for territory which could easily touch off wider hostilities in the Middle East.

The pro-Soviet Premier, Nabulsi, had taken office in the fall of 1956. With his ascension to power came a rapid growth of pro-Communist influence in the Jordanian civil service and in the armed forces. When King Hussein ordered Nabulsi to clamp down on Communist activity he refused. Instead, Nabulsi denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine. He stated that Jordan intended to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, would accept Soviet aid if offered, and would refuse American aid as incompatible with the country's independence.

During the early months of 1957 King Hussein became severely worried over the trend of events. He issued a personal warning to his nation against the dangers of Communism. On 10 April 1957 he dismissed Nabulsi as Premier. In mid-April, Bedouin troops loyal to King Hussein beat off an attempted military coup and forced the leftist Chief of Staff, General Nuwar, to depart in haste for Syria.

The issue remained in doubt, however. With Syrian and Egyptian encouragement, Nabulsi was preparing to arouse the mob against King Hussein. Early on the morning of 24 April well-organized mobs poured through the streets of the capital city of Amman, hurling stones and screaming curses of "American imperialism." Arab Legionnaires and the local police were barely able to contain the mobs and restore order.

That evening a calm prevailed in Amman as in the eye of a hurricane. Everyone waited tensely to see what would happen next. Then came the sensational news that the US Sixth Fleet and 1,800 Marines had suddenly been ordered to the eastern Mediterranean. Pres-

ident Eisenhower issued a statement to the press that he regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital.

Thus reinforced, King Hussein moved rapidly to assert his power. A new cabinet of unquestioned loyalty to the King was formed. Hussein set to work to weed out subversive influences. The Communists were put to rout. The flames of freedom which had flickered so low in Jordan began to burn brighter again.

In the kind of a world in which we live today it will be increasingly necessary for the US to make calculated and timely displays of force such as was made in Jordan, and, more recently, in Lebanon and Guatemala. There has probably never been a period in our history when the ability to project our military forces rapidly to the far corners of the world was so important as it is today. The anti-Communist leaders in the underdeveloped areas of the world need assurance that should they require help to re-establish order, such help is available and can get there fast.

Some have asserted that the answer to this problem is a UN police force such as has been used in the Middle East and the Congo. Certainly the UN has a significant role to play in this regard. Experience has demonstrated, however, that the UN can only be effective in combating disorder if the Kremlin is convinced that should it begin to send in forces on its own, the US will move fast and in greater strength.

Economic and technical assistance are of vital importance to the future of the underdeveloped countries of the world. But in rendering this assistance we must constantly bear in mind that difficult programs of economic reform designed to modernize agriculture, develop new industries, and raise standards of living require lengthy periods of law and order. Hence, the ability to project our military power to the emerging areas of the world is of transcendent importance today. Only in that way can we provide these areas with time—and in the struggle against Communism time is of the essence.

-A Modern Fable-

The Bears and the Eagles

By Capt R. C. Schulze

NCE upon a time a large apartment house burned to the ground. A little boy was the only survivor. It was reported that the fire had been caused by a carelessly thrown match. After he had recovered from severe burns, the boy was questioned at length by investigators. He readily told this story:

His family had lived on the top floor of the apartment house. Most of the tenants had many children, who eventually formed clubs. The two largest groups lived on the bottom and top floors and called themselves "The Bears" and "The Eagles," respectively. They became rather evenly matched and eventually their competition centered on a struggle for new members from middle floor families.

The Bears were adept at sneaking about. They stayed out after bedtime, and appealed to middle floor boys by such daring. They preached revolt against parental authority, and predicted that one day they would control the whole building. They advised their middle floor listeners that they would suffer if they did not join the Bears.

To combat this approach the Eagles attempted to strike back, although they were more restricted by their parents and busy with television and toys. They did, however, have extra money from their allowances to buy candy for the middle floor boys.

The Bears made gains and succeeded in dividing the children of several families. Tempers in the two groups became frayed though warfare between them was limited to pushing, shoving, and name calling. Both clubs had massive arsenals of slingshots, stink bombs, and baseball bats. Some enterprising Eagle had even concotted a "book match bomb," which temporarily unhinged the Bears. They soon recruited a junior chemist of

their own, however, and accumulated a pile of their own bombs.

The trend against the Eagles, continued until they became irritable and noticably short tempered. Their jelly beans and licorice sticks seemed to do little good; now even their match book threat was nullified.

One Eagle finally suggested that if they could only see the Bears whenever they sneaked around at night on the middle floors, maybe they could stop them. He advocated using some of their little "match book bombs" to burn holes in the floor over certain dark passageways and stair wells the Bears were known to use. A long argument ensued. Some of the Eagles maintained that such a plan was folly.

They asked for more faith in their individual abilities. Had not, they asked, a good record in past skirmishes, and even though outnumbered, they had some mightly good bat swingers. They concluded heatedly that they had more to offer the middle floor kids than candy, and felt that the Eagles should stick with water bags and bats and work a little harder.

The little boy who survived the fire lost faith in such face to face approches. That night after he had gone to bed he heard a noise in the hallway beneath him. He became afraid. He pulled a small match bomb out of his toy chest and lighted it to burn a peep-hole in the floor to see if the Bears were downstairs in the darkness.

He told the investigators that he never did see who was in the hall, but he heard a lot of screaming so he guessed they were "Bears" all right. Later the firemen found remains of other "match book bombs" that had been on almost every floor of the gutted building, but it was impossible to tell when, or even if, they had been set off by someone.